Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society
Author(s): John Bushnell
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Social History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 565-576
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3787433 .
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PEASANTSIN UNIFORM:
THETSARISTARMYAS A PEASANTSOCIETY
A colonel in the Tsarist army by the name of A. Rittikh wrote in 1893 that
service in the army turned ignorant peasants into civilized human beings. The
peasant conscript's military career began "with a bath and a haircut," then
proceded to "cleanliness and neatness in dress." At the same time, conscripts
were "taught to speak look, turn and move with military precision." They
learned new words and concepts. In sum, "the wholly rough-hewn and rude
[peasantconscript]receives, in the broad sense of the word, a human finish.''l
This has a familiarring. What Col. Rittikhthought of as the civilizingprocesswe
have latelycalledmodernization and it has been arguedthat service in the armed
forces is one of the routes through which peasantsin underdevelopedcountries
are modernized.To takejust one example, Lernerand Robinson have observed
that the Turkisharmy performeda modernizingfunction in the 1950's because
for the armyto absorblargequantitiesof sophisticatedweaponryTurkishsoldiers
had to be educated in its use and maintenance.An importantbyproductof this
militaryschooling was that Turkish soldiers "acquirednew habits of dress, of
cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most profound sense they acquired a new
personality." The army became "a major agency of social change precisely
because it spread . . . a new sense of identity-and new skills and concepts as
well as new machines Young Turks from isolated villages now suddenly felt
themselves to be partof the largersociety.'s2
It might be conceived that the Tsaristarmyplayeda similarmodernizingrole in
the late l9th and early 20th centuries. Following its defeat in the CrimeanWar,
the Russian army under the leadership of Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin
embarkedon an ambitiousprogramof reforms.One of Miliutin'smany goals was
to upgradethe army's weaponry,but because the change in weaponstechnology
was undramatic by mid-20th century standards, the starting point for a
modernizationprocesscannot be locatedhere. On the other hand, we might look
for a similarrippleeffect from the implementationof Miliutin'sprincipalgoal, the
capstone of his reforms:the conversion of the Tsaristarmy from long-term (25
years) to short-term service (6 years as of 1874, reduced to 3 by 1906). One
immediate consequence of reducing the conscript's term of service was that
military training had to be greatly compressed: the leisurely development of
militaryskills possible in the pre-reformarmy had to give way to more intensive
instruction.To this end, Miliutin introducedcompulsoryschooling in the 3 Rs
for all conscripts, and for a time the Tsarist army became the single most
importantsource of literacyfor Russian peasants (25-30 percent of all males of
draftage went into the armyin the last quarterof the 19th century).3
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566
journalof socialhistory
Since the intended efTectof al} of the many militaryreforms introducedby
Miliutin was to make the Tsaristarmy a more modern and more professionally
competent institutionSit is reasonableto ask how these reformsafTectedpeasant
conscripts.Was the Tsaristarmya modernizinginstitutionwdid it instill the habits
of disciplineand regularitysa sense of abstractorder, an openness to changesan
orientation toward the future and all those other traits we associate with
modernity?Was service in the armyat the least a qualitativelynew experiencefor
peasants, bringingthem-even if againsttheir will-into contactwith a world
beyondtheirvillages?
It must be noted at the outset that afterMiliutin'sretirementin 1881 the army
high command lost interest in educatingsoldiers, and many officers shared the
feeling of their new chief, Vannovskii, that education was positively harmful.
Junior officers who continued to think of themselves as educatorswere suspect
and were occasionally ordered to cease teaching the rudiments of literacy to
conscripts.While some peasants who came into the army with a semblance of
literacy-reading newspapersratherthan smoking them, as the saying wentdid receive further instruction if they were chosen to be NCO's, the mass of
peasantsoldiersleft the armyno more literatethan they hadenteredit 4
FIowever,the lack of a programof formal education need not mean that the
army failed to impart modern attitudes.The civilizing experience describedby
Col. Rittikhcould proceedwhetheror not soldierscould readand write,and many
officerssharedCol. Rittikh'sperceptionthatmilitaryservicein and of itself was an
educational experience.5 At any ratez service in the army, with its formal
hierarchy, its abstract rules and complex patterns of behaviors seems at first
glance a world away from life in the village and might be presumed to have
underminedthe traditionalmentalityof peasantsoldiers.Furthermore,in the late
19th century Dragornirov'spreceptson trainingwere gospel: soldiers were not
simply to be drilled they were to be made to internalizemilitarydiscipline, to
think about and understandthe rationalebehind the militarysystem.6We might
add that it was precisely in this period-from the 1880's on-that the army
became a predominantlyurban institution. While before, many regiments had
been scatteredabout the countrysideand soldiersquarteredin peasanthuts, units
were now concentratedin the cities and housed in proper barracks.7Military
society thus became more self-contained, while what extra-militaryexperience
soldiershadwas now urbanratherthanrural.
The case for modernizationby way of militaryservice can be taken one step
farther:the conscript'sinitialexperiencein the armywas utterlyunlike anything
he had ever known. During the first four months of service the conscriptwas
immersed in an intensive process of military socialization.It was during this
period that the soldier was taught, none too gentlynto i'speaknlook, turn and
move with militaryprecision,'5that he memorizedthe intricategrammarof the
militaryhierarchy,and that he was catechizedon the duties of a soldier and the
militaryvirtues. It was in this period, too, that soldiers were introducedto the
complete spectrum of the Tsarist army's vices-beatings, extortion by noncoms, outright theft, and so on. Naturallyenough, this was for the conscripta
time of extreme disorientation7depression and homesickness, he frequentlx
wastedawaybodily,and occasionallymaimedhimself for the sake of a discharge.
