1
Jaja Tamunosisi Gogo
PG/Ph.D/07/42436
INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT ON PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2011
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Ameh Joseph Jnr
Digitally Signed by: Content manager’s Name
DN : CN = Webmaster’s name
O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka
OU = Innovation Centre
2
INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT ON PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2011
BY
Jaja Tamunosisi Gogo
PG/Ph.D/07/42436
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF
THE Ph.D IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (Comparative Politics).
SUPERVISOR
PROFESSOR ALOYSIUS- MICHAELS OKOLIE
JUNE, 2014
3
TITLE PAGE
INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT ON PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2011
4
APPROVAL PAGE
This thesis has been approved by the Department of Political Science, University of
Nigeria Nsukka for the award of Ph.D in Political Science (Public Administration)
by:
_________________________
_____________________
Professor Aloysius – Michaels Okolie
(Supervisor)
Date
_________________________
Professor Jonah Onuoha
_____________________
( Head of Department)
Date
_________________________
Professor, C.O. T. Ugwu
_______________________
(Dean of Faculty)
Date
Professor Kunle Awotokun
External Examiner
5
DEDICATION
This study is dedicated to my dear wife and children for their support and love.
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are a number of people who influenced positively my journey through life
and who contributed immensely to the success of this thesis. I wish to acknowledge my
thesis supervisor, Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okolie for this outstanding zeal and
commitment towards the completion of this study. I am particularly impressed that you
did not only influence the research process but ensured that all corrections you noted were
duly effected. You are not just a supervisor but a friend and a brother. May God
continually enrich and bless you.
I remain very grateful to my former supervisor late Prof. Miriam Ikejiani-Clark
for her astuteness and dedication. Late Professors Aforka Nweke and Lambert Ejiofor
also helped to shape my academic life. I am also grateful to other lecturers in the
Department of Political Science, they include: Prof. Obasi Igwe, Prof. Okechukwu
Ibeanu, Prof. Emmanuel Ezeani, Prof. Jonah Onuoha, Prof. Ken Ifesinachi, Dr. Ifeanyi
Abada, Dr. Christian Ezeibe, Dr. Gerald Ezirim and Dr. Humphrey Agbo for their
support. I am particularly indebted to Professor Jonah Onuoha, Head of Department of
Political Science for always being there for me.
I also thank in a very special way my mother, Rhoda Jaja for her moral upbringing
and support that saw me through my undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. She
always advised me to focus squarely on my academic pursuit for according to her,
education is our passport to the future and the future belongs to those who prepared for it
today. I will not fail to appreciate others outside the University of Nigeria who
contributed immensely to my academic development providing me with opportunities for
practical experiences in Nigerian politics. I appreciate my brother Dr. Sam Sam Jaja for
his encouragement.
My deepest appreciation and gratitude go to my lovely and dear wife, Lady
Patience Tamunosisi Jaja for being always there for me. To my children, Sopiriala, Atili,
Duma, Tamunosisi Gogo Jaja II and Ibikunu, I thank you for being wonderful. Finally, I
thank God Almighty the giver of life and knowledge.
Jaja Tamunosisi
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
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1.1
Background of the Study
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1.2
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1.3
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1.4
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Statement of the Problem
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Objectives of the Study
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Significance of the Study
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CHAPTER TWO : LITERATURE REVIEW
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2.1 Relationship between legislative oversight and executive corruption9
2.2 Public accountability and legislative mechanisms 17
2.3 Legislative oversight and infrastructural development
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2.4 Gap in the literature
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CHAPTER THREE : METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 40
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3.1 Theoretical Framework
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3.2 Hypotheses
47
3.3 Research Design 47
3.4 Method of Data Collection
48
3.5 Method of Data Analysis
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CHAPTER FOUR : OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE AND
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA
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4.1 History of the Legislature - 57
4.2 The Legislature and Constitutional Development
68
4.3 Assessment of the Role of the Legislature 77
4.4 Oversight Process in Nigeria
83
4.5 Oversight over Individual Rights and Liberties
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4.6 Legislative Control of the administration - 90
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CHAPTER FIVE: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 100
5.1 Biometric Analysis of our Sample 100
5.2 Legislative Oversight and Exposition of executive corruption 102
5.3 Institutional Mechanisms of Public Accountability
109
5.4 Budget Process
119
5.5 Strategies for Enforcing Public Accountability and Performance
131
CHAPTER SIX: RE-ELECTION OF LEGISLATORS AND
MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 143
6.1 Factors that affect legislative mechanisms for accountability
143
6.2 Problem of creating incentives for legislators
151
CHAPTER SEVEN: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 157
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7.1 The legislature, development and infrastructure 157
7.2 Oversight powers of the legislature and infrastructural development
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7.3 Public --Private Participation Laws in Infrastructure Development
164
7.4 Funding of Infrastructural development 169
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7.5 Financial Prudence and Infrastructural Development
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
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8.1 Summary 194
8.2 Conclusion 197
8.3 Recommendations 199
Bibliography
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APPENDIX 1
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1: Distribution of Population, Households and Number of Sample
from the three LGAs 53
Table 4.4.1: sectoral presentation of the bills 83
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Table 4.5.1: Petitions referred to the Committee on Public Petitions of
the House of Representatives between June 1999 and June 2006,
90
Table 5.1.1: Frequency Distribution showing Sex of respondents
99
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Table 5.1.2: Frequency Distribution showing Occupation of respondents
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Table 5.1.3 : Frequency Marital Status of respondents
100
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Table 5.1.4: Frequency Distribution Showing Educational qualification of
Respondents
-101
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Table 5.2.1: Response to question 1- Have you heard about legislative
oversight in the State? 102
Table 5.2.2: Response to question 2- If the response to question 1 is yes,
where did you hear about legislative oversight?
102
Table 5.2.3: Response to question 3- Do you think that executive
corruption is widespread in the State? 103
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Table 5.2.4 : Response to question 4 -If answer to 3 is yes, how would
you rate the level of executive corruption in the State?
103
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Table 5.2.5: Response to question 5 - Does the performance of legislative
oversight functions severe legislative- executive relation in the State?
104
Table 5.2.6: Response to question 6- How would you explain the legislative
executive relation in the State?
104
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Table 5.2.7 : Response to question 7- Does legislative oversight
check executive corruption in the State?
105
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Table 5.2.8: Response to question 8- Have you witnessed legislative
corruption in the State?
106
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Table 5.2.9 : Response to question 9 - Does the legislative oversight
enhance public accountability in Rivers State ?
106
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Table 5.2.10: Response to question 10 – Is there any relationship between
legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in the State?
107
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Table 5.2.11: (X2 ) Chi-Square Table 108
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Table 6.1.1: Response to question 11- What do you feel is the major
impediment to legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State? - 142
Table 6.1.2 : Response to question 12 - How often are the legislature re-elected 143
Table 6.1.3: Response to question 13 - Do you feel that the shift investigations
by the Assembly are done in the interest of the State?
144
Table 6.1.4: Response to question 14- Most of the bills enacted by the
Assembly are executive bills 144
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Table 6.1.5 : Response to question 15- The Assembly members hardly get in
touch with their constituents? 145
Table 6.1.6: Response to question 16- The Assembly has been passive on
issues of unemployment, environmental rights and peaceful coexistence
145
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Table 6.1.7 : Response to question 17- Legislative oversight of the executive has
ensured executive’s compliance with legislative intents?
146
Table 6.1.8: Response to question 18- Legislative oversight has improved the
efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations in the State?
147
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Table 6.1.9 : Response to question 19 - The legislature has been evaluating
programme performance of the executive in the State?
147
Table 6.1.10 : Response to question 20 - If answer to no 19 above is yes,
what method do they apply? 148
Table 6.1.11 : Response to question 21- The Legislators have
investigated alleged instances of poor administration, arbitrary and
capricious behavior, abuse, waste, dishonesty, and fraud among the
executives in the State?
149
Table 6.1.12: Response to question 22 – The legislature determines the
financial priorities in the State?
149
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Table 6.1.13: Response to question 23- The Assembly ensures that executive
policies reflect the public interest in the State?
150
Table 7.2.1: Response to question 24 - Do the legislative investigatory
powers over government-wide activities enhance the development of
infrastructure? 160
Table 7.2.2: Response to question 25 - The appropriation power of
the legislature do not play a prominent role in infrastructural development
in the State?
161
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Table 7.2.3: Response to question 26 – The impeachment power of the
Assembly does not enhance the development of infrastructure in the State? 161
Table 7.2.4: Response to question 27 – What type of infrastructure
do the state government concentrate? 162
Table 7.2.5: Response to question 28 – What approach has the State government
adopted to enhance infrastructural development
163
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Abstract
The study interrogates the role of the legislature in enthroning public
accountability in Rivers State between 1999 and 2011. The specific objectives
were to: determine whether there is any significant relationship between
legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly and exposition of
executive corruption in the State between 1999 and 2011; ascertain whether
the quest for re-election among Legislators undermined the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period
under study and determine whether the legislative oversight by the Rivers
State House of Assembly enhanced infrastructural development in the State
within the period under study. We adopted the institutional theory, quantitative
and qualitative methods of data collection. We used multistage cluster
probability sampling to choose the local governments from where we
purposively selected our sample in Rivers State. The findings of this study are:
there is a significant relationship between legislative oversight by the Rivers
State House of Assembly and exposing of executive corruption in the State
between 1999 and 2011; the quest for re-election among Legislators
undermined the operation of legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers
State within the period of study; and the legislative oversight by the Rivers
State House of Assembly enhanced infrastructural development in the State
within the period of study. We recommended that the legislature should ensure
that the audited Rivers State account is published annually and hosted in the
Rivers State Government and Nigeria’s website; Rivers State government
should also consider using a combination of all financing alternatives, as the
effective use of all capital sources would maximize the state’s output, and
accelerate the realization of its dreams in infrastructural development.
14
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Background of the Study
The legislature is an important component of democratic governance. Indeed, the
need for the legislature is reflected in the very meaning of democracy- rule of the people.
In fact, the legislature is a necessary ingredient for governance in both traditional and
modern democracies. In order for the people to rule, they require a mechanism to
represent their wishes and the legislature serves this critical function. In fact, Mills (1999)
remarked that the legislature acts as the eyes, ears and voices of the people. It represents a
permanent and independent link between the people and government.
Although the legislature is known as a law-making body, it is important to note
that it performs the oversight function on the executives and other branches of
government in the state. Through elections, lobbying and petitions, citizens and groups
express their will and affect the outcomes of the legislative process. Some of the traits of
a well developed legislature like the American Congress are division of labour, a
leadership structure, a seniority system and a committee system (Ornstein, 2008). These
traits equip the legislature to properly oversee the executive activities, influence policies
and immunize them against executive dominance.
In recognition of the centrality of the legislature to democratic governance, the
Chapter 5, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria provided for the
legislature. Specifically, section 47 of the same constitution provided that: there shall be a
National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representative. Similarly, section 90 of the same constitution provided that: there shall be
a House of Assembly for each of the States of the Federation. The Constitution empowers
the legislators both at the federal and state levels to perform oversight functions over
15
government agencies. As Nigerians seek an end to the scourge of corruption in public
sector, the expectations are that the legislators would be more proactive, rather than
reactionary in the discharge of their oversight functions. They are expected to do this by
detecting and preventing waste, inefficiency and corruption before they happen.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Since the emergence of the current democratic
dispensation, series of public hearings and probes of agencies have been conducted
without official reports on some of these investigations at both federal and state levels.
Yet, the assumption holds that the legislature in a democratic state is a principal
arm of government through which governments are held accountable. It is usually
assigned the oversight function of bureaucracy. Schlesinger and Burbs (1975:10)
corroborated the above view thus:
The principle behind legislative oversight of the executive
activity is to ensure that public policy is administered in
accordance with the legislative intent….the legislative function
does not cease with the passage of the bill. It is therefore, only by
monitoring the implementation process that members of the
legislature uncover any defects and act to correct
misappropriation and maladministration. In this sense the
concept of oversight exists as an essential corollary to the law
making process.
Hence, corruption has long been institutionalized as the foundation of governance,
at all levels of government in Nigeria. Institutions decayed to an unprecedented extent, as
available resources and opportunities were filtered away by the powerful. As would be
expected, this process was followed by the subversion of due process and manipulation of
existing laws and regulations in all the tiers of governments, and these greatly
undermined accountability and performance in governments, especially at the state level.
Olu (2002), notes that the legitimacy and stability of the country became compromised as
citizens began to devise extra legal and. informal ways to survive. The corruption
quagmire in Nigeria was rooted in the failure and virtual collapse of governance,
16
disregard for procedures for ensuring accountability, and the presence of bad leadership
(Obasanjo, 2003).
However, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo, as part of its strategy to face the
challenges of governance established two anti graft commission to tackle the menace of
corruption endemic in our polity. Transparency, accountability, efficiency and good
governance have, therefore, become key issues in this strategy (Ogunbambi, 2005). This
was anchored on the need to enthrone a regime of genuine partnership with citizens,
while improving the processes and efficiency (Rafia, 2005).
Section 90 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria established
for the State House of Assembly for each State in the federation and Rivers State House
of Assembly derived their powers from Constitution. The state legislature has adopted
certain mechanisms to uphold accountability in Rivers State. Meanwhile, adequate
knowledge of these mechanisms of accountability, proper application towards these
mechanisms of accountability will influence public accountability and performance.
There are different manifestations of accountability but in this study, we are interested in
public accountability which manifests itself in many forms such as political
accountability, administrative accountability and fiscal accountability.
In Rivers State, like in most other states in Nigeria, the duty of the legislature is to
make the rules for day- to- day operations of government and ensure accountability to the
people. The efficient operation of these institutional mechanisms will no doubt improve
the performance of government. The study is therefore aimed primarily at interrogating
the role of legislature in enthroning public accountability in Rivers State between 1999
and 2011.
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1.2
Statement of the Problem
Both past and present leaderships in Nigeria have tried to fight corruption and
institute accountability in government in order to deliver democracy dividends to the
people. However, they failed largely because of lack of implementation of accounting
standards required for good governance. As a result of this, fraudulent and other serious
financial crimes are perpetrated by some public officers as well as carrier bureaucrats.
The most disturbing and remarkable, according to Enyinnaya (2006:1):
was the revelation which included direct embezzlement,
receipt of huge kickbacks, contracts inflation, large scale
salary fraud, etc were not detected by the normal operation
of financial controls including audits but a special
investigatory panel set up by the succeeding government
This development made many people to doubt whether there exist any information
about accounting, financial control system in the ministerial and extra ministerial
administration. In Rivers state, like in other states and ministerial departments there is the
need for pre and post audit transaction involving outflow of cash or cash payment at some
stage before their conclusion, hence the need for effective and efficient accounting
standards.
Meanwhile, sub- national governments were established with specific functions to
assist the national government to ensure that the public good reach the citizens
(Nwankwo, 2004). According to Nwankwo (2004), one of the strategies adopted by the
federal and state governments to ensure sustainable development and good governance in
Nigeria is legislative oversight. Under the military rule , the issue of accountability did
not arise as the might was right. Fiscal transparency is propagated as part of a larger policy
goal of good economic governance pursued to achieve poverty reduction and overall service
delivery.
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Meanwhile, Section 128 sub-section 2 (a and b) of the 1999 Constitution of
Nigeria empowered the House of Assembly for each State of the Federation to make
laws and expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the executive administration of
laws within its legislative competence. However, the extent to which the legislature
performs these functions depends on the level of independence it enjoys from the
executive. When the legislature depends a lot on the executive it exists solely to rubber
stamp the executive decisions (Nation Democratic Institute, 2000).
Scholars like Mill (1999), Hague and Harrop (2001),Ndoma –Egba (2012),
Pennings,(2000), Damgaard, (2000)
Maffio, (2002), Rockman (1985), Pelizzo and
Stapenhurst (2006), Schick, (1976), West and Cooper, (1989) among others have made
elaborate contributions to the literature on legislative oversight and public accountability.
However, these scholars glossed over the issue of whether there was any significant
relationship exist between the legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in
Rivers state between 1999 and 2011. Again, Clarke and Newman, (1997),Brereton and
Temple (1999), Konig (1997), Peters and Pierre, (1998), Marshall, (1994), Lewis (1991),
Kickert (1997) and Theobald (1997) were apt in their analysis. However, they glossed
over the linkage between public accountability and legislative mechanisms in Rivers State
between 1999 and 2011. Similarly, scholars like Oleszek (2010), Cohen. et.al (1988),
Richardson, (1987), Woodrow (1985), Kabbany (1999), Lindeman (2009), McCubbins
and Schwartz (1984) and Castelli (2009) as well as Congressional Record ( 2009) have
logically articulated that legislative oversight is the process by which a legislative body
takes an active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of state
government, yet these scholars failed to underscore the effect of legislative oversight on
infrastructural development in River State between 1999 and 2011.
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Again, scholars like Pennings,( 2000); Damgaard, (2000) and Maffio, (2002); have
discussed the instruments of legislative oversight and investigated how legislative oversight
relates to both political variables, accountability and socio-economic conditions. In addition
many studies have linked the poor development in Nigeria to inadequate funding and
limited financial autonomy. Elekwa (1996) noted that sub-national units in Nigeria do not
have substantial degree of financial autonomy to engage in any meaningful development
and this constitutes a great problem to funding and performance. The argument against
the above is that what matters most is not the quantum of money available that determines
service delivery but the prudent demonstration in utilization of available resources.
Scholars have made valid contributions on issues affecting public accountability in state
assemblies in Nigeria (Okereke, 2001; Schlesinger and Burbs, 197; Enyinnaya, 2006;
Ogunbambi, 2005). Although, their contributions are intellectually captivating,
motivating and imposing, little or no effort has been made to situate their studies toward
establishing the synergy between the activities of the Rivers State House of Assembly and
promotion of public accountability especially within the period under investigation. The
gap observed in the literature shall be filled within the context of these research questions:
1. Is there any significant relationship between legislative oversight by the Rivers
State House of Assembly and exposition of executive corruption in the State
between 1999 and 2011?
2. Did the quest for re-election among Legislators undermine the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period under
study?
3. Did legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly enhance
infrastructural development in the State within the period under study?
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1.3
Objectives of the Study
This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective of the
study is to interrogate the role of oversight functions of the Rivers State House of
Assembly in enthroning public accountability in the State between 1999 and 2011. The
study, therefore, intends to achieve the following specific objectives:
1. To determine whether there is any significant relationship between legislative
oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly and exposition of executive
corruption in the State between 1999 and 2011
2. To ascertain whether the quest for re-election among Legislators undermined
the operation of legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State
within the period under study.
3. To determine whether the legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of
Assembly enhanced infrastructural development in the State within the period
under study.
1.4
Significance of the Study
This study has both theoretical and practical significance. On the former, the study
will add new literature to the role of State House of Assembly in enthroning public
accountability especially in Rivers State between 1999 and 2011. It will also synthesize
the knowledge of both scholars and students on the relationship between legislative
oversight and public accountability in Rivers State; the attitude of Legislators towards
public accountability and its effects on the operation of legislative mechanisms of
accountability in Rivers State as well as the role of legislative oversight on performance
of governments in Rivers State in public service delivery
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Again this study will add to existing literature or rather serve as a resource
document for further research in this area. In addition, the outcome of the research will
provide an additional interpretation of the relationship between the functioning of these
accountability institutional mechanisms in terms of output and performance. Furthermore,
it will bring to light, in a coordinated and systematic form, the problems and prospects of
non-implementation of these mechanisms on performance.
At the practical level, the study will be of immense help to legislators at both state
and federal levels in performing their legislative oversight function. It shall acquaint them
with the main institutional mechanisms of accountability, which have been hitherto
neglected. Furthermore, the research will be of immense value to the local dwellers since
the knowledge, attitude and mere implementation of these mechanisms will ultimately
stimulate increased development and strengthen the bonds between the people and their
leaders at the state level. It will also help members of the NGOs interested in
development of the legislature in the post-colonial states to articulate models for advising
the legislature in the region.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we reviewed the extant literature in the subject matter and also
articulated the gap (s) in the literature. The primary aim of this section is to review
available literature that has direct bearing on the research question. As a prelude we,
reviewed the existing literature based on the following themes deriving from our research
questions:
1. Relationship between legislative oversight and executive corruption
2. Public accountability and legislative mechanisms
3. legislative oversight and infrastructural development
2.1 Relationship between legislative oversight and executive corruption
Mill (1999) insisted that oversight was the key for a meaningful representative
body. According to him, the proper office of a representative Assembly is to watch and
control their government. The underpinning philosophy for oversight is the Constitution’s
system of checks and balances among the legislature, executive and judiciary. A leading
role for the legislature has always been judged an essential defense against executive
tyranny. In a republican government, the legislative power necessarily predominates.
Arbitrary government is replaced by a formal procedure for law making. The painstaking
process for passing bills into law signals the importance attached to government by rules
rather than individuals. Authoritarian rulers govern by decree but in a democracy, Bills
are scrutinized and passed through a thorough, thread mill and painstaking process. Mill
noted that the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the
government; to throw light on executive business, to compel a full exposition and
justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; and to enforce them if
23
found condemnable. According to him, the relationship between a President as
representative of the executive in a presidential system of government and the legislature
everywhere is complex, without exception. The tension remains even when the same
party has produced the President and controls the legislature.
Hague and Harrop (2001) have remarked that whatever their party, members of
congress (the legislature) have different electoral interests from the President. They are
elected without term limits from their local areas for distinct terms. These particular
interests mean that the Presidential Government is inherently less party- based than its
parliamentary cousin. Secondly, in a system of shared control, presidential power
becomes the power to persuade .At the root of the executive/legislature tension is among
others, but prominently; the legislative oversight powers. The essence of the power
however remains to build strong public institution, minimize waste, inefficiency, control
corruption in the public sphere, and promotes accountability in government.
Ndoma –Egba (2012) remarked that legislative oversight refers to the power to
review,
monitor
and
supervise
agencies,
programmes,
activities
and
policy
implementation of the executive arm of government by the legislature. Underlying this
power of oversight are democratic principles as well as practical reasons. Oversight is a
loosely defined term that covers a wide variety of obligations and responsibilities of a
legislative nature and the extent of which is defined by each country’s constitution and
municipal laws. Part of this power is also inherent in the nature of parliament or the
legislature. Congressional (which is the United States expression for the Legislature or
Parliament), oversight refers to the act of congress looking over the executive branch as
well as monitoring and supervision of the implementation of public policies. Throughout
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history Congress has used many tools to pursue its oversight responsibilities; these
include special investigations, appropriation and legislative review.
Scholars like Pennings,( 2000); Damgaard, (2000) and Maffio, (2002); have discussed
the instruments of legislative oversight and investigated how legislative oversight relates to
both political variables, accountability
and socio-economic conditions. In spite of this
renewed interest in the study of oversight, our understanding of legislative oversight, as
Rockman (1985) lamented more than two decades ago, have remained asymmetrical.
Meanwhile, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006) argued that in the course of the past
decade, political science has started paying increasing attention to the study of legislative
oversight, which had been previously been described as an important but inadequately
researched area of legislative activity. Their comment is particularly true with regard to
comparative analyses of oversight tools and practices. They also argued that there is a
relationship that exist between the numbers of oversight tools available to a parliament on the
one hand and the probability that a country is formally democratic and/or liberal democratic
on the other hand. They noted that oversight tools available to a community’s parliament are
a strong predictor of whether a country is at least formally democratic. Our findings indicate
that the probability that a country is formally democratic increases as the number of oversight
tools increases. Again, they noted that while the probability that a country is liberal
democratic increases as the number of oversight tools available to the parliament increases.
However, we observed that the relationship between oversight potential and liberal
democracy is neither as strong nor as significant as the relationship between formal
democracy and oversight potential. This difference may be explained by the fact that liberal
democratic regimes are concerned not only with the formal aspects of democracy such as the
presence of democratic mechanisms and institutions, but also with the substance of
democracy. Liberal democracies are not satisfied with oversight potential; rather they seek
effective oversight implementation.
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Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006) also discussed the oversight tools adopted in the
countries of the Commonwealth Public Account Committees. They looked at what these
committees are; how and by whom they are instituted; how they function; results they are
able to achieve (and therefore how they influence the political system); and the conditions
which promote PACs good functioning and success. The analysis was performed based on the
assumption that parliamentary control of government activities can prevent governments from
abusing their powers and thus contribute to the promotion of good governance. In other
words, it was assumed that parliaments and parliamentarians are the agents of good
governance. In many countries, this is indeed the case. Parliaments and parliamentarians play
an important role in the promotion of good governance. While parliaments control
governments (and their activities), they must be controlled in other turn.
Schick, (1976) anchored his study of legislative oversight on four basic questions:
what is oversight? Why is it good for a political system? How can oversight be exercised?
And what is the impact of oversight? With regard to the first question, one could note that
scholars have proposed fairly different definitions of what oversight is. Some scholars have,
for example, suggested that legislative oversight consists in the legislative supervision of the
policies and the programs enacted by the government. Other scholars have noted instead that
oversight is not just a supervision of what the executive branch of government has done but is
also supervision of the executive’s legislative proposals. In parliamentary systems, where the
executive branch of government has the power to introduce a bill, the process through which
a bill becomes a law (the referral of that bill to specific committees, the discussion of the bill
within such committees, the debates of a bill in the plenary and the fact that the parliament
has ultimately the power to amend, approve or reject a government’s legislative proposal)
gives the legislative branch of government the power to oversee the government plans before
they are actually enacted. This point has an obvious implication, namely that several of the
activities and tasks that a legislature performs can be viewed as oversight activities.
26
West and Cooper, (1989) also noted that effective oversight is beneficial for a
political system for, at least, two basic reasons: first, because the oversight activity can
actually contribute to improving the quality of the policies/programs initiated by the
government; second, because as the government policies are ratified by the legislative branch,
such policies acquire greater legitimacy. They have also paid some attention to the tools that
parliaments and legislatures can employ to oversee the government and the government’s
activities. These studies have underlined that the legislatures may adopt several tools to
oversee the actions of the executives such as hearings in committees, hearings in the plenary
assembly, the creation of inquiry committees, parliamentary questions, question time, the
interpellations and the ombudsman. They noted, however, that the presence of the oversight
tool is a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight. Effective oversight, as
was observed, depends not only on the availability of oversight tools, but depends also on
additional conditions. Effective oversight may depend on the specific oversight powers given
to the parliament, on whether the parliament has the ability to modify legislation, on whether
parliaments and parliamentarians are given proper information to perform their oversight
tasks adequately, on the role of committee chairs, on the saliency of issues and on how
aggressively the opposition performs its role.
In spite of the wealth of information generated by the study of legislative oversight
with regard to the virtues, the tools and the conditions of effective oversight, much less has
been written with regard to the impact of oversight on accountability in Nigeria generally and
Rivers State in particular. Regardless of whether oversight is viewed as a sort of ex post
review of the government policies and programs or whether it is viewed instead as a
supervision of government activities that can be performed both ex post and ex ante, scholars
have generally agreed on the fact that effective oversight is good for the proper functioning of
a democratic political system.
27
Thus Friedberg (2006) argued that one of the ways parliament can fulfill its oversight
role is through its committees, which have been formed in large part to strengthen the role of
the legislature and to protect democratic regimes by ensuring the existence of proper
governmental and administrational order . He looked at parliamentary oversight by the Israeli
Parliament, the Knesset, through its committee system. It centers on the structural and
procedural problems which characterize the Israeli parliamentary committee system, and
which impair the effectiveness of its oversight. This is demonstrated by examining the
functioning of two committees: (i) the State Control Committee and (ii) the Education and
Culture Committee. He concluded that Knesset committees suffer from structural deficiencies
and a large number of procedures, which prevent them from carrying out efficient oversight
of the Executive. The examination of the State Control Committee and the Education and
Culture Committee shows that simultaneous membership on different committees has been
increasing over the years. Previous research shows that this may lead to lowered attendance in
the committee meetings, thus hindering oversight of the executive which requires time,
expertise, and knowledge of the supervised areas. Committees can scrutinize draft laws from
the government more efficiently and effectively than the plenary assembly through the
benefits of specialization. Although this analysis was canny, it did not examine whether there
is any significant relationship between the legislative oversight and public accountability in
Nigeria.
Again, Griffiths (2006) noted that South Africa’s transformation from apartheid to
majority rule represents a remarkable example of democratic transition and consolidation.
The creation of perhaps the world’s most progressive constitution combined with the
establishment and strengthening of institutions supportive of democracy have been
important components of this success.One of the key elements of the effort to insure
transparency and accountability in the reorientation of defense policy is the establishment
of parliamentary oversight of defense policy. Because the security sector has
28
responsibility for a critical state function, and because of the role of the military under
apartheid, it is essential that parliament assure that the armed forces are under effective
civilian control. Beyond that, parliament can also serve as a counter-weight to executive
dominance of defense policy. Yet the ANC’s dominant political position raises some
concerns about transparency and accountability that will undoubtedly remain given the
ANC’s capture of two-thirds of the vote in the 2004 elections and a commanding
advantage of 279 of the 400 National Assenbly seats. Perceptions of the ANC’s
intolerance of criticism and the centralization of power in the executive reinforce these
concerns. Despite some flaws, the handling of the investigation and the public nature of
the controversy over the SDPP demonstrates significant promise for the further
strengthening of South African democracy and provides important lessons regarding
defense oversight in South Africa. Although Griffiths (2006) was elaborate, he did not
focus this study on Nigeria.
According to Ndoma-Egba (2012), oversight responsibilities are carried out in two
broad ways: “the police patrol” method and the “fire alarm” method. The “police patrol”
method implies a continuous watchfulness or constant supervision of the Ministries,
Departments, and Agencies of Government and bureaucracy; the same way that the police
constantly patrols the streets to provide security. This type of oversight is usually costly
in terms of funds and capacity. The “fire alarm” method on the other hand is conducted as
a result of concerns by constituents; the public, or the media. It can also happen through
whistle blowing. Unlike the police patrol method which is preventive and designed to preempt or prevent issues, the “fire alarm” method is ex-post facto oversight as it deals with
issues after they have caused a fire. It is usually cheaper in terms of funds and maybe
costlier in terms of the damage that may have already occurred. He noted that Section 4
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) vests the
29
legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the National Assembly consisting
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the power extends to making laws for
the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof with respect to
any matter included in the exclusive legislative list set out in Part 1 of the second
schedule to the Constitution. He contended that this section also vests all implied and
interest powers of law making, including power of oversight in the National Assembly.
He also argued that public accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic
governance. Democracy will remain a pipe dream if those in public authority cannot be
held accountable for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, their policies, and their
expenditure. Accountability refers to the institutionalized practices of account giving.
However, legislative oversight thrives in a viable democracy. A viable democracy
requires more than the implementation of the key institutions of government. Rather,
accountable and efficient governance is embedded in a complex web of independent
conditions that require considerable drive and effort to develop and the media plays a
crucial role in the process of democratization and consolidation and must contribute to an
informed and active citizenry that is able to hold government to account. The media must
therefore be able to act as mobilizer of public opinion and watchdog of public values. The
lack of a vibrant civil society in many new democracies has been linked to the persistent
problems of corruption, ineffective governance and weak public and social institutions.
The National Assembly has, especially in the recent past deployed its enormous oversight
and investigative powers to expose weakness in our institutions and governance
processes. Of special mention is the continuous reform of the budget process. The
petroleum subsidy, the privatization process and pension investigations which revealed
massive fraud and suborning of the schemes thereby rendering them opaque and fraught
30
with corruption. These shortcomings will be addressed and eliminated as amendments to
the relevant legislations or new legislations are contemplated.
He concluded that while the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has
given the responsibility of oversight on the executive to the legislature the same
Constitution has placed the responsibility of ensuring public accountability on every
Nigerian. For the Legislature to retain and maintain the public trust in its oversight
functions, it must be like Ceasers wife above board. It must, as an institution, and its
membership stand up to the harshest public scrutiny.
2.2 Public accountability and legislative mechanisms
Haque (1994, 1996, 1998a & 1998b) noted that the major issue related to public
accountability is its contents or standards, which refer to the criteria for which public
officials are held accountable to citizens. These standards of accountability have changed
considerably under the current mode of public governance due to the restructuring of its
objectives and norms that shape such accountability standards. For instance, the
traditional objectives and norms of governance (which emerged in advanced democracies
and were followed in many developing nations) have been the achievement of
socioeconomic progress, law and order, poverty alleviation, employment generation, and
public well-being; and the maintenance of values such as impartiality, equality,
representation, integrity, fairness, welfare, citizenship, and justice. These objectives and
norms became the guiding standards of public accountability in most countries. In other
words, public servants became accountable for the successful realization of these basic
objectives and norms i.e. they were accountable for enhancing human progress,
maintaining law and order, resolving poverty and unemployment, providing public
31
welfare, ensuring impartiality and equal treatment, safeguarding citizens’ rights, and
guaranteeing justice and fairness.
Haque (2001) also emphasized that public governance in most countries has
recently undergone considerable change in terms of its objectives, norms, roles,
structures, and service recipients, which have serious implications for its public
accountability. In this regard, this article explored how these contemporary changes in
governance adversely affected the contents, agents, and means of its accountability. These
critical observations on the challenges to public accountability under the current
businesslike approach to governance imply the increasing significance of the issue in this
age of neoliberal reforms. He also
examined certain alternatives to address these
emerging challenges and concerns related to public accountability. First, with regard to
the standards of accountability, it is necessary to realize that the objectives, norms, and
roles of public governance are different from those of the private sector. Although
economic efficiency, economy, and competition are important as criteria of
accountability, what makes public governance truly public and distinguishes it from
private-sector management is its accountability for a unique set of public missions and
norms such as representation, equality, impartiality, integrity, justice, and citizenship.
Clarke and Newman, (1997) noted that with the recent paradigmatic transition in
the mode of public governance, its objectives have shifted to economic growth and
productivity, and its normative standards have changed toward efficiency, competition,
profit, and value for money, although these standards are largely associated with business
management . As Brereton and Temple (1999: 463) mention, it is ‘uncontroversial to note
that there is a consensus that the private sector ethos has “invaded” the public sector’.
Among advanced industrial nations, the overwhelming public sector concern for
efficiency, economy, competition, and value-for-money can be found in Australia,
32
Canada, France, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA, although such use of business
norms may have marginalized or removed traditional public sector values such as
honesty, integrity, and neutrality. They noted that many developing countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America have also moved towards these business-like objectives and
values.
As Konig (1997: 218) suggests, in contemporary public management “the new
diction is the language of the market, of competition, of enterprises, customers and, in a
nutshell, of entrepreneurial management”. These changes in the objectives and values of
governance imply corresponding adjustments in the standards of its accountability.
Instead of being answerable for social welfare, citizens’ rights, poverty eradication,
impartiality, fairness, representation, and justice, public governance is increasingly
accountable for accelerating economic-growth rate, boosting efficiency and productivity,
encouraging competition, maximizing profit, and ascertaining cost effectiveness. Thus,
under the current mode of governance, the standards of public accountability have
become instrumental in nature, especially in terms of an over-emphasis on procedural,
economic criteria (e.g. efficiency and productivity) rather than substantive public
concerns (e.g. equality and representation). It is essential to understand that the
accountability of public governance for market-based economic performance does not
necessarily imply its accountability for citizens’ rights, its accountability for competition
and productivity does not guarantee its accountability for representation and equality, and
its accountability for higher profit does not connote its accountability for welfare and
justice. Thus, the growing primacy of business-like criteria in realizing the accountability
of public governance may, in effect, displace its accountability for the established
democratic standards. He argued that the standards of accountability also refer to the
expected role or duty of public governance for which it is held accountable. Historically,
33
the post-war period saw the expansion of an active public sector role in delivering goods
and services in advanced capitalist nations, enhancing development and nation-building
in postcolonial societies, and adopting all-encompassing socioeconomic programmes in
socialist countries. Thus, in almost all nation-states, the system of governance became
accountable for varying activities and programmes that required its leading role in
society. But since the early 1980s, this active, direct, and leading role of public
governance has increasingly been replaced with a more passive, indirect, and facilitating
role (Peters and Pierre, 1998). This facilitating role of governance comprises various
support services to the private sector, maintenance of a conducive atmosphere for market
competition, implementation and monitoring of divestment and contracting out. Under the
current ethos of ‘new public management’, the increasing role of the private sector vis-àvis the emerging catalytic or facilitating role of public governance can be observed not
only in advanced capitalist nations like Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, New
Zealand, the UK, and the USA, but also in developing countries such as Malaysia, Korea,
Thailand, Singapore, Argentina, Taiwan, and India.
