Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci
Safety climate factors, group di€erences and
safety behaviour in road construction
A.I. Glendon a,b,*, D.K. Litherland c
a
School of Applied Psychology, Grith University, Gold Coast, PMB 50 Gold Coast Mail Centre,
Queensland 9726, Australia
b
Department of Psychology, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong
c
School of Engineering, Grith University, Gold Coast, PMB 50 Gold Coast Mail Centre,
Queensland 9726, Australia
Abstract
This study determines the factor structure of safety climate within a road construction
organization using a modi®ed version of the safety climate questionnaire (SCQ). It also
investigates the relationship between safety climate and safety performance. The SCQ was
administered to 192 employees from two districts and in two job categories Ð construction
and maintenance. A behavioural observation measure of safety performance was also developed. Factor analysis derived six factors, which were similar to those obtained in an earlier
study using the SCQ. Di€erences in the safety climate of job sub-groups were found on two of
the factors. No di€erences between the two districts were found. No relationship was found
between safety climate and the safety performance measure. While identical safety climate
factors cannot apply to all organizations, some general safety climate factors may emerge.
Discussion focuses upon the measurement of safety climate. # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: Safety climate; Road construction; Road maintenance; Employee perceptions; Safety
performance
1. Introduction
1.1. Safety climate
In a review of early research Cohen (1977) reveals that management commitment
to safety was a consistent factor in successful safety programs, although other factors
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61-7-5594-8964; fax: +61-7-5594-8291.
E-mail address: [email protected] (A.I. Glendon).
0925-7535/01/$ - see front matter # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0925-7535(01)00006-6
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
were also found (see Table 1). Management commitment remains a key component
of contemporary safety climate research (e.g. Flin et al., 1996; Marsh et al., 1998).
Smith et al. (1978) determined that more safety sta€, safety committees, and safety
training were associated with low accident rate companies. They also con®rmed
Cohen's (1977) ®nding that management commitment to safety is important. Cohen
and Cleveland (1983) found results similar to those of Cohen. Simonds and ShafaiSahrai (1977) concluded that factors such as management involvement, selected
promotional e€orts, work force characteristics, and physical conditions primarily
explained di€erences in injury frequencies.
Schroder (1970) suggested that measuring employee attitudes towards safety could
be a useful form of safety measurement, arguing that the more mature the safety
attitudes of employees, the more likely they would search for safer environments Ð
hence unsafe behaviour would decrease.
Safety climate overcomes many of the limitations of traditional safety measures,
such as reporting biases and after the fact measurement. Ojanen et al. (1988) suggested that safety performance should be measured on multiple levels, one of them
being safety attitudes, in order to determine the real safety level of an organization.
They claimed that measuring safety climate can indicate changes in organizational
safety behaviour and would therefore be useful for evaluating safety programs. They
argued that any e€ort to improve safety should be perceived as such by employees,
and that the only way to measure this is by using a safety climate questionnaire.
Glendon and McKenna (1995) advocated triangulation in safety measurement,
involving least two independent measures to assess safety performance or to gauge
safety program e€ectiveness.
Potential uses for safety climate questionnaires include, measuring employee perceptions of management commitment to safety, detecting areas of safety that require
improvement, identifying trends in an organization's safety performance and establishing benchmarks for safety levels of di€erent organizations (Lutness, 1987).
The concept of safety climate emerged from research on organizational culture
and climate. Schneider (1975) argued that a number of di€erent climates exist within
an organization. Researchers began measuring one speci®c type of organizational
climate Ð safety climate. Neal et al. (2000) found that safety climate operated as a
mediating variable between organizational climate and safety performance, as
measured by self-reports of compliance with safety regulations and procedures,
Table 1
Factors contributing to successful safety programs (Cohen, 1977)
1. Management Commitment Ð high management involvement in safety activities
2. Management/Supervisor/Worker Interactions Ð close contact enabling open communication
3. Workforce Stability and Industrial Relations Ð less turnover, more married, older workers with longer
service
4. Housekeeping and Environmental Control Ð more orderly plant operations
5. Training Ð early safety training of new workers
6. Conventional Safety Practices Ð safety committees, safety rules and accident investigation
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159
as well as participation in safety-related activities, which were also mediated by
employees' safety knowledge and motivation. Although it was a key determinant of
safety climate, Neal et al. found that organizational climate had no direct e€ects
upon their derived measures of safety. Their ®nding that safety climate can have
independent e€ects on these other safety measures, in the absence of contrary evidence, justi®es its application as a useful construct in its own right.
Several questionnaires have been developed in an attempt to determine the key
factors that comprise safety climate. A number of these have been summarised by
Flin et al. (2000) and Guldenmund (2000), who between them identi®ed 27 such
studies. To date, over 30 studies using safety climate questionnaires have been published. One of the ®rst to be developed was that of Zohar (1980), which was used to
measure the safety climate of production workers in 20 Israeli companies. Zohar
found eight safety climate dimensions. However, using the same questionnaire on an
American sample of production workers, Brown and Holmes (1986) found only
three safety climate factors, a di€erence which they attributed to cultural factors.
Dedobbeleer and BeÂland (1991) attempted to validate Brown and Holmes's three
factors on a sample of American construction workers, but found that a two-factor
model was more appropriate, although the three-factor model was partially supported. Di€ering statistical procedures may have in¯uenced the results, although
Dedobbeleer and BeÂland (1991) postulated that the di€erence was due to the di€erent industry sampled.
Coyle et al. (1995) also failed to ®nd a consistent safety climate factor structure.
They administered the same safety climate questionnaire in two similar organizations to investigate whether the same safety climate factors would emerge. When
each organization's questionnaires were factor analysed, the results indicated that
seven factors emerged for one organization, while only three factors emerged for the
other. Hale (2000) noted that few safety climate scales have been reused between
studies and that where this has occurred, factor structures and results have not
usually been replicated. For a large sample of o€shore workers, Mearns et al. (1998)
factor analysed three separate scales Ð risk perception, assessment of safety, and
safety attitudes Ð to extract a total of 16 factors. Flin et al. (2000) found that the
number of scales varied from two to 19 in the studies that they reviewed, while Lee
and Harrison (2000) extracted 28 factors from their analysis.
Flin et al. (2000) report on the origins of safety climate scales used in 19 studies.
Sixteen of these were derived from literature, in six cases supplemented by items
from empirical sources, including focus groups, interviews and accident data analysis; in one case some items from another questionnaire were used. The other three
studies used existing questionnaires Ð in one case in modi®ed form. Safety climate
scales have been developed primarily on the basis of attitude items (e.g. Niskanen,
1994), based exclusively upon safety related perceptions (e.g. Wilson, 1998), and
with both attitudinal and perception items (e.g. Williamson et al., 1997). Reviewing
16 studies that pro€ered de®nitions of safety climate/culture, Guldenmund (2000)
observed that perceptions are more likely to be associated with climate measures,
whereas attitudes are considered to be part of culture. From these and other studies,
the safety climate of an organization is generally taken to comprise a summary of
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employee perceptions of a range of safety issues. Budworth (1997) refers to measuring safety climate as taking the `safety temperature' of an organization.
Using a di€erent approach, Glendon et al. (1994) developed their safety climate
questionnaire (SCQ) by converting performance in¯uencing factors, which could be
common to many organizations, into perceptions of safety statements and other
aspects of organizational climate. Performance in¯uencing factors refer to any personal or external features that may in¯uence the probability of human error, and
have emerged from research on human reliability assessment. An initial pool of
approximately 350 was reduced to 58 items. The ®nal solution consisted of eight
factors. The SCQ items tend to be behaviourally anchored or deal primarily with
respondents' perceptions, making this instrument conceptually distinct from some
other safety climate scales.