The severityof the psychologica}stress was proportionateto the abruptnessof the
transitionfrom village to barracks.The conscriptwas well on the way to being
modernized,or at least uprooted.
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PEASANTSIN UNIFORM
567
At that point, however, the modernizingprocess-if that is what it wasended; of his initial militaryexperience only the vices carriedover in any mayor
way to the remainder of the soldierss term of service. The case for sociopsychologicalmodernizationbreaks down as soon as it becomes clearjust how
unmilitarylife in the Tsaristarmywas. The soldier'sduties, his byt,were functions
of the economic rather than the properlymilitarylife of his unit. In fact, the
Russian regiment's economic functions left little room for martialmatters.Not
only did the regimentcook its own food and bake its own bread;where possible it
grew its own fruit and vegetables and even kept some cattle. The regiment
producedits own uniformsand boots. (As of 1907, 150,000 soldiers-12 percent
their duty hours tailoring.) All regiments
of all enlisted personnel-spent
producedor otherwiseprovidedfor themselves-at no cost to the governmentblankets,coats, valenki,utensils and other militaryaccoutrement.Everyregiment
maintaineda productioncomplex-masterskie-staffed by soldierspermanently
detailedto providefor its economicneeds. However,soldiersfrom line companies
as well did duty as tailors, cobblers, carpenters,carters, cooks, and gardeners.
They also served as stable hands, singers, musicians,churchattendants,batmen
and lackeys in the officers' club. (If this incomplete list calls to mind the
organizationof a largeestate before the emancipation,it should.) Duringthe 8 or
9 months a regiment spent in its barracks,40 or more of the 100-odd men in a
company were performingthese unsoldierly duties. Since most other soldiers
were on guardduty or servingas duty orderlies,the total numberof men free for
the trainingthat was called for in the regulationswas low. One estimate put it at 1
or 2, rarelyas manyas 10. This figureis surelytoo low, butjust as surely, afterthe
first four months of intensive training,roughlyhalf the strengthof the company
on any given day were on details that were in no way military,while most of the
rest were simply standing guard. What militarytraininga soldier received was
episodic, and it is not difElcultto believe a reportthat a Russian soldier's military
skillsdeterioratedthe longerhe was in the army.9
The unsoldierlylife of the Tsaristsoldierwas due above all to the fact that, once
providedwith some workingcapitalby the commissariat,regimentswere expected
to be economicallyself-sufficient.However, the commissariatwas stingy, and the
regiment'scapitalwas insufficientto providefor its needs. The only resourcethe
regimenthad in excess was labor, so in orderto make good the deficit in material
soldierswere dispatchedto earn money in the civilianeconomy, a practiceknown
as " vol'nyeraboW."GeneralDragomirovobservedthat
In July enlisted personnelfan out in hay-mowing,in forests, along railwaylines, in town for
building;they sew clothing; they acquirean external aspect entirely unsuitaMe[for military
service],theybecomeunaccustomedto disciplineandlose theirmilitarybearing.
The soldiers' migratorylaborwas so obviously detrimentalto the army'smilitary
mission that there was frequent discussion of ending the practice.Yet as one
officer noted, his men needed blankets, the blanketshad to be paid for, and the
only recourse was to collect the money soldiers earned at their civilian work.
Vol'nyerabotwere builtinto the militaryeconomy.
If the money earnedthroughmigratorylaborbalancedthe regimentalbudget, it
did not entirely balance the individualsoldier's budget. Prior to 1906, soldiers
were requiredto providetheir own soap, spoons, boot brushesand polish, oil and
rags for cleaningrifles, bed linen, shirts, in many instancesblankets,and on and
on. Equipmentthat wasissued to the soldierswas so inadequatethat considerable
expense was involved in keeping it up to specifications.Army-issue boots, for
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journalof socialhistory
568
instance, were of such poor qualitythat they lasted no more than three months.
Soldiershad either to purchasetheir own or payfor repairs-and repairs,even if
performedby the companycobbler, could easily cost the soldier as much as four
before 1906 soldiers were paid only 2r. 70k. a year. The
rubles a year-yet
soldier's minimummonthlybudgetrangedanywherefrom 90k. to lr. 74k. a year.
However calculatedsit far exceeded his monthly pay of 22l/zk.(raised to 50k. per
month as of January1906).12Soldierswere allowedto keep for themselves some
of the money from their vol'nyerabott roughlyhalf the soldiers received money
from home; and in addition soldiers sold part of their daily bread ration to
civilians, this providing up to 30 extra kopeks per month.l3 In any event, in
addition to the regiment's involvement in the civilian economy, soldiers as
individualswerealso peripheralparticipantsin the market.
It should be evident by now that as an economic entity the Tsarist regiment
functioned in a way quite familiar to the peasant soldier. Like the peasant
household and village, the Tsarist regiment aspiredto self-sufficiency,but was
bound up in a largermarketsystem. Individualsoldierssold whatsurplusthey had
in order to cover the expense of maintainingtheir militaryhousehold. But since
the regiments marketablesurpluswas meager soldiersjoined the migratorylabor
force and sent theirearnings"home."