Marshall, (1994) also observed that a major dimension of accountability is the
agents or representatives to whom public governance is eventually accountable. In
democratic societies, the government is supposed to be accountable to all sections of the
population representing various class and group interests. Such a people-centered
tradition of accountability evolved with the emergence of a broader civil society, an
organized working class, and an increase in the entitlements or rights of common citizens.
In the history of capitalist development, the governing institutions went beyond serving
the interests of the dominant capitalist class, and became increasingly responsive to the
needs of common citizens with an expanding connotation of citizenship . In socialist
countries, on the other hand, the ideological assumption of a classless society required
34
public governance to be collectively accountable to the working class, although in reality
it was the ruling class that often exercised monopolistic dominance over the governing
institutions. In the developing world, many countries with elected regimes experienced a
considerable degree of government accountability for the provision of basic services to
various sections of the citizenry. During the post-war period, with the exception of certain
authoritarian regimes and totalitarian states, the scope of public accountability expanded
in different societies: the state became increasingly accountable to diverse groups and
classes of citizens entitled to social services such as education, housing, health, and social
security.
He further observed that under the contemporary neoliberal mode of governance,
there has been a change in the composition of agents (citizens) who ultimately hold public
agencies accountable. This is due to the redefinition of citizens as customers or clients
receiving public sector services. Under the current paradigm of ‘new public
management’, this redefinition of citizens as customers represents an accountability
challenge, because such a view tends to reduce the social rights associated with collective
citizenship to narrow commercial prerogatives of individual customers guided by an
exchange relationship. In other words, under this reductionist interpretation, public
governance is accountable for the effective delivery of its services to customers who can
pay, while it may remain indifferent towards low-income citizens who are not in a
position to use such services due to their financial incapacity.
.
In this regard, Lewis (1991) mentions that the private sector has standards that are
different from those in the public sector, and this distinction has been overlooked in the
process of embracing business-like entrepreneurship by the US government. In the case
of the UK, Rhodes (1997: 55) observes that the current ‘managerialism’ and its standards
like economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, have eroded the traditional values of
35
government, and pose a challenge to the culture of public governance. It needs to be
understood that public governance can afford to be less efficient, but it cannot overlook
issues such as racial discrimination, social injustice, and violation of citizens’ rights.
As Kickert (1997: 34) suggests, in a democracy, ‘a sacrifice in the degree of
rationality and efficiency must be made. . . . Without denying whatsoever the great
importance of effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector, other norms and values
play a role as well; values such as liberty, legality, legitimacy, equity and social justice.’
This basic normative dimension must be taken into consideration by policy-makers and
reformers in articulating the standards if public governance is to be held accountable.
Second, with regard to the ultimate agents holding public governance accountable, it is
necessary to ensure such accountability not just to the affluent users or customers of
public sector services but to all groups and classes of citizens, including low-income
households. In this regard, the top policy-makers need to re-examine the current tendency
to view citizens as customers because, as discussed in this article, the concept of customer
used in the marketplace is devoid of entitlements or rights associated with citizenship. It
has been previously suggested that this exclusion or marginalization of citizenship rights,
caused by the use of the customer principle, implies that public governance is less
responsive and accountable to underprivileged citizens who cannot financially qualify as
customers or clients. This erosion of citizens’ entitlements also means that the level of
public confidence in governance may diminish, especially among low income citizens.
This diminishing confidence represents a reminder to policymakers that public
governance must be made responsive and held accountable to common citizens in relation
to their socioeconomic needs and concerns.
Although some countries have introduced various forms of public consultation to
address this declining public trust in governance, more needs to be done in terms of
36
restoring or expanding citizens’ rights to basic public services such as education, health,
and housing. Finally, in order to overcome the aforementioned challenges to various
means of accountability, it is necessary to reinforce the political neutrality of public
service, which has come under threat due to increasing ministerial influence and
intervention in public personnel matters.
According to Theobald (1997), in fact, the very intention behind the current
business-like reforms in public governance has been political — in the context of
continuing socioeconomic declines, reform-minded political leaders often had a vested
interest in deflecting public attention and criticism away from their own failures by
targeting the shortcomings of the public service. However, these neoliberal political
reformers must pay attention to the fact that such a political tactic can merely be a
stopgap measure, and as mentioned earlier, this measure has failed to enhance public
confidence in government institutions in most cases . More importantly, the motive to
politicize public sector reforms goes against the very objectives of these reforms such as
efficiency and competition, which require political neutrality and impartiality. In order to
minimize politicization and increase political neutrality, it is necessary to reduce the job
insecurity of public servants, so that they are less vulnerable to their political heads
determining their careers based on vested political interest or agenda. More specifically, it
may be necessary to rethink the emerging trend of short-term, contract-based
appointments offered by ministers or political executives to senior public servants and to
restore merit-based appointments and permanent tenure in order to enhance the civil
service’s immunity to political influence. This policy reversal toward a more meritocratic
and permanent public service may minimize ministerial intervention, reduce the
politicization of public employees, and ensure that senior public servants are concerned
with public accountability rather than political loyalty.
37
According to the Canadian office of the Auditor General (2012), legislative
auditors throughout Canada have emerged as respected professionals who play a
significant role in our system of democratic government. As Legislative Auditors, they
provide assurance to legislators about the fairness of accountability information particularly financial statements - presented by governments and they issue advice on
how to improve public administration- assurance to legislators on management practices
and program performance and they issue advice on how to improve those practices. In
carrying out their work, legislative auditors sometimes bring a public focus to
shortcomings in the public sector - a focus that frequently gets media attention. Under the
broad mandates afforded to them, legislative auditors have considerable discretion in the
work they undertake and the way they manage their offices. At the same time, they hold
notable powers of inquiry and certain protections from dismissal and litigation. Looking
only at the powers in their governing acts might lead one to think that legislative auditors
operate in an unfettered manner and are beyond accountability mechanisms.
In exchange for being given the autonomy they require to conduct their job,
legislative auditors must be answerable to their legislatures and the public for the
responsibilities conferred on them. The value of legislative auditors has been their
independence as much as their professional expertise. In Canada, legislative auditors
enjoy the confidence of legislators and the public, and their independence is, for the most
part, unquestioned. Such independence is recognized as the cornerstone of legislative
auditing. It is paramount in ensuring that the credibility and reputation of legislative
auditors is maintained in the public eye. The ability of legislative auditors to conduct
audits that may reveal significant matters critical of a government has made the role
essential in the democratic process. At the same time, however, legislative auditors must
demonstrate that they have used their independence in the public interest by for ensuring
38
the accountability of legislative auditors. The office identified six themes that
accountability mechanisms and practices currently exist in legislative audit offices across
Canada. These include:
1) role and responsibilities,
2) office managing and resourcing,
3) quality assurance processes,
4) professional responsibilities,
5) audit reporting processes, and
6) public reporting obligations. Consistent with the preceding definition of accountability,
these themes are segregated into three distinctive parts:
According to the office, accountability, as noted above, requires responsibility.
Responsibility, in turn, requires the authority to act. Appropriately, legislative auditors
across Canada have been provided authority through comprehensive, legislated mandates
that cover all of government. Although the scope of the audit universe for legislative
auditors is not generally well specified in their governing legislation, it has evolved over
time to meet the respective needs of legislatures. One convention, although it varies
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, is that legislative auditors have the
responsibility to audit the whole of government. This broad mandate matches the
responsibilities and interests of legislators, covering organizations as diverse as
government departments (ministries), agencies, commissions, boards and Crown
corporations.
Another convention is that legislative auditors for the most part have the authority
to follow public money to where it is ultimately spent. In some cases this may involve
examining the systems and processes that a sponsoring government ministry or
39
organization has in place to satisfy itself that the recipients have spent the money
properly. While it is recognized that legislative auditors meet their auditing objectives by
examining a very broad range of issues, there is universal agreement that auditors must
not call into question the merit of program policies and objectives. This restriction, which
in some jurisdictions is specified in legislation, aims to prevent legislative auditors from
assuming a political role. All legislative auditors have also been granted authority, under
their respective governing legislation, to access any information they require to perform
their duties. This authority, however, has bounds. For example, legislative auditors do not
generally have access to third-party records or cabinet confidences. And their powers of
inquiry extend only to government employees about matters related to government
accounts and activities. In Manitoba, the legislative auditor has the right to subpoena
private individuals and businesses that are recipients of public monies for which they are,
or should be, accountable to the Legislative Assembly. Additionally, although legislative
auditors - whose appointment is typically transparent and overseen by legislatures cannot be removed from office at political whim or without public knowledge, they can
be removed for cause should they abuse the authority vested by the legislature.
To be independent, legislative auditors must be provided with sufficient freedom
and resources to be able to act without direction or interference. Nevertheless, such
freedom is accompanied by a number of checks and balances, in addition to the myriad of
legislative, professional and general accountabilities. For example, although legislative
auditors typically have a reasonable degree of freedom from government administrative
controls - which allows them to organize, staff and manage their offices and to engage
outside expertise if necessary - this freedom has limits. And, while they have discretion in
administering their offices, they generally choose to follow government administrative
policies in areas such as personnel (including salary levels, classifications, benefits and
40
grievance procedures), travel, asset procurement and accommodations. Again, legislative
auditors must continually earn the right to serve the public interest by demonstrating that
the trust in them is justified. Achieving and preserving a professional reputation of high
standing is therefore paramount. Although legislative auditors are given reasonable
independence, they must be accountable for all they do while exercising that
independence.
Haque (1994,1996, 1998a & 1998b) noted that the major issue related to public
accountability and legislative mechanisms. Haque (2001) also emphasized that public
governance in most countries has recently undergone considerable change in terms of its
objectives, norms, roles, structures, and service recipients, which have serious
implications for its public accountability.
2.3 Legislative oversight and infrastructural development
Oleszek (2010) noted that the fundamental objective of congressional oversight is
to hold executive officials accountable for the implementation of delegated authority.
This objective is especially important given the huge expansion of executive influence in
the modern era. If the Founding Fathers returned to observe their handiwork, they would
likely be surprised by such developments as the creation of a “presidential branch” of
government (the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and
the like) and the establishment of so many federal departments and agencies. From three
departments in 1789 (State, Treasury, and War, renamed Defense in 1947), a dozen more
have been added to the cabinet. The newest creation in 2002, is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Formed from the merger of 22 separate executive branch
units, it employs roughly 180,000 people. Clearly, given the role and scope of the federal
establishment, the importance of Congress’s review function looms large in checking and
monitoring the delegated authority that it grants to federal departments and agencies. The
41
goals of this report, then, are essentially six-fold: (1) highlight several reasons for the
expansion of the federal government; (2) discuss a few definitions of oversight; (3)
spotlight three essential purposes of oversight; (4) comment upon a few oversight laws
and rules; (5) review several important oversight techniques; and (6) identify several
incentives and disincentives to the conduct of congressional oversight. He further noted
that the role of government in a free society must be a matter of continuous negotiation
among members of the public,
Cohen et.al. (1988) argued that this fundamental idea is the essence of selfgovernment by the people through their elected representatives. From the beginning, our
Founding Fathers argued about the role of the national government. Their basic argument
continues to this day. Two schools of thought emerged during this early period, one
articulated by Thomas Jefferson and the other by Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson was an
advocate of limited government: “That government governs best that governs least.”
Government closest to the people—state and local units—is to be preferred, according to
Jefferson, to a robust and remote national government. As Jefferson said in his March 4,
1801, inaugural address:
Still one thing more, fellow-citizens—a wise and
frugal Government, which shall restrain men from
injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free
to regulate their own pursuits of industry and
improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of
labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good
government, and this is necessary to close the circle
of our felicities (Richardson, 1987:313).
According to Cohen et.al. (1988), President Jefferson, however, was not reluctant
to use the government to double the size of the country with the Louisiana Purchase.
Jefferson’s rival, Alexander Hamilton, favored a strong national government and an
energetic chief executive as essential if the new nation was to survive and prosper. In the
42
contemporary era, it appears evident that the Hamiltonian view has largely prevailed over
the Jeffersonian perspective. To be sure, Jefferson’s ideas of limited government and
states’ rights resonate powerfully with millions of Americans including lawmakers,
analysts, scholars, and others. Yet their actions often belie their words. Today’s yeoman
farmers might say they dislike or even resent big government, but they strongly support
farm subsidies. Many people, it seems, are ideologically conservative but operationally
liberal. On the one hand, they may emotionally view government as a necessary evil, but
personally they support federal programs that benefit them, and even welcome the
government’s expansion in various areas (security from terrorist attacks, protection of the
environment, and so on). The fundamental reality is that the national government has
taken on increasingly numerous functions and responsibilities throughout American
history. The 20th century—from the Progressive era to World War I, from the New Deal
to the Great Society—witnessed a huge increase in the size and power of government. Its
expansion was driven by a number of factors.
Domestic and international crises have expanded the reach of the government.
Wars, for example, threaten the nation itself, and the government often accrues new and
expanded prerogatives to protect the country. The intelligence community, as an example,
grew rapidly during the Cold War as the United States of America faced a major threat
from a nuclear-armed superpower rival: the Soviet Union. The internationalization of
numerous domestic issues—trade, the environment, immigration, drug trafficking, and
more—often requires a federal response for their resolution. Complexity is another factor
that promotes governmental growth. New issues and problems constantly arise that call
for governmental action, such as food safety or national preparedness in the event of an
epidemic or pandemic (H1N1, the swine flu virus, for instance). Many national programs,
moreover, are crosscutting—that is, more than one federal agency, jurisdiction, and, in
43
some cases, international organizations are engaged in policy implementation—which
adds to the complexness of determining how or what the government is doing. To be sure,
a nation with over 300 million people creates a variety of federal issues (civil rights,
financial turmoil, high unemployment, and so on).
Given today’s large federal establishment, congressional oversight is more
important than ever in ensuring that the federal government functions economically,
efficiently, and effectively. The American public’s traditional and usually healthy
skepticism about concentrating power in government underscores the legislative review
function’s significant role in holding federal agencies and officials accountable for their
actions and decisions. To determine the quantity and quality of legislative oversight is not
an easy assignment.
Woodrow (1985) argued that the central function of representative government is
to allow a free people to drag realities out into the sunlight and demand a full accounting
from those who are permitted to hold and exercise power. In fact, ‘dragging realities out’
is how the legislature shines the spotlight of public attention on many significant issues,
allowing lawmakers and the American people to make informed judgments about
executive activities and actions. Woodrow Wilson, in his 1885 classic titled
Congressional Government, declared that Congress’s informing function should be
preferred even to its legislative [lawmaking] function. He explained that unless Congress
have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and dispositions of the
administrative agents of government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being
served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of
discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very
affairs which it is most important it should understand and direct (Woodrow, 1985). He
further argued that to encourage, promote, and prod the legislative branch to do more
44
oversight, the House and Senate have enacted an array of laws and rules that help to
complement its many techniques for monitoring executive branch performance. Mention
of a few laws and rules illustrates Congress’s continuing interest in strengthening its own
procedures for oversight, as well as obtaining oversight-related information from the
executive branch. Two statutes worth brief noting for illustrative purposes are the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA, or the Results Act) and the
Congressional Review Act of 1996 (CRA).
According to Kabbany (1999), the administrative reality, exclaimed a House
Appropriations subcommittee chair, is that there is no one person, no individual today
who is responsible for food safety. The chair’s observation was underscored by a House
majority leader when he held up a pizza box: “If this were a cheese pizza, it would be
inspected by the [Food and Drug Administration]. If it were a pepperoni pizza, it would
be inspected by the [Department of Agriculture]. We definitely have a great deal of
duplication here. The Congressional Review Act enables Congress to review and
disapprove agency rules and regulations. Under the CRA, agencies must submit their
major rules to the House, Senate, and government Accountability Office (GAO) before
they can take effect. The act provides for expedited procedures in the Senate (but not the
House) if a lawmaker introduces a joint resolution of disapproval. To be eligible for
consideration under the terms of the Act, a disapproval resolution must be submitted in
either House within 60 days after Congress receives the rule. This law, however, has been
sparingly used by Congress to block agency rules. Since the law went into effect, only
one rule has been rejected (an ergonomics rule in March 2001) despite nearly 50,000
rules that have become effective. Various interpretive ambiguities, such as whether the
act allows disapproval of parts of a rule or only its entirety, account in part for its limited
use. Analysts also acknowledge that the law contains a potential flaw: The President can
45
veto the joint resolution of disapproval which is likely if the underlying rule is developed
during his administration. Congress is unlikely to override the President’s veto given the
two-thirds vote required of each chamber. Still, the law is available to either chamber to
express its views about agency rulemaking. Congress, to be sure, can repeal rules by
passing statutes, including appropriations measures that include provisions “designed to
prevent or restrict the development, implementation, or enforcement” of certain rules or
types of rules.
The Senate, too, has a number of rules that address oversight. Committee reports
accompanying each bill or joint resolution must contain an evaluation of their regulatory
impact, including “a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result
from the regulations to be promulgated pursuant to the bill or joint resolution” (Senate
Rule XXVI, clause 11). The Senate assigned comprehensive oversight authority to certain
standing committees (see Rule XXV) for specific policy areas, such as oceans policy or
energy and resources development. The Senate chair who authored the rule explained its
purposes. According to Congressional Record ( 2009), standing committees are directed
and permitted to undertake investigations and make recommendations in broad policy
areas—for example, nutrition, aging, environmental protection, or consumer affairs—
even though they lack legislative jurisdiction over some aspects of the subject. Such
oversight authority involves subjects that generally cut across the jurisdictions of several
committees. Presently, no single committee has a comprehensive overview of these
policy areas. [This rule change] corrects that. It assigns certain committees the right to
undertake comprehensive review of broad policy issues. The House has a similar rule
which it calls “special oversight.” For instance, the Committee on Homeland Security is
authorized to “review and study on a continuing basis all Governmental activities relating
to homeland security” (House Rule X, clause 3) even though some of those activities fall
46
within the legislative jurisdiction of other standing committees. Congressional Record (
2009), also pointed out that in carrying out its oversight responsibilities, Congress must
be able to choose from a variety of techniques to hold agencies accountable, so that if one
technique proves to be ineffective, committees and Members can employ others singly or
in combination. Most of these techniques are utilized by the committees of Congress:
standing, subcommittee, select, or special.
According to the report, Hearings and Investigations, a traditional method of
congressional oversight is hearings and investigations into executive branch operations.
Legislators need to know how effectively federal programs are working and how well
agency officials are responding to legislative or committee directives. And they want to
know the scope and intensity of public support for government programs to assess the
need for statutory changes. Although the terms “hearings” and “investigations” overlap
(“investigative hearings,” for example) and they may look alike in their formal setting and
operation, a shorthand distinction is that hearings focus generally on the efficiency and
effectiveness of federal agencies and programs. Investigations, too, may address
programmatic efficiency and effectiveness, but their primary focus—triggered by
widespread public interest and debate—is often on allegations of wrongdoing, lack of
agency preparedness or competence, fraud and abuse, conflicts of interest, and the like.
Famous examples include investigations so well-known that a few words are often
enough to trigger the attentive public’s recollection, such as the 1972 Watergate break-in,
the 1987 Iran-Contra affair, or the Hurricane Katrina debacle of 2005.
Lindeman (2009) program evaluation is an approach to oversight that uses social
science and management methodology, such as surveys, cost-benefit analyses, and
efficiency studies, to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs. This type of analysis
is often conducted by the GAO, IGs, and the agencies themselves. President Obama has
47
stressed the importance of measuring the effectiveness of government programs. Castelli,
(2009) noted that the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), added
that the rigorous, independent program evaluation can be a key resource in determining
whether government programs are achieving their intended outcomes as well as possible
and at the lowest possible cost. Each lawmaker’s office handles thousands of requests
each year from constituents seeking help in dealing with executive agencies. The requests
range from inquiries about lost Social Security checks or delayed pension payments to
disaster relief assistance and complicated tax appeals to the Internal Revenue Service.
Constituents perceive casework in nonpolitical terms, wrote two scholars. They expect
their representatives to provide [this service]. Casework, an ombudsman-like function,
has the positive effect of bringing quirks in the administrative machinery to Members’
attention. Solutions to an individual constituent’s problems can suggest legislative
remedies on a broader scale. On occasion, constituents’ casework requests may be used in
oversight hearings by Members to highlight and lend support to a problem or shortcoming
in the operations of a program or agency.
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argued that there is no doubt that Congress has
significant authority to oversee the executive branch. Control of the purse strings,
enactment of laws, the conduct of investigations, or the Senate’s confirmation role are
among the principal levers of power available to the legislative branch to hold executive
officials accountable for the implementation of federal policies and programs. In carrying
out its oversight responsibilities, Congress engages in different, often overlapping, types
or models of review: for example, programmatic versus political, adversarial versus
cooperative, formal (hearings) versus informal (staff meetings with agency officials), or
“police patrol” versus “fire alarm.” Police patrol oversight is akin to “the cop on the
beat”: pro-active, regular, and systematic review of administrative performance by House
48
and Senate committees. Fire alarm oversight is reactive; it occurs when outside events or
public interest triggers episodic reviews of the executive branch. Significantly, Congress
may be obtaining some extra police patrol assistance through the combination of
technology and civic-minded individuals or groups. A rather new oversight trend is the
“public as watchdog,” or, stated differently, the “democratization” of the review function.
There are many groups, such as the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) or
The Heritage Foundation, bloggers, and websites devoted to monitoring federal
expenditures and activities. For example, websites such as Recovery.gov (initiated and
maintained by a task force of federal inspectors general) or StimulusWatch.org (an
independent website developed by volunteers) enable interested individuals to monitor
projects that receive money from more than $800 billion economic stimulus package
enacted during the first session of the 111th Congress. President Obama has made
transparency and open government one of his top priorities. One result is that federal
agencies are posting more of their information and data online so citizens who visit the
sites can assess how their dollars are being spent or how well agencies are managing their
various projects. As the government’s chief information officer stated, the new-found
transparency “will elicit a more informed public oversight to help guide federal policies
and programs. A better informed public is likely to make their evaluations of federal
programs.
Castelli (2009) remarked that
Joint Legislative Committee on Performance
Evaluation and Expenditure Review, a standing committee of the Mississippi Legislature.
Created in 1973, PEER provides the Legislature with timely and accurate information on
Mississippi state government in order to enable that body to perform its function of
legislative oversight. PEER analyzes state agency programs and operations and helps the
49
Legislature make state government more effective, efficient and accountable. The forms
which PEER analyses take include:
•
performance evaluations,
•
investigations, and
•
expenditure reviews.
He argued that Legislative oversight is the process by which a legislative body
takes an active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of state government
and applies this knowledge to its other three primary functions: making laws and public
policy; setting budgets; and raising revenues. A Legislature must know and understand
the operations of state government in order to make informed decisions on the laws which
it passes and the financial decisions which it makes. As government has grown and
become increasingly complex, holding the public business accountable through effective
legislative oversight has become increasingly challenging and important. Illustrative of
the complexity of modern state government, Mississippi’s executive branch consists of
approximately eighty-five agencies, boards, and commissions operating without close
coordination under a complex administrative network which includes foundations,
advisory boards, independent administrative regulatory boards, regional federal officials,
and local officials. One of the consequences of this fragmented authority is a great deal of
disparity in the levels of efficiency and effectiveness achieved by various programs.
Legislative oversight can untangle the administrative network and fix responsibility for
corrective action. Adding to the complex state government framework the tight fiscal
constraints of recent years makes legislative oversight and its focus on the effective and
efficient utilization of public sector resources even more critical. While legislative
50
oversight can involve obtaining any type of information for consideration in legislative
deliberations, some of its primary objectives are to:
•
identify and avoid inefficiency and waste in government. This objective includes
identification of extravagance, fraud, and misuse of public funds as well as
identification of functions which are duplicative, overlap, or for any other reason
warrant redefinition, redirection, redistribution and/or restructuring;
•
determine the extent of government’s effectiveness in carrying out public policy
as set by the Legislature;
•
determine whether responsible parties are administering the law fairly and
properly throughout the state; and,
•
increase knowledge and understanding of government programs.
PEER has become a significant resource for the Legislature, providing in-depth
evaluations of government operations as well as short-term informational assistance.
Since its inception, the Committee has published over 470 reports and completed over
2,000 legislative and special requests, including fiscal notes, budget and other limited
scope analyses, special investigations, evaluations, and feasibility studies. Annually, the
Committee distributes over 2,000 reports to Mississippi legislators, governmental
agencies and interested citizens, as well as to public and private entities from numerous
states. PEER’s oversight and review process has resulted in a significant number of
actions by the Legislature and state agencies that have resulted in savings, cost avoidance,
or additional revenue for the state. In addition, even those reports that were designed to
inform or to recommend administrative or policy changes have often resulted in improved
public services with the same level of spending.
51
Gap in the Literature
Scholars like Mill (1999), Hague and Harrop (2001),Ndoma –Egba (2012), like
Pennings,(2000), Damgaard, (2000)
Maffio, (2002), Rockman (1985), Pelizzo and
Stapenhurst (2006), Schick, (1976), West and Cooper, (1989) among others have made
elaborate contributions to the literature on legislative oversight and public accountability.
However, these scholars glossed over the question of whether any significant relationship
exists between the legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in Rivers
state between 1999 and 2011.
Clarke and Newman, (1997),Brereton and Temple (1999), Konig (1997), Peters
and Pierre, (1998), Marshall, (1994), Lewis (1991), Kickert (1997) and Theobald (1997)
have remarked that the intention behind the current businesslike reforms in public
governance has been political in the context of continuing socioeconomic declines.
According to them, reform-minded political leaders often had a vested interest in
deflecting public attention and criticism away from their own failures by targeting the
shortcomings of the public service. Canadian Office of the Auditor General (2012), also
noted that legislative auditors throughout Canada have emerged as respected
professionals who play a significant role in our system of democratic government.
Although these scholars were apt in their analysis they glossed over the linkage between
quest for re-election among legislators and breach of public accountability mechanisms in
Rivers state between 1999 and 2011.
Although scholars like Oleszek (2010), Cohen. et.al (1988), (Richardson, 1987),
Woodrow (1985), Kabbany (1999), Lindeman (2009), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)
and Castelli (2009) as well as Congressional Record ( 2009) have logically noted that
legislative oversight is the process by which a legislative body takes an active role in
52
understanding and monitoring the performance of state government and applies this
knowledge to its other three primary functions: making laws and public policy; setting
budgets; and raising revenues. A Legislature must know and understand the operations of
state government in order to make informed decisions on the laws which it passes and the
financial decisions which it makes. As government has grown and become increasingly
complex, holding the public business accountable through effective legislative oversight
has become increasingly challenging and important. Illustrative of the complexity of
modern state government, Mississippi’s executive branch consists approximately eightyfive agencies, boards, and commissions operating without close coordination under a
complex administrative network which include foundations, advisory boards, independent
administrative regulatory boards, regional federal officials, and local officials. They noted
that PEER has become a significant resource for the Legislature, providing in-depth
evaluations of government operations as well as short-term informational assistance. Yet
these scholars de-emphasized the effect of legislative oversight by the House of Assembly
on infrastructural development in River State between 1999 and 2011. It is this gap in
literature that this study seeks to fill.
53
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
In this chapter, we explored potent theoretical framework and also evaluated the
appropriate methods of research as the basis for further investigation.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Despite that avalanche of theories abounds to explain the role of legislators in
enthroning accountability, institutional theory has become a prominent lens through
which organizational process of continuity and change are interpreted and understood. It
is concerned with the development of open systems of organization (Silverman, 1970;
Pfeffer and Salanak, 1978; Asivath, Royne and Delbridge, 2005). Such system
emphasizes the significance of social and cultural aspects of organizational environments
rather than the task and technical elements given prominence under contingency theory
and resource dependency theory (Donaldson, 1995; Oliver, 1991). However, much of the
early theorizing from an institutional perspective was concerned with an alternative to
financial and rational explanation of organizational forms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Rachel, et. al. 2005) and sought to understand similarity and stability within
organizational field (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Organizational environment can be
characterized by the sources of norms and values which permeate organizations and
influence action, in particular by informing the ‘taken-for-granted- assumptions regarding
behaviors, organizational forms and processes that are seen as legitimate.
Dimaggio and Powell’s (1983) identified ways that an organization within a field
fence pressure to conform to forms and processes deemed legitimate. These pressures as
identified by them are mimetic, coercive and normative forces. Mimetic forces refer to
the pressures to copy or emulate other organizations activities, systems or structures.
Innovations that are deemed to enhance legitimacy are seen as desirable, especially under
54
conditions of uncertainty where actor cannot be sure of what the outcomes of the adoption
of different processes or systems will be. Coercive forces on the one hand, are external
pressures exerted by governments, regulatory or other agencies to adopt the structures or
system, which they favor. These pressures are often associated with legal requirements,
health and safety regulations and so on. The role played by coercive force, in institutional
theory highlights the impact of political rather than the technical influences on
organizational change. Scott argues that ‘an institutional perspective gives special
emphasis to authority relations: the ability of organizations to rely on legitimate coercion.
Normative forces discuss the effect of professional standards and the influence of
professional communities on organizations. Normative forces capture the ways in which
organizations are expected to conform to standard of professionalism and to adopt
systems and techniques considered to be legitimate by relevant professional groupings.
These norms are conveyed through education and training of professionals and
certification processes accredited by professional bodies (Boyue and Delbridge, 2005).
The expectation of institutional theory is that there should be institutional
logics/mechanisms that underpin the organizing principle of the field (Friedland and
Alford, 1991). This is consistent with isomorphic and requires the identification of the
direction of discussing the link between institutional logics and the organizing principles
of government. As we have already mentioned, these institutional mechanisms consist of
mimetic, normative, and coercive factors. For the purpose of our theoretical framework,
the normative and coercive factors are the most crucial. These normative and coercive
forces are the product of societal norms and constitutional legal framework predominant
over a period of time. The normative factors constitute the standards to adopt to achieve
performance while, on the other hand the role played by coercive forces highlights
political impact. The federal government has taken many coercive steps to ensure
55
compliance with several mechanisms installed in the three tiers of governments in Nigeria
to ensure accountability and improve performance. The term compliance, suggests that,
over time, organizations are moving in the direction of movement that is required by
prevailing, institutional norms and the target organizational characteristics that are
expected to change. This is distinguished from convergence. The term convergence, on
the other hand, refers to, the extent to which all organizations in a field resemble each
other more closely over time. This can happen with or without compliance (organizations
may show a pattern of defiance in the face of institutional pressures and converge on the
‘wrong’ forms). This institutional theory is thoroughly supported only if both compliance
and convergence occur in response to isomorphic pressures. Dimaggo and Powell (1983)
identified the isomorphic pressures to include normative, coercive and mimetic pressures.
These pressures are placed upon state authorities’ councils to implement the reform and
achieve the set down objectives. The style of the implementation of the best value
framework points to the application of primarily coercive but also normative and mimetic
pressures by central government seeking to drive the reform programme.
Normative pressures are the societal norms and constitutional legal framework
already in place in the state government. State functionaries ought to have an improved
knowledge of these mechanisms and also ensure effective operations of these
mechanisms. The application of these mechanisms in carrying out the duties of the state
governments will to a great extent influence the performance culture, and change the
structure of the organization. Performance culture on the other hand, would mean greater
willingness to become more innovative – a shift to a culture that emphasizes enterprise,
service improvement, etc. Organizational structures can be defined as that of rules and
roles that shape the relationship between parts of an organization (Dawson, 1996).
56
Coercive pressure forces are exerted by the supervisory bodies (example, the
federal and state authorities) that ensure that governments functionaries comply to the set
down rules so as to increase efficiency and effectiveness and this enhance accountability
and increase performance. Coercive pressure on state government functionaries suggests
that the best value was intended to have an impact on bureaucracy, decentralization and
integration. However, negative political interference would imply a more rigid structure
and affect adherence, which will invariably affect accountability and undermine
performance. The role of coercive force as noted earlier highlights the impact of political
rather than technical influence. If government therefore, intervened positively, that is,
exert pressure that will make local government functionaries to abide by the rules and
regulations guiding local government, then performance will not be undermined and
accountability will be enhanced. But, where the central and state authorities use coercive
pressure negatively to state civil servants, it will affect accountability drastically and
performance will be undermined. Considering this definition, any negative interference
will considerably affect the performance of local government functionaries. The State
government functionaries as we are aware of are expected to become more customer
focused and more responsive to a range of stakeholders in ensuring that services
increasingly meet the needs of the citizenry not the convenience of service providers.
There can be no efficient service delivery where the institutional mechanisms are not
adhered to.
Strategy contents are principally concerned with the services that the provided and
methods by which they are delivered (Bogue and Walker, 2004). The best value regime
was intended to stimulate two major changes in strategy content – innovation and
partnership. There is a strong expectation among policymakers that the regime would
encourage state authorities to outsource services, for which they are responsible.
57
Authorities were consequently, required to challenge existing approaches and to
explore new method of service provision. They were expected to create, nurture and
manage markets in order to promote a mixed economy of ‘provision’ so that they can
create ‘the conditions under which there is likely to be greater interest from the private
and voluntary sectors in working with local governments to deliver quality services.
There is a strong expectation that the compliance of these mechanisms of accountability
would promote innovations in service delivery and design. The style of the
implementation of the mechanisms of accountability in Nigeria points to the application
of primarily coercive, but normative and mimetic pressures. Moreover, knowledge of
state government functionaries about these normative forces and then positive attitude
and positive coercive measures will however improve public accountability and thus
enhance performance.
Application of the Theory
As it has been acknowledged the world over, the legislature remains one of the
most important elements of the democratic process. Given how any member of the
legislature emerges, be it at the state or at the national levels, the second arm of
government is also considered as the official body democratically chosen by the people,
through the electoral process, to make laws, as well as amend or repeal laws for peace,
order and good governance of the state without prejudice to the provisions of the nation’s
constitution. It is, indeed, the platform on which nations and states make laws to create an
enabling environment for sustainable human development in all facets of life.
The Rivers State House of Assembly appears to lack institutional logics and
mechanisms that underpin the organizing principle of the institution. The state executive
Governor exerts enormous influence on the Assembly such that the capacity of the
legislators to ensure that government functionaries comply with the set down rules and
58
enhance accountability has been eroded. The negative political interference of the Rivers
State Governor on the State Assembly invariably affects accountability and undermines
the performance of government.
This explains why the legislative business in Rivers State, vis-a-vis how members
of the Houses of Assembly have been able to impact positively on the life of the people
through meaningful legislations reveals that performance is abysmal. The State has been
bedeviled with myriad of problems ranging from security, militancy and environmental
neglect and degradation; both emanating from a long period of exploitation of the crude
oil deposits and neglect of the human resource in the zone. The activities of the
lawmakers in Rivers State in the last decade to effectively act in accordance with their
legislative callings affects their capacity to identify and solve problems militating against
the people for a meaningful socio-economic and infrastructural development.