One explanation for inconsistencies in factor structures is the variety of questionnaires, samples and methodology used by di€erent researchers. However, even
when the same questionnaire is used, as in research by Zohar (1980), Brown and
Holmes (1986), and Coyle et al. (1995), di€erent factor structures have still been
found. Alternatively, Coyle et al. suggested that no universal set of safety climate
factors exists. McDonald and Ryan (1992) maintained that the factors that in¯uence
safety climate within one industry may not be valid in another. The argument is that
because organizations di€er in management style and safety regulations, di€erent
safety perceptions result, which are then re¯ected in di€erent factor structures.
While inconsistencies between studies suggest that no universal set of safety climate factors exists, from their analysis, Flin et al. (2000) report common factors
emerging from di€erent studies. The three main factors were ``management/supervision'', ``safety system'', and ``risk'', with ``work pressure'' and ``competence'' also
frequently found. Two of these ``Big 5'' safety climate factors correspond with two
of Cohen's (1977) factors contributing to successful safety programs Ð which predate the safety climate studies described here.
As factor analysis relies extensively on researcher discretion, especially in factor
labelling, it is possible that more similarities exist between factor structures from
di€erent studies than is apparent from the relatively super®cial comparisons conducted to date. Di€erences in factor structures are likely to be primarily an artefact
of items included in di€erent questionnaires. Some questionnaires (e.g. Glennon,
1982; Mason and Simpson, 1995; Walker, 1995; Budworth, 1997) were not factor
analysed, but were typically used to obtain general information about an organization's safety climate. The eight factors from Glendon et al.'s (1994) SCQ, also
described in Glendon and Stanton (2000), included some factors comparable with
the ``Big 5'' revealed by Flin et al. (2000). As Glendon et al. developed their SCQ
in the UK electricity industry, it would be fruitful to determine whether a similar
factor structure emerges in another industry and within a di€erent culture.
Research would ideally determine whether a safety climate factor structure results
primarily from the organization or industry sampled, the particular questionnaire
used, or from some combination of these variables. If some generic safety climate
factors exist, then similar factor structures should be obtained using comparable
questions to analyse the safety climate of di€erent organizations or industries.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
161
1.2. Measuring safety performance
One limitation associated with evaluating the e€ectiveness of di€erent safety programs is the lack of an adequate measure of safety performance (Rockwell, 1959). In
particular, diculties arise where researchers use di€erent techniques to evaluate
safety programs. Safety measurement is essential for reporting safety within an
organization, identifying where accident prevention resources are best allocated and
evaluating safety program e€ects (Tarrants, 1970). However, the e€ectiveness of
some measures of safety performance has been questioned by several researchers
(Blumenthal, 1970; Grimaldi, 1970; Jacobs, 1970; Tarrants, 1970, 1980).
Traditional measures of safety performance rely primarily on some form of accident or injury data (Chhokar and Wallin, 1984). Glendon and McKenna (1995)
identify 15 reasons why accident data, or similar outcome data, are poor measures
of safety performance. The main problems are that such data are insuciently sensitive, of dubious accuracy, retrospective, and ignore risk exposure. One technique
developed to overcome some of the limitations associated with traditional measures
of safety is behaviour sampling. This method is based on randomly sampled observations of workers' behaviour, and evaluating whether observed behaviours are safe
or unsafe (Tarrants, 1980). Types of behaviour that have been observed include
personal protective equipment use, machinery use, and manual handling. Typically,
a checklist identi®es behaviours to be observed. Using the behaviour checklist, one
or more trained observers systematically observe workers to determine whether they
are working safely or unsafely.
Behaviour sampling has been successfully used by several researchers implementing behaviour modi®cation safety programs (e.g. Komaki et al., 1978; Chhokar and
Wallin, 1984; Reber and Wallin, 1984; Reber et al., 1984, 1990, 1993; Cooper et al.,
1994; Walker, 1995; Vassie, 1998; Shannon et al., 1999). It has been suggested
that behaviour observation data are superior to accident statistics as they focus on
unsafe behaviour prior to accidents occurring (Reber et al., 1993). Furthermore,
behavioural data are sensitive to changes in safety, allowing for immediate identi®cation of some types of safety problems. Safety behaviour modi®cation programs
are described by several researchers (e.g. Altman, 1970; Komaki et al., 1978; Chhokar and Wallin, 1984; Reber and Wallin, 1984; Earnest, 1985; McAfee and Winn,
1989; Cooper et al., 1994).
Some researchers have found that the higher the safe performance the lower the
accident rate (Reber and Wallin, 1983, 1984; Reber et al., 1984; Tyler, 1986),
although Cooper et al. (1994) did not ®nd a signi®cant correlation between accidents
and behavioural data. Disadvantages of behaviour sampling include the considerable expense associated with this method, while studies can only provide average
results, which disregard individual behaviour di€erences (Grimaldi, 1970).
1.3. Safety climate and safety performance
Various studies have revealed that safety climate factors can predict safety-related
outcomes, such as accidents or injuries (Zohar, 1980; Brown and Holmes, 1986;
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Dedobbeleer and BeÂland, 1991; DeJoy, 1994; Niskanen, 1994; Hofmann and Stetzer,
1996; Diaz and Cabrera, 1997). More recently, modeling approaches are being
adopted in this ®eld. Neal et al. (2000) found that safety climate in¯uenced selfreported components of safety performance. Cheyne et al. (1998), using structural
equation modeling (SEM) revealed that safety activity antecedents included ®ve
safety climate factors Ð safety management, communication, individual responsibility, safety standards and goals, and personal involvement. Workplace hazards
and the physical work environment were also components of the model. Also using
a SEM approach, TomaÂs et al. (1992) found a weak, albeit just signi®cant link
between safety climate and reported safety behaviour in one of the three models that
they tested. In the other two models that they tested, TomaÂs et al. found no direct
relationship between safety climate and reported safety behaviour. In TomaÂs et al.'s
model, safety behaviour was signi®cantly predicted by worker attitude, co-workers'
response, hazards, and supervisor's response Ð which was also the main mediator
of safety climate. The utility of SEM approaches has been to reveal that safety climate has indirect e€ects upon safety behaviour, which are mediated by other variables, supporting Ho€man and Stetzer's (1996) observation that the in¯uence of
safety climate upon safety performance is through the work context. However, none
of these studies used independent measures for the dependent safety variable used in
their models. Lee and Harrison (2000) used nine self-reported performance measures, although their subsequent analyses, revealing relationships between these
measures and their 28 safety climate factors, did not allow for the possibility of
correlations between the presumed independent performance measures.
1.4. Sub-group di€erences in safety climate
Waring (1992) maintains that di€erences can exist in the safety climate of di€erent
groups in an organization due to di€erent daily work demands and experiences,
which can shape safety attitudes. Mason and Simpson (1995) and Budworth (1997)
identi®ed di€erences between the safety climate pro®les of senior and junior sta€
within a single organization and proposed targeted safety strategies based on such
di€erences. Cox and Cheyne (2000), Lee and Harrison (2000), and McDonald et al.
(2000) have also identi®ed signi®cant di€erences in safety climate factor scores
between sub-groups within di€erent organizations.
