InternationalPolitical ScienceReview (1998), Vol. 19, No. 3, 251-267
The Effects of Incorporation into WorldSystems on Ethnic Processes: Lessons from the
Ancient World for the Contemporary World
THOMASD. HALL
ABSTRACT.This article discusses how incorporation into a world-system
(ancient or contemporary) can create, transform, or destroy ethnic groups.
It suggests that: (1) ethnically homogeneous states have never been
common; (2) ethnicity has always been fluid with respect to identity,
boundaries, cultural content, and membership; (3) ethnic processes cannot
be understood without careful consideration of their interstate, or worldsystemic, context; (4) contemporary ethnic conflicts have contemporary
roots; (5) the differences between the contemporary and ancient worlds
need further study; (7) the origin of the ideal of the ethnically homogeneous state and shifts in ethnic processes in the twentieth century lack
adequate explanation.
[Italicized words prefixed by an asterisk (*) are explained in the Glossary
at the end of this issue.]
Introduction
I will argue two fundamental points in this article. First, the processes by which
ethnic groups are created (*ethnogenesis), transformed, and destroyed cannot be
understood without attending carefully to the larger, interstate context within
which these processes occur. Though the contextual setting is far from providing
a complete explanation, it is vital to constructing such an explanation. For those
closely familiar with *world-systemtheory, this is a specific extension of the claim
that all local social processes are shaped by, and in turn shape, world-system
processes (Bach, 1980). Second, new insights into contemporary ethnic processes
may be gained by examining ancient, that is to say pre-fifteenth century processes.
This examination will help distinguish new processes from old, and help untangle
complex ethnic processes. I hasten to add that I see this article as merely one
0192-5121 (1998/07) 19:3, 251-267; 004015 ? 1998 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi)
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on EthnicProcesses
into World-Systems
TheEffectsof Incorporation
statement in a continuing dialogue among students of ancient and contemporary
ethnicity. I hope each group of scholars will learn from the other.
For several years I have collaborated with Christopher Chase-Dunn in studying
pre-capitalist, that is before the fifteenth century, world-systems. To do this we have
had to modify extensively the world-system models originally proposed by Immanuel
Wallerstein (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). In particular I have elaborated the
concept of incorporation into a world-system of either a region or a group, or both
(Hall, 1986, 1987, 1989a: chap. 2; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: chap. 4). In this
article I focus on how world-systemic processes can create, transform, or destroy
ethnic groups, and how those processes are the same, and differ between ancient
and contemporary world-systems.
In order to do so, I begin with a brief discussion of definitional issues, then
summarize the historic depth of ethnic-like relations. With the stage thus set I will
summarize the comparative world-systems approach to these issues. After noting
two remaining puzzles, I conclude with a few lessons from the study of ancient
ethnic conflicts for the study of contemporary ones.
Definitional
Issues
When scholars, whose training and practice are rooted in different social science
disciplines, engage in discussions of common concerns, it is all too easy to get
bogged down in all sorts of conceptual and definitional issues. I prefer to extend
Arthur Stinchcombe's (1978) dictum that counting is the last, not first step in
theoretical and empirical investigation. Thus, definitions should emerge within
theoretical and empirical discussions. In order to forestall such confusion I present
a few garden variety definitions in order to begin the discussion.
I follow Wallerstein's definition of a world-system as an intersocietal system
marked by a self-contained division of labor. It is largely self-contained and has
some degree of internal coherence and forms a complete unit (Wallerstein, 1974,
1979, 1980, 1989). Hence the hyphen in the term which has, itself, become politicized (Thompson, 1983a, b; Wallerstein, 1983). Only in the twentieth century has
this "world" become truly global. Similarly, the term is now often used in the plural,
as I use it here, again with some contention (Wallerstein, 1993, 1995). While much
world-systems work-with or without the hyphen, with or without the plural-has
roots in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, his voluminous production is but a small
fraction of it (Hall, 1996a, b).
The word "modern" and its derivatives are similarly vexing. In this article I follow
the usage of Fred Riggs (1998) and Anthony D. Smith (1994: 392): using "contemporary" or "recent" rather than *modern,and using modernity for the constellation
of recent, more or less democratic, industrialized, national states. Still, I must point
out that for Wallerstein the "modern" in the "modern world-system" refers to
of which many scholars would not label
approximately the last 500 years-most
"modern," or "recent," or "contemporary." Thus, in this article I use "ancient" for
the period before circa 1500 CE. This, however, leaves the period from 1450 to ca.
1800 problematic.