Hence, the Rivers State House of Assembly in the past one year of the seventh
Assembly has not performed creditably as they are abnormally subservient to the
executive. This was inimical to the populace as it was detrimental to the socio-political
and socio-economic growth of the state. The Rivers State House of Assembly, in the last
one year, has displayed an appreciable level of maturity with regards to cohesion among
the ranks of its members. But as being perceived by majority of Rivers people, it appears
the House of Assembly is not as proactive as it should be and that is to a large extent due
to the failure on the part of the Assembly to effectively manage its communication with
Rivers people and not necessarily as a result of a deficiency on her part to perform
oversight functions particularly on the executive.
Meanwhile, the seventh Rivers State House of Assembly, in its seventh assembly,
has been both passive and active. It has deliberated and passed bills, considered motions
and performed some of its oversight functions to the best of its ability. It has however,
59
continued in the tradition of subservient relations with the executive arm. The Rivers
State House of Assembly, under the Speakership of Hon Otelema Dan-Amachree, has
given service to Rivers people. Besides the appropriation bills, the House has passed
eleven executive bills, all of which were later signed into law by the state governor, Rt.
Hon.Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi. The Local Government Amendment Bill No. 7 of 2011
was passed in May 2011; the Rivers State Tourism Development Agency Bill, the State
Bonds and Other Debts Securities Issuance Bill and the Rivers State Debt Management
Bill were passed in December of 2011; the Rivers State Contributory Pension Scheme for
Employees in the Public Service (Amendment) Law, No 1 of 2012 and the Rivers State
Local Government Law, No 2 of 2012 became law in February this year. The list got
longer in May of this year when the governor signed five of the House’s bills into law:
the Rivers State Universal Basic Education Amendment Bill2012, the Rivers State Senior
Secondary Schools’ Board Bill 2012, the Rivers State Governor and Deputy Governor
Pensions and Fringe Benefits Bill 2012, the Rivers State House of Assembly Service
Commission Amendment Bill 2012 and the Rivers State Water Sector Development Law
2012 (Garba, 2012).
However, to some observers who have been watching the Assembly’s activities
since it took off, the listed number of bills passed, the unlisted oversight functions
performed and the motions trashed were not enough to give it a pass mark. In fact, some
who have critically studied bills and motions debated on the floor of the House have
expressed such opinions as the activities have fallen below expectation, just as some
described some of the bills and eventual laws as rather unpopular, the recently enacted
“Rivers State Governor and Deputy Governor Pensions and Fringe Benefits Bill 2012”,
topping the list of the unpopular efforts of the Assembly. The Assembly has not been able
to convincingly win the affection of the people in the various categories of society; it has
60
been called all sorts of names by different groups for its perceived failure to assert its
autonomy, as specified by the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. To those holding this view, the
legislature in Rivers state has so far remained a lame-duck, only performing a rubberstamp role to suit the whims and caprices of the executive arm, thereby failing its sacred
task of representing and defending the interests of the people, whose stead they had been
elected to represent in the hallowed chambers. From all sides, you can hear abuses and
denigrating adjectives flying the way of the Assembly, mostly for failing to occupy its
role as the check on the executive arm.
3.2 Hypotheses
We shall explore the following hypotheses:
1. Ho: There is no significant relationship between legislative oversight by the
Rivers State House of Assembly and exposing of executive corruption in the
State between 1999 and 2011.
Hi: There is a significant relationship between legislative oversight by the
Rivers State House of Assembly and exposing of executive corruption in the
State between 1999 and 2011.
2. The quest for re-election among Legislators undermined the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period of
study.
3. The legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly enhanced
infrastructural development in the State within the period of study
3.3 Research Design
A research design is very important in any research work. This study adopted the
descriptive survey design and documentary research design. Survey Design, according to
De Cola (1979), is the gathering of data from a sample of cases selected from usually a
61
larger population, while documentary design is the examination and analyzes of official
documents, statistical records and other relevant documents. The questionnaire was
designed based on the main indicators of the hypotheses to get the relevant information
needed for the study and also for quick analysis of data. The questionnaires were
designed in such a way as to lend answers to the hypotheses testing.
3.4 Method of Data Collection
The two basic methods of data collection in social sciences are quantitative and
qualitative methods. In this study, we adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Under the quantitative method we relied on the self report techniques to generate
information from our sample. In the first case, we obtained data from direct responses
from interviews with 12 members of the State House of Assembly. They include the
Speaker, the House Majority Leader and 10 other members of the House of Assembly.
They were selected purposively and judgmentally. In addition, we also distributed
structured questionnaires in view of the topic under study. The questionnaires not only
serve as a supplementary source of data, but also, as a means of validating the
consistency of the results of the interview. We have chosen the interview method of data
collection because of the obvious advantage it has over other techniques like participantobservation. The later is more appropriate for in-depth analysis , usually of a specific
population. Interview is a data-gathering instrument that enables a seeker of information
to have an in-depth knowledge of an issue of concern through face-to-face interaction (at
times, by telephone conversation) with the provider of such information (Obasi, 2000). It
is used for gathering data on people’s knowledge, values, preferences, attitudes, beliefs
and life experience. But, unlike a questionnaire, it gives opportunity for in-depth
investigation or deeper probing into an issue under study. As a result of the above, we
chose the interview as the chief technique of data collection, rather than the
62
questionnaire. According to Obasi, (2000) and Ibeanu, (1992) the interview can apply to
a wider segment of the population, both literate and illiterate ones. Again, response is
more predictable or assured through the interview. This is unlike the questionnaire, in
which there is no assurance that respondents will complete the questionnaire they receive.
Furthermore, the interview, if well handled could yield more reliable data since the
researchers’ presence enables him to gauge – from the respondents demeanor, etc;
whether the information being given is authentic or not. In addition, it can permit greater
flexibility to accommodate unforeseen situation during an interview session.
Perhaps and most importantly, it provides opportunity to discover the emotional
or temperamental dimension of interviewee’s behavior during interview session. The
interview, as mentioned earlier, reduces to the barest minimum the problem of illiteracy.
The questionnaire, on the other hand, is predicated on some level of literacy on the part of
the respondent. Otherwise, the research must have to translate the questions for the
respondent into a language he understands and probably re-translate his answers into
English language (Ibeanu, 1992). This may not only introduce biases, (eg the research
leading the answers) but in the end, it boils down to a structured interview. Nonetheless, a
combination of these two techniques must be desirable. This is because they could yield
substantial data and also serve as a means of authenticating, validating and checking the
reliability of each other.
Furthermore, we recruited and trained research assistants to help in the handling
and distribution of the questionnaires. Consequently, research assistants were drawn from
career officials of the local government areas where the fieldwork will be carried out. The
latter condition might have introduced prejudice, but the advantage of working with
people who were acquainted with the history and specific duties in the field make up for
that. The research assistants were trained for three weeks. Its aim was to get them
63
acquainted with the research problem and objectives as well as the techniques of
interviewing. We found this beneficial though Durbin and Stuart (1951) have shown that
there is not much difference in the response rate recorded by “experienced and
inexperienced interviewers”.
The qualitative data included the data we generated from textbooks, government
documents and publications, resources from the internet, “archival” materials etc dealing
with legislature and public accountability in Nigeria generally and Rivers State in
particular. Secondary sources of data were considered quite useful in research especially,
for exploratory purposes. This however, does not suggest that when secondary materials
are quite cheap to embark on and expressive documents are capable of bringing to the
fore, significant variables in a specific problem and suggesting hypotheses embodying
these variables. All the same, whatever, techniques that were employed the most
important thing was that we ensured that data collected were dependable.
Population of the Study
The population of this study is all the population of people living in Rivers State.
According to the NPC, (2006), the State is inhabited by a total population of 5,198,716
people. Rivers State is divided into 23 Local Government Areas. The population of each
area varies from the other.
Sampling and Sampling Techniques
We used the Yamane’s Statistical Formula to determine the sample size of the
study. This decision was informed by the high ability/ capacity of the formula to control
sampling error. Yamane (1973: 727-728) stated the formula as:
n
=
N
1 + Ne2
Where n
=
the sample size
N
=
the total population
64
e
n
=
=
tolerable error (which is normally 0.05%)
N
1 + Ne2
n
=
5,198,716
1 + 5,198,716 x (0.05)2
n
=
5,198,716
1 + 5,198,716 x0.0025
n
=
5,198,716
1 + 12996.79
n
=
5,198,716
12997.79
n =
399.96 Rounded @ 400
We used multistage cluster probability sampling to choose the local governments
from where we purposively selected our sample in Rivers State. According to Babbie
(2007: 208) multistage cluster sampling is used to choose the sample where “much
interesting social science research requires the selection of sample from population that
cannot easily be listed for sampling purposes: the population of a city, state or a nation”.
Biereeenu –Nnabugwu (2006:192) noted that “multistage sampling involves sampling in
successive stages such that at each stage, selection is made by any of the known
probability sampling method”. We clustered the State into three Senatorial District as
follows:
1. Rivers West;
2. Rivers Central and
3. Rivers North.
65
We wrote the names of LGAs in each district in cards and applied the shuffling card
method of simple random sampling in each of the Senatorial District to select at random
one local government each from the districts. The selected three LGAs are as follows:
1.ONELGA in Rivers West ;
2.PortHarcourt in Rivers Central and
3. Khana in Rivers East.
Each of these selected LGAs was further divided into households and we used the
simple random sampling to select the households. The identification of these households
was facilitated by reference to existing households enumeration conducted by the
National Population Commission before the 2006 head count. From the records, we
selected the respondents purposively to ensure that those selected can read and write. The
use of purposive random sampling technique enables the researcher to pick those that
best met the purpose of the research. This however, nullifies the use of any simple
percentage to get the number of people to respond to the questionnaires. However, it will
be purposively administered to the category of respondents that can respond to the
questions perfectly well. This is because the study is on assessing the nexus between the
legislature and public accountability in Rivers State. The three Local Governments from
where our respondents were drawn were urban centers. This is because of the prevalence
of literate citizens in the urban areas. The questionnaires were distributed to the number
of people purposively selected.
The non- proportionality in population of selected LGAs was also mirrored in the
number of questionnaires distributed in the selected LGAs. We selected 100 households
from ONELGA, 180 households from Port Harcourt and 120 households from Khana .
Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of population, households and number of
respondents selected from the three LGAs:
66
Table 3.1: Distribution of Population, Households and Number of Sample from the
three LGAs:
LGAs
No
of
No
of
No
of
Population
Households
Selected
Household
ONELGA
283,294
2114
100
PortHarcourt
538,558
3057
180
Khana
292924
2719
120
1,114,776
7890
400
Total
Source: Fieldwork, 2012
Validity and Reliability
According to Durbin & Stuart (1951), Black & Champion, (1976) and Nachmias
& Nachmias (1981), the success of any research lies to a large extent on the dependability
of the data employed in analysis. This then raises the question, validity and reliability.
Validity occurs when a careful attempt has been made to ensure that an instrument
contains what it is supposed to contain by applying the theoretical knowledge in the field
about what is being studied and by convincing oneself that the item, in the instrument
has been logically validated (Obasi, 2000). Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the
ability of an instrument to produce the same consistent results over time when applied to
the same sample (Good and Hart, 1952; Black and Champion 1976; Mccormick and
Tiffin, 1975). In validating our interview schedule, we were concerned with establishing
its content validity. Content validity comprises content or face validity, predictive and
concurrent validity, construed validity or criterion related or empirical validity
(Kerlinger; 1977; Black & champion 1976; Obikeze, 1990; and Seltiz, et al. 1974). To
judge the validity of the interview schedule, we depended on wide consultations with
specialists. Then to test for reliability, a pilot survey in which sixty potential respondents
(20 from each local government) were interviewed. The responses of the sixty
respondents were therefore compared.
67
On the part of the questionnaire, although, we recognized the fact that the
processes of validating and checking the reliability of the instrument in a multi faceted
process (Black & Champion, 1976). We were interested in the internal consistency of our
instrument. To this end, we have endeavored to include questions to check the
consistency of the respondents. Again, as already noted, the combination of the interview
schedule and questionnaire were of immense value in validating our data. For secondary
data, we can only establish reliability by rigorous logic and content analysis to test the
dependability of expressive document (Ibeanu, 1992):
1.
If the truth of a statement is a matter of indifference to the author, then his
account is likely to be unbiased. But it must be noted that his indifference or
disinterestedness may have affected the reliability of his observation when it was
made.
2.
If the statement is prejudicial to the informant or his interests, it is likely to be
truthful. But we must guard against exaggerations and self-immolation, which
may occur.
3.
If the statement is of common knowledge, then the author is not likely to lie.
4.
If part of the statement is of tangential interest to the informant, the statement is
probably true.
5.
A statement is likely to be true when it is contrary to what is widely expected
from the informant.
On the other hand, it is also more difficult to establish the dependability of each
document as reports, editorials, official, and histories etc, which are usually written after
the events and are designed to convey definite impressions. Nevertheless, a rigorous use
of the technique of content analysis could help us select what is dependable from what is
not (see, Berelson, 1975). There are however other types of document (well researched
68
texts, instruction, official statistics) etc which tend to be more credible. We concentrated
on these for the study. It is very vital to note that our concern with validity and reliability
is not to suggest that our study is neutral, as liberal social scientist would claim. We point
this out in recognition of the fact, that an impartial and neutral conduct of social science
is a myth. This because the social science is based on set of ideas, beliefs, and is an
integral part of the development of society along with the economic and social formation
to which they correspond. A truly scientific social science, equally product and agent of
the transformation of society, must be critical and must seek to transcend these
formations (Ibeanu, 1992). Neutrality and objectivity as eternal criteria do not exist “the
only real human knowledge or science is gained through praxis, the unity of theory and
practice in social action, not by detached observation, and the political component of
praxis is inseparable in the final analysis from political practical activity” (Radice,
1975:10). This outcome gave rise to the approval of the final version of the questionnaire
by the research supervisor as contained in the Appendix 1 of this study.
3.5 Methods of Data Analysis
Taking into cognizance that data for this study were collected from both
quantitative and qualitative methods, we analyzed the data using both quantitative and
qualitative methods of data analysis. Specifically we analyzed data from the respondents
using both descriptive and inferential statistics. In order to ease the explanation of the
linkages between the variable of this study, we sorted and presented data in frequency
tables, graphs and simple percentages was also used to determine each category of
response and for the analysis of this study. The group interview correspondences were
used to enhance the data generated from questionnaire responses and qualitative
descriptive method was also used to analyze the data generated from secondary sources.
Since the first question of this study is concerned with test of significance of
relationship, we used the Chi-square here to test our hypothesis. Hence Obasi (1999: 33)
69
noted that “hypothesis that has to do with association and significance of relationship are
most suitable to be tested using the chi- square”. This can be mathematically represented
as follows:
X2
= Σ(Of-Ef) 2
Ef
Where: Σ = Summation
Of = Observed frequency
Ef = Expected frequency
We stated the hypothesis 1 in null and alternative form; we chose level of
significance at 0.05%; we used the level of significance and degree of freedom to obtain
the critical value; to obtain the degree of freedom, the formula is (n-1) where n is the
number of categories;
we also compared the critical/tabulated value and obtained
/calculated value.
Decision rule: If the obtained /calculated value is less than the critical/tabulated value,
we shall accept the null hypothesis but if the obtained /calculated value is greater than the
critical/tabulated value we shall reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative
hypothesis.
70
CHAPTER FOUR
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN
NIGERIA, 1960-1998
This chapter adopted a holistic approach to examine the phenomenon of
legislature and public accountability in Nigeria to provide a salient foundation for our
study in Rivers State. We specifically explored the history of the legislature in Nigeria
from 1960 to 1998; this chapter also appraised the Nigerian legislature and the
constitutional development as well as assessed the roles of the legislature in Nigeria.
4.1 History of the Legislature
The Nigerian Legislature under the colonial state could not perform legislative
functions as the most important institution of a liberal democratic state. The colonial
legislatures were designed to serve as agencies for articulation of views and ventilation of
popular feelings that were not expected to radically change the patterns and policies of the
respective colonial governments (Alabi, 2009). They were mere ratificatory assemblies
for the executive directives of the Colonial Governor (Awotokun, 1998). This orientation
was to have a long lasting effect on the performance of the legislature, not only during but
even years after effective renunciation of colonial rule. In 1963 a national daily
newspaper was quoted to have referred to the Federal Legislature as an expensive and
irrelevant talking shop (Awotokun, 1998).
Meanwhile, since British overlords awarded independence to Nigeria in 1960, the
legislature has hardly featured as a stable national institution. Though, there have been
about five legislative Houses: 1960 - 1964, 1964- 1966, 1979- 1983, 1983; 1991 - 1993
(under military rule) and now 1999 - 2011, the institution has remained the most
unknown, misunderstood and neglected of all the institutions of democratic governance.
Its history actually symbolizes the story of democracy in Nigeria. The immediate post
71
independence era had one full session and after a much disputed election and associated
violence, the military took over in 1966. The House did not complete its tenure.
From 1979 to 1983, the legislature existed under a new atmosphere. In a sharp
departure from the parliamentary system inherited from the British, the legislative (made
up of the two chambers of the Senate and House of Representatives) was separate from
the Executive Branch. A second legislative House (National Assembly) was inaugurated
in October , 1983. However, on December 31, 1983, it was disbanded in a putsch headed
by Major General Muhammadu Buhari.
Under intense pressure to return the country to democratic governance, the
military government under General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, which overthrew the
Buhari government, organized series of elections in 1991. The elections saw the
inauguration of State Governors, State legislative Houses and the National Assembly.
The State Houses of Assembly were answerable to the Governor, who reported to the
Military President. The National Assembly was answerable to the military Head of State,
who had earlier given instructions on what the Assembly could discuss and what it could
not. Shortly before the Assembly was disbanded in 1993, the military, which had handed
over power to civilian nominees called the Interim National Government (ING), took
over the reins of power again. It instructed the Assembly, in the words of the then Senate
President Ameh Ebute, we nevertheless went back to the Senate but before we went back
to the Senate, the then Commander of the Brigade of Guards, Major General Bashir
Magashi, informed me that we should not discuss anything about what was happening
(the Abacha coup). How could you think it was possible for us not to discuss the
handover or the so-called resignation of Shonekan? He said, no, that was the instruction
72
he received from above, and if we do not want to be rough handled by the boys do not
discuss it.
Arising from the foregoing, we state that the legislature was permitted to exist
under schemes of diarchy during the aborted third republic, this organ of government
remained within the stranglehold of the military rulers who used the legislature not as
representative of people’s will, but to create some sense of legitimacy for their
administrations (Awotokun, 1998).
This was not a novel practice. The British Colonial authorities had Legislative
Houses, which did not have powers. They were rubber stamps, whose existence merely
decorated the system. Besides the decoration, the colonial authorities sought to satisfy the
yearnings of popular participation without relinquishing control (House of Commons
Information Office, 1689).
A few points stand out from the above narration. First, an independent legislature
has not really operated in Nigeria before now. Second, in Nigeria 42 years of existence as
an independent state, the legislature has lived for only twelve years. Third, it has been the
target of military takeovers because it is the only feature of governance that distinguishes
democracy from authoritarianism. Fourth, arising out of the above is the fact that the
legislature possesses the least capacity to perform its functions, in terms of resources and
precedents.
This problem of lack of capacity is compounded by the fact that government has
operated for about thirty years without the legislature and so very few people (even those
within the legislature) know why such an expensive institution should be maintained.
Both members of the legislative Houses, the public and Executive are at a loss as to what
the responsibilities and authority of the legislature should be. With time, this confusion is
73
likely to clear and the legislature, if democracy thrives long enough, will become the
mainstay of democracy, in both perception and reality.
The current National Assembly was born into controversy. The President was
sworn in on May 29, 1999, and he did not proclaim the inauguration of the National
Assembly till June 3, 1999. In the glare of national television, the President inspected the
uncompleted National Assembly premises to justify the delay in the issuance of the
proclamation. What, of course, this showed was that the departing military authorities
had not prepared the necessary infrastructures for the take off of the legislature. This
delay in the inauguration, even for good reason, planted seeds of discord and mistrust.
When the National Assembly was finally inaugurated, members were lodged in hotels at
government expense. Government then spent on the average about N30, 000.00 each day
on each member of the National Assembly.
In their wisdom, (some may say, naivety) members chose to collect fifteen
thousand Naira (N15, 000.00) Daily Tour Allowance (DTA) already determined and
fixed by the government bureaucracy rather than live in hotels. This decision seemed to
have offended certain interests in the hotel business and the bureaucracy. The information
was leaked to the press and, of course, it did not go down well with poverty-stricken
electors, some of whom did not have food to eat. It was believed to be reckless and
callous to collect fifteen thousand Naira every day, the equivalent of the monthly wages
of a senior officer in the Federal Civil service
Shortly after, members of the National Assembly decided to have furnishing
allowances paid directly to them rather than allow government contractors furnish the
houses at very high fees. Senators who have bigger apartments were paid three million
five hundred thousand Naira (N3.5m) only, while members of the House collected two
74
million, five hundred thousand Naira (N2.5m) only. The public, which did not know that
government had planned to award the contracts for the furnishing of the Houses for
higher figures, was that incensed Government had earlier planned to award the contacts
for the furnishing of the houses of Senators at eleven million naira per House and eight
million naira for each House of the members of the House of Representatives.
For more than a year the public kept talking about this. Of course, the public did
not know that civil servants of the rank of Assistant Directors and above spend almost
four million Naira or more for furnishing their houses. Then came the 2000
Appropriation Act; the National Assembly which still lacks facilities for operations
increased the budgetary allocations for the Assembly. The public was again angry. The
fact that the National Assembly needed offices, computers, cars, etc, did not matter.
Increasingly, the Assembly came to be seen as an irritant and unnecessary baggage or
decoration of the new system of administration. Largely because the budget was
submitted late and the procedures for passage are tedious, the public became very angry
with the National Assembly for the late passage of the budget. This was because, non
release of funds for projects and government business was attributed to the fact that the
budget had not yet been passed. However, even when the budget was passed it was not
implemented. Funds were not released for projects budgeted for, and released for projects
not provided for in the appropriation acts (Fob, 1995).
Of course, the current National Assembly was treading on a well-trodden path of
controversy over money and perks of office. Most of the 1979-1983 legislative period
was spent on controversy on the wages of legislators. The framers of the 1999
constitution took cognizance of this problem and transferred powers to fix wages of
legislators from the National Assembly to the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal
75
Allocation Commission. The controversies generated by the budget of 1999 rose several
questions of what role should the National Assembly play. Several commentators thought
that the National Assembly should give its consent to whatever the President proposed.
Some even thought, and still argue that the National Assembly should not increase or
adjust budgetary proposition of the President.
However, Parliament arose from the fact that the King or Monarch needed to be
guided in the United Kingdom. As early as the 14th century, under King Edward 111
(1327-1377) it had been accepted in England that there should be no taxation without
parliamentary consent. In the 17th century , when parliament and the King could not
agree on who controls troops during the Irish rebellion, the resulting tension led to the
execution of King Charles. When the Monarchy was restored in 1668, the Bill of Rights,
which established the authority of the parliament over the King, was passed. The English
Parliament has two chambers: the House of Lords also referred to as the Upper Chambers
and the House of Commons. At the beginning, the House of Lords, which is constituted
by the nobility could veto bills or block actions of the elected House of Commons. This
has changed since and the House of Lords is more or less ceremonial and by appropriate
legislations, the House of Commons superiority over it has been established. The Bill of
Rights established binding principles including the following:
(1) No law could be made or suspended without parliamentary consent;
(2) Taxation or levying money for the use of the crown without parliamentary consent is
illegal
(3) Illegality of raising an Army without parliamentary consent; and
(4) Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament cannot be questioned or
impeached in any court or place outside parliament.
76
The United States of America borrowed the principles of the bill of Rights to
create its constitution whose main strength is the separation of powers between the three
branches of Government. These branches are first, the Executive, which comprises only
of the President (ministers or Secretaries and his aides). Second, the Congress, which is
made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and third the judiciary. It may
be noted that under the system in the United States, the Vice President presides over the
Senate. In reality though, the Vice President rarely goes to the Senate (House of
Commons Information Office, 1689).
The Congress in the United States lays down (initiates) policies of government or
approves policies from the Executive branch and the President implements approved
policies of government. Fob (1995) restated that the legislature is the political body
which decides most of the fundamental issues in society as well as the closest to the
people. The extent to which the Congress leads the other arms of government is
dependent on how close it is to the people. This explains why public opinion polls have
become so important in the politics of the United States of America. The press too, owes
its relevance, as the fourth estate of the realm, to its role of opening up Governmental
intrigues and secrecies to the public.
In order to ensure that the people control affairs in the United States, the
constitution gives a lot of powers to the Congress. These include power over the use of
armed Forces, and the National Treasury. In the same way, both Constitutions of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979 and 1999) gave the National Assembly almost
absolute powers over the National treasury and matters of prosecution of war with
another country. As a matter of fact, the National Assembly regulates how the President
functions as Commander-In-Chief. This indeed is the essence of democracy, which, as
77
we all know, is defined as government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
The people, at regular intervals, in our case, every four years, through adult suffrage
choose new leaders. The leaders are expected to work for the good of the people.
Presidential democracy also provides for a legislature, independent of those who
regularly administer the affairs of the State. Power, it is said, in democracy, lies with the
people. During the periods between elections, the legislature acts on behalf of the people.
In other words, the sovereignty of the people is exercised on its behalf by the legislature.
This is why in our system, as with the system in the United States of America, it
is only the legislature that can impose sanctions on office holders. For, instance only the
legislature can remove a member of the legislative house from office; or the law courts, if
a case, of criminal nature or any dispute arises. The only other way to remove a legislator
is through a referendum. And, of course, while the legislature can impeach (remove from
office) the President, no matter how dissatisfied the President is with the legislature, he
cannot dissolve it. Indeed, where the executive disagrees with the legislature, and the
President vetoes any bill, the National Assembly can brush aside (over ride) such a veto.
This can only be done through two-thirds majority vote in both chambers. As can be seen
from the above, the National Assembly possesses enormous powers, which have not been
fully exercised in this learning period.
In Nigeria, Sections 80 to 89 give wide powers to the legislature (at the National
level) over the finances of the Federation. Section 80 (3) states as follows:
No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the
Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the
Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been
authorized by an Act of the National Assembly. No moneys
shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or
78
any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner
prescribed by the National Assembly.
Besides its powers over the budget, the National Assembly, in the 1999
Constitution, is vested with approving authority of all decisions of Government. The
policies and general directions of government are laid down by the National Assembly
and the Executive Arm of government and the Judiciary to some extent implement and
enforce such decisions. For instance Local Governments created by the State Houses of
Assembly can only become legitimate Local Governments when the National Assembly
approves them. (Section 8); State creation and adjustments of State boundaries can only
be done by the National Assembly; treaties and external agreements need to be
legitimized the legislature (section 12) As a matter of fact, bodies that are independent
are independent only to the extent that they report to the National Assembly (Latimer
House, 1998).
Despite these shortcomings the House of Representatives has been performing its
duties effectively. Increasingly Nigerians are recognizing the importance of the
Legislature and the role that it should play in the life of the polity. The flurry of
commentaries, often very critical and negative, as well as the impeachment threat
resolution of the House of Representatives appears to have awakened interest in the
legislature. Though, the yardstick for measuring performance does not exist now,
Nigerians believe that the Legislature could have done better. Sometimes the same
persons saying that the legislature has not performed well argue in the same breadth that
the National Assembly has not cooperated fully with the Executive, that it has been too
confrontational.
79
Similarly, the 1999 Constitution empowered the State Houses of Assembly as the
senior partner in the democratic enterprise in their respective states. Section 91 of the
Constitution provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of
Assembly of a State shall consist of three or four times the
number of seats which that State has in the House of
Representatives divided in a way to reflect, as far as possible
nearly equal population. Again, it provided that a House of
Assembly of a State shall consist of not less than twentyfour and not more than forty members.
More so, Section 100 sub-sections 1-5 provided for the powers of the House of Assembly
as follows:
(1) The power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be
exercised by bills passed by the House of Assembly and,
except as otherwise provided by this section, assented to by
the Governor. (2) A bill shall not become Law unless it has
been duly passed and, subject to subsection (1) of this
section, assented to in accordance with the provisions of this
section. (3) Where a bill has been passed by the House of
Assembly it shall be presented to the Governor for assent .
(4) Where a bill is presented to the Governor for assent he
shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that
he withholds assent. (5) Where the Governor withholds
assent and the bill is again passed by the House of Assembly
by two-thirds majority, the bill shall become law and the
assent of the Governor shall not be required.
Again, section 120 (1-4) of the 1999 Constitution provides that:
(1) All revenues or other moneys raised or received by a
State (not being revenues or other moneys payable under this
Constitution or any Law of a House of Assembly into any
other public fund of the State established for a specific
purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated
Revenue Fund of the State. (2) No moneys shall be
withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State
except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by
this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been
authorised by an Appropriation Law, Supplementary
Appropriation Law or Law passed in pursuance of section
80
121 of this Constitution. (3) No moneys shall be withdrawn
from any public fund of the State, other than the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State, unless the issue of
those moneys has been authorised by a Law of the House of
Assembly of the State. (4) No moneys shall be withdrawn
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State or any
other public fund of the State except in the manner prescribed
by the House of Assembly.
The same Constitution in section 121 (1-2 ) also conferred financial powers on the state
Assembly as follows:
(1) The Governor shall cause to be prepared and laid before the
House of Assembly at any time before the commencement of
each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of
the State for the next following financial year. (2) The heads of
expenditure contained in the estimates, other than expenditure
charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State by
this Constitution, shall be included in a bill, to be known as an
Appropriation Bill, providing for the issue from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State of the sums necessary
to meet that expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for
the purposes specified therein.
The biggest challenge of the legislature is the establishment of legitimacy among
the people. The connection between the legislature and the people is the only reason why,
over the years, it has acquired more power than other arms of government. Institutionally
this is possible because of the pluralism of parliaments as it often reflects the pluralism of
the polity. Improving the quality of representation is therefore a challenge for the people,
and this can also be more effectively done, when there is flexibility in the delineation of
constituencies. The establishment of constituency offices by legislators at the National
level ought to be encouraged and enforced. State legislators ought to be accorded the
same privileges.
There is also the need for the legislature to enhance its capacity. Those elected as
legislators need to know the laws of the land (or educate themselves on the laws) as they
affect their constituents. Capacity building needs not be foreign agencies driven; these
81
ought to be major focus. Activities to enhance capacity building include, training,
workshops, seminars, field visits and parliamentary exchanges, human resources
development and the dissemination of best practices and lessons learned. The current
legislature has suffered greatly from the lack of staff and as well as facilities such as
office spaces. These need to be put in place because, the quality of every legislature is
dependent on the quality of its aides- who conduct research, write memos, conduct
opinion polls, keep in touch with constituents and help direct the legislator.
Of course all these require funding which has been a major problem. There is the
need to improve the funding to the legislature-and also for the funds available to be
applied in a manner that greater good would be achieved. It is important to note that
every society gets the legislature it wants to have.
4.2 The Legislature and Constitutional Development
A French philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu, in his book, The Spirit of Laws,
published in 1748, propounded the theory of separation of powers which outlined that for
government to work at its best; its arms should be separated from one another.
Amusingly, Montesquieu modeled his theory around Britain which Nigerian first copied
her parliamentary system. In the Britain type, power is shared between the king, who
enforces laws, Parliament, which make laws, and the judges of the English courts, who
interpreted the laws. Interestingly, this initiative later became the basis of the American
and the Nigerian 1979 constitution from which both democracies now operate the
presidential system of government, where the executive, legislature and judiciary share
powers independently (Omomia, 2013).
82
The Constitutions that have thrived in Nigeria before i960 included the Clifford
Constitution of 1922, the Richards Constitution of 1946, the Macpherson Constitution of
1951, and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 came
amidst the protests and agitations of Nigerian nationalists who were strongly opposed to
the preceding constitution and its limitations. Governor Macpherson constituted a
committee to review the existing constitution and make recommendations on how to draft
a "citizen-oriented" constitution. This produced the first elaborate involvement of
Nigerians in the making of a constitution for their country. Upon the submission of the
recommendations of the committee, the colonial government convened a Constitutional
Conference in Ibadan, Western Nigeria, in 1950. This conference gave the leaders of
Nigeria the opportunity to articulate their interests and ensure that their views are
represented in the new constitution. It has been argued by scholars that the 1951
constitution grew out of the final recommendations of this epoch-making Conference of
1950 (Ojudu, 2012).
The British subsequently accepted most of the recommendations of the
conference and reflected them in the 1951 constitution. These included elected majorities
in the central and regional legislatures and the power granted to regional legislatures to
legislate on certain matters (Ojudu, 2012).It was also this constitution that introduced
bicameral legislatures in the Northern and Western Regions which both had a House of
Assembly as well as a House of Chiefs. Even though this constitution stripped the
colonial governor of his reserve powers in dealing with the legislature, the governor was
still "the symbol of internal policy formulation and implementation." Thus, as we
mentioned earlier, the executive still remained over-developed in relation to the
legislature.
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The Federal Constitution of 1954 was meant to end the quasi-unitary and quasifederal system which had existed up till then under colonial rule and paved the way
towards political independence for Nigeria. This constitution too was preceded by a
Constitutional Conference held in London in 1953 involving all the Nigerian political
parties. Given that the parties could not agree on all the critical issues on the table, the
conference was continued in Lagos in 1954.These conferences led to the writing and
coming into force of a Federal Constitution on October 1, 1954. There are three
significant things about this constitution. First, the constitutional conferences that
preceded the making of this constitution, despite the existence of federal and regional
legislatures, point to the fact that both the colonialists and the Nigerian leaders
recognized that the existing legislatures were incapable of ensuring the kinds of
fundamental changes in the constitution and composition of Nigeria which were needed
at that time. Like the 1951 Constitution that preceded it, the 1954 constitution was a
product of a constitutional conference despite the existence of a legislature.
Second, the 1954 constitution resolved the issue of the legislative competence of
the two tiers of the federation, the federal and the regional government, such that in
matters of conflict, the federal law prevailed. Third, the composition of the federal
legislature significantly changed. Only 9 of the 194 members of the House of
Representatives, the federal legislature, were not elected. Also, the Western and Eastern
Regional Houses of Assemblies composed of only elected members.
It is again significant to note that despite the existence of elected representatives
in the federal and regional legislatures, constitutional conferences were still held to
determine the fate of the country with the drafting of the 1960 Independence
Constitution. Constitutional Conferences were held in London in May and June 1957 and
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in September and October, 1958. However, at these constitutional conferences, political
parties, which were, for most part, parallel to the three regions, represented the local
interests of Nigerians. After Nigeria became independent in 1960, we still needed a
Republican Constitution in 1963, which formally terminated the role of the Queen of
England as the titular Head of State and the place of the Privy Council in England as the
highest judicial authority over matters concerning Nigeria. The 1954, 1957, 1960 and
1963 Constitutions gave Nigeria a Westminster model of government which made the
headship of the executive also members of the legislature. Although, with these
constitutions, Nigerians were allowed limited contributions in the affairs of their own
land, this could not stop the continuous clamour for total independence from colonial
rule, which had engendered social sufferings, as well as discrimination in the areas of
employment, education, health, recreational facilities, coupled with unjust and high
taxation.
In fact, with the 1957 and 1960 and 1963 constitutions, the head of government
was elected from the legislature. In this parliamentary system of government, the
legislature is where ultimate power resided. Therefore, the legislature could determine
what could or could not happen; the executive was answerable to the people through the
parliament.