The similarity between the peasant and military economy extended to the
seasonality of the military-economic cycle. Units set off for their summer
encampmentsin early May. Field exercises-the most exhausting part of the
yearlycycle-were over by the end of Julyor earlyAugust. At thatpoint, soldiers
who had completed their term were dischargedfrom service, others were given
home leave, and most of the rest went off in searchof civilianwork.The regiment
withered from 1800 to roughly 300 men, with no more than 20 present in a
company. Military duties were supposed to resume in mid-October,but with
soldiers off doing one thing or another no start could be made until midNovember-at which point end-of-the-yearholidays intervened.What training
there was during the winter was confined to the four months between the new
year and the onset of field exercises-but as we have seen, trainin8was hardly
regular even then.14 Not only was militarylife as cyclical as peasant lifer the
modulationsof the two cycleswere virtuallyidentical.
Relations between offlcers and mens too, were congruent with the peasant
experience.It was not just that ofElcersthought of their men as the rude peasants
they had been prior to service though this was an importantelement of the
overall pattern.Denikin remarkedin 1903 that ofElcersjust could not conceive of
their soldiers as fellow men.ls This attitude came through most clearly in the
distinctionofElcersdrewbetweenordinaryconscriptsand the educatedvolunteers:
strikinga simple soldierwas a matterof course, but it was unthinkableto strikea
volunteer who came from a social world much like the ofElcerssown and might
actuallyfile charges.The simple soldier was quite awareof his inferiorstandings
which was entirely independent of his subordinate position in the military
hierarchy.That he could be beaten was as naturalto him as it was to his officer.
Soldiersdrew the line only at offlcersfrom other companies-their own ofElcers
could strike thems but the barinfrom another companywho did so was violating
the socialproprieties.16
These attitudeswere of course reminiscentof the master-serfrelationship,but
they were rooted more in the socio-economicrealityof the unit than in tradition.
The structureof which such attitudeswere a partwas most exposed to view in the
vol'nyerabot. GeneralDragomirovcommentedthat
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PEASANTSIN UNIFORM
569
so-called 'icivilian work" is in essence forced laborswith overtones of serfdom.
hired out his own peasants,now the militarycommander
Formerlythe pomeshchik
does the same . . . Such an applicationof authoritysometiWesleadsto an individuat
who does not wantto do civilianworkbeingcourtmartialed.
Another ofElceradded that not only did vol'nye raboW"accustom the commander
to view his men as serfs, from this it is not far to the use of soldiers as free
labor.''l8 And indeed, officers employed their men not only to sustain the unit,
but also for personal labor and other services. The attitude of ofElcers toward the
regimental shops was frankly proprietary: outfitting an apartment with new table,
desk and curtains was as simple as issuing an order. Setting soldiers to
constructing comfortable summer cottages at the regimental camp was just as
easy. In Saratov in the early 20th century, one enterprising regimental
commander ran a funeral procession business, employing in this enterprise the
men and horses of his unit. Less imaginative officers merely used their men as
household labor.19
Like peasants, soldiers were at the mercy of the strong of the world, and the
world was one in which formal regulations against striking soldiers or exploiting
irrelevant.
regulations of any kind-were
them for economic gain-formal
Custom alone counted, and Tsarist military custom was weighted heavily against
the soldier. Yet the soldier's peasant persona was more deeply rooted in military
society than that. Even where regimental custom conformed to military
regulations, the ordinary functioning of the unit recalled for the soldier the
familiar peasant world. The ofElcerwas not just the soldier's military superior, he
was simultaneously master of the unit's economy. If nothing else, this was a
necessity-for
situation ripe for abuse. There was ample opportunity-indeed,
ofElcers to divert money intended for provisioning soldiers to other needs of the
unit, or to their own pockets. (To the soldier, of course, it made no difference
whether money meant to purchase their food was gambled away by the company
commander or was spent repairing barracks.) Furthermore, whether or not
officers were in fact "stealing" from their men, they could be doing so, and it was
the ofElcers' economic functions
impossible for soldiers to complain-because
were vested in their authority as military superiors. This may seem a minor point.
But if officers had had primarily military functions, if they had not controlled the
finances for feeding and clothing their mens if they had not allocated their men to
production duties, they would not automatically have been perceived to be living
at the expense of the soldiers. (As one contemporary observer put it delicately,
the fact that the officer's military and economic functions were indivisible
undermined his moral authority.) As things stood, there was nothing more
natural than for soldiers to view their ofElcers as economic drones, or at least as
competitors for scarce goods.20 Certainly, of}lcers alone were not responsible for
the military economy was in fact one of scarcity. Yet the sociothis situation-in
economic pattern that derived from the army's scarcity economy could only
reinforce the prototypically peasant "image of limited good." Given the economic
reality of peasant (and military) life, one man's gain was indeed another's loss.
While this image was obviously congruent with the distribution of material goods
the distribution of psychic goods.21
the peasant's view-for
it also held-in
Since the image of limited good was fundamental to the peasant way of looking at
the world and was reinforced by life in the army, it is scarcely credible that military
service could have done much to reshape the peasant mentality.
