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The State’s Muscles
Radicalization and De-radicalization of Violence in Egypt, Libya and Syria
Witold Mucha1
Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, scholarly attention has been mostly devoted to civil
wars in Libya and Syria and the ways external stakeholders have tried to resolve the violent
conflicts. The case of Egypt was looked at in terms of transition of power from a military
ruling to a civilian government back and forth. While these three empirical contexts have
dominated the political, media, and scholarly debates related to the Arab Spring, the cases
have not been compared with each other on systematic basis. The commonalities and
differences with respect to the genesis, course, and preliminary outcome have not been
assessed yet from a comparative perspective. In particular, the state’s response to popular
uprisings and its aftermath needs further analytical attention as it promises insights into the
question of why people would radicalize or de-radicalize their agenda. Responding to this
question is paramount as escalation cycles beyond the Arab World might be shed light on as
well.
1
Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (KWI), Essen
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Introduction
Three years after the beginning of the Arab Spring, a diverse balance can be drawn when
looking at the different course and outcomes of popular uprisings between 2011 and 2014.
Either the aspired transition of power to civilian governments did not happen (e.g. Bahrain,
Yemen), did not last for long (e.g. Egypt), or caused large-scale violence (e.g. Libya, Syria).
Particularly the cases of Egypt, Libya, and Syria have dominated the scholarly, political, and
medial debates ever since (Heydemann and Leenders 2011; Droz-Vincent 2014; Erickson
Nepstad 2013). However, these cases have not been compared with each other on
systematic basis. In particular, the state’s response to popular uprisings and its aftermath
needs further analytical attention as it promises insights into the question of why people
would radicalize or de-radicalize their agenda.2 Responding to this question is paramount as
recent escalation cycles beyond the Arab World such as Ukraine or Venezuela might be shed
light on as well (Samoilenko 2014; Nagel 2014, Kornblith 2013).
In literature the notions of radicalization and de-radicalization are generally understood as
processes leading towards the increased or decreased use of political violence (Della Porta
and LaFree 2012, 5). While much research has been devoted to the first, the motives and
processes of de-radicalization have been largely neglected (Köhler 2014, 420). Four major
schools have driven the debate on radicalization processes: the sociological, social
movement, empirical, and psychological theories. The sociological argument goes that
individuals radicalize when reclaiming a lost identity in a hostile environment (DalgaardNielsen 2010). Social movement theorists find that radicalization is determined by group
dynamics and peer pressure (Sageman 2004, 2007). Empiricist approaches classify different
types of members within extremist groups (e.g. ‘leaders’, ‘misfits’) with different
2
In this paper, the ‘state’ will not be dealt with as a homogenous entity alone. Constituted by different ‘bits of
state’, such as the government, different intra-government factions, the army leadership and different factions
within, the police forces and so on, the term ‘state’ is all-encompassing.
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radicalization processes (Slootman and Tilie 2006; Nesser 2004). Psychological perspectives
are based on the assumption that people radicalize because of a number of different push
and pull factors. For instance, these are emotional vulnerability, discontent with the political
status quo, identification with victims, social ties, and the belief that making use of violence
is not immoral (Horgan 2008). In contrast to this wealth of studies on radicalization
processes, effectively, only three scholars (Omar Ashour, Tore Bjørgo, and John Horgan)
have really focused on issues of de-radicalization (see also Dechesne 2011; Horgan and
Braddock 2010). Generally, changes within a group, individual preferences, or external
factors have been discussed in this respect (Köhler 2014, 421). For instance, Bjørgo (2009)
differentiates between negative social sanctions, disillusions with the peer group activities,
and loss of faith in the ideology and politics on the one hand (i.e. push factors). On the other
hand, personal and collective prospects as well as responsibilities are identified as pull
factors in de-radicalization processes (Bjørgo 2009; Kazemian 2007; Laub and Sampson 2001;
Noricks 2009). Most of the de-radicalization literature has been engaged with individual
decision-making processes. The analytical focus has been on either joining Islamist terrorists
or political right-wing radicals (Köhler 2012, 12).
In light of the present research interest in the Arab Spring uprisings however, major findings
on group radicalization and de-radicalization need to be pointed to. Based on the analysis of
Islamist movements, Ashour (2009) defines radicalization as a “(…) process of relative
change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioral transformations that lead
to the rejection of democratic principles (…) and possibly to the utilization of violence (…), to
achieve political goals” (Ashour 2009, 5). Accordingly, de-radicalization is understood as a
“(…) process of relative change (…), one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and
de-legitimizes the use of violent methods (…)” (Ashour 2009, 5-6).
