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Relations industrielles
Relations industrielles
Integrative Versus Distributive Bargaining: Choosing
a Problem Resolution Process
Rick Coleman et C. R.P. Fraser
Volume 34, numéro 3, 1979
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Département des relations industrielles de l’Université Laval
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Rick Coleman et C. R.P. Fraser "Integrative Versus Distributive
Bargaining: Choosing a Problem Resolution Process." Relations
industrielles 343 (1979): 546–562.
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Integrative Vs Distributive Bargaining
Choosing a Problem Resolution Process
Rick Coleman
and
C.R.P. Fraser
This paper examines the antithetical nature oftwo methods
of resolving conflict through negotiation, and suggests there is
an appropriate process depending upon how a party views the
problem, and how he perceives it being viewed by his opponent.
Labour management relationships encompass both conflict and
coopération. The former condition is rooted in the necessity of dividing
finite resources, and the latter recognizes the symbiotic nature of the relationship 1 . Presumably the processes the parties choose to résolve problems
that inevitably arise reflect the bifurcated nature of their relationship.
However, the considérable académie interest in the processes used by the
parties to cope with their problems usually présupposes either an approach
based on coopération, or one based on conflict. It does not seem possible
that either a coopérative or conflict-based approach is always appropriate in
every labour-management relationship. A complète considération of the
problem resolution process should, therefore, contain an analysis of a
primary step. This step is the choice of the type of process to be used for
resolving a problem when it first arises.
* FRASER, C.R.P., Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia.
COLEMAN, Rick, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia.
** The authors are respectively Staff Représentative of the British Columbia Government Employées Union and Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia. The paper is
based on the former author's Master's Thesis.
1 HILLS, Steven, "Organizational Behavior and Theoretical Models of Industrial Relations", Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Winter Meeting, 1975, Madison, Wisconsin, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1976.
546
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
547
This paper is a theoretical examination of the way in which parties can
reach apparently effective problem solutions from the perspective of an initial choice of a process. For given situations, décision rules are formulated
which suggest the appropriate course of action. In particular, the discussion
focuses on the possible effect of spécifie stratégies which are necessitated by
choosing a particular process. Finally, the unique one-problem case is
generalized to considération of more than one problem.
AVAILABLE PROCESSES
There are four options open when a problem first arises. One party
may rely on the other to develop a solution and accept this solution arbitrarily. Second, one party may présent its own solution as the only alternative, choosing to terminate the relationship should that solution not be
acceptable to the other. Third, the party may negotiate a solution, attempting to dérive as much partisan satisfaction as possible regardless of the loss
to the other party as long as the relationship is prolonged. Fourth, the party
may join with the other in attempting to résolve the problem with the major
criterion being the overall quality of the solution (maximizing joint benefits)
rather than the comparative level of benefits.
In an industrial relations perspective which assumes a continuing relationship, the first two processes need not be considered. The first option can
be rejected because it lacks credibility in an interest-laden industrial society.
The second can be dismissed because it lacks the dependence implicit in this
symbiotic relationship. We are, therefore, left with the third and fourth options, referred to in the literature as "distributive" and "integrative"
respectively2.
The integrative option represents a spécifie procédure designed to optimize the probability of both parties obtaining a good and perhaps "best"
solution to a particular problem. The tactical imperatives3 suggest a suffi2 WALTON, R., and R. McKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labour Negotiations,
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965.
3 The integrative process is ultimately a problem solving exercise which concentrâtes on
the best total solution to a problem instead of immédiate individual party interests. This is a
procédure that requires a mutual identification of the problem, a search for alternate solutions,
and an eventual choice of a solution that will accommodate the interests of both parties. The
tactical imperatives associated with this procédure are associated with the need for trust and
mutual coopération in identifying what both parties need and want from an eventual solution.
They relate specifically to reducing the other party's fear of exploitation and building a strong
coopérative atmosphère.
548
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
ciently depersonalized bargaining atmosphère to erase the participants'
identification with one or the other party, and the establishment of an
overall, single team spirit. The key requirements are trust and openness.
The emphasis is on employing ail resources to defeat the problem rather
than spending a substantial portion on defending one's own partisan position.
