Sociology of Islam 1 (2013) 64–87
brill.com/soi
Culture or Class? Why Islam is Neither
the Question nor the Answer
Jeff Tan
Aga Khan University, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations
[email protected]
Abstract
The separate study of Islam prioritises religion and culture over other factors that may
influence economic development. This approach ultimately focusses on the individual as
the starting point and has much in common with the methodological individualism of
neoclassical economics. This paper argues that there is nothing exceptional about religion
and culture, or essential about Islam that warrants their separate analysis in relation to the
process of economic development. It adopts a comparative approach which does not
prioritise religion and culture, or essentialise Islam. Instead it seeks to explain the problems
of development in Muslim countries in terms of class formations related to the nature of
capitalist development, secularisation and social transformations.
Keywords
Islam; religion; class; development; the state
Introduction
The argument that religion and culture matter for development takes
as its starting point society as opposed to the rational, utility maximising
individual that is a central feature of orthodox (neoclassical) economics.
Nonetheless, the underlying premise remains rooted in methodological
individualism and rational choice theory. Individual behaviour and action
continue to be central in explaining economic progress, with religious and
cultural factors added as appendages to account for irrational (non-utility
maximising) behaviour. Here, free markets are central for private enterprise
because rational individual actions and interactions in the marketplace are
what drive economic activity and growth. Development failure in this context can be explained by particular religious and cultural values, practices
and institutions that constrain individual actions by restricting free trade,
undermining incentives, and stifling private initiative and enterprise.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013
DOI 10.1163/22131418-00101004
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The diversity of positions within the ‘religion and culture matter’ (RCM)
argument merely masks this common approach (see e.g. Harrison and
Huntingdon 2000; Rao and Walton 2004a). They all share the same theoretical problems related to the failure to understand the process of (capitalist)
development, and an inability to grasp the nature of entrepreneurship,
innovation and production in a globalised world. The general neglect of the
role of the state in the development process by RCM proponents has led to
policy conclusions essentially identical to those of orthodox economics in
terms of the role of markets and the state. At the same time the tendency to
attribute development outcomes to the presence of particular religions
treats the symptoms of development failure (e.g. manifested in the resurgence of religion) as the cause. In the case of Muslim countries, the conflation of appearance with essence can be traced back to the use of religious
symbols and discourse historically for legitimacy both by the state and
opposition which creates the impression that Islam is at the heart of economic processes and outcomes.
This paper adopts a comparative approach which does not take religion
and culture as the starting point, nor essentialise Islam. It will instead
locate the discussion of Islam and development within the broader religious and cultural debate, and situate the RCM thesis within the wider discourse on development. It analyses religion and culture as part of the wider
political economy, taking into account the role of the modern state and its
relationship with different social classes, and how this facilitates or constraints economic development. This is because the presence of economically unproductive but politically well organised groups can serve to
undermine policies promoting economic growth. The analysis of social
relations in Muslim countries necessarily draws on the nature of capitalist
development and secularisation and their impact on social transformations and the resurgence of Islamism.
The paper will argue that the revival of Islam draws support from different social classes by: a) providing a sense of security for the marginalised
poor; and b) lending legitimacy for the political demands of disenfranchised intermediate classes left out of the development process. The paper
is structured as follows. Section 2 locates arguments about the role of
religion and culture within the broader discussion of economic development, and the place of Islam within this. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
problems with RCM arguments, and examines the role of Islam within this
broader debate. Section 4 presents an alternative approach to understanding the failure of Muslim countries to develop based on an analysis of social
structures and the modern state. Section 5 concludes.
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1. Religion, Culture and Development
The relationship between religion and development posited by Weber
(1905) explicitly linked development with the emergence of capitalism.
At the heart of this were two key contributions. The first was that religion
(and culture) impacted economic outcomes by influencing individual values and behaviour. The second was on the impact of modernisation on religion in terms of secularisation and the emergence of a modern state as a
central feature of modernity. The literature on religion, culture and development has largely focused on Weber’s first contribution, emphasising the
importance of hard work, honesty, trust, and openness to strangers (see e.g.
Collier 1998; Barro and McCleary 2003; Tabellini 2005). Religion and culture
constitute the informal institutions and informal constraints that are necessary for the (prudential and moral) incentives they generate (Sen 2004:
43; North 1990).
Cultural influences are said to make a difference to ‘work ethics, responsible conduct, spirited motivation, dynamic management, entrepreneurial
initiatives, willingness to take risks and a variety of other aspects of human
behaviour which can be critical to economic success’ (Sen 2004: 40). ‘Good’
cultural values namely trust, belief in individual effort, generalised morality and low obedience are shown to lead to higher GDP and growth
(Tabellini 2006). Trust is a central feature which provides the basis for
social capital and an exchange economy (see e.g. Putnam 1993; Fukuyama
1995; Collier 1998; Sen 2004) with the failure of pre-capitalist economies
blamed on ‘the underdevelopment of basic virtues of commerce and business’ (Sen 2004: 40). The main emphasis and underlying assumption
here is that economic activity centres primarily on exchange between
individuals.
However, Weber’s discussion of the role of the modern state underlines
an important link between microeconomic activity (centred on individual
behaviour) and macroeconomic outcomes (related to economic growth).
Modernisation is characterised by the emergence of a rational-legal bureaucratic state based on meritocracy, accountability and clear and transparent
rules which are applied impartially. This provides predictability and most
crucially, safeguards individuals and private property from arbitrary and
predatory state actions. In comparison, pre-modern societies typically feature patrimonial states centred on personal and arbitrary rule, and are
characterised by corrupt patron–client relationships and opaque rules that
are applied partially. For Weber then, individual enterprise would amount
to nothing in the context of state tyranny and predation.