This conceptual
perspective is much in line with social movement theory. Mostly, the focus has been on the
way social movements interacted with police and other security forces and vice versa (Sunik
2014). Based on the ‘resource-mobilization’ or ‘collective action’ approaches, influential
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scholars such as Olson (1965) or Tilly (1978) identified the use of violence by social
movements as strategic choices against the backdrop of opportunity structures and specific
resources (McCarthy and Zaid 1977; Jenkins 1983; Buechler 1993). Della Porta and Diani
(1999) have dealt with people’s perceptions and attitudes towards violence and the way it is
framed and legitimized by leaders. While the majority of social movement research is
devoted to nonviolent movements, the radicalization process into violent groups has been
likewise studied in the discipline. The link to terrorism studies has been established by Tilly
(2004) and Wood (2003); though the Arab Spring likewise gave impetus into this direction
(Schmid 2014). Although terrorism studies and research on social movement theory still
remain separate disciplines in the field, a few exceptions have been made recently to
connect the perspectives (Tellidis and Toros 2014).
Regardless of the academic consensus on the definition of radicalization and deradicalization, most studies remain fragmented into separate disciplines and focus areas.
Moreover, research on Islamist political violence and terrorism has dominated the debate
during the last decade (Schmid and Price 2011). While at the same time, historical studies
have been rare and processes of de-radicalization have been effectively ignored (Della Porta
and LaFree 2012, 5). In the 1970s, political violence in advanced democracies constituted the
primary empirical basis for analyzing radicalization processes (Della Porta 1995). According
to Della Porta and LaFree (2012, 6), the term radicalization was used to describe “(…) the
interactive (social movements/state) and processual (gradual escalation) dynamics in the
formation of violent, often clandestine groups”. In light of the post-9/11 securitization
agenda and external interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), more academic
attention was given to Islamist terrorism in OECD countries (Kruganski et al. 2014). Particular
focus was on young Muslims and the question why they would join militant Islamist groups
despite their western socialization (Dechesne and De Roon 2013; Bizina and Grey 2014; King
and Taylor 2011). The personal and social background of Muslim immigrants, the cultural
and physical setting (e.g. mosques), and group pressure were identified as explanatory
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factors of individual vulnerability to radicalization in this respect (Waldmann 2009; McCauley
and Moskalenko 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005; Horgan 2008). Some scholars have looked into the
dynamics of disengaging from terrorism (Ashour 2007, 2008, 2009; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009;
Horgan and Braddock 2010; LaFree and Miller 2008; Cronin 2009; Stern 2010). This issue has
been dealt with from a Middle East perspective by Hafez (2003) and Hegghammer (2010)
amongst others.
Besides the dominant focus on either terrorism studies or social movement theory, other
literature is based on research on civil war, (counter-) insurgency, and political violence.
Contributions by Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007) on the emergence and escalation of
violence as well as on the (changing) actors involved in the process have been referred to
the most. However, with few exceptions such as Della Porta (2014), there are no
comparative works on different forms of violence, and research on civil wars seldom takes
into account results from other disciplines and vice versa. In light of these research gaps in
literature, this article will be divided into four parts. Following this introduction, Ohlson’s
Triple-R concept will be presented as analysis framework that allows for studying the
different conflict paths in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The subsequent empirical analysis will
constitute the core of this paper. At last, the implications for policymaking and future
research will be briefly discussed.
Analysis Framework
Kriesberg’s theory of social conflict is most often quoted when it comes to the analysis of
ways in which conflicts can become destructive or constructive (Kriesberg 1998, 151). He
finds that “[conflict] escalation generally refers to increases in the severity of the coercive
inducements used and increases in the scope of participation within a conflict” (Kriesberg
1998, 151). For the purpose of this article, the notion of escalation and de-escalation will be
used synonymously with the terms of radicalization and de-radicalization. Applying Ashour’s
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(2009) definitional distinctions, the focus will be on behavioral rather than ideological
relative changes. Ohlson’s (2008) Triple-R concept will be made use of to assess the variance
of the three empirical contexts.3 His approach is helpful to understand people’s decisions to
join protest movements as well as militant groups. Ohlson major argument goes as follows:
We may imagine a conflict actor contemplating the dangerous option of transforming
a situation of intra-state tension and latent conflict into large-scale, manifest
violence. There are risks involved, including the ultimate risk of loss of life. What is
required for that actor to actually take such a decisive step? It is argued here that the
answer ‘Yes’ to three fundamental questions is re-quired: (1) Do we want to do it? (2)
Can we do it? (3) Do we dare to do it? The questions and the answers to them
translate into three concepts: Reasons, Resources and Resolve, constituting three
distinct and interacting clusters of variables that explain changes in behaviour and
attitudes of conflicting parties (Ohlson 2008, 135).