The distributive bargaining process4 is the antithesis of the integrative
option. Essentially, the distributive model assumes that the primary concern
for each party is deriving a maximum share of a solution or, more appropriately, "seulement". Each party will go to considérable trouble to
positively effect the balance in its favour, given the nature of the stakes involved. Party Unes are clearly drawn and there is a common realization that
each party is concerned with obtaining the largest benefit share. The emphasis is on calculated maneuvers designed to alter the opposite's viewpoint
of what is an acceptable share distribution. Unlike the integrative process,
which seeks to détermine the one best solution to a problem, the distributive
process represents a method by which each party attempts to obtain the
. solution that it believes would maximize its own interests, fully realizing it is
a win/lose situation. Solutions are sought and graded against partisan utility functions on an independent basis. The emphasis is on forcing a particular solution rather than discovering one.
DECISION MODEL
Thus, there are two antithetical processes through which problems can
be resolved. The choice of one process over the other is based on (i) the party's expectations concerning the potential outcomes of a problem, and (ii)
its perceptions of the opponent's expectations concerning that outcome.
A party's expectations concerning the possible outcomes of a problem
can be seen as being based on the perceived total utility of the outcome. To
the degree that a problem is seen as one where the outcome potential is fixed, a trade-off exists where an increase in utility to one is a decrease to the
other. However, the problem can also be seen to hâve a potential gain to
4 The distributive process represents a method by which each party attempts to obtain
the solution that it believes would be best for partisan interests, fully realizing that it is a
win/lose situation. It is a dynamic process based on calculated maneuvers designed to alter the
opposite's viewpoint on what is an acceptable share distribution. Solutions are sought out and
graded against partisan utility curves on an independent basis.
549
INTEGRATIVE VS DiSTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
both parties. Thèse two possible expectations combined with the two
available processes for dealing with the issue indicate four possible décision
situations. Thèse are illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Possible Décision Processes: One Party
Expectations
Décision
Process
Integrative
potential
However, it is not sufficient to consider just one party; there is an interaction of two which must be considered. An individual will consider not
only his own expectations, but his perception of those of the other party as
well5.
The necessity of a party estimating its opposite's expectations of the
problem situation has been documented by a number of researchers, particularly those concerned with conflict bargaining6. Ail were concerned with
stratégies of distributive bargaining, and each indicated that effective
bargaining nécessitâtes an estimate of probable response. If a party is to
sélect an appropriate strategy with regard to the utility functions of the
other party, accurate assessment of their position is necessary. Otherwise a
party*s own position will suffer on two counts.
5 For simplicity "perception" will refer to assessments by one party of the other's expectations concerning the potential outcomes and "conception" will refer to one's own expectations concerning the outcomes.
6 STEVENS, Cari, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations, New York.
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963; Edward PETERS, Strategy and Tactics in Labour Negotiations, New London 1955; Ann DOUGLAS, Industrial Peacemaking, New York. Columbia
University Press, 1962; WALTON and McKERSIE, op. cit.
550
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
First, incorrect assessment will lead to inappropriate offensive bargaining behavior. An underestimate by party A of the level of benefit share that
party B is striving for, for example, may lead party A to a commitment to a
level which is really quite unacceptable to party B. This mistake could lead
to a breakdown in negotiations and to open conflict such as a strike.
Similarly, concession or commitment tactics based on such an overestimate
will cause party B to reassess his own bargaining position. An example of
such a mistake is provided by Douglas7.
Protection of one's own "real" position is as critical as accurately
assessing the other party's position. In this context, inaccurate perceptions
which lead to inappropriate information dispersement will cause the opposite party to act inappropriately. A party who reveals too much may actually alter the whole bargaining situation from one conducive to quick
agreement to one which will drag on for days, and perhaps break down8.
Siegal and Fouraker9 provide expérimental support for the argument
that an incorrect défensive strategy can lead to increased offensive tactics by
the other party. In early experiments of bargaining behavior they observed
that an unexpectedly generous bid by one party led to an increased level of
aspiration in the opponent rather than a quick settlement. Incorrect défensive strategy can be compared to the openness of an integrative strategy.
