Global Strategy:
The World is your Oyster
(if you can shuck it!)
Bibliographical Data and Classifications
Library of Congress Classification
HD30.28, HD62.4, HD2746.5, HD3612,
(LCC)
HB99.5
http://lcweb.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/lcco/lcco_h.pdf
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)
Global Strategy:
G34, D21, F42, K2, K3, K4, L51
http://www.aeaweb.org/journal/jel_class_system.html
The World is your Oyster
Free keywords
Global Strategy
(if you can shuck it!)
Strategic Management
International Business
International Acquisitions
Mergers & Acquisitions
Rules
Institutions
Address delivered at the occasion of accepting the appointment of
Endowed Professor of Global Strategy
at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM
The joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
on behalf of Vereniging Trustfonds EUR, on Friday, December 5, 2014
and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Internet: www.erim.eur.nl
ERIM Electronic Series Portal:
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Taco H. Reus
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management Series
Reference number ERIM: EIA-2014-059-S&E
ISBN 978-90-5892-395-0
© 2014, Taco H. Reus
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Rotterdam School of Management
Erasmus University Rotterdam
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
E-mail: [email protected]
In deze lezing vertel ik kort over de disciplinaire achtergrond, centrale
In this inaugural address, I will briefly talk about the disciplinary background,
onderzoeksvragen en thema's van Global Strategy. Vervolgens presenteer ik
central research questions and themes of Global Strategy. I also present what may
misschien wel het meest invloedrijke raamwerk over hoe Global Strategy werkt
be the dominant framework of understanding how global strategy works and
en hoe succes kan worden verklaard: het vormen en uitvoeren van wereldwijde
what determines its success: i.e., the formation and implementation of global
strategieën vereisen ingewikkelde verbindingen tussen – en slimme besluit-
strategies involves intricate connections between – and savvy decision-making
vorming over – resources, relaties en regels. Ik noem dit de R3 van Global Strategy.
about – resources, relations, and rules. I call this the R3 of Global Strategy. What
Maar wat vooral belangrijk is in de internationale context is de rol van regels.
comes into play particularly in the international context is the role of rules. My
Mijn doel in deze lezing derhalve is uw interesse te verhogen in de diversiteit aan
goal here today is to spur your interest in the variety of forms, functions, and
vormen, functies en krachten van regels. In Global Strategy spelen vele soorten
forces of rules. Many kinds of rules matter in Global Strategy, and they are
regels een rol op supranationale, nationale, organisatorische, individuele en
housed at the supranational, national, organizational, individual, and other
andere niveaus. En samen bepalen deze diversiteit aan regels hoe mensen en
levels to shape how people and firms behave in a global context, how they differ,
bedrijven zich gedragen in een internationale context, hoe ze verschillen, waarom
what determines their success or failure, and how strategic decisions, practices,
ze succesvol of onsuccesvol zijn, en hoe strategische beslissingen, praktijken en
and processes are conditioned. To illustrate the diverse roles of rules, I will
processen worden geconditioneerd. Als illustratie van het belang van regels
discuss the international acquisition process – one of the most important and
bespreek ik het internationale overnameproces – één van de belangrijkste
consequential strategic events for firms. This illustration seems to suggest that
strategische gebeurtenissen voor bedrijven. Deze illustratie laat zien dat succes
success in Global Strategy relies for an important part on a curiosity, or a desire
in Global Strategy voor een belangrijk deel wordt bepaald door een nieuws-
to know about how rules – both our own and others, both local and foreign –
gierigheid of verlangen om te begrijpen hoe regels – zowel die van onszelf als
influence who we and others are as individuals and as organizations.
van anderen, zowel lokale als buitenlandse – ons en anderen beïnvloeden als
individuen en als organisaties.
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Abstract
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Samenvatting
Samenvatting
4
Abstract
5
Content
7
1. Introduction
9
2. Domain of the Global Strategy Field
11
3.
15
7
The Global Strategy R3 – Resources, Relations & Rules
4. The Many Forms, Functions, and Forces of Rules in Global Strategy
19
5.
Conclusions
27
6. Words of thanks
29
7.
31
References
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM
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Content
1. Introduction
Dear Rector Magnificus,
Dear Dean,
Dear colleagues,
Lieve vrienden en familie,
Why then the world’s mine oyster,
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Dear distinguished guests.
which I with sword will open.
~William Shakespeare,
The Merry Wives of Windsor Act 2, scene 2, 2–5
(c. 1600)
What differentiates today’s executives from previous generations is their
elevated global scope. In the times we live, exploring and exploiting opportunities occur increasingly across dispersed geographic markets. Many of the
largest companies have most of their assets and sales abroad – an increasing
number upwards of 90 percent. And the global scope is not limited to the largest
companies. Start-ups may be able to sell to only a few hundred buyers locally,
which give them little chance of survival, but across borders, tens of thousands
of potential buyers can make their business sustainable overnight. Indeed,
today, the world truly is our oyster, the world is ours to enjoy.
Yet, global positioning and expansion is not easy. Having a world wide web of
activities involves navigating through a widely, and at times wildly, scattered
terrain, which often comes with many pitfalls and great uncertainty. Moreover,
the global reach of competition also looms large and creates immense pressure
to succeed. In this context, forming and implementing strategies for a global
landscape have become inevitable.