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Central to Weber’s individual-centred analysis is the role of (economic)
rationality necessary for wealth accumulation and capitalist development.
This is associated with the emergence of a modern, rational type of religion
(in this case Protestantism) which promoted logical reasoning and freedom from habit, tradition and emotions compatible with capitalism
(Weber 1905, 1963). The Protestant Reformation ‘taught that the pursuit of
wealth should be regarded not merely as an advantage, but as a duty’ giving
the bourgeoisie ‘the moral strength to subvert the previous order and create a new one, based on the organization of free wage earners for the purpose of economic profit’ (Guiso et al 2006: 26). Traditional religions such
as Confucianism in contrast are unable to promote the rational instrumentalism necessary for a dynamic industrial economy (Weber 1905, 1951).
The RCM thesis offers variations of this argument, with the ‘rational,
ordered, diligent, productive’ new Protestant man (Landes 2000: 12) contrasted with the ‘high costs of irrationalism’ in Africa (Etounga-Manguelle
2000: 69, 73). Rationality was also central to the emergence of rationallegal systems of public management, with the modern state replacing the
patrimonial state.
While the advent of capitalism can be traced to changes in the “relations
of production” (i.e. the emergence of a bourgeoisie and creation of wage
labour), the RCM emphasis is on exchange, with the emerging rationality
signalling a broader shift in societal morality from communalism toward
individualism giving rise to different cultural beliefs and reflected in different trading patterns (Greif 1994). Here, intra-European trade ‘expanded
much more rapidly than trade within the Islamic world, essentially through
the support of institutions fostered by individualism’ (Kuran 1997: 60).
Where communalism was based on trust and the strength of kinship ties
that enabled merchants to hire one another as their partners or agents,
‘individualism promotes growth not by breaking social ties but, rather, by
weakening and diversifying them’ (Kuran 1997: 60).
This is consistent with the New Institutional Economics (NIE) which
emphasises the importance of institutional frameworks which permitted
‘complex impersonal exchange necessary to political stability and to capture the economic gains of modern technology’ in former British colonies
in comparison to the ‘personalistic relationships’ of former Spanish colonies (North 1990: 117). Central to this analysis then is the role of institutions
and trends that supported the rise of European capitalism: ‘a lengthening
of chains of action through a growing capability to control complex networks of production, administration, research, and mass communication;
the transformation of legitimate political power from absolute dominance
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to the rule of law; and the metamorphosis of religion through the secularization of various domains’ (Kaufmann 1997, cited in Kuran 1997: 61).
Central to rationalisation and modernisation is the process of industrialisation. Industrialisation uproots traditional (rural) communities and leads
to a ‘functional rationalisation and differentiation, de-traditionalisation, and
individualisation’ of society (Gelot 2009: 37). The social changes as a result of
industrialisation in turn brought about economic rationality, producer specialisation and lifestyle pluralism and provided for material wealth and
political stability. The process of rationalisation undermined traditional
(religious) authority by changing the structure of consciousness and moral
basis of authority (Gelot 2009) while material wealth and political stability
further reduced the ontological insecurities that drive religion (Norris and
Inglehart 2004), making religion ‘less arresting and less plausible’, constricting the religious sphere and reducing church involvement (Bruce 2002). This
impact of industrialisation, modernisation and rationalisation on the decline
of religion in the public sphere lies at the heart of the secularisation thesis.
The impact of Islam on development is readily explained by this analysis,
not least by Weber himself. On an individual level, Islam as a traditional
religion was ‘deemed to cultivate fatalism, conformity, and conservatism’
(see Malik 2012: 2) and did not promote rationalism, prudence, individual
initiative and intellectual boldness, key prerequisites for Weber’s development of capitalism. As a feudalistic religion, Islam was based on a traditionalistic ethic that created little incentives for individual initiative, scientific
inquiry and intellectual boldness. Compared with Christianity, Islam
‘lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and
lacked the intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism
of Judaism’ (Weber 1963: 18).
On an institutional level, Islam was considered to be legalistic and
entailed the fulfilment of laws and communal enforcement of religiosity
in contrast to Protestantism’s lax enforcement of religion which encouraged an individualistic approach consistent with individualism (McCleary
and Barro 2006: 53). Islam was characterised by the inflexibility of Islamic
law, failure to achieve legal formalisation and arbitrary personal rule
(Kuran 2010: 82). The focus on Islamic law centres on inheritance, partnerships and trusts that were seen to undermine wealth accumulation and
prevent ‘the emergence of permanently lived organizations’ (Malik 2012: 3).
Islamic inheritance law stipulated the dissolution of partnerships following
the death of one partner, keeping businesses ‘small and ephemeral’. Partnerships were further restricted to those based on personalised exchange.
Waqfs (Islamic charitable endowments) ‘locked up’ capital and prevented
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their productive use. Islamic legal preference for witnesses over written
documents ‘hampered the rise of paper economy based on financial instruments, banks and joint stock companies’ while ‘the threat of apostasy discouraged Muslims from discarding Islamic law in favour of western legal
arrangements’ (Malik 2012: 5).