Thèse arguments may be used to support the contention that the initial
choice of a process must be a function of a party's own conceptions
together with an estimate of the opponent's conceptions. A party will not
blindly enter a bargaining situation hoping that the other party perceives
similar circumstances. A party facing a décision over one of two processes is
in the same predicament. If the process turns out to be distributive they will
want to be prepared. Consequently, that party will try to estimate the opposite's conception of the same problem before initiating or participating in
a particular process option.
Given that there are two possible expectations concerning the potential
outcome of a problem, and there are two possible processes to résolve that
problem, there are a variety of possible circumstances in which the parties
may find themselves.
Thèse combinations are illustrated in Table 1. For each of the parties,
there is represented (a) their conception of the possible outcome (columns II
7 DOUGLAS, op. cit., pp. 280, 281.
8 See, for example, DOUGLAS, p. 36.
9 SEIGAL, S., and L. FOURAKER, Bargaining and Group Décision Making: Experiments in Bilatéral Monopoly, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960.
551
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
and VI respectively) and (b) their perceptions of the other's position (columns III and V). For each unique set of circumstances there is an appropriate process to be followed. This is indicated in Column VIII of Table
1, and each is based on two gênerai rules for which considérable support can
be found in the literature. Referring to the décision paths from Figure 1:
(I)
If a party A identifies a problem as having integrative potential
but is not sure of the response of the other party, décision " b "
(distributive process) will be pursued over décision " a " (integrative process).
(II) Décision " d " (identifying a problem as distributive and pursuing an integrative solution) is never made.
Rule I suggests that mutual perceptions of integrative potential and probable integrative response (Table 1, case 1) are the only circumstances where
an integrative process would be chosen. Rule II indicates that an integrative
choice in the case when one perceives a distributive potential and expects a
distributive response (Table 1, case 10) would be irrational. Both décision
rules suggest that one party's désire for an integrative option is insufficient
incentive for an integrative process to be pursued.
TABLE 1
Process Décisions
/
II
III
IV
V
Case
#
D
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
Estimate Perception
of
of
Problem 1
Party B
I1
I
I
I
I
I
I
D
D
D
I
I
I
I
D
D
D
I
I
D
VI
VII
VIII
PARTY
B
PARTYA
Décision
Path
(Figure 1)
Perception
of
Party A
a
a
a
a
b
b
b
c
c
c
I
D
I
D
D
I
D
I
D
D
Estimate Décision
Path
of
Problem (Figure 1)
I
I
D
D
I
D
D
D
D
D
a
b
c
c
b
c
c
c
c
c
Expecte<
Process
I
Ior D
D
D
IorD
D
D
D
D
D
î I refers to expectations of integrative potential; D refers to expectations of distributive
potential.
552
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
Thèse rules are based on the behavior considered to be appropriate for
particular sets of perceptions. The discussion of their validity is based on (i)
the optimum use of différent initial tactics employed for each of the process
options; (ii) game theory experiments concerning trust and suspicion; and
(iii) spécifie aspects of North American industrial relations.
TACTICAL DIFFERENCES
The tactical maneuvers required for success in each process are entirely
différent. The integrative process calls for the identification and candid
considération of a number of alternate solutions together with a search for
new solutions through a combination of mutually attractive features10. The
distributive process on the other hand, works on a limited number of solutions generated separately by each party as its optimum solution11. The integrative process is exploratory and tentative, as opposed to the fïrm commitments of the distributive process12. The commitments necessary for success in the latter13 are disfunctional in the former14. Overall, the open atmosphère of objectivity, trust, and low pressure implicit in the integrative
process is inconsistent with the calculated high pressure, low trust tactics of
the distributive process.
The first steps of each process are consistent with the gênerai comparison. In the integrative process, the first step calls for a maximum sharing of information in the form of basic objective facts. This is necessary if
the solution is to adequately deal with each party's needs. The initial stages
of the distributive process serve the same function of information flow, but
the first step of the distributive process calls for a minimum sharing of correct information and the appropriate médium is tentative solutions (the infamous "demand"). The distributive strategy is to force the opponent into
revealing his real position (minimum acceptable level) while presenting a
much inflated version of one's own position.
