Electoral Punishment by Newly Enfranchised Groups: The Case
of Women’s Suffrage in the United States.
Mona Morgan-Collins
University of Pennsylvania1
Abstract
A long-standing debate in political science explores why elites decide to democratize, but
much less is known about the effects of suffrage expansion on electoral outcomes. The few
empirical studies that study immediate consequences of suffrage provide mixed evidence, often
attesting that parties were able to mitigate the electoral impact of the reforms. Departing from
accountability models of democratic representation, I theorize that suffrage expansion produces
large electoral swings against ideologically divergent incumbent politicians rather than parties,
particularly when political competition is high and party attachment is low. Using evidence
from the Nineteenth Amendment, I find that newly enfranchised women swayed the tides against
conservative incumbents, mostly in competitive districts. The electoral impact of suffrage waned
as parties absorbed women’s agenda. Substantively, these findings challenge the traditional
notion that women’s suffrage did not disrupt electoral status quo and that women, historically,
voted on conservative values.
1
I would like to thank various people for their advice and feedback including Rosie Campbell, Joni Lovenduski,
Torun Dewan, Simon Hix, David Soskice, Miriam Golden, Oyvind Skorge, Daniel Rubenson, Carlos Velasco, Elizabeth
Goodyear-Grant, Dawn Teele, Christina Wolbrecht, Lee Ann Banaszak, Corrine McConnaughy. Advance gratitude
goes to Marc Meredith and Kathleen Brown. Lee Ann Banaszak and Holly McCammon graciously shared data and
Evelyne Brie provided excellent research assistance. Participants at seminars and workshops at the LSE, University of
Pennsylvania, Toronto Political Behavior Workshop, Midwest Political Science Association conference and American
Political Science Association conference provided most useful feedback. Please contact me with any comments at
[email protected].
1
Introduction
A long-standing debate in political science explores why politicians adopt democratic reforms. The
most prominent explanations in political science emphasize the importance of strategic calculations
of political actors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; Mares 2015;
Przeworski 2009; Teele 2017). However, we know much less about the effects of such reforms. Did
suffrage expansion produce large electoral swings, or were elites able to mitigate its effects?
The few works that explore immediate consequences of suffrage expansion provide mixed evidence. Berlinski and Dewan (2011) use evidence from the Second Reform Act in Britain and show
that the post-suffrage victory of Liberals was incidental to the reform. Similarly, while Larcinese
(2014) finds that male suffrage in Italy was associated with small electoral gains of reformist parties,
he argues that the elite successfully neutralized full effect of the reform. In the United States, newly
enfranchised women did sway political tides after suffrage, but such effects are found to be fairly
small and vary across states (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016). Instead, suffrage is thought to exert
effects on non-electoral outcomes, affecting the functioning of political parties, public policies or the
make up of executive institutions (Eggers and Spirling 2016; Kroth et al 2015; Miller 2008).
In this paper, I contribute to the literature on electoral impacts of suffrage reforms. I suggest that
because most studies look for effects for parties at the national level, they overlook large electoral
swings for incumbent politicians at the district level, thus underestimating the electoral impact of
suffrage. Whenever parties consist of political factions and ideologically divergent politicians, the
effects of suffrage will vary by politicians at the district level rather than by parties at the national
level.
Building on theories of democratic accountability, I offer novel theoretical framework for the consequences of suffrage expansion. The argument is simple: because politicians were not incentivised
to respond to the new electorate prior to suffrage, newly enfranchised groups will be particularly
likely to disrupt electoral status quo at the district level. To the extent that newly enfranchised
groups share common preferences and weaker attachments to political parties, suffrage will result
in large electoral swings against incumbent politicians, particularly when their ideological position
is distant from the newly enfranchised groups.
2
Empirically, I examine electoral consequences of women’s suffrage in the United States. Analyzing county-level electoral returns and roll call data in all states affected by the Nineteenth
Amendment, I find that while the effects of suffrage vary by party, they are conditional on the ideological position of individual politicians, their incumbency status and political competition. The
impact of suffrage wanes with time, when politicians prove their commitment to the new voters
and when women develop stronger partisan loyalties. This evidence counters the prevalent view
that suffrage does not produce significant electoral swings and that elites are able to mitigate its
electoral effects.
Substantively, my findings go against the wide-spread belief that newly enfranchised women did
not disrupt electoral status quo. Despite the fact that politicians feared the impact of women’s suffrage, contemporary analyses and news documented the power of women’s votes and despite the fact
that women’s organizational activities for progressive issues were particularly high, most political
scientists today attest that electoral politics before and after women’s suffrage did not change much
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Andersen 1996; Corder and Wolbrecht 2016; McConnaughy 2013).
Further, my findings also challenge the conventional wisdom in political science where women, historically, held conservative preferences and voted for conservative parties (Duverger 1955; Inglehart
and Norris 2000; Norris 1988; Randall 1987).
What We Know About Women’s Suffrage
An emerging body of literature emphasizes strategic decision-making of politicians when it comes
to the adoption of women’s suffrage. Przeworski (2009) claims that politicians enfranchise women
only at times of electoral need and if they expect to benefit from it. The relatively late adoption
of women’s suffrage in Catholic countries is thus attributed to politicians’ electoral dependency on
women’s votes. Teele (2017) takes this argument further and argues that politicians only enfranchise
women when political competition is high and women are expected to be mobilized into their ranks.
The early enfranchisement of women in the Western part of the U.S. is thus related to both political
competition and the strength of the women’s movement. While McConnaughy (2013) opposes
the notion that women’s suffrage was a result of strategic attempts of politicians to attract all
3
newly enfranchised voters, she nonetheless recognizes the importance of electoral vulnerability and
strategic partnering of politicians with programmatically aligned women’s organizations. A common
implication of such theories is that strategic politicians back suffrage reforms only if they believe
that it will electorally benefit them, one way or the other.
However, the prevailing view among suffrage scholars is that, despite politicians’ expectations,
newly enfranchised women did not vote as a block (Lemons 1973, p.110-112 Andersen 1996, p.2;
Skocpol 1992; Freeman 2002, p.170). Rather than large electoral swings, Andersen (1996 p.143,
p.170) emphasizes the immense change in political agenda, policies, and style of politics that followed
the adoption of suffrage. Echoing Downsian predictions, she argues that women’s suffrage mostly
affected politics because politicians could no longer ignore the women electorate. Studies that use
ecological inference methods corroborate some of the common notion that the electoral impact
of suffrage was limited. Alpern and Baum (1985) analyze non-Southern states and show that
while women in the Mid-Atlantic states supported the Republican presidential candidate in the
1920 election at a higher rate than men, women in the Midwest and New England supported the
Democratic nominee. Overall, they conclude that while women’s votes did not mirror men’s, the
Republican victory at the national level after suffrage could not be attributed to women’s votes.