Some research on di€erent groups within organizations has focused on comparing
individuals who have not su€ered an injury with those who have. Brown and
Holmes (1986) explored di€erences in safety climate perceptions of post-traumatic
(accident involved) and pre-traumatic (no accident involvement) employees. The
post-traumatic group perceived lower management concern and less management
action than did the pre-traumatic group. The post-traumatic group was found to
have a lower level of risk perception. Comparing responses on a safety attitudes
questionnaire of employees with and without injuries, Sherry (1991) found several
dimensions on the safety attitudes questionnaire that could distinguish between
employees who had sustained injuries and those who had not. Guest et al. (1994)
found di€erences between safety climates of high accident and low accident gangs of
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
163
UK rail workers. The high accident gangs believed that they were more safety conscious than other workers were.
Despite potential bene®ts of comparing sub-groups within an organization, few
studies have evaluated di€erent groups on an a priori basis. Thus, research is
required to develop a suitable measure to determine whether di€erent safety climate
pro®les among sub-groups within an organization exist and to clarify bene®ts of
conducting such comparisons.
1.5. The present study
The SCQ's factor structure has not previously been tested on another sample.
Therefore, the present study aims to test the replicability of the safety climate factor
structure of the SCQ. It uses an opportunistic sample of respondents from the Main
Roads Department of Road, Transport, and Construction Services (RTCS), South
East, based in South-East Queensland, Australia. This organization is involved in
the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. Two districts of RTCS
(South East) are analysed Ð central and south Ð and two job types are examined Ð
construction and maintenance. The safety climate survey used is a modi®ed version
of the SCQ developed by Glendon et al. (1994). As noted above, the few studies that
have sought to replicate the factor structure of safety climate questionnaires have
generally found di€erent structures emerging from the same instrument.
1.5.1. Hypothesis 1
A similar factor structure to that obtained by Glendon et al. (1994) will be
obtained.
Research evidence to date that examines the relationship between measures of
safety climate and safety performance is scant and the ®ndings are inconclusive.
Construction, unlike many work activities, for example those that are carried out by
workers in isolation, o€ers generally good opportunities for behavioural observation
of work activity. Because of its generally poor coverage in the literature to date, a
second purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between a safety climate
measure and a behavioural measure of safety performance. To measure safety performance this study uses behaviour sampling, a safety measurement technique that
has been found to be valid and reliable, and also seeks to examine which safety climate factors might be related to safety performance.
1.5.2. Hypothesis 2
There will be a positive association between safety performance and safety climate.
Although several researchers have postulated that safety climate may di€er
between groups within an organization, few researchers have considered safety climate at this level of disaggregation. McDonald and Ryan (1992) suggest that it is
more likely that sub-cultures exist within an organization if sub-groups are autonomous and internally cohesive. Therefore, this study also sought to evaluate whether
di€erences exist between sub-groups within the selected organization. The subgroups being compared from RTCS (south east) are expected to vary due to their
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
di€ering characteristics. Table 2 displays the distinguishing characteristics of
the di€erent job types analysed. Di€erent districts will also be analysed to determine
whether subsidiaries of one organization will have similar safety climates due to the
similar management styles and safety rules.
1.5.3. Hypothesis 3
Sub-groups within the organization will exhibit di€erent scores on the scaled
safety climate factors.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Respondents were recruited from the central and south districts of RTCS
(south east) construction and maintenance departments. Of approximately 370
potential respondents, 198 completed the safety climate questionnaire, representing
a 54% response rate Ð acceptable for social science research (Oppenheim, 1992).
In this and all other aspects of the treatment of respondents, APA ethical standards were complied with. Table 3 shows numbers of respondents in each district and
job type.
All respondents were male, with an age range of 18 to 66 years. Table 4 displays
mean age, experience in current job, and experience in the organization for the
sample.
Five construction crews from RTCS south district were included in the behavioural observation. A total of 92 workers was observed in these ®ve crews.
Table 2
Distinguishing characteristics of construction and maintenance crews
Construction crews
Maintenance crews
Work in one location, on one project for a period
of time and then move to another project in
another location
Work on projects extending over long periods,
maintaining a large road network over an
extensive geographical area
Work as part of a project team of 5±30 people
Work as a small individual team of 2±5 members,
as part of a large maintenance project team of
up to 30
Usually work away from trac, or where trac
has been diverted for a long period
Work on roadways with trac temporarily
diverted from work area
Supervisors in close proximity and contact
Supervisors have limited contact, face to face
sometimes only once a day, other contact
through two-way radio
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
165
Table 3
Number of respondents in each district and job type
District
Job type
Construction
Maintenance
Totals
Central
South
30
76
38
54
68
130
Totals
106
92
198
Table 4
Means, standard deviations, and ranges of respondents' age and experience
Age
Experience in current job
Experience in organization
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
39.1
8.6
11.0
37.5
6.0
9.0
18
1
0
66
43
43
2.2. Design
The organization was opportunistically selected as a test of the SCQ's factor
structure. While both country and industry varied from the original study this might
be considered to be a particularly stringent test of the instrument. Advantages
of selecting this organization for study included the existence of two sub-groups of
employees engaged in qualitatively di€erent work activities in two separate districts,
giving a 22 factorial design for analysis. Another advantage was the opportunity
to study selected groups of workers from the organization using behavioural sampling, providing a correlational design for two independent measures of safety.
These two feature make this a unique study among safety climate studies to date.
2.3. Equipment
2.3.1. Modi®ed Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ)
An adapted version of the safety climate questionnaire developed by Glendon et
al. (1994) was used (see Appendix A). On the original questionnaire, responses were
recorded on a nine-point rating scale. Verbal anchors `never', `sometimes' and
`always' were located at points 1, 5 and 9, respectively. All items were worded in the
same direction, with high responses indicating a positive safety climate. While this
design runs counter to the notion of avoiding `response set' by reversing a proportion of questionnaire items, it provides a more logical format that is less prone to
error Ð both for respondents and during data transcription.
The questionnaire was modi®ed for use in the present study. Speci®cally, the
language was simpli®ed and irrelevant questions were discarded. All items that
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
comprised the `Spares' factor, and the `Incident Investigation and Development of
Procedures' factor on the original questionnaire were removed as being irrelevant to
the RTCS work environment. Other questions were adjusted slightly so that they
were applicable to RTCS (south east). The ®nal questionnaire used in this study
consisted of 40 items (see Appendix B). The Occupational Health and Safety CoOrdinator and the RTCS (south east) Principal Construction Technician assisted
modi®cation of the questionnaire.
2.3.2. Behaviour observation
A behaviour sampling technique was used to evaluate the safety performance of
each crew. This method was chosen as behaviour sampling has been recommended
as a reliable and sensitive method for evaluating safety performance (Fitch et al.,
1976; Tarrants, 1980). This method of safety measurement involves observing samples of behaviour at random intervals to determine safe performance.
To identify key safe and unsafe behaviours within RTCS (south east), organizational safety booklets, site supervisors, safety representatives, and employees were
consulted. The ®nal list of key behaviours to be observed was determined from discussions with the Occupational Health and Safety Co-ordinator and the Principal
Construction Technician. The Occupational Health and Safety Co-ordinator was
familiar with the frequency and range of accidents within RTCS (south east), while
the Principal Construction Technician visited all job sites frequently and was aware
of di€erent safe and unsafe behaviours performed on the job sites. The ®nal list of
key behaviours is shown in Table 5. The behaviours observed in this study are
Table 5
Key behaviours for observation
Personal Protective
Equipment
1. Safety helmets are to be worn in the vicinity of either a bridge site,
when working with any plant in the crane mode, or when working in trenches.
