Parties,IssueNetworks,andthePotentialforPoliticalChange:
CivilRightsandtheTransformationsofAmericanPolitics
ErikJ.Engstrom
RobertHuckfeldt
FanLu
MichaelNash
UniversityofCalifornia,Davis
ABSTRACT
PreparedfordeliveryattheannualmeetingofElections,PublicOpinion,andParties,
Edinburgh,Scotland,September2014.
1
Throughoutitshistory,muchofAmericanpoliticshasrevolvedaroundthe
politicsofrace.Indeed,issuesrelatedtoracehavebeencentralatnearlyallthe
criticaljuncturesinAmericanpoliticalhistory–thesigningoftheDeclarationof
Independence,theconstructionandadoptionoftheU.S.Constitution,westward
expansion,theCivilWarandReconstruction,theorganizationofAmericanforcesin
armedconflictsincludingbothWorldWars,andtheconstructionofsocialwelfare
policy.Moreover,raceprovidesonepartofthesolutiontoSombart’spuzzle(1906),
helpingtoexplainwhytherehasneverbeenasuccessfulsocialistmovementin
Americanpolitics.Thatis,racialconflictstandsinthewaycreatingacoalitionof
workingclassanddisadvantagedindividualswhoarebelongtoheterogeneous
racialandethnicgroups.
Inthiscontext,itcomesasnosurprisethatissuessurroundingracehave
beencentraltotheevolutionandorganizationofAmericanpoliticalparties,the
ideologicalbasesoftheseparties,andtheclassandsectionalorganizationof
Americanpartycoalitions.Writingin1949,V.O.Key(1949:5)observedthatthe
“politicsoftheSouthrevolvesaroundthepositionoftheNegro.”Whatwasoncea
southernissueresolvedbysoutherninstitutionsbecameanationalissuewhen,in
thefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,thelargescalemigrationsofAfrican
AmericansoutoftheSouthintonorthernandwesterncitiesledtoasetof
circumstancesthatprovidedpoliticalvoicetoblackaspirations.Andthisled,in
turn,toadramatictransformationofAmericanpoliticalparties.
RacialandethnicdivisionsinAmericansocietyhavehistoricallyservedasa
subtextfortheorganizationofAmericanpoliticalparties.Issuesregardingrace
2
haveservedtocreatepoliticalnetworkswithinandbetweenpoliticalpartiesthat
createasecondlevelofpoliticalorganization.Whentheboundariesoftheparties
areincompatiblewiththissecondleveloforganization,thepotentialarisesfora
reorganizationofpartisanpolitics.
Thispaperfocusesonlandmarkcivilrightslegislationadoptedin1957,
1964,and1965.Theselegislativevictoriesforproponentsofcivilrightsconstitute
aturningpointinAmericanpolitics.Theyinvolveddramaticbipartisan
cooperationinpassingcivilrightsbills,andtheyalsoledtotheendoftheNewDeal
coalition,andthetransformationofboththeDemocraticandRepublicanpartiesand
thebasesoftheirpoliticalsupport.
Thepaperlocatesthispoliticalprocesswithinitspoliticalandhistorical
contextbeforeaddressingtwointerrelatedprocesses.First,weconsideraseriesof
crucialvotesoncivilrightswithintheU.S.Senate.TheSenateprovideda
particularlyformidableobstacletothepassageofcivilrightslegislationbecauseof
theneedtoobtainacloturevotetoenddebate–avotewhichrequired
supermajority(two‐thirds)supportthatwasdifficulttoobtainduetotheeffortsof
southernandborderstateDemocratsandtheirallies.Second,weconsiderthe
implicationsofthesevotes,andtheprocesstheyrepresent,forthecreationofnew
partycoalitionsamongbothDemocratsandRepublicans.
RaceinPost‐WorldWarIIAmericanPolitics
PervasiveracialdiscriminationinAmericanpoliticsandsocietyproduceda
systemofracialapartheidintheAmericansouth,andwidespreadracial
discriminationintherestofthenation.Moreover,theproblemsdidnotstopwith
3
respecttothetreatmentofAfricanAmericans,butextendedtootherracialand
ethnicminoritiesaswell.Dramaticactioninpost‐WorldWarIIpoliticscreated
rapidprogressinthestruggleforracialequality–theadoptionofCivilRightsActsin
1957,culminatinginthelandmarkCivilRightsActof1964andtheVotingRightsAct
of1965.Thisprogressalsocamewithanenduringpoliticalprice.Inparticularit
ledtothedemiseoftheNewDealcoalition;thefracturingofaclass‐basedcoalition;
aconservativebacklashthattransformedsouthernpolitics;andtheendofthe
RepublicanPartyasthepartyofLincolnthatembracedindividualfreedomandcivil
rights.
ThePoliticalContext
Severaleventsoccurredduringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturyleading
toincreasedpressureonthepoliticalprocesstoaddressissuesofrace.In
particular,duringtheperiodpriortotheGreatDepression,alargemigrationof
AfricanAmericanstookplaceoutoftheruralsouthandintonortherncities.While
thismigrationslowedduringthe1930s,itresumedduringthewaryearsasmany
southernblacksmovednorthtotakejobsinwarindustries.Thismigrationwould
fundamentallyalterthestrategiccalculusofnorthernDemocraticpoliticianswho
cametorelyonAfricanAmericansupportatthepolls.
TheNewDealDemocraticPartyincreasinglycametorepresenttheinterests
andaspirationsofworkingclassAmericans.Localpartyorganizationssuccessfully
mobilizedmanyofthenewarrivalsintonortherncities,includingAfrican
Americanswhohadleftbehindnotonlytheone‐partySouth,butalsotheir
allegiancetothePartyofLincoln.Forexample,theDemocraticpartyorganization
4
inChicagosuccessfullymobilizednewAfricanAmericanarrivalsasparty
supporters.Asaconsequence,notonlytheCookCountyDemocraticorganization,
butalsotheDemocraticPartyinIllinois,cametorelyonthesupportofAfrican
AmericansinSouthChicago.
ThisprogresspointedouttheparadoxofAmericannationalpolitics.Atthe
endofWorldWarII—awarfoughttofreetheworldfromfascism—theU.S.
Congress,andtheU.S.Senateinparticular,remainedincapableofmovingforward
oncivilrights.Thisinabilitymadepresidentialsupportforblackaspirations
problematic.TwoDemocraticpresidents,FranklinRooseveltandHarryTruman,
dependedonthesupportofsouthernDemocraticSenatorsandHousemembersfor
thecontinuedprogressoftheNewDealandtheFairDeal.Asaconsequence,
Rooseveltmovedslowlyandcautiouslyonmattersofrace,adoptingsymbolic
actions,actingthroughhiswife,andemployingadministrativedevicestosupport
AfricanAmericanneedsandaspirations.