More recently, Corder and Wolbecht (2016) provide a rigorous analysis of women’s voting behavior in ten states in the 1920s. The authors find that women were, by and large, more likely to
support the Republican Party, although women in some Southern states were more likely to support the Democrats. They suggest that this pattern can be explained with differences in political
competition across states, where women tend to swing towards the dominant party in the state.
Although Corder and Wolbrecht (2016) show that, on average, women voted differently than men,
overall, they too, echo much of the traditional notion that women’s suffrage did not produce large
electoral swings, pointing to relatively small differences between the sexes and lower mobilization
of women.
In this paper, I contribute to the literature on women’s suffrage in two principle ways. First,
current scholarship on women’s suffrage implicitly or explicitly assumes that parties are ideologically coherent entities at the national level. Strategic explanations for women’s enfranchisement
expect electoral gains for the enfranchising party, and empirical analyses disregard local variation
4
in ideological positions of politicians within the same party.2 Yet parties often consist of ideological
factions, and ideologically divergent politicians. If voters consider ideological positions of politicians, studies that treat parties as ideologically coherent entities may underestimate the effects of
suffrage. Particularly with respect to women’s suffrage, progressive politicians cut across political
parties and, as a result, women should not express their progressive preferences for a single party,
but rather for individual politicians that were most amenable to their preferences.
Second, current scholarship on women’s suffrage mostly assumes that newly enfranchised women
vote along programmatic promises and positions at the time of election. Strategic explanations of
suffrage imply that parties can lure women into their ranks and empirical studies of women’s early
voting behavior mostly consider programmatic platforms at the time of election. However, it seems
unlikely that politicians would be able to ‘erase’ their past behavior and that newly enfranchised
women could be completely fooled by politicians’ attempts to ‘switch’ colors before the election.
Even when politicians court women’s votes before suffrage, they cannot easily negate their ‘bad’
reputation on relevant issues. This is particularly important because if new voters consider past
performance, rather than electoral promises, new voters will not be indifferent between incumbents
and challengers.
In this paper I provide an alternative view of women’s enfranchisement, and offer an explanation
for why, despite contemporary accounts, empirical studies find minimal swings in the electorate that
often sway various ways. If we acknowledge that political parties are ideologically heterogeneous
groups that cannot credibly ‘transform’ into women’s advocates overnight, we should expect women’s
suffrage to produce large electoral swings against incumbent politicians.
Towards a New Account of Women’s Enfranchisement
In stark contrast to existing scholarship on women’s suffrage, I assert that the electoral impact of
suffrage varies with ideological position of individual politicians rather than by parties and that
incumbents cannot prevent being held accountable for their past performance. Ample scholarship
2
For example, although Corder and Wolbrecht (2016) acknowledge that parties were not ideologically homogeneous
entities, their analysis relies on cross-state comparisons without specifically pointing to the ideological differences of
co-partisan politicians across regions and within states.
5
provides evidence that voters punish or reward politicians’ performance whilst in the office. Corrupt
politicians can be thrown away (Ferraz and Finan 2008), politicians responsive to their districts can
be rewarded (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; Kriner and Reeves 2012), non-competent incumbents
can be punished (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose 2011) and incumbents’ stance on salient bills can
be a liability (Nyhan et al 2010; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002). Voters also hold politicians
accountable for economic performance (Margalit 2011), and take their frustrations on politicians
even for events that are out of politicians’ control (Achen and Bertels 2004).
Although accountability mechanisms have not been at the center of scholarly debates about
suffrage, numerous contemporary sources document reward-punish strategies of new women voters.
Organized women actively disseminated information on politicians with particularly ‘bad’ voting
records and actively mobilized women against them (Lemons 1973, p.90-96; Andersen 1996, p.155158). Among the most ‘famous’ targets were senators James Wadsworth, John Weeks and Frank
Brandegee, all of whom had particularly troublesome voting records on the Seventeenth, Eighteenth
and the Nineteenth Amendments . Contemporary newspapers often reported that opponents of
suffrage were voted out by women, while progressive politicians were nominated or elected. For
example, the flagship journal of women’s political activism, Woman Citizen, published on 26 August
1922, reported:3
‘... [Women] claim the credit of being largely responsible for the defeat of the machine in
Pennsylvania and the nomination of Gifford Pinchot for governor. They were also active in
Iowa, where colonel Brookhart, a progressive, if not radical, was nominated; in North Dakota
where Senator McCumber lost nomination to Lynn J.Frazier, at one time non-partisan governor; and in Nebraska where R.B.Howell won the Republican nomination for the Senate. Mr.
Howell is also a progressive and was originally an advocate of both prohibition and woman
suffrage ...’
In this section, I develop a novel account of women’s enfranchisement where suffrage expansion
leads to large electoral swings and disruptions to the status quo. I then show how this framework
3
Quoted in Andersen (1996, p.157). Note that all Members of Congress had free subscription to the journal.
6
fits with the historical context of women’s enfranchisement in the U.S.
The Argument in a Nutshell
In an accountability model of democratic representation, elections allow citizens to hold governments
responsible for their past behavior (Fenno 1978; Ferejohn 1986). The spatial theory of elections,
introduced by Downs (1957), provides a good foundation for such mechanisms. It predicts that
because politicians seek re-election, they will try to position themselves in line with their electorate,
particularly when political competition is high. Building on accountability theories of democratic
representation, I argue that newly enfranchised voters will be particularly likely to disrupt electoral
status quo. As a result, suffrage will produce large electoral swings, where incumbent politicians
may incur significant electoral losses. I outline the key mechanisms that underline my argument.
First, when suffrage reform produces major change in the size of the electorate, newly enfranchised groups are, for the first time, able to evaluate politicians, who were not historically
incentivised to respond to them. Prior to suffrage, politicians do not have an incentive to develop
rapport with the excluded electorate, nor represent their ideological preferences. This argument
was nicely summarized by Eleanor Roosevelt, who observed that ‘There was a time when no one
asked what will the women think about this? Now that questions comes up often.’4
Second, when suffrage is extended, politicians’ ‘responsive’ ability is severely limited. If a politician has been actively opposing issues that matter to a newly enfranchised group, it would not be
easy to ‘transform’ himself into the group’s straight advocate at the time of election. As a result,
politicians cannot entirely eliminate ramifications by new voters at the ballot box. Even when politicians anticipate the adoption of suffrage, changing their ideological position prior to suffrage would
put them at risk of being punished by their current electorate if the reform would not be passed.
In the context of U.S. suffrage, women’s activism was mostly organized by issues and candidates
rather than by parties, and women’s groups sought to educate and mobilize women for or against
selected candidates (Edwards 1997, p.45; Andersen 1996, p.59; Wood 1999, p.84).
Third, the sanctioning mechanisms might be particularly strong in newly enfranchised groups
who may not yet develop solid partisan attachments. Several studies indicate that accountability
4
Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Women in Politics’, Good Housekeeping 110 (March 1940). Quoted in Andersen 1996, p.158.