The focus on Islamic institutions (as opposed to Islam) can be located
within the wider discourse on the creation of institutions to facilitate
resource pooling, coordination and exchange, and the “good governance”
discussion with its emphasis on secure property rights and formal contracts (see e.g. North 1990; Landes 2006). The governance discourse in turn
leads to the debate about the compatibility of Islam (and religion in general) with democracy (see e.g. Minkenberg 2007) which focusses on the
correlation between rich countries and democracy and the causality which
is argued to flow from democracy to growth. This liberal democracy narrative is consistent with the free market narrative, with political freedom and
economic freedom going hand-in-hand. Once again, the record of Islam
has been poor, recent events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
notwithstanding. The underlying argument being that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democracy because the territorial state (characterised by individualised citizenship, secular law and sovereignty) is alien to
Islam where there is no separation of the religious and political community, and where sovereignty lies with God. Parliaments as sources of (“manmade”) law are thus seen as blasphemous (Lewis 1958). Related to this is
the argument that Islamic organisational forms hindered effective political
movements and the emergence of a civil society (a key component of
democracy and the NIE “good governance” package) (Kuran 2007).
2. Religion and Culture: Some Theoretical Problems
Three main areas may be identified from the discussion in the previous section: a) the influence of religion and culture on individual values and
behaviour; b) the role of rationality and its impact on individual behaviour,
and the emergence of rational-legal systems of public management which
characterises the modern state; and c) the place of industrialisation in the
modernisation process, and its impact on religion. The standard RCM narrative focussing on religion and culture as dependent variables typically
looks at how these shape individual behaviour, and how these individuals
then drive economic activity (see McCleary and Barro 2006). The problem
here is that the analysis of Islam and development centres on the impact of
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Islam on individual behaviour and institutions that largely removes the
modern state and industrialisation from the discussion. It neither accounts
for the role of industrialisation and the state as part of the modernisation
process, nor the social relations that inform economic relations and activity and which shape the modern state. Crucially too is the failure to understand the logic and dynamic of capitalist development.
Underlying this is an approach based on methodological individualism
and rational choice theory which reduces society to the sum of its individuals and explains social outcomes in terms of rational individuals each seeking to maximise their utility. This is consistent and compatible with the
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics which has
increasingly been applied to other disciplines in the social sciences, and
employed to explain all manner of social phenomena. The difference with
neoclassical economics lies in the belief of RCM proponents that individual
rationality and utility maximisation are not endogenous but shaped by the
values transmitted by religion and culture. The methodological individualism of the neoclassical economic approach is thus usually contrasted with
the methodological holism of anthropology and sociology, and framed in
terms of individual action in human agency versus social structure (see e.g.
Rao and Walton 2004b: 14, 18). The (neoclassical economic) theory of utility
is opposed because it theorises human needs and wants outside of culture
and is based on ‘an entirely fictitious individual whose solipsist intentions
and desires are supposedly generated from within’ and as such is ‘not a
social being, and barely a human’ (Douglas 2004: 90).
However, the common emphasis on individual agency means that the
examination of development outcomes through the lenses of religion and
culture invariably still focusses on the individual, even when the emphasis
shifts away from religion and culture to institutions. Individual values
(rationality) and behaviour (actions and interactions) are either restricted
by religious/cultural beliefs and values or by religious/cultural institutions.
Religion and culture thus explain both development and underdevelopment as a result of rationality or irrationality. Individual actions and interactions in turn occur in a neutral (market) setting. Absent here are social
structures and power relations that govern the market, and the social context in which the state and development process are embedded. This
approach fits neatly into the state versus market debate, with state interventions (that constrain individual incentives and behaviour) juxtaposed
against free markets (and individual freedom). As such, the historical role
of the state is essentially expunged from the RCM analysis, with any subsequent treatment of the state disconnected from history and society,
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and without any reference to modernisation and state theories. By focussing on the individual, the RCM thesis removes the state and its role in
transferring resources and mediating conflict arising from the development process. Against this ahistorical, asocial and apolitical setting, state
failure and the idea of a state–market dichotomy are emphasised, allowing
the focus to be shifted to markets and the interactions between
individuals.
Even if religion and culture did affect individual behaviour, individual
actions and interactions do not take place in a neutral market unconstrained by wider social, economic and political factors. Instead, development is a conflict ridden process shaped by the balance of power in society
(see e.g. Moore 1966). This means that the link between individual economic activity and wider social economic outcomes will be mediated by
the (state) allocation of economic resources and political power specific to
each social context, and set of social relations. This neglect of the state is
initially surprising given its centrality in both sociology and Weber’s analysis of religion and capitalism. However, while Weber highlighted the centrality of the modern state, its role in developing the social and technological
forces behind the emergence of capitalism is largely under-theorised.
For Marx (1887), these forces related to changes in the relations of production (social classes and social relations) and forces of production (i.e.
technology and innovation). Rather than the Protestant work ethic, capitalist development emerged with the bourgeoisie and creation of a proletariat, and was driven by the imperative to innovate to remain competitive.
The emergence of a bourgeoisie was in turn the result of changes in social
relations and the balance of power in society, reflected in state redistributive policies in favour of this class. The state plays a key role in these changes
and in the emergence of capitalism in terms of its support of, and from, this
class through its domination of resources. In other words, the state is central to the social and structural transformation that characterises capitalist
development, industrialisation and modernisation.
Methodological individualism also allows RCM proponents to disregard
the organisation and nature of contemporary capitalism. The emergence of
the firm as a place of industrial organisation and decision-making suggests
that economic decisions are made at the firm (not individual) level and are
not based on profit maximisation (Coase 1937). Moreover, globalisation is
characterised by the domination by large (multinational) corporations of
the innovation process, global production networks, and global trade (see
e.g. Dicken 2003). The failure to take into account these two key features in
the organisation and nature of contemporary capitalism raises questions
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about the extent individuals play a role in innovation and entrepreneurship (see Tan 2011) and hence the link between religion, culture and individual behaviour on the one hand, and economic outcomes on the other.