Inspiteoftheseobstacles,startlingprogressoccurredintheperiodleading
uptothe1948presidentialelection.First,HarryTrumanusedanexecutiveorderto
desegregatetheU.S.armedforces.Second,theDemocraticconvention,urgedonby
twonorthernliberalsrunningfortheSenatein1948–HubertHumphrey(MN)and
PaulDouglas(IL)–addedacivilrightsplanktoitsplatform.Thiswasacrowning
blowtothewhiteseparatistswithintheParty,leadingtoasouthernwalkoutfrom
theconventionandthepresidentialcandidacyofSouthCarolinaGovernorStrom
ThurmondasaDixiecratcandidate.Thurmond’scandidacywonfourDeepSouth
states,andTrumanbarelywontheelectionasaconsequence.Thepoliticallesson
5
takenbymanyDemocratswasthatTrumanwouldhavewonhandilyifnotforthe
divisiveeffectsofraceonhiscampaign.
Thisisillustratedinthe1948TexasSenatecampaignbeingsimultaneously
wagedbyLyndonJohnsoninTexas.AsaHousemember,Johnsonhadbeena
committedNewDealerandafavoriteofFranklinRoosevelt.Inhisfirstrunforthe
Senate,however,hedistancedhimselffromthenationalpartyandrepudiated
Truman’scivilrightsefforts(EvansandNovak(1966:4).
MyfeelingsarewellknowninmydistrictandinWashington.AndHarryTruman
knowsIamagainsthimonthisprogram.Ijustdon’tthinkCongressshouldtryto
cramhisprogramdownthethroatsofSouthernstates....
Truman’swhisker‐thinvictoryin1948,thedefectionofSouthernDemocrats,
andthelossofAlabama,Louisiana,Mississippi,andSouthCarolinatoStrom
Thurmond’sStateRightscandidacysentamessagethatwasnotlostontherestof
thepartyanditscandidates.Inhistwosubsequentpresidentialcampaigns,Adlai
Stevensontreadsoftlyonissuesofraceinanefforttomaintainthesupportofthe
whiteSouth.InaspeechduringthecampaignatRichmond,Virginia,Stevenson
spoketothesufferingofsouthernersinthepostCivilWarperiodunderRepublican
controlwhenhesuggestedthat:”AmongthemostvaluableheritagesoftheOld
Southisitspoliticalgenius,whichinmanyrespectswasfaraheadofitstime.Even
todaysomeofthefinestproductsofSoutherngovernmentalthoughtareonly
beginningtowinthegeneralacceptancewhichtheyhavesolongdeserved....A
classicexample,itseemstome,istheConstitutionoftheConfederacy...”(1953:
153).
6
Inshort,itwouldappearthatmanyDemocratshadlearnedtheirlesson
duringtheneardebacleof1948.Iftheywantedtocontrolthepresidency,they
neededtomakethenecessarycompromisestomaintaintheirwhitesouthern
supporters,andthismadeprogressoncivilrightsdifficulttoachieve.
Atthesametime,thestrategyfailedtomaintaintheparty’scontrolofthe
presidency.Moreblackswerenowabletovoteduetotheirmovementnorthand
west,andsignificantminoritiessupportedEisenhower’scandidacyinboth1952and
1956,aswellasNixon’scandidacyin1960.Thiswasparticularlyproblematicas
manyDemocraticorganizationsinnortherncitieshadbecomebecoming
increasinglyreliantonstronglevelsofsupportinAfricanAmericanneighborhoods.
Democraticsupportforblackaspirationswasnotsimplyahumanitarianresponse
toinjustice.Itwasalsoanchoredinthepoliticalrealitythatthenon‐southern
elementsofthepartyconfronted.
ThisisnottosaythatthatthenationalpartylackedchampionsofAfrican
Americanrights.SenatorsPaulDouglas(IL)andHubertHumphrey(MN),both
newlyelectedtotheSenatein1948,becamevocalintheirsupportofblack
aspirations.Indeed,HumphreywouldbetheDemocraticfloorleaderinthe
successfulefforttopassthe1964CivilRightsAct.Moreover,outrageouseventsin
theSouthcontinuedtostirindignation:southernlynchings,hostilitytoward
returningblackarmyveterans,andhighprofilekillingssuchasthatofChicagoan
EmmetTill,a14yearoldwhowasmurderedonatriptoMississippiafterbeing
accusedofflirtingwithawhitewoman.
7
Atthesametime,thesocial,political,andinstitutionalconstraintswere
compelling,andaddressingthemprovedtounleashareorganizationofAmerican
politics.Intheanalysisthatfollows,weconsiderthepatternsofsupportfor
landmarkcivilrightsandvotingrightslegislation.Quitesimply,theDemocrats
couldneverhavehopedtopasstheinitiallandmarklegislationontheirown.
Indeed,themoststalwartoppositiontothelegislationcamefromthesouthern
Democrats,manyofwhomwerealsostalwartsupportersoftheNewDeal.Hence,
thepassageofthelegislationmustbeunderstoodwithinthecontextofcompeting
politicalnetworksthatreachedacrosspartisanboundaries.Thesenetworks
reflectedthefactthatthetwopoliticalpartieswerehighlyheterogeneous,notonly
intermsofraceandcivilrights,butalsointermsofideologymoregenerally,
therebymakingitpossibletoengageinbipartisancollaboratoinacrosspartylines.
Thisbipartisancooperationservedtoundermineandultimatelyputanend
totheNewDealcoalitionthatthatbothsustainedracialapartheidinthesouth,
whilealsomakingitpossibletopasslandmarksocialandlaborlegislation–the
SocialSecurityActandtheWagnerFairLaborStandardsAct,aswellaslegislation
aimedatamelioratingtheeffectsoftheGreatDepression.TheNewDealcoalition
wasbuiltonadedicationtotheinterestsofworkingclassAmericans,butworking
classAmericanscomeinavarietyofcolors.Andthustheunderlyingcompromise
onracecreatedafundamentalcontradictionthatinevitablyledtoitsdemise.
Thebipartisancooperationthatpassedthislandmarkcivilrightslegislation
wouldnotlast.AsPooleandRosenthaldemonstrate(20xx),politicsandpolitical
partiesabhormultidimensionalpoliticalcompetition.Thecooperativeeffortin
8
passinginitialcivilrightslegislationexposedothercontradictionsthatultimately
ledtoatransformedpoliticallandscape.Thisnewlandscapeproduceda
redefinitionofboththeDemocraticandRepublicanparties–partiesthatwouldbe
muchmorehomogeneousinternallyonissuesrelatedtoraceandideology,and
morehighlypolarizedacrossavarietyofissues.