7
models may fail to deliver when partisan loyalties are strong (e.g. Eggers 2014; Hellwig and Samuels
2008). Newly enfranchised American women were thought to have weaker attachments to parties
(Andersen 1996, p. 100; Goldstein 1973, p. 76, 134–138, Schuyler 2006, p. 85) and, as a result,
politicians often feared that they will not be able to rely on their loyalties (Schuyler 1996, p.8-10).
The relatively high occurrence of split ticket voting at the turn of the century may also indicate
an increased importance of the individual vote in newly enfranchised women. Burnham (1965)
estimates that the proportion of split votes was particularly high, often up to 10%, between 1920
and 1930 and scholars often point towards women’s higher probability to cast split votes (Goldstein
1973, p. 76, 134–138).
Fourth, I assert that evaluation of incumbents’ past performance will be particularly strong
when political competition is high. When political competition is low, candidates do not have an
incentive to respond to their constituents and focus on securing spoils from office rather than on reelection (Troustine 2006). Under such conditions, newly enfranchised groups thus face an incentive
to vote out incumbents regardless of their ideological positions. This has been most strongly seen in
the South, where enfranchised white women posed a challenge to Democratic machine candidates
(Schuyler 2006, p.105, 130).
Fifth, the electoral impact of suffrage will soften over time. Because incumbents can demonstrate responsiveness to women’s electorate in the subsequent elections, the incentives of newly
enfranchised groups to vote them out are lessened.
Indeed, progressive legislation backed by
the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee that formed after suffrage generally eased through
Congress with large bipartisan support (Lemons 1973, p.173). Simultaneously, new electorate will
gradually strengthen their loyalties to parties. Scholars that study women’s suffrage in the U.S. note
that, as women entered party ranks in the mid-20s, the power of their ‘individual’ vote declined
(Andersen 1996, p.158). When newly enfranchised groups enter political parties, their external
pressure on the political system lessens. As such, the success of women’s activism is thought to be
contingent on a strictly ‘maternalist’, ‘non-partisan’ and ‘separatist’ strategy. Once women’s lobby
adopted more ‘class-based’ programs, their external threat to the system naturally declined (Wilson
1997).
8
The Case of Women’s Suffrage in the United States
Women’s progressive activism. Women’s suffrage will produce electoral swings to the extent
that women’s preferences are, on average, distinct from those of men. There is a consensus among
scholars that American women at the turn of the century actively organized on abolitionist, progressive and maternalist agendas, that women’s activism was at the heart of Progressive era and
that women carried a progressive agenda well into the otherwise conservative 1920s (Andersen 1996,
p.153; Goss 2013).5 The involvement of women in voluntary organizations was immense. For example, women contributed to more than half of the signatures on the petition to Congress to abolish
slavery, women’s organizations boasted over one million members across the nation by 1910 and the
largest suffrage organization attracted 85,000 members by 1920 (Skocpol 1992, p.323-340; Banaszak
1996, p.45). Women contributed to maternalist welfare state agendas, sought to protect the lives
of women and children, and forged legislation on minimum wage, prostitution, temperance, child
welfare, spousal military benefits, mother’s benefits, education and food regulations (Skocpol 1992,
p.2, 325, Goss 2013, p.4, 27; Ladd-Taylor 1994, p.3-6). Many of these organizations supported
suffrage, often as a means to ameliorate women’s position in the home, curb society’s illnesses and
protect family values (Banaszak 1996, p.8; DuBois 1998, p.39; Scott 1991, p.96; Flexner 1959, p.182;
Skocpol 1992, p.326). Even in the conservative South, women increasingly joined their Northern more progressive - counterparts (McArthur 1998; Schuyler 2006).
Once enfranchised, women continued to influence policies through a vigorous lobby. Analyzing
Congressional hearings, Goss (2013, p.40) finds that while the most salient issue domains in Congress
concerned alcohol abuse and voting rights in the 1910s, the range of issues increased throughout the
1920s, incorporating child health, education, gender discrimination and immigration. At the federal
level, a newly established umbrella organization, Women’s Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC),
effectively organized legislative activities of multiple women’s organizations and became central to
women’s continued progressive activities throughout the 1920s (Lemons 1973, p.56; Wilson 2007;
Skocpol 1992, p.52; Andersen 1996, p.154).
5
Note that the activism of American clubwomen at the turn of the century did not abandon Victorian idea of
women’s moral superiority and ‘natural’ ability to nurture. Instead, women’s moral and caring authority at home
was extended beyond the home, well into their neighborhoods, communities and politics in general (Skocpol 1992,
p.3, 324; Goss 2013, p.26; Scott 1991, p.141).
9
Women vote for candidates, not for parties. The success of women’s lobby, activism
and organizational efforts often relied on a strict policy of non-partisanship. As Andersen (1996,
p.149) observes, mobilizing as a voting block was not feasible. Yet non-partisanship of women’s
activities did not mean that organized women were not partisan themselves. Partisan women
often mobilized women for specific candidates rather than for parties, hoping that tapping into
women’s distinct preferences and lower loyalty to parties would harbor success. Democratic women’s
organization thus sought women’s support for Wilson rather than for Democrats, while Republican
women mobilized women for Hughes rather than for the Republican ticket (Miller 1999; Wood 1999).
Such techniques stemmed from the observation that women were motivated by issues rather than by
parties and elections (Gustafson 2001; Schuyler 2006, p. 85; Andersen 1996, p.100 ). Women used
‘file systems to categorize political leaders as friend or foe’ (Schuyler 2006, p.4) and contemporary
cartoons depicted women choosing the best ‘apples’ from both partisan ‘baskets’.6 Emily Blair, later
appointed as a strategist in the Democratic party, noted that women’s choice in the 1920 election
might be hard, because progressive Republicans and liberal Democrats did not differ much.7
Politicians’ fear of women voters. Ample historical evidence documents that politicians
feared the power of women’s votes. This fear is attributed to the widely held notion that women
voted differently than men, had distinct policy agenda and preferences, that women organized
outside of the major parties and that women demonstrated impact in elections where they already
could vote (Wilson 1997, p.4; Andersen 1996, p.160, 170). In the South, Democratic Party leaders
feared electoral revolt of white women because of their lower attachment to parties, but also because
under low turnout, organized women could operate as swing voters (Schuyler 2006, p.8-10)
Whenever suffrage became perceived as inevitable, politicians often switched policy positions
or emphasized their pro-women or otherwise progressive policies (Andersen 1996, p.156-8; Lemons
1973, p.90-96). The grand Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, which aimed to reduce maternal and
infant mortality, is not only attributed to women’s lobbying efforts, but also to politicians’ acknowledgement that failure to act could be costly electorally (Skocpol 1992, pp. 497–506; Wilson 2007,
p.4). At the presidential level, some interpreted Wilson’s turn from a reluctant to a vehement sup6
Chicago Tribune, reproduced in Andersen 1996 (p.140)
7
Emily Newell Bair, Green Book 23, June 1920; quoted in Anderson 1999, p.110.