2. When safety helmets not required, re¯ective wide brim hats should be worn.
3. Re¯ective safety vests or jackets should be worn at all times.
4. Steel cap boots must be worn at all times.
5. Hearing protection should be worn when working with noisy machinery.
6. Thick gloves should be worn when dealing with chemicals or concrete.
7. Eye goggles should be worn in any situation where damage to the eye as a
result of ¯ying particles may occur.
Trac awareness
8. Watch for trac before crossing the road.
9. When working in the close proximity of trac, one person should be watching
the trac.
10. Persons are not to walk in machine, or truck operators' blind spots.
11. Ensure that trac is stopped before taking machinery onto the road.
House-keeping
12. Safety mesh should be erected around excavations.
13. After using any tools or small machinery (e.g. jack hammer), store them in
their correct place.
General
14. Use correct procedure when lifting.
15. If an object is heavier than 40 kg, two people should lift it, or use a lifting aide.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
167
similar to those used in Marsh et al.'s (1998) study of behavioural safety among
construction workers.
2.3.3. Two hand-held counters
These were used for recording behaviour observations.
2.4. Procedure
As the level of literacy of the sample was unknown, the questionnaire was pilot
tested on 10 RTCS (south east) employees. They were speci®cally asked to evaluate
the language used throughout the questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire,
10-min interviews were conducted with each person to discuss the questionnaire. All
questions were deemed to be relevant and comprehensible, consequently no further
modi®cations were made.
The questionnaire was distributed to respondents by their safety representative,
who read out a standard passage emphasising that replies were anonymous and that
respondents' participation was voluntary. Respondents were told that the questionnaire sought information that would be used to improve safety. Respondents
were given 15±20 min of work time to complete the questionnaire, after which the
safety representative collected the questionnaires.
To obtain safety performance levels, the second author and an experienced
observer observed the work practices of each crew. The observer counted the safe
and unsafe key behaviours displayed. The researcher was present only to instruct the
observer when to start and stop observing behaviour. Percentage of safe behaviour
was calculated using the formula:
%Safe behaviour ˆ
Total safe
100
Total safe ‡ Total unsafe
The behavioural observation was completed by an observer who had experience
working in construction crews in RTCS (south east) and was very familiar with all
safe and unsafe behaviours identi®ed in the key behaviours list. The observer and
the researcher were present on each of the sites for approximately 1.5±3 h. The
amount of time spent at each site was determined by the number of crew members;
more time being spent with larger crews. Prior to arriving on site, the researcher
selected observation periods using a random numbers table. Times were strati®ed
so that four 5-minute observation periods were conducted in every hour, excluding
any breaks. This technique is recommended by Tarrants (1980) to ensure that different periods throughout the day will be observed. No observations were recorded
in the ®rst 30 min to allow the workers to become accustomed to the observers.
The observer counted safe behaviour on one hand counter and unsafe behaviour
on another hand counter. Both hand counters were concealed from the view of the
workers. A total of 331 observations was recorded from the ®ve construction
crews. The number of workers and observations from each crew is displayed in
Table 6.
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
Table 6
Number of workers and observations for south district construction crews
Crew number
No. of workers
No. of observations
1
2
3
4
5
20
7
30
10
25
77
39
85
58
72
Totals
92
331
3. Results
3.1. Factor analysis
Because of the substantial changes from the original version of the SCQ, a con®rmatory factor analysis was not considered to be appropriate. To determine the
underlying dimensions of safety climate, a principal components factor analysis,
followed by a varimax rotation was performed on the 40-item safety climate questionnaire data from 192 respondents. Prior to the analysis, six cases were removed
on the criterion of having missing data >10%. All other missing values were
replaced with appropriate mean values. The case-to-variable ratio was 5:1. Recommendations for adequate case-to-variable ratio range from 2:1 (Kline, 1994) to 10:1
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Gorsuch (1974) and Hair et al. (1995) suggest a
minimum ratio of 5:1.
The response pattern for each question item was analysed. Inspections of the histograms and normal probability plots indicated that 36 of the 40 response distributions appeared to be negatively skewed, although the skewness value was not
signi®cant. The other four questions were positively skewed. None of the questions
displayed signi®cant kurtosis. K-S (Lillifors) was signi®cant for all items. Transformations were considered, but were not performed as factor analysis is generally
robust to non normality (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Brewer
and Hills (1969) examined the e€ect of skewness on factor analysis and concluded
that even serious skewness only minimally reduces the correlations. Responses met
all other aspects of normality.
The data were deemed to be appropriate for the analysis, as indicated by the
Kaiser±Meyer±Olkin measure of sampling adequacy value of 0.93 (Hair et al., 1995).
Bartlett Test of Sphericity was signi®cant [2=4560.0253, P<0.05], indicating that
correlations exist among some of the response categories. The ®rst analysis yielded a
seven-factor solution, which accounted for 69.2% of the variance. However, the
interpretability of this solution was rendered problematic because of eight complex
items, each of which loaded on two factors. These items were removed from further
analysis (questions 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 29, 31). A subsequent analysis of the
remaining 32 items yielded six factors with eigenvalues greater than one, which
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
169
together accounted for 69.3% of the explained variance. A varimax rotation was
performed to enhance factor interpretability. Table 7 displays factor loadings from
the varimax rotation. Items with factor loadings greater than 0.4 were selected to
de®ne factors, as suggested by Hair et al. (1995).
Cronbach's Alpha was calculated for the 32 items, resulting in an excellent reliability of 0.96 (Gregory, 1996). Reliabilities for individual factors ranged from 0.72 to
0.93, indicating adequate internal consistency (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 1997). Factor
scores were calculated for use as variables in further analyses, with consideration
given to factor loadings. Results of this analysis provided good support for
Hypothesis 1.
3.2. Multiple regression analysis
To evaluate the relationship between the behavioural measure of safety and the
safety climate factors, a standard multiple regression analysis was conducted. The
dependent variable was the percent safe behaviour for each crew from the behavioural observation, with scores on the six factors comprising the independent variables. Only observation data from construction crews in the south district were
analysed in the regression, as no behavioural safety measures were obtained for
central district or from maintenance crews in south district. Questionnaire data from
75 respondents were analysed, with the case to variable ratio 13:1 Ð adequate for
multiple regression (Hair et al., 1995).
None of the independent variables signi®cantly violated any of the assumptions
for the analysis, and no outliers were found. Table 8 displays the percent safe
behaviour for each of the crews obtained from the behavioural observation, as well
as crew factor means and standard deviations.
After it was determined that the data met the assumptions required for the
analysis, a standard multiple regression was performed. The variance accounted for
by the factor scores in the regression equation was 5.9%. This was not signi®cant
[F(6,69)=0.3112, P>0.05] indicating no relationship between safety climate factors
and behaviour observation data. Results from this analysis did not support
Hypothesis 2.
3.3. Multivariate analysis of variance
To determine whether di€erences existed between the safety pro®les of the di€erent job types and districts, a 22 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
performed. However, to ensure that comparisons between districts and job types
were not confounded by age and experience variables, a separate MANOVA was
performed to analyse the groups on these demographic variables prior to analysis of
the groups. Dependent variables were age, experience in current position, and
experience in the organization. Independent variables were job type (construction vs.
maintenance), and district (south vs. central).