This inability to grasp, and account for, the nature of capitalism is related
to the undue emphasis on trade and exchange as opposed to production
(see e.g. Kuran 1997). While trade is important for economic development,
this merely begs the question: trade in what? Put differently, buying and
selling bananas is not the same as manufacturing and exporting smart
phones. When the focus switches to production rather than (just) trade,
the key issues then centre on what is produced, how wealth is accumulated, and by whom. This is far more critical in explaining economic development than trade theories.
Hence while the European discovery of new trade routes is often used to
explain the rise of Europe and corresponding decline of the Ottoman
Empire (see e.g. Malik 2012), a more fruitful account can be obtained
through a closer examination of production and social relations. The state’s
connection to specific social classes and the nature of this relationship and
the balance of power will determine the type of economic activity and how
productive or unproductive this is. The Ottoman state’s connections with
‘money changers, financiers, members of the military class, tax farmers and
merchants engaged in arbitrage activities’ instead of a dynamic independent capitalist class meant that it favoured the former group as ‘principal
agents of accumulation’ (Malik 2012: 27). This can in turn be traced back to
the state’s fiscal independence from, and lack of connections with, productive economic classes because land remained the primary source of revenue generation and Ottoman policy was ‘guided by the demands of
provision rather than production’ (Malik 2012: 27). Similarly, the failure of
waqfs to finance productive investments (as opposed to consumption) and
its use to protect private property, evade taxes and circumvent Islamic laws
of inheritance was connected to its function as a vehicle for rent seeking
and patronage (Malik 2012: 11–13). In Egypt, the state and military elite controlled the economy, ‘neutralising the financial and industrial bourgeoisie
as potential rivals’ and eliminating large landowners (Badie 1986, cited in
Zubaida 1993: 134).
Any discussion of Islam and development, particularly in MENA, will thus
have to confront the state on these different levels. As discussed earlier, the
RCM treatment of the state is framed mainly in terms of the compatibility
of Islamic (legal) institutions with development, focussing on inheritance,
partnerships and trusts. This analysis of (Islamic) institutions does not
account for politics and the fact that ‘law is ultimately endogenous to
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politics’ with laws and regulations usually emanating from the political
sphere and their enforcement hinging on the will of political incumbents
(Malik 2012: 6; see also Charfi 2005). In this context it was not unusual for
senior scholars, as muftis, to formulate ‘legal justifications for whatever
their patron rulers wished to institute’ (Zubaida 2011: 15). In other words,
institutions are themselves outcomes of social and political factors and the
failure of the modern (legal) state in the Islamic world in favour of arbitrary
patrimonialism can be better understood by examining the social composition of the state and the types of classes it is connected to in society. The
implicit NIE assumption in contrast is that Islamic legal institutions are
incompatible with development because they restrict individual incentives
for exchange and hence trade. The theoretical and policy focus then shifts
towards creating the conditions for the operation of free markets, and in the
case of NIE, the creation of institutions to support the functioning of markets. The failure to understand how institutions emerge, and the direction
of causality, has not surprisingly led to failed attempts to create or impose
Western-style institutions (most notably democracy) and to promote
growth in developing countries. In the case of democracy the evidence suggests the opposite direction of causality, namely that ‘economic development gradually leads to social and cultural changes that make democratic
institutions increasingly likely to survive and flourish’ (Inglehart 2000: 94).
The RCM thesis thus fits neatly with orthodox economic solutions to
address the failure of development policy to promote social and structural
transformation associated with industrialisation and modernisation. This
is reflected in the shift in the focus of development policy from targeting
growth to meeting basic needs to alleviating poverty. Culture and religion
provide easy, politically and ideologically palatable explanations and solutions that are consistent with the basic assumptions and policy thrust of
neoclassical economics. These soft solutions are invariably based on the
idea of self-help and are best encapsulated in terms of strengthening the
(cultural) capacity to aspire among the poor so that ‘the future-oriented
logic of development could find a natural ally, and the poor could find the
resources required to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty’
(Appadurai 2004: 59). The onus of development is thus transferred from
society and public policy to the poor themselves (especially women)
through the idea of “empowerment” and “capabilities” (Sen 1999), “equality
of agency” and “public action” to give voice and opportunities to the poor
for redress (Rao and Walton 2004b: 29–30).
The methodological individualism that underpins the RCM thesis reflects
an affinity and affiliation with neoclassical economics and neoliberalism
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by framing culture in terms of coordinating resource allocation (Douglass
2000; Greif 1994, 2006). The analysis of social relations, class and power is
replaced by concepts such as “cultural capital” (Bordieu and Passeron 1977),
“social capital”, “religious capital” and “elite capture” to explain how preexisting social inequalities affect resource allocation and development outcomes (see e.g. Rao and Walton 2004a). Ongoing inequality and the failure
to change are explained in terms of a “political culture” (Calderon and
Szmukler 2004: 282), “cultures of apathy” (in place of “traditional cultures”)
(Douglas 2004: 87), “indifference” and a “culture of fear” (see e.g. Sen 2004:
41). In each instance, the explanation centres on the individual rather than
social relations and power structures, avoiding the more fundamental and
prickly issues of power, class and the structural sources of inequality arising
from the unequal distribution of resources.