10
porter of suffrage as a strategic calculation to capture women’s votes (Link 1954, p. 60; Lunardi and
Knock 1980), while the otherwise pro-business oriented Republican presidential candidate skillfully
consulted women’s organizations and attracted women with carefully designed broad social and
‘dry’ programs (Bagby 1962, p. 149; Freeman 2002, p. 24; Gustafson 2001, p. 191; Lemons 1973,
pp. 87–9).
One of the most salient battles for women’s votes concerned the suffrage bill itself. After the war,
politicians started to widely recognize the importance of the Nineteenth Amendment in securing
women’s support after suffrage (Wilson 1997, p.10-11). The progressively minded Republican Gifford Pinchot, later elected governor of Pennsylvania, urged anti-suffrage Republicans to reconsider
their stance, fearing electoral punishment by women voters.8 Likewise, the Democratic members
of the suffrage committee worried about the adverse effects of Republicans’ relatively better voting
record on the Nineteenth Amendment.9 In the end, the Nineteenth Amendment was passed under
a Democratic presidency, but in a Republican Congress and mostly by Republican controlled state
legislatures (Lemons 1973, p. 87; Wilson 1997, p.11). As a result, both parties attempted to claim
credit for their suffrage efforts (Lemons 1973, p.87).
Mobilization of women voters. Although women’s organizational activities skillfully exploited the threat of women’s votes, their weaker partisan loyalties and their distinct preferences,
the electoral impact of women’s votes was conditional on a successful mobilization of women. There
is no doubt that women voted at lower levels than men in most places. The participation gap is
attributed to a number of factors: women’s lack of a voting habit (Wilson 1997, p.12), women’s
lower interest and knowledge of politics (Corder and Wolbrect 2016), and to a number of practical
obstacles (Andersen 1996, p.51). Moreover, any type of legal restrictions affected women more than
men (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016; Wilkerson-Freeman 2002). At the same time, while women’s
participation was lower relative to men’s, women’s turnout responded to the same factors as men’s
(Corder and Wolbrecht 2006) and differences in turnout across states were larger than differences
between the sexes (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016). The mobilization and educating activities of organized and partisan women, in turn, were immense. Organized women had a long tradition of
8
Letter from Gifford Pinchot to Boies Penrose, January 25, 1919; quoted in Wilson (1997, p.10).
9
Petition by Democratic members of the suffrage committee in Senate; quoted in Wilson (1997, p.11).
11
disseminating information, improving political education of women and helping register newly enfranchised women (Schuyler 2006, p.4). Even in the South, Schuyler (2006, p.45-74) documents the
numerous mobilization activities of black and white clubwomen that helped to bring thousands of
new women voters to the polls.
Partisan swing, after all? Although women tended to vote for candidates rather than for
parties, the question remains whether one party still scored better - on balance - among women. In
the 1920 election, the Republican party was often reported to win women’s votes10 and the Republicans did marginally better on the most important issues to women - prohibition and suffrage.11
Although the old association between prohibition and the Republicans became less divisive by 1920,
and varied significantly by candidates, some speculated that the ‘wet’ reputation of the Democratic
presidential nominee might have contributed to women’s Republican preferences in the 1920 elections (Bagby 1960, p. 151; Kleppner 1987, pp. 205–207). The Republicans also did marginally
better in the race between the two major parties on the passage of the suffrage bill. McCormick,
a member of the Republican National Committee, predicted that most women would be drawn to
the Republican Party for its progressive and pro-suffrage record.12 Perhaps precisely because the
progressive agenda cut across party lines (Wilson 1997, p.16), whoever had the majority in Congress
sponsored and passed more progressive bills (see Appendix C). These differences between parties
were not negligible, at least not until the mid 1920s. On balance, more progressives were in the
Republican party. While Harding’s nomination before the 1920 election meant a victory for the
pro-business wing in the Republican Party, former progressives stayed with the Party. The differences between the two presidential candidates were not large enough to warrant former progressives
to switch to the Democrats, particularly as the Democratic presidential nominee was considered to
be a candidate of the South and the reactionaries (Bagby 1962, pp. 146–150).
10
Just after the 1920 election, the New York Times headline quoted the head of the Women’s Republican Committee
in New York State ‘Mrs. Livermore attributes half of the Republican Majority to Women’s Efforts.’ Similar claims
appeared in Chicago Tribune September 12, 1920; New York Times October 10, 1920; New York Times November
3, 1920; Minneapolis Morning Tribune September 14, 1920 (see too Alpern and Baum 1985, Corder and Wolbrecht
2016).
11
Goss (2013, p.40) finds that, before 1920, women’s groups were most active in Congress on alcohol abuse and
voting rights. For women’s historical support of prohibition, see Tingsten 1937 and Goldstein 1975.
12
Ruth McCormick, Why Women Will Join the Republican Party, pamphlet, 1922; quoted in Wilson 1997, p.17
12
Empirical Strategy
To uncover a causal relationship between suffrage and electoral outcomes, it is necessary to isolate
the effect of suffrage from possible confounding factors. For example, if suffrage is adopted in
localities which also exhibit socio-economic characteristics that determine electoral outcomes, it
is difficult to confidently link changes in electoral support to the actual reforms. Moreover, the
extension of women’s rights was a calculated move by politicians who often considered the reform’s
likely impact (Przeworski 2009; Teele 2017). As such, studies that exploit variation in the adoption
of suffrage reforms across states or countries inevitably suffer from a possible selection bias.
My estimation strategy goes a long way in tackling these issues. I exploit variation in the
strength of suffrage within one country where the reform was imposed on all localities by a federal
amendment. I compare counties that received higher ‘dosage’ of suffrage treatment to counties with
lower suffrage exposure. The idea is that counties with more women were more exposed to the
treatment and therefore should see a more profound change in the partisan support. The idea of
using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage in examining its effects of suffrage reforms was first used by Berlinski
and Dewan (2011) and is now a frequently applied technique (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014;
Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013).13
Luckily for this design, it has been a fair commonality throughout the world that the proportion
of adult women across localities varies significantly. About 90% of all counties in the affected states
had between 43% and 51% of adult women in the first election year after the Nineteenth Amendment,
although there were counties with as few as 27.2% of women and some with as many as 55.6%.14 The
proportion of women across counties, however, is not exogenously assigned. Counties with a larger
proportion of women of voting age can differ systematically from counties with a lower proportion
of women. Indeed, in my sample, more women were in counties with higher population density,
manufacturing output, crop value and membership in the largest denominations (see correlates of
13
An alternative research design can exploit the fact that some states were enfranchised before the Nineteenth
Amendment and compare electoral trends in a simple diff-in-diff design. The most signifcant concern of this strategy
is that the suffrage treatment was not exogenously assigned, where some states self-selected into the control group.