Neither party will be affected by the distributive/integrative tactical
divergence if both parties recognize an integrative potential and perceive a
io MINER, J., The Management Process-Theory, Research and Practice, New York,
Macmillan Co., 1973.
il STEVENS, op. cit.
12 WA L TON and McKERSIE, op. cit.
13 STEVENS, op. cit.
u HINTON, Brian, "Environmental Frustration and Creative Problem Solving", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52, 1968, pp. 211-217.
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
553
forthcoming integrative response. But if one party blindly pursues an integrative process and the other side is intent on the distributive process, the
information sharing will be one sided and the first party will be at a distinct
disadvantage, having revealed its preferred position. Each party should
recognize this situation, or fail to recognize it only once. Depending on the
party's degree of risk avoidance, it could either wait for the other party to
show its hand or pursue the safer route regardless (Rule 1).
A perception of distributive potential and distributive response will
never be handled in an integrative manner because this would invite exploitation (Rule II). However, in the situation of integrative potential,
distributive response (Rule 1) there is an added variable. The degree of certainty that the other party will respond in a distributive manner to an integrative initiative is a function of party A's trust in party B.
TRUST AND SUSPICION
The effect of trust, and its counterpart, suspicion, on collective
bargaining has attracted a great deal of académie considération. Anecdotal
évidence15 however, need not be relied upon because the topic has generated
a great number of controlled laboratory experiments.
In particular a number of game theorists hâve attempted to analyze collective bargaining through the sélective manipulation of trust in artificial
bargaining environments. Deutch, for example, defined trust as choosing to
pursue a path that may lead to an event perceived to be harmful, even
though occurrence of this event is dépendent on another person and there
are definite indications that the potential loss may be greater than the potential gain16. Trust, therefore, becomes synonymous with confidence.
In terms of the probability of coopération between parties, given at
least one trusting party, "... the choice (between cooperating or not) is
determined by such variables as the relative attractiveness of the competing
alternatives and the subjective probabilities of realizing the alternatives"17.
Severe problems of trust, therefore, occur when one or both parties are "...
indirectly oriented to obtain maximum gain at minimum cost (to
themselves)"18. Such is the case in distributive bargaining.
15
16
Human
n
is
DOUGLAS, op. cit., p. 72.
DEUTCH, M., "The Effect of Motivational Orientation Upon Trust and Suspicion",
Relations, Vol. 13, 1960, pp. 113-139.
Ibid., p. 125.
Ibid., p. 123.
554
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
Deutch was primarily concerned with the effect of individually perceived intentions on trusting behavior. He used a two-person, potentially
variable-sum game in which individual rewards were dépendent on choices
made by both parties. The game was structured such that décisions based on
individual rationality were impossible unless conditions of mutual trust also
existed. Subjects were programmed to a coopérative, compétitive, or individualistic motivational orientation and experiments were conducted controlling for simultaneity of choice and pre-choice communication variables.
The cases of most interest to the collective bargaining sphère are those in
which non-simultaneous choice was paired with an individualistic orientation. The latter is closest to the "integrative" orientation given above
because only the compétitive motivational orientation carried the implication of win/lose conflict. The coopérative orientation was much stronger
than the integrative requirements given above. The indication from this
work is that Deutch's subjects were risk averters when faced with an intergrative/distributive décision and uncertainty of an opposite's reciprocal
action.
Unfortunately, Deutch's study lacks a certain degree of relevance to industrial relations because he made no attempt to control for the negotiating
history of relationships. However, there is another study which did control
for this variable. Benton, Gelber, Kelly, and Liebley19 conducted a card
game simulation where both parties were rewarded a certain amount per
trial depending upon the succeeding state of a card variable. The critical
aspect of the expérimental design was that only one player had cost-free
knowledge of the card variable, whereas the other party could only obtain
direct knowledge at a penalty cost to both. As in labour-management
negotiations, both players were faced with dilemmas of honesty versus
deceit and trust versus suspicion. The controlled variable was "trustworthiness', as measured by the first subject's (perfect information) history of
deceit. The authors found that the rate of doubting, even in the face of
négative conséquences, increased markedly according to the controlled subject's untrustworthy behavior.