TheHeterogeneityofthePartiesPriortotheCivilRightsRevolution
TheSenatevotesoncivilrightslegislation,examinedbelow,revealthe
internalheterogeneityofAmericanpoliticalpartiesduringthepost‐WorldWarII
era.Muchofthisheterogeneitywasrootedinthehistoricalpeculiaritiesoflocal,
regional,andtemporalcircumstance.Mostimportantly,southernerswere
Democratsintheearly20thcenturyasadirectlegacyoftheCivilWar.AftertheCivil
WarandReconstruction,thesouthernvoters’onlyviablechoicewastovotefor
Democrats.TheybecameDemocratsbecausetheycouldnotbecomeRepublicans—
thelegacyofLincolnandthe“WarofNorthernAggression”meantthattheyrejected
theRepublicanPartyjustastheyrejectedUniondominance.Moreimportantly,if
whitesweretomaintaincontrolovertheAfrican‐Americanpopulation,party
competitionneededtobeeliminatedandone‐partycontrolembraced(Key1949;
Kousser1974;Woodward1938).
Indeed,theprimaryissuegivingrisetosouthernpoliticalunitywastheplace
ofAfrican‐Americanswithinsouthernsociety.TheunfoldingeventsoftheCivil
RightsMovementduringtheearly1950sdemonstrateditsimportanceintheform
ofthe“SouthernManifesto.”InresponsetotheSupremeCourtrulinginBrownv.
theBoardofEducation,the“SouthernManifesto”accusedtheSupremeCourtofan
9
abuseofpowerandlaidoutitscaseforstates’rights.Allbut3ofthe22southern
senatorssignedthedocument,anditreceivedunanimoussupportfrommembersof
theU.S.HousedelegationsinAlabama,Arkansas,Georgia,Louisiana,Mississippi,
SouthCarolina,andVirginia.Aswewillsee,however,thepoliticalsolidarityofthe
southdidnotextendfarbeyondissuesofrace.
Heterogeneitywithinpartisancampswasalsoanimportantfactoramong
northernDemocratsandRepublicans.Thisheterogeneitypersistednotonlywithin
states,butatmoreparticularizedlocallevelsaswell.Newethnicimmigrantsto
NewYorkencounteredmachinepoliticsandaDemocraticpoliticalmachinerunby
TammanyHall.NewethnicimmigrantstoPhiladelphiaencounteredmachine
politicsandaRepublicanmachinerunbytheVarebrothers.InChicagoduringthe
1920s,competingRepublicanandDemocraticmachinescourtedvoteswithvery
similarappeals.Someofthisnorthernheterogeneitywaseliminatedbythepolitical
successesoftheNewDeal,butagreatdealremainedparticularlywithregardsto
civilrights,ascanbeseeninthepassageofboththe1957and1964CivilRights
Acts.NeitherbillwouldhavepassedwithoutthecollaborationofNorthern
DemocratsandRepublicans,andbothbillsencounteredoverwhelmingresistance
amongsouthernDemocrats.
Thisheterogeneityhadpersistedwithinlargerpoliticalmovementsthat
previouslycutacrosspartylines.BoththePopulistandProgressivereform
movementshadbeeninspiredbyleadersfrombothparties:RepublicansRobert
LaFollette,GeorgeNorris,andHiramJohnson,aswellasDemocratsWilliam
JenningsBryan,WoodrowWilsonandAlSmith.Moreover,bothmovementshad
10
supportersintheNorthaswellasintheSouth.Indeed,byrevealingthe
heterogeneityamongSouthernDemocrats,thepopulistmovementintheSouth
createdabitterfightwithinstateDemocraticParties(Woodward1938)–battlesin
whichthePopulistswereeventuallyeliminated(Kousser1974).Inshort,therehad
beenliberalandprogressiveaswellasconservativeelementswithinbothpaties
andbothregions.
Inshort,atthebeginningoftheCivilRightsera,bothpartieswereinternally
heterogeneous,andeachcontaineditsowninternalcontradictions.Patternsof
supportforcivilrightslegislationinthe1950sand1960srevealedthedepthofthe
divisionswithintheparties,anditcreatedanenvironmentforthereconsideration
ofpartyboundaries.
PolicyNetworksAmongandWithinParties
Forsomepurposes,onemightconsiderthepre‐civilrightseraofthe
twentiethcenturytoconstituteathreepartysysteminAmericannationalpolitics–
Republicans,Democrats,andsouthernDemocrats.WhiletheDemocratsand
southernDemocratsvotedtogetherondeterminingpartyleadershipintheHouse
andtheSenate,theheterogeneityofpolicypositionsamongthesouthernDemocrats
meantthatstablepoliticalcoalitionsdevelopedovertimeregardingeconomicissues
betweenconservativesouthernDemocratsandRepublicans.Indeed,theresulting
“conservativecoalition”oftenstymiedliberallegislation,particularlywhen
Republicanscontrolledthepresidency.
Atthesametime,othersouthernDemocratstookliberalissuesoneconomics
andsocialwelfare,andprovidedthecoresupportforRoosevelt’sNewDealand
11
Truman’sFairDeal.Theproblemwasthatthiscooperationwasseverelylimitedby
theissuestouchingonthecivilrightsofAfricanAmericans.Asaconsequence,the
DemocraticPartycouldnotgovernasaunitedpartywhenracecameintoplay.And
Republicans,inturn,couldunderminetheliberalDemocratsbycooperatingwith
theeconomicallyconservativesouthernersjustastheycouldunderminethe
southernDemocratsbycooperatingwithnon‐southernDemocratsonrace.Inshort,
theconstructionoftherelevantpolicynetworksthreatenedtheunityofthe
DemocraticPartinseveraldifferentways.
TheNewDeal‐FairDealcoalitionbegantocomeunraveledinthelate1940s
asaconsequenceofTruman’sactionsindesegregatingthearmedforces,moving
againstemploymentdiscriminationinfederalemployment,andestablishinga
President’sCommitteeonCivilRights,aswellastheDemocraticParty’sadoptionof
acivilrightsplanktoitsplatformatthe1948convention.Theculminationofthis
processoccurredwiththeadoptionofthe1957and1964CivilRightsActs,andthe
1965VotingRightsAct.
Wegaugethestrengthofsupportforthethreecivilrightsproposalsby
consideringtwovotesforeachmeasure–thevoteonfinalpassageaswellasakey
intermediatevotetakenontheSenatefloortoweakeneachofthemeasures.In
1957and1964,theintermediatevotewasonanamendmenttograntjurytrials
whensuitswerebroughtagainstlocalelectionofficialsaccusedofviolatingvoting
rights.TheamendmentwasseenasweakeningtheActinasmuchascivilrights
advocatesbelievedthatwhitesouthernjurieswouldnotconvictlocalofficials
accusedofabridgingthevotingrightsofblackcitizens.In1965theintermediate
12
votewasonanamendmenttoeliminatethelegislation’sprohibitiononpolltaxin
stateaswellasfederalelections.Forallthreeyears,wedefinecivilrights
supportersasSenatorswhovotedagainstthejuryamendment(oragainstthe
eliminationofthepolltax)aswellasvotingforfinalpassage.Wedefinemixed
supportassupportingfinalpassagebutinfavoroftheamendmentthatweakened
thebill.Andwedefinenon‐supportersasindividualswhovotedtoweakenthebill
aswellasvotingtodefeatitonfinalconsideration.