I nonetheless present results from this analysis in Appendix D. While I find that the Republican Party benefitted at
the expense of the Democrats, strong pre-existing trends prevent any sensible inference.
14
The densities are highly similar across regions (see Appendix E).
13
the treatment in Appendix E).15 If the county characteristics that vary systematically with the
proportion of women were also correlated with vote choice, a model that regresses electoral support
in the suffrage year on the proportion of women would return biased and inconsistent estimates. In
this paper, I therefore regress change in partisan support before and after suffrage on the proportion
of women, thus controlling for fixed-county characteristics that could confound the true relationship.
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset that covers all counties without boundary changes
before and after the Nineteenth Amendment in all states affected by the reform. As most states in
the West gave women full voting rights prior to the Nineteenth Amendment, the sample consists of
34 states, mostly in the Northeast, Midwest and the South.16,17 Using this sample, I estimate the
following difference in difference specification,
∆Yi1920−1918 = α + βF emaleV otei1920 + ∆εi1920−1918
(1)
where ∆Y refers to a change in the electoral (Republican or Democratic) support between the
first election after the enfranchisement in 1920 and the last election before the enfranchisement in
1918 in county.18 When a party did not run in the election, I code its vote share as 0.19 F emaleV ote
refers to the proportion of eligible women of voting age at the county level in the suffrage year. This
variable effectively captures a change in the proportion of the newly enfranchised, which goes from
15
This is not surprising, as more remote areas have been known to show higher sex ratios, often reflecting immigrants’ attraction for male-dominated industries, such as mining and railroad construction (Hobbs and Stoops 2000,
pp. 62–63). Moreover, in the 1920s, there were five women church members for every four men. The Methodists, in
particular, had about two women for every man (US Census Bureau 1926, pp. 14–19).
16
Full description of the data set and sources is in Appendix A. Note that the sample excludes two Southern
States which defied the Nineteenth Amendment and includes three states that gave women full voting rights before
the Nineteenth Amendment, but where women voted for the first time to Congress only in the 1920 election. As
shown in the Appendix, the main results are robust to the exclusion of these three states.
17
Corder and Wolbrecht (2016) analyze presidential election in ten states, two of which enfranchised women before
the Nineteenth Amendment and only two were located in the South. Note however that Coder and Wolbrecht (2016)
report that the sample of ten states in representative to the U.S. in general.
18
choose 1918 mid-term election as a reference year to presidential election year in 1920. A reassurance for this
choice may be the fact, as I show below, that the effects of suffrage lasted until 1922. In this case, both 1918 and
1922 were mid-term elections, where 1918 provides perhaps even more suitable reference year.
19
This approach is more efficient. If a county is, for example, uncontested in one election, but contested in the
following election, a change in the Republican vote share still carries an important information about the extent of
the Republican gain. The concern of this approach, however, is that one cannot vote for a candidate that does not
run. In tackling this issue, I run a number of robustness checks and show that my results are robust to inclusion of
a variable which indicates a change in candidates between the two elections. I also show that change in candidates
does not correlate with the Female vote. More (or less) candidates were not running in counties with most women.
14
0 in 1918 to a proportion of eligible women in 1920. All regressions include a constant which
accounts for a trend across all enfranchised counties or a coefficient on a single 1920 year dummy
in a typical difference in difference setting (Wooldridge 2010). Further, given that T=2, equation
(1) is equivalent to a fixed effects strategy with county and year dummies. The advantage of this
approach is that I account for the unobserved fixed county characteristics that could confound the
true relationship between suffrage and electoral outcomes.
Endogeneity Concerns
The estimates from equation (1) could still return biased and inconsistent estimates if electoral
support of parties was trending differently in counties with different exposure to the suffrage treatment. In other words, if county characteristics were correlated with trends in electoral support,
the estimates might be spurious. This would occur if, for example, there were more eligible women
in 1920 in counties which also witnessed faster growth in Republican support that was driven by,
for example, higher black migration from the South to the North. In tackling this possibility I
employ two strategies. First, I include a number of socio-economic variables at their pre-suffrage
levels, their change over five-years prior to suffrage and district (or state) specific shocks. The controls consist of population density, value of all crops, total manufacturing output and proportion
of male adult blacks, male adult illiterates and main religious affiliations. Including the change in
these control variables addresses some concerns that the effect of interest might be driven by trends
such as migration from South to North. Second, I regress the change in electoral support before
suffrage on the proportion of eligible women in 1920. Once all controls are included in the model,
these ’placebo’ regressions return small and insignificant estimates, which helps to support the validity of the parallel trend assumption prior to the enfranchisement. After controlling for several
confounders, I show that counties with more eligible women in 1920 did not witness any trend in
electoral support prior to the reform.
Contrary to some of the studies that exploit variation in the strength of suffrage on electoral
outcomes, this study poses an additional advantage. Since women were enfranchised in one fell
swoop, the ‘dosage’ of suffrage across counties could not have been manipulated by the government.
For example, Berlinski and Dewan (2011) exploit the fact that male suffrage was gradually extended
15
to men of certain income. However, precisely because the income level was set by the government, it
could have been set at a level that would minimize the reform’s effect. In the case of the Nineteenth
Amendment, the suffrage was extended to all women, giving the authorities lower chance to stipulate
which type of women were enfranchised in order to manipulate its effect.
Testing the Theory
The empirical strategy described in this section allows me to estimate the effects of suffrage by
parties. However, in line with the argument outlined above, the immediate effects should vary
by ideological position of incumbents and political competition rather than by party. In order to
test the theoretical framework, I therefore construct a ‘progressive score’ for all incumbents that is
defined as a proportion of ‘yea’ votes on all progressive bills passed in the previous Congress.20 The
higher the ‘progressive’ leaning of the incumbent, the more attractive this candidate should be to
newly enfranchised women.21 In testing the argument of this paper, I interact my key treatment
variable, Female vote, with the ideological position of incumbent’s party and incumbent’s party.22
If women seek to vote out particularly conservative incumbents, the Republican Party, for example,
should lose in districts with a conservative Republican Incumbent and in a districts with progressive
Democratic Incumbent.
Results
I first explore the effects of women’s votes by parties. In particular, I examine whether Republicans
increased their support more in counties which were most affected by the reform. Table 1 reports
20
In Appendix E, I explore whether the main results are robust to two alternative measures. First, I use a ‘prowomen score’ of all incumbents that is defined as a proportion of ‘yea’ votes on bills that were backed by women’s
organizations. [IN PROGRESS]. Second, I use DW-NOMINATE scores from the 1st dimension to identify liberal and
conservative politicians in the 66th Congress. Note that DW-NOMINATE scores indicate positions of incumbents on
the economic dimension and therefore are not correlated with the two previous measures (see Appendix C). Detailed
description of all measures in Appendix C.
21
This approach assumes that women, on average, preferred the most progressive candidates. This seems reasonable, given that women’s organizations backed most progressive bills. Their progressive score would thus be close to
‘100’, while the highest progressive score among incumbents is about ‘55’.