In contrast to influential studies by Weinstein (2007) or Kalyvas (2006), the Triple-R concept
is better adequate to assess motivations, opportunities, and capabilities of violent
oppositional actors. While Weinstein is capable of explaining why the level of violence
against civilians varies between rebel groups, Kalyvas’ work is useful in understanding how
indiscriminate violence compensates for the lack of military resources. In other words,
Weinstein’s research helps to understand why violence is applied by non-state armed groups
while Kalyvas’ studies show the way it is done. As these scholars focus on civil warfare,
onsets on the verge of high conflict intensity are unlikely to be captured by their approaches.
Classic conflict dyads based on the state fighting a rebel group can be hardly applied to
large-scale violence that erupts from clashes between police forces on the one hand and
mass demonstrators on the other. Although the Libyan and the Syrian examples have shown
3
Given the limited scope of this article, the analysis will focus on the early radicalization and de-radicalization
processes in 2011. Thus, neither the rise and fall of the Morsi government in Egypt, nor the volatile transition in
Libya after Qaddafi’s death, nor the latest spillovers from civil war in Syria will be dealt with. Excellent studies
dealing with dynamics after 2011 are given by Awad (2013), McQuinn (2013), and Droz-Vincent (2014).
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that protest movements are capable of militarizing their efforts, such a step is a rather large
leap. In contrast to narrow analysis lenses, which are useful for Weinstein’s and Kalyvas’
purpose, Ohlson’s broad continuum allows for comparing very diverse actors with each
other. These range from well-equipped rebel groups to nonviolent protest movements. In
applying the independent variables of reasons, resources, and resolve to the analysis of
popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria two issues will be shed light on: first, the
composition and mobilization of the early opposition forces, and second, the regimes’
response to the dynamics on the ground. In light of this, the paper is based on the
assumption that radicalization and de-radicalization processes are determined by the
interplay between actions by the opposition forces on the one hand and the state on the
other.
Radicalization and De-radicalization in Egypt, Libya and Syria
In the early stages of demonstrations in January and February 2011, external observers
believed to see a very linear narrative that drove the people to the streets of cities such as
Cairo, Benghazi, or Homs: autocratic regimes not able to provide for social wealth and not
willing to expand political rights to the majority of citizens. Although this rationale can be
well applied to most of the popular uprisings throughout the region during that time, the
very paths followed different leads as the table below is illustrating.
Table 1: Deaths during violent clashes between opposition and government forces, 2011-14
Syria
Country
160.000
Number killed, minimum
Mar 2011 – ongoing
Period of unrest
Egypt
3.000
Jan 2011 – Sep 2013
Libya
30.000
Feb 2011 – Oct 2011
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Own illustration based on The Economist 2011, ‘The Arab Spring Death Toll, The Price of
Protest, So far’, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/07/arab-spring-deathtoll, accessed 12 June 2014.
The following analysis will apply the Triple-R concept to these three cases before discussing
the commonalities and variances in the final section of this paper.
Egypt
In contrast to Libya and Syria, the popular uprising did not escalate into civil war in Egypt in
early 2011. Before crossing the threshold towards large-scale violence, the state authorities
and the opposition forces managed to de-escalate the situation by (mostly) nonviolent
means. Despite the relatively low death toll compared to Libya and Syria, however, there
were critical moments during the violent clashes in January and February 2011 – tipping
points that could have led to very different paths. Based on the Triple-r variables, the
analysis below will shed light on the specific dynamics. Scholars wondered why the uprisings
of a large-scale protest movement occurred in 2011 although the background reasons had
not altered much during the thirty-year-long presidency of Mubarak (Anderson 2011, 2).