The aversion to realpolitik is central to the methodological individualism
of neoclassical economics which chooses to ignore the reality that resource
allocation is driven by the interests of different social classes and facilitated
by the unequal distribution of power in society rather than being simply
mediated by the invisible hand of the free market. This seemingly apolitical
approach is of course deeply political and ideological (see e.g. Deaton et al
2006; Bayliss et al 2011) and it is not a coincidence that most if not all of RCM
proponents are also champions of free market policies and neoliberalism
(see e.g. Landes 2006; Porter 2000; Montaner 2000; Fukuyama 2000; Rao and
Walton 2004a). This is not a trivial point or mere political point scoring
because neoliberal policies centred on privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation are fundamentally political decisions with social and economic
consequences (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow 1991; Fine 1997; Tan 2008).
3. Culture, Society, Politics and Class: An Alternative Explanation for
the Failure of Islam
The failure and unwillingness of RCM proponents to engage with the issue
of power and class explicitly is reflected in the misreading of, and inability
to understand, the rise of Islamism and the use of religion for political ends.
The non-separation of religion and politics in Islam has meant that Islam is
usually not analysed separately from politics. In this case, Islamic movements are both necessarily religious and political movements. This however assumes that all Islamic (religious) movements are motivated by
religious conviction rather than more material interests. This assumption is
unrealistic and conflates appearance (religion) with essence (the material
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interests of specific social classes that tend to drive religious movements)
(see e.g. Zubaida 1993). In the case of Muslim countries, this conflation
arises from the use of Islam historically to legitimise political power and
opposition (e.g. in Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia) which suggests that Islam is at the heart of the development process (see e.g. Wierenga
2006; Stark 2005; Haqani 2004; Entelis 2001; Means 2009; Zubaida 1993).
The analysis of Muslim countries in terms of social relations necessarily
draws on the processes of modernisation and secularisation, the nature of
capitalist development, and the impact of these on social transformations
related to the resurgence of Islamism. This resurgence is not unique and
needs to be situated within the wider resurgence of religion globally. The
global revival of religion and in particular Islam is typically seen as a reaction to modernity and a refutation of secularisation as a thesis and process.
This argument is illustrated in the revival of religion in both rich and poor
countries, and among wealthy and poor people (see e.g. Berger 1999; The
Pew Forum 2006). Methodological and data issues aside, the continued and
increasing religiosity in the US, the world’s richest country, along with the
inverse correlation between religiosity and wealth, suggest that this religious resurgence is a rejection of secularisation and modernity.
However, if increasing incomes and economic security brought about by
modernisation reduces the need and time for individual religious activity,
then economic insecurity can be expected to increase religious activity.
This appears to be the case in the US where religiosity is inversely correlated
with wealth (see e.g. Gallup 2009) and where those with lower incomes and
education levels tend to be more religious (Norris and Inglehart 2004). This
suggests that poor people tend to be more religious because religion provides a sense of security, with those least (economically) secure being the
poorest. This is because religion (and religious revivalism) often serve as a
‘mechanism to reduce the anxiety which results from the social and economic pressure of modernization’ particularly for young people ‘in times of
accelerated socio-cultural transformation, when traditional values have lost
their primordial legitimacy, and new ones have not yet attained societywide acceptance’ (Evers 1991: 99, cited in Kiem 1993: 93). This is one reason
why ‘religious revivalism is particularly widespread among the urban lowermiddle class of cities in developing countries which mainly consists of
migrants from rural areas’ (Evers 1991: 6, cited in Kiem 1993: 93–94).
Insecurity may also arise as a result of failed modernisation (where governments simply fail to reduce poverty and deliver material benefits) or
uneven (incomplete) modernisation. It is thus necessary to understand
the uneven and often incomplete nature of economic development that
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characterises modernisation and capitalism. Economic development
depends on the successful social and structural transformation needed for
industrialisation and the transition of traditional (rural) to modern (urban)
societies. The economic benefits of mass dislocation in, and migration
from, the countryside, along with rapid urbanisation will depend on the
penetration of the capitalist mode of production necessary to transform
the traditional agriculture sector, and the creation of a viable modern economy based on manufacturing. This process creates winners and losers,
especially in the short term, as new social classes emerge and benefit from
structural changes to the economy while other classes are marginalised.
Poor countries are thus characterised by the presence of large income and
wealth gaps socially and spatially (regionally), with those earning a living in
the rural sector typically left behind economically. At the same time the
introduction and expansion of capitalist production methods uprooted
rural communities, separated them from their land and traditions, and
disrupted traditional sources of identity, authority and community (see
Li 2002; Entelis 2001). The search for alternative livelihoods reflected in the
process of rural–urban migration is as much the outcome of the failure of
traditional agriculture as it is the penetration of capitalism into the countryside. The process of development and modernisation is thus characterised
by social dislocation and the loss of tradition, increasingly without economic benefits as a result of economic stagnation that followed the imposition of neoliberal policies. The “culture shock” of being confronted by
symbols of modernisation (and Westernisation) along with the loss of traditional livelihoods, cultures and societies without the compensation of material improvement not surprisingly leads to the rejection of modernisation
and secularisation by displaced classes and communities. This opposition is
naturally ‘at its strongest when mobilised against modernity’ and is expressed
in terms of opposition to the modern state and society which characterises
the Islamic resurgence (Badie 1986, cited in Zubaida 1993: 140).
This can be seen in the return to traditional values for which religion is a
central part of and is reflected in increasing religiosity and support among
the poor for religious “fundamentalist” groups, political parties and movements. In the case of Algeria for example, ‘the stressful and dislocating consequences of rapid social change’ and partial modernisation resulted in
‘widespread frustration and resentment of the sacrifices made in the name
of modernity’, inspiring ‘a reaction and a demand for a return to the proven
basis of cultural tradition – Islam’ (Entelis 2001: 425). On the surface these
responses appear as a counter-secularisation tendency but are in fact
driven by the failure of development and modernisation to bring economic
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benefit to the wider population, and are thus consistent with the secularisation thesis broadly speaking.