22
There were only minimal changes in the nomination of candidates between 1918 and 1920: incumbents did not
run only in 322 counties in the sample in 1920. As a robustness check, I re-run the analysis only with counties where
incumbents run for re-election. I show that the results remain almost intact, if not stronger (see Appendix E).
16
Table 1: The Effect of Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republicans and Democrats
1920-1918 (with Placebos)
Dep. Var.
a) Change in the Republican Vote 1920-1918
Model
Female Vote (%)
(1)
1.075***
(0.155)
Dep. Var.
b) Change in the Democratic Vote 1920-1918
Model
Female Vote (%)
Controls (1919)
Controls (1919-1914)
State Fixed Effects
District Fixed Effects
Obs.
(2)
1.177***
(0.216)
(3)
0.478**
(0.192)
(4)
0.345***
(0.127)
Placebos
(5)
-0.335
(0.213)
(6)
-0.184
(0.161)
Placebos
(7)
-0.146
(0.165)
(8)
-0.958***
(0.248)
(9)
-0.878***
(0.218)
(10)
-0.43***
(0.139)
(11)
0.031
(0.202)
(12)
-0.063
(0.153)
x
x
x
x
2238
Yes
Yes
x
x
2056
Yes
Yes
Yes
x
2056
Yes
Yes
x
Yes
2054
Yes
Yes
Yes
x
2056
Yes
Yes
x
Yes
2054
Notes: The table shows that while the Republican Party gained in counties with more women, the Democrats lost.
Placebo regressions regress change in partisan support between 1916 and 1916 on the treatment and controls. Neither
of the placebo regression returns large or significant estimates, indicating lack of strong pre-existing trends. Controls
include: ln(Population density); % Adult male black; % Adult male illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; %
Methodists; % Lutherans; Value of crops (in millions); Total manufacturing output (in millions); ’Female Vote’ is
defined as a percentage of adult women in counties in 1920 in the sample. Sample refers to the states where women
voted for the first time to Congress in 1920. Counties that were redistricted between 1920 and 1918 are excluded; If
counties that were split between several electoral districts (N=80), state fixed effects are used instead of district fixed
effects; Placebos refer to models that regress change in party vote shares between 1918 and 1916 on the Female vote
in 1920 and controls; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; **
significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
baseline results for the effect of the Female vote on the change in Republican and Democratic vote
shares respectively. The first column shows estimates without any controls. The second column
adds controls fixed at the 1919 levels and differenced over the period from 1914–1919. The third
column includes state fixed effects, and the fourth column uses district fixed effects. The last two
columns show results from placebo regressions, where the change in party support prior to suffrage
is regressed on Female vote.
The first four columns of Table 1 show consistently negative coefficients for Democratic candidates and consistently positive coefficients for Republican candidates. However, the size of the
estimates responds strongly to the addition of controls and fixed effects. After adding all controls
and district dummies, Models 4 & 9 estimates that the Republicans gained 0.345% of votes for
17
every percentage point increase in adult women, while the Democrats lost 0.43%. A five percentage
point increase in adult women in a county gives the Republican Party additional 1.7%, while the
Democrats lose on average 2.2%, producing about a 2% swing in electoral support between the two
parties.23
The last two columns of Table 1 show that, when all controls and fixed effects are included in the
models, neither placebo regression returns large or significant estimate. While the strong response
of estimates to the control variables indicates pre-existing trends in the outcomes, at the very least,
after adding controls to the models, counties with more women were not trending differently prior
to the Nineteenth Amendment. The only exception is a non-significant but sizable coefficient for the
Republican Party in the model with state fixed effects. Adding controls for changes in candidacy,
however, reduces the size of this coefficient to almost 0 (see Appendix F). This is important because
all results presented below are robust to inclusion of these controls.
Incumbency Effects
I argue that the effects of women’s suffrage shown above should vary mainly with ideological position
of incumbents. If the Republican Party benefitted at the national level, could this be attributed to
a higher progressive scores of the Republican candidates? In this section, I therefore test whether
the pro-Republican effect of women’s suffrage depends on the progressive score of the incumbent
party in a district. To this end, I interact Female vote with Progressive score of incumbents and
with a dummy indicator for the Incumbent party. I present graphs of the marginal effects for
the Republicans and Democrats in Figure 1. Full results from these regressions are shown in the
Appendix F.
The first graph in Figure 1 plots the results for the Republican Party. It shows that when
Republican candidates were defending a seat (depicted in red), they lost when their voting records
were conservative, but gained when they were progressive. When, on the other hand, Republican candidates were challenging Democratic incumbency (depicted in pink) Republican candidates
23
These results are robust to controlling for changes in candidacy between the two elections, including uncontested
districts. A very reassuring is also the fact that changes in candidacy between 1918 and 1920 were not related to
Female vote. The results are also robust to excluding three states which enfranchised women in 1918, but where
women votes in 1920. While the effects seems to be smaller in the South, none of the interaction effect with South
dummy are significant. Full results from all sensitivity analyses in Appendix F.
18
gained most when they challenged conservative Democratic incumbents. The second graph in Figure 1 plots the results for the Democratic Party. It shows that Democratic incumbents (depicted
in blue) lost almost invariably, but slightly less when their were progressive. However, when Democratic candidates challenged Republican incumbents (depicted in light blue), they gained votes if
the Republican Incumbent was conservative. Overall, the graph shows that women attempted to
voted out incumbents regardless of their party, particularly those with conservative voting records.
Women mostly favored challengers, particularly when incumbents had a conservative voting record.
These results strongly suggest that while the Republican Party benefitted from women’s suffrage, Republican incumbents did not harbor women’s votes if they were conservative. Similarly,
Democratic incumbents gained votes if they were progressive. The pro-Republican swing can thus
be explained not with a general attachment of women to the Republican Party, but to the fact
that the Republican incumbents, on balance, performed better on progressive bills in the previous
Congress.
Political Competition
In the theoretical section above, I outlined why the ideological position of incumbents should not
matter when political competition is low. When incumbents do not need to worry about re-election,
they seek to maximize their spoils from the office, giving an incentive to women voters to sanction
them regardless of their ideological position. In this section, I therefore reproduce the results presented above only in counties where one party received 70% or more in 1918 election. The first
graph in Figure 2 plots marginal effects for the Republican Party, the second graph in Figure 2
plots marginal effects for the Democratic Party. The graphs show that political competition matters: when political competition is low, women preferred challengers regardless of their ideological
position.24 These patterns can help to explain why, on balance, incumbents did always worse than
challengers, regardless of their ideological position (as shown in Figure 1).
24
Full results in Appendix F.
19
Figure 1: Plotting the Effect of Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and
Democratic Candidates by Progressive Record of Incumbents.