“The urban poor have long lamented rising prices, low wages and the widening gulf
between them and the rich, who increasingly have fled the clogged and dirty urban
streets for gated communities. Farmers likewise complained that they have been
unable to earn a living and that politically connected prominent families have been
retaking land granted to those working it since the 1952 revolution. Egyptians of all
political and economic stripes have complained about the marriage of business and
political power, about an unaccountable and often brutal internal security apparatus
and corruption that has robbed the country of its wealth and its people of both their
dignity and freedom (International Crisis Group 2011a, 1).”
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Fawzy (2012) agreed by stressing that “accumulative bad governance” had led to the
protests and clashes around Mubarak’s ousting (Fawzy 2012, 54). Wardany (2012) specified
the argument in showing the regime’s constant neglect of a youth-oriented legislative
framework (i.e. education, employment, political engagement) (Wardany 2012, 38).
According to Shokr (2011), “Egypt’s parliamentary elections in November 2010 were perhaps
a tipping point that eroded any remaining legitimacy for the Egyptian regime” (Shokr 2011,
11). The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) had won an unprecedented 93 percent
majority with no opposition party getting more than six seats. The high level of systematic
fraud ranging from candidate selection, campaigning, voting, and ballot counting to
monitoring had led to a parliament effectively without any opposition. The opposition
leading Muslim Brothers, which had held 20 percent of seats in the parliament, suffered the
most substantial losses as the group ended up with not a single seat (Shokr 2011, 11).
Interviewed after the 25 January protest in 2011, an Egyptian diplomat explained in
reference to the 2010 elections:
“The situation could have been contained if the past months hadn’t been so badly
mismanaged. When you force the opposition – all the opposition – onto the streets,
that’s where they will act. The elections showed an enormous regression, not
progress. They seemed to definitively close the door on any opening of the system
and prepared the ground for Gamal to succeed his father. But Egypt isn’t Syria [where
in 2000 Bashar Assad took over from his father Hafez]. Mubarak and his advisers
didn’t understand this. They never imagined the people could turn against them
(International Crisis Group 2011a, 2).”
The most crucial tipping point that triggered mass demonstrations was the news from
Tunisia’s President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali’s departure for Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011
(Shokr 2011, 12). His fall contributed to young Egyptian activists in calling over Facebook and
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other social media for a ‘day of anger’ on 25 January 2011 (Balata 2011, 71). Intended as
symbolical date to issue general protest against the regime, quickly four concrete demands
were articulated: the resignation of the Minister of the Interior, a fair minimum wage, the
end of the Emergency Law as well as a two-term limit on the presidency (International Crisis
Group 2011a, 3). Unprecedented in Egypt’s history, the numbers of protesters on 25 January
went beyond expectations of activists and state authorities alike. “[For] the first time in most
protesters’ memory, they outnumbered the police. (…) [In] some places no police were in
sight, as protesters paused before apartment buildings and called on those watching to join.
Many did (International Crisis Group 2011a, 3).” The revolt that had started as youth-led
movement became a popular uprising carried by lower and middle class citizens and capable
of bringing the state’s riot security forces to their knees (Shokr 2011, 12). The movement
was quickly joined by established political stakeholders such as the Muslim Brotherhood and
prominent individuals such as ElBaradei. At the end of 28 January the capital and other
urban cities were littered with police stations and vehicles as well as NDP-offices ablaze and
smoldering from the more radical activists’ earlier unrest (International Crisis Group 2011a,
5). Despite the regime’s different security tactics in the attempt to tackle the uprisings (e.g.
riot police, media and communication blackouts), not until 29 January President Mubarak
announced the dismissal of his cabinet and the acceleration of reforms. However, his
statement not to be “lax or tolerant” regarding threats of public order added fuel to the
masses’ discontent with the regime’s lack of responsiveness (International Crisis Group
2011a, 5). Of the four demands issued on 25 January, the call for Mubarak’s resignation
became the most frequently and most actively voiced demand by the protesters
(International Crisis Group 2011a, 5). One major development during these hours was the
deployment of the military in the urban centers that was expected to restore public order.
While the military became the country’s de facto authority, the Ministry of the Interior
pulled its forces from duty in the streets. The government’s ‘stick-and-carrot’ approach
based on violent repression and limited political concessions eventually tired the protesters.