The implication for the présent study is that distrust, and a ,;<b" décision path, is a function of past bargaining behavior. By the very nature of
the distributive process (controlled information flow, misinformation, etc.)
Benton et al's findings suggest that any perceptions of a distributive
19 BENTON, Alan, E. GELBER, H. KELLY, B. LIEBLEY, "Reactions and Various
Degrees of Deceit in a Mixed-Motive Relationship", Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 12, 1968, pp. 170-180.
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
555
response based on past expérience should be sufficient motivation to pursue
an initial distributive strategy.
Loomis20 was even more pessimistic regarding the potential for an integrative process. In the theoretical introduction to his paper, Loomis suggests that there are four conditions essential for the establishment of a relationship based on trust, ail of which are only satisfied in case 1 of Table 1:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Each individual must be committed to reaching some goal where
commitment is such that failure to achieve the goal would cost
more than he would be willing to risk in an uncertain venture.
Each individual must realize that he cannot reach a spécifie goal
without the help of other persons.
Each individual must recognize a similar dependence of the
other person(s) to him and that they are ready to help him.
Each individual must know that the other parties are each aware
that the members are ail mutually interdependent.
By Loomis' estimation, the crucial factor is a state of "perceived
mutual trust". He discounts any possibility of anything but a case 1, Table
1 situation leading to an integrative process:21
... If the individual perceives mutual trust, he will cooperate, and if the
individual does not perceive mutual trust he will not cooperate. In the
second case the individual should see (équivalent to Table 1, cases 5, 6,
7, 10 for party A; cases 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 for party B) since he has no
reason to expect that the person will cooperate, that an uncooperative
choice is his best défense against undue loss.
A paper written by Shure, Meeker, and Hansford22 is more specifically
focused on the first move of a tactical interchange. The task in this experiment was such that coopération was possible, thereby maximizing total
gain, together with two other behavior combinations: dominance/ submission and mutual interférence. If both parties remained leary of each other's
motives, mutual interférence would isolate individual players thereby permitting little or no reward, but also no direct "punishment". If one party
decided to trust the other, however, severe vulnerability was experienced
due to an aspect of the game design that gave the opposite party the power
to dominate future behavior if the first party chose to initiate an inter20 L O O M I S , J., " C o m m u n i c a t i o n , the Development of Trust a n d Coopérative
Behavior", Human Relations, Vol. 12, 1959, p p . 305-317.
21 Ibid., p . 308.
22 S H U R E , G., R. M E E K E R , a n d E. H A N S F O R D , " T h e Effectiveness of Pacifist
Stratégies in Bargaining G a m e s " , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, 1975, p p . 106-117.
556
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
change with an integrative move. Domination ranged from allowing the opposite party to maximize his total possible gain to the infliction of physical
pain (an electric shock).
In this experiment there was no bargaining history to bias the subjects'
décisions. Actions were based solely on each subject's culturally acquired
feelings for a situation where they could gain a reward, but only through extrême vulnerability. Such a cost was too much for over one half on the subjects to even contemplate coopération in the form of an integrative process.
This suggests a high probability that a "safe" distributive option will be
pursued in ail cases where response is unsure, even when a party recognizes
a potential for coopération.
Thèse controlled experiments indicate that any party facing a high
threat situation will tend to react in a safe manner. There are a number of
aspects of the labour-management sphère which make this conclusion even
more valid.
Aspects of North American Industrial Relations
THE PRESENCE OF AUDIENCES
An audience is defined as a physical or psychological présence for
whom the negotiator must perform. The motivation to perform rests on the
need for peer support for psychological well-being and career goals. In most
cases, the audience is somehow dépendent upon the negotiator's performance for either tangible (as in monetary value of a benefit share) or intangible outcomes (emotional feelings of victory or defeat). Much concern
is therefore directed towards the negotiator's behavior by himself, his
fellow negotiator's, and his constituency. A positive or négative audience
response may be directed at any aspect of the negotiator's behavior or the
conséquences of this behavior: spécifie commitments, concessions,
agreements, bargaining style, etc.