Officers, then, employed their peasant soldiers to maintain the regimental
estate and to benefit themselves, and if they did not, no matter-soldiers
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journal of social history
suspected them of doing so. To complete the picture of the army as a peasant
society, it remainsonly to consider the officer's role as outsider, a role that was,
again, built into the daily routine of militarylife. The fact is that officers,junior
ofElcersincluded, spent very little time with their men. Much of their time was
given over either to managementand relatedpaperwork,or to verificationof the
managementof other officers.Officerssat on countlesscommissionsthatchecked
the books of the various economic subunits, revolving funds and permanent
capitalthat made up the regimentaleconomy. OSlcers were rated more for their
proficiencyas economic managersthan for their ability to trainand lead menwhich, given the predominanceof the regiment'seconomic functions, was logical
enough. Little wonder, thens that the road to success lay through the company
and regimentaloff1ces.It was there that junior off1cerscame to the attention of
their superiors,it was there that they could performservices genuinely useful to
the regiment and its commander and could hope to reap a suitable reward.
Whether or not their formalduties called for them to be in the offices that was
where they congregatedat every opportunity.It was anyhowboringto spend time
with soldiers, much more interestingto be involved in the social life centeredon
the ofElces.Little wonder, again, that a companycommander'scontact with his
men was ordinarilylimited to a cursorylook-through(and that not every day), or
that lieutenants-when forcedinto the barracksagainsttheirwill-idled on the
sidelines, smoking, gossipingand tellingjokes.22Lackof contactbetween officers
and men was certainlydetrimentalto training,but then a regiment's economic
functions had priority.Since the economic life of the unit was routine only
routinedispositionshad to be made.
If officers were distant, periodicallyintrusive figures, who was in day-to-day
charge of the men? Obviously, the NCO's. However, after the Miliutinreforms
the Tsarist army had proportionatelyfewer long-term NCO's than any other
Europeanarmy, because few soldiers reenlistedafter completingtheir appointed
term. From the 1880's on, there were at most the company Sgt. Major and
perhapsone or two long-termsenior sergeants-but only perhaps.All the other
non-com slots were filled by literateconscriptsgiven some extratraining,but only
on the companyrostercould these be distinguishedfrom privates.The Sgt. Major
was certainly the most importantauthoritywith whom soldiers regularlycame
intocontact, but he-was the onlyauthoritywith whom they were in regularcontact.
The Sgt. Majorkept no closer trackof the men under him than was necessaryto
satisfy the company commander, or alternativelygrossly abused his authority
because the companycommanderhad so little knowledgeof what went on in the
unit.
Mostly, in fact, soldiers were left to themselves, the Sgt. Major merely
maintaininga patinaof propermilitaryorder and discipline Since soldiers were
more or less free to organizethemselves, it is not at all surprisingthat they fell
back on the type of social organizationthat Russian peasants away from their
villages had employed for centuries, the artel' (The recrudescenceof familiar
civilian patternswas made all the easier by the fact that most soldiers in a unit
weresdue to the recruitingsystem, zemliaki-Landsleute-often from the same
or neighboringvillages.) The companychose an artel'shchik
who was responsible
for purchasingfood and sundry other of the soldiers' necessities with funds
providedby the companycommander,and it was the self-constitutedsoldier
that concludedcontractsfor
[email protected]
It seemed so naturalto the soldiers
that they should managetheir own afEairs-because that was their experienceas
peasantsland because that was the norm in the army-that invariablythe most
artelJ
vol'nye
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PEASANTSIN UNIFORM
571
detested offlcerswere those who actuallyattemptedto supervisetheir men. It was
the very principleof ofElcerintrusion in the barracksthat soldiers resented, not
the results. It made no difTerencethat units in which officers played an active
supervisoryrole were the best clothed, the best shod and the best fed. Soldiers
preferred-and performedbest for-the ofElcerwho let his upit run itself, even
if they suffered some privation in consequence.25 In the soldiers' view, the
off1cer'sproperrole was that of an outsider-the improvingofElcerwas as much
resentedas the improvinglandlord.
was not simplyan outsider,he was a mediatingoutsider,
Yet the TsaristoiMlcer
a necessarypartof the soldier'sworld.Onlyhe could providethe link betweenthe
relatively autonomous, unit-level soldier community and the larger military
world. And like mediating outsiders in peasant society, the Tsarist officer
combined in his person the roles of socio-political middle man, economic
intermediary,intercessor,and patron.26In anthropologicalterms, the relationship
between officer and soldier was multiplex rather than single-interest (i.e.,
specialized) -a distinction in modes of authority that has been called the
watershedbetweentraditionaland modernsociety.27
Otheranalogiescan be found between peasantand militarysocietieswbut surely
enough has been said to demonstratethat the Tsaristarmywas not a modernizing
institution.In defiance of formal tables of organizationand the prescriptionsof
training manualss the soldier's socio-economic experience replicated that of
peasant society, the similarityextending even to types of contact with the nonpeasant (or non-military)world. Though the army had on papera hierarchyof
command and disciplinethat had no analogue in peasantsociety, in practicethe
relationswas familiar-even if by the late l9th century
patternof ofElcer-soldier
it was somewhat archaicby civilian standards.The peasant remaineda peasant
even while in uniform.