How do strategists make decisions in a global landscape? What factors are
core to implementing these cross-border schemes? How are firms influenced by
their backgrounds in their attempts to expand abroad? And how are global
dynamics, such as regional and worldwide integration and tensions, global
environmental challenges, the rise of emerging markets, and the expansive
reach of multinationals from emerging markets changing the competitive
landscape for firms? Why can some firms maneuver so effectively across the wild
global landscape, while others seem to falter and fail in their attempts? These
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are some of the highly important and current questions that the field of global
2. Domain of the Global Strategy Field
strategy aims to address.
research field, and its disciplinary background. I will also briefly situate this Trust
systems, individuals, actions, and decisions that are a part of, or impinge on, the
Fund Chair in Global Strategy in its local context – the Netherlands and the
practice of strategy and strategic management of business and non-business
Rotterdam School of Management. Then, I will outline what may be the dominant
organizations in the global context.”1 The “global” focus of the field emphasizes
framework of understanding how global strategy works and what determines
the domain’s interest in the study of cross-border business activities and in the
its success. In a nutshell, forming and implementing global strategies involves
comparative analysis of business activities to the extent that they materialize
intricate connections between – and savvy decision-making about – resources,
differently in different national contexts. As such, the term “global” captures all
R3)
seems simple, it actually
forms of “cross-border activities [commonly] described as global, international,
reflects the core dimensions of a highly complex, dynamic, and ambiguous
transnational, multinational, regional, multi-regional or by any other term that
global strategy process. While resources and relations are clearly crucial for
substantially implies that activities take place in multiple countries and are
global strategies, what comes into play particularly in the international context
integrated across borders.”2 The “strategy” focus of the field alludes to organi-
is the role of rules. Discussing these rules with colleagues and executives
zations’ expansive worldviews, plans, and decisions to consider foreign locations
generated more questions than answers. One important reason for this is that
as potential financial, factor, and product markets, and as sources of knowledge,
the forms, functions, and forces of rules seem to be more diverse and intricate
learning, and competitive advantage in their own right. The field addresses the
then we are generally able to grasp. So, one of my aims today is to trigger your
global aspects of the four central questions in strategic management: How do
interest in the diverse roles of rules. I hope to do so by giving you an example of
firms behave in a global context? Why do firms differ in a global context? What is
the roles of rules in the international acquisition process.
the function of the head office in a globally diversified firm? And what determines
relations, and rules. While this triplex of Rs (or
success or failure in global competition?
As a prelude to this discussion, I would like to emphasize three conundrums
The roots of Global Strategy can be traced back to the strategic moves and
that every global strategist seems to face:
1.
Value added from foreign endeavors comes with added, and quite often
global location decisions made by the very first multinational companies, such
exponentially more, uncertainty.
as the Dutch East India Company. However, the academic roots of the field are
2. Local strategies are not really local, and global strategies are not really global.
much younger. With the advent of increased internationalization of companies
3. Analyses to determine global strategies can be very thorough and diligent
following WWII, scholars began to consider the Multinational Company (MNC)
but are often fraught with shortcuts, biases, stereotypes, and emotion.
as an important research object. Many seminal contributors have developed the
field since. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) considered the intermingled
Moreover, if the world is our oyster, then opening the shell (or “shucking the
challenges of local responsiveness, global efficiency, and continued learning of
oyster” as Americans like to say), requires not just identifying the obviously
MNCs in a global environment, and Michael Porter (1990) emphasized the role of
increasing potential all around the world, but also fostering a global sense and
MNCs in shaping the competitive advantage of nations.
curiosity in the diverse roles of rules. Too often it seems that while we all spot the
oyster, we have a hard time shucking it without crushing at least some of the
treasures inside. With that let me start by outlining the domain of the global
strategy field.
1
2
Except from the vision statement of the Global Strategy Journal
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)2042-5805).
With this use of the term global I follow the vision statement of the Global Strategy
Journal.
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GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
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as “the study of any and all aspects of the environment, organizations, institutions,
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The Strategic Management Society describes the domain of Global Strategy
In my talk today, I would like to describe the domain of this still emerging
Strategic Management Society
Strategy teaching. With these connections and our own research programs and
course curricula, the quality of research and teaching in Global Strategy is very
This Trust Fund Chair stretches this sub-discipline in Strategic Management.
impressive at the Rotterdam School of Management.
Over the last two decades, Global Strategy has become an essential pillar within
the Strategic Management field, and is recognized as such by the field’s leading
Now that I have sketched the domain and context of this professorship, let
scholarly association, the Strategic Management Society, with the introduction
me discuss what may be the dominant framework to understand Global Strategy.
journals (the other being the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal) focusing on
sub-disciplines within the broader field of strategic management. It is also a
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of the Global Strategy Journal. This journal is quite unique as it is just one of two
testimony of the strength of the academic community and practical relevance of
the Global Strategy sub-field.
The Netherlands
The practical relevance of global strategy research and teaching is especially
strong in countries like the Netherlands, which are highly dependent on the
ability of their firms to internationalize their business, adapt to local conditions
in a broad variety of host environments, and leverage knowledge and capabilities
of local subsidiaries across all nodes in transnational networks. The Netherlands,
in particular, has been a fertile ground for global businesses and for Global
Strategy thinking. Dutch politicians and business men have long promoted and
thrived on modern free trade. In particular, international experiences of Philips
have stood at the basis of much global strategy thinking, and global strategy
cases on companies such as Unilever and Shell have enriched our field of
research.