The most contentious terminological terrain is that relating to "ethnicity." I
begin with the following, typical, or garden variety meanings. I (and indeed all the
authors in this issue) refine and modify these definitions as we proceed. *Ethnicity
is a publicly recognized, shared feeling of belonging to the same group defined by
kinship or biology. Race is the same thing, but typically marked by one or more
THOMASD. HALL
253
phenotypical manifestations. To anticipate many comments, these markers are
clearly socially constructed. *Nationality is similar to ethnicity, but defined by
citizenship in or subjection to a state. Clearly, a nationality may encompass many
ethnicities. In this discussion I will use ethnicity as a cover term, not because I wish
to gloss over important distinctions, but for the more prosaic purpose of simpler
exposition.
I must note here, however, that I have an important disagreement with the usage
of Fred Riggs'. For me ethnicity existed in the ancient world, albeit in substantially
different forms. Here I follow the discussions of Smith (1994: 191, 381) and Tamir
(1995: 494) on nationalism. To study the emergence of a new or changing social
process we must be careful not to build explanations of those changes into our
concepts. Let me hasten to add that I fully concur with Fred Riggs's claim that
"modern," or contemporary ethnicity is very different from ancient ethnicity. But
precisely because I seek to understand how the modern version emerged from the
ancient version, I do not wish to restrict the term "ethnicity" solely to the modern
version.
These definitions are rather facile. In the late twentieth century due to increased
race-ethnic-national mixing-the Tiger Woods phenomenon-these distinctions can
blur significantly. However, in ancient times the distinctions sometimes collapsed
to the same thing, especially for non-state societies, where often-but not alwaysthere was no difference between "primordialist" and "situational" definitions of
group identity.1
Further, the tension between biology and politics is significant throughout the
range of phenomena that these three terms address. *Raceis often seen as largely
biological, whereas nationality is typically seen as largely political. This is far from
accidental, but rather is a manifestation of the shift from kin-ordered societies to
tributary or state-ordered societies (discussed below, and in Chase-Dunn and Hall,
1997; Sanderson, 1955a; and Sanderson and Hall, 1995a). Furthermore, imputing
biological bases to political and social differences is an all-to-familiar strategy to
manipulate perceptions and to influence intergroup relations. To begin to understand and analyze the tension and confusion in these terms, I will briefly recap what
we can learn from world history on the matter.
Polyethnicity Is Normal, Not National States
William H. McNeill claims that world history shows "polyethnicity as normal in
civilized societies, whereas the ideal of an ethnically unitary state was exceptional
in theory and rarely approached in practice" (McNeill, 1986: 4). By *polyethnicity
McNeill means what sociologists conventionally call pluralist2 or multicultural
societies, without making any of the finer distinctions used by Fred Riggs (1994,
1997a, 1998), and especially without reference to their "modernity"in Riggs's sense.
McNeill couches his argument in terms of "civilization" and "barbarism,"by which
he means what Gerhard Lenski (Lenski, Nolan and Lenski, 1995) would call agrarian states and horticultural, pastoral, or foraging societies, or what I would call
tributary and kin-ordered modes of accumulation (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, esp.
chaps. 2 and 3).3 In short, the drive for nation-building, especially when focused on
racial-ethnic-linguistic-cultural homogeneity, is an aberration of the last few
centuries in the over 5 000 years of the history of states. The recent resurgence of
states made up of multiple ethnic groups is a continuation of the historically natural
condition of states.
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In a review of McNeill's book, Leslie Laczko (1990) questions McNeill's assertion that polyethnic hierarchy is on the rise everywhere. His denial does not
gainsay the commonality of ethnic conflict. Laczko further notes that "the work
does little to clear up the widespread conceptual confusion in the field when it
uses the term national unity as a synonym for ethnic homogeneity, in much the
same way as all those nationalist thinkers have often done!" (Laczko, 1990: 428).
Still, McNeill's account underscores that multi-ethnic states are typical, and
ethnically homogeneous states have been very rare in both the ancient and
contemporary worlds. This fact raises two questions. First, why and how did an
state ever arise, especially in the face of
ideal of an *ethnicallyhomogeneous
overwhelming evidence that ethnic-racial-linguistic-cultural diversity remains the
statistical norm in states (see Gurr, 1993)? Indeed, why do some still hold on to
this ideal? This question I will defer until later. Second, why is ethnic diversity so
pervasive? I will begin with McNeill's explanation, then turn to world-systems
elaborations of his explanation.
McNeill argues that three fundamental processes constantly generate polyethnicity in states.4 Polyethnicity is common first and foremost because states, based
on agriculture for over 95 percent of their existence, are far more productive, have
higher population densities, and are much wealthier (even if very unequally distributed) than non-state societies. Hence they often displace or conquer the others as
they spread into new territories, absorbing new peoples.