From the post independent Nigeria in 1960, the position of the legislature has
become a symbolic institution, in the manner that philosophers and political scientists
emphasized on separation of powers in an organized people participatory government to
endure friction and coercion by the players. The legislature has the law making
responsibility, besides the control of any national purse in the way the annual estimates of
a country are considered and approved by it, among other statutory roles. The
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significance of the application of the principle of separation of powers in a democracy, be
it the parliamentary method, which was first practiced by Nigeria when it attained
independence in 1960 till 1966 under the British parliamentary systems, assumes the
limitations of authority and exercise of powers among the various key players or
stakeholders in the various arms of government. Curiously, for six years, between 196066, the Nigerian first republic was under a British parliamentary system, until the first
coup of January 15, 1966, when most of the gladiators were overthrown and subsequently
murdered by a military junta, that later held the political life and prospects of Nigeria in
the jugulars. While the military interregnum has become a potent part of the Nigerian
history, more often than not, political gladiators, scientist as well as historians have
continued to describe it as one of the darkest moments of the Nigerian life.
However, the 1979 Constitution changed all that. Even though the military
supervised the process, a Constituent Assembly also met to consider the constitution
which was drafted by the Constitution Drafting Committee. The military proposed a
presidential system of government which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly. This
new constitution that came out of this provided for a bicameral legislature, with a Senate
and a House of Representatives. A constituent assembly and a constitutional conference
also preceded the adoption of the 1989 and 1995 constitutions respectively.
The 1989, 1995 and 1999 Constitutions were essentially the same, save for some
"no go areas" imposed by the General Ibrahim Babangida regime on the National
Assembly in the short-lived Third Republic. However, no constituent assembly or
constitutional conference preceded the imposition of the current 1999 constitution. In a
sense therefore, the preamble of the 1999 contains a monumental lie when it states that,
"We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, having firmly and solemnly resolve
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.... Do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following Constitution." "We the
people" never met to make any such resolve. "We the people" did not "make, enact and
give ourselves" the 1999 constitution. In fact, we did not see a copy of the constitution
that the military regime led by General Abdusalami Abubakar imposed on us until the
day President Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn-in on May 29, 1999. The late legal
luminary, Chief Rotimi Williams, (SAN), accurately referred to the 1999 Constitution as
‘a lie against itself’ (Ojudu, 2012). The only thing that the people of Nigeria resolved to
do in 1999 was to be done with the military – as they say on the streets, "anyway and
anyhow." And because we were so resolved, no one asked to see the constitution before
bidding the military a long delayed goodbye. The legislature that came to be based on this
constitution was therefore also not a subject of a popular resolve. On the basis of this
historical excursion on constitutional development in Nigeria in relation to the legislature,
we can conclude that apart from the Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Republic
Constitution of 1963, all other Constitutions in Nigeria's colonial and postcolonial history
have produced limited reformations and no transformation. Yet, the transformation
occasioned by the Independence and Republican constitutions has remained inadequate,
because they were focused exclusively on gaining independence from colonial rule, and
securing internal sovereignty.
Nigerians needed to be politically independent; however, this independence from
foreign rule has only led to internal colonialism. After a few decades of political
independence in 1960, many Nigerians realized that a second liberation is necessary. But
this realization is not unconnected to the history of policy inconsistencies, weak
institutions and presence of strong executives. The legislative Houses that were created in
the colonial times and the colonial and postcolonial constitutional conferences and
constituent assemblies involving Nigerians and political parties, as is evident from what
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we have stated , involved only very limited sections of the country. Starting with the local
elite in Lagos and Calabar, expanding to the elite in the south and eventually in the whole
of the federation, including the north, and eventually involving only leaders of political
parties. Even though these political parties represented large ethnic groups, they did not
exhaust the wide array of identities and interests that needed to be represented. This is
why all these produced only reformation and very limited political, and not fundamental,
transformation.
There is therefore, the need for fundamental transformation of Nigeria. This
transformation, as it is evident from the history of the constitutional and legislative
processes that we have described, cannot be accomplished by any legislative house. At
best, what the legislature can do is to ensure reformation. But what Nigeria needs is
transformation. Who can argue that most Nigerians, except the few in power, are not
happy with the way Nigeria is being run? Who can argue with the fact that there are
terrible structural problems with the Nigerian federation that cannot be fixed by mere
legislative initiatives and token reformation? Who can argue against the fact that when
the foundation of a 36-storey building is faulty and the house is threatened with collapse,
what you need is not a carpenter to help build a support pillar, but engineers and
technicians to rebuild the foundation of such a threatened edifice?
When the foundation is faulty, you have to rebuild so that the building will not
collapse. The federal legislature, as it is presently constituted, can never lead to national
transformation. At best, it can only produce a measure of national reformation. But even
this is not practicable in a National Assembly dominated by the members of the ruling
party- a party with absolutely no discernible and defensible agenda and a party with little
or no understanding of the fundamental challenges of the Nigerian nation. It remains a
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party which concerns itself only with power and not with responsibility, a party that has
produced the most backward, the most vacuous and the most embarrassing political
leadership in Nigeria since the amalgamation of 1914. When such a party dominates the
federal legislature, you cannot even hope for national reformation, let alone national
transformation. Interestingly many of the members of the ruling party in private
discussions, often than not, agrees with this in whispers. Even when we move beyond a
ruling party which represents only a symptom of the fundamental crisis of the Nigerian
nation, the trouble with Nigeria is not a problem that can be solved by the legislature. The
legislature can at best, hold things in place as decently as possible for a while. What
Nigeria needs is to learn critical lessons from the constitutional and legislative history
that we have just outlined. From the colonial to postcolonial times, every time Nigeria
needed a new political architecture, we have always had a national talk-shop, either a
constitutional conference or a constituent assembly. Even if all these have not produced
the desired country about which we can all be proud, at least, they have shown that
critical political restructuring of the Nigerian federation is too serious a task to be left to
the legislature.
The challenge that Nigeria faces goes beyond law-making; it is a problem
concerning the very legitimacy of the Nigerian federation as it relates to the consent of
the people who are called Nigerians. Without restructuring the country in a way that all
will be happy and proud to be Nigerians, we can only continue a deceit which continues
to blow itself in our faces constantly. Consider the Boko Haram phenomenon and the
permanent insurgency in the Niger Delta. Add to that the perennial slaughtering and
bloodletting in the Middle-Belt by those claiming to be compatriots, and the glaring
perplexity of the present leadership about what is to be done, and you will come to the
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conclusion, like many other patriots, that only a fundamental solution is needed to resolve
these critical problems (Omomia, 2013) .
In the Second Republic of President Shehu Shagari, Nigeria adopted the
presidential system of government with an executive president as the head of the federal
government. In the presidential system of government, there was the parliament
consisting of the bicameral legislature of the senate, headed by Dr. Joseph Wayas and
Edwin Umezeoke, who was speaker of the House of Representatives. The Shagari
administration was in power until 1983 when it was overthrown in a coup and the
military once again disrupted democracy. Instructively, between 1983 and 1998, several
palace coups involving the juntas of that period occurred: general Babangida overthrew
the military administration of General Buhari and Idiagbon and enthroned himself and
General Sanni Abacha in charge of that junta (Omomia, 2013) .
Again in 1993, when General Ibrahim Babaginda, the head of the military
government, put in place an interim civilian administration charged with conducting
elections, after annulling the election of Moshood Abiola which resulted into another
civil war in the country, the interim administration lasted for only three months when it
was replaced in a palace coup by the military. The new military administration was
headed by General Sani Abacha. General Sani Abacha’s government ruled the country
from 1993 to 1998 when the head of state suddenly died in June 1998, after declining to
restore MKO Abiola’s mandate. It is recalled vividly that it was during the postBabaginda and Abacha tenure that the country encountered tremendous opposition from
the home and international community over human rights abuses, leading to Nigeria’s
suspension from the commonwealth, and as well treated like a pariah nation. This
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development resulted into so many diplomatic rows between Nigeria and other civilised
democracies, including Britain, America and Canada (Omomia, 2013) .
But with the unexpected death of General Abacha in June 1998, General
Abdulsalami Abubakar headed the new military administration, and was immediately
confronted with the herculean task of drawing Nigeria back from the brink of collapse
and restoring her image. Commendably, this administration rose up to the occasion, as it
quickly addressed the issues of human rights abuses, release of all political detainees and
prisoners and began a political transition program which eventually ushered in the
civilian administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo on May, 29, 1999, in less than one
year .
However, since the new lease of life, following the newly established democratic
government, Nigerian rose from the doldrums and again began to identify with the global
community. Inaugurated on May 29, 1999, simultaneously, along states executive
governors, after the general elections, democracy yet came alive in Nigeria, with high
hopes from the electorates. But quite often than not, the poser has been how sustainable is
democracy in our sloppy journey of nation hood, considering the occasional brushes with
the operators, especially the habitually faceoff between the executive and the legislature,
which has assumed a frightening dimension that is capable of jeopardizing and
endangering the hard earned civil rule.
4.3 Assessment of the Role of the Legislature
In the main, the scrutiny of the executive, or what is largely regarded in our extant
legislative process as oversight, encapsulates a system of checks and balances that
requires the legislature to keep a check on the executive so as to ensure it functions within
the bounds of law and in an efficient and transparent manner. To this end the scrutiny of
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the executive includes a wide range of activities undertaken by the legislature to monitor,
review and encourage compliance with constitutional obligation by the executive.
The Nigerian legislature has taken different forms since the country’s
independence in 1960 and has been disbanded or in more adequate term, decreed out of
existence a number of times by the Military rulers. The 1999 Constitution which ushered
in the extant presidential system with effect from May, 1999, vested legislative powers of
the nation in a bi-cameral National Assembly consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It is in furtherance of this that the 1999 Constitution provides for
legislative power of scrutiny and investigation over the executive, in addition to other
“implied impressive array of enumerated powers”. For instance, the National Assembly is
constitutionally authorized to appropriate funds; approve deployment of armies; approve
declaration of war; consent to treaties; approve presidential nominees (senate); impeach
the President and Vice-president. Reinforcing all these powers is the broad powers
granted to the National Assembly to “make laws for the peace, order and good
governance of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in
the Exclusive Legislative list”.
Constitutional Provisions
i.
Power to Investigate – as stated in Section 88 (1) of the Constitution, the
National Assembly is empowered by resolution published in its journal or in the
Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be
directed an investigation into:
(a)
any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws, and
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(b)
the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government
department charged or intended to be charged with the duty of or
responsible for –
(i)
executing or administering laws enacted by the National assembly,
and
(ii)
disbursing or administering monies appropriated or to be
appropriated by the National Assembly.
These powers of investigation as stated in Section 88 (2) are exercisable only to
enable the National Assembly to:
(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and
correcting any defects in existing laws, and
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of
laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement of funds
appropriated by it.
ii.
Power to Procure Evidence – as stated in Section 89 (1) the National Assembly
is empowered for the purpose of any investigation under Section 88 of the
Constitution to:
(a) procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct or circumstantial, as it may
think necessary or desirable, and examine all persons as witnesses whose
evidence may be material or relevant to the subject matter;
(b) require such evidence to be given an oath;
(c) summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or produce any
document or other thing in his possession or under his control, and examine
him as a witness and require him to produce any document or other thing in
his possession or under his control, subject to all just exceptions; and
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(d) issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having been
summoned to attend, fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not excuse
such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the House or the
committee in question, and order him to pay all costs which may haves been
occasioned in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, refusal or
neglect to obey summons, and also to impose such fine as may be prescribed
for any such failure, refusal, neglect; and any fine so imposed shall be
recoverable in the same manner as a fine imposed by court of law.
(2)
A summons or warrant issued under this section may be served or
executed by any member of the Nigeria Police Force or by any person authorized
in that behalf by the President of Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may require.
iii.
Power to Receive the Audited Accounts of Government – Section 85 (2)
provides that:
the public accounts of the Federation and all offices and
courts of the Federation shall be audited and reported on by
the Auditor-General who shall submit his reports to the
National Assembly; and for that purpose, the AuditorGeneral or any person authorized by him in that behalf
shall have access to all the books, records, returns and other
documents relating to those accounts.
iv.
Power to Appropriate Funds – Sections 80 to 83 of the Constitution provides
the powers and controls of the National Assembly over public fund. Section 80 (4)
does specifically provide that “no money shall be withdrawn from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in
the manner prescribed by the National Assembly”.
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v.
Power of Impeachment, Removal and Confirmation – Section 143 provides for
the power of the National Assembly to remove the President or Vice-President
from office for gross misconduct, which is defined as great violation or breach of
the provisions of the Constitution. This provides the National Assembly with the
ultimate oversight power. Other sections of the Constitution provides the National
Assembly with powers to confirm the appointments of certain officers appointed
by the executive and also to remove some of these officers as the need may arise.
This also provides the National Assembly with oversight powers over these agents
of government; however, the Constitution does not confer on the National
Assembly the powers to remove Ministers, who are the main agents of
government in charge of its major organs.
vi.
Power to make all laws – the Constitution (Section 4 (2)) vests power in the
National Assembly to make laws for peace and good governance of the Federation
or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive
Legislative List.
House Rules
The rules of the House provides for oversight of the executive particularly through the
activities of the Committees. Section 103 (1-3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that :
(1) A House of Assembly may appoint a committee of its
members for any special or general purpose as in its opinion
would be better regulated and managed by means of such a
committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise as it
thinks fit delegate any functions exercisable by it to any such
committee. (2) The number of members of a committee appointed
under this section, their term of office and quorum shall be fixed
by the House of Assembly. (3) Nothing in this section shall be
construed as authorizing a House of Assembly to delegate to a
committee the power to decide whether a bill shall be passed into
Law or to determine any matter which it is empowered to
determine by resolution under the provisions of this Constitution,
but such a committee of the House may be authorized to make
recommendations to the House on any such matter.
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Rivers State is one of the 36 states of Nigeria. Its capital is Port Harcourt. In the
Rivers State House of Assembly there are 23 standing committees covering virtually all
aspects of the society such as Women, Law, Economy, Human Rights, Education, Youths
and Sports, Environment, Tourism, Agriculture, Public Accounts and Rural Development.
These standing committees of the Assembly oversee the activities and smooth running of
the House. There are at present 32 Honourable Members of the House. Major political
offices of the Assembly are zoned into the three senatorial districts of the State. In fact,
law-makers who are not principal officers of the House are Chairmen of House
Committees. The Assembly though mindful of its constitutional responsibilities and
obligations has a very cordial working relationship with the Executive and Judiciary arms
of government as well as with other governmental and non-governmental organs and
agencies (Eze, 2011).
Governor Peter Odili had zero opposition and zero oversight in the manner he had
chosen to run the state. Theoretically there was a legislative arm of government which in
a democracy should do the oversight job concerning how the executive arm is run. But in
Rivers State, Nigeria, the states Houses of Assembly (legislatures), are an extension of
the executive arm. They have no mind of their own and so are incapable of acting as a
watch dog over the excesses of the executive. Even though the situation is said to be
nationwide that of Rivers state is strikingly disturbing. The father and son relationship
between the Speaker of the state House of Assembly has made the Rivers State situation
quite pathetically worse. The Speaker Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi is described in that
report “as a long time personal aide of Governor Peter Odili, beginning from when he was
Deputy Governor”. The leadership of the Rivers State House of Assembly did not change
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after the hand –over of Governor Odili to Rt Hon. Amechi Rotimi in 2007. In fact the
situation has worsened.
4.4 Oversight Process in Nigeria
The framework under which the National Assembly undertakes the scrutiny of the
executive arm is embodied in the oversight mechanisms that have been established to
guarantee a measure of effectiveness and efficiency in holding the executive to account.
Through the instrumentalities of Standing, select and Special Committees, the public
accounts committee and the office of the auditor-general, the National Assembly has
sought to monitor, review and investigate executive intentions and activities. The
oversight covers such areas as policy, appropriation and accounts, instances of poor
administration and non compliance with legislative intent and protection of individual
rights and liberties.
Policy Oversight:
The executive arm of government established itself over the years as a dominant
institution through the instrumentalities of military rule. However, since the return to
democracy, the National Assembly has striven to make inputs in the national policy
process. It has through its policy oversight responsibilities resisted, influenced, or
amended some of the crucial pieces of legislations brought before it for consideration.
For instance, out of the 589 Bills read on the floor of the National Assembly from
1999 to January 2006, 92 were passed, and 82 of these assented to by the President. Two
Bills were passed into law by two-third majority, while 8 are pending with the President
for his assent.3 Furthermore, from the 589 Bills read on the floor of the Assembly, 236
Bills representing 41.1% were initiated by the executive arm, while 353 Bills representing
59.9% were initiated by members. However, Out of the 92 Bills that were passed on the
floor of the National Assembly, 83 were executive Bills while the remaining 9 were
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member Bills. Two reasons perhaps account for the executive success in getting its Bills
passed. First, is that the executive is more cohesively organized and usually deploys the
party machinery in getting its members who are in the majority to support government
Bills. Second, is that majority of the executive Bills are regulatory legislations needed to
leverage the massive economic and political reforms embarked by government after
nearly thirty years of military rule. In addition, the military regime that preceded the
restoration of democracy was conducted by decrees. Most of the decrees were out of
alignment with democratic practice, and therefore needed modifications to bring them
into conformity with the constitution. As such, National Assembly members supported
such changes. Table 4.4.1 below shows the sectoral presentation of the bills
Table 4.4.1: sectoral presentation of the bills
SECTOR
NO. OF BILLS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Regulatory
466
79.41%
Social
37
6%
Economy
34
5.7%
Infrastructure
11
1.86%
Foreign Affairs
41
6.96%
Total
589
100%
Source: Legislative Institute, Abuja.
Even though the executive retains control over policy development, the National
Assembly through its relevant committees has had to search-light such policies through
intensive legislative scrutiny. One of such instrument is the public hearings which has
become a permanent feature in the legislative process and serves the purpose of
expanding inputs from stakeholders.
However, the National Assembly has not always been successful in getting the
executive to pander to its opinions and resolutions on general policy issues particularly
those that do not require legislation for implementation. Several instances abound, but the
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most succinct case in the government decision to go ahead with the partial deregulation of
the petroleum downstream sector despite motions and resolutions for a halt to such
policy.
Oversight over Appropriation:
The most important source of influence of any legislative institution is its control
of the public purse. Section 80 of the 1999 Constitution vests the power and control over
public funds in the National Assembly. To this end, Subsection (1) makes it mandatory
for all revenue or other moneys raised or received by the federation to be paid into and
form one Consolidated Revenue Fund of the federation. Subsection (2) provides that
funds can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund only on the authorization
of the National Assembly. Subsection (3) of the Constitution makes it clear that funds
cannot be withdrawn from any other fund except as authorized by the National Assembly.
Subsection (4) prescribes that no moneys shall be withdrawn except in the manner
prescribed by the National Assembly.
The appropriation process is one of National Assembly’s most important
mechanisms of oversight. The power of the National Assembly to appropriate money and
amend the budget submitted to it by the executive is a defining measure of its overall
power. How has the National Assembly gone in the approval, review and monitoring of
budgets since 2000?
The transition to democratically elected government in 1999 has substantially
changed the Nigerian budget process. Before then, the budget process was characterized
by executive dominance, poor financial management, poor implementation, and a general
lack of transparency and accountability. The National Assembly had since budget 2000
changed all that in pursuance of the spirit of the Constitution. It had during the first full
appropriation process under the new constitutional democracy indicated that it would not
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merely serve as a rubber stamp to executive budget proposals and that it is poised to
monitor what is approved. It is widely acknowledged that no other issue has in the past
seven years generated much conflict between the National Assembly and the executive as
the appropriation exercise. Apparently, in clear understanding that the parliament is the
appropriate place to ensure that the budget best matches the nation needs with available
resources; members have had to insist on making input in arriving at sectoral allocations.
In doing this, all budget approvals since 2000 have had to be delayed, sometimes, three
months into the budget cycle and often with total budget figure different from that
submitted by the executive.
This scenario notwithstanding, members complain that the appropriation process
can only serve as a tool for effective oversight if ample time is allowed for budget
debates. This can easily be overcome through the legislation of a budget cycle to be
adhered to by both the executive and the National Assembly. In this regard, the draft
budget should be submitted early enough to the National Assembly to allow for a proper
and comprehensive review. The minimum time frame between the submission and
passage of the budget should not be less than three months. National Assembly on its
part should approve the budget prior to the commencement of the fiscal year.
Furthermore, the National Assembly should encourage the compilation and debate on
budget aggregates and performance indicators prior to the presentation of the budget by
the President. This will create expectations and stimulate interest in the budget itself.
More importantly, within the limit of the powers exercised by the National
Assembly, it is necessary that the budget process is made transparent and participatory.
For now, the entire budget process is dominated by the executive, the legislature and their
agencies. The involvement of the public is essentially restricted to clapping and cheering
from the gallery of the House chambers during budget presentation by the President.
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Apart from this, the civil society organizations are now getting involved in budget
performance appraisal and forecast for which the outcome of such exercise on budget
policies is yet to be determined in concrete terms.
Beyond the acknowledged performance of the National Assembly in the scrutiny
of budget proposals, it has not been a similar story in terms of monitoring and evaluating
budget performance. The National Assembly has had celebrated conflicts with the
executive over non implementation of the budget as appropriated. It has severally passed
resolutions to register its displeasure with the executive over unimplemented portions of
the annual budget and in some instances threatened to impeachment the President on that
score.
One popular mechanism which various committees use in monitoring the
implementation of policies and legislations is the project and sights verification visits.
Otherwise known as oversight visits, members use the occasion to carryout on- the-spot
assessment of programmes and projects as approved by them.
There are however
inherent problems with the exercise. Firstly, most oversight visits are undertaken without
adequate preparation and study on what to oversight on the site. In other words, there are
usually no checklist of inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact benchmarks upon which a
review could be anchored on. Secondly, the interactions during such visits are solely
dependent on information supplied by the agencies without any corresponding efforts to
source independent information on the agencies activities. Thirdly, most reports from
oversight visits are scanty and sometimes written in most unprofessional parlance and
style. When such reports are considered and submitted to the relevant chamber during
plenary, nothing is ever heard about such reports. In a specific instance, the House
committee on poverty alleviation had its 2004 oversight report stated
Committee’s
findings
clearly
show
that
NAPEP
has
performed
that The
below
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expectations. Therefore, the Committee strongly believes that there is need for an urgent,
total reorganization as well as change in NAPEP’s policies and implementation
procedures, in order that NAPEP can address the exigencies of the present level of
poverty in the country.
Despite these weighty findings, there is no indication that any further action was
taken to address the issues raised. In fact there is no available evidence of correspondence
between the committee and the agency. Fourthly, the statutory requirement for each
ministry and agencies to submit annual reports to the National Assembly three months
before budget considerations have at best been perfunctory. In the first place, there is
currently no standard format for such report presentation. This has resulted in a situation
where most members have limited information on the operations of agencies they oversee
except when they pay oversight visits. Ordinarily, such a report ought to incorporate such
reviews as agency policy direction, internal transformation, monetary receipts and
disbursements, achievements, challenges, gaps and insights for the future.
At any rate, other tools of Legislative scrutiny have also been useful. Evidence
abound that various committees have had reasons to summon and in some cases
compelled the attendance of executive officials for explanations on issues of current
concerns and development. Most of these public hearings have led to dramatic exposures
that eventually crystallized into national embarrassment. Such cases as the national
identity scandal, the MT African Pride ship and the ALSCON privatization stand out as
outstanding success stories.
The capacity of the committees to undertake the scrutiny of agencies under their
purview requires not just the constitutional authority, but the human and financial
resources to investigate, monitor and review. As it is now, most committees do not have
office secretariats to accommodate the support staff and in some instances, committee
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secretaries are reshuffled frequently as to allow for specialization in policy areas. In
addition, there is the ever recurring paucity of funds to facilitate visits and procure
information independently from the executive. Above all, a good number of the members
are “unwilling to rock the boat” through what they describe as oversight activism. For
them, as members of the ruling party, it is a mark of party loyalty to protect the
Government interest at any time it is under threat.
.
Oversight over Poor Administration and Non-compliance with Legislative Intent
All through the period of military rule, the culture of executive impunity and
lawlessness prefaced much of government engagement with the rest of the Nigerian
society. The 1999 Constitution has specifically sought to “expose” such cases through the
investigatory instruments of the National Assembly and with a view to applying remedial
actions. The National Assembly has responded and continues to respond to crucial
national issues albeit with measured success in getting the executive to respond to their
intents. Where the National Assembly has successfully investigated matters, their
resolutions on such issues have more often than not been neglected by the executive
without any serious sanctions, or appropriate response to such obvious contempt of its
powers. A cursory look at some of the charges leveled against the President on the three
occasions impeachment moves were made against him shows the frustration of the
National Assembly in getting the executive comply with constitutional provisions and
legislative intents. Such changes include:
A key question which the National Assembly will need to address is the extent to
which non enforceability of its oversight recommendations and decisions impinge on
their power to scrutinize the executive. The uncertainty surrounding this issue perhaps
explain the several breaches by the executive whose response and attitude to matters of
103
oversight decisions are lukewarm and more often than not dismissive. It is hardly possible
to exercise effective oversight without power to follow up compliance with legislative
intents.
4.5 Oversight over Individual Rights and Liberties
The National Assembly through its Committees on Public petitions entertain
petitions or Complaint from the public bothering on issues such as illegal termination of
appointment, wrongful dismissal, compulsory retirement, executive lawlessness, nonpayment of retirement benefits, maltreatment of pensioners, regularization of promotion,
unsettled salaries and wages, illegal demolition of houses etc. Although some of the
public petitions were heard, determined and appropriate authorities made to act, the
number of such cases attended to so far are too few leverage on the cases of
infringements. As the table 4.5.1 below shows, out of the 746 petitions referred to the
Committee on Public petitions of the House of Representatives between June 1999 and
June 2006, only 81 have been considered by them.
Table 4.5.1:Petitions referred to the Committee on Public Petitions of the House of
Representatives between June 1999 and June 2006,
No. of Petitions
S/NO Legislative Period
No. of Petitions
Considered
Referred to
Committee
1
June 1999 – June 2000 91
18
2
June 2000 – June 2001 176
16
3
June 2001 – June 2002 92
7
4
June 2002 – June 2003 36
2
5
June 2003 – June 2004 149
13
6
June 2004 – June 2005 131
19
7
June 2005 – June 2006 71
6
Total
746
81
Source: collated from information obtained from the Secretariat of the Committee
On Public Petitions.
4.6 Legislative control of the administration
Legislative control of administrative action is essential if representative
government is to function properly. The establishment of representative legislatures at the
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federal and state levels of government by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999, after a period of military rule devoid of any representative or accountable
governance, essentially epitomized a fresh attempt at constitutionalism in Nigeria.
Upon the enthronement of democratic rule in Nigeria and its gradual
advancement, democratic values such as separation of power in the function of the
various arms of government became the focal gravamen and compass for measurement of
government actions and inactions. The independent origin and survival of the executive
and the legislature are expected to produce countervailing ambitions that motivate mutual
checks and minimize the risk of tyranny of the majority.
The oversight function of the legislature in Nigeria finds legislative importance in
chapter 5, part 1 that is, sections 80(i) – (4) and 88 (i) – (2)(b). Section 88 (i) is noted that
each house of the National Assembly shall have power…. To direct or cause to be
directed an investigation into:
Any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to
make laws; and the conduct of affairs of any person,
authority, ministry or government department charged or
intended to be charged, with the duty of responsibility for
(1) executing or administering laws enacted by the National
Assembly and (11) disbursing or administering moneys
appropriated or to be appropriated by the National
Assembly.
It also goes further to state that this 'power' is conferred to enable the National
Assembly expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the executive or administration of
laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement and administration of
funds appropriated by it.
Against this background, it is quite puzzling that controversy rears its head over
the issue of legislative oversight, checks and balances etc. This power, no doubt is
105
derived from the practice in the united state. It is not also without a limitation. The power
of the legislature to conduct investigation is inherent in the legislative process. The power
is broad; it encompasses inquires concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defect in our social,
economic or political system for the purpose of enabling congress to remedy them. It
comprehends probes into department of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency and waste.
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of the legislature nor is the congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. There are functions of the executive and judicial
departments of government. No enquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of the legislative task of the congress. Investigation conducted solely for the
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to “punish” those investigated is
indefensible.
It must however be recognized that the legislative's power to investigate is not
absolute as it has some legal impediments. This was made known by the court in TONY
MOMOH V. SENATE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1982) NCLR, 105 in that
case the Court of Appeal clearly held that section 82 of the 1979 constitution (akin to
section 88 of the 1999 constitution) is not designed to enable the legislature usurp the
general investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the
judiciary. Any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose defined by
section 82(2) that is now 88(2) of the 1999 constitution is invalid. The prosecution of the
persons guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or misconduct in the discharge
of the public office is left to the executive. This only reinstates the doctrine of separation
106
of power between the various arms of government. This was held in OBAYUWANA V.
ALLI & ORS (1983) 12 SC147 at 191-192, EL-RUFAI V. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2003)12 WRN I (SC). Thus, at the risk of repetition, the power
of investigation by the legislature cannot be invoked to apply to issues that are outside the
purview of the legislature in the exercise of the power to make law. See TONY MOMOH
V. SENATE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (Supra).
In Nigeria since 1999, this investigative power has attracted some level of abuse.
These law-makers especially at the National level see this function as a way of enriching
themselves and/or becoming politically relevant or vocal. To showcase their grammatical
or advocacy prowess. Hence members of the National Assembly lobby, sometimes,
ungodly or unduly to become chairmen of “juicy” committees of the House or Senate.
The moment they get this chairmanship positions, their next port of call is “oversight
function”; committee's public sitting. And since Nigerians are looking for dramas to
watch due to the much respected culture of corruption in this country, everyone seems to
be giving a standing ovation to the legislators who conduct these proceedings. Most of
the committees leave the obvious to pursue shadows just to intimidate their prey to bow
to pressure and then look for a way out through unholy “settlement” just as we discussed
last week on impeachment in this country. If you are on a committee to expose corruption
and inefficiency in the interest of the entire country, you would do so dispassionately and
without exposing your personal emotion towards the investigated. However, an
investigator commences his sitting by insulting or abusing the investigated, calling him or
her names or try to bamboozle the public even before facts begin to unravel themselves,
then, it will seem to the people that the investigation was long concluded before the
actual investigation. It will also create an impression that skeletons are many in the
cupboard of the investigator. There might be none but the impression of the masses will
107
definitely suggest there are. In recent times, we have seen many such investigations and
in the end, nothing really comes out for the benefit of the people. The whole investigation
sometime becomes a conduit pipe for financial waste at the detriment of the people.
Behind the scene, too many waters pass under the Bridge and the investigators go
home smiling and congratulating themselves for fooling unsuspecting Nigerian on the
media.
Some committee members now parade around facilities in the various
departments and parastatals under their committee only to attract patronage, recognition
and to acquire meal or flight tickets to choice countries of the world for personal or
family pleasure. Get scholarships and job opportunities for their family members and
cronies. These are not the real intent of the law or constitution for legislative oversight
function. It is not for political sentiment and/or personal vendetta against executive or
administrative office holders. It is to expose corruption and enhance efficiency so as to
deliver democracy to the door steps of the masses. All the banters, points, counter points
we now see or read today about legislative oversight functions should be well-intended
and again, those to be investigated cannot just fight back and intimidate the investigator
to continue the spree of executive or administrative looting, or cry wolf when non-exist.
Unless we see our appointments to public offices as a call to duty for the people as
against an opportunity for self or personal aggrandizement, the power will continue to be
a mirage or a window-dressing
Constraints
All legislatures in general and committees in particular can undertake effective
and efficient scrutiny of the executive if constraints of resources and executive hyper
activism are brought to minimum. While both the State Assemblies and National
Assembly have without doubt striven to exercise its oversight responsibilities, it is also
saddled with constraints which impede their work.
108
Politically, there is an unspoken weak incentive for undertaking effective scrutiny
of the executive in Nigeria. A good number of legislators, particularly from the ruling
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) are usually unwilling to be seen and regarded as
activists and reformist entrepreneurs when it comes to putting the executive on the spot
over its actions or inactions. The major reason behind this is the emerging cases of low
re-election rate among those who are perceived as “recalcitrant party members” always in
support of vibrant oversight by the legislature. The experience in the past twelve years is
that the Peoples Democratic Party, which is the ruling party, and has overwhelming
majority in most state Houses of Assembly including Rivers State as well as the National
Assembly, sees diligent oversight of the executive under their control as confrontational
and in some instances as anti-party activity. This much was contained in a statement
credited to Chief Ojo Maduekwe, one time Secretary of the Peoples Democratic Party
(the ruling party in Nigeria), who threatened House of Representative members in his
party, and who are part of those agitating for impeachment proceedings against the
President. According to him, legislators who oppose party positions should learn from the
experience of their predecessors who could not return to their seats for their obvious
confrontation with the executive. Impliedly, this statement was made to pass intimidating
message to legislators not to confront the executive under any guise. One other moment
was in 2003 when President Obasanjo in his 2004 budget presentation gave a strong order
to the National Assembly to keep off from the MDAs as he warned that the new regime
would not tolerate oversight as a weapon of blackmail or channel for inducement. When
these intimidatory messages are added to the excessive executive power, they constitute
serious constraints to effective scrutiny of the executive.
The power of political parties in most developing democracies to select candidates
for elections in the long run affects legislative behaviour of members. In this regard, Bach
109
(2000:9) has noted and correctly too that “when the parliamentary careers of legislators
depend on their placement on their party’s list, the last thing they want to do is to engage
in activity that challenges the policies and actions of their own party’s government”. The
Constitution of Nigeria makes it very clear in Section 65:2(b) that a person shall be
qualified for election into the National Assembly if “he is a member of a political party
and is sponsored by that party”.
Similarly, section 106(a-d) provides that subject to the provisions of section 107 of
this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a member of a House of Assembly
if:
(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria;
(b) he has attained the age of thirty years;
(c) he has been educated up to at least the School Certificate level or its equivalent; and
(d) he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party.
This confers enormous powers on the parties to exercise full control on the
nomination of candidates through party primaries and to moderate the behaviour of
members. For example, only about 25% of the members of the House and 23% of the
Senators made it back to the National Assembly in 2003. In the 2011 PDP primaries
across the country, there is indication that over 40 out of the 75 PDP members in the
Senate have lost their seats. Although, it is true that most of the legislators lost their seat
for non-performance including their inability to properly provide checks over executive
actions, a good number of the legislators lost their seat because of their perceived
confrontational disposition towards the executive. However, despite this constraint, some
members of the ruling political party continue to engage the executive in the
understanding that the survival of democracy in Nigeria is more important than winning
election. The principled opposition by a considerable number of PDP members to the
executive tenure elongation or what is popularly called “third term bid” continues to
110
reverberate as the defining index of National Assembly’s independence from the
executive.
Institutionally, several resource gaps challenge the legislature in Nigeria.
Oversight of the executive by Legislative Committees is no doubt a technical and
sometimes complicated engagement. They need trained and specialized support staff that
have the capacity to organize and analyze sometimes complicated information and deliver
them in understandable form to the legislators to facilitate legislations. In addition, robust
research services have become sacrosanct in view of the sophistication and diversity of
issues that they deal with and for which most part, added inputs are required. The
committees in Nigerian legislatures both t the federal, states and local government levels
lack sufficient research services and are sometimes constrained by funds to draw on
outside resources. The research department of the legislature has not been involved in
providing targeted research inputs to the legislative process due largely to the limitations
in capacity and orientation of the staff. This perhaps explains the recent establishment of
a Policy Analysis and Research Project whose mandate includes among others to “builds
its capacity to effectively initiate and evaluate bills by providing the required research,
analytical and dissemination resources”.