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
I am very proud to be part of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus
University. It is not only one of Europe’s largest international business schools
with a very international audience of future and current leaders, it also is one of
the strongest research schools which provides a very stimulating environment
and is a great place to work. The founding fathers of its predecessor, the
Foundation for Business Administration, were the biggest Dutch multinationals
– Royal Dutch Shell, Akzo Nobel, ABN AMRO, Unilever, Philips, and Tata Steel. As
such, the multinational company and an international orientation have been
part and parcel to our school since the very beginning. The school provides an
extremely resourceful platform to study and teach Global Strategy. Across the
academic field, we are connected with worldwide centers of gravity in Global
Strategy research, and, particularly through our participation in CEMS, in Global
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GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
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3. The Global Strategy R 3 – Resources,
Relations & Rules
Following others, such as the highly prolific scholars Tatiana Kostova and Mike Peng,
I view the field of Global Strategy to be
influenced
by
resource-based,
However, I like to refer to resources, relations,
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heavily
industry-based, and institution-based views.
and rules, which together comprise the
14
Global Strategy R3 – that is the Global Strate-
15
Global Strategy R1: Resources
Seminal researchers, such as Edith Penrose (1959), Birger Wernerfelt (1984),
and Jay Barney (1991), have generated a tremendous stream of research that
focuses on a resource-based view of the firm. This body of work emphasizes that
firms differ both in DNA and in performance because of the unique resources
they hold, develop, or are able to acquire. However, with the increasing turbulence in the global landscape of firms, scholars began to argue that most
resources rapidly decay or, at least, are constantly at risk of becoming imitable or
threatened by substitutes, and as a result they can quickly lose their status as
source for sustainable competitive advantage. You cannot outlast the competition for long with static resources even if they seem uniquely superior. In this
dynamic global environment, competitive advantage mainly depends on the
development of dynamic capabilities to integrate and reconfigure competencies
to deal with diverse and rapidly changing environments (e.g., Teece, Pisano, &
Shuen, 1997). Many scholars (e.g., Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999) have
suggested that knowledge – particularly know-how and expertise – may be the
most important resource in this context, but even that could walk out of a firm
any day because it resides in the heads of individuals or groups. Rather, it is the
ability to transfer, integrate, build, and at times destroy knowledge that is the
most critical dynamic capability. This can be challenging in a global context
because when an activity crosses borders, it calls for the integration of widely
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge that all
fight for attention (cf. Hayek, 1945).
Some firms seem to be very good at this challenging activity. For example,
industry experts have richly described Nokia’s source of sustained competitive
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
gy Toolbox.
advantage as its ability to attract clever people with unique experience and
But if you go abroad – cross just one border – you will often quickly experience
creative skills not only from Finland or Scandinavia but from around the world.
how different rules can be on the other side. The global strategy field is therefore
It was an important reason why the company was able to hold over half of the
dominated by research that considers this role of rules. This extraordinary
global smartphone market share in 2007. Yet, even these attractive dynamic
interest in rules is what distinguishes global strategic management from
capabilities only seem to keep a company on top temporarily. Within just two
general strategic management.
dramatic years, Nokia lost much of its smartphone market share, and was largely
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To give you a sense of the importance of rules, please recall this year’s FIFA
World Cup in Brazil that brought together teams from 32 countries. The FIFA has
So, continuously developing, acquiring, managing, and particularly trans-
a clear rulebook in place. Some players may disagree with the rules, some may
forming resources is a very complex part of formulating and implementing
purposefully violate them – which can have consequences – and some may
Global Strategies.
accidentally violate them because they get a bit too worked up (again possibly
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acquired by Microsoft.
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Global Strategy R2: Resources and Relations
game should be played and how to win within the confines of the rules.
Apart from resources, global strategists also smartly have to shape industry
Now consider if we could travel back in time to the pre-football era when
relations with other firms, organizations, and governments. The work by Michael
nobody had heard of this peculiar game and we had invited the wisest German
Porter (e.g.,1980, 1990) has been particularly influential in this regard. He
and Greek philosophers to play against each other. There is actually old footage
emphasized that firms need to consider their position in relation to suppliers,
that provides insight into what would have happened…4 Monty Python revealed
buyers, rivals, and firms from related industries in such a way that they can reap
that even the most resourceful, well-connected, wisest men are quite vulnerable
the highest returns. In a global context, this positioning within a network
if they do not know the rules of the game. They would not know how to play the
ofrelations becomes exponentially more complex and dynamic. Consider again
game, how to score, or even why to score. In such a context, a Eureka-moment
Nokia’s set of relations. The former CEO, Kallasvuo, underlined that “nowhere in
makes it easy to win the game.
business history has a competitive environment changed so much as it did with
the converging of several industries – to the point that no-one knows what to
Like the ancient philosophers in an unfamiliar football context, global
call the industry anymore. Mobile telephony converged with the mobile
strategists face complex foreign games, which can cause considerable uncer-
computer, the internet industry, the media industry and the applications
tainty and ambiguity. What’s more, global strategists often have to play simul-
industry – to mention a few… and today they’re all rolled into one.” 3 The network
taneous games, which are particularly challenging because they are not always
of relations in a global landscape is developing constantly and can create radical
familiar with the rulebooks of all these different games.
shifts in opportunities and threats that are often extremely difficult to anticipate.
As the role of rules is so important to global strategy, I would like to focus on
this part of the Global Strategy R3 a bit more.
Global Strategy R3: Resources, Relations and Rules
As I already mentioned, while resources and relations are clearly crucial for
global strategies, in the international context, rules in particular play an
important role. In the academic world, we call these rules institutions but I will
not use this word here. I like to stick with the term rules, not just because it is the
term that most people on the street would use, but also because I think it helps
to consider their forms, functions, and forces from more diverse angles. In a local
context, rules are often in the background; everybody takes them for granted.
3
From an interview of Quy Huy and Timo Vuori. Read more at
http://knowledge.insead.edu/strategy/what-could-have-saved-nokia-and-what-canother-companies-learn-3220#cS02tJuHRPTZQEOc.99
4
Monty Python’s Flying Circus footage of Philosopher Football:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2gJamguN04
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
with consequences). However, in general, most players understand how the
4. The Many Forms, Functions, and Forces of Rules
in Global Strategy
Nobel Prize winner, Professor Douglas North, explained that rules are
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social
interaction.” It is important to note that the term “constraint” does not mean
practices, and facilitate, even enforce, other behaviors and practices. They determine what is or what is not allowed, accepted, and valued. Clearly, there are
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that rules just limit interactions, but rather that rules limit some behaviors and
many kinds of rules that we, and the organizations we work for, follow. Just to
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illustrate, consider traffic light rules. They facilitate the flow of traffic and
19
ability to go really fast. And, think about the cyclists that rule our streets, and
surprise foreigners when they visit. Or, consider measurement rules that helps
us understand and communicate the geographic distance between two points.
