The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, 2013, 85–107
doi:10.1093/cjip/pot001
Advance Access publication 23 January 2013
Political Rivals and Regional Leaders:
Dual Identities and Sino-Japanese
Relations within East Asian
Cooperation
Jinsoo Park*y
This article argues that the dual identities of political rivals and
regional leaders have been of critical importance in determining China and Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral
relations within East Asian cooperation. China and Japan, in
identifying each other as political rivals rather than cooperative
partners, have defined their interests in regional cooperative
projects, particularly those led by the other party, in terms of
power politics. At the same time, China and Japan’s efforts to
gain followers’ acceptance of their aspired leadership identities
have shaped their regional policy options and behaviours. The
combination effects of these dual identities have produced variances in China and Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral
relations within East Asian financial and institutional cooperation. Particularly with regards to regional projects led by the
other party and supported by a majority of followers, China
and Japan cooperated with the intention of neutralizing the
other’s dominance in the region and to demonstrate the
responsibilities one should assume as aspirant regional leader.
China or Japan opposed, in terms of power politics, cooperative projects the other party initiated that did not secure
majority support among followers, instead promoting their
own initiatives to expand followers’ acceptance of their
leadership.
The regional policies of China and Japan, as the two prominent powers in
East Asia, and their bilateral relations are critical to the degree and fate of
East Asian cooperation. Without the constructive participation of both
y
Jinsoo Park is a Research Professor at Korea University.
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
ß The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]
86
Jinsoo Park
China and Japan, no amount of effort could succeed in promoting regional
cooperation, the main reason being that both can exercise de facto veto
power over any regional cooperative initiative.
Proof of this lies in the experience of East Asian cooperation since the late
1990s. The participation and proactive roles of both China and Japan
underpinned the successful establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three
(APT) in the late 1990s, and the development of regional financial cooperative projects in the 2000s such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and CMI
Multilateralization (CMIM). Exercise of de facto veto power by China or
Japan, however, also resulted in abortive regional cooperative projects such
as an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997 and an APT-based East Asia
Summit (EAS) in 2005.
At the same time, experience of East Asian cooperation raises important
questions on the regional policies of China and Japan and their bilateral
relations as dependent variables. Why did China and Japan cooperate on the
CMI and the APT but not on an AMF and an APT-based EAS? Despite
their functional similarities, why did China object to an AMF but support
the CMI, and why was Japan for the APT but against an APT-based EAS?
Taken as a whole, how can we explain variances in China’s and Japan’s
regional policies and in their bilateral relations within East Asian regional
cooperative projects?
This article’s main argument is that the dual identities of political rivals and
regional leaders have been of critical importance in determining China’s and
Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral relations within East Asian cooperation. Perceiving each other as political rivals rather than cooperative
partners, China and Japan’s focus on power politics has been a key determining factor of their policies on regional cooperative projects, particularly those
led by the other party. At the same time, as both China and Japan wanted to
be regional leaders they keenly sought regional neighbours’ acceptance of
their aspired leadership identities. Their shaping of regional policy options
and behaviours, therefore, reflected the degree to which their neighbours
accepted the projects. The combination effects of these dual identities have
produced variances in China’s and Japan’s regional policies and in their
bilateral relations within East Asian financial and institutional cooperation.
More specifically, in the cases of the CMI and APT, each of which was led
by one of the parties and supported by Korea and most the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China and Japan cooperated
with the intention of neutralizing the other’s dominance and to demonstrate
their responsibilities as aspirant regional leaders. As a result, cooperative
competition emerged, wherein China and Japan cooperatively vied for regional leadership. In the cases of the AMF and APT-based EAS, each of
which one party initiated but did not secure firm support from most
ASEAN countries, China and Japan opposed them in terms of power politics
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and promoted their own initiatives to expand followers’ acceptance of their
leadership. This resulted in conflictive competition wherein China and Japan
competed for regional leadership through conflicting leadership initiatives.
In the second section, this article briefly reviews the existing rationalist
approaches to Sino-Japanese relations and pinpoints gaps that need to be
filled. In the section following, it shows how the dual identities of political
rivals and regional leaders play significant roles in the determination of
regional powers’ policies. The article then examines the relationship between
dual identities, and Sino-Japanese relations through the cases of the AMF,
CMI, APT and APT-based EAS. It concludes by considering its implications for the study of Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation.
Rationalist Explanations
There has been a substantial body of works on Sino-Japanese relations
within East Asian cooperation, but most tend to argue that political rivalry
and power politics have constituted critical impediments to Sino-Japanese
cooperation and/or that considerations of institutional efficiency have facilitated Sino-Japanese cooperation.1 While both realist and liberal approaches
may provide some insights into conflict or cooperation between Japan and
China, they provide at best only partial explanations.
Realist Explanations
Realists are in essence sceptical about the possibility of international
cooperation among states. Both classic realists and neo-realists assume
that states give top priority to their survival and autonomy in the essentially
anarchic world in which there is no centralized authority to provide order on
1
Most of the studies on the roles of China and Japan in East Asia, as a reviewer of this
article rightly commented, are policy-oriented. However, this does not mean that these
policy-oriented studies analyse Sino-Japanese relations without theoretical orientation.
Quite clearly, some scholars such as Paul Bowles, William W. Grimes, and Mohan
Malik analyse Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation from a realist standpoint.
On the other hand, T. J. Pempel and others base their arguments on a liberal assumption
that growing interdependence increases the possibility of cooperation. Even those who
combine elements of different IR approaches to analyse Sino-Japanese relations in East
Asia do not deny the theoretical assumptions of realists and liberals, but rather depend, at
least partially, on them. In this sense, it is quite important to figure out to what extent
analyses depending, both totally and partially, on the theoretical assumptions of realists
and liberals can explain Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation. Paul Bowles,
‘Asia’s Post-crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back in, Keeping the (United) States
out’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 244–70; William
W. Grimes, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative
Multilateralisation’, Asia Policy, Vol. 11 (2011), pp. 79–104; Mohan Malik, ‘China and the
East Asian Summit: More Discord than Accord’, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
February 2006, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinaandEastAsiaSummit.
pdf; T. J. Pempel, ‘Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness,’ in T. J.
Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 1–28.
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Jinsoo Park
a global scale.2 States, for their survival and autonomy, seek to create a
balance of power and to maximize their powers, particularly military
powers. It is assumed in the realist literature that states tend to balance
against one another rather than cooperate, mainly because of concerns
about the relative gains of international cooperation for their national autonomy and security, and distributive consequences.3 Exceptionally, however, great powers are assumed to cooperate with each other to
counterbalance more powerful states.