In other words, the resurgence of religion in developing (poor) countries
cannot by definition be part of the desecularisation process simply because
these countries have yet to develop (i.e. modernise) and hence secularise
(secularisation being a feature of modernisation). This reconfirms the secularisation thesis that economic insecurity increases religiosity as poor people seek solace in religion. Religious beliefs, practices, and institutions can
thus be seen as coping mechanisms in the face of extreme uncertainty and
are ‘invented, abolished, revitalized and reinterpreted as reaction to crises’
(Riesebrodt 2000: 24). Secularisation and the global resurgence of religion
thus represent two sides of the same coin (Riesebrodt 2000: 26).
The poor however are not the only ones supporting the increasing role of
religion, and crucially they are not the ones leading religious movements.
Instead, the revival of religion in developing countries is largely driven by
the intermediate classes – including the middle class, the petite bourgeoisie and religious authorities – who have also been left out of the development process. Again, an understanding of the development process is
essential here. Capitalist development by definition entails the emergence
and subsequent economic and political dominance of a capitalist class
which generates wealth and drives economic growth through the process
of capital accumulation. As modern states in developing countries all
embark on the process of modernisation (development) to catch up with
the West, they necessarily provide economic rents (privileges) in support
of dynamic and productive classes that can spearhead this process. In the
context of modernisation and industrialisation, this invariably means
redistributing (public) resources to support a capitalist class engaged in
manufacturing (see Tan 2010).
The successful emergence and patterns of diffusion of capitalism (and
related institutions) will be shaped by elite resistance (Sachs 2000). As
a religious culture provides for the growth and accumulation of wealth
and power of religious institutions and religious classes (Riesebrodt 2000),
the redistribution of resources towards a manufacturing sector and an
industrial bourgeoisie usually entails the removal of rents from other sectors and social classes, including traditional and religious groups. In the
case of Islam, these classes usually comprise Islamic scholars, theologians
and clerics, with the ulama ‘patronized through a system of rewards and
privileges’ in exchange for providing political rulers with religious legitimacy and acting as intermediaries between rulers and the people (Malik
2012: 7; Monshipouri and Motameni 2000). In the Ottoman case, ‘religious
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hierarchy was incorporated into an elaborate bureaucratic structure with
substantial pays and privileges’ and with religious families competing for
‘religious offices, titles and tax farms’ (Malik 2012: 7; Hourani 1993). At the
same time modernisation also involves the expansion of the modern state’s
authority and control. This is because secularisation involved the dominance of the state and market spheres over religion, removing the religious
ethic from the central economic, political and cultural institutions and
freeing them from religious control, in the process constricting the religious sphere and confining the role of religious expertise to a shrinking
space (Riesebrodt 2000; Bruce 2002; Durkheim 1984, 1995). Hence, the secularisation of Western Europe corresponded with the transfer of power,
authority, property and functions from the Catholic Church to the modern
state (Gelot 2009: 48). In the case of Muslim countries such as Iran under
the Shah, the state took over sectors previously under the control or influence of traditional (religious) elites, in particular education (knowledge),
social services and law (see Keddie 1998). In this case modernisation and
secularisation removed rents associated with traditional or pre-modern
societies prompting a reaction by religious groups seeking to preserve privilege and authority. However, although the manifestation of this reaction
will be in terms of reviving religion in public life, the underlying motivations need not be religious.
The response of those social classes excluded from the state’s modernisation project, and its manifestation in religious terms are not unique to religious classes or Muslim countries. Instead, the rise of Islamist groups and
political Islam needs to be considered as part of a wider resurgence of religion globally (see e.g. Berger 1999) and it is important to then examine the
wider global context in which this religious resurgence has taken place in
order to explain the apparent failure of Islam. Religious fundamentalism
has been a common response to encroaching modernity (Gellner 1992)
brought about by (Western) colonialism and more recently globalisation.
In each case, opposition is in response to rapid social and economic
changes that threaten the economic interests (and rents) of particular
groups and classes. These responses are often manifested along ethnic,
communal and religious lines where the ‘[c]ommunal defense of one’s religion against rivals became political and was often tied to a defense of
invented traditions that favored groups and classes who felt left out by
secular modernization. This grouping of those “left out” crossed class lines
and included, in different areas, lower- and middle-class people disrupted
by modernization and secularization, classes tied to the traditional economy and some special groups like the Hindu upper castes … disfavored
J. Tan / Sociology of Islam 1 (2013) 64–87
79
by affirmative action programs’ (Keddie 1998: 709). In Muslim countries,
socioeconomic failures ‘led the marginalized segments of civil society to
rebel against the state, using religion as a catalyst for mobilization and
resistance’ and drawing on Islamic language and symbols ‘as a tool to
address socio-economic issues and perceived inequalities associated with
Westernisation’ (Monshipouri and Motameni 2000: 717).
It is thus necessary to distinguish between appearance and essence given
that religious nationalism ‘does not always involve a high level of belief
(though many of its adherents are very religious) but utilizes or invents
increasingly popular religious symbols and successfully identifies religion
with the nation’ (Keddie 1998: 708). Communalism ‘lay behind the first
ideological formulation of Islamic fundamentalism, by Maududi, a development that has influenced Muslim fundamentalists everywhere’ and was
fuelled by (British) colonial policies which defined people by, and rewarded
them according to, religious categories thereby intensifying ethnic and religious differences (Keddie 1998: 705–706, 709–711; see also Shaheed 1999;
Gülalp 1995). The likelihood of a political religious response is greater
where there is high religiosity and widespread religious nationalism or
communalism in the context of the failure of governments to deliver economic benefits (Keddie 1998: 700, 703).