Most of these legislative Houses including Rivers State House of Assembly lack a
budget office. As a consequence, it has restricted its focus on the appropriation process
without developing the capacity to understand and challenge the basis of the
appropriations presented to it. If the Assembly intends to determine the financial priorities
of government and to monitor the implementation of the budget effectively a budget
office becomes imperative.
In addition to this, there are generally speaking no indications of specific
oversight monitoring and reporting schedules for committees of the Rivers State
111
Assembly. Committees are left to decide how they conduct oversight and are not required
to submit their oversight plan for scrutiny and for records. Without such a required
monitoring and scheduling plan it will be difficult to adequately, for example, budget for
oversight activities for each legislative year.
Again, the Rivers State House of Assembly like the other states legislature
including the National Assembly does not have a minimum benchmark for conducting
oversight. There are no general guidelines for conducting oversight, except for the
guidelines for conducting investigative hearings. There are no written rules for oversight,
no schedule for oversight, no specific report requirement for oversight except as part of
the general activities of a committee or of a special committee or of an investigative
hearing that could all be encapsulated in “Oversight Rules” statutes of both Chambers of
the National Assembly and State Assemblies. This could further be backed by an
oversight manual that would further expatiate on the rules and provide a step by step
“how to do” oversight to guide the legislators, their staff, the executive, the general
public. For this reason, oversight activities of the Rivers State Assembly do not appear to
be systematic, well coordinated, and continuous to guarantee an effective watch over the
executive. These are at best accomplished in a haphazard and episodic manner.
Above all, there are few facilities available for effective committee work.
Currently, there are just too few Committee rooms in Rivers State to serve the
Committees. As a result some important Committee meetings have had to be either put
off or wait till there is available room for deliberation. In addition to the problem of
space, the frequent transfers and postings of Committee Secretaries rob the Committees
of personnel who may have developed competence and specialization in a given policy or
agency portfolio.
112
The lack of diligence in information management in the State has also resulted in a
very poor perception and misrepresentation by both the media and public about oversight
activities of committees. For now, oversight reports or even reports and decisions after
public hearings are not made available to the public who ought to have access to them as
of right. This de-links in communication, in addition to the existing weak constituency
relations between the legislators and the public automates the poor perception of the
Rivers State House of Assembly as a representative institution.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
This chapter summarizes the bio-metric data of respondents and also tests for the
significance of relationship between legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of
Assembly and exposition of executive corruption in the State between 1999 and 2011.
5.1 Biometric Analysis of our Sample
This chapter tests our hypothesis one empirically using the data generated from
our sample, the correspondence from our group interview, official documents among
other publications. We administered 400 questionnaires to our sample drawn from the
three LGAs in Rivers State as shown in our section on sampling above. In ONELGA
LGA, out of the 100 questionnaire that was distributed, 90 was returned and 10 was not
returned; in Khana LGA, out of the 120 questionnaires distributed, 116 was returned and
4 was not returned and in Port Harcourt , out of the 180 questionnaires distributed, 174
was returned and 6 was not returned. This brought the total number of returned
questionnaires to 380.
Out of these returned questionnaires, 5 questionnaires were
wrongly completed and we considered it unsuitable for this study. This study therefore
has a total of 375 properly completed and returned questionnaires. This represents about
93.75% response rate. The analysis of the bio- data of our respondents was summarized in
tables 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.4 below:
Table 5.1.1 : Frequency Distribution showing Sex of respondents
Sex
Male
Female
Total
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Frequency
175
200
375
Percentage
46.66
53.33
100
114
Table 5.1.1 above shows that our sample was not gender biased as it was drawn
from both male and female sex groups. A total of 46.66 percent of the respondents were
male while 53.33 percent were females.
Table 5.1.2 : Frequency Distribution showing Occupation of respondents
S/N
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Rank
Civil Servants
Public Servants
Traders
Farmers/Fishermen
Others
Total
Frequency
70
22
99
180
4
375
Percentage
18.66
5.86
26.4
48
1.06
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2011.
From the distribution above, 18.66 percent of our respondents were civil servants,
5.86 percent were public servants, 26.4 percent were traders, 48 percent were farmers and
others- the unemployed- 1.06 percent. This suggests that the majority of the people of
Rivers State are farmers/ Fishermen followed by petit traders and civil servants, public
servants and the unemployed respectively. We also noted that those who had no
employment filled in others as their occupation
Table 5.1.3 : Frequency Marital Status of respondents
Frequency
Marital Status
Single
Married
Others
Total
77
149
149
375
Percentage
20.55
39.73
39.73
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2011.
Table 5.1.3 shows that 20.55 percent of our respondents were singles; 39.73 were
married while another 39.73 chose other, as their marital status. About 130 respondents
were either widows or widowers and the remaining 19 persons are divorcees. Our group
interview has also revealed that the harsh economic condition in the area and alcoholism
are responsible for the high death rate and divorce in the State.
115
Table 5.1.4: Frequency Distribution Showing Educational qualification of
respondents
S/N
Educational Qualification
Frequency
Percentage
1.
First School Leaving Certificate.
197
52.53
2.
WAEC/GCE/NECO
93
24.8
3.
OND/NCE
41
10.93
4.
HND/B.Sc.
24
6.4
5.
MPA/M.A/M.Sc.
15
4
6.
D.PA / Ph.D
5
1.33
7.
Total
375
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2011.
Table 5.1.4 above shows that the sample was characterized by mainly holders of
First School Leaving Certificate, West African Examination Council and National
Certificate of Education. Only about 11.7 percent of the samples were graduates while
about 88.3 percent were not graduates.
5.2 Legislative Oversight and Exposition of executive corruption
We applied questions 1 to 10 to test the first hypothesis in this study which was
stated in null and alternate forms as follows:
i.
Ho: There is no significant relationship between legislative
oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly and exposing of
executive corruption in the State between 1999 and 2011.
ii.
Hi: There is a significant relationship between legislative oversight
by the Rivers State House of Assembly and exposing of executive
corruption in the State between 1999 and 2011.
Table 5.2.1: Response to question 1- Have you heard about legislative oversight in the
State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
320
No
50
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
85.33
13.33
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
320
370
375
116
Table 5.2.1 above shows that 85.33 percent of our respondents have heard about
legislative oversight in the Rivers State; 13 percent of our respondents were not aware of
the practice while 1.33 percent of our respondents were undecided on the question.
Despite that legislative oversight is a professional exercise involving legislators, the
majority of our respondents was aware of the existence of such practice.
Table 5.2.2: Response to question 2- If the response to question 1 is yes, where did you
hear about legislative oversight?
Response
Church
Newspapers
Radio
Television
School
Others
Frequency
32
69
171
35
10
3
Percentage
10
21.56
53.43
10.93
3.12
0.93
Cumulative Frequency
32
101
272
307
317
320
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Table 5.2.2 above shows that 10 percent of our respondents who were aware of
such practice as legislative oversight in the State heard about it the first time from the
church; 21.56 percent from newspapers; 53.43 percent from radio; 10.93 percent from
television; 3.12 percent from school and 0.93 percent of our respondents heard about
legislative oversight the first time from other sources like peer discussion, public eateries
and bar. Our group interview also revealed that the high level of awareness about
legislative oversight in the State was because of the extensive media campaign mounted
by both government and some non-governmental organizations against executive/political
corruption since 1999.
Table 5.2.3: Response to question 3- Do you think that executive corruption is
widespread in the State?
Response
Yes
No
Undecided
Frequency
300
65
10
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
80
17.33
2.66
Cumulative Frequency
300
365
375
117
Table 5.2.3 shows that 80 percent of our respondents believe that executive
corruption are widespread in the State. Out of the remaining 20 percent 17.33 percent do
not think that executive corruption is widespread while 2.66 percent of our respondents
were undecided. Our interviewees were reluctant to respond to this question because they
suspect the actual intention of the study.
Table 5.2.4 : Response to question 4 -If answer to 3 is yes, how would you rate the level
of executive corruption in the State?
Response
Frequency
Very High
70
High
230
Undecided
0
Low
0
Very Low
0
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
23.33
76.66
0
0
0
Cumulative Frequency
70
300
300
300
300
Table 5.2.4 above shows that 23.33 percent of our respondents believed that
executive corruption in the State were very high, 76.66 rated it high and none of the
respondents rated it low, very low or undecided. We also gathered from our group
interview that political/ executive corruption is rampant in Nigeria and Rivers State is not
an exception. They remarked that the incidence of executive corruption becomes
pronounced more easily in oil producing states because of the high amount of funds that
accrue to these States from Federation Account and her establishments like NDDC and
Ministry of Niger Delta. Our respondents were general rather than being particular on
Rivers State.
Table 5.2.5: Response to question 5 - Does the performance of legislative oversight
functions severe legislative- executive relations in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
94
No
220
Undecided
61
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
25.06
58.66
16.26
Cumulative Frequency
94
314
375
118
Table 4.2.5 above revealed that 25.06 percent of our respondents agreed that the
performance of legislative oversight functions severed legislative- executive relation in
the State; 58 percent do not agree and 16. 26 percent were undecided. Again, our
correspondence from the group interview shows that it is however difficult for the
performance of legislative oversight functions to severe legislative- executive relation in
the State because the legislature merely serve as a rubber-stamp of the executive
especially between 2007 and 2011. They agreed that the level of legislative dependence
on the executive have increased from 2007 unlike the first legislature of the fourth
Republic in 1999 that stood firm to check the executive excesses in Rivers State under
Governor Peter Odili.
Table 5.2.6: Response to question 6- How would you explain the legislative executive
relation in the State?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Very cordial
200
55.33
200
Cordial
100
26.66
300
Non- cordial
20
5.33
320
Confrontational 10
2.66
330
Undecided
45
12
345
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Table 5.2 6 above shows that 55. 33 percent of our respondent agreed that
legislative executive relation in the State is very cordial; 26.66 percent of our respondent
agreed that legislative executive relation in the State is cordial; 5.33 percent of our
respondent agreed that legislative executive relation in the State is non- cordial; 2.66
percent of agreed that legislative executive relation in the State is confrontational while
12 percent were undecided on the question. Our interview revealed that the relationship
between the two arms of government in Rivers State is beyond very cordial. They argued
that executive –legislative relations in Rivers State is very cordial to the extent of
naturalizing the legislative teeth/ power to check executive excess. They further argued
that the executive has successfully, since 2007, muscled the legislature, making the
119
apparent most powerful organ of government a subservient organ to the executive. The
legislature they, maintained, has become a mere ritual, a rubber stamp of Rivers State
executive.
Table 5.2.7 : Response to question 7- Does legislative oversight check executive
corruption in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
9
No
366
Undecided
0
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
2.4
97.6
0
Cumulative Frequency
9
375
375
Following table 5.2.7, 2.4 percent of our respondents agreed that the legislative
oversight checks executive corruption in Rivers State; about 97.6 percent disagreed that
legislative oversight checks executive corruption in the State and none of the respondents
was undecided in this question. The interview correspondence showed that the people are
very much aware of the existence of the incidence of executive corruption and the plight
of the legislature to control the executive powers. This executive power in the State, is a
consequence of the provisions of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria that allowed the executive
to approve every funds in the State including funds for legislative businesses.
Table 5.2.8: Response to question 8- Have you witnessed legislative corruption in the
State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
320
No
53
Undecided
2
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
85.33
14.13
0.53
Cumulative Frequency
320
373
375
Table 5.2.8 revealed that 85.333 percent of our respondents agree that they have
witnessed legislative corruption in the State; 14.13 percent or our respondents noted that
they have not witnessed legislative corruption in the State while 0.53 percent of our
120
respondents were undecided. In our group interview, they equally agreed that though
executive corruption is rampant, instances of legislative corruption also exits. They
corroborated that even the legislators are human beings and Nigerians, hence, her
leadership often collect and give bribes and therefore perverting public standards.
Stressing this point one of our respondents from Port Harcourt (name withheld) insisted
that the Speaker of the Rivers State House of Assemble meddles with the Governor and
this explained why the legislature had been unable to use her oversight powers to check
the current Governor of Rivers State.
Table 5.2.9 : Response to question 9 - Does the legislative oversight enhance public
accountability in Rivers State ?
Response
Frequency
Yes
40
No
330
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
10.66
88
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
40
370
375
Table 5.2.9 shows that 10.99 percent of our respondents feel that the legislative
oversight enhances public accountability in Rivers State;; 88 percent disagreed while
1.33 percent were undecided on the question. Our interview response concurred with the
majority of the questionnaire response that the legislative oversight do not enhance public
accountability in Rivers State.
Table 5.2.10: Response to question 10 – Is there any relationship between
legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in the State?
Response
Yes
No
Undecided
Frequency
100
200
75
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
55.33
26.66
20
Cumulative Frequency
100
200
375
121
Table 5.2.10 shows that 55.33 percent of our respondents agreed that there is a
relationship between legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in the
State; 26.66 percent of our respondents objected to the existence of this relationship
between legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in the State and
about 20 percent of our respondents were undecided on the question. Meanwhile, our
respondents from the group interview also were divided in their views on whether there is
a relationship between legislative oversight and exposition of executive corruption in the
Rivers State. We shall test the significance of this relationship here with( X2) chi- Square
as shown below:
But X2 = Σ(Of-Ef) 2
Ef
Where: Σ = Summation
Of = Observed frequency
Ef = Expected frequency
Table 5.2.11: (X2 ) Chi-Square Table
Responses
Yes
No
Undecided
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Of
100
200
75
Ef
125
125
125
Ef = ΣOf/ Number of Categories
Number of Categories = 3
Ef = 100+ 200+ 75/ 3 = 125
X2 cal
= Σ(Of-Ef) 2 + Σ(Of-Ef) 2
Ef
X2 cal
Ef
= (100-125) 2 + (200-125) 2
+ Σ(Of-Ef) 2
Ef
+ (75-125) 2
122
125
X2 cal
125
= (-25) 2 + (75) 2
125
X2 cal
125
X2 cal
X
2cal
X2tab
+ (-50) 2
125
= 625 + 5625
125
125
125
+ 2500
125
= 5 + 45 + 20
= 70
was calculated at 0.05% level of significance and degree of freedom (Df) with
formula as n-1. Where n = Number of categories of response
N= 3
Df = 3-1 = 2
X2tab = (0.05
2)
X2tab = 5.991
The Calculated value (70) is higher than the tabulated value (5.991) therefore; we
reject the Ho and accepted the alternative hypothesis which states that there is a
significant relationship between legislative oversight and exposition of executive
corruption in the Rivers State.
5.3 Institutional Mechanisms of Public Accountability
Auditing Framework is one of the mechanisms for public accountability.
According to Waldron, (l978:15):
auditing is an examination of books, accounts and vouchers
of a business of an organization as will enable the auditor to
report that in his opinion, the balance sheet is properly drawn
up, so as to give a true and fair view of the state of the affairs
of the business and that the profit and loss accounts give a
true and fair view of the profit or loss for the financial period
according to the best of the information and explanation
123
given to him and as shown by the books, and if not, to report
in what respect he is not satisfied.
The auditor compares the balance sheet and accounts with the underlying records
and through his skill and expertise, satisfies himself that the records contain a proper
record of transaction entered into. The auditor at the end of the audit forms an opinion on
the truth and fairness of the accounts, which he has investigated and examined. If the
auditor is satisfied, he should report and if he is not satisfied he should report in what
respect he is not satisfied.
In the same vein, Millichamp: (1992:1) opined that “in auditing historical, annual
reports and accounts of companies are produced by the director (as managers) and other
people were not expected to be interested in them, but, today, a much wider range of
people are interested in the annual reports and accounts of companies and organizations”.
In view of the above assertion, it therefore, becomes necessary to audit the
accounts of companies and local governments to solve the problems of credibility in
reports and accounts. There is also the need for auditing of local, state and federal
government accounts so as to check whether they conform to statutory requirements of
the companies Act of 1985 or not.
In addition, all accounts should comply to the requirement of the financial
reporting standard (FRS) and other relevant statements of standard accounting practice
(SSAP). It is, therefore, imperative that an audit be carried out on accounts of the
organizations to ensure that they comply to these requirements. Moreover, through
auditing, errors and fraud can be dictated and prevented. This explains the reasons why
auditing is regarded as one of the mechanisms for ensuring accountability in the local
government system. Moreover auditing is classified under two categories. These are:
a. Audit according to the method of approach
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b. Audit according to nature of the work undertaken (Nwabueze, 2000)
Furthermore, auditing can be classified according to the method of approach to his
work by the auditor such as final or completed audit, the audit work is carried through to
completion in one continuous session; transactions are audited in regular intervals and the
exercise is finished at the end of the continuous session.
The advantages of such an audit are that responsibilities are shared and the audit
timetable facilitated. Secondly, the possibility of altering audit figures in between audit
session is obviated. The demerit of such an audit is that if it is not commenced early, it is
possible not to finish the audit of a fairly large organization before the date of the annual
general meeting. Thirdly, it is difficult to deploy audit staff if the accounting years of the
client end on the same date. If the interim audit is used, it means that auditing will be
conducted on a particular date within the accounting period. Some of the advantages of
this mechanism include:
i.
Publication of interim accounts may be needed.
ii.
It speeds up the completion of final audit at the end of the financial year .
iii.
Detection of error and fraud is facilitated.
iv.
It helps to keep the client records up to date .
v.
The presence of auditors imposes some moral checks on the client’s staff
However, the disadvantage of auditing by method of approach is that there is the
chance of altering figures after the interim audit (Nwabueze, 2000). Again, in auditing,
we have continuous audit. In this type of audit, the work is conducted throughout the
course of the accounting year. Continuous audit is usually conducted in large
organizations. It is quite different from interim audit, as it is not undertaken to a specific
accounting period. It is imperative to note that this kind of audit engage the auditor on the
audit work throughout the financial year. The advantages include:
125
i.
there is moral check on the workers as the auditors is always around;
ii.
it makes for more effective use of staff since they can be shifted to any
area that needs much attention;
iii.
there is plenty of time to enable the audit work to be carried out more
thoroughly and in greater detail.
The demerits of this type of audit are:
i.
the audit being a continuous one, there is the tendency of familiarity between the
auditor and the workers and this may lure the workers into seeking the assistance
of the auditor when they get involved in any crime/problem;
ii.
the work of the staff may be interrupted by the auditors and this may
inconvenience the staff;
iii.
there is the possibility of altering figures fraudulently or misguidedly after audit.
BALANCE SHEET AUDIT
A balance sheet audit aims at dealing with the balance sheet items only, in the
main, not with the general transaction of the period since the last balance sheet date
(Millichamp, 1996; Nwabueze, 2000).
Balance sheet audit consists of verification of every item in the balance sheet,
working back to the books of prime entry and their documentary evidence. For this type
of audit to be in operation, in any organization, there is need for an effective system of
internal control in force in the organization.
SYSTEM AUDIT
In system audit, the auditor investigates the available systems. He investigates the
accounting system, the internal control system and any other systems. He relies on the
efficacy of the systems to know the extent of work he should do. He does not vouch or
126
verify every transactions, rather he is more concerned with the system of documentation
and recording transaction. This type of audit is also applicable in the local government
system.
However, audit can be classified by nature of work. The basic types of audit can be
grouped as follows:
i.
Private Audit
ii.
Statutory Audit
iii.
Internal Audits
Management Audits (Nwabueze, 2000).
Private Audit
This is basically the audit of unincorporated bodies. Example are sole traders,
partnerships, charity etc. In this type of audit, the auditor operates according to an agreed
limit of work. There has to be an agreement on the work required of him.
Statutory Audits
This is an audit governed by the company and allied matters (Decree, 1990). It is
the audit of incorporated bodies. Where the statutory audits are to be conducted, the legal
requirements will provide necessary information as to the nature of the certificate or
report required, and here the auditor will carry out the audit on whatever manner he
considered necessary provided he operates within the provision of the law.
In
the
statutory
audit,
the
auditor's
appointment,
remuneration
and
retirement/removal is carried out in accordance with legal stipulations. The nature of his
work and his report should also be carried out in accordance with legal requirements.
Local governments fall under this category.
127
Internal Audits
This type of audit differ significantly from those mentioned earlier on, because
this type is carried out by an internal auditor who is an employee of the organization
while the ones discussed prior are carried out by an independent auditor. An internal
auditor being the employee of the organization engages in work on behalf of the
organization, although the nature of his work requires some element of independence
while carrying out his duty. He is the head of the unit which is appended to the chief
executive. This type of audit is operational in the local governments in Nigeria. Inaddition, local governments employ the use of statutory audits because local governments
are required by law to audit their accounts yearly. Financial Memoranda, chapter 40(1)
stipulates that there shall be established in each local government an internal audit headed
by an internal auditor to provide a complete and continuous audit of the accounts and
records of revenue, expenditure, plant, allocated and unallocated stores where applicable
notwithstanding the existence of audit unit in the local Government, the individual
officer’s responsibilities shall subsist and Departmental check shall continue. The Internal
Auditor: The internal auditor shall be directly responsible to the Chief Accounting
Officer, Financial Memoranda (40.2):
Section 40 (3) states that the internal auditor shall be responsible for carrying out
an independent appraisal of the accounting, financial and other processes of the State
government with the following objectives:
* to assist in protecting the assets and interest of state government by carrying out a
continuous examination of activities in order to detect fraud, misappropriation, irregular
expenditure and losses due to waste, extravagance and mal-administration;
* to secure the continued maintenance of soundly based systems ·of control with each
area of departmental responsibility;
128
* to review and, where necessary, make recommendations for the improvement of
systems, control and procedure to ensure that they remain adequate in the light of
changing circumstances and are adhered to in practice,
* to monitor the use of resources in the pursuit of the defined objectives of the State
government.
Audit Programme
Section 40(4) states that the internal auditor shall prepare audit programmes which,
when not in use shall be carefully kept under lock and key, to guide those undertaking
internal audit duties in accordance with provision of Financial Memorandum 40(5) the
audit programmes shall be so prepared that:
•
the entire area of audit activities referred to in financial memorandum ,40(3) is
effectively and promptly covered;
•
where routine checks are essential they are not carried out at exactly the same time
in the same manner in each occasion.
Internal Audit Report
Section 40(6) states that the internal audit shall report to the chairman at least four
times each year of the internal audit work. These reports shall specifically indicate the
internal auditor’s findings with respect to;
a. the collection of revenue;
b. recurrent and capital expenditure;
c. the protection of physical and other assets of Local Government;
d. the efficiency and effectiveness of systems, control and procedure relating to (a), (b),
(c) above.
e. the use of the resources of the Local Government in achieving its objectives;
129
f. any instance of :1.
fraud
2.
misappropriation
3.
irregular expenditure
4.
waste or extravagance
5.
mal-administration
6.
any other matters revealed by internal audit to which is considered the chairman’s
attention should be drawn.
Again, section 40(7) stated that wherever circumstances necessitate it, a special
report shall also be submitted by the Internal Auditor to the Executive Committee through
the Chairman on such other matters, including those set out at(a) – (e) of Financial
memorandum 40(6), as are appropriate. Similarly, 40(8) The Council or the Executive
Committee, as may be appropriate, shall consider the repot of the Internal Auditor at the
next meeting following the date of repot. Also, 40(9) A copy of the Internal auditor’s
report under financial memorandum. 40(6) and 40(7) shall be sent to the Auditor-General.
Prepayment Audit
Again, before any payment is made, a prepayment audit vouchers and supporting
documents shall be made by the internal auditor on all payment vouchers to verify that
the provisions of these Financial Memoranda have been followed in all respects, that
payment is one properly authorized and correctly charged to the stated sub-head or
account, and that sufficient funds are available to meet it.
Management Audits
This can be defined as the investigation of business from the highest level down
wards in order to ascertain whether sound management prevails throughout, thus
130
facilitating the most effective relationship with the outside world and the more efficient
organization and smooth running internally.
Management audit according to Nwabueze (2000) is a new development in
auditing. It requires a lot of skill and training before an auditor can cope. It deals
specifically with all aspects of management including the following:
(a)
The suitability, practicality and present compliance or otherwise of the
organization with its designated objects and aims.
(b)
The current standing of the organization, in relation to the general public and
within its own particular industrial or commercial field.
(c)
The present return on investing capital whether poor, adequate, or above
average and the rate of return over a significant period.
(d)
The relationship of the business with its own shareholders and the investing
public in general.
(e)
The relationship between management and staff with the business
The primary objective of an audit is the critical examination and verification of
the accuracy and truth of a financial statement by a qualified and impartial observer the
auditor. After critical examination and verification, he makes a report on the truth and
fairness of the accounts.
The secondary objective of an auditor is to detect fraud and error and to prevent
fraud and error. For an auditor to achieve his objective there is need for the establishment
of an effective internal control system. If error and fraud are detected and prevented,
performance must inevitably increase.
However, auditing is a very important mechanism for ensuring accountability and
performance in any organization. The three basic justifications of its importance are;
firstly, imperfections in the ability of those responsible for managing resources entrusted
131
to them, and in recording the financial implications of the decision making process. The
auditors experience gained through auditing and his professional training makes him well
qualified to assist his client on what is currently accepted as good accounting practice.
Again, management or employees could also commit honest and genuine mistakes; the
auditor helps to minimize this.
Furthermore, imperfections in the moral character of management or employees
resulting to dishonest manipulations of the recording and reporting systems in order to
either cover up malpractices or at least to postpone discovering, audit act as a moral check
in this aspect. An improved level of knowledge by the staff of local governments that
accounts will be audited minimize the level of fraud and error committed and this
therefore, shows that auditing minimizes the scope of dishonesty (Aghim, 1978).
Moreover, for the auditor to review and report, he has to be prejudice, uninfluenced and
thus should not be involved in recording and preparing financial statement so that he can
be objective during auditing process (Santock, 1998; Walley, 1974; GIGGs, 1961).
Auditing is therefore perceived by many to act as watchdog in the accounts of any
organization. It is one of the most important tools that aid management in detection and
prevention of fraud. Again, where fraud is detected and prevented, then performance will
not be undermined.
In Rivers State, an internal auditor, who is an employee of the State conducts
auditing work and he works with the chief executive. As a result, those disadvantages
mentioned earlier to be the problems of internal audit are also the problem of River State
government as a result of the type of audit conducted by the state. Auditing is also
conducted using a continuous audit method/approach. The merits and demerits of this
method of auditing also apply to the Rivers State and other States in Nigeria.
132
5.4 Budget Process
Budget process is a very important institutional mechanism of public
accountability in Nigeria. The provision of State government law regarding government
annual estimate states that every Commission of the State government shall in each year
cause to be prepared in accordance with any directions made in that behalf by the
Executive committee, a detailed estimate of its revenue and expenditure for the next
financial' year. The objectives of the estimate are:
(i) to provide a financial plan of action,
(ii) provide legal authority for incurring expenditure.
Again, budget process also provides a mechanism for ensuring that adequate controls
are maintained over expenditure and revenue and also establish the financial position of
the State . Furthermore, the rules' to be applied to ensure compliance are stipulated in the
revised financial memoranda (FM, 1990). The objective of the estimate is to provide
management with a plan for future operation.
It provides summaries and reports that can be used to compare actual
accomplishment with the planned programmes. Again, budgeting helps mangers to
articulate goals, objectives and programmes of the organization. This, to a large extent
promotes accountability and performance. A budget therefore, is the systematic design of
all the estimate of income and expenditure of an organization, with the ultimate intention
of directing, coordinating, and controlling the monetary commitment of an organization
towards the attainment of its goals and objectives covering a specific future period of time
usually a financial year.
Budget is a joint exercise of the executives, legislature and the administrators. The
executive prepares the estimate; the legislature authorizes the estimate and the
administrator implements the estimates as required by these contracting parties (Agu,
133
2003; Unamka, 1996). Asechemic (1994) sees a budget as a financial or qualitative state
of plan to be pursued in achieving given objectives. According to Garrison (1995), budget
includes a detailed plan, outlining the acquisition and use of financial and other resources
over some time. Hence, budget involves a long range planning and the determination of a
suitable plan for attaining these objectives. Moreover, Onoh (1990:1994), sees budget as
an annual comprehensive report of the state of the nation’s economy that review old and
social problems and anticipates new ones. Rene Gaze (1990: 190) posits that the budget
in a modern state is a forecast of an estimate of the public receipts and expense and an
authorization to incur them. The fundamental thing in all the definitions by various
authors is that budget has as its factor plan, time and economic objective redefined in
financial terms.
Budgetary control on the other hand is a scientifically planned process by in
which the actual state of affair is compared with the plan so that appropriate action may
be taken with regards to many deviations before it is too late. Control can be defined in a
variety of ways. According to Harper (1994) control is seen as action taken to compel
events to conform to plan. The essential of control is action to correct divergences.
Accounting and financial management regard control as performance reports,
which provides feedback by comparing results with actual. It highlights the deviation to
plans. Consequently, the actions and efforts of executives are therefore, concentrated on
the significant deviation from expected results. The information gathered highlights the
area mostly in need of investigation. Control is a vital part of management and
administrative process.
Unfortunately, government budgeting has failed to serve as an instrument of
accountability and performance. This is because local governments in Nigeria have failed
woefully in controlling budgeting. Akinyele (1992) states that budget is a practice that
134
could be called a technique for ensuring a more effective check on the organization.
Unfortunately budget estimates are mere projections given in view of expected change,
which may or may not materialize especially during inflation. In most case, percentage
prices are higher than the expected price and this is one of the problems of budgeting for
public accountability may not be achieved.
Moreover, government budget especially in Rivers State is
usually deficit
budgets. The actual is usually greater than the estimate and it increases public
expenditure, aggregate demand for goods and services, without corresponding increase in
their supply. In most cases, the legislature are not carried along to effect the increases.
This does not augur well for accountability to be achieved in the local government system
and this also undermines performance. In fact, enormous waste is going on in the public
sphere of Rivers State and padding of budgets has contributed to stifle development in the
State.
Due Process
Due process is a mechanism for ensuring strict compliance with openness,
competition and cost accuracy, rules and procedures that should guide contract award
within the federal government of Nigeria (Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit,
2006). Due process has become the popularly adopted short form for budget monitoring
and price intelligence unit (BMPIU). The unit is charged with the implementation of
Nigeria’s Public Procurement Reform Program. President Olusegun Obasanjo established
the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) in the year 2001 in
fulfillment of his commitment to ensuring transparency and accountability in the
management of our public resources. The unit was established in view of the fact that it
was discovered that Nigeria has lost several billions of naira over the last two decades.
135
This was as a result of fragrant abuse of procedures for award of public contracts,
inflation of contract costs, absence of transparency, fairness, openness, competition and
merit which are fundamental criteria for award of public contracts. As a result of the
above, there became an urgent need to reform the procurement system; so as to reduce the
large scale corruption and waste that had reduced the efficiency of the Nigeria public
sector.
The vision of BMPIU, which was established to checkmate this unfortunate
behaviour, is to help move Nigeria to a level where public procurement (Public
Contracting) is governed by the principle of integrity, transparency, competence, and
competitiveness as National Ethos. This is to be practiced in the three tiers of
governments.
However, the mission of the BMPIU is “to use the one process mechanism to reestablish and sustain an open, transparent and competitive Federal Procurement System,
that is integrity driven upholds spending within budget and ensures speedy
implementation of projects in order to achieve value for money outcomes without
sacrificing quality and standards. Furthermore, the objectives of the process include:
i.
To make sure that project conceptualization and packaging match the defined
priorities and targets as set in annual Appropriation.
ii.
To strictly enforce the due process principles of transparency, competition,
efficiency and value for money in the procurement of public goods, works and
services.
iii.
To ensure that all Federal Governments projects are monitored and
implemented in line with due process principles (BMPIU, 2005)
iv.
To present extra budgetary spending by Ministries, Departments and
Agencies, by ensuring that only due projects with due Appropriation with the
136
National Assembly are certified and thus funded for execution (BMPIU,
2005).
Again, to prevent contract inflation by ensuring cost reasonableness, accuracy and
comparability of all public contracts with national, regional and global costs. In addition,
BMPIU has many functions to perform. These functions are:
1) to regulate and set standard to ensure harmonized Bidding and Tender
Documents for all Federal government contracts, even in the local
governments;
2) to formulate polices and guidelines on public sector procurements;
3) to develop, update and maintain relevant system wide database and
technology;
4) to uphold professional ethics and report erring procurement personnel,
public officials departments and private sector companies and their
personnel to relevant authorities for appropriate application of prescribed
sanctions;
5) to monitor Price of tendered items and provide price database advising
services to the public sector. Reform procurement audits documents and
monitor projects from point of award to final completion;
6) to coordinate training to promote capacity building of procurement
personnel and development systems and standards in the public sector;
7) to sensitize, promote and educate the public on public procurement issues
and advise the president of Nigeria on status of Federal Government
Procurement in relation to the Annual Appropriation and
137
8) to provide relevant procurement and budget performance information to
any interest parties and institutions (Budget Monitoring and Price
Intelligence Unit, 2005).
Bank Reconciliation Statement: According to the Financial Memoranda 1990,
section 19.23, a detailed statement must be obtained, from the bank, of the month’s
transaction on the local governments accounts and where this can be obtained, a
certification of the balance on the local government’s accounts. The transactions
according to the bank statement must be checked against the entries in the local
government’s cashbook and the two records reconciled. According to the FM 19.24 the
following procedures shall be followed in reconciling the cashbook with the balance
according to the bank statement of accounts:
The cheque book counterfoils must be checked against the cashbook entries and
any queries settled. Reconciliation must be verified in the manner indicated:
It should be checked that remittances in transit to the bank at the end of the
previous month have not been credited in the bank statement in which the appropriate
entries must be ticked off;
It should be checked that charges, which had not been brought to account in the
cashbook at the end of the previous month, have since been recorded on the payments
side of the cashbook. The relevant cash book entry or entries should be ticked:
a)
Outstanding cheques at the end of the previous month should be checked to
and ticked on the bank statement and are, therefore, still to be presented for
payment, must be listed as outstanding cheques;
b)
It should be checked that any credits in the bank which had not been brought
to account in the cash book at the end of the previous month, have now been
138
entered on the receipt side of the cash book and the relevant entry therein must
be ticked; etc.
This is the order that should be followed in reconciling the accounts of the bank
Rivers State government to ensure accountability and increased performance.
Duties and Responsibilities of the Executive
The Executive Committee shall be responsible for the management and control of
the finances of the state. The executive committee should make such recommendations as
it consider necessary. The committee should also receive and consider the annual estimate
proposals of all ministries, departments, and ensures the preparation of draft of the annual
estimates of revenue and expenditure. It is the duty of the executive committee to carry
out such tests and other checks that are necessary to satisfy itself that the state
government revenues are promptly collected and accounted for and its fund properly
disbursed. The committee should also ensure that all expenditure is properly authorized.
Public Accountability and Performance
Conventionally, public accountability refers to answerability to one’s actions or
behavior. Formally, public accountability involves the development of objective
standards of evaluations to assist the owners of an organization to evaluate the
performance of duties by individuals and units within the organization (Adamolukun,
2002)
Public accountability, thus, has three crucial components: a clear definition of
responsibility, reporting mechanisms, and a system review, rewards and sanctions. Public
accountability flows in different directions: upward, downward, between subordinates
and superiors and laterally among professional peers (Adamolekun, 2002).
However in public enterprises, the number and monetary value of public sector
activities have increased substantially and the increase has led to the demand for
139
accountability. The employees who manage and administer these activities of local
governments need to render accounts of the activities of the public. The public in turn,
needs to receive accountability reports, for them to assess the performance of those
entrusted with government resources. However, improved information about local
government needs and preferences becomes the theoretical advantage of decentralization,
but these are not guarantees that leaders will actually act on these preferences unless they
owe some sort of accountability to the citizens.
