OSCA/OCI’S CASE LAW UPDATE
FEBRUARY 2017
Baker Act/Marchman Act Case Law .............................................................................................................. 2
Drug Court/Mental Health/Veterans Court Case Law ........................................................................... 3
Family Court
Delinquency Case Law ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Dependency Case Law......................................................................................................................................... 5
Dissolution of Marriage Case Law .................................................................................................................. 7
Interpersonal Violence Injunctions (DV, SV, Dating, Repeat, Stalking) Case Law .................... 14
Baker Act/Marchman Act Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Second District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Third District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fourth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fifth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Drug Court/Mental Health/Veterans Court Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Second District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Third District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fourth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fifth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Delinquency Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Second District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Third District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fourth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fifth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Dependency Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
C.M. v. Department of Children and Families, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 629417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
ANSWER BRIEF STRICKEN. The First District Court of Appeal struck the Guardian ad Litem’s
answer brief as untimely filed. The court’s opinion was a one sentence per curiam and Judge
Makar concurred in an opinion setting out reasoning as to why the sanction of striking the brief
was appropriate.
https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2016/4711/164711_NOND_02162017_093616_i.pdf (February
16, 2017)
Second District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Third District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fourth District Court of Appeal
A.A.F. v. Department of Children and Families and Mr. & Mrs. L., __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 436293
(Fla. 4th DCA 2017). DENIAL OF MOTIONS TO INTERVENE AND FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a putative father’s motion
to intervene and motion for relief from a final judgment of termination of parental rights. The
court held that he was not entitled to notice because he was not registered with the Florida
Putative Fathers Registry. The court also held that he could not raise an as-applied constitutional
challenge for the first time on appeal.
https://edca.4dca.org/DCADocs/2016/2970/162970_DC05_02012017_091107_i.pdf (February
1, 2017)
Fifth District Court of Appeal
M.S. v. Department of Children and Families, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL456892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
ADJUDICATION OF DEPENDENCY REVERSED. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed an
adjudication of a father’s three children as dependent. The department had failed to present to
the trial court any evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the father’s arrests or any
evidence that the father’s alleged drug-related actions harmed the children. The court remanded
the case for entry of order denying the petition for dependency.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/013017/5D16-3860.op.pdf (January 30, 2017)
D.H. v. Department of Children and Families, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 728063 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AFFIRMED BUT REMANDED FOR AMENDED ORDER
STRIKING ONE GROUND. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed termination of a mother’s
parental rights but remanded the case for entry of an amended final judgment striking
§ 39.806(1)(b) as one of the grounds for termination. The court affirmed the judgment because
evidence presented at the trial supported other statutory grounds.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/022017/5D16-3435.op.pdf (February 23, 2017)
Dissolution of Marriage Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
Hudson v. Hudson, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 486959 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING RENT TO SPOUSE WHO WAS AWARDED MARITAL HOME BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT
DID NOT OBLIGATE OTHER SPOUSE TO PAY RENT WHILE HE LIVED IN THE HOUSE; TRIAL COURT’S
AWARD OF MAJORITY TIME-SHARING TO SPOUSE AFFIRMED. Former husband appealed a trial
court award of rent to former wife because it was not properly plead; he also appealed the award
to her of majority time-sharing. Despite a partial mediated settlement agreement the spouses
entered into after their dissolution proceedings began, which provided inter alia that former wife
would have exclusive possession and ownership of the marital homeownership, former husband
continued to live with her in the home until the final hearing—nearly four years later. At the final
hearing former wife requested to be awarded rent for this period. The trial court found that she
was entitled to an award of “reasonable rent” for the time former husband lived there over her
objection. The appellate court noted former wife did not amend her petition to include a request
for past-due rent, nor was the issue tried by consent; however, the trial court should not have
awarded rent because the settlement agreement did not obligate former husband to pay rent
while he was there. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s award of rent to former wife.