The key to understanding the differences between developed and developing countries is not in Islam, religion or culture but instead the balance
of social forces. Where capitalism, modernisation and the modern state
emerged organically in developed countries as a result of changes in class
configurations and social relations (Marx 1887), these processes and institutions were imposed on developing countries through colonialism, not
least in MENA (Zubaida 1993). What this meant was that the domestic capitalist class, where this existed, was small, politically weak, and poorly connected to the state. The modern state in turn lacked legitimacy and popular
support, having been externally imposed, and its relationship with society
narrowly defined, often based on kinship, tribal and clan connections with
the political leadership (Zubaida 1993). In the absence of popular support,
political legitimacy will have to come from the delivery of broader economic benefits through the development (modernisation) process (as was
the case in the East Asian authoritarian regimes), and this was the intention of most states in newly independent developing countries. The failure
then to deliver material benefits to the wider population further undermines political legitimacy, with the state invariably resorting to increasing
repression, natural resource rents (e.g. oil) and/or external patronage (e.g.
foreign aid) to stay in power as illustrated in MENA (Zubaida 1993).
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Here it is necessary to distinguish between the marginalised poor (for
whom religion provides a sense of security) and the disenfranchised intermediate classes excluded from political and economic decisions (for whom
religion provides legitimacy and a vehicle to access state power and benefit
from state patronage). This helps us clarify the different roles between these
two classes and the fact that the disenfranchised intermediate classes are not
coincidentally the same groups driving Islamist movements. Religion thus
not only legitimises the grievances of a small, educated, articulate and well
organised class but also helps maximise political opposition to the state and
the state’s modernisation project by mobilising mass support from the poor,
many of whom ‘are dependent on others to whom they are subordinated
through clientelistic relationships or other forms of authority’ (Riesebrodt
2000: 28). This also appears to be the case in Europe where ‘education is not
significantly correlated with religiosity while wealthier individuals are more,
rather than less, religious!’ (Halman and Draulans 2006: 279).
We can now examine the rise of Islamism in Muslim countries to illustrate
this argument. The dramatic resurgence of Islam in the 1970s was driven by
Pakistan (following General Zia’s coup in 1977) and the Iranian Revolution
in 1979 which gave an impetus to the further growth of Islamist movements
including the rebirth of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and rise of new
Islamic institutions, Muslim student associations and the dawah (‘call to
Islam’) movement (Moghadam 2003: 33; Keddie 1998). Islamist movements
were usually led ‘by men with western or westernized educations’ with fundamentalists in the Muslim world and elsewhere often coming from the
same student and professional backgrounds (see Keddie 1998: 715, 718).
These Islamist groups were a political response to, and hence product of,
modernity and were supported or co-opted by the state to contain opposition and as a bulwark against the left (Zubaida 1993). Rather than a “clash
of ignorance” this strongly suggests that the underlying motivations behind
Islamist groups are political and not religious. The Muslim world’s openness to religious fundamentalist reactions is in turn partly explained by the
control by Islamic institutions and ulama of most education, courts, and
social services, and the subsequent wresting of control of these areas by the
modern state (Keddie 1998: 712–714, 721). The support of the disenfranchised intermediate classes for Islamist groups is a recurring theme across
several Muslim majority countries. These groups invariably comprise those
who have lost out as a result of state modernisation policies who then utilise Islam to legitimise their political claims.
In Pakistan, support for fundamentalists such as Jama’at-i-Islam came
from many traditional middle-class Muslims and students (Binder 1961).
J. Tan / Sociology of Islam 1 (2013) 64–87
81
Islamists were able to mobilise financial and human resources which
enabled them to run schools, operate charities, and publish newspapers,
and most critically, organise cadres on the streets (Binder 1961). In Turkey,
the Islamist opposition was supported by small merchants, craftsmen and
small businesses economically threatened by the encroachment of
European capitalism in the nineteenth century and subsequent industrialisation policies in the 1960s and 1970s (Gülalp 1995). Islamism was later
fuelled by global integration as a result of liberalisation which undermined
the state-led development project (Gülalp 1995; Monshipouri and
Motameni 2000). More recently, support for the AKP (Justice Party) came
from a growing conservative–religious industrial Anatolian bourgeoisie
seeking new markets through the European Union accession process via
the Independent Businessmen’s Association and The Union of Chambers
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Warhola and Besci 2010: 440–441).
In Egypt, the resurgence of Islam since the 1970s ‘reconfirmed the position
of Islam as a tool of political expression for the lower middle and middle
classes’ with Islamic political parties drawing from new groups of urban professionals to successfully contest elections in the 1980s (Stark 2005: 311–312).
The MB was traditionally controlled by the conservative ulama fraction and
‘engaged in a wide range of social and political activities in which private
Islamic volunteer organisations effectively took over the role of a largely
passive state’ by running mosques, clinics and welfare institutions, claiming
the ‘political space in the professional associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers and journalists’ (Stark 2005: 311–312). Subsequent MB offshoots
appealed to the middle class through the ‘liberalisation of middle class
Islamist ideology’ (in the case of the Wasat), the intelligentsia (mostly students, but also teachers, functionaries, technicians, craftsmen and junior
officers), Islamic groups in universities and radical preachers (e.g. Jamma’at
al-Muslimin and the Jihad group) (Stark 2005: 315; Zubaida 1993: 158).