Moreover, President Olusegun Obasanjo, at the inauguration of the technical
committee on review of the structure of local government councils, states that successive
governments in Nigeria have initiated several reforms on the local government system,
with the aim of improving effectiveness as a vehicle for promoting and sustaining
development. For so long, our people have yearned for democracy in our nation and
rightly deserve a qualitative lift in their living conditions, as visible dividends of
democracy. Again, unless the existing state local government system is reviewed and
restructured to promote greater accountability, optimal performance and drastic reduction
of the current astronomical cost of operating the system, the yearnings of the people will
be unwarranted. He emphasized on the importance of public accountability in the second
tier of government as the only gate way to prosperity.
Public accountability however is defined by Obi (1996) as a complex rational
choice and use of resources, which involves responsibilities of functionaries. It has a
series of control mechanisms and sanctions for preventing negative actions by
functionaries. Public accountability also involves subordinate superior relationships, strict
compliance with legal requirements, and organizational policies (Obi, 1996). Our major
thesis is that public accountability is indispensable for good governance, the greater the
quality of public accountability in governance, the greater the quality of governance
140
(Ogban, 2000). Akpan (1982) noted that the public servants hold their positions in trust
for the people who are masters. Those who are expected to render service must account to
the people for their success and failure and those who are entrusted with custody and
disbursement of public funds must appropriately account to the people for their use.
For one to be accountable for something, one must have authority with its
associated responsibility, which will make him answerable to his supervisors. In the light
of the above, all the government functionaries must make sure that the responsibilities
assigned to them are carried out in the best manner, failure to do this, may constitute a
major drag on the effectiveness of the organization. Accountability is a system whereby
results of expenditure and, by extension, of policy making decision, shall be stated,
evaluated and justified where need be (Dean, 1996). It should be noted that the primary
aim of public accountability is to harness the available resources. For this aim to be
achieved, adequate checks and balances must be taken to prevent fraud and errors that
may result in poor accountability and hence affect performance (Agu, 2000). For
accountability to be enforced there must be internal and external control mechanisms.
Caril and Fredrick (2002) stressed the need to strengthen the internal control of self
reliant of public officials through education and training. In fact, external and political
controls were necessary to ensure that public officials were politically responsible. Over a
period of time, the two perspectives have merged. Internal and political controls are
regarded as complementary rather than substitute for one another (Ladipo, 1995). Internal
control emphasizes the social control on public officials through education and training
and a codification of some ethical guidelines for officials that would enable them to
override political directions contrary to state or public interests. External control, on the
other hand, emphasizes the political controls on civil servants to ensure that they are
accountable to the public or their political representative (Jabbra & Owired, 1988).
141
According to Amoke & Asogwa (2000), public accountability encompasses
various issues. These are:
1. Fiscal accountability relating to responsibility for public funds; Legal
accountability which focuses on responsibility for carrying out
programmes;
2. Programme accountability deals with responsibilities to carry out
procedures;
outcome
accountability,
which
is
concerned
with
responsibility for results;
3. Political accountability, which deals with responsibility for stewardship.
The above five dimensions of public accountability can further be
telescoped under three basic groups - Political accountability,
4. Administrative accountability and Fiscal accountability (Amoke &
Asogwa, 2000; Joseph, 1998, Beyene & Otobo, 1994).
Administrative accountability revolves on virtually every worker in an
organization, especially those at the echelon. Political accountability assumes that
occupants of political offices would meet the expectations of the electorate by fulfilling
the promises made in the manifesto of their parties. Fiscal accountability, on the other
hand, is directed towards ensuring that funds are utilized by government agents, in
accordance with established regulations and guidelines or rules, for purposes for which
they are intended. The aim of these basic groups or public accountability is to ensure that
the organization achieves its set down objectives. By implementing these groups of public
accountability properly, performance will be high.
As Akpan (1982) rightly observed, public accountability connotes strong
awareness and acceptance of the fact that all public servants owe and hold their position
in trust for the people who are their masters. It is an integral part of an organization.
142
However, Ojong (2002) sees public accountability in the same perspective as a process
whereby one renders an account of his activities to someone who has the power to ask for
it and also evaluate and reward ones performance. Public accountability is the
requirement that subjects all public servants and private workers to a detailed scrutiny, in
the use of resources and manner of performance and finally the requirement that
government explains and justifies its actions to the people and ensures that governments
are responsible for their actions, that rulers at all levels report to the ruled (civil service
reform 1999). Onor (2002) opined that, one of the most critical forms of accountability is
public accountability. He went further to argue, that public accountability relates to being
answerable to a wider public. Without public accountability, appropriation is liable to
remain ineffective. According to Onor (2002) and Saad (1980), public accountability can
be broken down into four component parts:
a)
Effective appropriation and use of financial resources
b)
Faithful compliance or adherence to legal requirements and administrative
polices;
c)
Efficiency and economy of operations and
d)
Attainment of results of government programmes and activities vis-à-vis its set
goals and objectives.
If Rivers State legislature utilizes their constitutional powers and adhere to these
tenets of public accountability, and show sensitivity to the existence of several
institutional structure that regulate transparency and accountability in handling
government business, the activities of executive government officials are likely to be
beyond reproach. The mere implementation of these mechanisms will ultimately
stimulate increased development and strengthen the bonds between the people and their
leaders at the local government levels. Consequently, performance will be optimal. These
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institutional mechanisms are contained in the Constitution and State Laws, other
Statutes/Legislation on Public Funds, Financial Control and Management Act 1958, Audit
Act 1956, Appropriation Acts and the Financial Memoranda. 1991. It provides rules
aimed at the prudent management and judicious utilization of public funds for the benefit
of the larger society (Onor, 2002; Hyden & Brathon, 1992; Laleye, 1993).
In Rivers State, the Governor and the public officials rarely abide by the rules and
regulations of financial discipline. Meanwhile, this is the only way to ensure
accountability and restore public confidence in the system, all of which would increase
performance. Without proper accountability, performance will be very low.
The Importance of Public Accountability
Public accountability is essential for the efficient functioning of all organizations
especially of government organization in a democratically governed state. First, public
accountability structure in the public sector is surrogates for market forces in non-market
conditions. They help to reflect the preferences of the public as citizens and consumers in
the public realm (Adamolekun, 2002).
Again, public accountability also serves as a quality control device. Public
accountability is the requirement that those who hold public trust account for the use of
that trust to citizens or their representatives. Public accountability underscores the
superiority of the public will over private interests for those engaged in the provision and
delivery of services to the general public. For this reason, it is often argued that where
there is no public accountability, the public administrative system runs amok.
Secondly, according to Adamolekun (2002), public accountability is closely
related to the enjoyment of democratic life. Democratic governance implies the
144
supremacy of citizens in the governing process. The requirements that ministers are
responsible and public servants become accountable are at the very root of democracy.
Furthermore, public accountability is one of the five norms of good governance;
the other ones are efficiency, transparency, predictability, or rule of law and legitimacy.
Again, public sectors (local government inclusive), are usually perceived to be generally
wasteful. Waste is perceived in two senses. It is the inefficient use of public resources and
this affects performance adversely. Secondly, waste is the perception that most political
executives are corrupt and many permanent officials collude and, in some cases, may
become a part of the rent seeking elite. Therefore, there is need for public accountability
to reduce/ eliminates waste.
Furthermore, the sharp decline in resources available to state institutions and
performance in the face of rising expectations in the late 1980s and 1990s has brought
tremendous pressure on governments to ensure that they give citizens maximum possible
value for their money. Occasional news of large scale “mega corruption” has further
fueled these demands (e.g. at one level, the stories circulating on the wealth of African
dictators such as the late Mobutu) (Ekpo, 1979; Reno, 1995).
5.5 Strategies for Enforcing Public Accountability and Performance
The two major strategies are internal and external mechanisms on the one hand and
voice and exit options on the other. However, they are not alternatives but complements.
Internal mechanisms are the aggregate of the control established in the local government
system to carry on the business of the local governments in an orderly and efficient
manner and to secure as far as possible the accuracy and reliability of their records. The
purpose of internal control includes the following:
145
i.
to safeguard the assets from misuse and abuse. Internal control helps to check
against pilfering and misuse of assets'. It guides against stealing of items and
procedures are usually devised to safeguard assets;
ii.
to secure the reliability of the accounting records. In doing this, those involved
ensure that records are accurate, transactions are recorded and processed.
Moreover, there has to be continuous check of the goods to ensure that goods
do not leave the factory without the permission of whoever is in –charge
(Oguonu,2002)
iii.
to comply with the laid down rules and policies of the organization, it is very
important to adhere religiously to the rules and regulations of the organization.
This, to a large extent, helps to achieve the set down objectives of the
organization. Adhering strictly to the rules and regulations of the organization
help in curbing fraud and enhancing accountability; and
iv.
finally, to ensure that the organization is operated in an orderly and efficient
manner and to secure as far as possible, the accuracy and reliability of the
accounting records. It is however very imperative for state government to have
a detailed plan of action and the method/means of achieving this plan
(Oguonu, 2002).
In most countries, the ministers have been further strengthened by the
appointment of special advisers (e.g. the United States, and the United Kingdom/or mini
cabinets, France, Germany) to provide independent advice to their respective ministers
and to ensure that the minister is effective in bringing his or her civil service under
effective control and the legislature also helps to scrutinize the drafts of all legislation
made by the executive branch and has to pass them into law. They are also responsible for
passing the budget appropriation bills. For countries that follow the U.S. tradition, they
146
also approve top appointments, ministers and their deputies, heads of independent
commission and ambassadors.
In Nigeria in general and Rivers State in particular, despite that the legislature
exists, the arm of government rarely ensures adequate control on executive financial
discipline. Other controls available to the legislature include parliamentary oversight,
letter to the ministers and adjournment debates. The legislature however, can exercise
these roles with competence and independence. As a result, they have access to
independent sources of information and are therefore, empowered to ask for information
from the executive branches in many ways. In some countries, the latter also have access
to administrative support including research staff and liaison.
Again, the judiciary plays important role in holding public service accountable.
They provide judicial remedies to citizens who might have been adversely affected by
administrative actions or inaction contrary to law. The judiciary is expected to be
independent like the legislature (Dia, 1995; Laleye, 1993). Furthermore, several countries
have instituted specialized bodies to investigate cases of misuse of power, or to fight
corruption. For instance in Nigeria, we have the EFCC, ICPC and the Due Process; all
geared at enhancing public accountability and performance. This is because, without
proper accountability, performance will be low.
Despite the institutionalization of these anti-graft commissions in Nigeria, our
interview revealed that corruption abounds in Nigeria especially in the Niger Delta
including Rivers State. The executive arm of government in the region do not adhere to
the mechanisms of public accountability so as to ensure optimal result. The legislature is
relegated to the background in Rivers and
executive control of the state’s treasury
other Niger Delta States to permit full
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The Niger Delta youths especially in Rivers State have visited their
disappointment with the pace of financial management in the oil producing states on both
foreigners and nationals through intensified militancy in the Niger Delta. In
order
to
maintain the vision 20:2020 President Yar’Adua launched the popular 7-point agenda
which include:
(1)
Sustainable growth in the real sector of the economy
(2)
Physical infrastructure- development of power, energy and transportation
(3)
Agricultural development
(4)
Human capital development- education.
(5)
Security, law and order
(6)
Combat corruption
(7)
Niger Delta development (Nigeria Project Agenda, 2007).
Although some scholars like Mitee (2009) and Blues (2009) questioned the
appropriateness of such programme, it has gone down in history book that late President
Yaradua’s 7-point agenda succeeded in Niger Delta development and helped to revive the
declining supply of oil and foreign earnings.
Mitee focused on the benefit of the
programme, according to him, the Amnesty would not yield the required fruit of peace in
the region since it is targeted at only the militants and not those that legitimately pursue
their grievances. Again the survival of Niger Delta militants after many years of Federal
government’s physical combat with the aid of Joint Task Force has proved that the
militants constitute state within the Nigerian state with access to instrument of use of
force and capable of frustrating state defense and government thereby endangering
national security. Blues argued that Amnesty is not necessary for Niger Delta people
rather it is a travesty. According to him it is the Niger Deltans that need to pardon the
Federal government for illegally occupying their farm lands and not the other way round.
148
President Yar’Adua’s call for peace building through announcement of pardon to
freemen who were never convicted in Niger Delta was a strategy of holding the entity
known as Nigeria together. Thus the strategy was used for maintaining the status quo
which is in the interest of the dominant class in Nigeria. The rate of crime in the region
was unbecoming hence, the amnesty was announced to facilitate the disarmament of the
region or reduce the proliferation of light weapons in the Niger Delta. Ajaero (2009:14)
noted that :
Ex-militant Ekpe Mupolo alone handed over a huge cache of arms
and ammunition to the Presidential Committee on Amnesty led by
Abbe. The weapons he surrendered included 14 Ak 47 rifles, six
rocket propelled guns, 24 G3, Six RPG bomb, 44 AGL bombs,
heaps of dynamites and several boxes of other assorted weapons.
The weapons surrendered by the various militant groups within the
period of Amnesty deal significantly helped to reduced the number
of light weapons in circulation in the region.
Oil has been identified as the major source of conflict between Niger Delta
militants and Federal government’s Joint Task Force. Our interviewees in Rivers State
revealed that the militancy is the response of the Niger Delta youths for political
corruption in the region. They insisted that the conflict in the region would be intractable
if the incidence of political corruption is not addressed. The post amnesty package in
Niger Delta involves general re-socialization and education of the ex-militants to reembrace societal norms and values.
The creation of Ministry of Niger Delta, OMPADEC and NDDC are targeted at
providing effective atmosphere for the Amnesty Programme. Various perceptions on
these establishments in the Niger-Delta were clearly addressed by the Federal government
on the grounds that the region serves as oil reserve of the nation. Also, the effect of
environmental degradation on both individuals and groups were considered and attempts
were made to resolve them. Discussion channels were opened with various stakeholders
in the Niger Delta. The Federal government also learnt to avoid the use of force like they
149
did in 1995 when Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others were killed. The options of granting
Amnesty to the militants, disintegration of Nigeria, another civil war and declining oil
supply were considered and granting of Amnesty to Niger Delta militants was favoured.
The programme was however implemented by requesting the militants to surrender their
weapons and orientation camps were opened to re-socialize the ex-militants.
Today, the militants secure oil pipe lines instead of destroying them, secure oil
workers instead of kidnapping them and negotiate instead of warring, the Federal
Government pardoned instead of prosecuting the militants. Again, the Federal
government now focuses on communal welfare rather than settling a microscopic few,
thus the government had began to pay Niger Deltans compensation for destroying their
land and water.
The Niger Delta Amnesty was for the people of Niger Delta the greatest
opportunity for rapid development and transformation of the people from the culture of
militarism to pacifism; culture of armament to disarrangement, authoritarianism to
democracy and propagation of prejudice to counteracting prejudice which some observers
believe that “those who submitted arms in the Amnesty deal were not the real militants,
others hold that the militants were treated as prisoners in camps and feared that they
might re-launch attach on the oil pipelines” (Abubinke, 2009:24).
Training and Oversight Function
Training is an important factor that determines the quality of legislative oversight
globally. Hence, in
Rivers State, legislators and their aides are adequately trained to
perform their function. In fact, one major administrative innovation in the Rivers State
House of Assembly was the posting of parliamentary secretaries to each member of the
House. These secretaries were well trained in legislative matters and were constantly
150
subjected to quarterly trainings aimed at capacity building. Indeed these secretaries joined
the parliamentarians in local and overseas trainings, and study tours. However, the nature
of their training differs from that of the parliamentarians and specifically directed at
supporting capacity development for good governance. Most of the oversea training were
sponsored/supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Particularly, in its 4th and 5th country cooperation programme in Nigeria, the
UNDP’s overall goal includes:
to promote national development that would impact
substantially on the quality of life and living conditions of
the poor people in urban and rural communities particularly
the most vulnerable group … (UNDP, 2001:4).
Hence, among its medium and long-term objectives, the development programme
seeks to:
•
Enhance manpower training and technological development to meet the
increasing challenges;
•
Generate and utilize necessary data to enhance more effective system of policy
formulation and implementation.
Similarly, USAID’s assistance in the area of legislative and bureaucratic capacity
building was very remarkable. In fact, USAID/Nigeria’s CSP2004 -2009 was
launched January 1, 2004, and strategic objective grant agreements were signed with
the government of Nigeria on June 30, 2004. During the period of transition the
mission continued to expend resources and achieve results in four program areas that
had formed the core of the development assistance portfolio since 1999: democracy
and governance, agriculture and economic growth, basic education and integrated
health services.
151
On democracy and governance, USAID’s portfolio was designed to assist civil
society and selected governance institutions in Nigeria to sustain progress in
introducing democratic systems and practices and defusing violent conflict. The
program strengthened the capacity of selected courts and legislative bodies and
increased the transparency of the electoral process (USAID/Nigeria Annual Report,
FY2005). Thus, in Results framework 620-011, 11.2, USAID/Nigeria noted, among
others, “increased accountability of key governmental institutions”.
Indeed the bureaucratic structure and the House of Assembly in Rivers State
within the study period were great beneficiaries of UNDP and USAID capacity
training. The outline of training programmes sponsored by UNDP/USAID for House
of Assembly members and support staff in Rivers State between the period 1999 –
2007 were as follow:
1. Capacity building and legislative process – June 17 – July 16, 1999 at the
United States of America.
2. Budgeting and budgeting process, September 12, 1999 - September 20, 1999
at United Kingdom.
3. Executive-Legislative Relations and democratization –April 20, 2000 – April
28, 2000.
4. The legislative and oversight functions: Problems and challenges – 4th
November, 2006 – 14th November, 2000 – Australia.
5. The legislature and Public accountability in new democracies – 14th June –
28th June, 2001.
6. Innovative budgeting and financial administration – 6th August - 16th August ,
2002 in South Africa.
152
7. Challenges of managing Executive Financial lawlessness in New States – 25th
November – 2nd November, 2002 – Canada.
8. Workshop on Financial Regulation of the Executive – 10th October – 16
October, 2003 in United Kingdom.
9. The Legislature and Local Government Administration – 17th - 24th May, 2004
– Australia.
10. Governance and Accountability – 8th June – 14th June, 2005 – United States of
America.
11. Challenges of Democratic Transition in Nigeria – 11th July – 21st July, 2006.
The above are very instructive. It also excluded workshops/seminars and retreats
organized for House members by the State Government and the House leadership
within the period under study. Arising from these conferences, workshops, retreats
and study tour overseas were the following:
a) Parliamentary secretaries accompanied the parliamentarians and indeed
participated in the training workshop.
b) Several on-the-job training workshop, as an off-shoot of the above were
organized for administrative staff.
c) Capacity building and training workshops were organized for the clerk, Heads
of Units and top administrators within the period under study.
d) The House Leadership evolved and sustained effective reward system for
outstanding staff of the Assembly.
e) An elongated salary package was approval for the administrative staff to
enhance commitment, motivation and effectiveness.
f) Car and motorcycle revolving soft-loan packages were approved for
administrative staff.
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g) Integrated Housing Policy was approved and implemented for the
administrative staff to enhance proficiency.
Therefore, in our estimation the administrative staff was remarkably motivated
and in return greater number demonstrated outstanding and great competence, thereby
facilitating smooth and effective operation of the Assembly. No doubt, the
competence, commitment and efficiency demonstrated by the administrative staff
made the House to generate and prosecute over fifty resolutions within the period
under investigation. These resolutions were aimed at enhancing good governance,
accountability and responsiveness in public administration. The outlines of some of
these resolutions are hereby stated below:
1.
House Resolution on Suspension of some Directors of Finance and Supplies
and Heads of Accounts Departments (7/7/99)(P.8)
2.
House Resolution on Proper Coverage of the House activity (13/7/99) (P.10)
3.
House Resolution on Incessant Power Failure in Rivers State ( 13/7/99)
(P.12)
4.
House Resolution on the US’s Survey which shows that about 5.3 million
people die annually from unsafe water, while another 3.35 billion cases of illhealth resulting from the same sources (16/7/99) (P.13)
5.
Resolution on Presentation of Messer Isobo Jack and Rynold Bekinbo
Dagogo-Jack (30/7/99) (P.16).
6.
Resolution on the Bill on the Niger Delta Development Commission
(30/7/99) (P.18)
7.
House of Assembly Resolution on Construction of Filling Station at NO.
10/14 Omoku Street, D/Line, Port Harcourt (26/8/99) (P.128)
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8.
House of Assembly Resolution on the Activities of the Revenue Collection
Agents (06/10/99) (P.32)
9.
House Resolution on Sale of Rivers State Government Shares in Michelin
Nig. Ltd. (10/03/2000) (P.210)
10.
House Resolution on Appointment of the Acting Vice-Chancellor, of Rivers
State University of Science and Technology, Nkpolu Port Harcourt
(13/10/2000) (P. 261).
11.
Submission of details of statutory monthly Allocation of the Local
Government Council in the State (03/11/2000) (P.276).
12.
House Resolution on the Suspension of the Chairman, Asari-Toru Local
Government Council, Buguma.
13.
House Resolution on Compelling Corporate Bodies and Business Concern in
Rivers State to erect sign posts for identification.
14.
Notice of allegation of gross misconduct and the resolution of the Khana
Local Government Legislative Council, to impeach the Chairman of the
Council, Hon. Kingsley L. Leh.
15.
Suspension of the Chairman, Opobo/Nkoro Local Government Council, Hon.
(Engr). Christopher Ogolo
16.
House Resolution on Sosoliso Plan Crash in Port Harcourt (18/12/06)
17.
Notice of allegation of gross misconduct and the resolution of the Khana
Local Government Legislative Council, to impeach the Chairman of the
council, Hon. Kingsley L. Leh.
However, at the inception of the House in 1999, problems of red-tapism, human
errors, incompetence, inefficiency, ignorance, low morale and low output had
characterized legislative functions. Following the remarkable human capacity
155
transformation arising from multiple training programmes, situation changed and the
House was better for it. Despite that the House of Assembly members in Rivers State and
their clerical officers have undergone several trainings to improve their performance, the
legislature has not adequately ensured effective control of the executive excesses due to
several reasons especially continual patronage by the executive arm.
From the foregoing discourse, we therefore validate our first hypothesis which
states that there is a significant relationship between legislative oversight and exposition
of executive corruption in the Rivers State. The implication of legislative incompetence in
checking executive corruption as shown in this chapter is that executive corruption will
continue unabated in the State.
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CHAPTER SIX
RE-ELECTION OF LEGISLATORS AND MECHANISMS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
In this chapter, we tested the second hypothesis which states that the quest for reelection among legislators undermined the operation of legislative mechanisms of
accountability in Rivers State within the period of study. We applied quests 11 to 23, the
correspondence from our interview and other relevant documents to test the hypothesis.
6.1 Factors that affect legislative mechanisms for accountability
Globally, reviews on legislative studies have tried to address the question of
factors that affect legislative mechanisms for accountability but in this thesis we shall
examine the factors as it affect Rivers State. We also represented the responses to our
questions in this section. Table 6.1.1 below shows the feeling of respondents on the major
impediment to legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State.
Table 6.1.1: Response to question 11- What do you feel is the major impediment to
legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State?
Response
Frequency
Zoning of
20
public offices
Quest for re220
election
Party politics
20
over
110
dependence on
the executive
Others
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
5.33
Cumulative Frequency
20
58.66
240
5.33
29.33
260
370
1.33
375
Table 6.1.1 above shows that 5.33 percent of our respondents believe that the
major impediment to legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State is the
zoning of public offices; about 58.66 percent believe that quest for re-election is the
major impediment to legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State. Again
157
5.33 percent believe that party politics is the major impediment to legislative pursuit of
public accountability in the State and 29.33 percent believe
that legislative
overdependence on the executive is the major impediment to legislative pursuit of public
accountability. About 1.33 percent believes that other factors including 1999 Constitution
of Nigeria which over empowered the executive to fund the state’s businesses including
legislative business and insufficient training of legislators as the major impediment to
legislative pursuit of public accountability in Rivers State. Our interviewees also pointed
at quest for re-election among legislators and the legislators overdependence on the
executive for direction and funds as the major impediment to legislative pursuit of public
accountability in the State.
Table 6.1.2 : Response to question 12 - How often are the legislature re-elected
Response
Frequency
Very often
70
Often
305
Rarely
0
Never
0
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
18.66
81.33
0
0
Cumulative Frequency
70
375
375
375
Table 6.1.2 above shows that 18.66 percent of our respondents believe that
legislators are very often reelected and about 81.33 percent believe that legislators are
often reelected. None of the respondents believe that the legislators are rarely or never reelected. We also gathered from our group interview that legislators’ re-election is rampant
in Nigeria and Rivers State is not an exception. They remarked that the incidence of reelection is largely dependent on the extent of the legislators’ loyalty to the Governor.
Those that are often denied ticket for re-election are those that have severed relationship
with the Governor. Legislators do not need the consent of the people to be re-elected; it is
the Governors’ consent that is primary, then the peoples rituals of election to legalize the
process.
158
Table 6.1.3: Response to question 13 - Do you feel that the shift investigations by the
Assembly are done in the interest of the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
94
No
220
Undecided
61
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
25.06
58.66
16.26
Cumulative Frequency
94
314
375
Table 6.1.3 above revealed that 25.06 percent of our respondents feel that the
shift investigations by the Assembly are done in the interest of the State; 58 percent feel
that the shift investigations by the Assembly are not done in the interest of the State and
16. 26 percent were undecided. Again, our correspondence from the group interview
shows that the shift in investigations is intentionally initiated to distort the content of final
reports on the executive performance in the State. This practice although was borrowed
from the National Assembly has not been used to ensure effective check on the executive
spending in Rivers State.
Table 6.1.4: Response to question 14- Most of the bills enacted by the Assembly are
executive bills
Response
Frequency
Yes
320
No
53
Undecided
2
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
85.33
14.13
0.53
Cumulative Frequency
320
373
375
Table 6.1.4 revealed that 85.33 percent of our respondents agree that most of the bills
enacted by the Assembly are executive bills; 14.13 percent of our respondents answered
that most of the bills enacted by the Assembly are not executive bills while 0.53 percent
of our respondents were undecided. In our group interview, they equally agreed that most
of the bills enacted by the Assembly are executive bills. Private member bill rarely move
to second reading but most of the executive bills are granted accelerated hearing which is
usually directed by the State Governor. Stressing this point, one of our respondents (name
159
withheld) insisted that the leadership of the Rivers State House of Assembly often
conspires with the Governor to frustrate genuine legislator process and actions towards
law making outside the ambit of appropriations.
Table 6.1.5 : Response to question 15- The Assembly members hardly get in touch with
their constituents?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Yes
300
80
300
No
51
13.6
361
Undecided
24
6.4
375
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Following table 6.1.5, about 80 percent of our respondents agreed that the
Assembly members hardly get in touch with their constituents; 13.6 percent feel that the
Assembly members get in touch with their constituents while 6.4 percent was undecided.
The interview correspondence showed that the Assembly members hardly get in touch
with their constituents. The Assembly members get in touch with their constituencies
only during elections to legitimize the rigging of the election by the ruling party. The
Assembly members rarely maintain constituency offices in their constituencies and when
they have one, legislative idea is hardly generated from the offices because the staff in
these offices are not experienced or trained. It mainly serves as campaign base during
elections.
Table 6.1.6: Response to question 16- The Assembly has been passive on issues of
unemployment, environmental rights and peaceful coexistence
Response
Frequency
Yes
320
No
53
Undecided
2
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
85.33
14.13
0.53
Cumulative Frequency
320
373
375
Table 6.1.6 revealed that 85.333 percent of our respondents agree that the
Assembly has been passive on issues of unemployment, environmental rights and
160
peaceful coexistence; about 14.13 percent or our respondents answered that the Assembly
has not been passive on these issues while 0.53 percent of our respondents were
undecided. In our group interview, we gathered that the Rivers State House of Assembly
has been passive on issues of unemployment, environmental rights and peaceful
coexistence. They only exist to legitimize the practices and activities of the executive
through financial appropriations. While the incidence of poverty and unemployment
thrive in the State, the people’s representatives are amassing wealth for campaign in the
successive election year. They appear pro- masses, pro-youth, pro-environment and propeace in election years and this type of friendliness is not sustainable.
Table 6.1.7 : Response to question 17- Legislative oversight of the executive has ensured
executive’s compliance with legislative intents?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Yes
9
2.4
9
No
366
97.6
375
Undecided
0
0
375
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
The table above shows that the legislative oversight of the executive has not ensured
executive’s compliance with legislative intents. About
2.4 percent of our respondents
agreed that the legislative oversight of the executive has ensured executive’s compliance
with legislative intents while about 97.6 percent disagreed and none of the respondents
was undecided in this question. The interview correspondence shows that the legislative
intents in Rivers State are determined by the executive since the legislative organ is
merely a rubber stamp of the executive. The only intent the legislature nurture and sustain
in Rivers State is approval of executive bills and requests especially between 2007 and
2011 under the Governorship of Rotimi Amaechi.
161
Table 6.1.8: Response to question 18- Legislative oversight has improved the efficiency
and effectiveness of governmental operations in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
53
No
320
Undecided
2
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
14.13
85.33
0.53
Cumulative Frequency
53
373
375
Table 6.1.8 above shows that 14.13 percent of our respondents feel that the
legislative oversight has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental
operations in the State; 85.333 percent of our respondents disagreed while 0.53 percent of
our respondents were undecided. In our group interview, they equally disagreed that
legislative oversight has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental
operations in the State. They insisted that the only means through which the legislative
oversight can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations in the
State is to wither the legislative dependence on the executive and elongate the tenure of
legislator beyond the executive.
Table 6.1.9 : Response to question 19 - The legislature has been evaluating programme
performance of the executive in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
330
No
40
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
88
10.66
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
330
370
375
Table 6.1.9 shows that 88 percent of our respondents believe that the legislature
has been evaluating programme performance of the executive in the State; 10.66 percent
of the respondents disagreed while 1.33 percent were undecided on the question. Our
interview response concurred with the majority of the questionnaire response that the
legislature has been evaluating programme performance of the executive in the State.
162
Hence, legislative oversight do not enhance public accountability in Rivers
State.
However, they remarked that the legislative evaluation programme of the executive has
been ineffective because the executive arm of government do not give the legislature
adequate opportunity to carry out these functions.
Even when the outcomes of the
evaluation indicted the executive, the Assembly lacks the political muscle to punish the
offenders.
Table 6.1.10 : Response to question 20 - If answer to no 19 above is yes, what method do
they apply?
Response
surveys
cost-benefit
analyses,
efficiency
studies
Frequency
100
223
Percentage
30.30
67.57
Cumulative Frequency
100
223
7
2.12
330
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Out of the 330 respondents that affirmed question number 19, about 30.30 percent
argued that the legislature apply the survey method for evaluation; 67.57 percent replied
that the legislature apply the cost –benefit analysis for evaluation of programmes in the
State; while 2.12 percent replied that the legislature apply the efficiency studies approach
for evaluation of executive programmes in Rivers State. Meanwhile, in our interview, our
respondents noted that there is no uniform approach adopted by the legislature in Rivers
State for evaluation of programmes. The Rivers State legislature adopts a multivariate
approach to evaluation which involves the survey, cost –benefit analysis and efficiency
studies. They also noted that cost benefit analysis is easy to apply and this is its relative
advantage over the other two approaches.
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Table 6.1.11: Response to question 21- The Legislators have investigated alleged
instances of poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behavior, abuse, waste,
dishonesty, and fraud among the executives in the State?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Yes
311
82.93
311
No
57
15.2
368
Undecided
7
1.86
375
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Following table 6.1.11, about 82.93 percent of our respondents agreed that the
legislators have investigated alleged instances of poor administration, arbitrary and
capricious behavior, abuse, waste, dishonesty, and fraud among the executives in the
State; 15.2 percent disagreed and 1.86 percent of our respondents was undecided in this
question. The interview correspondence showed that the legislators have investigated
alleged instances of poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behavior, abuse, waste,
dishonesty, and fraud among the executives. However, they revealed that the
investigations of the legislature that indicted the executive government were never
published for public consumption and proper disciplinary measures were not taken.
Hence, the legislative investigations on the executive have not been put to proper use in
the State especially between 1999 and 2011.
Table 6.1.12: Response to question 22 – The legislature determines the financial
priorities in the State?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Yes
0
0
0
No
350
93.33
350
Undecided
15
6.66
375
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Table 6.1.12 above shows that none of our respondents believe that the legislature
determines the financial priorities in the State. About 93.33 percent of our respondents do
not believe that the legislature determines the financial priorities in the State and about
6.66 percent of our respondents were undecided on the question. Our respondents from
the group interview also were undivided in their views that legislature do not determine
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the financial priorities in the State. This area is almost an exclusive zone of the executive
even though the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria allows for the legislature to participate.
Table 6.1.13: Response to question 23- The Assembly ensures that executive policies
reflect the public interest in the State?
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Yes
9
2.4
9
No
366
97.6
375
Undecided
0
0
375
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
The table above shows that 2.4 percent of our respondents agreed that the
Assembly ensures that executive policies reflect the public interest in the State about 97.6
percent disagreed and none of the respondents was undecided in this question. The
interview correspondence showed that the executive is more powerful that the legislature
in Rivers State like at the federal level in Nigeria and in almost every other states in
country since the return of democracy in 1999.
6.2 Problem of creating incentives for legislators
This caption is necessary because it determines the performance of the legislature
in creating legislation, conducting administrative oversight and solving constituent
problems would improve if the task of creating legislation were separated from the other
tasks of the legislature. Most sub-national legislators in developing countries, including
the Rivers State House of Assembly are denied of the appropriate incentives for
legislators to carefully comply with established precedents for general benefits. We
assume most legislators enjoy the power and prestige of office and seek long term
political careers. Consequently, legislators in pursuit of power have strong incentives to
take whatever action is required to ensure re-election. To make the professional review a
re-election issue, a legislator in sponsoring a bill or amendment would assume the
responsibility that the bill would pass a professional review. And the current intensity
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bias in the campaign financing of elections would be greatly reduced by publicly funded
elections with fixed limits for each level of office. Currently, the unlimited campaign
financing by political action committees and private
contributions
gives
a
disproportionate influence to concentrated interests in elections.
With fixed amount, publicly funded elections, the legislator wishing to remain in
office would have to be prepared to face an opponent with equal funding. Moreover, the
voters with limited resources to carefully analyze issues would focus on simple measures
of performance which they understood. A negative professional review becomes a simple
measure of failure to perform which an enterprising opponent would quickly bring to the
attention of voters. A negative professional review on the grounds of lack of general
benefits is a clear sign that the incumbent has been captured by special interests. A
negative professional review on the grounds of lack of consistency or efficiency is an
indicator that the legislator may not be competent. Consequently, legislators wishing a
long political career would subject sponsored bills to much more careful scrutiny than is
the current practice.
To encourage accountability to all voters, legislators would be elected in state
elections. Given the broad scope of government and the complexity of political issues
legislators should run for legislative specialties which are defined as particular areas of
legislation-for example, finance, social programs, or defense. Prior to each election,
legislators running in one of these legislative specialties would be guaranteed committee
assignments in the area specified.
Nevertheless, the professional review would not suddenly shift the re-election
incentive of each senator from that of maximizing the benefits to his constituent groups to
the lofty Rivers State purpose of promoting general benefits, consistency and efficiency.
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Rather, the legislator would be interested in performing analysis to ensure that his
promotion of his constituent's interests lies within the precedents established by previous
professional reviews. The legislators would thus have a strong interest in establishing
their own professional review mechanism to greatly reduce the risk of professional review
challenges in the courts.