This is not to say that service in the armyhad no impacton individualRussian
peasants. The peasant soldier wass after all, stationed far from home and in an
urban environment. Still, this sort of contact with the modern urban world was
itself partof the Russianpeasant'sordinaryexperience.Millionsof peasantsin the
late l9th and early 20th centurieswere engagedin migratoryseasonal labor (and
had been for generations), and other millions were engaged in non-seasonal, but
temporary, labor in the cities. Yet the urban setting had a muted impact on
peasant migrants,because urban peasantshad traditionalsocial institutionsthat
set them apartfrom the city proper.28If the urbanpeasantwas in but not of the
city, how much truer must this have been of the peasant soldier, whose urban
experience was mediatedby the peasantstructureof his militaryunit? Whatever
new experience came to the peasant soldier while in the army was being more
efElcientlyacquiredby other peasantsin the civilianworld.As all contemporaries
reported,it was the returnedpeasantmigrantwho broughtchange to the village
not the ex-soldier.
In the finalanalysis,then, answeringthe questionposedat the outset-was the
Tsaristarmy a modernizinginstitution-does not contributevery much to our
understandingof socio-culturalchange in the Russianpeasantry.It has, however,
been a useful way to get at what a soldiers life in the Tsaristarmywas reallylike.
This in turn throwssome lighton other aspectsof Tsaristmilitaryexperience,and
suggests new approaches to some old issues. These can only be briefly
adumbratedhere.
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journalof socialhistory
We are in a betterposition, firststo understandthe behaviorof the Tsaristarmy
during periods of civil turmoil. For instance, the mutinies of 190S and 1906
exhibited similarities at a number of levels to contemporaneous peasant
disturbances.Allowing for differences in the organizationalframeworkwithin
which they occurred, mutinies and peasant disturbances had a very similar
internaldynamic-the way they started, and the way they worked themselves
out. They coincided,too, in theirtiming (respondingto the same externalstimuli)
and in their frequencycurves (they peakedat roughlythe same time both in 1905
and 1906). Finallysthe ultimate objects of mutiny and peasantriot were similar.
Given whatwe knowof soldiersociety, it wouldbe strangeif it had been otherwise
-yet the mutinies have ordinarilybeen treatedas politicaldemonstrations,or as
responsesto militaryconditionsnarrowlyconstrued.29
We may also be in a better position to understand the Russian soldierzs
performancein battle. Russian soldiers were renownedfor their enduranceand
bravery-for their stolidity-but were also renownedfor their lack of initiative
and their tendencyto deteriorateinto a helpless herdas soon as theirofElcerswere
put out of action.30The virtues of the Russian soldier were characteristicof
peasantsociety.His defects, too, were rootedin peasantsocialorganization,which
was entirely inappropriateon the battlefield.A Tsaristmilitaryunit was cohesive
so long as its off1cerswere present-but a unit without officershad lost not just
its appointedleaders, it had lost as well its intermediaryto the world beyond the
unit. On the battlefield, Russian soldiers without officers were not so much
militarilyas socially isolated. They had no sense of being part of an integrated
military machine, nor could they have, since this was not their peacetime
experience. Soldiers without ofElcershad no more notion of how to comport
themselves than would a Russian village suddenlymaterializedin the midst of a
battle.
Finallys what has been said of soldier society suggests a number of ways to
approachthe TsaristofElcercorps.In the final analysisssoldiersociety was what it
was because officers permitted it to be so. OfElcersociety was functionally
complementaryto soldier society, and not just in the way I suggested earlier;a
more detailedanalysisof this aspect of the officercorps would be well worth the
while. It has, for instance, recently been suggested that many of the ills of the
Tsaristarmyon the eve of WorldWar I can be attributedto uncontrolledrivalry
amongcliquesof generals(the generals'inabilityto coordinatetheiractivitiesalso
made itself felt prior to and during the Russo-JapaneseWar), which negated
otherwise beneficial military reforms.32Clearly rivalry between high-ranking
cliques was only one of several end productsof the functioning of the Tsarist
military system. Furthermorel the reforms hastily enacted after the RUSSQJapaneseWar failed not because of accidentalpersonalrivalry,but because they
were incompatiblewith the realityof the Tsaristarmy-they were obliteratedby
self-perpetuating(officer-perpetuated)militaryroutine. And just as there was a
connection between the soldiers' peacetime experience and battlefield
performance,there must certainlyhave been such a connection for the ofElcer
corps. Indeedsa few militarycommentatorsafterthe Russo-JapaneseWarplaced
the blame for defeat squarelyon habitsacquiredby officersin the course of their
economic chores.33In any events to appreciateproperlythe service habits of
Tsarist ofElcers in peace and war, we need a structural-if
you will, an
anthropological-analysis of the officer corps much like that offered here for
enlisted personnel.
Carnegie-Mellon
Universiw
John Bushnell
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FOOTNOTES
1. A Rittikh, Russkiivoennyibyt v delstvitel'nosti
i v mechtakh(Spb., 1893), p. 20. Rittikh
makessimilarobservationson pp.38 and 263.
2. Daniel Lernerand RichardD. Robinson,
"Swordsand Ploughshares:The TurkishArmy
as a ModernizingForce," WorldPolitics13, (Oct.