Malaysia’s Islamic resurgence can be traced back to the dakwah (dawah)
movement of the 1970s that sought a return to Islamic ‘roots’ and which
emerged from Malaysian universities ‘as an attempt by a young urbanised
middle class to gain access to the political and economic domain of the
state’ (Stark 2005: 309). The movement was led by ABIM (the Islamic Youth
League of Malaysia) which was supported by ‘disenfranchised and disempowered middle-class Malays’ (Wong 2007: 470) comprising ‘mainly middle-level urban workers, students, groups or professionals without social
status or power, who were marginally involved with modern development
processes and generally incapable of acquiring an important platform in
decisionmaking concerned with the government machinery or economy’
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(Karim 1992: 175). ABIM indirectly increased Malaysia’s Islamisation when
it took over the leadership of PAS (the Islamic Party of Malaysia) in 1982,
transforming that largely rural, ethnic, peasant-based party into one pushing for Islam in the public sphere. The subsequent state-led Islamisation
(through the introduction of Islamic legal systems and institutions) was a
political response to the increasing popular support for PAS (see e.g. Means
2009). A more direct impact occurred when ABIM, and its leader Anwar
Ibrahim, were co-opted into government, leading to the gradual “abimisation” of UMNO (the ruling Malay party), ‘the ascent of the “dakwah persona” into the political mainstream and a gradual Islamization of society’
(Stark 2005: 309).
Islamism in Indonesia is represented by two major mass-based rival
Islamic political groups, the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the more
hard-line Muhammadiyah; newer fundamentalist parties such as PKS
(Social Justice Party); paramilitary groups including the FPI (Islamic
Defender’s Front) and the Al Qaida-linked Jema’ah Islamiyah; and various
mainstream conservative groups such as the powerful Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars) and pesantren
(Islamic boarding schools) (Wieringa 2006). The support base for these
groups comes from both the marginalised poor (where religion acts as a
coping mechanism under conditions of rapid social change) and the middle class (teachers, urban businessmen and merchants) who form the
socio-economic base of the Muhammadiyah (see Samson 1985: 168; McVey
1983: 201). As in Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence was reflected in the spread
of dakwah activities by the Muhammadiyah to purify religious life from
pre-Islamic beliefs and practices by eliminating ‘non-Islamic elements
from rituals and ceremonies’ (Kiem 1993: 102).
In Algeria, the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) attracted ‘a large percentage
of the electorate by appealing through a national campaign that was as
much a social program as a religious’ by providing ‘comprehensive social
programs that included schooling, business development and neighbourhood beautification, garbage pickup, tutoring sessions and economic assistance for needy families’ in a time of ‘severe economic crisis and apparent
government ineptitude’ and the failure of neoliberal policies (Entelis 1996:
427; Monshipouri and Motameni 2000). Although the party’s greatest
appeal was with ‘the impoverished urban centers filled with unemployed
and discontented youth’ (where over 70 per cent of Algeria’s total population was under the age of 30) (Entelis 1996: 428), the ‘commercial bourgeoisie … were among the most important financial contributors to the Islamic
movement’ (Bekkar 1992: 14).
J. Tan / Sociology of Islam 1 (2013) 64–87
83
4. Conclusion
There is nothing exceptional about religion and culture or essential about
Islam that warrants their separate analysis in relation to development.
Their emphasis represents another false avenue in the pursuit of policy
solutions which are not based on a proper understanding of, or engagement with, the underlying social causes of failed structural transformations
in developing countries. The RCM approach shares with neoclassical economics an emphasis on the individual centred on methodological individualism. Where the latter takes the individual as its starting point, the RCM
thesis embeds individual behaviour within a religious and cultural context
which is largely devoid of social relations and power structures. This essentially class-free analysis then justifies the focus on individual actions and
interactions, and the creation of a false dichotomy between markets and
the state. The ongoing demonising of the state has led to a shift in development policy from promoting structural transformation and growth to
notions of empowering the poor and other similar self-help solutions
encapsulated by RCM theories and consistent with the removal of the
state’s historical role.
This paper has instead argued that the failure of development has little to
do with religion or culture but rather the nature of social relations and balance of power in society, especially as this relates to the state’s connections
to society. A proper assessment of the problem is thus not possible without
an understanding of the dynamics of capitalism which accounts for how
development has occurred historically and helps explain key features of
the global economy. This highlights the importance of the state in the modernisation process, and the nature of innovation, production and trade that
occur on an organisational – not individual – level, mainly within and
between large (multinational) corporations.
State failure in Muslim countries (especially MENA) makes them ideal
candidates for anti-state and Orientalist-type, essentialist arguments.
These arguments ignore the role of the state and hence the need to analyse
state failure (rather than simply replacing the state with markets) and conflate appearance (the use of Islam to legitimise power or opposition) with
essence (underlying material interests). Understanding the essence of the
resurgence of Islam again entails an understanding of the uneven and often
incomplete nature of capitalist development which displaces traditional
societies and cultures often without the compensation of material benefits
offered by modernisation. Opposition to modernisation will usually be
manifested in religious terms to legitimise material and political grievances
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and will come from both the marginalised poor and disenfranchised intermediate classes. Crucially, Islamist movements and groups are invariably
led by elements from intermediate classes left out of the development process or, in the case of a religious class, by those whose privileges have been
removed by a (modernising) state, as the brief survey of several Muslim
countries illustrates. In this case, class (social relations) matters more than
religion or culture for development. If Islam is not the problem, then it is
unlikely to be the solution.
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