Concluding that the trial court properly considered the necessary factors, relied on competent,
substantial evidence, and did not abuse its discretion, the appellate court affirmed the award of
majority time-sharing to former wife.
https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2016/0364/160364_DC08_02072017_081536_i.pdf (February
7, 2017)
Ard v. Ard, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 535390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDS
ARE WITHIN THE BROAD DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT; HOWEVER, THEY MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; HERE, THEY WERE NOT. Former husband
appealed a non-final order awarding temporary support to former wife. The appellate court
reiterated that temporary awards of alimony are within the broad discretion of a trial court;
however, they must be supported by competent, substantial evidence demonstrating one
spouse’s need and the other’s ability to pay. Here, the award was unaccompanied by any findings
regarding former wife’s need for support, but was based in a large part on her testimony
regarding the “anticipated” expenses she would incur when she moved out of her mother’s
house. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded.
https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2016/2492/162492_DC13_02102017_082452_i.pdf (February
10, 2017)
Landrum v. Landrum, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 729772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). ASSETS ACQUIRED
DURING A MARRIAGE INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY ARE MARITAL; ASSETS ACQUIRED BY EITHER
SPOUSE BEFORE THE MARRIAGE ARE NONMARITAL; A HALF-INTEREST IN A PARCEL THAT
BECOMES MARITAL BECAUSE MARITAL FUNDS WERE USED TO OBTAIN IT DOES NOT CONVERT
THE OTHER HALF-INTEREST THAT IS NONMARITAL INTO A MARITAL ASSET. Former husband
raised several points in his appeal of a final order equitably distributing the spouses’ marital
assets; the appellate court found one error requiring reversal and remand. When the spouses
married, former husband solely owned a 13-acre parcel, and owned a half-interest in a smaller,
contiguous parcel with his sister. During the marriage, marital funds were used to help pay the
sister’s property taxes on a third parcel she owned; as repayment, she deeded former husband
her half-interest in the parcel they owned together. The trial court determined that this parcel
became a marital asset because it was acquired with marital funds. This was error. Assets
acquired during a marriage by spouses individually or jointly are marital; assets acquired by either
spouse before the marriage are nonmarital. Here, former husband’s half-interest acquired before
the marriage was nonmarital and the interest he acquired from his sister with marital funds was
a marital asset; however, his acquisition of his sister’s half-interest in the parcel with marital
funds did not convert his nonmarital half-interest into a marital asset.
https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2016/0291/160291_DC08_02242017_092543_i.pdf (February
24, 2017)
Pattison v. Pattison, __ So. 3d __, WL 2017 729771 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT IN FINDING SPOUSE IN CONTEMPT FAILURE TO PAY; BUT ITS ORDER THAT SPOUSE’S
FAILURE TO PAY IN THE FUTURE WOULD RESULT IN AUTOMATIC FUTURE CONTEMPT AND
IMMEDIATE INCARCERATION VIOLATED SPOUSE’S DUE PROCESS. Former husband did not
dispute his failure to pay, but appealed the provisions of the trial court’s order which operated
prospectively as automatic findings of future contempt punished by immediate incarceration
without further hearing, for any of his future failures to meet his obligations of monthly alimony
payments and arrearages. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in ordering
automatic future contempt and incarceration. A trial court has the discretion to “fashion a
contempt order sufficient to coerce former husband’s compliance with his support obligation;
however, a trial court may order incarceration after an intentional violation of a court order only
after finding that the contemnor has the present ability to purge the contempt and refuses to do
so” [Italics in opinion]. “[T]he contemnor ‘carries the key to his cell in his own pocket.” Ponder v.
Ponder, 438 So. 2d 541, 543, (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The appellate court held that the trial court’s
order deprived former husband of his due process right to defend against future allegations on
non-payment. It noted that the 4th DCA has reached the same conclusion on a case directly on
point, Hipschman v. Cochran, 683 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The appellate court
affirmed the contempt finding, reversed the provisions of the order it found improper, and
remanded for the trial court to fashion a remedy which would ensure former husband’s
compliance with his obligations but be consistent with due process.
https://edca.1dca.org/DCADocs/2016/0615/160615_DC08_02242017_092813_i.pdf (February
24, 2017)
Second District Court of Appeal
Munoz v. Munoz, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 456667 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
DELEGATED ITS AUTHORITY TO THERAPIST; A TRIAL COURT’S ORDER MUST SET FORTH SPECIFIC
STEPS PARENT MUST TAKE TO REESTABLISH TIME-SHARING; IT MUST GIVE A PARENT THE KEY TO
RECONNECTING WITH HIS OR HER CHILDREN. Former husband sought to modify a default final
judgment which awarded sole parental responsibility and time-sharing to former wife; in
response, former wife sought to establish child support, including retroactive support. In the
absence of a transcript, the appellate court was limited to errors on the face of the judgment.