We accept these rules but others may not. We can distinguish between formal
rules that are explicit, such as laws, regulations, and other formal agreements
that can be written down, and informal rules that relate to more tacit understandings, habits, cultural norms, routines, broadly shared expectations, and
deeply ingrained viewpoints. All these forms of formal and informal rules limit
some and facilitate other behaviors and practices.
You could say that Global Strategy scholars (including myself) are a bit overly
intrigued by differences in informal cultural rules. Interestingly, there is quite a
diverse collection of arguments about their influence on cross-border success.
The most dominant view adopts a culture clash argument emphasizing that
cultural differences lead to misunderstandings, conflict, and distrust between
groups of people that are used to a different set of informal rules. Contradicting
this argument, some scholars advance a cultural enrichment argument stressing
that experiences with differences in rules lead to opportunities to learn how to
approach tasks, activities, and practices in a different way, fostering success
through enhanced creativity and learning from cross-border activities. A cultural
complementarity argument combines the culture clash and enrichment arguments, and states that it is better for firms to expand into regions with cultures
that are neither too similar because there would not be many learning opportunities, nor too different because it would be too difficult to understand the
foreign context. A cultural adaptation argument is a mirror image of the
cultural complementarity argument. It argues that firms perform cross-border
activities better when cultures are very similar because fewer misunderstandings will occur, but also when cultures are very different because the people
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
enforce certain driving behaviors, but they also constrain us by limiting our
involved expect and more readily accept the differences, and will prepare for
too many misunderstandings about the rules. Perhaps we will ignore the rules,
them more carefully in advance. This argument suggests that when cultures are
like we ignore them at home. On the palette of differences, we will notice that
moderately different, people expect similarities while facing unexpected
many rules actually also do not matter at all or do not have to matter, for
differences.
example, eating habits and transportation rules. Even seemingly important
formal rules such as differences in forms of capitalism, or cultural norms about
approaches to hierarchy may not matter at all in a particular cross-border
do not influence our tasks. Only some differences matter, and some of these will
matter negatively and some positively. Since our research predominantly takes
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setting. Many formal and informal rules may differ between countries but they
a broad-brush approach toward national differences, we have little insight into
20
what and how differences really matter. This is an important gap because
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just because there are more differences, but because it is increasingly difficult to
determine which of these differences matter and how they matter.
Considering all these different arguments together, perhaps not surprisingly,
most studies actually find the relationship between cultural differences and
cross-border success to be insignificant. Together we get rather a confusing
picture … something like a cat. Yet, I do not think we should conclude that none
of these arguments matter. It may be best to conclude that it all depends. My
colleagues in the Global Strategy corner of our department have discussed this
in highly cited articles: René Olie (1994) spoke of shades of culture and that their
forces depend on the nature of cross-border relationships, and Arjen Slangen
(2006) argued that culture clashes are likely only when cross-border activities
are characterized by high levels of integration, and that more positive outcomes
can be expected when autonomy is retained. In one my own studies, we found
that the effect of cultural differences in international acquisitions depends on
the extent to which firms develop integration capabilities, such as fostering rich
communication ties and mutual understanding (Reus & Lamont, 2009). While
cultural differences can constrain these integration capabilities, fortunately
there are plenty of other forces that can also create them.
Much of the Global Strategy research emphasizes rules and differences in
rules at the national level, and indeed, due to legal and socialization processes,
We tend to use the concept of cultural differences in very broad, abstract
many formal and informal rules are created and sustained at the national level.
ways. But what does it really mean when we say “these cultures are different,” or
However, rulebooks are created and sustained at many different levels of
when we say “the cultural distance between the Netherlands and China is larger
analysis. With the acceleration of regional integration and the need for world-
than between the Netherlands and Belgium”? I think that when we compare
wide coordination, we have an expansive rulebook at the highest supranational
two countries, they are likely to have many rules that are quite similar, and many
level. Consider how politicians from all across the world are trying to rewrite
rules that are likely to be more or less different. So, when organizations expand
rules following the financial crisis. On the other hand, our own personality gives
in a distant country, we have a palette of similarities and a palette of differences
us a kind of personalized rulebook on how we prefer to behave and how we
in rules. On the palette of similarities, we can easily build relationships without
develop our own routines. When it comes to CEO personalities, or more broadly
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
decision-makers in distant countries experience high levels of uncertainty not
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The flow chart depicts the international acquisition process with several key
organizational rulebook. Although, there are many other forces that influence
events or characteristics in the merger time line. Roughly speaking, we can
organizational rulebook. Firms have formal and informal routines that may
distinguish a pre-merger and a post-merger phase, with a holding period
emerge over time to replace time-consuming decision-making processes. These
when firms have to wait for regulatory approval. But please note that we
could become dynamic capabilities that help organize the firm’s critical resources,
could think of different phases as well as different moments. I have been a bit
but they also could become core rigidities that restrain organizations from
selective, just to be able to selfishly highlight some of our own research. For
formulating and implementing novel practices that are needed to respond to new
example, in this flow chart I have not included the ways in which firms prepare
environmental demands. At the industry-level, groups of companies can create
for an acquisition to wade through rules effectively. Interesting recent
industry rulebooks, setting self-imposed formal standards of environmental
research found that firms in the U.S. make substantially more campaign
performance to industry members as well as formulating more informal rules of
contributions to political parties one year prior to making an acquisition
conduct, and following popular fads.
(Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014). They seem to realize that they have to abide
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their individual rulebook, this can actually have a tremendous influence on the
23
Part of the challenge for Global Strategy and for understanding how firms
anticipation of their pending acquisition decision.
behave and succeed in a cross-border setting is that these rules at different
levels influence each other in supporting and conflicting ways. A wide variety of
Pre-Merger Phase
national, supranational, industry, organizational as well as individual rulebooks
interact to influence the formulation and implementation of global strategies. I
In our own work, we have looked at the role of prior experience. Firms
would like to illustrate the variety of ways in which rules play a role in critical
generally enter a new acquisition event with some baggage – they have more or
strategic events by discussing some of my own research. I have been fortunate to
less prior experience in making acquisitions and form organizational rules
work in a great team of researchers. With the benefit of hindsight, and looking at
about how to take over a company – i.e., they form acquisition routines. Such
the work we are currently doing, I think we are predominantly trying to under-
experience could help when the routines fit the new acquisition context well;
stand these diverse roles of rules. We often focus on the international
however they may misfit the context. We looked at large acquisitions, and saw
acquisition context, or merger and acquisition (M&A) context more generally.
that many acquirers involved had substantial experience but predominantly in
These strategic events are rare and consequential for the firms involved, so
making small acquisitions. In other words, the organizational rules on how to
research can be particularly practically relevant. They are also important and
take over a company were shaped through a series of small acquisitions. This can
memorable to the people involved, which explains why executives are often
be a problem when making a large acquisition because the rules are different
willing and able to participate in the research we do.
and they affect firms in a very different way (Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011). For
example, small deals only affect small pockets of the firms involved, whereas
large deals can impact many departments and business units throughout the
firm. We saw that prior experience in making small deals was not beneficial but
rather hurt the performance of subsequent large deals. Fortunately, there are
ways to prevent these mishaps. We saw that when acquirers retained top
managers of the acquired firms, performance effects of experience were not as
bad; these acquired top managers could help to challenge the organizational
rules of the acquirers, and adapt their organizational rules to better fit the
unique conditions of large acquisitions.
In the pre-merger phase, negotiations generally occur with a small set of
players – secrecy rules the game. The CEOs of the firms involved may hold secret
meetings during which they get to know each other and develop trust – they
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
by strict rules, and perhaps hope to get some help from the politicians in
develop certain inter-personal rules of the game. Actually, often the consultants
and if the acquirer comes from a country that has starkly different rules, the
of the firms involved do all the talking, not the CEOs, so then an indirect
acquirer may be viewed as illegitimate because it would be guilty by association.
conversation with all kinds of communication rules and barriers takes place.
The 2006 acquisition of a port management business in the United States by
24
The ultimate outcome of the pre-merger phase is to buy or not to buy the
national differences in deeply ingrained rulebooks, or supranational tensions
target, and what to pay beyond what the market would pay for it – the
due to these differences, can delay and even block foreign activities. Although
acquisition premium. Although firms initiate thorough analyses and due
shareholders approved the acquisition and President George Bush even
diligence before determining these key outcomes, much uncertainty remains,
vigorously argued in favor of the deal, it received so many legitimacy challenges
particularly in the international acquisition context. Psychological research,
that Dubai Ports decided to turn over the acquired units to an American
heavily influenced by the prolific scholars Tversky & Kahneman (e.g., 1974),
competitor.
Post-Merger Phase
relying heavily on information (the anchor) that appears early on in a decisionmaking process. Decision-makers tend to come back to that anchor frequently
When acquirers do survive the time surrounding the announcement, and
and new information that is consistent with the anchor receives more weight,
receive approval from shareholders and regulators, the deal can be completed
while inconsistent information is discarded. In the context of acquisition
and the post-merger phase begins. Often the team that managed the pre-
premium decisions, we found that indeed international acquirers were more
merger phase is different from the team that manages the post-merger phase,
likely to anchor their decisions on the premium that another acquirer paid in a
and they may follow quite different rulebooks. Synergy potential and actual
local market’s preceding acquisition than domestic acquirers (Malhotra, Zhu, &
synergy realization greatly depend on the extent to which pre-merger and post-
Reus, 2014). This anchoring can be a good thing as it clearly simplifies the
merger rulebooks are written in line, and are at least understood by everyone
decision and it does so on the basis of some relevant information. Yet, it may also
involved.
downplay important information unique to the focal acquisition. In their
anchoring, we found that international acquirers gave more weight to decisions
Individual, organizational, and national rulebooks also influence how
by reference groups – i.e., they tended to follow other international acquirers.
acquirers approach integration and what requires specific attention during
This is revealing particularly considering that this reference group generally
integration. For example, Monin and colleagues (2013) presented an in-depth
pays higher premiums. We found that US firms on average paid 11% more for
case of a large, international merger in which the firms started with the norms
international deals than they did for domestic deals. At least in part, this foreign-
of justice based on equality – the rule was equal distribution of power, status,
domestic divide in what firms pay for their international acquisitions may
and work. Over time, the norm of justice shifted to emphasizing equity on the
persist because international acquirers anchor their decisions on the relatively
basis of meritocratic performance – the rule became the work goes to the unit
higher preceding international acquisition premiums. It is like buying a new
that performs best. In one of our own studies, we also looked at justice rules
home and anchoring your decision on someone close to you that unfortunately
during the post-merger phase, and found that informational justice rules – i.e.,
paid quite a bit more for his new home than the person next door.
providing justification for difficult but critical integration decisions – is
important for acquisition performance in the short run, while procedural justice
Once the decision is made, and firms announce their intention to acquire,
the international acquisition process transforms from being highly secretive to
rules – i.e., providing an actual voice in these decisions – is important for longterm acquisition performance (Ellis, Reus, & Lamont, 2009).
being staged in front of a large audience. At that point, many stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, competitors, regulators, politicians, journa-
National rules also can influence how firms approach integration. For
lists, and the general public, consider the acquisition and determine whether it
example, we found that when US firms make acquisitions in countries with very
fits their rulebooks. In the context of international acquisitions, local
different cultures, they find it more difficult to attend to emotions of newly
constituencies may view the acquisition as an invasion by a foreign intruder,
acquired members, but when they make acquisitions in more humane-oriented
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
25
suggests that under such heavy uncertainty, people tend to use simplification
rules or “heuristics.” Anchoring, for example, refers to a simplification rule of
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Dubai Ports World was a particularly controversial case that illustrates that
cultures that “encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic,
5. Conclusions
friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others” (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman,
& Gupta, 2004, p569), they, in fact, attend to emotions more (Reus, 2012).