From this understanding, it is argued that China’s opposition to Japan’s
proposal for an AMF reflected Chinese officials’ concerns about Japan’s
dominance, and their deeply-rooted mistrust of Japan’s political intentions.4
William W. Grimes also argues that although Japan and China’s economic
interests in a regional financial governance mechanism were essentially identical, their political rivalry constituted a critical impediment to its genuine
development.5 Some scholars moreover argue that China changed its
regional policy from opposition to an AMF to support for the CMI because
it sought more to reduce US economic influence in the region than to balance Japan.6
Similarly, with regard to East Asian institutional cooperation, Takeshi
Terada argues that Japan’s pursuit of an expanded EAS rather than an
APT-based EAS was an attempt to resist or respond to China’s growing
influence over regional political and economic affairs.7 It is also argued that
the first EAS gave salience to historical strategic rivalries between China and
Japan and their conflicting geopolitical interests.8
Realist approaches are quite right to insist that political rivalry and mistrust
between Japan and China constituted an impediment to their cooperation.
But they remain silent on the question of why Japan and China cooperated on
the CMI and the APT despite their political rivalry. Power politics, while
quite real, were far from insurmountable. Moreover, several facts refute the
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1967); Kenneth N.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, 1979).
Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding International Economic Order
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 77–82; Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation
among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990).
Yang Jiang, ‘Response and Responsibility: China in East Asian Financial Cooperation’,
The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2010), pp. 603–23.
William W. Grimes, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn?’, pp. 79–104.
Paul Bowles, ‘Asia’s Post-Crisis Regionalism’, pp. 244–70; Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and
the Idea of an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’: Institutional Uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific,’ in
Andrew T. H. Tan and J. D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., Non-Traditional Security Issues in
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic, 2001), pp. 227–56; David P.
Rapkin, ‘The United States, Japan, and the Power to Block: APEC and AMF Cases’, The
Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2001), pp. 373–410.
Takeshi Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEANþ6 and Japan’s Initiatives: China’s Rise and the
Agent-structure Analysis’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2010), pp. 71–92.
Mohan Malik, ‘China and the East Asian Summit’.
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Sino-Japanese Relations within East Asian Cooperation
89
argument that China supported the Japanese-led CMI to counterbalance the
United States. Firstly, it was China that strongly asserted the close linkage of
the CMI with the US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF).9
Secondly, China viewed a stable relationship with the United States as critical
to its sustainable economic development.10 Likewise, the argument that Japan
cooperated with China on the APT to counterbalance the United States is not
tenable. Although Japan participated in the first APT summit meeting in 1997,
it displayed a lukewarm attitude towards the project. The Japanese government
adopted a more committed stance only after China began to engage proactively
with the APT in 1998. Although we may accept the argument that China and
Japan were playing dual hedging games—against the United States and against
each other—11the realist explanations do not answer the question of why Japan
did not cooperate with growing China for the creation of an APT-based EAS,
which could have been a useful instrument to hedge against a more powerful
outsider, the United States.
In this way, an explanation focusing solely on power politics does not
provide a compelling understanding of the variances in China’s and
Japan’s regional policies or of their bilateral relations within East Asian
regional cooperative projects.
Liberal Explanations
Liberals believe that states seek absolute gains, and that this makes international cooperation possible, if not easy, to achieve. They argue that realists
overemphasize the salience of relative gains, and that absolute gains are more
important than realists suggest. For liberals, states promote international
cooperation and the creation of international institutions in order to enhance
their national interests, in particular national welfare goals. In this sense, it is
argued that great powers can cooperate in promoting international cooperation as long as sufficient mutual interests exist among them.12 Managing
complex interdependence requires that states cooperate with one another13
9
10
11
12
13
Jennifer A. Amyx, ‘Japan and the Evolution of Regional Financial Arrangement in East
Asia’, in Ellis S. Krauss, and T. J. Pempel, eds., Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations
in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 198–218.
David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International
Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004), pp. 64–99; Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for Stability with
America’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (2005), pp. 39–48; Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese
Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging’,
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), pp. 77–94.
William W. Grimes, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn?’, p. 85.
Duncan Snidal, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, International Organization,
Vol. 39, No. 4 (1985), pp. 579–614; David Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the
International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1993), pp. 459–89; David Rapkin and
Jonathan Strand, ‘The U.S. and Japan in the Bretton Woods Institutions: Sharing or
Contesting Leadership?’, International Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1997), pp. 265–96.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).
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and so cope with challenges posed by high and rising levels of interdependence
that impinge on their welfare goals but which a single state’s individual action
cannot address. Exogenous factors, such as globalization and crises, also
catalyse international cooperation among states. It is believed that international institutions help states deal with challenges and achieve their national
welfare goals. Recognition of the beneficial functions of international institutions, therefore, encourages states to cooperate with one another.14
Following the liberal assumptions, it is argued that the efficiency required
of regional governance institutions in dealing with challenges posed by the
1997 Asian financial crisis encouraged states to cooperate.15 Some Japanese
officials, for example, maintained that China’s support for the CMI was
encouraged by Chinese officials’ recognition of the importance of regional
stability to China’s sustainable economic development under the globalized
financial system, and that a regional financial mechanism could be an effective means of stabilizing regional finance.16 Likewise, some may argue
that Japan and China cooperated on the establishment of the APT because
both regarded it as of great value to the interests of their respective economies and of the region as a whole in reshaping regional economic structures
to cope with the negative effects of globalization.
Although these liberal explanations provide some insights, considerations
of institutional efficiency are not sufficient to explain the complexity of
Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation. China’s efficiency consideration may be a factor explaining its participation in the CMI, but it is
not sufficient to explain China’s opposition to the initial AMF idea, which
could have been more effective in stabilizing regional finance. What is more,
China’s interest in regional financial cooperation emerged immediately after
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This being the case, liberal explanations leave
unanswered the puzzle of the timing of China’s support for a regional
financial mechanism. Similarly, why did Japan oppose China’s promotion
of an APT-based EAS that was expected to expand the influence of ‘plus
three’ over regional cooperation and community building? Moreover, given
the stronger ‘associative’ and ‘integrative’ coherence of an APT-based EAS
than of an ASEANþ6-based one,17 the former might be a more effective
14
15
16
17
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
Kevin G. Cai, ‘The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement and East Asian Regional
Grouping’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003), pp. 387–404.; Richard
Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’, Asian Survey, Vol. 42,
No. 3 (2003), pp. 440–55.; Douglas Webber, ‘Two Funerals and a Wedding?: The Ups and
Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis’, The Pacific
Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2001), pp. 339–72.
Alan Wheatley, ‘Asian Plan for Closer Monetary Ties Makes Headway’, Reuters News,
August 8, 2000, https://global.factiva.com.
Christopher Dent, ‘What Region to Lead? Development in East Asian Regionalism and
Questions of Regional Leader’, in Christopher Dent, ed., China, Japan and Regional
Leadership in East Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 3–35.
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regional institutional framework than the latter. All this implies that Japan’s
pursuit of an expanded EAS was not motivated purely by its consideration
of institutional efficiency.
Liberal approaches may provide a plausible explanation for an individual
case of Sino-Japanese relations, but do not offer a comprehensive understanding of Sino-Japanese relations within East Asian cooperation.