(a) Dependent Variable: Change in the votes for the Republican Party 19201918
(b) Dependent Variable: Change in the votes for Democratic Party 19201918
Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals, full results in Appendix (with robustness
to candidates). Progressive Score of Incumbent is defined as a percentage of ‘Yea’ Votes on progressive bills in a
district in previous Congress (66th); The estimates for the Republican and Democratic Vote 1920-1918 depend both
on the Progressive score of incumbents and the Party of the incumbent, i.e. whether seat was defended or challenged.
The first graph shows that women modestly supported Republican incumbents with progressive voting records, but
voted out conservative Republican incumbents. It also shows that women attempted to vote out the most conservative
Democratic incumbents, turning to the Republican challengers instead.
20
Figure 2: Plotting the Effect of Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and
Democratic Candidates by Progressive Record of Incumbents when Political Competition is low.
(a) Low Political Competition; Dependent Variable is a Change in the votes for
the Republican Party 1920-1918
(b) Low Political Competition; Dependent Variable is a Change in the votes for
Democratic Party 1920-1918
Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals, results in the Appendix (with robustness
to candidates). Progressive score of incumbents is defined as a percentage of ‘Yea’ Votes on progressive bills in a
district in previous Congress (66th); Low competitive districts are defined are districts where one party received 70%
or more in 1918 election. The graphs show that ideological position of candidates does not matter when political
competition is low.
21
Long-Term Effects of Suffrage
While women in the 1920 election attempted to vote out the most conservative incumbents, the
question remains how lasting was the impact of women’s suffrage. I argue that the electoral effects
of suffrage should wane with time, as women develop loyalties to political parties and politicians are
able to respond to their preferences. Although I cannot estimate the degree of convergence at the
district level or map the strength of women’s attachment to parties over time, I show that differences
between parties on progressive bills in Congress declined shortly after suffrage. While Republican
representatives continued to be more supportive of progressive bills as they held the majority in
Congress throughout the 1920s, the differences between the two major parties were largest in the
66th and 67th Congress.25 The electoral impact of women votes should therefore be largest in the
1920 and 1922 elections.
Using the same empirical strategy, I estimate the difference in vote support for major parties
before and after suffrage, but this time I leave a larger window between the pre- and post-suffrage
election year. For example, the effects of women’s votes in the 1922 elections could be assessed by
regressing the change in partisan support between 1922 (second post-suffrage election) and 1918
(last pre-suffrage election) on the Female vote in the 1922 election. Figure 3 depicts coefficient
estimates with 95% confidence intervals from 10 such regressions, estimating the effect of women’s
votes in 1920, 1922, 1924, 1926 and 1928 elections for each party.26 The graph shows that while
women, on balance, supported the Republican Party in the first two elections after suffrage (1920
and 1922), the effects flattened after that.27
This pattern in data strongly coincides with partisan convergence on progressive (and other)
issues and with a strong decline in progressive bills in mid-1920s (see Appendix). This decline is
often attributed to the abandonment of ‘maternalist’ agendas by women’s groups. Once women’s
groups started to promote more class-based programs and entered political parties, their external
threat to the status quo lessened. They also became more vulnerable to counter-lobby of patriotic
25
Appendix C presents several descriptive plots of House roll call votes.
26
Full regression models in Appendix F.
27
Note that Corder and Wolbrecht (2016) find that gender voting gap persisted throughout the 1920s, despite the
fact that ample evidence that parties became less polarized on progressive as well as other agendas.
22
and pro-business groups (Wilson 1997).
Figure 3: Plotting the Long-Term Effects of Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for
Republicans and Democrats.
Notes: The figure plots the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from regressions that estimate longterm effects (full tests in Appendix E). Blue denotes estimates for Democratic Party, red denotes Republican Party.
The Models for 1920 show the baseline results for comparison and regress the change in party support between
1920 and 1918 on Female vote (also shown in Table 1 and Appendix Figure 3). Models for 1922, 1924, 1926 and
1928 estimate the long-term effect of women’s suffrage. For example, models for the second election after suffrage
regress the change in party support between 1922 and 1918 on Female vote. While the effect in the 1922 election is
comparable to the baseline estimates in 1920, the Republican Party did not retain such benefit for the rest of the
1920s. This coincides with decline of women’s lobby, increased convergence of parties and decrease in progressive
bills (see Appendix C).
Robustness Checks
One caveat of my identification strategy is that women’s participation levels vary across counties.
This may pose a significant threat to inference that uses the proportion of adult women as an
indicator of the strength of the Female vote. My measure becomes less likely to capture the strength
of women’s vote relative to men’s whenever the size of the actual electorate is sizably distorted.28
28
One of the most sizable distortions is any remaining disenfranchisement of blacks, particularly in the mostly
black counties. For example, my measure will not perform well in a county with 90% blacks, most of whom are
disenfranchised with various informal and formal measures.
23
However, this would be a significant concern only if such distortions were systematically related to
the proportion of adult women in a county. In this section I therefore identify and asses several
ways in which my results could be driven by such distortions.
Formal Restrictions of the Electorate
At the turn of the century, most states restricted the pool of eligible voters by registration, poll
taxes and literacy tests (Carlson 1976; Harris 1929; Keyssar 2000).29 This may be a problem,
if, for example, counties with more women also had the most stringent restrictions. Previous
scholarship also shows that any type of legal restrictions on electoral participation affected women
more than men (Anderson 1996, p. 51; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006, 2016; Wilkerson-Freeman
2002). Unfortunately, the number of registered voters by county is not available for the relevant
period. In Table 2, I therefore asses whether the effect of the Female vote depends on 1) registration
requirements, 2) poll taxes and 3) literacy tests. I also create a more accurate treatment measure by
excluding disenfranchised illiterates in states with literacy tests. The results are very encouraging the main results do not depend on formal restrictions to the electorate. This may not be surprising
given that the proportion of adult women at a county level is mostly uncorrelated with formal
restrictions to the electorate.30
Men’s and Women’s Mobilization
Second, I consider the possibility that men’s turnout was higher in places with more women. Previous research on the enfranchisement of black voters in the United States has shown that white
voters mobilized at higher levels to ‘negate’ the voting power of black voters (Washington 2006;
Enos 2011). If men mobilized at higher levels in counties with more women, the partisan effect
of suffrage would rely on the voting behavior of men rather than women. While I cannot exclude
this possibility altogether, I can test it on data from Chicago, where authorities kept voting records
29
In the Black Belt, three quarters of counties implemented all three types, mainly aiming to disenfranchise black
population. States outside the Black Belt, however, also frequently restricted the pool of eligible voters.
30
Density plots of the treatment are highly similar across Southern and Non-Southern region in the sample, as
seen in Appendix E. See too correlates of the treatment, also in Appendix E. While high registration and poll taxes
are not related to Female vote, there were more women in counties with literacy tests.
24
25
Yes
Yes
Yes
2054
(5)
-0.339*
(0.198)
-0.061
(0.229)
1.524
(11.896)
Change in Dem.