In the attempt to revive the mass protests, on 1 February a successful “million man march”
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was organized (Balata 2011, 70). The impact of this march was substantiated by the
military’s declaration not to use force against the people (Balata 2011, 72; International
Crisis Group 2011a, 7). At the same time, Mubarak gave his second speech declaring that he
would not run again for President and he would meet constitutional demands as raised by
the activists. Some segments of the movement discussed whether a known president to be
replaced in a few months might be a better option than chaos. Indeed, the image of chaos
and anarchy was transported by regime and media authorities identifying ‘foreign agents’
(e.g. U.S., Israel or Hamas) being responsible for financing and training demonstrators to
destabilize Egypt (International Crisis Group 2011a, 9). Against this backdrop of uncertainty
regarding the military’s position, the president’s will to stay in power and rising xenophobia
in Cairo, the violence escalated. After pro-Mubarak groups hit the streets on 2 February
several clashes between the adversary groups occurred and resulted in 15 deaths and
hundreds injured let alone at the Tahrir Square (International Crisis Group 2011a, 8).
Surprised by the violence intensity, the government quickly promised to punish those
responsible for the attacks. At the same time, the new violence cycle triggered pressure
from the U.S. and Europe (International Crisis Group 2011a, 10). Several attempts to broker
a deal between the regime and the opposition failed. On the one hand, the protesters
demanded Mubarak’s resignation. On the other hand, the heterogeneous composition of
the movement complicated the internal decision-making process (International Crisis Group
2011, 10-11). The activists continued to occupy the Tahrir Square. At the same time, strikes
and other joint actions were increased with other organized groups (e.g. workers). After
Mubarak’s announcement to transfer some powers to the vice-president was rejected by
the protest movement, the military acted as arbiter of Mubarak’s fate.
“The chants at the enormous protests the day after his speech called for it to put an
end to the nation’s ordeal as Tunisia’s army had done. Exactly what transpired over
those final days – within the military, between the military and the president,
between the military and the elite Republican Guard that answered directly to him,
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and between Cairo and the capitals of the world – remains unclear. But to the great
credit of the people and the military, the bloodshed that some had feared never
materialized (…) (International Crisis Group 2011a, 14).”
Finally on 11 February, Vice-President Omar Suleiman stated that Mubarak had given up his
post and transferred power to the military (Karawan 2011, 43). After dissolving both
legislative councils, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) carried out the
responsibilities of the president (Kandeel 2011, 38-39). Apparently, the reserved role of the
armed forces during the protests had contributed to the relatively pacific attitude of the
masses. It is likely that a more repressive behavior of the military would have made the
activists consider arming themselves. Given that Egyptian’s army leadership supported the
“legitimate demands” of the people and approved “peaceful” demonstrations in an
announcement on 31 January 2011, that tolerance has probably signaled their turning away
from the Mubarak regime facing the sign of the times. Moreover, despite Mubarak’s tight
lock on power, the president’s eventual resignation substantially de-escalated the conflict
onset. By meeting the movement’s primary demand, the countrywide demonstrations,
strikes, and the occupation of the Tahrir Square by increasingly frustrated activists were
halted. The government had learned to refrain from repressive means and adhere to
institutional conflict regulation; that is, a formal resignation as prelude to elections for a
constitutional assembly. In light of this ‘success’, the heterogeneously composed and
spontaneously organized protest movement did not consider radicalization and
militarization. There was no need. Neither military and organizational capabilities (i.e.
resources) nor central leadership (i.e. resolve) were necessary factors to oust Mubarak and
his regime. If the military and/or Mubarak’s power circle had not made the very concessions,
questions of resource and resolve might have become relevant issues. The cases of Libya and
Syria well illustrate this relationship between state response and radicalization of opposition
forces.
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Libya
On 15 February 2011, people in Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi, took to the streets and
demanded the end of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s four-decade-long regime. Within a couple of
days, the protests spread to the country’s east and some parts of the west (International
Crisis Group 2011b, 1). However, whereas demonstrators in Tunis and Cairo forced their
rulers to step down, Qaddafi made it clear from the start that he would not accept that fate
and rather hold on to power by whatever means necessary (Anderson 2011, 6). According to
the International Crisis Group (ICG), the mismatch between national income opportunities in
an oil-rich country as Libya and its low level of development provided breeding ground for
discontent with the government in the 2000s:
“(…) Libyans have been exasperated by what they perceive as the low level of
development of their country, given that, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, the state is sitting
on immense oil wealth. While the regime did indeed use steady oil revenues to build
an impressive welfare system in the 1970s, providing homes, benefits and even cars,
in recent decades this system has been eroded, and much of the population now
struggles to make ends meet (International Crisis Group 2011b, 1).”