Alternative Explanation: Dual Identities of Political
Rivals and Regional Leaders
Constructivists can help us provide compelling insights into Sino-Japanese
relations within East Asian cooperation by bridging the gap in the rationalist literature. In general, they aim to address how states conceive of their
identities in the international and regional system, how these conceptions
translate into concrete foreign policy interests and choices, and how their
deeds interact with the outcomes of international relations.18
It is generally accepted that China and Japan have identified each other as
political rivals rather than cooperative partners,19 although for strategic and
diplomatic reasons both Chinese and Japanese government officials tend not
to express officially and directly their mutual perceptions of such rivalry.
Due to difficulties in achieving Sino-Japanese reconciliation on history and
politics, they have found working together on regional cooperation difficult.20 In this sense, power politics based on the identities of political rivals
have defined the bilateral relations between China and Japan. Consequently,
even though their interests are identical in some regional cooperative projects, the two states may nonetheless be reluctant to cooperate. For this
reason, explanations focusing on political rivalry can provide insights into
East Asian cooperation in the study of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations.
It should be noted, however, that a state may have multiple identities in its
social interactions.21 As far as China and Japan are concerned, both have
expressed intentions to exercise leadership within regional cooperation in
18
19
20
21
Thomas Berger, ‘Set for Stability? Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict in East Asia’,
Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2000), pp. 408–28.
See Kent E. Calder, ‘China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No.
2 (2006), pp. 129–39; June T. Dreyer, ‘Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for
Developing Nations’, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2006), pp. 538–57; National
Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), East Asian Strategic Review 2003 (Tokyo: NIDS,
2003), pp. 206–13. In particular, the NIDS, which is the core policy research arm of
Japanese Ministry of Defence, recognized clearly Sino-Japanese relationship as rivalry
for regional leadership.
Byung-Jun Ahn, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of East Asian Integration’,
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), pp. 18–35.; Yung Chul Park and Yunjong
Wang, ‘The Chiang Mai Initiative and Beyond’, The World Economy, Vol. 28, No. 1
(2005), pp. 91–101; Douglas Webber, ‘Two Funerals and a Wedding?’, pp. 339–72.
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power
Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 391–425.
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East Asia in their capacity as major powers in the region since the mid- to
late 1990s. Japan’s prime ministers and other high officials, such as Keizo
Obuchi, Junichiro Koizumi, and Haruhiko Kuroda, have asserted quite
clearly Japan’s leadership role within East Asian cooperation.22 China’s
leaders have also been keen to project China’s new image as a responsible
great power, this being considered a soft expression of China’s regional
leadership.23 For example, Jiang Zemin emphasized China’s responsible behaviour in the Asian financial crisis, and Hu Jintao made clear China’s
responsibility for peace, development, and cooperation in Asia.24 These instances were considered as revealing China’s intention to be ‘a responsible
leader of [East] Asia’.25 Both China and Japan have sought to construct
their national identities as regional leaders as a means to cope with physical
and/or normative challenges, such as uncommitted regional powers, which
they cannot manage through their existing identities.26 In other words, both
China and Japan act out their aspired identities as regional leaders in their
regional social interactions.
China and Japan’s aspired identities as regional leaders can shape their
interests in an East Asian region and in regional institutions. If regional
powers are to transform their identities to that of regional leaders, shaping
regions and forming regional groups can be considered as extremely useful
for such transformation, because regional leaders can exist only when there
is ‘some sort of coherent regional entity to lead’.27 Similarly, leadership
aspirants may find much value in regional institutions, because they can
serve as conduits through which to diffuse leadership aspirants’ ideas,
norms and visions.28 In other words, leadership aspirants define their interests in regional cooperative institutions according to whether those institutions are aptly designed vehicles through which to transform their identities
into that of regional leader.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
See, Yoshiko Mori, ‘Obuchi Raises Aid Voice and Amount at ASEAN Summit’, Reuters
News, December 16, 1998, https://global.factiva.com; Junichi Fukazawa and Toshinao Ishii
‘China’s ASEAN Strategy Outmaneuvers Japan’, Daily Yomiuri, November 6, 2002, https://
global.factiva.com; Hardev Kaur, ‘Kuroda–A Regional Financial Cooperation Mechanism
Vital’, Business Times, January 19, 2000, https://global.factiva.com.
See, Christopher Dent, ‘What Region to Lead?’ pp. 3–35.
See, Jiang Zemin, ‘Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Sixth APEC Informal
Leadership Meeting’, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, November 18, 1998, http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24917.htm; Hu Jintao, ‘China’s Development Is an Opportunity for
Asia’, Speech at Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, Boao, China, April 24, 2004,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm.
Ching Cheong, ‘China Gains Big in FTA Deal with ASEAN’, Straits Times, November 30,
2001, https://global.factiva.com.
For the detailed reasons why China and Japan sought to transform their national identities
to regional leaders, see Jinsoo Park, ‘Regional Leadership Dynamics and the Evolution of
East Asian Regionalism’, Pacific Focus, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012), pp. 302–04.
Christopher Dent, ‘What Region to Lead?’, p. 3.
Thomas Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional
Integration’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2002), pp. 677–96.
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Leadership-aspirants consider followers’ acceptance as key criteria when
defining their interests in regional cooperation and institutions. All identities
are inherently relational.29 Likewise, the status of a regional leader ‘is not
least a social category and depends on the acceptance of this status and the
associated hierarchy by others’.30 If China and Japan want to transform
their identities to that of regional leaders, therefore, they need to gain acceptance of such leadership from their regional neighbours, and to make
them act as followers. To do so, China and Japan are required to ply a range
of roles that correspond to the identity of regional leader, such as: stabilizer
of regional economic and political orders, provider of collective goods, and
resolver of collective actions problems; in other words, champion of regional
common interests on the global stage.31 They can also gain acceptance by
incorporating followers’ interests and/or ideas into their leadership projects32 or shaping, adjusting and elevating followers’ motivations, values
and goals.33 If we assume that China and Japan are reflective actors that
can engage in critical self-reflection and in choices designed ‘to ‘‘change the
game’’ in which they are embedded’,34 they can thus modify and change
their leadership strategies to gain followers’ acceptance, so reflecting follower feedback. Therefore, it can be assumed that the foreign policy interests
and behaviours of China and Japan are produced and reproduced by their
strategies to gain acceptance from others of their leadership claims.
Although the commitment to and salience of particular identities vary,35
states’ foreign policy interests and behaviours are rarely defined by a single
identity. In general, multiple identities jointly constitute states’ interests and
behaviours, mutually influencing one another. It is generally accepted that
leadership emerges from competition among potential leaders to appeal to
and win followers.36 Political rivalry can intensify such competition, forcing
potential leaders to be more sensitive to followers’ conditions of acceptance.
Political rivals may compete for leadership within regional cooperation to
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, pp. 391–425.
Daniel Flemes, ‘Regional Power South Africa: Co-operative Hegemony Constrained by
Historical Legacy’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2009), p. 140.
Christopher Dent, ‘What Region to Lead?’, pp. 3–35; Daniel Flemes, ‘Brazilian Foreign
Policy in the Changing World Order’, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 161–82; Walter Mattli, ‘Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes’,
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1–27; David P. Rapkin, ‘The
United States, Japan, and the Power to Block’, pp. 373–410.