1960),
same pointare LucianW. Pye, '4Armiesin the Process p. 32. Otherswho make much the
of PoliticalModernization" in John
J. Johnson, ed., TheRoleof theMilitary
in Underdeveloped
(Princeton,1962), pp.8084; James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Countries
Africa," ibid.,pp.396-98;MorrisJanowitz,Atilitary Role of the Militaryin Sub-Saharan
andCoercionin theDeveloping
Nations(Chicago, 1977), pp. 156-8, W. RaymondInstitutions
Duncan, i'Development Roles of the
Militaryin Cuba:ModalPersonalityand Nation
Building,"in SheldonW. Simon, ed., The
Afilitaryand Securit in the ThirdWorld:Domestic
and International
Impacts(Boulder, Col.
1978), pp.77-121.
3. On the Tsaristarmyat the time of the Crimean
War:John SheltonCurtiss, TheArmy°f
NicholasIJ1825-1855
(DurhamsN.C., 1965). On Miliutin'sreforms:P.A.
Zaionchkovskii
Voennyereformy1860-1870godovv Romii(M., 19S2),
and ForrestA. Miller, DmitrXi
Mililltin
and the ReSormEra in Russia, (Nashville, 1968).
P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhaviei
russkaiaarmEia
na rubezheXlX-XXstoletii,1881-1903(M., 1973), pp.
116-17,providesfigures
on draftees.
4. Requiredinstructionwas droppedin the
mid-1880'sthen restored,for the infantryalone,
in 1902 Even when literacyinstructionwas
required,however, it frequently-perhaps
ordinarily-remained a dead letter.The ofE1cer
in chargefilledout and presentedthe proper
formsduringbrigadeinspection,and no one asked
whether instructionhad actuallybeen
provided.Ziaonchkovskii,Samoderzhavie
i russkaiaarmEia,
pp. 276-9; A. Gerua, Posle voiny.
Onasheiarmii(Spb.,1907), pp. 54-5; Vtsartsveshtykov(N.
Ignatyev,A Subalternin OldRussia(New York, 1944), p. Novgorod, 1908), pp.21-2; A.A.
ewreia(Paris, 1930), pp. 112-13, 130-31; M. Grulev, 150; M. Grulev, ZapiskigeneralaZloby dnia vzhizni armii (lBrestLitovskl,1911), pp.76, 78, reportsa lackof enthusiasmfor
educating
Russo-Japanese
War. A.I. Denikin, Ptlt'russkogoofitsera(New York,soldierseven afterthe
1953), p. 123, claims
thatat least after 1902 hundredsof thousandsof
Russiansoldiersdid become literatewhile
inthe army,but the weightof the evidenceis against
him.
On the instructionprovidedin the uchebnyerotyfor
futurenon-coms:A. Rittikh,Russkii
voennyibyt, pp. 55-6; Col. Mamontov, "Sovremennoe
polozhenie 'untr-ofitserskogo
voprosa'
v Rossiii za granitseiu,"Obshchestvo
revnitelei
voennykh
znanXi,
kn. 4 (1906), p. 82.
5.W. BarnesSteveni, TheRussianArmyfrom
Within(New York, 1914), pp. 35, 44, 47,
reports
this as the common sentiment among Russian
much
that the Russianarmywas carryingout a civilizingofElcers.Other offlcers felt not so
missionas that it should be doing
so:
CaptainVeselovskiisK voprosuo vospitanXisoldata
(Spb,
p. 164;MstislavLevitskii
Vospitanie
soldata(Spb*,1911), p. 4 and passim, M Galkin,1900),
Novyiput'sovremennogo
ofitsera
(I., 1906), pp. 19, 53-5.
6.Dragomirov's ideas on this subject are laid
out in,
podgotovka
k boiu(many editions), especiallyPart I, and interalia, Opytrukovodstvadlia
(Kiev,1906). Both are reprintedin M.I. Dragomirovz Podgotovkavoiskv mirnoewremia
lzbrannyetrudy.Koprosyvospitanfia
i
obucheniia
(M. 1956). Dragomirov'sinfluenceis remarked
by
Miuller,"Moralsnoe
vospitanie
voisk v Germanii, Rossii i Iaponii. Sravnitel'nyiGerman
etiud
laponskoi
voiny," Voinai mir(1907), no. 3, passim;A. Gerua, Poslena osnovanii Russkovoiny,pp. 73-4, 100-1;
and
by most othercontemporarycommentators.
7.
ln 1882, only 53.6 percentof the armywas housed
in
troops
were quarteredeither in barracksor in private regularbarracks;by 1903, all field
apartmentsunderbarrackconditions.
Zaionchkovskii,
Samoderzhavie
i rasskaiaarmiia,pp. 270-1; Rittikh, Russkiiwennyi
byt,pp.
138-141
.
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journalof socialhistory
574
8. Actually,the introductionof conscriptsto the vices began before they arrivedin their
regiments,as they were subjectto blatantextortionby non-comswho conveyed them from
the inductioncenters (Gerua, Posle voinKpp. 105-7). On the experienceof the conscripts
duringtheirfirstfour monthsof service, see VtsarstveshWkovpp.2-4, 7, 14; M. Zenchenko,
Obucheniei vospitaniesoldata(Spb., 1902)*pp. 71-85; Rittikh, Rllsskiivoennyibyt,pp. 38-9,
42; B.v. Rechenberg-Linten, Russische Soldaten und OSfziereaus der Zarenzeit.Nach
Selbsterlebnissen
in einer russischenGarnison(Bern-Leipzigs1924), pp. 8-9, 14-18; N.D.