AsTable3shows,southernDemocratsintheSenatewerestronglyopposed
toallthreemeasures,whileDemocratscooperatedwithRepublicansinpassingthe
threelandmarkmeasures.Indeed,in1957,theRepublicansweremoreunitedin
theirsupportforcivilrightsthanthenon‐southernDemocrats.Incontrast,by1964
theDemocratshaddisplacedtheRepublicansasthepartyofcivilrights.Morethan
75percentofnon‐southernDemocratsgavefullsupportin1964and1965,while
only39percentofRepublicansgavefullsuportin1964andonly19percentgave
fullsupportin1965.Incontrast,morethan75percentofsouthernDemocrats
providednosupportinallthreeyears,with95percentprovidingnosupportin
1964.
Figure1providesanetworkgraphthatdemonstratesthepoliticallyunstable
natureoftheSenatecoalitionsin1957.MajorityLeaderLyndonJohnsonwasonly
abletosecuresouthernagreementtoforegoafilibusterifagroupofnorthwest
Democratswouldagreetosupportamendmentsthatweakenedthebill–oneof
whichwasthejuryamendment(Caro,2002).Inreturn,agroupofsouthern
13
DemocratsagreedtosupportauthorizationfortheHellsCanyonDam–aproject
nearanddeartothenorthwesternDemocratswhoparticipatedinalogroll.
ThisgroupofprimarilyliberalwesternDemocratshadbeenvocalsupporters
ofpublicpowerandtheconstructionofalargeHellsCanyonDamontheSnake
RiverasitrunsalongtheIdaho‐Oregonborder.OneofthesenorthwestDemocrats,
SenatorFrankChurchofIdaho,hadmadethedamaprimaryissueinhissuccessful
campaignfortheSenate.Thedammetwithstiffresistanceamongtheopponentsof
publicpower,andthenorthwestDemocratshadbeenstymiedintheireffortstowin
authorizationfortheproject.SenateMajorityLeaderLyndonJohnsonengineereda
thelogrollinwhichagroupofSouthernDemocratsagreedtosupporttheSenate
voteonauthorizationforthedamcontingentonthesupportofthenorthwest
Democratsforamendmentsthatweakenedthe1957CivilRightsAct.These
participatingsouthernDemocratsincludedtheleaderofthesoutherncaucus,
SenatorRichardRussellofGeorge,andmostimportantlytheyagreedthatthey
wouldnotsupportafilibusteroftheCivilRightsBill.
Ifthesouthernershadthevotestosustainafilibuster,whywouldtheyagree
tothelogroll?LyndonJohnsonwasattheheightofhissignificantpowersas
majorityleader,andhehadnationalaspirationsthathissoutherncolleagues
wantedtosupport.Moreover,whilethesoutherndelegationhademployedthe
filibustereffectivelyonmanyoccasions,itwasanextremedevicethathadtheeffect
ofisolatingthemnotonlywithintheSenate,butmorebroadlywithinthelarger
policymakingprocess.Inshort,membersofthesoutherndelegationwerelooking
foralternativewaystorealizetheirsharedgoals.
14
Figure1thusportraysaveryfragileadhocpoliticalcoalitionthatdepended
onaone‐timedealamongsouthernandnon‐southernDemocrats.TheSenators
withinthenodesatthenorthwestcorneroftheplot(41,42,43,32,and33)
providedstrongsupportfortheAct;thenodesinthemiddle(12,13,21and22)
providedmixedsupport;andthenodesatthesouthwestcorner(51,52,53,61,and
62)providednosupport.Thefigureillustratestheideologicallydiversenatureof
thesouthernDemocrats,aswellastheirvirtualnon‐existentsupportforeventhe
weak1957CRA.Allthesenatorsprovidingnosupportweresoutherners,andonly
fivesouthernDemocratsfromTexas,Tennesse,andFloridavotedforthebillon
finalpassage.Moreover,thesouthernDemocratsvotingagainsttheActonfinal
passageincludedconservatives,moderates,andliberals.Andbothstrong
supportersandthoseprovidingmixedsupportincludedconservatives,moderates,
andliberalsaswell.
ThefigurealsoshowsthestrongRepublicansupportfortheAct.Thesizesof
thenodesareproportionaltothenumberofsenatorsrepresentedbyeachnode.
Hencenode41(conservativeRepublicans)accountsforthelargestgroupinsupport
ofthemeasure.Moreover,node33(liberalDemocrats)providesstrongsupportfor
themeasure,butotherliberalDemocrats,representedwithinnode13,provided
weaksupport.Finally,someoftheseliberalDemocratswhofailedtoprovidestrong
supportwerefromtheNortheast,includingSenatorJohnKennedyfrom
Massachusetts.
Inshort,the1957Actrevealedthepoliticalandideologicaldisarrayand
weaknessoftheDemocraticPartyinaddressingissueswithrespecttoCivilRights.
15
ThecoalitionlinedupinsupportoftheActprovedtobeveryfragile–itwouldhave
notbeenabletodefeatthesouthernfilibusterthatwasavoidedduetotheHells
Canyonlogroll.Moreover,heterogeneousinterestsandideologicalpositioins
withinthecoalitionofsupportundermineditslongtermprospects.Larger
coalitionsofsupportwouldneedtobeassembledtopassfuturecivilrightsand
votingrightslegislation,andanewpoliticalorderwouldneedtobeconstructedin
termsofbothpartyandideology.
Inthenextsection,weconsiderthefullarrayofideologicalpositionsheldby
senatorsbefore,during,andafterthecivilandvotingrightsrevolution.Putting
majorideologicalshiftsamongsouthernsenatorstogetherwithchangingsupport
amongnon‐southernsenatorsoncivilrightsandvotingrightsprovidesakeyto
understandingthecontemporaryideologicalorderingofAmerica’spoliticalparties.
RegionalVariationinSenators’Ideology
U.S.Senatorsarethehighestvisibilitynationalpoliticalleaderswithinthe
individualstates.Whileanelectorate’schoiceofgovernormaybebasedonissues
andconcernsthatarerelativelyidiosyncratictothestate,thechoiceofasenatoris
likelytobeamorestraightforwardideologicalchoice.Hencethevotingrecordofa
senatorisnotonlyanindicationoftheindividualofficeholder’sideological
predisposition,butthepredispositionofthestateelectorateaswell.