Daniel Flemes and Thorsten Wojczewski, ‘Contested Leadership in International
Relations Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa’, GIGA
Working Paper, No. 121 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2010);
Stefan A. Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global
Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010), pp.
197–221.
James M. Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, p. 419.
Ibid., p. 398.
James M. Burns, Leadership, p. 18.
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prevent intra-regional counterbalancing,37 or to use institutionalized cooperation as a means to gain political presence.38
Leadership strategies to gain followers’ acceptance can, from another
point of view, mitigate and modify power politics considerations. If a
leadership-aspirant dominates followers’ acceptance through a regional cooperative initiative, its rival leadership-aspirant is forced to support it.39 To
the extent that a leadership-aspirant should gratify and respond to the needs
and wants of potential followers to gain their acceptance of its leadership
identity, it should be reluctant to exercise veto power against regional cooperative projects that a majority of followers support, even though they are
led by its political rival.
From this understanding, there can be two hypotheses with regards to the
combination effects of the identities of political rivals and regional leaders
on China’s and Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral relations within
East Asian cooperation. Firstly, China or Japan is likely to support regional
cooperative projects that the other party leads or participates in that a majority of followers support.40 This does not mean that China or Japan accepts the other’s leading roles. Rather, that by joining the projects, it seeks
not only to prevent its political rival from gaining an uncontested leadership
position, but also to demonstrate that it is a responsible leader, caring for
followers’ needs and wants. After joining the projects, China or Japan is
likely to compete with its political rival for a better leadership position with
respect to determining terms and modalities. This is because the identities of
political rivals remain to shape the bilateral relations between China and
Japan. As a result, cooperative competition emerges wherein China and
37
38
39
40
Thomas Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, pp. 677–96.
Thomas G. Moore, ‘China’s Rise in Asia: Regional Cooperation and Grand Strategy’, in
Heribert Dieter, ed., The Evolution of Regionalism in Asia: Economic and Security Issues
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 34–56.
Dirk Nabers, ‘Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in International Politics: The Case of
East Asia’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2010), pp. 931–49.
It should be stressed here that not all regional powers care about support from other
states. Sandra Destradi implies that regional powers may identify themselves as emperors,
hegemonic states or regional leaders, and their cares about other states’ needs and support
can vary according to which identities they choose. As discussed above, regional leaders
and leadership-aspirants seek to gain followers’ acceptance and this differentiates regional
leaders from other types of regional powers. In other words, if both China and Japan
identify themselves as regional emperors or regional hegemonic states, they are less likely
to bother about ASEAN’s decisions and to go along with them. As long as both China and
Japan aspire to be regional leaders, they should care about ASEAN countries’ support. As
Japanese Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Haruhiko Kuroda, clearly
recognized, ‘leadership is not something which you can have without consent or cooperation from other members’. Therefore, the level of ASEAN’s support is closely relevant to
the leadership aspirations of Chin and Japan and is a key determining factor for their
regional policies. See, Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire,
Hegemony, and Leadership’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2010), pp.
903–30; Hardev Kaur, ‘Kuroda–A Regional Financial Cooperation Mechanism Vital’.
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Japan cooperate on regional cooperative projects as a means to compete for
regional leadership.
Secondly, China or Japan is likely to object to regional cooperative projects that are initiated by the other party which do not secure support from a
majority of followers. China or Japan then feels free to exercise veto power
against the other party’s leadership initiative, because this blocking behaviour does not harm its reputation as a regional leader responsible for followers’ demands, and can effectively frustrate the leadership aspirations of
its political rival. At the same time, China or Japan tries to promote cooperative projects designed to expand its leading role and followers’ acceptance. This results in the emergence of competition wherein China and Japan
compete for regional leadership through conflicting leadership initiatives.
In the following sections, these hypotheses will be tested through the cases
of China’s opposition to an AMF and support for the CMI, and Japan’s
support for the APT and opposition to an APT-based EAS.
China’s Opposition to an AMF
In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis that revealed the imperfections
of the US- and IMF-centred global financial governance system, the
Japanese government proposed establishing an AMF. It was aimed at providing emergency financial assistance to any Asian country suffering a financial crisis, such as the one that hit Thailand in the summer of 1997. It
was also expected to act as a regional financial governance institution to
prevent and manage any possible financial crisis in the region, and to stabilize regional financial order. Through its AMF proposal, the Japanese
government desired to ‘create a policy alternative to the IMF prescription’.41
The AMF proposal was Japan’s unprecedentedly ambitious leadership
initiative.
With both the United States and the IMF opposing Japan’s AMF proposal, China’s position was crucial to its prospects. Without China, second
largest holder of foreign exchange reserves in the region,42 it would be impossible for any regional financial governance system to materialize. More
importantly, China’s opposition could give the United States strong justification for opposing Japan’s AMF idea. For this reason, the United States
lobbied China to try to get it to object to the AMF by stressing the threat of
41
42
Eisuke Sakakibara, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund : Where Do We Go From Here?’, paper
delivered to international conference on globalisation, sponsored by Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, February 26, 2001.
China reserved US dollar 142.9 billion in 1997, 149.2 billion in 1998, and 146.2 billion in
1999. Chinability, ‘China’s foreign exchange reserves, 1977–2011,’ http://www.chinability.
com/Reserves.htm. On the other hand, Japan, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at that time, had more than US dollar 200 billion.
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Japanese hegemony.43 China’s support might have forced the United States
to acquiesce to Japan’s AMF idea, or at least yield more authority to
Japan’s shaping of the regional financial order. China hence opposed the
AMF proposal. Instead, Chinese officials supported the central role of the
IMF in the economic reform and adjustment of developing countries.44
These regional policies stemmed in part from China’s suspicions about
Japan’s underlying motivations, which were reinforced by Japan’s raising
the proposal without prior consultation with China. On September 10 1997,
Japanese vice finance minister of internal affairs Eisuke Sakakibara, who
formulated the AMF idea, sent a confidential memo to Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea informing them of his
AMF plan. China was not on his list.45 As Sakakibara later admitted,46 this
omission reinforced China’s fear that an AMF would consolidate Japan’s
dominance by creating a kind of yen hegemony, and so undermine China’s
influence in regional affairs.47 In order to prevent Japan’s dominance within
the regional financial order, China needed to oppose the creation of an
AMF and to support the IMF’s continued centrality within regional financial governance.
These policies also suited China’s leadership strategies. It is generally
accepted that China had sought to construct its national image as a regional
leader or, at least a responsible great power, when the Asian financial
crisis took place.48 To construct such an identity, China tried to gain acceptance from others in the region, keeping an eye out for their needs and
wants.
When the Japanese government put forward the AMF proposal at the
annual meeting of the IMF/World Bank in Hong Kong in late September
1997, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand initially backed it, but this support was vulnerable
43
44
45
46
47
48
Phillip Y. Lipscy, ‘Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal’, Stanford Journal of East
Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003), p. 96.