Some literature is devoted to analyzing this aspect of the labourmanagement interchange, particularly the dominance of a constituency on
the labour side. Blum23 writes that audiences are the sole reason for the présent form of collective bargaining. He suggests that the negotiators are
23 BLUM, A., "Ritual versus Reality in Collective Bargaining", Harvard Business
Review, December, 1961.
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
557
aware of what the level of seulement will be from the start, but appearancesof hard fought battles are necessary to sustain constituency support.
A cursory treatment of the subject is provided by Rubin and Brown24.
Thèse authors hâve stated a number of gênerai propositions. The most relevant to présent purposes is one which states:25
If a bargainer is accountable to an audience for whatever it is that will
bring positive évaluation, then this accountability is the mechanism by
which he may be controlled.
Rubin and Brown suggest that constituencies hâve the power to apply
sanctions to negotiators who are perceived to be behaving inappropriately.
Sanctions include removal of the negotiator from his rôle, reduced support
(wildcat strikes, etc.) and damage to his bargaining réputation. Empirical
support for this proposition is provided by McKersie, Perry, and Walton26.
Observing the 1961 Auto Workers/International Harvester contract
negotiations, thèse authors "... found that a negotiator's failure to bargain
in accord with his constituency's préférences had serious implications for
his continuation as a member of the bargaining team" 27 . Further, "... a
good number of delegates perceived high costs in failing to advocate their
constituents' demands. Many of the delegates faced serious challenges to
their leadership from organized factions within the membership and could
be said to hâve chosen their orientation in response to implicit political
sanctions" 28 .
On a similar plane, Rubin and Brown pose a second proposition: 29
Audiences, especially dépendent ones, generate pressures toward loyalty, commitment, and advocacy of their preferred positions.
In support of their proposition the authors cite a number of expérimental studies which demonstrate the conformity of negotiators to group
norms.
24 R U B I N , F . , a n d R. B R O W N , The Social Psychology of Bargaining and
Negotiations,
New York, Académie Press, 1975.
25 Ibid., p . 47.
26 M c K E R S I E , R., C . P E R R Y , a n d R. W A L T O N , "Intraorganizational Bargaining in
L a b o u r N e g o t i a t i o n s " , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, 1965, p p . 463-481.
27 R U B I N a n d B R O W N , op. cit., p . 4 8 .
28 M c K E R S I E et a l . , op. cit., p . 4 6 5 .
29 R U B I N a n d B R O W N , op. cit., p . 50.
558
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
The relevance of the "audience effect" for présent purposes relates to
the potential willingness of a negotiator to act cooperatively in front of a
distributively oriented constituency. Constituents are often not aware of the
intricacies of negotiations30. They see only the broader picture which in
North America usually delineate an "us/them" relationship. If there is
some doubt of an expected integrative response in the negotiator's mind,
there may be a great deal of doubt in the less informed constituent. Labour
relations literature contains a number of outstanding examples of the audience phenomenon.
In 1965, four and one-half years of peaceful (no strikes or breakdowns
in negotiations) negotiating in the steel industry was terminated with the
unseating of the union leadership. Apparently, three décades of severe strife
(e.g. long strikes, vicious diatribes) and bitter win/lose bargaining prior to
1960 had created militancy in the rank and file. The latter distrusted
management's intent and believed that their leaders were being tricked into
subservience to management's desires31.
On the same plane a period of accrimonious and costly bargaining between the Amalgamated Méat Cutters and Retail Food Store Employées
Union and a supermarket employers' association was followed by a brief
period of more integrative behavior. No emotional shouting matches were
permitted and no accusations were allowed during a party's présentation.
But because "... the new bargaining approach did not follow the traditional
pattern, both sides (constituents) began to question not only the adequacy,
but the integrity of their spokesmen" 32
BARGAINING POWER IN FUTURE DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
In the opening pages of Industrial Peacemaking, Douglas notes that
when "... the negotiators close the doors to the conférence room, they turn
their backs on reality in any of the sensés in which science and society use
that term" 33 . The validity of this statement is demonstrated in the
distributive model provided above. Except where extrême condition of
disproportionate power exist, the model implies that negotiation outcomes
30
B L U M , op.
cit.