The appellate court found that the trial court had improperly delegated its authority by granting
a therapist sole authority to evaluate former husband’s progress through a three-phase daytime
time-sharing schedule intended to reestablish former husband into his daughters’ lives, and by
allowing former wife the sole discretion at any time to replace the therapist. To the appellate
court, the most troubling aspect of the order was its failure to resolve when, if ever, former
husband would ever be entitled to overnight, unrestricted time-sharing with his children, if or
when he completed the third phase of the schedule. The appellate court found these three
errors, taken together, constituted reversible error. The appellate court cited its prior opinions
holding that a court must give the parent the key to reconnecting with his or her children. An
order that fails to tell a parent what “specific steps” he or she must take to reestablish timesharing is deficient because it prevents the parent from knowing what is expected and prevents
a successor judge from monitoring the parent’s progress. Reversed and remanded. The trial court
was instructed on remand to enter an order setting forth requisite findings and rulings regarding
the time-sharing former husband would be entitled to upon completion of any reunification
schedule fashioned by the court.
http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2017/February/February%2003
,%202017/2D16-1604.pdf (February 3, 2017)
Stokes v. Stokes, __ So. 3d. __, 2017 WL 519310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). INCONSISTENT ORDERS
REMANDED FOR AN ORDER THAT IS CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT. The appellate court remanded
inconsistent orders regarding time-sharing and a parenting plan to the trial court for an “order
that is consistent throughout.”
http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2017/February/February%2008
,%202017/2D16-225.pdf (February 8, 2017)
Ramadon v. Ramadon, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 651118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). DENIAL OF
CONTINUANCE WAS CLEARLY UNJUST TO SPOUSE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Although it
found itself “not unsympathetic” to what it termed a “protracted, contentious” dissolution case,
the appellate court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying former wife’s
motion for continuance. Under the facts of the case, denial of a continuance created a “clear
injustice” for former wife; moreover, former husband would not have suffered any prejudice or
inconvenience as a result of a continuance, other than a delay and the possible expenditure of
attorney’s fees. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court was
“encouraged” to set strict discovery guidelines and impose sanctions for noncompliance.
http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2017/February/February%2017
,%202017/2D14-5843.pdf (February 17, 2017)
Third District Court of Appeal
Schafstall v. Schafstall, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 697697 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT’S
FINDINGS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CALCULATION OF A
SPOUSE’S GROSS INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT INCLUDES REIMBURSED EXPENSES
OR IN-KIND PAYMENTS THAT REDUCE LIVING EXPENSES; TRIAL COURT MUST IMPUTE INCOME
TO A PARENT WHO IS VOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED OR UNDEREMPLOYED UNLESS IT FINDS THE
PARENT PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY INCAPACITATED. Former wife disputed the trial court’s
findings and calculation of her monthly income. The appellate court concluded the trial court’s
findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence. The statutory guidelines for child
support require a trial court to include reimbursed expenses or in kind payments that reduce that
spouse’s living expenses in a spouse’s gross income. Here, the trial court correctly included the
value of mortgage payments made by former husband and the amount of former wife’s cell
phone bill paid by former wife’s mother. The trial court must also impute income to a parent if it
finds that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, unless it finds that the parent
suffers from a physical or mental incapacity over which the parent has no control. Here, the trial
court’s imputed income to former wife in a lower amount than she had received during her most
recent employment. Affirmed.
http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D16-1756.pdf (February 22, 2017)
Fourth District Court of Appeal
Preudhomme v. Bailey, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 436370 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DISMISSING SPOUSE’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. After noting the numerous postdissolution proceedings and appeals following a 2010 dissolution, the appellate court held that
the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice former wife’s 2015 complaint seeking damages
and other relief against former husband and other individuals and entities. In the absence of a
transcript, the appellate court’s analysis was limited to the four corners of the complaint, and the
written order of dismissal with prejudice, which was silent as to the trial court’s reasoning or
basis for its ruling. After enumerating the circumstances in which either dismissal or dismissal
with prejudice is improper, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
https://edca.4dca.org/DCADocs/2015/2831/152831_DC13_02012017_085701_i.pdf
(February 1, 2017)
Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 514336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT’S
DISMISSAL FOR SPOUSE’S LACK OF STANDING AFFIRMED; A SPOUSE SEEKING CHILD SUPPORT IN
A DISSOLUTION ACTION FILED AFTER A CHILD REACHES MAJORITY IS GENERALLY ENTITLED TO
SUPPORT ONLY FOR THOSE MONTHS WITHIN THE PRECEDING 24 MONTHS WHEN THE CHILD
WAS A MINOR OR QUALIFIED FOR SUPPORT UNDER SECTION 743.07(2),F.S. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that former wife lacked standing to seek retroactive child
support for the first time over three years after the child’s 18th birthday. Former wife failed to
show either that the child was otherwise legally dependent under s. 743.07(2), F. S., or that such
support was agreed to by the spouses. A spouse seeking child support in a dissolution proceeding
that is filed after the child reaches majority is generally entitled to support only for those months
within the preceding 24 months when the child was still a minor or qualified for support under s.