Withinthiscontext,weaddressregionalvariationinthescoressenators
receiveontheirvotingrecordsfromtheAmericansforDemocraticAction(ADA)
from1948through2008.TheseADAscoresarebasedonthepercentageofliberal
votescastbyeachsenatoronasetofvoteschosenbytheADA,andhencetheyvary
16
from0to100percent.Thesescoreshavebeenanalyzedinvariousways.Some
scholarshaveusedtheoriginalscoresastheyareprovidedbytheADA,andwewill
returntotheoriginalscoreslaterinthisanalysis.PooleandRosenthal(1985;1997)
employascalingmethodologytoidentifyunderlyingideologicaldimensionsintime.
AndGroseclose,LevittandSnyder(1999)adjustscorestoreflectchangingmeans
andvariancesinthedefinitionofideology.
Ourownpurposesaresomewhatdifferent.Wearenotinterestedina
definitionofideologythatisadjustedforchangingperceptionsanddefinitionsin
time.Thatis,wearenotinterestedinatimeinvariantmeasureofideology.Rather
weusetheADAscoresastimespecificmeasuresbasedontheissuesconfrontedina
particularsessionoftheSenate,astheseissuesareseenintheeyesofthe
participantsatthetime.Withinthiscontext,ourmainpurposeistoobservethe
ideologicalpositionsofindividualsenators(andgroupsofsenators)relativetotheir
colleagues.InFigure4wetranslatethesenators’individualscoresintoquintilesfor
eachSenate.Thisideologicalmeasurethusprovidesasenator’spositionrelativeto
themedianpositionwithinthechamber,definedrelativetotheprimaryissues
addressedbythechamberinthatsession.
Figure4showstheADAquintilesforeachregionorganizedbytime,from
1948until2008.Theperiodinquestioncapturestheperiodbefore,during,and
afterlegislativeactivityoncivilrights.Whilethecivilrightsissuewasalready
importantin1948,ithadyettooccupysignificantspaceonthecongressional
agenda.Inparticular,non‐southernsenatorshadnotbeenrequiredtotake
positionsoncivilrightsforAfricanAmericans,andithadnotbecomeadefining
17
ingredientofliberalism.Forexample,SenatorJohnKennedywasseenasaliberal
eventhoughhisviewsandpositionsoncivilrightswereambiguousatbest.Atthis
pointintime,followingtheNewDealandinthemidstoftheFairDeal,beinga
liberalhadmoretodowitheconomicissuesandsocialwelfare.
[Figure4here]
Incontrast,by2008,civilrightshadbeenincorporatedasacentralissue
withinthedefinitionofpartiesandideology.Atthesametime,manyofthedefining
eventsinthecivilrightsmovementhadrecededinimportance.Thisisnottosay
thatliberalsandconservativeswereofonemindwithrespecttounderlyingissues,
butratherthatthecivilrightsissuesweremorelikelytoplayoutinlegalcasesand
administrativeactions.Senateactionwasstillimportantbutitwasalsolessvisible
andmorelikelytodealwithissuessuchaswhetherpreclearancerequirementsin
Section5oftheVotingRightsActshouldapplytothewholecountryoronlytoareas
ofthecountry(almostentirelyintheSouth)withhistoriesofviolatingcitizens’right
tovote.1Theseissueswerelessvisibletothepublicatlargeandeventothepress.
Thefigureshowsverydifferentlevelsandpatternsofchangeinideology
acrossthestates,andtheresultsareperhapssurprising.Inparticular,thetwo
highestlevelsofliberalismatthebeginningoftheperiodwereintheBorderstates
andtheSouth,andthemostconservativelevelswereintheMidwest.Thisreflects
theafterglowofthestrongsupportthatRooseveltreceivedfromsouthernand
borderstatesenators.ItalsodemonstratesthepoliticaldilemmathatRoosevelt
1TheNunnAmendment,whichcalledfornationwidepre‐clearance,wasdefeatedbyanarrowvote
ontheSenatefloor.AuthoredbythemoderateDemocraticsenatorfromGeorgia,itwaswidelyseen
asameasuretoreduceVRArestrictionsonsouthernstatesandlocalities.
18
faced–hecouldnotmoveforwardoncivilrightswithoutoffendingthesouthern
baseofhissupport.Indeed,thebackboneofsupportfortheNewDealcamefrom
theSouth(Katznelson2013),andmany(butcertainlynotall)southernsenators
wereNewDealstalwarts,reflectingtheveryrealproblemsofpovertyfacedby
whitesaswellasblacksintheSouth.Atthesametime,Roosevelt’svisionofthe
Americanroleininternationalaffairshadmeantincreasedmilitaryspending,anda
disproportionateamountofthatspendingoccurredintheSouth.
Thefigurealsoshowsprecipitousincreasesanddeclinesinthelevelsof
liberalismwithinregions.Liberalismdeclinedinanespeciallydramaticwayinthe
Southacrossthissixtyyearperiod,andthemostdramaticdeclinesoccurred
between1948andthemid‐1970s,withashort‐termresurgencecenteredon1990
thatquicklydisappeared.Duringthissameperiod,substantialdeclinesappeared
inthelevelsofliberalismamongborderstatesenators.Incontrast,themost
dramaticincreaseinliberalismoccurredintheMidwest.Itshowedthelowestlevel
ofliberalismintheearlypartoftheperiod,butbytheendoftheperiodit
demonstratesthesecondhighestlevel.Increasesinliberalismamongnorthern
senatorsweresufficienttomaketheNortheastthemostliberalregioninthe
country.Indeed,weseesomethingthatapproachesaninversionoftheearlier
distributionofliberalstrengthwithinthecountry.
Insummary,atthebeginningofthisperiod,thecorestrengthofliberalism
withintheSenatewaslocatedintheSouthandBorderStates,andthecorestrength
ofconservatismwaslocatedintheMidwest.Bytheendofthisperiod,theNortheast
andMidwestdelegationsprovidedthecorestrengthofliberalism,withthecore
19
strengthofconservatismlocatedwithintheSouth.Indeed,atonepoint,theSpeaker
oftheHouse(NewtGingrich),theSenatemajorityleader(TrentLott),andtheChair
oftheNationalRepublicanParty(HaleyBarbour)wereallsouthernRepublicans.In
short,theNewDealcoalitionendedwiththeadventofthecivilrightsagenda,and
thistransformationledtoaregionalrealignmentamongthepartiesthatisreflected
intheideologicalcompositionoftheSenate.
Atthesametime,aggregationattheregionallevelmasksagreatdealofwhat
ishappeningwithintheindividualstates.Indeed,understandingthewholerequires
amorecompleteunderstandingoftheparts.Adetailedanalysisofeachregionlies
beyondtheboundariesofthispaper,buttheSouthiskey,andwefocusonpolitical
transformationwithinthesouthernstatesbeforeconcluding.