Using Wilks' lambda, no main e€ect was found for district [F(3,167)=0.513,
P>0.05] indicating that the samples from the central and south districts did not
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
Table 7
Varimax rotated factor loadings for the six-factor solution
Label
Factor 1 Ð Communication and Support; 18.3%; 5.89; 0.93
Work problems are openly discussed between workers and supervisors
Workers are spoken to when changes in work practices are suggested
Workers can express their views about work policy
Workers can discuss important policy issues
Changes in working procedures and their e€ects on safety are e€ectively
communicated to workers
Workers are told when changes are made to the working environment on a job site
Company policy is e€ectively communicated to workers
Arrangements are made so workers are not working by themselves
Workers are encouraged to support and look out for each other
Potential risks and consequences are identi®ed in training
Factor 2 Ð Adequacy of Procedures; 13.7%; 4.40; 0.92
Work procedures are complete and comprehensive
Work procedures are technically accurate
Work procedures are clearly written
Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice
Workers can easily identify the relevant procedure for each job
An e€ective documentation management system ensures the availability
of procedures
Factor 3 Ð Work Pressure; 13.0%; 4.17; 0.89
There is sucient `thinking time' to enable workers to plan and carry out
their work to an adequate standard
There are enough workers to carry out the required work
Workers have enough time to carry out their tasks
Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic
Workload is reasonably balanced
Problems arising from factors outside worker's control can be
accommodated without negatively a€ecting safety
Item loadinga
79
78
77
71
69
68
57
55
53
45
79
79
79
65
56
53
74
71
69
68
67
63
Factor 4 Ð Personal Protective Equipment; 10.1%; 3.23; 0.86
PPE use is monitored to identify problem areas
PPE users are consulted for suggested design improvements
Findings from PPE monitoring are acted upon
PPE use is enforced
87
81
78
50
Factor 5 Ð Relationships; 7.2%; 2.30; 0.82
Workers are con®dent about their future with the organization
Good working relationships exist in this organization
Morale is good
80
71
67
Factor 6 Ð Safety Rules; 6.8%; 2.18; 0.72
Safety rules are always practical
Safety rules can be followed without con¯icting with work practices
Safety rules are followed even when a job is rushed
74
70
62
a
Decimal points omitted from factor loadings.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
171
Table 8
Percent safe behaviour, factor means, and standard deviations for ®ve south district construction crewsa
Crew number
Safety climate factor
Communication and support
Adequacy of procedures
Work pressure
Personal protective equipment
Relationships
Safety rules
Percent safe behaviour
a
1
2
0.88
0.25
0.11
0.68
0.25
0.21
83
(1.26)
(1.31)
(1.00)
(0.95)
(0.61)
(1.53)
3
0.29
0.23
0.09
0.07
0.03
0.03
82
(1.02)
(0.91)
(0.96
(1.04)
(0.85)
(0.85)
4
0.08
0.35
0.02
0.19
0.21
0.25
92
(1.13)
(0.83)
(1.06)
(0.77)
(1.19)
(0.62)
5
0.15
0.05
0.20
0.14
0.13
0.41
69
(0.68)
(1.01)
(0.76)
(1.01)
(0.83)
(1.14)
00 (1.31)
0.34 (0.99)
0.95 (0.97)
0.40 (1.53)
0.27 (0.59)
0.22 (0.70)
86
Standard deviations in brackets.
di€er in regards to age, experience in current job, or experience in the organization.
A signi®cant multivariate main e€ect was found for job type [F(3,167)=3.598,
P<0.05]. However, inspection of the univariate statistics found that no variable
signi®cantly contributed to the main e€ect. Thus, construction and maintenance
crews did not di€er in age, experience in current job, and experience in the organization. However, a signi®cant interaction was found [F(3,167)=4.525, P<0.05].
From the univariate statistics it was determined that signi®cant contributions were
from age [F(1,169)=9.309, P<0.025] and experience in organization [F(1,169)=
11.579, P<0.025]. Tukey's Honestly Signi®cant Di€erence post hoc analyses
indicated that a signi®cant di€erence existed between central district construction
and central district maintenance crews, and between south district maintenance and
central district maintenance crews.
After it was determined that the groups did not di€er in respect of main e€ects of
age and experience variables, the MANOVA was performed. Dependent variables
were the six safety climate factors identi®ed from the factor analysis. Independent
variables were crew type (construction vs. maintenance) and district (central vs.
south).
Prior to statistical analysis, assumptions of MANOVA were evaluated. Although
there were unequal sample sizes in each cell, the smallest cell contained more cases
than the number of dependent variables (26:7), meeting MANOVA cell size
requirement (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). None of the independent variables
showed signi®cant skewness or kurtosis. Normal probability plots were examined,
with K-S (Lillifors) insigni®cant for all factors. To evaluate homogeneity of variance, Bartletts Box was interpreted for each of the dependent variables. This test
was only signi®cant for Factor 1. However, the calculated Fmax test ratio of the largest to smallest variance indicated that this was not problematic. The multivariate
test of homogeneity of variance, Boxes' M, was signi®cant [F(63,40252)=2,
P<0.001]. As the sample sizes were unequal and the largest variance was not associated with the largest group, this test cannot be ignored. To overcome violations
of homogeneity of variance, Olson (1979) recommends using Pillai's criterion to
172
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
evaluate multivariate signi®cance rather than Wilks' lambda as it is more robust to
violations of the assumptions. Bartlett's test of sphericity was not signi®cant
[2(15)=2.178, P>0.05], indicating that no signi®cant correlations exist between the
dependent variables. Means and standard deviations of the factor scores for the main
e€ects are shown in Table 9.
Using Pillai's criterion, no signi®cant main e€ect was found for district
[F(6,183)=0.011, P>0.05]. However, a signi®cant main e€ect for job type was
found [F(6,183)=6.148, P<0.05]. To investigate the main e€ect for job type further,
univariate statistics were evaluated. However, before evaluating the univariate statistics the Bonferroni correction was applied to correct for Type I errors, giving an
alpha level of 0.007. Signi®cant e€ects were found for Factor 5 Ð Relationships
[F(1,188)=21.165, P<0.007] and for Factor 6 Ð Safety Rules [F(1,188)=7.987,
P<0.007]. From examination of the means in Table 9, and Figs. 1 and 2, it was
determined that construction crews scored higher than maintenance crews on Relationships (Factor 5). However, the reverse applied for Safety Rules (Factor 6), with
maintenance crews scoring higher than construction crews.
A signi®cant interaction e€ect was found between job type and district
[F(6,183)=4.081, P<0.05]. Examination of the univariate statistics revealed that
Factor 5 Ð Relationships Ð was the only dependent variable that had a signi®cant
univariate e€ect [F(1,188)=11.77, P<0.007]. Fig. 3 displays this interaction.
Table 9
Factor score means and standard deviations for MANOVA main e€ectsa
Safety climate factor
District
Central
Communication and support
Adequacy of procedures
Work pressure
Personal protective equipment
Relationships
Safety rules
a
0.11
0.09
0.02
0.05
0.11
0.04
(0.90)
(0.93)
(1.09)
(0.95)
(1.10)
(0.85)
Job type
South
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.02
Construction
(1.05)
(1.04)
(0.96)
(1.03)
(0.94)
(1.07)
0.19
0.09
0.03
0.09
0.24
0.21
(0.97)
(0.94)
(0.98)
(1.00)
(0.98)
(1.01)
Standard deviations in brackets.
Fig. 1. Main e€ect for job type for factor 5 Ð Relationships.
Maintenance
0.23
0.10
0.04
0.10
0.28
0.24
(1.00)
(1.07)
(1.03)
(1.00)
(1.06)
(0.94)
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
173
Fig. 2. Main e€ect for job type for factor 6 Ð Safety Rules.
Fig. 3. Interaction e€ect for factor 5 Ð Relationships.