‘China backs IMF’s strengthened surveillance and dialogue’, Xinhua News, September 21,
1997, https://global.factiva.com; Li Peng, ‘Address by the Premier of the State Council of
the People’s Republic of China’, statement at the Annual Meetings of the Boards of
Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, Hong
Kong, China, September 23–25, 1997, http://www.imf.org/external/am/speeches/pdf/
pr01e.pdf; Liu Zhongli, ‘Statement by Minister of Finance of the People’s Republic of
China’, statement at the 1997 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the World
Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, Hong Kong, China, September 23,
1997, http://www.imf.org/external/am/speeches/pdf/pr15cne.pdf.
Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside The Crisis That Rocked The Global Financial System
And Humbled The IMF (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
‘Accommodating China’, Business Times Singapore, February 22, 2003, https://global.fac
tiva.com.
See also Yang Jiang, ‘Response and Responsibility’, p. 608.
Shaun Breslin, ‘Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and
Implications’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2009), pp. 817–35.
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to United States’ pressure and lobbying.49 Since the response of its neighbours to Japan’s AMF proposal was undetermined, China’s opposition at
the above Hong Kong meeting was at first ‘muted’. When, however, in the
face of strong United States opposition most regional states withdrew their
initial support for the AMF proposal, China officially stated that launching
an AMF was premature, giving as its reasons low consensus in the region.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said:
I think that the parties concerned have yet to conduct studies on this issue . . .
which has produced different views. This has not been put on the
agenda . . . (Asian) countries are in the stage of maintaining an atmosphere for
consultation. They have not yet reached agreement on taking measures or trying
to find a solution to the financial crisis.50
Since there was no firm support among East Asian countries for the creation of an East Asian financial governance mechanism, China without
hesitation exercised de facto veto power against an AMF that would consolidate Japan’s regional leadership or dominance in shaping the regional
financial order. The move did no harm to China’s reputation as a responsible regional leader.
At the same time, China sought to build up its identity as a regional leader
by providing financial assistance worth more than US$4 billion to crisis-hit
countries in the region, and maintained a policy of non-devaluation of its
currency, ‘in line with the guiding principle of being a ‘‘responsible country’’,
and within the framework of the IMF’.51 For China, cooperating bilaterally
within the IMF framework was a more efficient way of reinforcing its identity as a regional leader than creating an AMF. Chinese officials felt the
necessity, in the face of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, for regional financial
cooperation that could stabilize regional economies. For example, Chinese
Central Bank Governor Dai Xianglong stressed regional financial cooperation, saying that ‘financial instability harms all Asian countries’.52 China
committed financial assistance to the IMF-sponsored rescue package for
Thailand in August 1997. This was not only to safeguard its economic
interest but also to show willingness to assume the responsibilities of a
regional leader. The country’s commitment was construed as helping
China ‘build up diplomatic capital for the future’,53 ‘take its rightful place
49
50
51
52
53
Eric Altbach, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional
Leadership’, Japan Economic Institute (JEI) Report, No. 47a (Washington D.C.:
JEI, 1997).
‘China Cautious on Proposed Asian Monetary Fund’, Agence France-Presse, November
18, 1997, https://global.factiva.com.
Pang Zhongying, ‘Bigger Role for China in Regional Cooperation’, China Daily, January
5, 2009, https://global.factiva.com.
Robert Flint and Karby Leggett, ‘China to Add $1 Billion to Thai Bailout’, Asian Wall
Street Journal, August 15, 1997, https://global.factiva.com.
Mure Dickie, ‘China Looks to Future by Backing Thailand Bailout’, Reuters News,
August 14, 1997, https://global.factiva.com.
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as a regional player’,54 and ‘gain face as a full-fledged player in regional
affairs’.55 In this situation, China had no reason to discard the bilateral
cooperative mechanism that proved beneficial for its aspired leadership in
favour of an AMF that would cement Japan’s presence in the regional
financial order.
As a result, conflictive competition emerged wherein China and Japan,
having conflicting ideas on bilateral cooperation within the IMF framework
and on the creation of an East Asian financial governance mechanism,
competed for regional leadership.
China’s Support for the CMI
Despite the abortive AMF proposal, Japan did not give up the idea of the
creation of a regional financial governance mechanism. In October 1998,
Japan proposed the so-called New Miyazawa Initiative, in the expectation
that ‘in the long run the establishment of an international guarantee institution with a prime focus on Asia will be seriously considered’.56 Eventually,
in May 2000, the Japanese government proposed the CMI, in hopes it would
develop into an AMF.57The fate of a renewed Japanese-led initiative to
establish a regional financial governance mechanism once again hinged on
China. In contrast with its previous opposition to an AMF, however, China
joined the CMI.
To understand China’s joining the CMI it is necessary first to consider
ideational changes in the region that started in 1998. In response to the
inabilities and inappropriateness of the United States and the IMF’s dealing
with the Asian financial crisis, resentment against them among East Asian
countries grew.58 Meanwhile, impressed by Japan’s New Miyazawa
Initiative, some East Asian countries became eager to create a regional financial governance mechanism. In November 1998, Korean Prime Minister
Kim Jong Phil repeatedly offered his support for a Japanese-led AMF, and
Thailand and Malaysia respectively resurrected the AMF plan in July and
August 1999. In November 1999, ASEAN called on Japan to make the
Miyazawa Fund a permanent facility.
These ideational changes posed challenges to the Chinese government. As
one Chinese official commented: ‘The impetus for regional economic
54
55
56
57
58
Giles Hewitt, ‘China Emerges as Regional Financial Player’, Agence France-Presse,
August 15, 1997, https://global.factiva.com.
Robert Flint and Karby Leggett, ‘China to Add $1 Billion to Thai Bailout’.
Ministry of Finance, Japan, ‘A New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis
(New Miyazawa Initiative)’ 3 October 1998, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_
policy/financial_cooperation_in_asia/new_miyazawa_initiative/e1e042.htm.
‘Japan to propose Asian currency pact’ Agence France-Presse, March 29, 2000, https://
global.factiva.com.
Richard Higgott, ‘The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment’, New
Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1998), pp. 333–56.
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cooperation was so strong that it became an inevitable trend that some
mechanism would be established, possibly even without the participation
of China.’59 However, not all regional powers are responsible for the
needs and wants of others. Regional powers that identify themselves as
emperors or hegemonic states may be indifferent to others’ demands. It
should be stressed that China’s self-identification as a responsible regional
leader made it more sensitive to regional pressure. China consistently
adopted after the Asian financial crisis strategies geared to the wants and
needs of others that would expand regional acceptance of its leadership.
In fact, China’s support for the CMI came as no surprise. Although China
had followed the strategy of bilateral cooperation within the IMF framework in order to increase regional acceptance of its leadership, as the wants
and needs of its neighbours changed, it began to change and modify its
leadership strategy according to ideational changes in the region. From
late 1998, China used the idea of a regional multilateral framework as an
effective tool for gaining regional acceptance of its leadership. At the second
APT Summit meeting in December 1998, China not only agreed to the
regularization of APT Summit meetings, but also proposed the APT
Finance and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting. This was in response to growing interest among its neighbours in East Asian cooperation, and in Japan’s
New Miyazawa Initiative. In reply to Malaysia’s repeated requests, in
November 1999 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji even offered China’s official
support for an AMF which it had originally opposed—China’s leadership
strategy of meeting the demands of other regional states for an AMF.