Second, this expansion is fueled by differentials in the occurrence of disease. As
McNeill notes (1986: 12; and 1976), until the mid-nineteenth century cities were
net population sinks. Their populations always had to be replaced. Where this did
not occur voluntarily, it was accomplished through force. Slaves typically became
lowest ranking members of society. Occasionally, though, they were palace guards.
Once in a while these palace guards took over the government (e.g., Mamluks in
Egypt). In either case, the importation of new populations tended to generate and
increase polyethnicity.
Third, trade led to mixing. Some long-distance traders took up residence in
distant lands, creating trade diasporas. This movement facilitated trade because
traders knew that at the end of a long exchange (whether direct, or indirect) they
would be dealing with people who traded by the same rules. These communities
maintained their differences from their host populations and were often recognized
by host governments as having the right to govern their own affairs (Curtin, 1984).5
Later, when universal religions (Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism) united large
areas, ethnic enclaves were no longer as necessary as before. Trade diasporas gave
way to what Curtin (1984) calls trade ecumenes-that is, large areas where values
were shared. Where trade diasporas persisted, members often adhered to a different world religion as well as being ethnically distinct. To sum up, McNeill's
argument is that polyethnicity is due to "the political, commercial, and epidemiologic consequences of civilized social articulation" (McNeill, 1986: 25). Or put in
more conventional language, ethnic diversity is a necessary consequence of the
normal functioning of states. To be sure, this diversity is far from egalitarian.
Typically it is hierarchical, often extremely so (Friedman [1998] makes the same
point).
I now turn to an elaboration of this argument, or what might be called a "yes,
but" critique. That is, I find McNeill's argument persuasive, but somewhat misspecified in its emphasis on states. Rather, I argue that the generation of diversity
also inheres in world-systems.
D. HALL
THOMAS
The Contribution
255
of a World-System
Perspective
A key insight and finding of a world-system perspective is that the world-system is
a fundamental unit of analysis within which all other social processes and relations
must be studied (Bach, 1980). This does not mean that everything can be explained
by or from a world-system perspective. It only means that a world-system perspective must be part of any broad explanation. Thus, my critique of McNeill's analysis
of polyethnicity is not that it is wrong, but that it is incomplete.
Several scholars have modified and extended world-system theory into what is
typically called *pre-modern,herein called "ancient," that is pre-1500 CE, settings.
Though they disagree on a number of issues, they all agree that processes of longterm social change since at least 5 000 years ago require study from a world-system
perspective, as well as from conventional, civilizational, state, and local perspectives." At least two points from my work with Christopher Chase-Dunn are
especially germane here. First, all world-systems expand and "pulsate" (ChaseDunn and Hall, 1997, 1998), that is expand and contract, or expand rapidly then
more slowly. Second, we argue that all world-systems have four boundaries demarcated by sharp declines in different types of interactions: (a) those shaped by bulk
goods trade networks (BGN); (b) those shaped by political/military interactions
(PMN); (c) those shaped by prestige or luxury goods networks (PGN); and (d) those
shaped by information networks (IN) (see Figure 1).
Often these are nested, as shown in Figure 1. It is only in very small, isolated
world-systems, as in islands, and in the late twentieth century when the worldsystem becomes truly global, that these four boundaries coincide.
FIGURE1. Nestingof theBoundariesof the Four Networksof Exchange.
Source:Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Copyright ? 1997 Westview Press.
256
TheEffectsof Incorporation
into World-Systems
on EthnicProcesses
Expansion of world-systems involves gradually incorporatingnew regions and new
peoples into the system as it expands. When one world-system expands into the
territory of another, typically there is some type of merger, rather than full incorporation (this is discussed in detail in Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). A key point
here is that incorporation can occur along any of the four boundaries, and these
may not coincide.
I have shown (Hall, 1986, 1989a) that incorporation is not simply a matter of
being in or out of the system, but rather is a matter of degree (Figure 2). I further
argued that changes in a world-system itself can cause lessening of the degree of
incorporation,despite a general trend toward an increasingly tighter incorporation.
The pulsation of world-systems is one of the causes of such reversals, as are changes
in frontier policies and practices of states, and heightened resistance to incorporation by those being engulfed. As Friedman shows, cycles of hegemony also shape
processes of incorporation and processes of ethnic change (Friedman, 1994, 1998).
Indeed, these shifting zones of incorporation make up many of the world's
frontier regions.7 These are the places where the formation and transformation of
ethnicity is most active as various peoples and regions are incorporated into worldsystems. The process of incorporation varies with the type of world-system doing
the incorporation-tributary or capitalist world-systems-and with the type of
group being incorporated-state or non-state group. The difference between states
and non-state groups is a salient distinction, but not the only one."