Tukey's Honestly Signi®cant Di€erence post hoc analysis indicated that signi®cant
di€erences existed between central district maintenance and the three other groups,
and between south district maintenance and central district construction. Findings
from this analysis provide some support for Hypothesis 3.
4. Discussion
4.1. Review of hypotheses
Despite modi®cations to the SCQ, a similar factor structure to that obtained by
Glendon et al. (1994) was found, providing good support for the ®rst hypothesis.
Results from this study suggest that although the same safety climate factors will not
apply to all organizations, some safety climate factors may be stable across industries, organizations and national cultures. Glendon et al.'s eight-factor solution
could not be replicated because of modi®cations to the safety climate questionnaire
used in this study. The present research identi®ed six factors, ®ve of which were
similar to those obtained by Glendon et al.
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
Contrary to expectations, this research did not ®nd any relationship between
safety climate and safety behaviour. Therefore the second hypothesis, that a relationship would be found between safety climate and performance, was not supported. One explanation for why no relationship was found is that safety climate
and safety performance exist independently under a superordinate safety construct.
This theme is explored in greater detail below.
The third hypothesis, that sub-groups within RTCS (south east) would have different safety climates, was partially supported. It was found that sub-groups di€ered
on some aspects of safety climate.
4.2. Comparison of safety climate factor structure with previous research
The present study determined that a six-factor safety climate structure was the
most appropriate for RTCS (south east). After comparison of the items loading
onto the six factors, with Glendon et al.'s (1994) eight-factor item loadings, very
strong similarities were apparent (see Appendix C). Five of Glendon et al.'s eight
factors were con®rmed by the present study. The modi®ed versions of the items that
loaded onto the factors `Adequacy of Procedures', `Work Pressure', `Personal Protective Equipment', `Relationships' and `Safety Rules', loaded onto similar factors in
this research. Another factor from Glendon et al.'s research was partially
supported Ð `Communication and Training'. However, in the present research the
communication items loaded with support items, and the training items were not
included in the analysis. The items loading on Glendon et al.'s other two factors Ð
``Incident Investigation and Development of Procedures'' and ``Spares'', were irrelevant to RTCS (south east), hence were not included in the questionnaire. The
similarities between the factor structures suggest that Glendon et al.'s method of
developing the SCQ Ð from general performance in¯uencing factors Ð may have
resulted in safety climate factors that are operationally based.
Prior research has failed to obtain the same factor structure when the same safety
climate questionnaire has been administered (Zohar, 1980; Brown and Holmes,
1986). When they found that the same safety climate factor structure was not
applicable to two similar organisations, Coyle et al. (1995) argued that safety climate
factors are not universally stable. Contrary to previous research, the present study
obtained similar safety climate factors when a safety climate questionnaire was
administered to a sample in a di€erent industry and culture. Results from the present research contradict Coyle et al.'s suggestion that no universal set of safety climate factors exists. The current research indicates that at least some safety climate
factors suggested by Glendon et al. (1994) might be stable across both industries and
cultures.
The method used by Glendon et al. to develop the SCQ may explain the contrasting results. The SCQ items were developed from performance in¯uencing factors, and thus should be particularly relevant to work performance because they are
operationally anchored. Because their content is proximal to work activity they
could be said to represent the `base level' of safety climate perceptions. They represent the immediate safety shell within which work activity occurs. Higher order,
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
175
more abstract safety climate factors, such as management commitment, which is not
an SCQ factor, are more likely to be extracted from more generalised safety climate
instruments. These could be subject to greater variation when tested across groups
or between organizations, and thus provide less robust factor structures. Both types
of measure are important, but could be measuring safety climate at di€erent levels.
Factors obtained in the present study may be more generic than safety climate
factors from some other studies. A safety climate questionnaire that had some factors that were relevant to all industries would allow organizations to benchmark
themselves on these factors. However, because all organizations have slightly di€erent safety requirements, all items on a safety climate questionnaire cannot be relevant to all organizations. A safety climate questionnaire with a core of generic
factors that consistently obtained a comparable factor structure regardless of
organization, industry sector or culture, would be a useful tool for safety professionals. Additional research is required to test the generalizability of the SCQ on
other samples. It is possible that with modi®cations the SCQ may be applicable to
many organizations.
4.3. Relationship between safety climate and safe behaviour
This research failed to ®nd any relationship between safety climate and the behavioural observation measure of safety performance. The present results contradict the
limited previous research on the relationship between safety climate and safety performance (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Glennon, 1982; Lee and Harrison, 2000).
Several reasons may have contributed to the failure to ®nd a relationship between
safety climate and safety performance. First, the safety climate measure may tap
a di€erent aspect of safety than the behavioural measure of safety. The SCQ is a
subjective self-report measure, while behaviour observation is a more objective
method. Di€erent measurement methods may re¯ect di€erent aspects of safety. As a
subjective measure of safety, the SCQ provides di€erent information than an objective measure of safety like behaviour observation. From other studies in the construction sector, such as Marsh et al. (1998), it seems that if behaviour changes are
sought, then it is necessary to execute a behaviour based program. The methods
used in this study may be seen as complementary rather than overlapping measures
of safety.
Ojanen et al. (1988) suggested that safety climate questionnaires obtain information about management goals and strategies concerning safety, whereas observation
methods measure the use of safety equipment and other safe behaviours. They argued
that a safety climate measure that identi®es workers' perceptions of management's
commitment to safety does not have to be related to actual behaviour and that safety
measures at di€erent levels are required to provide a full picture of safety within an
organization. The present results emphasise the importance of using a triangulated
approach to measuring safety. Measuring the safety climate of an organization provides information about safety that is unavailable from behaviour sampling.
An alternative explanation as to why no relationship was found is that the
behavioural observation measure may not have been sensitive enough to identify
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A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
di€erences in safety performance between di€erent crews. All crews achieved a
relatively high percentage of safe behaviours, indicating a ceiling e€ect for the
behaviour sampling, resulting in restricted variance Ð a factor that could not reasonably have been foreseen prior to the study. Furthermore, the measure was limited to safety behaviours that could be observed, particularly personal protective
equipment use and thus could not re¯ect the complete range of safety performance.
However, even though around half the items on the behaviour safety measure were
concerned with personal protective equipment, no relationship was found with the
Personal Protective Equipment safety climate factor. Additionally, behavioural
observations were conducted only once, contrary to its recommended use (Tarrants,
1980). However, resources were not available to conduct such extensive measurement in the current study, and given the ®ndings, might not have been justi®ed.
A further limitation of the behaviour observation is that a group-based measure
of safety was obtained. An individual measure of safety performance might have
been more sensitive. Moreover, the group measure of safety performance was compared with an aggregated individual measure of safety climate. Realistically, however, an individual measure of safety performance is almost unobtainable due to the
nature of the work. The crews observed in the present research rely on each other for
safety. For example, one person is usually designated as the trac observer, hence
the safety of other workers from this hazard is primarily the responsibility of one
worker. Thus, in this work environment the crew's overall safety level is a more
appropriate measure of safety than is an individual measure. An individual behavioural measure of safety is more obtainable, and meaningful, in circumstances such
as measuring the safety performance of production workers, who are more responsible for their own safety, and who often remain in one area.
While the problems associated with the use of behaviour observation in this study
do not diminish its general utility as a measure of safe performance, they do indicate
that researchers using this method as an independent measure should take due note
of its possible shortcomings.
Although no relationship was found between safety climate and safety behaviour,
the utility of the SCQ is not diminished. Rather, this study highlights additional
bene®ts gained from administering a safety climate questionnaire, particularly in
relation to triangulation of measures. The present results indicate that information
about safety obtained from safety climate questionnaires may not be available by
measuring safety performance.