China’s eventual participation in the CMI also constituted strategy to
expand acceptance of its regional leadership through demonstrating that it
was a stabilizer of regional economies. Chinese Finance Minister Xiang
Huaicheng stressed: ‘our government is in support of such an initiative
[the CMI] because it contributes to financial and economic stability in the
region’.60
China’s leadership strategy of taking into consideration others’ needs and
wants also influenced the country’s approach to its political rivalry with
Japan. Before Japan officially proposed the CMI plan in May 2000, it
made no secret of its intention of using the CMI to promote internationalization of the yen. Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said in
April 2000:
We had been reluctant . . . about the yen’s internationalisation . . . But our hesitation is now going away . . . we are planning to expand swap and repurchase
59
60
Quoted in Yang Jiang, ‘Response and responsibility’, p. 610.
Thanong Khanthong and Wichit Chaitrong, ‘Asian Leaders Join to Protect Region’s
Finance’, Nation, May 7, 2000, https://global.factiva.com.
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100 Jinsoo Park
agreements between Japan and other countries . . . Through such things, I hope
other countries will have a sense of affinity with the yen.61
China, still not reconciled with Japan, was concerned about the possible
creation of a yen hegemony, and reluctant to be involved in the CMI because it would cement Japan’s dominance in the regional financial order.62
However, China could not exercise de facto veto power against the CMI as it
had in the instance of the AMF, because it recognized that the CMI was
welcomed by most other states in the region. Rather, China was forced to
take a more proactive stance on the CMI in order to demonstrate its responsibility. In this situation, the way to neutralize Japan’s leading role, or
at least be on an equal footing with Japan in leadership competition, was to
participate in the CMI and to compete with Japan within it.
Although China joined the CMI, its political rivalry with Japan remained
one of the key factors defining its bilateral relations with Japan. Stressing
considerations of diversity and consensus among states in the region,63
China sought to mitigate and manage Japanese power in the course of negotiations to determine the terms and modalities of the CMI. China hence
frustrated Japan’s efforts to make the CMI a multilateral operative framework and to enhance its surveillance system. China also insisted on 100%
linkage of the CMI funds to IMF conditionality.64 These moves reflected
China’s intention to prevent Japan from freely using the CMI as a tool to
consolidate its dominance in shaping the regional financial order. As a
result, the CMI was established in the form of bilateral agreements rather
than as a multilateral agreement. It did not impose obligations to share
financial information, and introduced third-party enforcement through the
IMF link. As such, China and Japan cooperated within the CMI to compete
for political influence in the region.
Japan’s Support for the APT
The APT was established in 1997 as the first genuine East Asian institutional
framework. Its successful establishment was possible because both Japan
and China not only participated but also played crucial roles in it. In particular, Japan’s support for the APT was in sharp contrast to its previous
lukewarm stance in the early 1990s on the creation of an East Asian
61
62
63
64
‘Japan Growing More Ambitious about Pushing Yen’, Agence France-Presse, April 25,
2000, https://global.factiva.com.
Alan Wheatley, ‘Asia Takes Baby Steps toward Closer Monetary Ties’, Reuters News,
January 15, 2001, https://global.factiva.com.
Xiang Huaicheng, ‘Speech at the Third ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting,’ Kobe Japan,
January 14, 2001, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/asem/
asem_2001/aseme03i3.htm.
Jennifer A. Amyx, ‘Japan and the Evolution of Regional Financial Arrangement in East
Asia’, pp. 198–218.
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101
Economic Group, whose potential members were exactly same as those of
the APT.
Although Japan participated in the first APT summit, it was at first keener
to strengthen its bilateral relations with ASEAN than to promote the APT.
Japan even refused ASEAN’s request to regularize APT Summit meetings.
After the failure of its AMF proposal in 1997, the Japanese government was
reluctant again to take the initiative in the formalization of a region-wide
institutional framework like the APT. Instead, it quietly sought to recover its
regional leadership by trying through functional cooperation to enhance its
bilateral relationship with ASEAN.65 In 1999, however, Japan, began to
take a proactive role in the promotion of the APT. This was facilitated by
consideration of its political rivalry with China and of its leadership strategy
to gain followers’ acceptance.
As noted above, China began to take a more committed stance towards
the APT in 1998. As one influential Japanese scholar said: ‘When China got
involved, things became political.’66 Although the Japanese government
took a lukewarm stance on the APT, ‘the Chinese government’s agreement
to take up ASEAN’s invitation essentially forced Tokyo’s hand . . . the
Japanese government could not afford to let China gain an uncontested
leadership position in the region’.67 Moreover, although Japan was the largest provider of financial assistance during the Asian financial crisis, it was
not Japan but China that had garnered ‘the lion’s share of appreciation’
from ASEAN countries.68 In this context, Japan needed to mitigate China’s
growing influence in the region.
Secondly, Japan, which had sought to transform its national identities as a
regional leader, could not overlook the eagerness among its neighbours for
the creation of an East Asian institution. After the onset of the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, Japan’s regional leadership, if any, had waned. Japan’s ambitious AMF plan was frustrated, and it was even accused of causing and
exacerbating the crisis. In this context, Japan needed to (re)construct its
image as a regional leader. The Japanese government moreover needed to
reshape regional economic order to absorb the negative impact of globalization, in the interests of its own economy and that of the region as a whole.69
To do so, Japan needed to take a more overtly leading role.
To transform its national identity to that of a regional leader, Japan was
required to be mindful of followers’ needs and wants. The APT was a kind
65
66
67
68
69
Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject
Defeat or Quiet Victory?’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 2
(2000), pp. 219–53.
Personal interview with Yoshihide Soeya, Tokyo, Japan, June 23, 2009.
Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’, Asian Survey,
Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002), pp. 440–55.
Kusuma Snitwongse, ‘A New World Order in East Asia?’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (2003), p. 38.
Personal interview with Hitoshi Tanaka, Tokyo, Japan, June 17, 2009.
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102 Jinsoo Park
of ‘follower-initiated leadership’70 project. Japan proposed in January 1997
the holding of regular Japan–ASEAN summit meetings, but ASEAN countries converted the proposal immediately into a more ambitious plan to
include China and South Korea. They found much value in the APT for
dealing with challenges that the Asian financial crisis posed which they could
not address by themselves. In this sense, they were willing followers, or
smaller states in need of a regional leader, that could not solve their problems and achieve common goals in the face of the Asian financial crisis. They
asked Japan as well as China not only to agree to the regularization of APT
Summit meetings, but also to play crucial roles in promoting an East Asian
grouping. It was in this context that Japan needed to demonstrate its responsibility as a regional leader.
After taking a more committed stance on the APT, Japan competed with
China to be seen as the most important agenda-setter. Japan tried to use the
APT to reshape the regional financial system71 through which it aimed to
enhance its presence in both the regional and international financial systems.