ButovskiilSbornikposlednykhstatei(Spb.,
1910), pp. 128, 131.
On the high rate of sicknessduringthe first four months, see N. ButoYskii7Nashisolda.
(Tipymirnogoi voennogovremeni)(Spb., 1893), pp 10-1l, 79, 145*M. Grulev, Zlobydnia,pp.
241-3, pointsout that much of the sicknesswas due to the fact that manydrafteeswent into
the army "under protest"-the list of medicalexemptionsdid not cover them, but they
were not reallyfit for service. Grulev estimatesthat as manyas 10-15 percentof all draftees
were dischargedon medicalgrounds,often afterhospitalization,soon afterarrivingin their
units. N.N. Golovin, TheRussianArmyin the WorldWar(New Haven, 1931), p. 22, also
refersto the highproportionof drafteeswho arrivedat theirunits "underprotest."
The referencesto beatirlgs,theft and extortionare innumerablenthe only questionbeing
how prevalentthey were in fact. Whateverthe true incidence,it is clearthat newly-arrived
conscriptswere the most vulnerable,but that all soldiers consideredthese phenomenaa
normalfeatureof militarylife.
9. Rittikh, Russkiivoennyibyt,pp. 86-8; A. Gerua, Posle voiny,pp. 51-2, 65-6, 103, 107-8,
111; A.P. Voznesenskii, ';O voennom khoziaistve," Obshchestvo
revniteZei
voennykhznanXi
kn. 1 (1906), pp. 109-11, 118; A.A. Ignatyev,A Subaltern,p. 75; Grulev, ZJobydnian
pp. 1547
229; A.M. Volgin, ObarmEi
(Spb., 1908) pp. 114-16.A.I. Denikin, Staraiaarmiiav. 1 (Paris,
1929), p. 93, explicitlycomparesthe runningof a regimentat the turn of the centuryespeciallyin the interior-to runninga pomest'e.
10. Zaionchkovskii,Samoderzhavie
i russkaiaarmEia,
pp.272-3.
11. Razvedchikno. 539, 13 Feb. 1901.The sources on thiscurious practicearenumerous,
forit was widelydiscussedin the militarypressat the turnof the century.See JohnBushnell
4iMutineersand Revolutionaries. Military Revolution in Russia, 1905-1907," Ph.D.
dissertation,IndianaUniversity, 1977, pp. 18-20 and notes. In addition:Rittikh, Russkii
voennyibyt,p. 52; M. Grttlev, Zapiski,p. 93. Vollnyerabowwere finallysuppressedin 1906:
Razvedchik,
no. 796, 29 Jan. 1906.
12. The two budgets(otherswere offeredas well) are in R. Maksheev,'iZhalovanlei pensii
nizhnymchinam," Intendantskii
zhurnal,1903, no. 5, pps44-7; Razvedchikno. 565, 14 Aug.
1901. On the items soldiers had to provide for themselves, and the cost involved in
maintaininguniformsand, especially,boots in requiredorder,,see Bushnell, "Mutineers,5'
pp.16-18. In addition, see Voznesenskiil ;'O voennom khoziastve," pp. 105, 107. On the
increasein payand the December1905 increasein equipmentissuedto soldiers:;'UIushenie
bytanizhnikhchinov," Russkiiinvalid,no. 255, 6 Dec. 1905.
13. Bushnell, ;iMutineers,"p. 18; Ignatyev,A Subaltern,pp. 146-7;Steveni, RussianArmy,
pp.65-6; Grulev, Zapiski, p. 94; Denikin, Put', p. 120; Rechenberg-Linten, Ru.ssische
So1daten,
p. 16.
14. The seasonalcycle is laid out in the most detailby Rittikh, Russkiivoennyibyt,pp.44-7,
54,100, 143, 146, 153. No other sourceoffers contraryevidence.Grulev, Zlobydnia,comes
upwith a figureof 25-30 in a companyaftersummercampeven after the
rabotyhad
beenabolished-the restwere detailedto otherdutiestemporarily.
volJnye
15. A. Denikin, i'Soldatskiibyt," Razvedchik,
no. 661, 24 June 1903.On the inferiorsocial
statusof Tsaristsoldiersin general,see Bushnell,"Mutineers,"pp.21-3.
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PEASANTS1N UNIFORM
575
(Berlin, 1902), pp. 448 62, providesdirect soldier
16. Golosiz resskoiarmEi.RzaoblachenEia
testimony on this point. The known behavior patternin the army-frequent strikingof
soldiersand the soldiers'acceptanceof same-is at leastcircumstantialevidence.
17. Russkiiinvalid,no. 235, 28 Oct. 1900.
voennyizhurnal,1902, no. 1.
18. "Eshcheo vol'nykhrabotakhsnVarshavskii
voprosy(Spb., 1907), pp. 62, 64; Grulev, Zloby
19* N.D. Butevskii, Stat'ina sovremennye
v. 1, p. 93.
dnia,pp.228-9, 237-8;Denikin, StaraiaarmEia,
20. Voznesenskii,i'O voennom khoziastve,w'pp. 111-12, 122.
21. George Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good,' American
(1965), no. 2, pp.293-315.