ThePoliticalTransformationoftheSouth
Forthoseaccustomedtopoliticsinthelate20thandearly21stcenturies,it
maybedifficulttoconceiveoftheSouthasthehotbedofAmericanliberalism.By
themid1960sandearly1970s,southernsenatorssuchasJohnSparkmanandLister
Hill–bothfromAlabama–wereunderstoodasrightwingconservativesopposedto
theliberalagenda.TheysignedtheSouthernManifesto.Theysupportedwhite
supremacyandopposedanyextensionofcivilrights.Sparkmaninparticularwasa
militaryhawkwhosupportedAmericaninvolvementinVietnam.Indeed,
contemporarydefinitionsofliberalismwouldexcludethetwoAlabamasenators,or
atleasttreatthemascuriouscontradictions.
Duringthemajorityoftheircareers,however,theywerebothleadingliberals
bythedefinitionofthetime.Sparkmanwasasupporterofunions,publichousing,
20
education,andpublichealth–certainlyissuesthatcontinuetoresonateamong
contemporaryliberals.HillwasanimportantbackeroftheNewDeal,supporting
governmentprogramsonpublicworks,theTennesseeValleyAuthority,andpublic
employment,aswellasbeingacentralfigureinsupportingmedicalresearchand
publichealthprograms.OneofthecentersattheNationalInstitutesofHealthis
namedinhishonor,recognizinghislastingcontributions.Inshort,bothmenwere
centraltothesuccessoftheNewDealandtheRooseveltrevolution.
HowcanweunderstandtheliberalismofSparkmanandHill?Bothwere
membersofBigJimFolsom’spopulistwingoftheAlabamaDemocraticParty(Key
1949).AmonghismanyleadershiprolesinboththeHouseandtheSenate,
SparkmanchairedtheSenate’sCommitteeonBanking,Housing,andUrbanAffairs,
andhewasthevicepresidentialnomineeoftheDemocraticPartyin1952.Lister
Hillwasthesonofaprominentsurgeon,namedinhonorofDr.JosephListerwho
mademajoradvancesinantisepticsurgery.Trainedasanattorney,Listerservedin
boththeHouseandtheSenate,andhewasacoauthoroftheHill‐BurtonAct,
officiallyknownastheHospitalandHealthCenterConstructionActof1946
Duringtheearlypartoftheircareers,bothHillandSparkmanwere
consistentsupportersoftheNewDealandtheliberalwingoftheDemocraticParty,
andbothdevelopedliberalvotingrecords.2Theirpoliticalpathsdivergeinthe
1950swhenbothsigntheSouthernManifestoin1954,andbothvoteagainstthe
CivilRightsActof1957.AsacentralpartofthenewDemocraticPartyagenda,there
2PerhapsthemostcommittedliberalintheSenateduringthisperiod,PaulDouglasofIllinois,
providesgenerousretrospectiveevaluationsofHillandSprakman,aswellasothersouthern
DemocraticsupportersoftheNewDealinhismemoirs(Douglas1971).
21
wasnolongeranyroomintheParty,orwithinliberalism,forindividualswho
opposedtheextensionof14thAmendmentguaranteestoAfricanAmericans.Their
ownvotingrecordsshiftedtowardbeingmoreconservative,andtheirseatsare
ultimatelyoccupiedbyindividualswhoareconsistentlyconservativeacrossabroad
rangeofissues.3Thedecadeofthe1950sisapivotpointbothinthehistoriesof
partypoliticsandinthedefinitionofliberalism.Whensouthernpoliticiansrealize
thattheycannotbeliberalsandwhitesupremacists,theyincreasinglyadopt
positionsthatareconservativeacrosstheboard.Moreover,thisisnotsimplya
processofreplacement,whereconservativecandidatesforofficearemorelikelyto
beelected.SittingmembersoftheSenatemovetheirownvotesinadecidedly
conservativedirection.Theybecomeevenmoreatoddswiththedominant
ideologicalpositionoftheDemocraticParty,andthustheRepublicanPartyhasa
chancetomoveintothesouthernpoliticalvacuum.Thismeans,however,thatthe
RepublicanPartywillhaveamoredifficulttimemaintainingitstraditionalroleas
thepartyofLincolnandcivilrights.
Insummary,notonlyliberalismandconservatism,butalsothepolitical
parties,wereredefinedbythecivilrightsmovementinAmericanpolitics.Atthe
beginningofthatmovement,thepartieswererelativelyhomogeneousonissuesof
thefederalactivityintheareasofsocialwelfarelegislationandtheeconomy,but
theywerebadlydividedonissuesrelatedtocivilrights.Sixtyyearslater,the
partiesarehomogeneousbothonissuesofcivilrightsandonissuesrelatedto
socialwelfareandtheeconomy.Inparticular,southernpopulismthatledto
3SenatorHowellHeflinwasSparkman’simmediatesuccessor.HewasaDemocratwithapopulist
orientationwhocombinedsupportforamixofliberalandconservativecauses
22
supportforsocialwelfareissuesinthe1930sand40shastakenonaconservative
pointoforientation.Asaconsequence,theascendantsouthernRepublicansinthe
Congressarelargelyopposedtoanyincreasedfederalgovernmentactivityinthe
areasofeconomicregulationandsocialwelfare,suchastheAffordableCareAct.
Thisleadstoseveraloutcomes:aCongressandapopulationthataremore
politicallypolarized,andaunifiedconservativemovementthathasbeen
empoweredbyincreasedlevelsofsupport,particularlyfromtheSouth.
Replacementvs.Transformation
Thesepatternsofpartisantransformationraiseanimportantquestion.To
whatextentwasthechangeduetothereplacementofformerofficeholdersby
newlyelectedSenatorswhobetterreflectthenewrealitiesofraceandpoliticsinthe
nationandinindividualstates?Andtowhatextentwerethesechangescreatedby
contemporaryofficeholderswhohavechangedtheirpoliticalstripes.