So there can be this darker side due to rulebook challenges or threats, but I
diversity of roles of rules more carefully. Rulebooks matter, and differences do as
well, but most important is to know how people and organizations recognize,
Yet, while numerous studies have considered antecedents to cross-border
understand, and deal with them. It requires not just insight in foreign rules but
knowledge transfer (e.g., Bresman et al., 1999; Lord & Ranft, 2000), its perfor-
also and perhaps even more importantly in local rulebooks and our own indivi-
mance effects have rarely been studied empirically. In fact, esteemed colleagues
dual rulebooks. From an academic and practical point, we still have very limited
Van Wijk, Jansen and Lyles (2008) conducted a thorough meta-analysis of the
insight into why some firms are able to forge ties across distant regions, increase
relationship between knowledge transfer and performance but could not
their ability to understand diverse groups of people, and motivate their orga-
include a single M&A study. However, whether knowledge investments lead to
nization members to work across the widely and wildly scattered global land-
value creation is not so self-evident as it may seem (Reus, Ranft, Lamont, &
scape. Foreign and local rulebooks are important sources to increase our insight.
Adams, 2009). We considered the performance effects of a knowledge flow that
dominates the international acquisition context: i.e., the transfer of non-
A better understanding of distant rulebooks can help firms adapt their own
location-specific knowledge from acquirers to acquired firms; for example,
local rulebooks. Firms, such as Tata Steel and Philips already seem to have
transferring managerial knowledge from the acquirer to its acquired firm (Reus,
adopted this approach when developing products to serve the Base of the
Lamont, & Ellis, In Press). Such a knowledge flow maybe a way to extend the
Pyramid. They adapt to the rules that are set in less developed markets to
acquirer’s expertise and capabilities to the acquired firm, but it also has
develop products and engineering processes that are both more cost-efficient
potential negative implications which reveal a darker side of knowledge
and energy-efficient. They adopt Base of the Pyramid rules to become more
transfer that is often ignored. In particular, such a knowledge flow can threaten
competitive under the rules of the Rest of the Pyramid.
the pre-existing rulebook the acquired members have long cherished – the
transfer of knowledge to acquired firms is at the same time a call to change long-
To come back to the conundrums I mentioned in the introduction of this talk.
held routines. We find support for this adverse knowledge transfer effect.
Venturing into foreign markets can create added value, but can also come with
Performance effects improve only at very high levels of knowledge transfer,
added, and quite often exponentially more, uncertainty. Rules will be different,
when acquirers extend their own knowledge and associated routines and power
awkward, and surprising, and mishaps will be more likely, but some rules will
structures completely.
also be intriguing, unique, and possibly valuable. The high uncertainty in global
decision-making makes global strategies quite local. Indeed, global strategies are
influenced by very local and individual preferences, personality, simplification
rules, as well as organizational routines and practices. While firms generally
conduct thorough analyses and prepare diligently for global endeavors, it is
important to remember that global strategy decisions, and the tools used to
derive them, are often highly influenced by individual, home-grown, local rules.
Therefore, I think we can only shuck the oyster if we have a good understanding
of foreign, local, and our own individual rulebooks. This requires a curiosity about
how rules – both our own and others, both local and foreign – influence who we
and others are as individuals and as organizations; what we and they do, how we
and they behave, and how this all influences ensuing opportunities and
constraints in the global context. Having such a curiosity in distant and nearby
27
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
26
Global strategy scholars and executives also have emphasized the importance
of knowledge transfer in the post-merger phase of international acquisitions.
TACO H. REUS
TACO H. REUS
would argue that we can turn the light back on if we consider the multitude and
rules helps to determine the value and limitations of rulebooks, and to see where
6. Words of thanks
our rulebooks might need some adjusting.
Dear Executive Board of the Erasmus University, Dear Dean of the Rotterdam
School of Management, Dear Vereniging Trustfonds EUR,
I am very thankful for the opportunities you have given me to develop my
research and teaching agenda. I see this Endowed Professorship in Global Strategy
28
I greatly enjoy working at this university, and am very proud to be a part of one
of the top business schools of Europe.
Dear Professor Van Oosterhout,
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TACO H. REUS
not as an accomplishment but rather as an anticipation of what is still to come.
29
is de hoofdrede waarom ik hier nu sta. Je bent een geweldige collega en vriend.
Dear Professor Heugens,
Pursey, het is ongelooflijk hoeveel jij betekent voor de universiteit, de school, de
afdeling en de mensen die op jouw pad komen. Ik ben ontiegelijk blij dat ik ook
op jouw pad terecht kwam!
Dear Professor Meijs, and all colleagues at the Business-Society Management
Department,
Lucas en alle andere collega’s van de BSM afdeling, ontzettend bedankt dat ik
mijn eerste tijd terug in Nederland bij jullie heb mogen doorbrengen. Tijdens
mijn sollicitatiegesprekken was ik al erg onder de indruk van het enthousiasme
in onderzoek – vooral in thema’s die ontzettend van deze tijd zijn. Het was heel
mooi om daar tussen te mogen zitten. Yolanda, jij vooral bedankt voor de
assistentie en gezelligheid.