As manifested in the so-called Obuchi Plan,72 Japan also sought to bridge
development gaps in the region and eventually to revitalize its developmental state model. China, meanwhile, concentrated on promoting cooperation
in the trade field within the APT, as seen in its ambitious initiative for a
China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
These different goals were highly relevant to the political rivalry between
Japan and China. Japan’s initiatives were expected to help Japan preserve its
presence in the region, given that finance and developmental fields were
areas in which Japan had the edge over China, in terms of the availability
of capital, experience, and knowledge. China, meanwhile, considered regional trade cooperation, especially the FTA issue, the perfect area through
which to steal the march on Japan, given the increasing attractiveness of its
huge potential market.
As such, Japan’s support for the APT was facilitated by its recognition of
political rivalry with China and its aspired identity of regional leader.
Japan’s Opposition to an APT-based EAS
At the third APT Directors-Generals’ meeting in April 2004, China urged
for the evolution of the APT into an EAS, and expressed its desire to host
the first EAS meeting. Behind this was China’s expectation that an
70
71
72
Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and
Leadership’, p. 924.
Saori N. Katada, ‘Japan and Asian Monetary Regionalisation: Cultivating a New
Regional Leadership after the Asian Financial Crisis’, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2002),
pp. 85–112.
See Keijo Obuchi, ‘Press Statement’, Manila, the Philippines, 28 November 1999, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9911/press_pm1.html.
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APT-based EAS would provide an avenue for China to seize regional
leadership and develop a China-centred East Asian community (EAC).
An APT-based EAS was expected to expand China’s (and Japan’s) roles
in an East Asian institutional framework beyond the limitations of its ‘guest’
status. In addition, it might be an ideal framework to buffer and mitigate
United States influence in the region.
Although an APT-based EAS would allow Japan as well as China to
reinforce their influence in the regional institutional framework, Japan
sought to cancel out China’s proposal and advocated an expanded regional
institutional framework. Through the so-called Issue Paper of July 2004,73
the Japanese government suggested that Australia, New Zealand, and India
be admitted as members of an EAS. In addition, Japanese Foreign Minister,
Nobutaka Machimura, proposed in January 2005 that the United States be
included in an EAS as an observer.
Japan’s opposition to an APT-based EAS derived in part from consideration of its political rivalry with China. Japan sought to provide a counterweight to China, which would otherwise dominate the summit and, more
critically, the process of community building in East Asia. A Japanese government official made this clear: ‘in the scope of ASEAN-plus-three (China,
Japan and South Korea), Japan is the only country that can say things
against China . . . But in the East Asia Summit, it’s not just Japan, but
also Australia, New Zealand and India’.74
Japan’s regional policy was not, however, solely determined by its recognition of political rivalry with China. It should be stressed that Japan’s
vision of an expanded EAC had been revealed prior to 2004. In his speech
in Singapore in January 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
called for the creation of an EAC that should by no means be an exclusive
entity. He suggested that Australia and New Zealand, together with the APT
members, be core members of such a community.
This vision of an expanded EAC reflected Japan’s growing fear that it was
losing the edge over China in regional cooperation. This sense of fear was
reported by the Japanese newspaper, Daily Yomiuri, under the title,
‘China’s ASEAN strategy outmanoeuvres Japan’.75 The article stated that
Japanese government officials, noting how China had been increasing its
presence in the region through its strategic diplomacy, felt as a matter of
extreme urgency the need to regain their country’s economic leadership. This
reveals how Japan’s recognition of political rivalry had constantly shaped its
regional policy towards the regional architecture.
73
74
75
Ministry of Foreign Affair, Japan, ‘Issue Papers Prepared by the Government of Japan’,
June 25, 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/issue.pdf.
Naoko Aoki, ‘Japan, China Rivalry Marks East Asia Summit Preparations’, Kyodo News,
December 8, 2005, https://global.factiva.com.
Junichi Fukazawa and Toshinao Ishii, ‘China’s ASEAN Strategy Outmaneuvers Japan’.
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104 Jinsoo Park
Why, then, did Japan begin overtly to promote its vision of an expanded
EAS only after China proposed an APT-based EAS in 2004? This was highly
relevant to Japan’s leadership strategy. Firstly, ASEAN countries’ concerns
about an EAS restrained Japan from overtly promoting its vision of an
expanded EAC. According to a Korean member of the East Asian Vision
Group,76 while most ASEAN countries shared the rationale of evolving the
APT into an EAS, they feared that more powerful Northeast countries
would dominate the effort to create a unified East Asia. For this reason,
an EAS was envisioned as ‘a long-term desirable objective of the
ASEANþ3’.77 In this situation, the Japanese government could not give
shape to its expanded EAC, even though it was considered a useful means
to neutralize China’s growing power and influence in the region. The
Japanese government instead sought to increase its ‘intellectual leadership’
for the future community-building effort.78 With this in mind, in December
2003, Japan invited all ASEAN members to Tokyo to assure them of its
vision and share with them the view that Japan and ASEAN would play a
central role in the creation of an EAC.79
Secondly, China’s promotion of an APT-based EAS and concerns among
some ASEAN countries about a Sino-centric regional order offered Japan
the perfect opportunity to promote its own vision for the future regional
order. China’s proposal for an APT-based EAS was not welcomed by some
ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Singapore. Rather, ASEAN countries strongly argued that ‘ASEAN should be in the ‘‘driver’s seat’’ of any
East Asian Summit’.80 China’s high-profile policies in the trade and security
fields in the early 2000s mitigated the perceptions of China as a threat
among ASEAN countries, but most still had misgivings about China’s
potentially untrammelled power.81 Although there was no broad consensus
76
77
78
79
80
81
Personal interview with Kyung Tae Lee, Seoul, Republic of Korea, August 18, 2009.
East Asian Study Group, ‘Final Report of the East Asia Study Group’, Phnom Pen,
Cambodia, November 4, 2002, p. 5, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/
pmv0211/report.pdf.
Personal interview with Hitoshi Tanaka.
Ministry of Foreign Affair, Japan, ‘Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and
Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium’, Tokyo, Japan, December
11–12, 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/year2003/summit/tokyo_dec.
pdf. This event certainly engendered China’s concern that it would be alienated in the
process of East Asian community building and thus its quest for regional leadership would
be undermined. Underpinning China’s push for an APT-based EAS was therefore
‘Beijing’s insecurities and fears regarding the gathering momentum for a broader EAC
that could shift power alignments within Asia’. Mohan Malik, ‘China and the East Asian
Summit’. See also, You Ji, ‘East Asian Community: A New Platform for Sino-Japanese
Cooperation and Contention’, Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pp. 19–28.
‘ASEAN Should Be in ‘Driver’s Seat In Any East Asian Summit’, Agence France-Presses,
June 28, 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/afp/56.htm.
Personal interview with Jin Canrong, Beijing, China, July 17, 2009. See also, Evelyn Goh,
‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia’, International Security, Vol. 32,
No. 3 (2008), pp. 113–57.