In short, the professional review would change the process of creating legislation
in various ways. First, legislators would insist that the Governor in submitting proposed
legislation to the House would also have to submit the careful analysis upon which the
proposed legislation was based. In the House legislation would be submitted to a further
two part review. First, public hearings with media exposure would emphasize the human
aspects of the legislation and legislators as media celebrities would make their traditional
political statements concerning the purposes of the legislation. Second, a technical
analysis of the legislation would be conducted by specialists presenting opposing analysis
of the proposed legislation. These proceedings would generally be too technical to create
a great deal of public interest.
Recall that the main functions of the legislators would be to resolve governmental
problems of their constituents, to conduct administrative oversight, and to vote on
sponsored legislation. Unlike
today, constituents would only approach their
representatives with governmental administrative problems. These legislators would have
a technical support staff for administrative oversight and a larger staff to handle
constituent relations. Congressmen who maintained good constituent relations, provided
oversight on administrative matters of interest to their districts, and voted the interests of
their districts could enjoy a long career. Even though all their actions would be subject to
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a possible professional review, legislators would enjoy less risky careers than those of
senators.
The power of the House to influence government legislation and policies would
stem from its power of legislative oversight. The House alone would investigate scandals
and other failures of leadership in the administration. Also in keeping with tradition, the
House would initiate the legislative budget process. This process would provide
legislators with clout in their oversight in how well administration policies were
satisfying their constituent’s needs.
Our interview ties legislative professionalization and power to career paths. In
particular, higher rates of reelection and longer legislative careers should produce more
professional, competent, and high-quality legislatures. Legislators have more incentives
to strengthen their own institution when they intend to remain there for a long career. In
fact legislators with greater prospects for long careers were actually less likely to support
strengthening the legislative branch. We explain this as part of a local equilibrium where
career legislators’ short-term need for pork trumped their long-term interest in a stronger
institution.
This quest for re-election is common to both executives and legislators. Most
countries have tried to ban legislative re-election. However, ban on legislative re-election
is not very common. The prohibition of re-election, such as in Mexico, may mean that
parliamentarians have to leave shortly after warming up to the parliamentary process. It
was also mentioned that a parliament can fall short of capacity and effective continuity in
its processes with such practices.
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Further, the link was made between ‘legislative re-election’ and ‘recall’, the latter
being in use for example in California and being considered in several Canadian
provinces. It was pointed out that good governance may be adversely affected if the use
of recalls increases instability of elections and mandates. Similarly it was mentioned that
continuity and stability is an essential element of building leadership within the ranks of
political parties, looking towards fostering future top level leaders.
Our interview revealed that the term 'legislative re-election' does not convey
which of the forms of re-election is being referred to. For instance, national presidential
re-election is controlled by legislation in countries such as Kenya, Mexico and the USA,
and while the lower level legislature in the USA has a more limited two-year term, they
together with many others including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kenya, have no
limitations as to the number of terms one can serve. The Tanzanian example was brought
up, where incumbent members of parliament can be re-elected as many times as their
political parties nominate them and voters elect them, but also that the competition within
parties still produce turnover among members of parliament. With the exception of the
Chief Executives whose terms have been somehow controlled all over the world,
legislative re- election may have its limitation on other elective offices. Continuity and
stability is an essential element of building leadership required within the ranks of
political parties in order to produce presidents and other cadres.
In River and many other states in Nigeria, one may not be noticed in one term
parliamentary appearance even if you are holding the golden boot of leadership hence; it
becomes necessary for legislators to seek re-election. They claim that re-election would
enable them to consolidate the legislative process in the State. In the bid to seek reelection
and considering that executive Governors are too powerful in Nigeria to frustrate re-
169
election ambition, legislators play subservient role to be in good book of the Governor to
secure reelection. We therefore validate our second hypothesis which states that the quest
for re-election among legislators undermine the operation of legislative mechanisms of
accountability in Rivers State within the period of study
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter tests the hypothesis three which states that the legislative oversight
by the Rivers State House of Assembly did not enhance infrastructural development in
the State within the period of study. We looked at the legislature, development and
infrastructure and then applied questions 24 to 28, the correspondence from our interview
and other relevant documents to test the hypothesis.
7.1 The legislature, development and infrastructure
The Rivers State House of Assembly is the legislative (lawmaking) arm of the
government. The twenty three member House of Assembly was inaugurated in June 1999,
with the Speaker of the House as Chairman to check the other two arms of government.
The extent to which the legislative oversight has brought about development and
improvement in infrastructure has been analyzed here.
Nigerian infrastructural development is nothing but comparable to the war-turn
states of Somalia, Congo DR, and Afghanistan. Even Iraq and Rwanda’s infrastructure
are far better than Nigeria’s. In the 2010 approved budget, done by the late President Yar
‘Adua government in 2009, the National Assembly passed and approved for the
purchase of 7 Helicopters, in addition to the stream of presidential jets and planes wasting
away at enormous cost to the Nigerian people. In the same budget was listed a guesthouse
for the Senate President costing a whooping sum of N750 million. Again, an approval of
N250 million was listed as expenditure for chasing termites out of Aso rock. Later, a
whopping N7billion was approved for the construction of “Aguda House,” a “befitting”
house for the then Vice President- Goodluck Jonathan. In 2011 another, $150million
dollars was spent to buy three more jets for the presidency. These approvals were made as
171
if there was no form of oversight in the system (Okpi, 2012). This is similar to the
situation in Rivers State where appropriations are done as though there were no
legislature in existence as the expense of poor infrastructure. The cries of political
marginalization, environmental degradation and economic pauperization continued
among the indigenes of Rivers while their politicians swim in ocean of wealth abound
(Garba, 2012).
In this study we considered development as just not building or provision of
infrastructure or social amenities. Development is the consistent improvement of the
people’s environment, human beings, resources, value systems and traditional
occupations. The environment consists of the forests, water bodies, rocks, valleys,
mountains and the entire landscape owned by the people. Human beings include their
brains and especially their talents, experiences, knowledge and philosophies embedded in
their spiritual minds and psychologies that propel them to act, re-act or take no action.
Resources here refers to all the surface and under the surface things of material value
including land, vegetation, crops, trees, minerals, heat-energy, gas, coastal areas etc.
Value systems refer to those generally accepted traditional principles or customs with
which life is lived. They include the governmental system, principles that guide private
relationships, inter-communal relations, sports and entertainment, law and adjudication,
etc. Traditional occupations refer to the economic systems of engagement for the
production of wealth and sustenance of life. These occupations were derived from the
nature of the people’s environment, their known talents, resources and value systems.
In Rivers State, the then Commander Alfred Diette Spiff, the pioneer leader of the
state, drew up a very ambitious plan to develop the state. This led to the establishment of
the College of Science and Technology ( now Rivers State University of Science and
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Technology), College of Education ( now Ignatius Ajuru University of Education),
School of Basic Studies ( now College of Arts & Science), School of Nursing, School of
Health Technology, Nigerian Tide, taking over of primary and secondary schools hitherto
owned by churches and establishing new ones, construction of roads, establishment of
utilities board, Pan African Bank which died later due to funds mismanagement and those
responsible used the stolen funds to float their own banks, Pabod Finance & Investment,
Pabod Breweries, Pabod Supplies, Pabod Foods, scholarship and bursary programmes,
building of the state Secretariat complex, stadia and providing supports for the
establishment of Federal institutions, agencies and facilities like the army barracks,
airforce base, naval and police infrastructure across the state. There were NPA, River
Basin Development Authorities, NEPA/PHCN facilities and offices, refineries and
petrochemicals, University of Port Harcourt, Nitel/Mtel, NIPOST, NAFCON and private
businesses represented by the giant oil and gas companies, oil and gas services companies
etc. All these in addition to other facilities established by the Eastern Region government
including Trans-Amadi Industrial Layout, Hotel Presidential Port Harcourt, Oilmill
Factories, Bori Camp etc. Also established were dispensaries, health centres and
hospitals.
Later, Rivoc, RisomPalm Ltd, WAGI, Onne Port, School-to-Land Authority,
Liquefied Natural Gas projects, Bori Polytechnic were established. There was the
expansion of state and federal enterprises and projects in the state. Thereafter, the state
hosted the OMPADEC and now NDDC corporate headquarters, and established Omoku
Gas Turbine and the state is currently working on the monorail and Greater Port Harcourt
City projects. Despite that Rivers state hosts these significant infrastructures; it is still
classified as underdeveloped/undeveloped by the UNDP.
173
This is because there had not been consciously sustained effort at improving the
items of development. That is why today the Rivers environment is endangered and being
extinct; the talents of the people are not known. The people of Rivers State do not have
the capacity to discover, exploit and refine mineral resources deposited beneath their
soils. They cannot even clean-up their environments polluted by crude oil spillages. The
traditional occupations of the peoples of Rivers State have not been improved compared
to what they were in the 1980s. Besides Trans-Amadi Industrial Estate, there is no other
one that can make significant contribution to the ongoing computation of the state’s GDP.
Our interview revealed that despite the recent attempt by Governor Amaechi to
revitalize the school in the State, over 80% of the secondary schools in the state are
afflicted with cultism; while about 30% of the primary schools in the state are overdosed
with cultism. All the tertiary institutions in the state are the seventh-havens of cultism
practices and they control oil bunkering and illegal mining of crude oil in the state. These
are booming because these cultists have strong political support; despite the existence of
the state laws prohibiting cultism in the state. At the end, Rivers State had lost its
character and life had never been the same again. This is where we are today with the
youths of Rivers State and the role of values in our efforts at development.
To worsen the matter, there is high level unemployment of youths, many children
of school age still roaming the streets of Rivers State, unresolved inter-community
conflicts fueled by cultism, corruption in government, general lack of appropriate
development pathways or ideologies. It is not just about building roads, bridges, buying
and installing transformers etc which had been the case since 1999, but more about to
provide them in context since they are needed to improve a particular item of
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development. Real development is when the people are directly responsible for the
transformation of the items of development in order to satisfy their needs.
At 43 year old, Rivers State had averagely executed the project of building
infrastructure despite the huge sum of fund that flows from oil derivation and other
loyalties. Our interview shows that the leadership in Rivers State since 1999 has not been
able to industrialize the state to be driven by its empowered talents whose focus will be to
unleash knowledge and structural growth in the agriculture, resources and values of the
peoples of Rivers State.
7.2 Oversight powers of the legislature and infrastructural development
This section presents the responses from our questionnaire and interview to test
our third hypothesis. Table 7.2.1 shows the response on the effect of legislative
investigatory powers over government-wide activities on the development of
infrastructure in Rivers State.
Table 7.2.1: Response to question 24 - Do the legislative investigatory powers over
government-wide activities enhance the development of infrastructure?
Response
Frequency
Yes
40
No
330
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
10.66
88
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
40
370
375
Table 7. 2.1 show that 10.66 percent of our respondents believe that the legislative
investigatory powers over government-wide activities enhance the development of
infrastructure in the State; 88 percent of our respondents disagreed while 1.33 percent was
undecided on the question. Our interview response remarked that the investigatory
powers of the legislature do not enhance or improve the development of infrastructure in
175
the State. They further remarked that the Rivers State legislature engages in this practice
to appear potent in checking the executive through investigation of government –wide
activities.
Table 7.2.2: Response to question 25 - The appropriation power of the legislature do not
play a prominent role in infrastructural development in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
330
No
40
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Table 7.2.2
Percentage
88
10.66
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
330
370
375
shows that 88 percent of our respondents agreee that the
appropriation power of the legislature do not play a prominent role in infrastructural
development in the State; 10.66 percent believe that the appropriation power of the
legislature play a prominent role in infrastructural development in the State while 1.33
percent were undecided on the question. Our interview response shows that the
appropriation power of the legislature do not play a direct role in infrastructural
development in the State. Although the appropriation power of the legislature is vital for
execution of the State’s annual budget, its role in infrastructural development in the state
is not direct.
Table 7.2.3: Response to question 26 – The impeachment power of the Assembly does
not enhance the development of infrastructure in the State?
Response
Frequency
Yes
330
No
40
Undecided
5
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Percentage
88
10.66
1.33
Cumulative Frequency
330
370
375
Response to question 25 is similar to the response of question 26. As shown above
in table 7.2.3, about 88 percent of our respondents believe that the impeachment power of
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the Assembly do not enhance the development of infrastructure in the State; 10.66 percent
believe that the impeachment power of the Assembly enhance the development of
infrastructure in the State while 1.33 percent were undecided on the question. The
response of our interviewees shows that the executive fear of the impeachment power of
the legislature has been erased after most legislative houses in Nigeria abused that
precious legislative power. The River State Governor controls more than 70 percent of the
legislators who wish to be reelected hence; the issue of impeachment does not arise. They
furthered that the executive embarks on infrastructural development in Rivers State
largely to endear themselves to the people for the successive election year and not
because of fear of impeachment.
Table 7.2.4: Response to question
government concentrate?
Response
Frequency
Schools
111
Roads/
100
Flyovers/
Bridges
Hospitals
78
Power
54
Others
32
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
27 – What type of infrastructure
do the state
Percentage
29.6
26.66
Cumulative Frequency
111
211
20.8
14.4
8.53
289
343
375
Table 7.2.4 above shows that 29.6 percent of our respondents believe that the
State government concentrates on development of schools; 26.66 percent believe that the
State government concentrates on development of roads/ flyovers/ bridges; 20.8 percent
believe that the
State government concentrates on development of hospitals; 14.4
percent believe that the State government concentrates on development of power while
8.53 percent identified other areas of infrastructural development where the state
government concentrates. These areas include: market development, development of
more turbines; amusement parks and other tourist centers. Our interview shows that the
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State government does not concentrate on any specific area of infrastructural
development. They however, noted that the infrastructure so far are insufficient in the
State compared to the large sum of fund that flows into the state monthly.
Table 7.2.5: Response to question 28 – What approach has the State government adopted
to enhance infrastructural development
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative Frequency
Public
15
4
15
approach
Private
0
0
15
approach
Public-Private
360
96
375
approach
Source: Fieldwork, 2011
Table 7.2.5 above shows that 4 percent of our respondents believe that the State
government adopted the public approach to enhance infrastructural development; none of
our respondents replied that the state rely on private approach to enhance infrastructural
development while 96 percent believe that the State government rely on public-private
approach
to enhance infrastructural development. Our interview revealed that this
approach hinders the legislature from exercising effective monitoring of the
infrastructural development despite the fact that the state contribution to this partnership
remained higher.
7.3 Public --Private Participation Laws in Infrastructure Development
The Rivers State Public Private Participation in Infrastructure Development Law
No. 5 of 2009 (The Law) is a law to promote, facilitate, and regulate partnership between
the Public and Private sectors in Infrastructure Development in Rivers State, and to
establish the Rivers State Council on Public Private Partnership, and the Rivers State
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Bureau of Public Private Partnership, and other matters related thereto. The Law is
divided into twelve (12) Parts and seventy – eight (78) sections.
Part I (Ss. 1 – 4) of the Law provides for the establishment of the Public – Private
Initiative (PPI), the objectives, application, registration and execution of proposal. The
Partnership Initiative between the public and private sectors for the financing,
development, implementation, and management of infrastructure and provision of
services in Rivers State – S. 1. The Objectives of the PPI is to strengthen institutional
governance in the State by improving managerial skills and accountability with respect to
the construction, rehabilitation and provision of infrastructure and essential services in the
State; attract private funds for investment in the state; improve the management of State
resources in order to provide efficient and cost effective service delivery in the State;
increase the employment generation potential of the State economy; provide a clear,
transparent and well defined legal, regulatory, and institutional framework in order to
enhance private investment in the State; strengthen human capacity development within
the State; provide quality, efficient and affordable services to residents of the State and
expand services to a broader range of users in the Federation.
Part II (Ss. 5 – 12) of the Law provides for the establishment, composition,
functions, etc of the Rivers State Council on Public Private Partnership. S. 5 of the Law
establishes the Rivers State Council on Public Private Partnership (The Policy Council).
The Policy Council consist of the Deputy Governor who shall be the Chairman, the
Attorney General and Commissioner of Justice, the Secretary to the State Government,
Surveyor General of the State, Commissioners for Budget and Economic Planning,
Finance, Works, Commerce and Industry, Urban and Regional Planning (in the absence
of any Commissioner, the Permanent Secretaries of the designated Ministries shall act),
179
representative of the Port Harcourt Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and
Agriculture; etc – S. 6. The Policy Council shall formulate, develop or modify for the
State a Master Plan setting out government objectives, sector priorities, and the level of
investment required (master plan).
Part III (Ss. 13 – 26) of the Law provides for the establishment, composition,
functions, etc of the Rivers State Public – Private Partnerships (The PPP Bureau). The
Law vest on the Governor the power to appoint the Executive Director of the PPP Bureau
who shall be the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the PPP Bureau; a graduate
from a recognised university and must either be a legal practitioner, a graduate of
economics with a Masters in Business Administration, Finance or any related discipline,
an Accountant who shall be a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Nigeria, or any other recognised accounting profession in Nigeria; or an engineer who
shall be a member of the Council of Registered Engineers of Nigeria (COREN); be an
indigene of Rivers State; have held a senior management position in a public
administration or Corporate management; have a minimum of fifteen (15) years cognate
experience in his profession – S. 14. The Law clearly provides for the removal of the
Executive Director of the PPP Bureau – S. 15, appointment of the Directors of the PPP
Bureau – S. 16, Project Advisors and other staff of the PPP Bureau, application of the
provisions of the Pension Reform Act 2004 to the employees of the Bureau .
The PPP Bureau shall:- be a centre of expertise for the promotion, development,
implementation of Public – Private Partnership projects in the state; assist the Policy
Council in the formulation of PPP Policies and Guidelines in the State; provide technical
assistance and support on PPP implementation to all government agencies contracting
authorities, and the private sector in the State; appraise, review, evaluate, and approve all
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PPP projects throughout the process of project selection, preparation and procurement in
the State; facilitate the issuance or renewal of permits, licences, and other regulatory
approvals for PPP projects from all government agencies and authorities; co-ordinate the
activities of contracting and other relevant government authorities, and the private sector
with respect to the PPP projects in the State; etc – S. 20. The PPP Bureau shall in carrying
out its functions under the Law, engage the services of consultants, experts, and technical
advisers .
The Law establishes in the Chambers of the Attorney General the Contract
Management Unit (CMU) which consists of the Attorney General as Chairman, Director
Legal Drafting, Ministry of Justice as the Secretary, etc – S. 23. The PPP Bureau shall
provide the CMU with technical assistance to enable it carry out its functions – S. 25. The
CMU is to manage activities after the PPP project commissioning in order to ensure that
the parties adhere to the terms of the contract agreement; liaise with the contracting
authorities in the monitoring, and enforcement of PPP projects; review any proposed
changes to the contract agreement; issue quarterly progress reports on PPP projects to the
State Executive Council; deliberate on refinance, expansion, or renewal of terms of
existing contracts; be a centre for the amicable resolution of disputes arising from the PPP
Contract Agreement; and carry out such functions as the Attorney General and
Commissioner for Justice may deem necessary in the regulation and monitoring of PPP
projects.
Part IV (Ss. 27 – 42) of the Law provides for the establishment in the Ministry of
Finance the Infrastructural Development Finance Unit (IDFU) – S. 27. The composition
of the IDFU is provided for in S. 28 of the Law and tasked with the responsibility to
ensure value for money for the State by applying commercial standards in evaluating
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financial risk and cost; etc – S. 30. The IDFU shall in carrying out its functions
collaborate with the PPP Bureau so as to give effect to the implementation of the Law –
S. 31. In carrying out its functions IDFU may engage consultants and technical advisers –
S.32. The Law permits the IDFU to form or cause to be formed a special purpose
company for the purpose of raising long term debt and equity from the public as may be
necessary for the financing of public-private partnership projects .
Parts V – VIII (Ss. 43 – 60) of the Law provide for the stages in the registration
of a potential PPP project. Where a Contracting Authority intends to implement a Project
under this Law, it shall register as a Solicited Project Proposal (Proposal) with the PPP
Bureau. The Bureau shall register a Proposal if it contains information on the availability
of the necessary expertise in the Contracting Authority to proceed with the Project and a
detailed profile of members of its team; give the details of the appointment of a Project
Officer from within or outside the Contracting Authority or a transaction advisor if so
deemed necessary by the contracting authority; contains a pre-feasibility study. If the
applicable, registration fee in accordance with the guideline to the Law and been paid;
and the Proposal has complied with the requirement of the Law – S. 44. Upon registration
of the Proposal the PPP Bureau shall make an assessment of the Proposal submitted to it
and make necessary recommendation where necessary and submit same to the Policy
Council for its review and onward presentation to the State Executive Council. The State
Executive Council shall notify the Policy Council of its decision to proceed with the
Proposal as a PPP project and shall issue an “in principle” approval – S. 44 (2). Upon the
decision to proceed with the Proposal by the State Executive Council the Bureau shall
issue BUREAU APPROVAL NO. 1 to the Contracting Authority. On review of the
Feasibility Study of the Contracting Authority as contained in S. 46, if satisfied the PPP
Bureau shall issue BUREAU APPROVAL NO. 2 – S. 47. The long process of
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negotiation ends upon the receipt of the executed copies of the Agreement and the PPP
Bureau issues the BUREAU APPROVAL NO. 4. No PPP Agreement shall commence
prior to the issuance of BUREAU APPROVAL NO. 4 – S. 59 (4).
Parts IX and XI (Ss. 61 – 77) of the Law deal with unsolicited project proposal,
duration of the PPP Projects, extension, termination of the PPP Agreement, financial
provisions bothering on the funds of the PPP Bureau, estimates, accounts and audits,
annual reports; miscellaneous matters which include funds of the CMU, directive of the
Governor, power to make regulations definitions, citations, etc.
7.4 Funding of Infrastructural development
Rivers State Government has many alternatives for financing infrastructure
development and must, therefore, consider the cost of funds and the ease of accessing
same. According to Onyema (2013:2), Rivers State fund her infrastructural development
through the following:
Federal Funding
Funding by the Federal Government of Nigeria
State Internally Generated Revenue
Contributions via an increase in the IGR tax-base
Private/Foreign Investment
Private investment with rights/guarantees by the Government
Bank Debt
Short-term financing widely used in Nigeria
Debenture/Bond Issuance
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Listing of debenture by state-owned companies with FGN backing or of State
infrastructure bond or Municipal bond
Privatization
Post-privatization listing of state-owned companies on the NSE
Equity Investment
Equity investment by an investor in majority state-owned companies
National Investment Fund
National investment fund designed for investing in infrastructure (e.g., SWF)
Public Private Partnerships (PPP)/Concessions
Implementation of the Rivers State PPP in Infrastructure Development Law 2009
Rivers State can consider several options for its infrastructure financing needs
Development
Finance Institutions (DFIs)
Debt issuance by DFIs with a medium- to long-term investment horizon
The Nigerian
Meanwhile, the NSE’s secondary bond market offers easy access to capital, at a
reasonable rate, specifically for long-term finance needs. Hence, Rivers State’s ambition
to catalyze the industrialization and transformation of the State requires a massive
financial outlay which can be obtained from the capital market. The NSE’s secondary
bond market is especially suited for funding long-term, capital-intensive infrastructure
projects, and can easily accommodate Rivers State’s N250bn requirement for
infrastructure projects.
According to the Federal Ministry of Finance (2012), the figures of revenue
allocation by the Federal Account Allocation Committee showed that oil producing states
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shared 13 per cent derivation fund of about N48.35bn in January 2012, with Akwa Ibom
State getting the largest share of N12.58bn, followed by Rivers State, with N12.43bn,
while Abia State had the least, N116.36m. However, out of the total amount of N238.6bn
that went to the states and their local governments in January, Rivers State got the largest
amount of N23.67bn, followed by Akwa Ibom State with N22.86bn, and then Delta State,
which received N18.92bn, all being oil states in the South-South geopolitical zone. The
state that received the least amount was Ebonyi State (South-East) with N3.34bn,
followed by Ekiti State (South-West) with N3.47bn, and then Nasarawa State (NorthCentral) with N3.63bn. In the North-West geopolitical zone, Kano State got the highest
amount of N7.10bn, while Zamfara with N4.10bn got the least. In the North-East, Borno
State got the largest amount of N5.23bn, while Gombe State with N3.97bn got the least in
that zone. Aliyu’s Niger State got N4.86bn, the largest amount among the states in the
North-Central geopolitical zone, while Nasarawa State had the least amount in the zone
(Okpi, 2012).
In the South, the South-South zone, made up of oil bearing states, obviously got
the largest share of all the zones, with Rivers State getting the highest, and Cross River
State getting the least amount, N4.48bn. The South-West got a considerable share with
Lagos State getting the largest amount, N10.41bn, and Ekiti State getting the least amount
in the zone. Despite being an oil producing state, Abia State, in the South-East, got
N4.40bn. Imo State, with N5.24bn, got the largest amount in the zone, while Ebonyi got
the least. According to the Executive Director, African Centre for Leadership, Strategy
and Development, Dr. Otive Igbuzor, in his 2002 paper titled, ‘Constitution making and
the struggle for resource control in Nigeria’ there has always been controversy over the
appropriate formula that should be used to divide resources in Nigeria.
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Our interview revealed that if oil money were to dry up today (maybe crude prices
drop to uneconomic levels or we are unable to export), only Lagos state in the entire
federation would be able to settle its wage bill. This statistic was shocking but only Lagos
generates enough internal revenue to pay its workers. To meet wage obligations, the rest
of Nigeria depends on federal allocation which is between 70-90 per cent from oil. Lagos
is a secondary beneficiary of oil activities, of course, but because of its industrial base and
unique position as the commercial and financial capital of Nigeria, the state will still
generate sufficient IGR to take care of its wage bills. While Lagos and Sokoto States
generated 60 per cent and 46 per cent IGR respectively in 2008 ( the latest statistics we
had access to),others depended on federal allocation for the bulk of their income. Some
states have IGR-to-total revenue percentage that is as low as three per cent. Only two
states had an IGR ratio above 40 per cent. For most states, the federal allocation ratio is
above 80 per cent. This went down slightly to 70 per cent in 2009. States whose IGR are
about 20 per cent or a little more in 2008/2009 include Borno, Gombe, Rivers, Osun,
Oyo, Ogun and Abia States. Most states did less than 20 per cent.
Rivers State also generates significant IGR, but it is mainly from oil activities and
this might not be sustainable in the long-run. Our interviewees remarked that Rivers
citizens are living a false life in Nigeria. Often, the demand for more federal allocation
dominates public discourse in the State. There is political agitation, but no economic
viability plan. Everybody wants a fiefdom with which they would go to FAAC meeting
every month to collect their share of the oil-fuelled federation account. Nobody has asks
whether Rivers can pay her bills without FAAC. The reason for this mentality is that
Nigeria runs a “unitary federalism”, where the resources of parts of the country are
pooled into a central pot and shared to the rest of the country.
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In fact, infrastructure deficit in Nigeria, has assumed crisis dimension so much so
that recent study estimated the cost of fixing it to be US $5 trillion (Cookey-Gam,2011).
This stunning disclosure by the Managing Director, Phoenix Global Capital Markets
Limited, Rotimi Oyekan, did not shock the audience gathered at a three-day
investor/issuer education programme recently organized in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in collaboration with Rivers State Government.
Coming from an expert, who was immediate past Commissioner of Finance in
Lagos State and an active party to the state’s N275 billion bond issues, Oyekan must be
taken seriously for the financial implication of the country’s infrastructure deficit.
According to him, the future of Nigeria’s economy depends directly on the adequacy and
quality of its infrastructure. But regretted there is a huge fund gap in social infrastructure,
health, education, security, power, and transportation, which must be tackled
systematically. The state governments, he argues, make more impact on the lives of the
populace than the Federal, regretting that the revenue sharing formula is skewed in favour
of the centre, hence the need for sub-national bonds to meet the ensuing gap. For this
reason, state governments have more often than not taken recourse to debt- financing
instruments like bonds at the capital market in the effort to fix infrastructure demands in
their domain. Financial institutions treat sub-national governments as second-class
governments. This was more pronounced during former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s
administration, which tied validity of any state government bond to the tenure of the
incumbent governor. Though the objective was to encourage fiscal discipline and
transparency at the state level, it succeeded in discouraging issuance of long-tenor state
bonds.
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Consequently, only six of the 36 states raised funds at the capital market through
issuance of bonds during Chief Obasanjo’s eight-year civilian rule. The result was dearth
of projects development in most of the states since they could only rely on expensive
short term bank loans to finance capital intensive long term projects. To say the least,
state government bonds, during Obasanjo’s administration, were quite unpopular at the
capital market until lately after his exit in 2007. Not that the administration did not
appreciate the need to access debt capital market as veritable source of raising
competitively-priced long term financing. Some states had and still have enormous debt
profiles just as many others lacked fiscal discipline and transparency. Thus state bonds
under former President Obasanjo did not have the backing of the Federal Government but
after his exit in 2007, the floodgate opened for sub-national bonds though with low level
of patronage initially.
The statistics reveals that Federal Government bonds account for N2.089 trillion
or 19.5 per cent while sub-national bonds account for N249 billion or 2.3 per cent. This
sum pales into nothingness when it is considered that about US $5 trillion is required for
fixing infrastructure gap in the country.
However, corporate bonds soared astronomically to N1.330 trillion representing
12.4 per cent of total capitalization of the capital market, as value of preference stocks
stood at insignificant N4.588 billion. Some of the states, which have shown increasing
interest in the bond market include Lagos, which raised N50 billion in a five year-tenor
issue in December 2008. The state also issued another N57.7 billion bond in April 2010
for a seven-year tenor. The Lagos State bond is the only bond issued without irrevocable
standing payment order (ISPO). Others on the list include, Imo, which raised N18.5
billion, which was issued in June 2009. Kwara State raised N17 billion in a bond issuance
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in August 2009 with a five-year tenor, while Niger State raised a conservative N6 billion
through a bond issue in October 2009. Also, Bayelsa raised N50 billion from a bond issue
in June 2010 while Kaduna raised N8.5 billion in an issue in August 2010. The list also
includes Ebonyi, which raised N16.5 billion in September 2010, Edo issued a five-year
bond for N25 billion while Benue raised N13 billion via a bond issue in June this year.
While some state governors deployed funds raised through bonds to transform
infrastructures in their domain, some others obviously mismanaged theirs or diverted it to
private accounts outright. The government of Mr. Babatunde Raji Fashola has continued
to transform the face of Lagos with funds raised from the capital market through bonds.
Massive network of roads and drainage constructions, beautification of the environment,
development of judiciary facilities as well as new housing estates, opening up of new
suburbs and electrification of same, building and upgrading of schools facilities across the
state, equipping of security outfit in the state and many more have formed the nucleus of
the government’s mega city vision from inception till now. In less than five years, so
much have been achieved by the Fashola administration that even the opposition could
not help but admit that Lagos never had it so good such that filthy notorious hide outs like
Oshodi, Mushin, Obalende, Yaba, Ojuelegba and many others have been turned to
shining examples of grass to grace.
Of all the massive projects going on in Lagos State, the one that has stunned
observers is the mega-city Orile-Mile 2-Badagry Road project presently under
construction. Although the 8-lane road construction with light rail in-between is believed
to be a partnership, there is no evidence so far that other parties to the partnership project
has shown serious commitment. So much about Lagos and what the state government is
doing with about N107 billion so far raised in the N275 billion bond issue.
Delta State after its 4-year tenor N5 billion floating bond issued in 2003 during
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the administration of former governor James Ibori, the state has concluded plans to raise
another N200 billion through bonds issue. The governor, Mr. Emmanuel Uduaghan, has
lined up massive infrastructural development projects, touching on the three-point agenda
of his administration - peace and security, human capital development and infrastructure
development. The state, which had committed about N159 billion to the Federal
Government Independent Power Plant (IPP) projects all over the country is also
embarking on own Independent Power Plants to achieve a target of 450 mega watts of
electricity to improve on the power situation in the state both for individuals and
industrial use. The IPP project is crucial to its planned industrial park. In its urbanisation
drive, the state designated some areas where industrial and economic activities would
concentrate. The aim is to encourage investors to come in with their portfolios and
establish there.
Rivers State House of Assembly has approved N250 billion for the proposed state
bond in order to facilitate infrastructural development in the state. The first tranche of
N100 billion bonds was due in October, 2011 with a tenor of three to five years. Leaders
of the Rivers State House of Assembly noted that the House had endorsed the bond in
view of its importance and benefits to the people of the state.
This is another exemplary scenario where all stakeholders have been engaged in
discourse to carry them along. Defending its decision to raise N100 billion bonds in the
first tranche, the state government said it was targeted at replacing decaying
infrastructure, helping to diversify its economy from oil and prepare for the challenges
ahead after oil dries up in the next 41 years as revealed by a study. According to the
Rivers State Commissioner for Finance, Chamberlain Peterside, the funds would further
help to boost the economic potentials. Already, Rivers, he argued, was a high income
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earner with potentials for more revenue in petrochemicals and agro-allied industries with
an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $4,000/per annum, representing three times
the national average (http://184.172.132.46es/news/businessnews/2011/sept/12/bussines12-09-2011-). He was optimistic that the bond issuance would be a huge success, going
by its dual international credit rating, which makes it the first and only state with such
rating for now.
Proceeds of the bond, Peterside assured, would be ploughed into aggressive
infrastructure investment in roads, transportation, new city, schools, healthcare and urban
amenities; stressing that the state was poised for long-term growth if investment tempo
can
be
sustained
(http://184.172.132.46/webpages/news/businessnews-12-09-2011-
001.html). According to him, the State’s IGR has grown from N19.9 billion in 2005 to
N58.4 billion by 2005, assuring that with all infrastructure and projects being proposed,
the state is capable with all infrastructures in place, to meet its obligations. Going
forward, he said the State government is focused on renewing its infrastructure while
targeting job creation to stem youth restiveness and ease social tension; besides
institutionalizing governance by building key institutions like “public procurements
office, fiscal responsibility act, public accounting modernization and management of
infrastructure assets. The economic diversification programme, he noted, would see
Internally Generated Revenue growing from 50-70 per cent of aggregate, in addition to
focusing on power generation and raising the contribution of non-oil sector and
agriculture to the value chain (http://184.172.132.46/webpages/news/businessnews/201112-09-2011-001.html)
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7.5 Financial Prudence and Infrastructural Development
We x-rayed how the governments of Peter Odili and Rotimi Amechi in Rivers
State managed the resources of the State between 1999 and 2011. In order to do this, we
looked at the level of state indebtedness. This becomes imperative considering the Punch
Newspaper publication in its edition of 4th August, 2012 where the frightening financial
status detailing the external high indebtedness of most of the States in Nigeria and the
heart-warming stand of Rivers State coupled with the pressure from some cynics that
Amaechi is not doing much in lieu with the resources at his disposal.
According to States and Federal Government’s external debt stock obtained by
Saturday Punch, 4th August, 2012 from the Debt Management Office, Lagos, Kaduna,
Cross River, Ogun and Oyo occupied the top position on the list of external debts
incurred by State governments as of June 30, 2012 Borno, Delta, Plateau, Taraba and
Anambra states had the lowest external debts.
Lagos topped the list of external debtors with $517,677,672 as of June 30, 2012.
Next to Lagos is Kaduna with $197,155.525, Cross River has $109,351,503 external debt.
