The Theory of Relationship Specific Investments: Long-Term Contracts and Gas Pipeline Development in the United States Dresden University of Technology Workshop on Energy Economics and Technology 21 April 2006 Jeff D. Makholm, Ph.D. Senior Vice President [email protected] One Foundation, Two Markets The Oil and Gas Pipeline Networks Look Alike Major Crude Oil Pipelines Natural Gas Pipeline Network 2000 Same Basic Pipeline Economics… Economies of Scale 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 1 4 7 10 13 16 Average Cost 19 22 25 28 Same Basic Pipeline Economics… Spatially Separated Markets Production Origin Market Pipeline Consumption Destination Market Same Basic Pipeline Economics… Vertical Restraints Production Transport Relationship-Specific Investments Consumption/ Refining One Foundation: Similar Markets in 1935 Same Technology, Basic Economics Gas Pipelines Oil Pipelines Market Structure Long-Term Contracts Pipeline Capacity Markets Integrated Never No One Foundation: Different Markets in 2006 Same Technology, Basic Economics, Oil Pipelines Gas Pipelines Integrated Market Structure Separated Never Long-Term Contracts Always No Pipeline Capacity Markets Yes What Happened? Critical Institutional Milestones Unregulated Changed Regulators Regulated: 1906 OIL 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 GAS Unregulated Gas Price Problem Regulated: 1938 Shortage/Surplus Contractualized: 2000 Oil Pipelines: “Evolutionary Gradualism” “Hepburn” Act Vertical Integration 1906 Common Carriage Joint Ventures Batches, Tankage “Uncommon Carriage” Pro Rata Rules, Etc. Darwin De-regulate Regulate Gas Pipelines: “Punctuated Equilibrium” Utility Holding Company Act De-regulate Gould s a G 1935 1938 Utility Natural Gas Act 1986 Pip es ry a im city r P pa Ca Regulate 1992 Se c Ca ond pa ary cit y De-regulate 2000 Pre 1935 Problems Vertical Integration Abuses of Holding Companies Evasion of State Regulation Uncertain Future/Growing Difficulty in Financing Resulted in: “the most stringent, corrective legislation that ever was enacted against an American industry” (PUHCA of 1935) Foundations for the Regulated Era No new gas pipelines were built from 1936 to 1944. But legal and regulatory scholars were very active: z Uniform System of Accounts (1938) z Hope Natural Gas Decision (1944) z Administrative Procedures Act (1946) z NARUC Policy on Depreciation (1943) As a result, gas pipeline loans flowed easily thereafter. Problem with Delivered Gas Contracts Contract Carriage not Imposed by NGA Fear of Monopoly Abuse by Pipelines z Affiliated Interest Transactions z Exercise of Market Power by Producers So: Supreme Court Extended FPC Regulation to Producer Prices What Happened to Monopsony? So far as discrimination between various sellers in the same field is concerned, the introduction and widespread incorporation in long-term contracts of the most-favored-nation and price-renegotiation clauses have certainly tended to eliminate this, and in so doing have substituted the threat of monopolistic for that of monpsonistic exploitation.” (Testimony of Professor Alfred E. Kahn: 1959) …and Where is Professor Kahn in 2006? Problems for the Regulated Era New Pipeline Certification: “Administrative Competition” z Determining “economic need” administratively is hard to do where there are competing interests. Regulating a Volatile Commodity Pass-Through Challenged Regulatory Competence z …then, as now. Complex market-Congressional-regulatory interaction led to “voluntary” restructuring z Capacity contracts as property rights Contractualization Era Competition to build new lines Finalizing the regulation of “rents” Diminished role for Federal regulation Summary A Case Study in Attracting Investment Despite Widely Differing Industry Structures z The Success/Failure of Vertical Integration z The Success/Failure of Traditional Regulation Applied to Gas Pipelines z Unintended Consequences and Contracts Throughout, Constrained by Old Legislation and the Theory of Relationship-Specific Investments
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