Vote 1920-1918
(1)
0.359*
(0.192)
-0.023
(0.222)
-5.953
(11.196)
Controls (1919)
Controls (1919-1914)
District FE
Obs.
PT
Female Vote * PT
Female Vote
Dep Var:
PT
Female Vote * PT
Female Vote
2. Poll Taxes (PT)
Dep Var:
Yes
Yes
Yes
2054
(6)
-0.428***
(0.16)
-0.004
(0.241)
-14.232
(12.369)
Change in Dem.
Vote 1920-1918
(2)
0.404***
(0.145)
-0.126
(0.213)
11.654
(11.473)
Change in Rep.
Vote 1920-1918
Controls (1919)
Controls (1919-1914)
District FE
Obs.
LT
Female Vote * LT
Female Vote
Dep Var:
LT
Female Vote * LT
Female Vote
3. Literacy Tests (LT)
Dep Var:
(4)
0.305**
(0.125)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2054
(7)
-0.507***
(0.156)
0.366
(0.247)
-21.874*
(12.221)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2054
(8)
-0.397***
(0.136)
Change in Dem.
Vote 1920-1918
(3)
0.401***
(0.139)
-0.265
(0.231)
17.036
(11.445)
Change in Rep.
Vote 1920-1918
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
electoral districts (N=80), state fixed effects are used instead of district fixed effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant;
voted for the first time to Congress in 1920. Counties that were redistricted between 1920 and 1918 are excluded; If counties that were split between several
output (in millions); Female vote is defined as a percentage of adult women in counties in 1920 in the sample. Sample refers to the states where women
Adult male black; % Adult male illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; % Lutherans; Value of crops (in millions); Total manufacturing
variable in counties with literacy tests, the main results remain robust to this more accurate, improved measure. Controls include: ln(Population density); %
of women’s suffrage did not depend on registration requirements, poll taxes and literacy tests. When illiterate women are excluded from the key treatment
literate population in states with literacy tests. Overall, the table shows that the main results are robust to formal restriction of the electorate. Te effect
one if literacy tests were in place; Models in the last column replace treatment (Female vote in 1920) with the proportion of adult literate women among adult
Female vote with a dummy variable that equals one if poll taxes were in place; Final set of models interact Female vote with a dummy variable that equals
Notes: First set of models interact Female Vote with a dummy variable that equals one if registration requirements were high; Second set of models interact
Controls (1919)
Controls (1919-1914)
District FE
Obs.
HR
Female Vote * HR
Model
Female Vote
Dep Var:
HR
Female Vote * HR
Model
Female Vote
1. High Registration (HR)
Dep Var:
Change in Rep.
Vote 1920-1918
Table 2: Robustness of the 1920 Result to Formal Restrictions of the Electorate
separated by sex. I present the results in Table 3. The first two columns show that there is indeed
a positive correlation between the proportion of women and the registration levels of men in both
the 1914 and 1916 elections. Men registered at higher levels in wards with more women. However,
none of these regressions control for third factors. In the last two columns in Table 3, I therefore
regress a change in men’s registration before and after suffrage on the proportion of women. This
identification strategy, as in the main study, controls for fixed ward characteristics correlated with
the proportion of women. If men mobilized more in wards with more women, we should find positive effect. Yet the models in Table 3 return much smaller coefficients which are not even close to
conventional levels of statistical significance. At least in Chicago, it seems that men did not register
at higher levels in localities with a higher proportion of women.31
Table 3: The Effect of Female Vote on Male Registration in Chicago
Dependent Var:
Model
Female Vote 1910
Obs.
Male Registration
1914 (%)
Male Registration
1916 (%)
Change in Male
Register. 1914-1911
Change in Male
Register. 1916-1911
(1)
1.609***
(0.446)
35
(2)
1.72***
(0.557)
35
(3)
0.031
(0.323)
34
(4)
0.125
(0.289)
34
Notes: Data sourced from Goldstein (1973) and US Census Bureau. Data for registration rates utilizes 1911 municipal
elections (pre-suffrage), 1914 school elections (post-suffrage) and 1916 presidential elections (post-suffrage). Male
registration is defined as the proportion of men who registered. All regressions include a constant; Additional analyses
of male turnout in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10%. The first two models regress men’s registration levels on the proportion of women. The third
model regresses the change in men’s registration on the proportion of women. The results shows that while men
registered at higher numbers in places with the most women, men’s registration levels did not increase in the most
affected places by women’s suffrage. At least in Chicago, men did not turnout more to ’negate’ the effect of women’s
suffrage.
Final Remarks
In this paper, I have argued that women’s suffrage in the United States resulted in large electoral
swings against incumbent politicians. Three factors were most important: ideological leaning of
incumbents, the level of political competition and ideological differences between parties on relevant
31
In the Appendix, I show that men also did not turned out at higher levels in response to the proportion of
women. I also show that the pro-Republican effect was not a result of a higher mobilization of - better organized women.
26
issues. Newly enfranchised women attempted to vote out conservative incumbents, and to reward
progressive ones. When political competition was low, however, women’s votes improved accountability by punishing incumbents regardless of their ideological leanings. Such effects were lessened
over time, when women entered party politics and political parties sufficiently absorbed women’s
agendas.
In pointing to the importance of differences across districts, this paper provides explanation for
why several studies often find small effects of suffrage or find mixed results that differ by states.
When partisan attachments are low, newly enfranchised groups will swing electoral tides by incumbent politicians rather than by parties. Although the Republican Party benefitted, on balance,
from women’s votes, much in agreement with the common belief, women did not vote as a block.
However, the fact that women did not vote as a block does not mean that women’s votes did not
shake up electoral status quo. Although not a perfectly unified block, newly enfranchised women
scrutinized incumbents regardless of their party. This evidence thus provides a rebuttal to those
who claim that suffrage does not affect electoral politics, either because newly enfranchised groups
do not have distinct preferences or because elites are capable to minitage its immediate effects with
electoral promises.
Although this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the electoral impact of suffrage, my
findings have implications for theories that seek to explain the adoption of suffrage. In light of my
findings, it remains unclear why strategic politicians would enfranchise women upon expectations
of electoral benefits. If newly enfranchised groups scrutinize incumbent politicians, fearing electoral
loses, politicians should try to ‘delay’ the adoption of suffrage as long as possible. As a result, they
adopt suffrage only when failure to do so would result in even greater loses - rather than in electoral
benefits.
Finally, my findings challenge the conventional wisdom that women, historically, voted on conservative values. Contrary to popular belief that women’s ‘liberal’ stance is a relatively recent phenomenon, this paper can help to explain why women’s suffrage increased public spending. Rather
than puzzling over why would conservative women supported left policies, this paper provides a
much simple answer, where progressive women support progressive and pro-welfare policies. Much
work thus needs to be done on the electoral effects of women’s suffrage from comparative per-
27
spective. If American women held progressive preferences, did, too, newly enfranchised women in
Europe support parties with liberal and socialist agendas?
28
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