Dear Colleagues at the Department of Strategic Management & Entrepreneurship,
It’s an honor to be part of this strong department. It is very special how much
research and strong teaching we are able to offer. Special thanks to the Global
Strategy Corner – I apologize for having been a little preoccupied with this
inaugural address for the past months; very much looking forward to our
continued conversations! Other colleagues, friends, executives, it would be great
if you like to join our monthly Global Strategy conversations, please do let us
know.
Patricia en Carolien, bedankt dat jullie me op de rails houden; wat een goed
team zijn jullie!
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
Hans, Ik denk nog vaak terug aan onze lunch in Philadelphia in 2007. Dat gesprek
Dear Colleagues at Florida State University and Florida Atlantic University,
7. References
Thank you for giving me such a supportive environment to help me find my
academic path. You really were one big family away from home!
Barney JB. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.
Journal of Management 17(1): 99-120.
Dear Professor Lamont, Dear Professor Ellis,
Bruce, of course, I am particularly and extraordinarily grateful to you! You are
Solution. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA.
much for being a great team together with Bruce, and of course also a great
friend! We are beginning to have quite an exceptional track record!
Bresman H, Birkinshaw JM, Nobel R. 1999. Knowledge transfer in interna-
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TACO H. REUS
such a great educator, guide, inspiration, and a great friend. Kim, thank you so
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30
dilemmas, challenges, practices, and processes of strategic management.
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Journal 30(2): 137-161.
Dear students,
Thank you for the great exchange of ideas!
Ellis KM, Reus TH, Lamont BT, Ranft AL. 2011. Transfer effects in large acquisitions: How size-specific experience matters. Academy of Management Journal
Dear executives,
54(6): 1261-1276.
Thank you for the great exchange of ideas!
Hayek FA. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic
Dear Andac,
Review 35(4): 521-530.
You have been a great travel companion during this academic journey. We are a
bit further apart now, and I often miss our talks, but fortunately we can continue
Holburn GLF, Vanden Bergh RG. 2014. Integrated market and nonmarket
our discussions on both sides of the Atlantic and in cyberspace. And, of course,
strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition
thank you very much for the suggestions on the earlier version of this talk.
events in the energy sector. Strategic Management Journal 35(3): 450-460.
Lieve MaM en Daddyboy,
Nu sta ik hier! – ontzettend bedankt dat jullie al mijn gekke beslissingen hebben
House RJ, Hanges PJ, Javidan M, Dorfman PW, Gupta V. 2004. Culture,
leadership, and organizations. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
gesteund. Dat die beslissingen uiteindelijk naar dit punt hebben geleid komt
vooral door heel veel geluk die ik van jullie heb gekregen.
Lord MD, Ranft AL. 2000. Organizational learning about new international
markets: Exploring the internal transfer of local market knowledge. Journal of
Lieve Christien, lieve Meis,
International Business Studies 31(4): 573-589.
Rufus en ik zijn de gelukkigste mannen op aarde met jou. Wat hebben wij een
mooie wereld samen en wat een mooie reizen – ben heel benieuwd naar onze
volgende plek. Ik hou zo veel van jou!
Malhotra S, Zhu P, Reus TH. 2014. Anchoring on the acquisition premium
decisions of others. Strategic Management Journal: advance online publication
September 4. doi: 10.1002/smj.2314.
Beste vrienden,
Ik hoop dat mijn verhaal vandaag wat meer inzicht geeft over wat ik nou
eigenlijk doe. Er zit zeker een kip en ei bij, maar ook een oester!
Ik heb gezegd.
Monin P, Noorderhaven NG, Vaara E, Kroon D. 2013. Giving sense to and
making sense of norms of justice in post-merger integration. Academy of
Management Journal 56(1): 256-284.
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
31
Dear co-authors,
Thank you so much for teaming up to explore and make sense of the curious
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TACO H. REUS
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ISBN 90-5892-126-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8057
following international acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal.
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performance: The moderating effect of integration. Journal of World Business
inter-organisationeel perspectief, 12 October 2001, EIA-06-MKT,
41(2): 161-170.
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Downsize to Enterprise: Management Buyouts and Restructuring Industry.
knowledge transfer: A meta-analytic review and assessment of its antecedents
Triple inaugural address for the Rotating Chair for Research in Organisation
and consequences. Journal of Management Studies 45(4): 830-853.
and Management. March 28, 2001, EIA-01-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-006-2,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/338
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GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
border acquisition implementation. Journal of World Business 47(3): 342-351.