WeaddressthesequestionsbyconsideringthechangeinADAscoresfor
singlesouthernSenateseatsbetween1947and1967–thecrucialperiodinthe
transformationofthepartisanlandscape.In1947,HarryTrumanhadyetto
desegregatethearmedforces,andtheDemocraticPartyhadyettoaddacivilrights
planktoitspartyplatformatthe1948convention.In1967,bywayofcontrast,the
newpositionofcivilrightswithinAmericanpoliticshadbeenredefined.TheCivil
RightsActof1964andtheVotingRightsActof1965wereinplace.TheRepublican
PartyhadnominatedBarryGoldwaterwhoopposedtheCivilRightsAct.Andin
1964–thefirsttimeasouthernerwaselectedpresidentsincetheCivilWar–the
23
deepsouthstatesofLouisiana,Mississippi,Alabama,Georgia,andSouthCarolina
votedforaRepublicancandidate.4
Aswehaveseen,thebiggestchangeoccurredintheSouth,andTable2
addressesideologicalchangeforindividualSenateseats,irrespectiveoftheoffice
holder.TheSenateseatsaresortedbythe1947ADAscore,withthemost
conservativeseatlistedfirstandthemostliberalseatslistedlast.Thetableshows
theincredibleideologicalheterogeneityofthesoutherndelegationin1947.The
southerndelegationwassolidlyDemocraticin1947,butitwasneithersolidly
liberalnorsolidlyconservative(Key1949).Incontrast,by1967theADAscoreslie
almostuniformlyontheconservativeendofthescale.OnlyAlGore,Sr.from
TennesseeandRalphYarboroughfromTexashadADAscoresabove50.Andonly
oneothersouthernsenator,WilliamFulbright,hadascoreabove30.
Inshort,wecanseetheindividuallevelchangesinvotingrecordsthatgave
risetotheaggregateredefinitionoftheSouthinnationalpolitics.Onlytwoofthese
senatorswereRepublicans–JohnTowerhadbeenelectedasaRepublicanand
StromThurmondchangedhispartyaffiliationin1964.Atthebeginningofthe
period,thepartisanaffiliationofthesoutherndelegationwasuniformlyDemocratic
andideologicallyheterogeneous.Attheendoftheperiod,thesoutherndelegation
wasmovingtowardpartisanheterogeneity,eventhoughithadbecomeincreasingly
andmuchmorehomogeneouslyconservative.
Thetableincludesonly21senateseatsbecauseoneseatwasleftvacantin
1947bythedeathofSen.BilboinMississippi.Ofthe21remainingseats,8were
4ThevoteofthedeepSouthwas,inanothersense,aglimmerofthingstocome.The1964wasthe
lastelectioninwhichamajorityofwhitevoterssupportedtheDemocraticcandidate.
24
heldbythesameofficeholdersthroughoutthe21yearperiod.Theseindividualsall
demonstratemoreconservativevotingrecordsattheendoftheperiod,withan
averageadjustmentof‐55.Incontrast,twoofthe13replacementsenatorsactually
demonstrateamoreliberalpositionattheendoftheperiod,andtheaverage
adjustmentis‐29.Inshort,weseearemarkablepoliticalredefinitionofthe
southernDemocraticSenatedelegation,ledprimarilybypartisanchangeamong
existingsouthernSenators.Notonlydotheytakeconservativepositionsonthe
expansionofcivilrightsandvotingrights,buttheyalsoadoptamoreconservative
positionacrossarangeofcrucialissues–theissuesestablishedbyADAasthebest
testofwhatitmeanstobeliberalversusconservativewithinaparticularsessionof
theCongress.
Table3employsaseriesoflinearmodelstoestimatethetrendineachofthe
eightsenators’votingscores.ForeachsenatorexceptListerHillofAlabama,a
secondorderpolynomialprovidesthebestestimateofthetrend.AsFigure3shows,
thecommonpatternisaprecipitousdeclineintheADAscoreatthebeginningofthe
period,followedbyaslowerrateofchangeattheendoftheperiod.Hillprovides
theexception,withasteadyrateofdeclineinliberalvotingovertheentire21year
period.
SummaryandConclusion
In1947,shortlyaftertheendofWorldWarII,theAmericanSouthwasnot
simplythemostDemocraticregionofthecountry,itwasalsothemostpolitically
liberalmeasuredonthebasisofADAscores.Nearly70yearslater,ithasbecome
themostconservativeregionofthecountry,andDemocraticprospectsintheregion
25
areseverelydiminished.Onemightcertainlyprotestsuchastatementbasedonthe
factthatracialequalityhadbeeneffectivelyexcludedfromthepoliticalagendauntil
1948.Indeed,NewDealliberalismhadfailedtoadvancetheSecondRevolutionin
AmericanPolitics,broughtaboutbytheCivilWarandtheadoptionofthe14th
AmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.5Dueprocess,equalprotection,andcolorblind
politicswithinthestateswereunrealizeddreams,andtheNewDealmadeonly
modestsymbolicprogressinmovingthecivilrightsagendaforward.
Theissueisreallytwo‐fold.First,liberalismhasbeenredefinedand
expandedtofocusonissuesrevolvingaroundthe14thAmendment–issuesofdue
processandequalprotection.Second,whiletheseissuesoftencarryeconomic
implications–nondiscriminatoryhiringpractices,affirmativeactionprogramsin
employment,andsoon–theirgoalsareinasensesubsidiarytotheearlyfocusof
liberalismthatpromotedapopulistagenda.Thisearlierliberalandpopulistagenda
wasraciallybiasedanditalsoignoredtheaspirationsofwomen.Thenewerliberal
agendahaslostitswidespreadpopulisteconomicappeal,andhasdifficultyin
maintainingsupportamongdisadvantagedgroupswithinthewhitepopulation.
Perhapsnotsurprisingly,industrialtradeunionsareinretreat,andeconomic
inequalityhasexpandedwithinthelargerpopulation.
Whileprogressincivilrightslegislationduringthe1950sand1960swas
fundamentallydependentonthecollaborationandleadershipoftheRepublican
Party(WhalenandWhalen1985;Purdum2014),thetransformationofliberalism
5Weappropriatethetitleofthe“SecondRevolution,”lessinthesenseofBeardandBeard(1927),
butratherinthecontextofthepost‐CivilWarrevisionsintheU.S.Constitutiontorightthewrongsof
slavery,thethree‐fifthscompromise,anditsfailuretocreateaguaranteeddefinitionofcitizenship
thatwascommonandinviolableacrosstheStates(McPherson1991).
26
hasalsoproducedstrikingchangesinthenatureofconservatism.Theconservative
partyofthe1940sand1950swasapartyofindividualfreedom,bothintermsof
economicactivityandintermsofcivilrights.WhentheDemocraticPartyevolved
intothepartyofcivilrights,importantelementsoftheRepublicanPartyevolved
intothepartyofaconservativewhitepopulistrebellion.Indeed,thesouthern
strategyofRichardNixonembracedsouthernwhitesdisaffectedbyanational
governmentandaDemocraticPartythatembracedtheaspirationsofracial
minorities,culturalminorities,andwomen.
Inshort,byembracingasouthernstrategythatultimatelyattractedmajor
levelsofsupportamongwhites,theRepublicanPartycompromiseditsappeal
amongAfricanAmericansintheSouthandelsewhere.Indeepsouthstateslike
Mississippi,theDemocraticcandidateforpresidenttypicallyobtainsmorethan90
percentoftheAfricanAmericanvotebutlessthan20percentofthewhitevote
(HuckfeldtandKohfeld1987:1).Indeed,inthecountryasawhole,theDemocratic
candidateforpresidenthasnotobtainedmajoritysupportamongwhitessince
1964.