Both tributary and capitalist world-systems have a range of subtypes. Tributary
can range from highly decentralized (feudal systems) to highly centralized
Strength of
incorporation
None
Weak
Moderate
Strong
Impact of core
on periphery
Impact of
periphery
on core
None
Strong
Stronger
Strongest
None
Low
Moderate
Strong
Names for types of peripheries
Hall and ChaseDunn and Hall
Wallerstein
Arrighi
Sherratt
Frank and Gills
External Contact
arena
None
External arena
None
Nominal
or formal
Margin
Hinterland
Marginal or
region of refuge
Incorporation
Normal
or formal
Margin
Hinterland
Full blown/
dependent
Peripheralization
Effective or real
Periphery or
structural
interdependence
Periphery
FIGURE2. Continuum
of Incorporation
Hall, 1986, 1989a).
(modifiedfrom
Source:Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Copyright ? 1997 Westview Press.
THOMASD. HALL
257
(something akin to Marx's oriental despotism, albeit not limited to or all that
common in Eastern Eurasia). Capitalist systems range from early mercantile systems
from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries in Europe to a fully productive
capitalist system, the one that has increasingly dominated the world since the late
eighteenth century. This latter distinction overlaps somewhat with Riggs's (1997a,
b, 1998) distinction between capitalism and industrialism, and shares his recognition
that industrial states or *production
capitalismdiffers in its social consequences significantly from all early forms of states, and I would add, world-systems.
Of special concern here is how these processes differ in ancient settings, and what
we may learn from them about ethnic relations and processes. In ancient settings,
political considerations are as frequent as access to trade and resources as reasons
for incorporation. These reasons remain common, if not the most frequent, for
incorporation in early merchant capitalism. Encounters with a large variety of nonstate societies were more common than in the modern world-system, although such
encounters have been common in what Wallerstein calls the "modern world-system"
(1450 to the present). What is distinctive, as McNeill (1986) argues, is that ancient
systems and state elites did not try to force ethnic uniformity. Rather, they tolerated differences as long as their goals were met. This does not mean that there
were no forced changes in religion, governance, customs, and so forth. Only that
complete assimilation was almost never a goal. Polyethnicity, or multi-ethnic states,
were acceptable. Furthermore, since most states were multi-ethnic, there is no
reason to expect that subjects would find it odious to be conquered by yet another
ethnic elite, unless of course taxes increased or they were relocated forcibly or
pressed into slavery. In that case their objections, and rare rebellions, would be
couched in those terms, not ethnic terms.
Especially worthy of note are the transformative consequences of incorporation.
Depending on a number of specific circumstances, incorporation can fragment
groups, destroying fragile states and thereby engendering a number of "tribes."
Other circumstances favor formation of states by amalgamating non-state societies.
Both of these processes have occurred repeatedly among Central Asian pastoralists
(Barfield, 1989; Hall, 1991; Frank, 1992; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: chap. 8).
Chiefdoms may be formed from formerly band organized groups (Comanches in the
American Southwest [Hall, 1989a], or Araucanians in La Plata [Hall, forthcoming;
Jones, forthcoming]. If there is prolonged interaction and interbreeding (and
sometimes intermarriage) new hybrid groups may be formed, such as metis
descended from Native American women and male French fur traders; or genizaro
descended from Native American and Hispanic populations in southwestern United
States (Meyer, 1994; Hall, 1989a, b).
Frequently, incorporated groups lose former autonomy and become ethnic
minorities. Native Americans in the United States and Canada are familiar
examples. This was also the fate of the Hispanic populations of New Mexico,
California, and Texas after 1848 (see Hall, 1989a). Entirely new identities can be
created when groups are relocated and old identities stripped and replaced with
new ones, as happened to African slaves imported into the United States. Where
states, or portions of states are absorbed, territorial minorities are created. This
was especially common in colonial areas. These absorbed groups give rise to many
ethnic movements and civil wars in the contemporary world (Gurr and Harff, 1994).
The contemporary world differs significantly from the ancient world. First, states,
for the most part, have become much larger, encompassing more minority groups.
Second, states have increasingly emphasized national unity, often interpreted to
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mean ethnic unity, in their nation-building efforts. Third, the right to a separate,
ethnically homogeneous state is often used to justify claims of independence.