De Cremer, D., On Understanding the Human Nature of Good and Bad Behavior
veilingen, 28 June 2002, EIA-10-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-027-5,
ISBN 978-90-5892-223-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17694
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/346
Dekimpe, M.G., Veranderende datasets binnen de marketing: puur zegen of
Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R., Organization Theory: Bright Prospects for a
bron van frustratie?, 7 March 2003, EIA-17-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-038-0,
Permanently Failing Field, 12 September 2008, EIA-2007-032 ORG,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/342
ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-175-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13129
Dijk, D.J.C. van, “Goed nieuws is geen nieuws”, 15 November 2007,
EIA-2007-031-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-157-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10857
34
Jansen, J.J.P., Corporate Entrepreneurship: Sensing and Seizing Opportunities for
TACO H. REUS
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Heck, E. van, Waarde en Winnaar; over het ontwerpen van electronische
in Business: A Behavioral Ethics Approach, 23 October 2009,
a Prosperous Research Agenda, April 14, 2011, ISBN 978-90-5892-276-2,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22999
35
ISBN 978-90-5892-361-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Jong, A. de, De Ratio van Corporate Governance, 6 October 2006,
EIA-2006-028-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-128-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8046
Dissel, H.G. van, “Nut en nog eens nut” Over retoriek, mythes en rituelen
in informatiesysteemonderzoek, 15 February 2002,EIA-08-LIS,
ISBN 90-5892-018-6,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/301
Donkers, A.C.D., “The Customer Cannot Choose”, Apruil 12, 2013,
ISBN 978-90-5892-334-9,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/39716
Jong, M. de, New Survey Methods: Tools to Dig for Gold, May 31, 2013,
ISBN 978-90-5892-337-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/40379
Kaptein, M., De Open Onderneming, Een bedrijfsethisch vraagstuk, and Wempe,
J., Een maatschappelijk vraagstuk, Double inaugural address, 31 March
2003, EIA-16-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-037-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/305
Dul, J., “De mens is de maat van alle dingen” Over mensgericht ontwerpen van
producten en processen., 23 May 2003, EIA-19-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-038-X,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/348
Ende, J. van den, Organising Innovation, 18 September 2008,
EIA-2008-034-ORG, ISBN 978-90-5892-189-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13898
Fok, D., Stay ahead of competition, October 4, 2013, ISBN 978-90-5892-346-2,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/41515
Groenen, P.J.F., Dynamische Meerdimensionele Schaling: Statistiek Op De Kaart,
31 March 2003, EIA-15-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-035-6,
Ketter, W., Envisioning Sustainable Smart Markets, June 20, 2014,
ISBN 978-90-5892-369-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/51584
Knippenberg, D.L. van, Understanding Diversity, 12 October 2007,
EIA-2007-030-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-149-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10595
Kroon, L.G., Opsporen van sneller en beter. Modelling through, 21 September
2001, EIA-03-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-010-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/340
Maas, Victor S., De controller als choice architect, October 5, 2012,
ISBN 90-5892-314-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/37373
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/304
Magala, S.J., East, West, Best: Cross cultural encounters and measures, 28 September
Hartog, D.N. den, Leadership as a source of inspiration, 5 October 2001,
2001, EIA-04-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-013-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/284
EIA-05-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-015-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/285
Meijs, L.C.P.M., The resilient society: On volunteering, civil society and corporate
community involvement in transition, 17 September 2004,
EIA-2004-024-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-000-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1908
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
Dijk, M.A. van, “The Social Value of Finance”, March 7, 2014,
Meijs, L.C.P.M., Reinventing Strategic Philanthropy: the sustainable organization
of voluntary action for impact, February 19, 2010,
Roosenboom, P.G.J., On the real effects of private equity, 4 September 2009,
ISBN 90-5892-221-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16710
ISBN 90-5892-230-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17833
Rotmans, J., Societal Innovation: between dream and reality lies complexity,
Oosterhout, J., Het disciplineringsmodel voorbij; over autoriteit en legitimiteit in
Corporate Governance, 12 September 2008, EIA-2007-033-ORG,
June 3, 2005, EIA-2005-026-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-105-0,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7293
Smidts, A., Kijken in het brein, Over de mogelijkheden van neuromarketing,
Osselaer, S.M.J. van, Of Rats and Brands: A Learning-and-Memory Perspective on
Consumer Decisions, 29 October 2004, EIA-2003-023-MKT,
36
25 October 2002, EIA-12-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-036-4,
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ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-183-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13229
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/308
37
ISBN 90-5892-074-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1794
Pau, L-F., The Business Challenges in Communicating, Mobile or Otherwise,
ISBN 90-5892-033-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/302
31 March 2003, EIA-14-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-034-8,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/303
Stremersch, S., Op zoek naar een publiek…., April 15, 2005, EIA-2005-025-MKT,
ISBN 90-5892-084-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1945
Peccei, R., Human Resource Management And The Search For The Happy
Workplace. January 15, 2004, EIA-021-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-059-3,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1108
Verbeek, M., Onweerlegbaar bewijs? Over het belang en de waarde van empirisch
onderzoek voor financierings- en beleggingsvraagstukken, 21 June 2002,
EIA-09-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-026-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/343
Peek, E., The Value of Accounting, October 21, 2011, ISBN 978-90-5892-301-1,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/32937
Verwijmeren, P., Forensic Finance, September 19, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-377-6,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/76906
Pelsser, A.A.J., Risico en rendement in balans voor verzekeraars. May 2, 2003,
EIA-18-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-041-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/872
Waarts, E., Competition: an inspirational marketing tool, 12 March 2004,
EIA-2003-022-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-068-2, http://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1519
Pennings, E., Does contract complexity limit oppoortunities? Vertical
organization and flexibility., September 17, 2010, ISBN 978-90-5892-255-7,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20457
Wagelmans, A.P.M., Moeilijk Doen Als Het Ook Makkelijk Kan, Over het nut van
grondige wiskundige analyse van beslissingsproblemen, 20 September 2002,
EIA-11-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-032-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/309
Pronk, M., Financial Accounting, te praktisch voor theorie en te theoretisch voor
de praktijk?, June 29, 2012, ISBN 978-90-5892-312-7,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Rodrigues, Suzana B., Towards a New Agenda for the Study of Business
Whiteman, G., Making Sense of Climate Change: How to Avoid the Next Big
Flood. April 1, 2011, ISBN 90-5892-275-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Wynstra, J.Y.F., Inkoop, Leveranciers en Innovatie: van VOC tot Space Shuttle,
Internationalization: Integrating Markets, Institutions and Politics, June 17,
February 17 2006, EIA-2006-027-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-109-3,
2010, ISBN 978-90-5892-246-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20068
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7439
Rohde, Kirsten, Planning or Doing, May 9, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-364-6,
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/51322
Yip, G.S., Managing Global Customers, 19 June 2009, EIA-2009-038-STR,
ISBN 90-5892-213-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15827
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
GLOBAL STRATEGY: THE WORLD IS YOUR OYSTER (IF YOU CAN SHUCK IT!)
Smit, H.T.J., The Economics of Private Equity, 31 March 2003, EIA-13-LIS,
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