Anthropologtst67
22. Veselovskii, K voprosu,p. 12; Gerua, Posle voiny,pp. 47-51, 54, 118;Voznesenskii, ';O
voennom khoziaistve," pp. 97, 112-18;Zenchenko, Obuchenie,pp. 59-63; Rittikh, Russkii
voennyibyt,p. 75; Galkin, Nowput pp.49-52; Rechenberg-Linten,RussishcheSoldaten,pp.
pp. 63-70, 120-22;Grulev, Zlobydnia,54, 57-8, 155-7.There was
13-22;Butovskii,Sbornike
little contact between ofElcersand men even during guardduty, because the ofE1cersand
p. 10. PeterKenez, "A
men on guarddetailcame from differentunits:Levitskii, Vospitanie,
SlavicStudies7, (1973), pp. 1298
Profile of the PrerevolutionaryOfficerCorps," CaliSornia
133-34, notes that a disproportionatenumberof TsaristofElcerswere assignedto staffwork,
while the ratio between ofE1cers(includingstafTofficers) and men was the lowest of any
majorEuropeanarmy.
23. Ignatyev,a Subaltern,p. 85; Vtsarstveshtykov,p. 8; Grulev, Zapiskizpp.92, 94, 981133;
p. 59; Golosiz russkoiarmii pp. 4-5; Rittikh, Russkiivoennyibyt,pp.
Zenchenko, Obuchenie,
48-9; Mamontov, 'iSovremennoe polozhenie iuntr-ofitserskogovoprosa','5 pp. 97, 101;
K.V., "Sravnenienashikh uslovii obucheniisoldata s zagranichnymi,"Russkiiinvalid,no.
154, 20 July 1905; P. Sagat-skii,'iK unter-ofitserskomuvoprosu," Razvedchikno. 821, 18
i russkaiaQrmiiaz pp. 120-23;Butovskii, Stat'i,p.
July 1906; Zaionchkovskii,Samoderzhavie
258Golovin, RussianArmKp. 29.
24. V tsarsfveshtykov,p. 13; Voznesenskii, "O voennom khoziastve," p. 110; Rittikh,
Russkiivoennyibyt,pp. 51-2; Gerua, Posle voiny,pp. 86, 88; Bushnell, "Mutineers,"pp. 2021.
25. V tsarstveshtykov,pp. 23-4. There is some indicationthat the ';improvingofElcer"was
more common after 1905 than before, and that the soldlers'perceptionof the properrole of
their ofElcersmay graduallyhave been changing.But the change could only have been
gradual,becausethe bulkof the Tsaristofficerswere still immersedin omce paperwork.
26. On the officer'srole as patron(in providingspecialtreatsout of his own pocket,helping
pp. 86-7t 89, 144; B.V.
out soldiers in time of need, and so on), see Ignatyev, A Subalterns
o moeizhizni 1 (Paris, 1969), p 58. The patronrole was filled most
Gerua, Kospominanfia
often in the Guardszwhere officerswere independentlywealthy.It may well be that where
soldiersfelt that the patronrole was being adequatelyfilledthey were more likelyto be loyal
to their ofElcers;this may have been one of the reasons why some units did not mutiny
during the epidemic of mutinies in late 1905. See Bushnellz"Mutaneers" pp. 95-7 (the
evidence is thereinpresentedlbut the pointis not statedin the same terms).
of Science,23 (Dec
27. E.G. Baileys"The PeasantView of the Bad Life" TheAdvancement
1966), p. 401.
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576
journalof social history
28. There is a nice discussionof the peasant'splacein the city in JosephCraneBradley,Jr.,
"Muzhikand Muscovite: Peasants in Late Nineteenth-Century Urban Russia," Ph.D.
dissertation,HarvardUniversity,1977, pp.98-117, 170-73,and passim.
29. Bushnell, "Mutineers,"pp.68-97, 145-52,295-343, discussesthe mutiniesof 1905and
1906, though not quite in the same terms (the peasant analogy is suggested, but not
developed).
30. Representativecomments from the late 19th and early 20th centuries "Report of
CaptainCarl Reichman," in U S. War Department,GeneralStaff G-2, Reportsof AIilitary
PartI, 1906, p. 244; F.V. Greene, Sketchesof
Observers
attachedto theArmiesin ANanchuria,
ArmyLifeinRussia(New York, 1880), pp.24-S, 124-5;Steveni, RussianArmy,p. 50; Grulev,
Zlobydnia,pp.55, 85.
pp. 7-10, does an intelligentjob in deriving the
31. Veselovskii, K voprosuo I:ospitanXi,
Russiansoldier'smartialvirtuesfrom his peasantbackground.
32. NormanStone, TheEasternFront1914-1917(New York, 1975), pp 17-35;W. Thomas
Wilfong, "Rebuildingthe Russian Army, 1905-1914:The Question of a Comprehensive
Planfor NationalDefense," Ph.D. dissertation,IndianaUniversity,1977, pp. 170, 174-5.
33.Gerua,Poslevoiny,50, 57, 61, 332;Voznesenskii,"O voennom khoziastve,"p. 97.
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