Theelusiveelementinthiscontemporarypoliticalconfigurationisthe
unifiedrepresentationoftheeconomicallydisadvantagedpopulationwithin
Americanpolitics.Notonlyisvotinginnationalelectionsstructuredbyrace,but
someinterestsarenotfullyrepresented.AconservativeRepublicanpartywins
majoritysupportamongdisadvantagedwhites,whilealiberalDemocraticParty
winssupermajoritysupportamongdisadvantagedAfricanAmericansandsizeable
majoritiesamongotherdisadvantagedminoritygroups.Mostdiscussionsofthe
economicinequalitygapinAmericanlifefocusoneconomicchange,butaclose
readingofAmericanpoliticalhistorysincetheendofWorldWarIIsuggeststhat
politicalchangeplaysacrucialroleaswell.
27
28
29
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Table 1. Senate Votes on the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act: the percentage who provide full support, qualified support, and no support. 1957 1964 1965 Democrats (non‐south) full support 48.0% 78.3 77.8 mixed support 52.0 19.6 5.6 no support . 0 2.2 16.7 n=25* n=46 n=45 1957 1964 1965 Southern Democrats full support .0% .0 16.7 mixed support 22.7 4.8 5.6 no support 77.3 95.2 77.8 n=22* n=21 n=18 1957 1964 1965 Republicans full support 73.3% 39.4 19.4 mixed support 26.7 42.4 74.2 no support . 0 18.2 6.4 n=45* n=33 n=31 *N‐sizes are all based on senators who participated in all three votes in each year. 31
32
Table 2. Southern delegation ADA scores by Senate seat, 1947 through 1967, sorted by the 1947 score.* Entries are italicized in instances where the same individual served the entire period. State 1947 1967 Change 1. Texas O'Daniel 0 Tower 8 8 2. Tennessee McKellar 10 Gore 54 44 3. Tennessee Stewart 20 Baker 15 ‐5 4. Virginia** Byrd 20 Byrd 8 ‐12 5. Louisiana Overton 30 Long 15 ‐15 6. North Carolina Hoey 40 Ervin 15 ‐25 7. Louisiana Ellender 50 Ellender 23 ‐27 8. Virginia Robertson 50 Spong 23 ‐27 9. Arkansas McClellan 60 McClellan 15 ‐45 10. Georgia George 60 Talmadge 8 ‐52 11. Florida Holland 60 Holland 15 ‐45 12. Texas Connally 70 Yarborough 62 ‐8 13. South Carolina Maybank 70 Thurmond 0 ‐70 14. Georgia Russell 70 Russell 8 ‐62 15. Mississippi Eastland 70 Eastland 8 ‐62 16. North Carolina Umstead 70 Jordan 8 ‐62 17. Arkansas Fulbright 80 Fulbright 38 ‐42 18. Alabama Hill 90 Hill 15 ‐75 19. Alabama Sparkman 90 Sparkman 8 ‐82 20. South Carolina Johnston 90 Hollings 8 ‐82 21. Florida Pepper 90 Smathers 23 ‐67 *Mississippi’s Theodore Bilbo died during his term of office in 1947, and was not rated by the ADA. His successor, John Stennis, had ADA scores of 44 in 1948 and 0 in 1967, for a change of ‐44. **Harry Byrd, Jr. succeeded his father – Harry Byrd, Sr. – in 1965. 33
Table 3. Estimating the trend for the decline in ADA scores
among
the Southern delegation for those Senators who
served at least
20 years beyond 1947. (The standard
errors for coefficients are in parentheses.)
Fulbright
of Arkansas
Time
time2
-3.23
(1.66)
.10
(.06)
66.5
(9.7)
28
.15
18.33
constant
N=years
R2
SE of est.
Sparkman
of Alabama
-7.01
(1.23)
.14
(.04)
104.5
(8.2)
32
.74
16.53
Russell
of Georgia
-4.86
(1.23)
.13
(.05)
51.9
(6.2)
23
.68
10.80
McClellan
of Arkansas
-2.92
(.86)
.07
(.03)
36.6
(5.6)
31
.42
Eastland
-3.85
of Mississippi (.82)
.10
(.03)
39.7
(5.5)
32
.52
11.07
Ellender
of Louisiana
-3.88
(1.33)
.10
(.10)
50.7
(6.6)
24
.51
11.68
Hill
of Alabama
-4.21
(.50)
98.0
(6.2)
22
.78
15.01
Holland
of Florida
-4.18
(3.09)
53.2
(7.9)
24
.62
11.90
.10
(.06)
10.99
34
Figure1. Ties based on votes regarding final passage, jury amendment, and Hells
Canyon Dam. FinalJury
HellsDemocratsor
subgroupPassageTrialCanyonRepublicans?
12 Y Y
Y both 13
Y Y
Y Democrats(N.&S.)
21 Y Y
N Republicans 22Y Y
N both 32 Y N
Y Republicans
33
Y N
Y both 41 Y N
N Republicans 42 Y N
N Republicans
43 Y N
N Republicans 51
N Y
Y S.Democrats 52
N Y
Y S.Democrats 53
N Y
Y S.Democrats 61
N Y
N S.Democrats 62
N Y
N S.Democrats
Thefirstdigitofidentifiesoneofsixuniquevotingblocs,andthesecondidentifies
the(1)conservative,(2)moderate,and(3)liberalsubgroupswithintheblocsbased
onADAscores.ThesenatorsineachsubgroupcanbefoundinAppendixA.
35
Figure2.SenateADAquintilesbyregion,1948‐2008.
1.5
Mean ADA Quintiles
4.5
Southern Senators' Mean ADA Quintiles, 1948-2008.
1950
1960
1970
bandwidth = .8
1980
1990
2000
2010
year
1.5
Mean ADA Quintiles
4.5
Border State Senators' Mean ADA Quartiles, 1948-2008
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
year
bandwidth = .8
36
Figure2(continued).
1.5
Mean ADA Quintiles
4.5
Western Senators' Mean ADA Quintiles, 1948-2008.
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
year
bandwidth = .8
1.5
Mean ADA Quintiles
4.5
Midwest Senators' Mean ADA Quintiles, 1948-2008.
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
year
bandwidth = .8
37
Figure2(continued).
1.5
Mean ADA Quintiles
4.5
Northeast Senators' Mean ADA Quintiles, 1948-2008.
1950
bandwidth = .8
1960
1970
1980
year
1990
2000
2010
38
Figure 3. Estimated ideological trends for southern Senators.