Erstwhile native peoples have been especially savvy in using the doctrine of sovereignty to press such claims (Wilmer, 1993). Fourth, the frequency with which claims
of sovereignty are pressed directly contradicts all predictions of modernization
theory. These occurrences appear to be much more common in the contemporary
world.9
Finally, all of this suggests that there has been a fundamental shift in the nature
of *ethnicityin the contemporary world from what it was in the ancient world. In
ancient times a primordialist approach to ethnicity was at least plausible, and possibly more accurate. In the contemporary world, by contrast, situational, reactive, or
interest-based ethnicity seems to be far more common, rendering the primordialist approach almost untenable (Hall, 1984). Part and parcel of this change is the
increasing politicization of ethnicity, and identity in general (see Friedman, 1994,
1998). Indeed, much of the contention that attends discussions of ethnicity and race
derives from the new preponderance of situationally defined groups in confrontation with primordialist conceptions of what ethnicity and race mean.'?
Some of the difference may be an artifact of differing time scales. For instance
the formation of a new ethnic group, say metis or genizaro, takes several generations, whereas many contemporary conflicts focus around shorter-term issues.
Similarly, it took decades, or even centuries, of interaction among nomadic peoples
and with Spaniards and Anglos to create or transform the loosely connected "bands"
of nomadic peoples inhabiting what is now the southwestern United States into the
Indian nations we know today.
Our understanding of these differences is not helped by the propensity of many
such movements to impute deeply ancient roots to relatively recent events. Some
of Vine Deloria's remarks (1995) about Lakota people always having been in what
are now the Dakotas come to mind, and recent controversies about the Bering Strait
theory of the population of the Americas."
According to Malcolm (1994), various partisans in Bosnia have sought to manipulate and use ancient conflicts to excuse or even obscure current motivations in the
war there.
The biggest obstacle to understanding the conflict is the assumption that what
has happened in that country is the product-natural, spontaneous and at the
same time necessary-of forces lying within Bosnia's own internal history. That
is the myth which was carefully propagated by those who caused the conflict,
who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gunmen were doing
was done not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable historical forces beyond
anyone's control (Malcolm, 1994: xix).
Malcolm makes two points that are germane here. First, that external factors
shaped the conflict (Serbian manipulations and the misunderstandings by the
Western powers of the nature of the conflict). Second, that the roots of the conflict
are not ancient, but quintessentially modern. Rather, ancient conflicts have been
manipulated as a rationalization for the seizure of property and power by whatever
means. Malcolm notes in support of this analysis the efforts to bomb archives, as
specific targets, in order to destroy earlier history-all the better to revise it to suit
current purposes.
This is precisely what Fred Riggs (1997a, b, 1998) has called a "para-modern"
process: the harmful side of modernization. Contemporary ethnic conflicts have
THOMASD. HALL
259
contemporary causes. As Riggs puts it, "If anyone living today could claim descent
from the Philistines, they would have plenty to fight about-primordial wars mean
nothing today except in the minds of those who can use the myths to buttress their
contemporary struggles" (Riggs, 1997b: 9). Majid Tehranian (1998) makes much
the same argument when he claims that contemporary fundamentalist movements
are not holdovers or reactionary, but post-traditionalist.
The Western powers have, themselves, fallen victim to the ancient roots
argument. However, some observers have noted that the conflicts in central Africa
are not necessarily ethnic or tribal, but about scarce resources. Ethnic differences
are the excuse for depriving some people of their resources and/or eliminating them
as competitors. Thus, ethnicity has become the "rationalization of choice" for a wide
variety of conflicts. The irony here is that such conflicts may, themselves, be ethnogenetic, creating the very groups whose existence is imputed to have been the root
of the conflict.
Conflict as a cause of ethnogenesis, however, is not limited to the modern world.
Conflicts between Burmese language groups and Thai language groups helped form
Burma and Siam out of loose federations of what appear to have been chiefdoms.
Still, the groups today are clearly distinct in culture and state structure. However,
the constant taking of prisoners in centuries of warfare insures that neither group
is genetically pure, or even distinct. This, however, does not seem to hold as strongly
for the numerous "hill tribes" in those two states.'2
As Fred Riggs argues (1997a: 7), cleavages, which occur when "a community
rejects that identity [of the conqueror] and demands recognition of its sovereignty
as an independent or autonomous people," often give rise to violence in the contemporary world. Under this definition, cleavages were extremely rare in the ancient
world. Rather, diversity was common. As Riggs notes, the presence of democracy
and nationalism in the modern world (along with industrialism) creates conditions
which not only foments cleavages, but promotes violent ethnonationalist movements
when democratic means cannot achieve sufficient autonomy.
Before turning to the conclusions that may be drawn from this discussion, I want
to comment on two puzzles it raises, but does not solve.
TWo Puzzles
As alluded to earlier, this analysis of polyethnicity or multi-ethnic states generates
two puzzles: (1) why the ideal of ethnic homogeneity emerged and flourished in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and (2) why ethnic conflict has become so
common in the late twentieth century.