Ogun State is the fourth most indebted state with $96,285.547 as of June 30, 2012. Oyo’s
external debt (the fifth) was $78,878,401 as of June 30, 2012,
Investigations showed that the present administrations in Ogun and Oyo inherited
the foreign debts from their predecessors. States, whose external debts are low, include
Borno ($12,726,028); Delta ($15,785,110); Plateau ($20,190,627); Taraba ($20,681,527)
and Anambra ($25,370,842). However, while other four states depend on federal
allocations, Lagos generates huge internal revenue, which was about N23bn monthly in
the first quarter of the year. At the zonal level, South-West leads the external debtors with
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$840,913,596, followed by the North-West, $473,305,365; South-South, $289,952,619;
North-Central, $189,192,241 and North-East, $186,303, 921. External debts of other
states, apart from the 10 mentioned above are: Abia, $32,675,171; Adamawa,
$29,183,118; Akwa Ibom, $61,198,851; Bauchi, $63,029,387; Bayelsa, $27,897,951;
Benue, $26,501,393 and Ebonyi $41,060,946.
Edo State’s foreign debt is $41,408,440; Ekiti, $34,071,754; Enugu, $47, 788,769;
Gombe, $29,572,867; Imo, $50,573,894; Jigawa, $28,720,760; Kano, $59,400,227;
Katsina, $74,147,092 and Kebbi, $47,132,689. Kogi State owes $33,976,282; Kwara,
$43,798,143; Nasarawa, $36, 547,616; Niger, $28,178,180; Ondo, $52,255,534; Osun,
$61,744,688; Rivers, $34,301,764; and Sokoto, $40,419,413. Others are Yobe State,
$31,111,004; Zamfara, $26,329,259 and the Federal Capital Territory, $37,671,245.
Apart from initiating critical bills for the economic revolution in the State, the
Governor inaugurated a high powered Economic Advisory Council comprising the best
brains in Rivers State. They include Prof Nimi Briggs as Chairman with Prof Tam David
West, Engr. Tonye Princewill, Barr Ledum Mitee, Dr Chamberlain Peterside amongst
others as members. While inaugurating the Council, the Governor remarked that the task
before the high-powered team was to make recommendations that would attract new
investors and make old ones more profitable. The governor said the responsibility of the
State government was to abide by the blue print for economic development of the state
because government alone cannot be the sole producer of funds and employment. He
noted that the present security challenges in the Niger Delta cannot be an excuse for mass
poverty in the state. He explained that the present economic position of Rivers State was
worrisome because a lot of companies have down-sized their operations while others have
closed down completely.
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In the same vein, the Governor set up a committee headed by the Deputy
Governor, Engr. Tele Ikuru and made up of members of the Nigerian Society of
Engineers, Quantity Surveyors, Urban and Regional Planners, Architects, amongst others,
to produce a blue print for the infrastructural development of Port Harcourt. According to
him, Rivers State is determined to confront the challenges of infrastructural development
in the state, but while you make suggestions in that respect, it is not the primary
assignment of the Economic Advisory Council because your task is to look at the micro
and macro indices of economic growth bearing in mind our limitations as a state
government.
The Governor also noted that the members of the economic council were chosen
strictly on merit, as no consideration was given to where the person comes from, adding
that the challenges of the assignment which was remuneration free included weak
infrastructural base and negative value system. Prof Briggs, the Chairman of the
Economic Team assured that they would examine the issues seriously and proffer
solutions that would assist the State move forward while congratulating the Governor for
the decision to find solution to the economic problems in the State. Rt. Hon. Chibuike
Amaechi also set up an agency called Bureau on Public Procurement alias ‘Due Process’
with the highly respected Barr Franklyn A. Nierum as its Director General. This is a man
who due to his sterling and uncompromising attitude to corruption, is hated by many of
the government officials and contractors who see him as an enemy of the system but most
certainly loved by Gov. Amaechi who sees in him the key to stopping corrupt practices in
the State. This Commission is to monitor projects, ensure proper valuation and costing of
contract in line with the market value thereby reducing corruption and inflation in the
system and ensuring that credible and capable contractors execute government projects in
the State.
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The Rivers State Commissioner for Finance, Dr. Peterside Chamberlain, explained
that the current administration had borrowed N30bn in October 2010, an amount that was
paid off in September 2011 and that another loan of N20bn was accessed in July 2011
from Guaranty Trust Bank and Zenith Bank and noted that a substantial part of the loan
from Zenith Bank had already been paid back. The commissioner further pointed out that
the funds were used to finance the state’s ongoing electricity project, which would be
completed by December 2012.
To demonstrate the seriousness of the Governor of Rivers State , the
Commissioner argued that Governor Amaechi carefully managed the resources of the
State, he immediately on assuming office in 2007 constituted his Cabinet with men and
women of integrity and seeing the decay in infrastructure in the State commenced his task
by initiating and signing into law, Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Agency Bill No.
3 of 2008, Sustainable Development Amendment Bill No. 1 of 2008, procurement public
bill, Saving Public Fund Bill and even a bill excluding the office of the Governor from
signing and awarding of contracts. The fact remains that no other State in Nigeria has
such laws in operation excluding the Governor from interfering and awarding of contracts
and saving part of its revenue for the rainy days. With the enactment of these bills, the
Governor demonstrated early enough the type of governance he intends to bequeath to the
State – Governance premised on Accountability, service delivery, people orientated
government for the greater good of Rivers people.
According to the Commissioner, in order to lay a strong foundation for positive
change in governance in the State, the administration has taken it upon itself to initiate
very critical bills on fiscal responsibility to the State House of Assembly and virtually all
of which have been passed into law and assented to by me. The Executive arm of
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government so far has credit for having at least 60 per cent of all bills passed by the
House of Assembly, saying that virtually all the bills were designed to deal with the age
long problem of financial irresponsibility and rascality and as far as the existing laws on
fiscal responsibility are concerned, anyone in government who tries to have an over sight
of the due process mechanism in the State would surely run into problems.
Explaining the Governor’s plans for Rivers State Economy, Dr Peterside disclosed
that his mandate was to help sustain the development, projects and the investments that
the governor was working on. Rivers State has a potential tax base, with companies, huge
market in the hospitality space and a lot of employees. Another part of his plan is to seek
avenues to increase revenues from existing sources, making proper use of the recently
launched Rivers State Geographical Information System (RIVGIS), which he described
as a system that would help automate and hasten the issuance of Certificates of
Occupancies. He also gave the assurance that foreign investors would be drawn to Rivers
State in his time as Commissioner for Finance. According to him, it had to do with
creating an enabling environment coupled with a clear demonstration of the State’s
appreciation of investment, commitment and openness to ideas as being exemplified by
the state chief executive.
By 1999 when democratic rule returned to Nigeria, the then new administration
led by Peter Odili met a mere N250million per month as IGR. The governor worked
assiduously to up this to about N2.5billion on the average. The current governor,
Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi has moved this to as high as N5billion in December 2011,
though the year’s average was put at N2.6 trillion, according to governor’s account to the
people via the 2012 budget presentation.
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According to the Finance Commissioner, the administration of Governor Amaechi
has embarked upon many projects unprecedented in any other State in Nigeria that
includes, setting up of the Songhai Farms and the N20 billion Agric Scheme that will
revolutionize agriculture in the State, starting off of the billion Greater Port Harcourt city
to decongest the present Port Harcourt City and construction of one of the best stadia that
hosted the last Sports Festival in the new city. Building and equipping 180 health centres
across the state, constructing many roads and schools, embarking on a monorail first of its
kind in Nigeria which the Governor has promised the completion of the first two phases
by 2014. Upon completion, the monorail would transport 40,000 passengers daily.
The government has offered of scholarships to over 2,000 students in Nigerian
Higher Institutions and spending of about N5bn for her students in foreign Intuitions.
Building a world Class University which when completed will turn out well equipped
graduates that will hold their own in any field and compete with the best in the world.
Building in Rivers State University of Science and Technology a hostel that will
accommodate about 6, 000 students and accommodation for all the Lecturers of the
university. The university will be fully ICT compliant. It’s important to point out here that
the Rivers State Government is among the few States in Nigeria that offer free education
and free health delivery to its people but stands apart as the only State offering free
education, free sandals, free books and free uniform in Nigeria. About 200 primaries
schools have been set up in 200 communities, a feat that no other state is yet to
accomplish.
Under health system, the government has about 100 medical doctors employed to
staff most of the Health Centres in the rural areas. The Rivers State Government has
currently embarked upon the exercise to eradicate malaria vectors from the State. The
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Health Centre at the Rivers State University of Science and Technology will soon be
opened to the public. The State was lauded last year for its daily commissioning of a
health centre over a 60 day period in 60 communities in its 60-60-60 initiative. The
Dental Hospital located in the Garrison area of Port Harcourt will soon be opened.
The Rivers State Government has invested over N100b per year from 2008 till
2011 in provision of roads, bridges and Social amenities. In this regard, the Government
has engaged in the construction of 800km roads with 250 already completed. 10 major
bridges under construction with 3 already completed. 20 minor bridges under construction
with four completed, 2flyover/interchange under construction. 6 Land reclamation/shore
protection projects at Andoni, Opobo, Buguma, Abalama, Olombie/Owukiri Island, Oba
Ama, Okirika with 1,1400,000km 2 completed. 2 major markets and a shopping mall
under construction (phase 1 of mile 1 market housing 960 shops and two banking halls
completed). Apart from all these the Rivers State Government has built three power
stations built at Omoku (150 Mega watts), Trans-Amadi (130 Mega watts) and Eleme (75
mega watts). By June, 2011, capacity was increased to 500 Mega Watts under the $195
million dollars 180 MW gas turbine awarded to Saipem. Seven Transmissions stations
(132/33 kilo volts) and 7 Distribution injection sub-stations 33/11 Kilo Volts built. The
security and freedom the people of Rivers State are now enjoying can only be appreciated
if the scenario and state of Rivers State before Gov Amaechi assumed office can still be
remembered by our people.
The Commissioner for Finance remarked that
Rivers State has again been
affirmed a ‘B’ international rating by leading international financial analysis agency,
Standard and Poor’s (S & P) in a report released recently. The long-term outlook for the
state is revised upwards from last year rating of “Stable” to “Positive” on the strength of
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significant ongoing infrastructural investments (in roads, ICT, health care, education and
urban renewal) and relentless efforts to transform the public finance framework. All this
would help lift the state’s social and economic status in the long run. The agency in its
2010 credit analysis report on Rivers State, noted that the state currently had a high credit
quality, owing to its strong cash holdings, low debt and a healthy operating balance. More
importantly, the state’s efforts towards modernizing public sector administration, which
included information technology upgrade and an improved transparency and
accountability in administration is a plus to the administration. Standard and poor’s also
noted that Rivers has a strong liquidity base with no substantial debt burden. According S
& P, as of July 2010, Rivers continued to enjoy a very comfortable liquidity position. It
had N43.9 billion in local currency and $11 million in U.S. dollars. By this overview,
cash holdings in the state at the end of 2010 should be at around N50 billion, based on
Standard and Poor’s assumption of N200 billion”.
In appreciation of all these feats, the Rivers State Governor, Rt. Hon. Chibuike
Rotimi Amaechi has been conferred with the prestigious “SERA’s” award for his
contributions towards the social development of Rivers State, in line with the objectives
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), especially in the areas of Health and
Education.
Despite that fund management is one of the most
difficult tasks of public
officials, Rivers State government has demonstrated a high level of skill, integrity,
probity in this regard. The numerous projects completed and ongoing in the State is a
clear indication that the Governor indeed deserves encomiums from all and sundry rather
than being vilified by some people.
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Despite that Rivers State faced serious infrastructural challenges in 1999 when
Governor Peter Odili was in charge of the government, Governor Amaechi have been
able to change the face of Rivers. A lot of dilapidated roads are being reconstructed, and
new roads are being built, dualization of roads, electrification of rural areas and lots more.
Executive Governor of Rivers State adopted the Public Private Partnerships (BPPP) to
unleash infrastructural development in the State. The state Governor has identified civil
servants as very important stakeholders in the Public Private Partnership agenda on
governments’ project implementation. Our interview shows that the government is very
passionate about the PPP agenda because of the country is endowed with abundant
natural resources. They noted that the Bureau has continued to receive political support
from His Excellency Governor Amaechi who believes in the ability of the private sector
to work closely with government to achieve set objectives. They also noted that
government has become selective in looking at projects that will impact on the lives of
the people to accelerate infrastructural development.
Investment in infrastructure has been described as one of the surest means of
accelerating economic development. The level of infrastructural development in a country
determines productivity, stimulates the economy and improves the living standards of the
people. In fact, infrastructure deficit in Nigeria has resulted in poor quality of services
and very high cost of living.
Cookey-Gam (2011) explained that Rivers State
Government has embarked on massive infrastructural development Projects across the
state. Governor Amaechi's aggressive urban renewal programme will revive Port
Harcourt to its Garden City status. According to her, creating the Greater Port Harcourt
City Development Authority, to regulate urban development and build a world class city
internationally recognized for excellence and the preferred destination for investors and
tourists is another strategy of the State Government to fast-track infrastructural growth in
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Rivers state. On the
issue of taxation, the Administrator said the Rivers State
Government is addressing the problem of multiple taxation in its bid to encourage
investors.
Greater Port Harcourt Administrator further stated that the Master Plan for the
New City covers a period of 50 years, adding that the Authority was established by law
(GPHCDA Law No.2 2009) enacted by the Rivers State House of Assembly. For
investors there is a secure environment and a one-stop shop where all transactions can be
done. She argued that the New City has provisions for green areas with a plan to
accommodate both high and low income earners.
Some of the capital intensive projects according to Onyema (2013) in Rivers State
under Governor Amaechi’s regime include:
Monorail Project - “Rivers Monorail” Bring organization and
structure to the public transport system
Port Harcourt M-1 & M-10 Highways Improve economic growth
by facilitating the movement of goods and services across the
state
Rural Electrification Project Provide steady power supply in
Rivers by the end of 2013 to accelerate economic growth
Bulk Water Supply & Sanitation Infrastructure Facilitate
economic development of the State
Diri (2013) noted that in the educational sector, the Governor has completed some
750 model primary schools and 24 secondary schools furnished with laboratories
equipment, standard library and books in the local government areas that make up the
201
State. The Governor has also announced the ‘free for all’ education programme in Rivers
and offer scholarships to many students across the State. According to Diri (2013: 26), to
compliment the provision of infrastructure in education, “the administration offered free
education to people in Rivers State up to Secondary school level and offered scholarship
in different universities in different parts of the world—Canada- 279, India 202, Ireland
30, Singapore 136, United Kingdom 384”. Again over 1049 students are studying abroad
under the Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency (RSSDA). The author claimed
that the Governor has also provided comprehensive training programmes for teachers in
the State to compliment the free education programme.
Similarly, Diri (2013) reported that the State government has revolutionarized the
health sector since the advent of Governor Amaechi in 2007. He reported that by 2010,
the government of Amaechi completed, commissioned and handed over 60 healthcare
centres to 60 communities in the State at the cost of over N200 million each. As at 2011,
over 100 healthcare centres were completed and they serve as the mini-diseases control
centres. According to West (2012), the broad objectives of the health policy of the Rivers
State government include provision of standard; efficient, effective and affordable health
services and to make available qualifies staff.
Diri (2013) pictured numerous road
networks which he credited to the high level of discipline of the Governor. He also
mentioned several roads, bridges and culverts either completed or under construction by
the administration. The number of power turbines he credited to the administration has
further buttressed that he believed that Governor Amaechi is performing creditably.
Meanwhile, the account of the member most authors, argued that the
administration has done exceptionally well in infrastructural development in the State
compared to his predecessor but this negates our observation in Rivers State and the
response of the majority of our interviewees in this study confirmed our observations. Our
202
interviewees revealed that the development projects in the state are meager compared to
the huge sums of fund that flows into the state from the federal government as well as the
funds generated internally.
For instance, NBS, (2011) reported that a total of N8.8 trillion accrued to the three
tiers of government from the Federation Account between January and December 2012
from the statutory and VAT allocations. According to the report, this amount is exclusive
of other allocations such as derivation (for oil-producing states), excess crude account,
domestic crude account, subsidy reinvestment programme (SURE-P), and Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation refund and foreign exchange differentials.
The report provided that South-South states received the highest allocations, with
Akwa-Ibom receiving N217,776,188,886.07, followed by Rivers State which received
N177,488,261,117.17. Bayelsa State got N115,743,144,031.67; Delta State got a total of
N156,052,071,645.19, while Edo State got N68,169,040,433.24. Cross River State
N63,894,575,941.74 (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/oil resources -states-how-st).
Lagos State in the Southwest got a total of N168,688,367,207.00 (the highest in the
region), followed by Oyo State, which received a total of N93,524,683,879.60. Other
states in the region: Ondo, got N78,416,358,272.47 (apart from 13 per cent derivation
funds);
Osun,
N72,200,789,928.64;
Ogun,
N68,975,959,765.69
and
Ekiti,
N50,303,046,508. In the North-Central, Niger State got the highest, with a total allocation
of N79,747,942,955.64, followed by Benue State, which got N74,603,841,100.92. Plateau
got
a
total
of
N59,990,295,696.88;
Kogi
N70,564,808,263.64;
Kwara
N52,393,463,610.54 and Nassarawa, N49,262,377,875.93; FCT, N19,130,584,542.15.
Allocations to the five South-East states are as follows: Abia, N63,964,695,387.15;
Anambra,
N71,968,922,762.11;
Enugu,
N62,548,484,175.02;
Ebonyi,
N45,335,956,658.49 and Imo N77,410,109,305.85.In Northwest, Sokoto State received
203
N74,313,032,890.28; Kebbi, N63,796,638,658.10; Kaduna, N81,046,716,051.44; Kano,
N130,005,314,633.13
and
Katsina,
N96,823,335,677.90
(http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/oil resources -states-how-st)
The 36 states in Nigeria have shared a total sum of N1 trillion between January
and June 2010 from the national treasury (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/richpoor-states-how-st). In a summary of federal allocations to the states obtained by the
Economic Confidential, the online intelligence magazine, within the period South-South
states that are mostly oil-producing received the highest allocation of N386.8 billion
followed by North-West N162.5 billion and South-West N160.7 billion. Other regions
like North-East got N119.7 billion, North-Central N117.2 billion and South-East received
N99.4 billion. In the finding by the Economic Confidential, Akwa Ibom State alone
received a total sum of N104 billion while its neighbour, Cross River only got N18 billion
in the first six months of the year. Among the non-oil producing states, Lagos got the
highest allocation of N48.5 billion followed by Kano with N31.9 billion. In a table that
depicts the ranking of the states by the volume of allocations they received in that period,
Akwa Ibom State came first with N104 billion, followed by Rivers N99.1 billion, Delta
N90.4
billion,
Bayelsa
N49
billion
and
Lagos
(http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/rich-poor-states-how-st).
On
N48
the
billion
table
of
recipients from the Federation Account, Ebonyi is last with N16.5 billion, Ekiti N16.7
billion, Kwara N16.8 billion, Nasarawa N16.8 billion and Taraba N17.2 billion
A total of N8.8 trillion accrued to the three tiers of government from the
Federation Account between January and December 2012 from the statutory and VAT
allocations (NBS, 2012). This is according to a report by an authoritative online medium,
Economic Confidential magazine. This amount excludes other allocations such as
derivation (for oil-producing states), excess crude account, domestic crude account,
204
subsidy reinvestment programme (SURE-P), and Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation refund and foreign exchange differentials. The statistics provided by the
medium showed that South-South states received the highest allocations, with AkwaIbom receiving N217, 776,188,886.07, followed by Rivers State which received N177,
488,261,117.17. Bayelsa State got N115, 743,144,031.67; Delta State got a total of N156,
052,071,645.19, while Edo State got N68, 169,040,433.24. Cross River State N63,
894,575,941.74
In the Southwest, Lagos State got a total of N168, 688,367,207.00 (the highest in
the region), followed by Oyo State, which received a total of N93,524,683,879.60. Other
states in the region: Ondo, got N78,416,358,272.47 (apart from 13 per cent derivation
funds);
Osun,
N72,200,789,928.64;
Ogun,
N68,975,959,765.69
and
Ekiti,
N50,303,046,508. In the North-Central, Niger State got the highest, with a total allocation
of N79,747,942,955.64, followed by Benue State, which got N74,603,841,100.92. Plateau
got
a
total
of
N59,990,295,696.88;
Kogi
N70,564,808,263.64;
Kwara
N52,393,463,610.54 and Nassarawa, N49,262,377,875.93; FCT, N19,130,584,542.15.
Allocations
to
the
five
South-East
states
are
as
follows:
Abia,
N63,964,695,387.15; Anambra, N71,968,922,762.11; Enugu, N62,548,484,175.02;
Ebonyi, N45,335,956,658.49 and Imo N77,410,109,305.85. In Northwest, Sokoto State
received
N74,313,032,890.28;
N81,046,716,051.44;
Kano,
Kebbi,
N63,796,638,658.10;
N130,005,314,633.13;
Katsina,
Kaduna,
N96,823,335,677.90;
Zamfara, N58,718,959,085.4 and Jigawa N81,595,023,492.97. Borno State in the
Northeast received N86,937,123,465.06; Taraba State, N64,934,346,702.87; Yobe,
N63,558,436,853.11; Adamawa, N69,270,963,933.11; Bauch, N78,754,834,467.25 and
Gombe, N48,750,924,392.47.
205
The Federal Government got a whopping sum of N2, 430,374,155,844.59.
Although the figures include allocations to the 774 local governments, they were not
separated from those of the states because a common practice in almost all the states is
the lack of fiscal freedom for the councils. “The states help the local governments to
spend their money” was how a financial analyst put it during the week. The online
medium also noted that the disparity in the allocations to the states came as a result of the
indices developed by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission
(RMAFC), upon which the monthly disbursements are made by the Federation Accounts
Allocation Committee (FAAC) chaired by the Minister of State for Finance. The indices
include population, land mass, derivation, equality, internally generated revenue and other
social development factors like school enrollment, hospital beds and road networks.
Although the Rivers State Government under Rotimi Amaechi has performed a
near miracle in revitalizing the infrastructural amenities of the state between 2007 and
2011 compared to the state of infrastructure in the state from 1999 to 2007, this study
revealed that the infrastructure is insignificant compared to the volume of resources that
flows to the State. The state receives funds from the federal allocation monthly,
derivation funds, royalties payable by oil Multinational Corporations and the large IGR
base, yet the number of un-motorable roads in the State has increased, the outlook of Port
Harcourt airport cannot compare with the airports in Lagos State or Abuja; power supply
has remained a major challenge for industries and the evidence of revitalized school and
healthcare centers are fast disappearing because the efforts were not far reaching. The
legislature had limited or no access to check the executive spending on these
infrastructure because the state government hide under the cloak of state –private
partnership for the development. We therefore validate our hypothesis three which states
206
that the legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly did not enhance
infrastructural development in the State within the period of study.
207
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 Summary
The study interrogated the role of the legislature in enthroning public
accountability in Rivers State between 1999 and 2011. We noted that the 1999
Constitution of Nigeria empowered the
House of Assembly of each State of the
Federation to make laws and expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the executive
administration of laws within its legislative competence. However, the extent to which
the legislature performs these functions depends on the level of independence it enjoys
from the executive. When the legislature depends a lot on the executive, it exists solely to
rubber stamp the executive decisions
(Nation Democratic Institute, 2000). The study
raised the following research questions:
1
Is there any significant relationship between legislative oversight by the Rivers State
House of Assembly and exposition of executive corruption in the State between
1999 and 2011?
2.
Did the quest for re-election among Legislators undermine the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period under
study?
3.
Did legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly enhance
infrastructural development in the State within the period under study?
Despite that avalanche of theories abounds to explain the role of legislators in
enthroning accountability, institutional theory was adopted in this study. The expectation
of institutional theory is that there should be institutional logics/mechanisms that
underpin the organizing principle of the field (Friedland and Alford, 1991). As it has been
acknowledged the world over, the legislature remains one of the most important elements
208
of the democratic process. Given how any member of the legislature emerges, be it at the
state or at the national level, the second arm of government is also considered as the
official body democratically chosen by the people, through the electoral process, to make
laws, as well as amend or repeal laws for peace, order and good governance of the state
without prejudice to the provisions of the nation’s constitution. It is, indeed, the platform
on which nations and states make laws to create an enabling environment for sustainable
human development in all facets of life.
This explains why the legislative business in Rivers State, vis-avis how members
of the Houses of Assembly have been able to impact on the life of the people reveals that
performance is abysmal. The State has been bedeviled with myriads of problems ranging
from security, militancy and environmental neglect and degradation; both emanating from
a long period of exploitation of the crude oil deposits and neglect of the human resource
in the zone. The activities of the lawmakers in Rivers, giving an insight into how they
have been able to, in the last decade to effectively act in accordance with their legislative
callings and proffer solutions to the identified problems militating against the people for a
meaningful socio-economic and infrastructural development of the zone.
The two basic methods of data collection in social sciences are quantitative and
qualitative methods. In this study, we adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Under the quantitative method we relied on the self report techniques to generate
information from our sample. In the first case, we obtained data from direct responses
from interviews with 12 members of the State House of Assembly. They include the
Speaker, the House Majority Leader and 10 other members of the House of Assembly.
They were selected purposively and judgmentally.
The qualitative data include the data we generated from textbooks, government
documents and publications, resources from the internet, “archival” materials etc dealing
209
with legislature and public accountability in Nigeria generally and Rivers State in
particular. Secondary sources of data have been considered quite useful in research
especially, for exploratory purposes. The population of this study is all the population of
Rivers State. According to the NPC, (2006), the State is inhabited by a total population of
5,198,716 people. Rivers State is divided into 23 Local Government Areas. The
population of each area varies from the other. We used the Yamane’s Statistical Formula
to determine the sample size of the study. This decision was informed by the high ability/
capacity of the formula to control sampling error. We used multistage cluster probability
sampling to choose the local governments from where we purposively selected our
sample in Rivers State. We clustered the State into three Senatorial District and three
LGAs were selected as follows:
1.ONELGA in Rivers West ;
2.PortHarcourt in Rivers Central and
3. Khana in Rivers East.
Specifically we analyzed data from the respondents using both descriptive and
inferential statistics. In order to ease the explanation of the linkages between the variable
of this study, we sorted and presented data in frequency tables, graphs and simple
percentages was also used to determine each category of response and for the analysis of
this study. The group interview correspondences were used to enhance the data generated
from questionnaire responses and qualitative descriptive method was also used to analyze
the data generated from secondary sources. Since the first question of this study is
concerned with test of significance of relationship, we used the Chi-square to test our
hypothesis.
In chapter four of this study, we holistically discussed the phenomenon of
legislature and public accountability in Nigeria to provide a salient foundation for our
210
study in Rivers State. In chapter five we summarized the bio-metric data of respondents
and also tests for the significance of relationship between legislative oversight by the
Rivers State House of Assembly and exposition of executive corruption in the State
between 1999 and 2011. In chapter six we interrogated the second hypothesis which
states that the quest for re-election among legislators undermined the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period of study;
chapter seven, we tested the hypothesis three which states that the legislative oversight
by the Rivers State House of Assembly did not enhance infrastructural development in
the State within the period of study and the last chapter summarized and concluded the
study
8.2 Conclusion
Rivers State House of Assembly in the past one year of the seventh Assembly has
not done well as members were abnormally loyal to the executive, inimical to the
populace and this was detrimental to the socio-political and socio-economic growth of the
state. The House of Assembly, displayed an appreciable level of maturity with regards to
cohesion among the ranks of its members. But as being perceived by majority of Rivers
people it appeared the House of Assembly was not as proactive as it should be and that
was to a large extent due to the failure on the part of the Assembly to effectively manage
its communication with Rivers people and not necessarily as a result of a deficiency on
her part to perform oversight functions particularly on the executive.
The Assembly did not convincingly win the affection of the people in the various
categories of society; it was called all sorts of names by different groups for its perceived
failure to assert its autonomy, as specified by the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. To those
holding this view, the legislature in Rivers state has so far remained a lame-duck, only
performing a rubber-stamp role to suit the whims and caprices of the executive arm,
211
thereby failing its sacred task of representing and defending the interests of the people,
whose stead they had been elected to represent in the hallowed chambers. From all sides,
one could hear abuses and denigrating adjectives flying the way of the Assembly, mostly
for failing to occupy its role as the check on the executive arm. Hence, we conclude that
there is a significant relationship between legislative oversight and exposition of
executive corruption in the Rivers State. The implication of legislative incompetence in
checking executive corruption as shown in this study is that executive corruption will
continue unabated in the State.
Again, lack of diligence in information management had also resulted in a very
poor perception and misrepresentation by both the media and public about oversight
activities of committees. For now, oversight reports or even reports and decisions after
public hearings are not made available to the public who ought to have access to them as
of right. In River State and many other states in Nigeria, one may not be noticed in one
term parliamentary appearance even if you are holding the golden boot of leadership
hence; it becomes necessary for legislators to seek re-election. They claim reelection
would enable them to consolidate the legislative process in the State. In the bid to seek
reelection and considering that executive Governors are too powerful in Nigeria to
frustrate re-election ambition, legislators played subservient role to be in good book of the
Governor to secure reelection. We therefore validated our second hypothesis which states
that the quest for re-election among legislators undermined the operation of legislative
mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period of study
Finally, the Rivers State Government under Rotimi Amaechi has performed a near
miracle in revitalizing the infrastructural amenities of the state between 2007 and 2011
compared to the state of infrastructure in the state from 1999 to 2007, this study revealed
212
that the infrastructure is insignificant compared to the volume of resources that flows to
the State. The state receives funds from the federal allocation monthly, derivation funds,
royalties payable by oil Multinational Corporations and the large IGR base, yet the
number of un-motorable roads in the State has increased, the outlook of Port Harcourt
airport cannot compare with the airports in Lagos State or Abuja; power supply has
remained a major challenge for industries and the evidence of revitalized school and
healthcare centers are fast disappearing because the efforts were not far reaching. The
legislature had limited or no access to check the executive spending on these
infrastructure because the state government hides under the cloak of state –private
partnership for the development. We therefore validate our hypothesis three which states
that the legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly did not enhance
infrastructural development in the State within the period of study.
From the foregoing discussion, we arrived at the following findings:
1. There is a significant relationship between legislative oversight by the Rivers
State House of Assembly and exposing of executive corruption in the State
between 1999 and 2011.
2. The quest for re-election among Legislators undermined the operation of
legislative mechanisms of accountability in Rivers State within the period of
study.
3. The legislative oversight by the Rivers State House of Assembly enhanced
infrastructural development in the State within the period of study
8.3 Recommendations
Arising from our investigations and findings, the study makes the following
recommendations:
213
a. The Rivers State legislature should liaise with the national anti –graft
commissions in Nigeria to expose executive corruption in Rivers State.
b. The legislature should ensure that the audited Rivers State account is published
annually and hosted in the Rivers State Government and Nigeria’s website.
c. An independent financial base should be established by the Rivers State
Government to ensure the financial independence of the legislature. This should
be funded from retained earnings of Rivers State.
d. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria should be reviewed to elongate the tenure of
legislator at local , state and national levels. The local councilors should enjoy a
non renewable tenure of 4 years while the state and federal legislators should
enjoy a renewable tenure of 8 years each. This will reduce the grip of the
Governors on legislators who seek re-election.
e. The Constitutional recall system should also be simplified. In its present state, it is
almost impossible to recall a legislator in Nigeria.
f. The NSE’s secondary bond market offers easy access to capital, at a reasonable
rate, specifically for long-term finance needs. Rivers state’s ambition to catalyze
the industrialization and transformation of the state requires a massive financial
outlay which can be obtained from the capital market. Rivers should embrace the
NSE’s secondary bond market since it is especially suited for funding long-term,
capital-intensive infrastructure projects.
g. Rivers State government should also consider using a combination of all
financing alternatives, as the effective use of all capital sources would maximize
the state’s output, and accelerate the realization of its dreams in infrastructural
development.
214
h. The Rivers State government should establish a publicly owned development
bank to be audited by the legislature in six months interval to provide a long term
funded by retained earnings and foreign funding.
i. The State government should also implement PPP structures for upgrading transit
and airports in Rivers state
215
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224
APPENDIX 1
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria
Nsukka
5th September, 2012.
Dear Respondent,
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
I am a Ph.D student of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka.
I am currently doing a research work on Legislative Oversight and Public
Accountability in Rivers State , 1999-2012 and I need your cooperation to generate
necessary data on the above-mentioned topic.
This work is purely an academic exercise which serves no other purpose than to fill our
curiosity to know hence, your responses will be restricted solely to that purpose. You are
assured that the information you will provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality
Please, we urge you to be honest and sincere in responding to the following questions.
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.
Yours Faithfully,
Jaja Tamunosisi
225
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please give your answers to the following questions by marking X in the boxes
that match your answers and comment where appropriate.
SECTION A (PERSONAL DATA)
i. Sex: Male
Female
ii.
Occupation: Civil Servant
Public Servant
Trader
Farmer
Others (Specify)_____________________
iii. Marital status: Single
Married
Others (Specify)___________
iv. Highest educational attainment: FSLC
WAEC/GCE/NECO
OND/NCE
HND/ B.A./B.Sc.
MPA/MA/M.Sc
DPA/Ph.D
SECTION B (MAIN QUESTIONS)
B1
1. Have you heard about legislative oversight in the State? Yes
No
2. If the response to question 1 is yes where did you hear about legislative oversight?
Church
Newspaper
Radio
Television
School
others________
3. Do you think that executive corruption is widespread in the State? Yes
No
4. Response to question 4 -If answer to 3 is yes, how would you rate the level of
executive corruption in the State?
Very High
Low
High
Very Low
5. Does the performance of legislative oversight functions severe legislativeexecutive relation in the State? Yes
No
6. How would you explain the legislative executive relation in the State?
Very cordial
,
Cordial
non-cordial
confrontational
7. Does legislative oversight check corruption in the State? Yes
No
8. Have you witnessed legislative corruption in the State?
No
Yes
9. Does the legislative oversight enhance public accountability in the State ?
Yes
No
10. Is there any relationship between legislative oversight and exposition of executive
corruption in the State? Yes
No
Decline
226
11. What do you feel is the major impediment to legislative pursuit of public
accountability in Rivers State?
Zoning of public offices
Quest for re-election
Party politics
over
dependence on the executive
Others………………………………
12. How often are legislature re-elected
Very often
Often
Rarely
Never
13. Do you feel that the shift investigations by the Assembly are done in the interest
of the State Yes
No
Decline
14. Most of the bills enacted by the Assembly are executive bills, Yes
Decline
No
15. The Assembly members hardly get in touch with their constituents? Yes
No
Decline
16. The Assembly has been passive on issues of unemployment, environmental rights
and peaceful coexistence Yes
No
Decline
17. Legislative oversight of the executive has ensured executive’s compliance with
legislative intents? Yes
No
Decline
18. Legislative oversight has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of
governmental operations in the State? Yes
No
Decline
19. The legislature has been evaluating programme performance of the executive in
the State? Yes
No
Decline
20. If answer to no 19 above is yes, what method do they apply? surveys
benefit analyses,
efficiency studies
cost-
21. The Legislators have investigated alleged instances of poor administration,
arbitrary and capricious behavior, abuse, waste, dishonesty, and fraud among the
executives in the State? Yes
No
Decline
22. The legislature determines the financial priorities in the State? Yes
Decline
No
23. The Assembly ensures that executive policies reflect the public interest in the
State? Yes
No
Decline
24. Do the legislative investigatory powers over government-wide activities enhance
the development of infrastructure? Yes
No
Decline
25. The appropriation power of the Legislature do not play a prominent role in
infrastructural development in the State? Yes
No
Decline
227
26. The impeachment power of the Assembly do not enhance the development of
infrastructure in the State?
Yes
No
Decline
27. What type of infrastructure do the state government concentrate
Schools
Roads/ Flyovers/Bridges Hospitals
Power
Markets
Others
28. What approach has the State government adopted to enhance infrastructural
development: Public
Private
Public -Private