743.07(2). The appellate court noted that the order granting former husband’s motion for
summary judgment stated that any claim for retroactive child support belonged to the child.
Because that issue was not before the trial court, the appellate court instructed the trial court to
strike that finding from its order.
https://edca.4dca.org/DCADocs/2016/1651/161651_DC05_02082017_090344_i.pdf (February
8, 2017)
Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 514338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT ERRED
BY AWARDING FORMER HUSBAND AN EQUITABLE LIEN ON FORMER WIFE’S EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION INTEREST IN HIS RETIREENT BENEFITS AS A REMEDY FOR HER FAILURE TO MAKE
AN EQUALIZATION PAYMENT; ENFORCEMENT OF A FINAL JUDGMENT WITH REGARD TO
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ARE THOSE OF CREDITOR AGAINST DEBTOR. Former wife appealed the
trial court’s qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), granting former husband’s motion to
enforce the underlying final judgment of dissolution. The appellate court agreed with former
wife’s argument that the trial court erred by awarding former husband an equitable lien upon
her equitable distribution interest in his retirement benefits as a remedy for her failure to make
an equalization payment. It affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s order. The appellate court
cited DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which it opined: “The remedies
available for enforcement of those provisions of the final judgment with regard to the equitable
distribution of assets are those of creditor against debtor.” Thus, the trial court erred in
sanctioning former wife by awarding former husband an equitable lien upon her equitable
distribution interest in his retirement benefits. Reversed and remanded for the trial court to
strike the portion of the order awarding the equitable lien.
https://edca.4dca.org/DCADocs/2016/0401/160401_DC08_02082017_085818_i.pdf (February
8, 2017)
Riddle v. Riddle, __ So. 3d __, 2017 697731 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). APPELLATE COURT QUASHED
BROAD ORDER THAT DISQUALIFIED SPOUSE’S ATTORNEY FROM REPRESENTING SPOUSE IN ALL
ASPECTS OF THE CASE; DISQUALIFICATION OF A PARTY’S CHOSEN COUNSEL IS A DRASTIC
REMEDY THAT SHOULD BE USED SPARINGLY. Former wife sought a writ of certiorari directed to
a trial court order that disqualified her attorney from representing her in dissolution proceedings.
Former husband conceded that the order was overbroad because it disqualified counsel from “all
aspects” of the case. Noting that disqualification of a party’s chosen counsel is a drastic remedy
that should be used sparingly, the appellate court granted the petition and quashed the order
that disqualified former wife’s attorney from representing her in all aspects of the case, and
remanded to the trial court.
https://edca.4dca.org/DCADocs/2016/3805/163805_DC03_02222017_094204_i.pdf (February
22, 2017)
Fifth District Court of Appeal
Johnson v. State, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 456906 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). APPELLATE DIVISION OF
CIRCUIT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPEAL AND SHOULD HAVE TRANSFERRED TO
APPELLATE COURT; SECOND-TIER CERTIORARI IS NOT A SECOND APPEAL; IT IS EXTRAORDINARILY
LIMITED AND NARROW IN SCOPE; IT SHOULD ONLY BE EXERCISED WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A
VIOLATION RESULTING IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. Former husband sought second-tier
certiorari review of an opinion from the appellate division of the circuit court in which the circuit
court affirmed a judgment and sentence for indirect criminal contempt. The appellate court held
that the appellate division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and
should have transferred it to the proper appellate court. The case stemmed from the trial court’s
issuance of an order for former husband to show cause why he should not be held in indirect
criminal contempt for failing, on one occasion, to return the children either to their school or to
former wife in accordance with the spouses’ time-sharing agreement and final judgment of
dissolution. Former husband was found guilty of indirect criminal contempt after a hearing and
sentenced to 45 days in jail. He appealed to the appellate division of the circuit court which issued
a per curiam affirmance. The appellate court noted that its review was limited to determining
whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the court departed from
the essential requirements of law. State v. Kirby, 752 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The
appellate court cited USAA Cas. Ins. Co v. Emergency Physicians of Cent. Fla, 200 So. 2d 153, 154
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016), for its clarification: second-tier certiorari is not a second appeal; it is
extraordinarily limited and narrow in scope. “Second-tier review should only be exercised when
there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in the miscarriage of
justice.” Petition granted, order quashed, remanded for further proceedings.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/013017/5D16-2756.op.pdf (February 3, 2017)