Why Equate States with Ethnic Homogeneity?
In the 1950s and early 1960s modernization theory dominated the social sciences
and was more or less taken for granted by many historians. Those who accepted
the claim by modernization theory that ethnic homogeneity was an inevitable consequence of modernization were dismayed by the proliferation of ethnic conflicts
around the world. One of McNeill's goals in his 1985 lectures was to chide historians for accepting this view uncritically. While few people adhere to modernization
theory uncritically, and it is close to dead (Wallerstein, 1976), it still has a considerable hold on the popular imagination. This is all too evident in the many claims
on the need for ethnic unity in order to have a strong state. It is also a widely held
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TheEffectsof Incorporation
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view among contemporary beginning college students-as those of us who teach
about ethnicity know too well.
McNeill's answer is again rooted in ancient history, and partially instructive. In
their very early stages of formation Rome and Athens were, indeed, ethnically
homogeneous. But as they grew they became more diverse. Writers from that transitional period saw this as a problem and wrote nostalgically about the glorious
(presumably ethnically pure) past (Friedman's quotation from Seneca illustrates
this nicely). In the late middle ages Northern European thinkers were reading these
ancients and presumed that to be the way to greatness.
John Bartlett in the Makingof Europe(1993) argues that the Norman culture of
knighthood spread throughout the western end of the Eurasian land mass, creating
the idea, and the actuality of Europe as a distinctive region. The highly variegated
terrain of western Eurasia favored small, and hence relatively homogeneous states.
Thus, the intellectuals reading the ancients found themselves in much the same
situation as the ancient writers. They lived in hitherto homogeneous states which
were becoming diverse.
Increasing communication and trade created pressure for developing standardized languages and uniform practices. The world-wide burst in population growth
in the mid-eighteenth century made it easier for cities to recruit workers from
the same, rather than from different, ethnic groups. This facilitated the development of national languages, and made the ideal of ethnic homogeneity seem
feasible.
The key in both McNeill's and my own view was the growing need for larger
armies. As the need for infantry grew, state elites had to devise a way of recruiting more soldiers without raising the dangers inherent in arming peasants. The
boon of citizenship proved to be the answer. Citizenship, however, carried with it
a right to participation (democracy in some form) and thus further heightened
pressures for cultural uniformity.
This is far from a sufficient explanation for the rise of the ideal of the ethnically
homogeneous state. There is much more to it. As Yael Tamir (1995: 438) observes,
"It is truly ironic that the power of nationalism depends precisely on those aspects
of the nation's image least supported by research evidence," that is, its antiquity.
What remains a puzzle is how such a clearly empirically incorrect view ever took
hold, and why its hold has persisted so long despite overwhelmingly contradictory
evidence.
Why the Rise in Ethnic Conflict?
McNeill claims the European-basedideal of the ethnically pure state began to erode
around the time of World War I. He attributes this to the waves of decolonization
and the realization by the imperial powers that ethnic homogeneity was neither
possible nor necessary. This account of the rise and demise of the ideal of ethnically homogeneous nationalism is far from satisfactory. But to explicate it fully
would take far more time and space than is appropriate here. Clearly though, as
the Bosnian example shows, *ethnonationalism
remains a convenient ideology for
rationalizing seizure of power and property. That is, the ideal of ethnically homogeneous states can be marshalled for other political causes. Be that as it may, we can
conclude with McNeill (1986: 36) that: "The accelerated mingling of diverse peoples
within state boundaries that we everywhere witness in our own time, and specifically since World War I, is therefore a return to normal as far as Western European
THOMAS
D. HALL
261
nations are concerned." Though I agree that recent increases in ethnic conflict are
a return to "normal," this does not fully explain the timing of the rise.
I will leave aside the puzzles of why the chimera of ethnically homogeneous states
persists, despite its obvious everyday empirical contradictions, and the timing of the
resurgence of ethnic conflict. I turn to the conclusions that emerge from the analysis of ancient states and world-systems.
Conclusions
The first, and possibly most important conclusion is that ethnically homogeneous
states have been rare since the first formation of states. When they do occur they
are peculiar accidents of history, or brief phases on the way to ethnic diversity. This
conclusion not only reframes the problem from Why so much ethnic unrest today?
to Why should anyone seriously have expected otherwise? It also suggests radical
changes in policies regarding ethnicity, the main one being that we should continue
to criticize the drive for ethnic purity as fundamentally unnecessary, in Bosnia,
Rwanda, Canada, the United States, and everywhere else. Furthermore, there is no
real need for assimilationist policies. Multi-ethnicity, or in sociological terms,
pluralism, is not only possible, but preferable. However, this interpretation does not
give any guidelines for making it workable.