31 FELLER, D., "The Steel Expérience: Myth and Reality", Proceedings of the TwentyFirst Annual Winter Meeting, 1968, Madison, Wisconsin, Industrial Relations Research
Association, 1969.
32
33
Business Perspectives,
1968, p p . 4-10.
D O U G L A S , op. cit., p . 8.
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
559
dépend to a great extent on the skillful use of the available tactics rather
than on an environmental reality. Part of negotiation skill is providing as
favourable an image as possible of one's power position. The latter is defined in the context of inability to resist/ability to insist. The degree to which
expériences negotiators realize this negatively affects the relevance of a
"real" power structure. This conclusion is implicit in the nature of the
distributive process. The présentation of a favourable net expected utility
function and the attempted manipulation of the other party's net expected
utility function, particularly through a commitment strategy, indicates the
prevalence of exaggerated projections. For example, if a party makes a
threat to strike, this threat will hâve no coercive power unless it is believed
by the opposite party.
Each party must therefore be careful not to give its opposite any impression of weakness. In a continuing relationship the necessity of
demonstrating a favourable image carries over between différent contract
negotiations. A sign of weakness given in one set of negotiations may
become relevant when the contract reopens through a deflated image of
"power" and consequently, perceptions of minimum acceptable levels of
benefit shares. This effect could lead to unnecessary sanctions or even
deadlock if the initial préparation of party B's ability to resist/insist is incorrect.
In the présent discussion thèse arguments suggest that a party which
foresees any future distributive bargaining with the same opposite party will
not jeopardize the potential future value of commitment tactics by
demonstrating any dependence on the other party for future reward
distribution. The instigation by party A of an integrative process may be a
signal to party B that A does not hâve the power to push for what it wants in
a distributive process, and must rely on party B's coopération in order to attain even the smallest benefit share.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The décision model proposed in this paper makes prédictions of rational behavior which can be expected in circumstances of particular
perceptions. Prédictions for each perception/conception combination are
given in column VIII of Table 1.
In the first four cases listed, party A is expected to pursue an integrative process. It will enter the process prepared for a maximum sharing
of information. In case 1 this plan will be reciprocated, but in cases 2, 3,
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RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979)
and 4 party A will soon discover that party B is not prepared to share information so freely. Party A will encounter réservation in case 2, but
distributive agression in cases 3 and 4. In case 2, party A will probably encounter a fairly quiet opposite who will be prudently awaiting signs from
party A that the problem is as party B itself sees it. Any other behavior will
destroy any likelihood of coopération.
In case 3, party B may décide to respond to party A's integrative initiative by creating the false impression that it is an integrative problem,
hoping thereby to trick party A into revealing too much information. There
is some doubt that this can continue for any length of time because party B
will not want to reveal any information regarding its own position. This will
alert party A of its inappropriate choice in case 4, party B will enter predisposed to pursue the distributive process.
The same arguments apply to party A's choice in cases 5 through 10.
Party A will either try to fathom the situation or pursue the distributive process regardless because of a perception that B has an inclination towards the
distributive option. The rôles are sometimes reversed; however, it seems
clear that only in the first case is the integrative process likely to be chosen
and completed. Even in case 5 where both parties are actually T , the
distributive process will ultimately prevail because the integrative option
does not allow for the kind of information exchange where one party gives
an incrément of information and then waits for the other party to make a
similar contribution. This is not a trust filled atmosphère and temptations
and suspicions will arisé concerning how much and what kinds of information should be traded. In ail other cases a choice of the integrative option
would be a tactical error since it would put a party at a severe bargaining
disadvantage.
The same logic used for isolated problems can be extended to cases
where there are two or more. When problems are of différent catégories i.e.
integrative or distributive potential the antithetical nature of the processes
will guide the choice of a process. If the two processes are attempted at the
same time or even in the same relationship, one or the other process must
suffer some altération. Either the distributive process must become uncharacteristically open or the integrative process will be debased by
calculated information restriction. Degrees of variation in information flow
and coopérative, non-partisan discussions are as critical to the integrative
process as calculated restriction of information is to the distributive process. The latter can continue as such with a varying amount of disclosure,
but the integrative process cannot continue to operate with any partisan
restriction of information flow. Such restriction will foster distrust and the
INTEGRATIVE VS DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
561
degree of coopération will decrease for both parties. Therefore integrative
processes need to be separated from the distributive variety.