4.4. Sub-group di€erences in safety climate scores
The present study identi®ed di€erences in the safety climate of sub-groups. However, a di€erence was only found between job types, and not between districts.
Furthermore, the sub-groups only di€ered on two of the safety climate factors Ð
`Relationships' and `Safety Rules'.
Construction and maintenance crews were expected to show di€erent safety climates, due to variations in their work conditions (see Table 2). The di€erence found
between the crews on the `Relationships' factor of safety climate can be explained by
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
177
analysing their work environment. Construction crews have more supervisor contact
than maintenance crews do, which may contribute to their higher scores on the
Relationships factor. This factor consists of items such as ``morale is good'', and
``good working relationships exist in this organization''. This indicates that greater
supervisor contact may bene®cially a€ect perceptions about safety. This is not surprising as previous research has indicated that the ®rst line supervisor is the key
person in injury control and that management involvement is an important factor in
keeping accident rates low (Simonds and Shafai-Sahrai, 1977). Furthermore, Cohen
and Cleveland (1983) concluded that, compared with high accident rate companies,
low accident rate companies have more frequent positive contact and interaction
with employees.
The di€erence found between the crews on the Safety Rules factor can also be
explained by reference to their respective work environments. Maintenance crews
scored higher than construction crews on such questions as ``safety rules are followed even when a job is rushed'', and ``safety rules are always practical''. Construction crews are exposed to more hazards, such as machinery, than are
maintenance crews. Consequently, while the same overriding safety rules and regulations apply to both crews, more of the rules speci®cally apply to construction
crews. Hence, maintenance crews may have a more favourable opinion of safety
rules as they have fewer rules to follow than do construction crews.
This study has determined that sub-climates for safety can exist within an organization. This accords with previous research, which suggested that sub-groups within
an organization can di€er on dimensions of safety climate (McDonald and Ryan,
1992; Waring, 1992; Budworth, 1997). Practical implications for evaluating the
safety climates of sub-groups primarily focus on where safety programs should be
targeted to bene®t each group the most. Speci®c information about how the groups
di€er has been obtained from the safety climate questionnaire. Thus, the present
research has clari®ed some bene®ts of comparing safety climates of sub-groups.
4.5. Concluding thoughts and ideas for future research
Along with ®ndings from other studies, this study's results suggest that di€erent
instruments could measure qualitatively di€erent safety climate concepts. At an
operational level would be instruments that access safety climate factors impacting
most directly upon work performance and that deal exclusively with perceptions.
Examples would be the SCQ (Glendon and Stanton, 2000) and Wilson (1998). At an
intermediate level would be instruments, primarily perception-oriented but perhaps
also containing some attitudinal items, which typically produce ``Big 5'' type factors
such as `management commitment' or `safety system'. Examples of such broaderbased safety environment scales include Williamson et al. (1997) and some of those
analysed by Flin et al. (2000). At a purely attitudinal level are safety climate scales
that could tap into some aspects of safety culture. Examples include Niskanen's
(1994) safety climate scale, and the work of Donald and Canter (1993), which has
not traditionally been included within the safety climate literature. There would also
be hybrid instruments that produced safety climate factors at two or more levels.
178
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
To progress this ®eld of study, future research into safety climate could usefully
consider more rigorous methodology. As well as di€erentiating between perceptual
and attitudinal items in safety climate scales, improved discrimination between
scaled items would be bene®cial. This should indicate whether items are designed to
access operational or behaviourally anchored aspects of safety as a component of
work performance on the one hand, or more abstract or environmental components
of the safety climate concept on the other. Structural equation modeling approaches
could usefully consider safety climate measures at di€erent levels and the relationships between them. Wherever possible use should be made of independent outcome
measures as criterion variables.
Now that a number of safety climate instruments exist, researchers could usefully
design more balanced studies to examine some of these measures more systematically. In controlled studies comparisons could include using these instruments to
test for di€erences within organizational sub-cultures, between organizations within
an industry sector, between industry sectors, and between countries or cultures.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to employees at Main Roads Department, Road Transport and Construction Services (RTCS), South East, Queensland, and particularly to Geo€
Lucht, Occupational Health and Safety Co-ordinator. We also acknowledge helpful
comments from anonymous reviewers on an earlier draft of this paper.
Appendix A. Glendon, Stanton, and Harrison (1994) safety climate questionnaire
items
1. Safety rules are adhered to even under production pressures.
2. Safety rules can be implemented without con¯icting with established work
practices.
3. Safety rules are practical to apply in all situations.
4. There are adequate opportunities for sta€ to express their views about operational problems.
5. There are adequate opportunities to discuss important policy issues.
6. Consultation is adequate when changes in working practices are proposed.
7. Meetings take place where causes of operational problems are openly discussed
between engineers and management.
8. An e€ective system exists for communicating plant changes and their implications for safety to operating personnel.
9. An adequate system exists for transmitting critical information regarding the
state of the system during shift change over.
10. Users are involved in developing the incident investigation systems.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
179
11. Members of investigation teams are trained to identify factors which in¯uence
the causes of error.
12. The investigation system considers management and policy in¯uences on the
causes of incidents.
13. The investigation system is regularly reviewed and updated to ensure that it is
achieving its objectives.
14. There are clear and well-documented procedures for developing speci®c remedial actions on the basis of identi®ed caused of incidents.
15. A systematic process is used to identify which jobs and tasks have the greatest
priority with regard to the development of procedures.
16. An e€ective and well-documented procedures development system exists.
17. The procedures development system used job and task analysis to ensure that
the contents of procedures re¯ect actual working practices.
18. Error analysis is used to identify warning information to be included in the
procedures.
19. Explicit guidance is provided on human factors aspects of procedures layout
(language, formate, etc).
20. E€ective training is provided on skills speci®c to individual tasks and equipment.
21. Potential errors, consequences and recovery points are identi®ed in training.
22. Training includes e€ective skills practice for normal operations.
23. Training includes skills practice for emergency (eg fault conditions).
24. Training is carried out by individuals with relevant operational experience.
25. Provisions are made to minimise the isolation of one employee from others.
26. Employees are encourages to support and look out for each other's well
being.
27. Aspects of company policy are e€ectively communicated to individuals.
28. Sta€ trust the management in this organisation.
29. Management trust the sta€ in this organisation.
30. Top management support engineering sta€.
31. Sta€ are con®dent about their future with the company.
32. Good working relationships exist in this company.
33. Morale is good.
34. Sta€ have adequate time to carry out individual and concurrent tasks.
35. There are sucient sta€ to carry out the required work.
36. There is sucient 'thinking time' to enable sta€ to plan and carry out their
work to an adequate standard.
37. Distractions can by accommodated without adversely a€ecting work.
38. Frustration's that arise from factors outside sta€ control can be accommodated without adversely a€ecting work.
39. Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic.
40. Workload is reasonably well balanced.
41. Workload adjustments which have to made at short notice can be accommodated without adversely a€ecting work.
42. Knowing that other sta€ are waiting for the completion of a task which
180
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
required concentration can be accommodated within normal work activity.
PPE use is systematically enforced.
Relevant personnel are speci®cally trained in the use of emergency PPE.
PPE users are consulted for suggested design improvements.
PPE use is monitored to identify problems areas.
Findings from PPE monitoring are acted upon.
Operators can easily identify the relevant procedure for a job.
An e€ective documentation management system ensures the availability of
procedures.