Second, there are many criteria by which groups have been distinguished. These
criteria rise and fall in salience with world-systemic changes. Key differences follow
the four world-system boundaries: bulk goods networks, political/military networks,
prestige goods networks, and information networks. Hence there are different incorporation processes, or trajectories of incorporation, as well as varying degrees of
incorporation along each of these boundaries. All give rise to different kinds of
ethnic minorities. In the modern world-system, as these four boundaries have come
to coincide, the mechanisms which generate ethnic groups have changed. Whether
they have become fewer remains unclear. That they are different, however, is
inescapable. Similarly, as Jonathan Friedman shows, cycles of hegemony in the
world-system also transform identity politics in important ways.
Thus, third, ethnic phenomena and relations cannot be understood solely by
reference to local processes, but must always be studied within their broader
national and international contexts. This is true for both ancient and modern
instances. Yet those contexts are, themselves, significantly different in the ancient
and modern worlds. In short, lessons from the ancient world must be used with
caution.
Fourth, world-systems, as well as states, create diversity. More often they transform it, primarily, but not exclusively, by incorporation. The processes are part and
parcel of the normal functioning of states and world-systems. Thus, ethnic diversity
is normal. Similarly, cycles in the world-system (e.g., hegemony, as argued by Friedman) shape and transform identity politics in systematic ways.
Fifth, ethnicity has always been somewhat fluid with respect to identity, boundaries, cultural content, and membership. It changes through time. It is impermanent. It is this fluidity, as Tamir (1995) argues, that generates a need to impute
deep historical roots-precisely to solidify that which is inherently ephemeral.
Sixth, a major difference between the modern world and the ancient is volume
and velocity of ethnic processes and the pervasiveness of states. In short, while a
primordialist approach mayhave made sense in many ancient contexts, it very seldom
does in the contemporary world. Phrased differently, the very nature of *modern
262
TheEffectsof Incorporation
into World-Systems
on EthnicProcesses
ethnicity has changed in the contemporary world. This is precisely why there is so
much contention about what it is and means, and why it is subject to so much
postmodern deconstruction and reconstruction. This difference is the basis of Fred
Riggs's argument that ethnicity is a (para-)modern social phenomenon.
Seventh, in the case of non-state societies, and even some states, incorporation
into a world-system, or even a state, transforms formerly autonomous social organizations into sub-parts of a larger whole. That is, "tribes" become minority groups.
Eighth, the drive for sovereignty by such groups is an attempt to regain that
autonomy. Formerly non-state societies have been especially adept at manipulating
the concept of sovereignty to their own advantage. As Franke Wilmer (1993)
observes, to deny their claims to sovereignty is to deny validity of the concept of
sovereignty itself.
Ninth, the processes creating ethnic conflicts are part and parcel of modernity.
That is, not only did modernization theory err in predicting the demise of ethnicity (and status markers generally), it failed utterly to understand that modernity
creates such ethnic conflicts. As Fred Riggs has put it (1997a, b, 1998), modernity
has its downsides, ethnic conflict being the major one. I would amend his argument
only slightly to note (as in the third point) that this downside of modernity is a
property of the world-system, not of states. Thus, explanations of its workings must
attend the forces driving world-system processes.
Finally, the pursuit of ethnic homogeneity is a chimera, often used to justify
pursuit of other goals, like wealth and power. It is a rationalization. Like all rationalizations, it works better if there is some plausible factual basis upon which it
might draw. Thus, the policy recommendations listed under the first item above.
In terms of praxis, it is high time that the concept of the ethnically pure state be
constantly and harshly criticized. This, however, does not mean that claims for
equal treatment should be ignored. Rather, it means that the task at hand for social
scientists, politicians, and citizens is to devise ways in which states and societies
may function while differences are supported and even celebrated. This, to be sure,
is a daunting task.
Notes
1. For typical definitions of these approaches see, for instance, Gurr and Harff (1994: 78ff.).
2. The term *pluralism as used by sociologists and anthropologists, refers to societies
composed of more than one ethnic group who share some, but not all, institutions.
Sometimes a further distinction is drawn between cultural pluralism (a situation in which
only some, but not all cultural attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyles are shared) and structural
pluralism (where groups share only some, but not all institutions) (see Farley, 1995:
166-167 for a typical sociological discussion). This "pluralism"is very different fromJ.S.
Furnivall's infelicitous concept of "plural society," by which he means a society "comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling,
in one political unit" (Furnivall, 1939: 446). Furnivall's concept at best would be an
extreme form of pluralism. Indeed, if one pushed the sociological analysis further and
noted that assimilation, pluralism, and separatism delineate a continuum of adaptation
of one group to another ranging from complete to minimal, Furnivall's "plural society"
would be placed very close to the separatism pole of the continuum. To be fair, Furnivall developed his concept for dealing with the peculiarities of the colonial situation.