Further, in some cases problems of a similar nature may hâve to be
separated. By their nature integrative processes should tend toward the
isolation of particular problems. Indeed, the nature of the integrative
modePs first task of problem définition implies the necessary singularity of
problems. Distributive combinations are slightly more complicated.
Theoretically they could go either way depending upon the party's perception of which will prove most advantageous. It may be felt, for example,
that a bargaining advantage will be enjoyed if a problem is considered by
itself. In gênerai, however, there is a tendency for distributive issues to be
treated together. This "packaging" occurs because parties do not commit
themselves to a singular solution to one issue before ail issues are considered34 but also because two issues provide two sets of information plus
additional tactics which are generated from the combination. The latter
refers to a concession process where each party attempts to manipulate the
other's net utility function for one issue through another35.
The conclusion to be reached is that normally, a désire for separated
problem solving will only exist if both parties wish to pursue an integrative
process. This condition is unlikely unless both parties perceived a potential
for an integrative solution and a forthcoming integrative response from the
other party. Given a history of distributive bargaining, such perceptions are
unlikely. Even where an integrative response is considered likely, success of
this type of process dépends upon separating this resolution process from
distributive processes.
34 Labour Gazette, January, 1975, pp. 40-46.
35 See, for example, W A L T O N and McKERSIE, op. cit., p . 77.
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Coopération ou contestation en tant que
méthode de règlement des différends
L'examen des deux méthodes pour résoudre les différends permet de constater
que leurs exigences se contredisent.
L'approche coopérative ou la négociation interdépendante vise à rechercher le
meilleur règlement d'un problème. Les stratégies et les tactiques que l'on utilise s'opposent à l'idée de conflit ou à l'approche de contestation. Le processus choisi, dans
une situation donnée, repose en premier lieu sur le fait qu'une partie considère le
problème en lui-même. En d'autres termes, y a-t-il possibilité d'un avantage qui est
partagé entre les parties ou existe-t-il une possibilité d'accroître leurs avantages
mutuels,?
En deuxième lieu, le choix du processus peut reposer sur la perception qu'une
des parties se fait du point de vue de son adversaire. En d'autres mots, l'adversaire
considérera-t-il la question en recourant aux stratégies et aux tactiques d'une approche de coopération ou d'une approche de contestation?
Cette double approche, qui repose sur la façon dont on conçoit le problème à
résoudre et sur l'opinion que l'on a de l'adversaire, peut conduire à la possibilité de
dix situations différentes. (Tableau 1) (Le cas illogique de n'envisager que la possibilité de contestation mais de choisir l'autre méthode ne peut être considéré comme
option). Les auteurs estiment que le processus de coopération ne pourra se produire
avec certitude que là où les deux parties considèrent le problème et l'adversaire comme s'ils désiraient coopérer dans la recherche d'une solution. Dans les deux autres
cas, on peut accepter de suivre un processus de coopération, mais cela dépend de
l'attitude initiale d'une partie qui considère le problème ou l'autre partie sous l'angle
de la contestation.
Les auteurs tirent cette appréciation de trois sources. Ils considèrent d'abord les
tactiques inhérentes aux deux méthodes pour régler le problème ainsi que l'effet de
ces tactiques sur l'autre partie. En second lieu, ils ont tenu compte de l'expérience acquise en matière de confiance et de méfiance des deux parties l'une envers l'autre.
Finalement, ils étudient certains problèmes particuliers dans le domaine de relations
professionnelles, soit l'influence d'un groupe sur le comportement de ses agents et
l'effet du pouvoir de marchandage dans des rapports professionnels dynamiques.
Enfin, les auteurs laissent entendre que l'étude d'un cas unique isolé peut s'appliquer également à des cas à problèmes multiples.