Technical drawings and circuit diagrams are readily available for engineers.
Procedures are technically accurate.
Procedures are complete and comprehensive.
Procedures are written in clear, unambiguous language appropriate to users'
needs.
Written procedures match the way tasks are done in practice.
Critical spare parts are available from stock.
The time required to obtain spare parts is known and acceptable.
Good availability of spares ensures that correct parts rather than substitute
parts are ®tted by sta€.
Appropriate back-up equipment is readily available.
The questionnaire comprises eight factors
1. Work Pressure (questions 34, 35, 36, 38, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42)
2. Incident Investigation and Development of Procedures (questions 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19)
3. Adequacy of Procedures (questions 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54)
4. Communication and Training (questions 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27)
5. Relationships (questions 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33)
6. Personal Protective Equipment (questions 43, 44, 45, 46, 47)
7. Spares (questions 55, 56, 57, 58)
8. Safety (questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Appendix B. Safety climate questionnaire items Ð present study
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Safety rules are followed even when a job is rushed.
Safety rules can be followed without con¯icting with work practices.
Safety rules are always practical.
Workers can express their views about work problems.
Workers can discuss important policy issues.
Workers are spoken to when changes in working practices are suggested.
Work problems are openly discussed between workers and supervisors.
Changes in working procedures and their e€ects on safety are e€ectively communicated to workers.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
181
9. Workers are told when changes are made to the working environment on a job
site.
10. E€ective training is provided on skills speci®c to individual tasks and equipment.
11. Potential risks and consequences are identi®ed in training.
12. Training includes e€ective skills practice for normal work.
13. Training includes skills practice for emergencies.
14. Training is carried out by people with relevant experience.
15. Arrangements are made so workers are not working by themselves.
16. Workers are encouraged to support and look out for each other.
17. Company policy is e€ectively communicated to workers.
18. Workers trust the management in this organisation.
19. Management trust the workers in this organisation.
20. Workers are con®dent about their future with the organisation.
21. Good working relationships exist in this organisation.
22. Morale is good.
23. Workers have enough time to carry out their tasks.
24. There are enough workers to carry out the required work.
25. There is sucient `thinking time' to enable workers to plan and carry out their
work to an adequate standard.
26. Problems arising from factors outside workers' control can be accommodated
without negatively a€ecting safety.
27. Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic.
28. Workload is reasonably balanced.
29. Changes in workload which have been made at short notice can be accommodated without negatively a€ecting safety.
30. Personal protective equipment use is enforced.
31. Relevant workers are speci®cally trained in the use of emergency personal
protective equipment.
32. Personal protective equipment users are consulted for suggested design
improvements.
33. Personal protective equipment use is monitored to identify problem areas.
34. Findings from personal protective equipment monitoring are acted upon.
35. Workers can easily identify the relevant procedure for each job.
36. An e€ective documentation management system ensures the availability of
procedures.
37. Work procedures are technically accurate.
38. Work procedures are complete and comprehensive.
39. Work procedures are clearly written.
40. Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice.
182
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
Appendix C. Comparison of the safety climate factors of Glendon et al. (1994)
with those from the present study
Factor
Present study
1: Communication Work problems are openly
and support
discussed between workers
and supervisors.
Workers are spoken to when
changes in work practices are
suggested.
Workers can express their views
about work policy.
Workers can discuss important
policy issues.
Workers are told when changes
are made to the working
environment on a job site.
Changes in working procedures
and their e€ects on safety are
e€ectively communicated to
workers.
Company policy is e€ectively
communicated to workers.
Arrangements are made so
workers are not working by
themselves.
Workers are encouraged to
support and look out for each
other.
Potential risks and consequences
are identi®ed in training.
Glendon, Stanton and
Harrison (1994)
Meetings take place where
causes of operational
problems are openly
discussed between
engineers and management.
An e€ective system exists
for communicating plant
changes and their
implications for safety to
operating personnel.
An adequate system exists
for transmitting critical
information regarding the
state of the system during
shift change over.
E€ective training is
provided on skills speci®c
to individual tasks and
equipment.
Potential errors,
consequences and
recovery points are
identi®ed in training.
Training includes
e€ective skills practice for
normal operations.
Training includes skills
practice for emergency
(e.g. fault conditions).
Training is carried out by
individuals with relevant
operational experience.
Provisions are made to
minimise the isolation of
one employee from others.
Employees are encouraged
to support and look out
for each other's well being.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
183
Aspects of company policy
are e€ectively
communicated to
individuals.
2: Adequacy of
procedures
Work procedures are complete
and comprehensive.
Operators can easily
identify the relevant
procedure for a job.
Work procedures are technically An e€ective
accurate.
documentation
management system
ensures the availability of
procedures.
Work procedures are clearly
Technical drawings are
written.
circuit diagrams are
readily available for
engineers.
Written work procedures match
Procedures are technically
the way tasks are done in practice. accurate.
Workers can easily identify the
Procedures are complete
relevant procedure for each job.
and comprehensive.
An e€ective documentation
Procedures are written in
management system ensures the
clear, unambiguous
availability of procedures.
language appropriate to
users' needs.
Written procedures match
the way tasks are done
in practice.
3: Work pressure
There is sucient `thinking time'
to enable workers to plan and
carry out their work to a
adequate standard.
There are enough workers to
carry out the required work.
Workers have enough time to
carry out their tasks.
Time schedules for completing
work projects are realistic.
Sta€ have adequate time
to carry out individual
and concurrent tasks.
There are sucient sta€ to
carry out the required work.
There is sucient `thinking
time' to enable sta€ to
plan and carry out their
work to an adequate
standard.
Distractions can by
accommodated without
adversely a€ecting work.
184
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
Workload is reasonably
balanced
Problems arising from factors
outside a worker's control can
be accommodated without
negatively a€ecting safety.
4: Personal
protective
equipment
PPE use is monitored to identify
problem areas.
PPE users are consulted for
suggested design improvements.
Findings from PPE monitoring
are acted upon.
PPE use is enforced.
5: Relationships
Workers are con®dent about their
future with the organisation.
Good working relationships exist
in this organisation.
Morale is good.
Frustrations that arise
from factors outside
sta€ control can be
accommodated without
adversely a€ecting work.
Time schedules for
completing work projects
are realistic.
Workload is reasonably
well balanced.
Workload adjustments
which have to made at
short notice can be
accommodated without
adversely a€ecting work.
Knowing that other sta€
are waiting for the
completion of a task
which required
concentration can be
accommodated within
normal work activity.
PPE use is systematically
enforced.
Relevant personnel are
speci®cally trained in the
use of emergency PPE.
PPE users are consulted
for suggested design
improvements.
PPE use is monitored to
identify problem areas.
Findings from PPE
monitoring are acted upon.
Sta€ trust the management
in this organisation.
Management trust the sta€
in this organisation.
Top management support
engineering sta€.
A.I. Glendon, D.K. Litherland / Safety Science 39 (2001) 157±188
185
Sta€ are con®dent about
their future with the
company.
Good working
relationships exist in this
company.
Morale is good.
6: Safety rules
Safety rules are always practical.
Safety rules can be followed
without con¯icting with work
practices.
Safety rules are followed even
when a job is rushed.
Safety rules are adhered
to even under production
pressures.
Safety rules can be
implemented without
con¯icting with
established work practices.
Safety rules are practical
to apply in all situations.
There are adequate
opportunities for sta€ to
express their views about
operational problems.
There are adequate
opportunities to discuss
important policy issues.
Consultation is adequate
when changes in working
practices are proposed.
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