Indeed, I argue that his plural society is a characteristic of a certain degree and type of
incorporation which cannot be explained solely from colonial society.
3. This terminological difference reflects roots in history as a profession and a civilizational
approach to history as opposed to various social science approaches. The differences are
THOMASD. HALL
263
more than terminological. For discussion see Sanderson (1995b), especially chapters by
McNeill and Melko, and Sanderson's introductory essays. For purposes of this article,
however, these equivalencies are adequate.
4. I use polyethnicity, in accord with McNeill's usage, to mean any sort of
racial-ethnic-cultural-linguistic mixing. Note, in my view religion is subsumed under
culture.
5. Kotkin (1993) makes much of the trading "tribes" in the contemporary world. To be
sure, his point that they remain important today is well taken. He is mistaken, however,
in seeing them as something new. They are as ancient as long distance trade itself.
6. For reviews of this literature see Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: chaps. 1-3), Frank and
Gills (1993), Peregrine (1996a, b); Hall (1996a, b); and Sanderson (1995b). An entire
subsection of the section on International Political Economy, the World Historical
Systems subsection, has been formed around this subject.
7. I have addressed the issue of frontier dynamics elsewhere. See Hall (forthcoming a, b,
1996a, b).
8. I want to point out that the range of types and variation within types isfar greater among
non-state societies than state societies. While vitally important to understanding both
long-term social change and incorporation processes, discussion of these differences
would detract from the discussion at hand. These issue are discussed in detail in Hall
(1989a) and Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997).
9. This, however, could be an artifact of our lack of detailed knowledge of ancient history
with respect to ethnic movements. At this time, the preponderance of evidence strongly
suggests that this is a real difference and not an artifact of selective knowledge. Still,
further research on this subject could substantiate this claim more robustly.
10. Fred Riggs (1994, 1997a, b, 1998) comes to a similar conclusion, that contemporary
ethnicity differs significantly from ancient forms of ethnicity. He also draws a number
of useful distinctions among types of ethnicity and movements that warrant closer examination than I give them here.
11. For instance, the virtual discussion group, Native-L carried a great deal of debate about
this issue. With some participants attributing anthropological/archaeological explanations of the peopling of the Americas via the Bering land bridge as an attempt to undermine and degrade indigenous religions.
12. This discussion of Southeast Asia merely glosses over very complex processes. These
remarks are meant to be suggestive, not definitive. It is based on the following sources:
Aung-Thwin, 1985; Cady, 1966; Chutintaranond, 1995; Chutintaranond and Tun, 1995;
Coedes, 1966, 1968; K.R. Hall, 1985; Kulke, 1986; Marr and Milner, 1986; Penth, 1994;
Vickery, 1986; Wang, 1986; Wicks, 1992; Wyatt, 1984, 1994. Wang and Chutintaranond
especially argue that the concepts of state and empire need to be rethought in the Southeast Asian context. Their discussions of the "mandala" of statelets resonates quite well
with the discussion of marcher states, and state formation in Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997,
esp. chap. 5.
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Biographical Note:
THOMASD. HALL is Lester M. Jones Professor of Sociology and Coordinator of
Conflict Studies at DePauw University. He is the author of Social Changein the Southwest, 1350-1880 (1989) and along with Christopher Chase-Dunn, author of Rise and
Demise: ComparingWorld-Systems(1997). ADDRESS:Department of Sociology & AnthroIN 46135-0037,
USA.
Greencastle,
[email:
pology, DePauw
University,
[email protected]]
is a revised version [29 May and 6 Oct 1997] of a paper presented at
Acknowledgements.This
the panel on Insecurity:Migration (Refugees) and Ethnic Nationalism As Symptoms of World
D. HALL
THOMAS
267
Systemic Crisis, at the International Studies Association meeting, Toronto, March 1997.
Figures 1 and 2 are copyright ? 1997 Westview Press, and are reprinted by permission of
Westview Press. I thank the commentators and panelists for their insightful comments. Leslie
S. Laczko also made useful comments. At DePauw University thanks are due to colleagues
Eric Silverman and Thomas Ewing for inviting me to present an earlier version of this paper
at the Faculty Research Colloquium, and to the John and Janice Fisher Fund for Faculty
Development for assistance in attending the International Studies Conference and in
preparation of this paper. Last, but not least, to the considerable efforts of Fred Riggs in
organizing and editing this collection. As usual, despite all this good will, I bear full
responsibility for any errors.