Barsis v. Barsis, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 456912 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). A TRIAL COURT VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT ADJUDICATES ISSUES NOT PLEAD, OR MODIFIES TIME-SHARING AND SUPPORT
IF NOTICE OF HEARING DOES NOT INCLUDE SUCH ISSUES. The ppellate court agreed with former
wife that the trial court violated her right to due process; accordingly, it reversed. The final
judgment of dissolution ratified a parenting plan submitted by the spouses which provided that
they would share the parental responsibility for all major decisions involving their three minor
children and would share time equally. They agreed to exchange the children on Sunday;
however, because the location was not specified, former husband requested the court to
designate a specific location for exchange. Although former wife was provided with notice, she
was not present at the hearing. The trial court awarded former husband sole time-sharing,
limited former wife’s contact with the children “as allowed” by former husband, and abated
former husband’s child support. The appellate court found it “well-settled” that an order which
adjudicates issues not plead denies fundamental due process. A trial court violates due process
when it modifies time-sharing or child support if the notice of hearing does not include these
issues. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/013017/5D16-2768.op.pdf (February 3, 2017)
Duke v. Duke, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 544618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). IN ABSENCE OF A TRANSCRIPT,
REVIEW IS LIMITED TO ERRORS ON THE FACE OF THE JUDGMENT; GROSS MONTHLY INCOME
INCLUDES INTEREST GENERATED FROM A RETIREMENT ACCOUNT; A FEE AWARD THAT MERELY
RECITES THE FULL AMOUNT IS INSUFFICIENT. Former husband appealed a final judgment
dissolving a twenty-five year marriage. The appellate court reversed the alimony award,
attorney’s fee award, the requirement that former husband maintain life insurance, and the
parenting plan. It affirmed the remainder of the judgment without comment. In the absence of
a transcript, appellate review was limited to errors on the face of the judgment. The appellate
court agreed with former husband that the trial court erred in basing former wife’s income solely
on her full-time job; it should have imputed to her gross monthly income the interest generated
from her one-half share of former husband’s retirement account. Former wife conceded that the
trial court erred in the attorney’s fee award by failing to make the requisite findings. An award of
fees that “simply recites” the full amount is insufficient. Here, the trial court’s failure to set forth
specific findings as to the hourly rate and the number of hours expended was apparent from the
face of the judgment, leading the appellate court to reverse and remand for the required findings;
however, the trial court’s finding of former wife’s need for alimony and former husband’s ability
to pay were affirmed in absence of a transcript. The trial court’s lack of required findings
regarding need for life insurance to secure the financial obligation were also reversible error. The
appellate court agreed with former husband that the trial court’s parenting plan did not make
the required statutory findings; a trial court’s failure to make these findings is reversible error
even without a transcript. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/020617/5D16-120.op.pdf (February 10, 2017)
Brown v. Brown, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 728067 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND
THAT CONTEMNOR HAD THE PRESENT ABILITY TO PAY SUPPORT. Former husband appealed the
trial court’s order of indirect civil contempt for his failure to pay alimony to former wife. The
appellate court reversed because the trial court failed to expressly find that former husband had
the present ability to pay support. Reversed and remanded.
http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2017/022017/5D16-737.op.pdf (February 24, 2017)
Interpersonal Violence Injunctions (DV, SV, Dating, Repeat, Stalking) Case Law
Florida Supreme Court
No new opinions for this reporting period.
First District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Second District Court of Appeal
Zapiola v. Kordecki, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 535398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INJUNCTION REVERSED. The petitioner was granted an injunction for protection against domestic
violence after she alleged that her girlfriend threw a drink at her, punched her, and could use her
job to hurt her in the future. The respondent appealed, claiming that the physical violence only
happened once several years ago, and that she had never threatened the petitioner since.
Because the allegations referring to the respondent’s work were vague and did not show that the
petitioner was in imminent danger, or that she had been threatened, the appellate court
reversed the injunction.
http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2017/February/February%2010
,%202017/2D16-820.pdf (February 10, 2017)
Third District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fourth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.
Fifth District Court of Appeal
No new opinions for this reporting period.