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on promoting exclusive East Asian regionalism,82 China made little effort to
assure its neighbours of its vision of an APT-based EAS. Rather, China’s
proposal for hosting the first EAS without any prior consultation put
Southeast Asian countries on their guard.83 It fuelled ASEAN countries’
concerns that the regional project in which they had played important
roles would be hijacked by stronger states. As one newspaper correctly
reported:
Beijing has been enjoying the run of Asian diplomatic play for at least the past
three years. But instead of confirming China’s position as prime mover in the
new emerging Asia, the [East Asia] summit emphasised the misgivings that other
nations have about its potential and ambitions.84
Taking advantage of concerns among some ASEAN countries about a
Sino-centric regional order, Japan exercised de facto veto power against
China’s promotion of an APT-based EAS, and the Japanese government
acquiesced in Southeast Asian states’ strong ambitions to be in the driver’s
seat of the EAC construction. This was not only to lure them, but also to
prevent China from being the sole driver. Toshihisa Tanaka, a deputy
director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Ocean Affairs
Bureau said:
We are of the view that ASEAN continues to be the driver of our efforts . . . or
according to their own description a ‘safe driver’. It is true maybe that Japan
alone cannot occupy the driver’s seat . . . Maybe if China occupies the single
driver’s seat for Asian cooperation efforts, well, we may feel a little bit
uneasy. So, in that sense, we continue to rely on ASEAN as a ‘safe driver’ for
our joint cooperation.85
At the same time, the Japanese government began to argue publicly for its
own vision of an expanded EAS. Taking the opportunity of China’s promotion of an EAS, it attempted to lead discussions on the structure and
substance of an EAS.86 In particular, Japan presented its own idea of an
expanded EAS through the aforementioned Issue Paper:
If the membership [between the APT and the EAS] is the same, is there a merit
in holding an East Asian Summit? ASEAN now holds a regular Summit with
India, and is discussing holding a commemorative Summit with Australia and
New Zealand (CER). Can we continue to regard ASEANþ3 as the basis of
evolution toward an East Asia Summit?87
82
83
84
85
86
87
Marcus Hund, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism?
A Skeptic’s Appraisal’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003), pp. 383–417.
Hadi Soesastro, ‘East Asia: Many Clubs, Little Progress’, Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 169, No. 1 (2006), pp. 50–53.
Philip Bowring, ‘An Asian Union? Not Yet’, International Herald Tribune, December 17,
2005, https://global.factiva.com.
James Simms, ‘Japan Diplomat: Want East Asia Group To Be Open’, Dow Jones
International News, December 12, 2005, https://global.factiva.com.
Personal interview with Hitoshi Tanaka.
Ministry of Foreign Affair, Japan, ‘Issue Papers Prepared by the Government of Japan’.
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106 Jinsoo Park
Japan subsequently argued repeatedly for the inclusion of these countries
in an EAS, stressing it should be open and inclusive.
With mediation by ASEAN countries that seemed obsessed with ‘taking
the driver’s seat’ in regional processes rather than developing a genuine East
Asian institutional framework, the first EAS was launched in December
2005 as a non-exclusive regional institutional framework discrete from the
APT, and including Australia, India, and New Zealand. Both China and
Japan then began to support ASEAN’s role as a driver in the East Asian
framework, but this did not mean that they would cease efforts towards
attaining regional leadership. China started to assert that the APT should
lead the initiative for creating an EAC and tried to relegate the EAS to a
forum for consultations between the APT members and those outside the
group, such as India and Australia. Japan, meanwhile, maintained that the
EAS should take the initiative in launching the community. This reflected
both China and Japan’s desires to play a leadership role in the region. As a
result, Sino-Japanese conflictive competition emerged. Japan and China
have been the champions respectively of the EAS and APT, and increasingly
engaged in a struggle to constitute their preferred regional body as institutional core of regional cooperation and community building in East Asia,
and so assume a better leadership position in the region.
Conclusion
It has been argued in this article that dual identities have played significant
roles in shaping China and Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral
relations in East Asian cooperation. The article has highlighted how both
China and Japan have the dual identities of political rivals in their bilateral
interactions and regional leaders in their regional interactions. It also argued
that these dual identities jointly produced the variances of China’s and
Japan’s regional policies and their bilateral relations, which resulted in
Sino-Japanese cooperative competition within the CMI and the APT and
their conflictive competition with regards to an AMF and an APT-based
EAS. From these findings, this article suggests that explanations focusing on
dual identities can help us provide compelling insights into the complexity of
Sino-Japanese relations that have crucial impacts on the fate and degree of
East Asian cooperation.
The four cases analysed in this article are of more than passing historical
interest. In fact, many studies on Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation have not moved beyond a simple deterministic understanding that
growing interdependence facilitates Sino-Japanese cooperation, but that
enduring political rivalry serves as a critical impediment to their genuine
cooperation. However, this understanding is neither informative nor precise
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Sino-Japanese Relations within East Asian Cooperation
107
in understanding what Sino-Japanese relations are actually like within East
Asian cooperation and their impacts on East Asian cooperation.
For example, those focusing solely on political rivalry between China and
Japan expect Sino-Japanese relations to be a critical impediment to the
development of an independent East Asian financial governance system.88
China’s and Japan’s self-perceptions of regional leaders, however, have
lingered to shape their regional policies and thus their bilateral relations.
The combination of dual identities of political rivals and regional leaders
drove China and Japan to compete cooperatively with each other in the
process of the CMIM. Sino-Japanese cooperative competition for regional
leadership has moreover contributed to the gradual development of the
CMIM towards an independent East Asian financial governance system.
In 2014, the CMIM fund will be expanded from US$ 120 billion to 240
billion and the IMF de-link portion will possibly be increased by 40%.89
The key implication of this article is that the regional policies of China and
Japan and their bilateral relations are not predetermined, but depend on
their various role definitions and strategies. In order for us to provide compelling insights into Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian cooperation, it is
essential to trace possible changes in the identities of China and Japan within
the regional system and to explore how such changes influence their regional
policy interests and behaviours.
Although both China and Japan have consistently sought to construct
their national images as regional leaders, they may now want to transform
their identities once again. For example, China has since the mid 2000s
transformed its role definition from that of a regional leader simply responding to others to one of self-assertion.90 As one Japanese scholar argues,
Japan may now seek to identify itself as a middle power rather than as a
regional leader.91 These possible changes may constitute regional policy
interests and behaviours different from what we have so far seen.
88
89
90
91
William W. Grimes, ‘The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn?’, pp. 79–104.
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea, ‘ASEANþ3 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors; Meeting Successfully Concludes’, May 3, 2012, http://english.
mosf.go.kr/upload/mini/2012/05/FILE_A66G81_20120503182819_1.pdf.
Yang Jiang, ‘Response and Responsibility’, pp. 603–23.
Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Japan’s Middle-Power Diplomacy’, Paper delivered at Tokyo
Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 2009, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/art
icles/2008/japans-middle-power-diplomacy/.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, 2013