Similar to other revolts in the region, the ousting of Tunisia’s President Ben Ali on 14 January
2011 was a decisive catalytic event that triggered the demonstrations against the Qaddafi
regime. On 26 January, Qaddafi held a speech pinpointing to the problem of housing
shortages and invited the youth to take what was theirs. On 27 and 28 January, hundreds of
Libyans occupied empty housing projects across the country. Qaddafi had managed to
channel the discontent against the responsible authorities away from him. During the
following days, the security forces were restrained from intervening in the occupations.
People claimed what was theirs and got in conflict with each other (International Crisis
Group 2011b, 3). Although this maneuver bought the government time, the ousting of
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Egypt’s President Mubarak on 11 February triggered yet another protest cycle in Libya
(Taheri 2011, 273-277). A ‘day of rage’ was announced to be held on 17 February (Van
Genugten 2011, 67). The regime tried to prevent mass demonstrations with the help of a
variety of different measures. Foremost, these included the mobilization of pro-regime
demonstrations. Moreover, tribal leaders were warned to refrain their youth from
participating in the protests. On 22 February, the regime spread information that reforms
were under way and wage increases would be awarded soon (International Crisis Group
2011b, 4). Given that these measures were primarily used in the western urban centers
around Tripoli, eastern Benghazi became the stronghold of opposition (FOCUS 2011, 3).
Qaddafi’s hold to power became stronger the longer the protests took. Already on 20
February, his son Saif Al-Islam had stated that “we will keep fighting until the last man or
even the last woman standing (…). If everybody is armed, it is civil war, we will kill each
other” (Saif Al-Islam quoted in International Crisis Group 2011b, 4). In late February, the
escalation increased when Benghazi protests were quelled down by the state forces making
use of violence; “(…) including firing at unarmed civilians during funerals for those killed by
the regime” (International Crisis Group 2011b, 4). According to Al Jazeera and CNN, state
brutality was also illustrated by attacks against hospitals, systematic rape and execution of
injured (Al Jazeera, 27 March 2011; CNN Libya Live Blog, 23 March 2011). The opposition
forces contributed to the intensification of violence on the ground:
“While there is no doubt that many and quite probably a large majority of the people
mobilised in the early demonstrations were indeed intent on demonstrating
peacefully, there is also evidence that, as the regime claimed, the demonstrations
were infiltrated by violent means (International Crisis Group 2011b, 4).”
In the weeks to come, the rebellion was supported by defections in the east and west. In
some cases, entire battalions joined the oppositional movement. On 19 March, first military
operations were executed by the NATO against the Qaddafi-regime and lasted until 31
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October 2011 (International Crisis Group 2011b, 6). After heavy battles in Misrata, Sirte, Bani
Walid, and Qaddafi’s death on 20 October, civil war officially ended and NATO strikes
completed until 31 October 2011 (International Crisis Group 2011c, 6). In sum, the
opposition forces had enough reasons to take up arms against Qaddafi. The government’s
lack of responsiveness to the activists’ demands coupled with ruthless and violent repression
eventually convinced the protesters to say ‘yes’ to the question on ‘do we want to fight?’.
Triggered by the events in Tunis and Cairo, the activists perceived no alternative other than
the revolt to change their status quo. In contrast to uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the early
protests in Libya were not driven by young, well-educated members of an expanding middle
class. Underemployed young men, whose educational level and access to information
technologies were below those in Egypt or Tunisia, constituted the major force driving the
protests (Lacher 2011, 141; Tempelhof and Omar 2012, 5; International Crisis Group 2011c,
1). Moreover, no organized oppositional groups such as trade unions or labor movements
had been established in Libya (Van Genugten 2011, 68-70). Beyond the marginal role of
established opposition forces, Lacher (2011) found:
“There is no evidence that the calls by exiled opposition activists for protests played
any significant role in triggering the uprising, and since no opposition parties or
movements existed inside Libya, the decisive developments of the first weeks had
already occurred by the time the exiles returned. Perhaps the most remarkable
difference, however, was the lack of institutions capable of managing the crisis.
Instead of pressuring the leader to resign and initiate a transition of power, as the
Tunisian and Egyptian militaries did, the Libyan army and other state institutions
disintegrated rapidly (Lacher 2011, 141. See also Van Genugten 2011, 65-67).”
The defection of senior officers, diplomats and army units was one of the reasons for the
emergence of a heterogeneous and fragmented oppositional movement that was primarily
driven by tribal and regional interests (Lacher 2011, 141-142). Acknowledged by NATO as
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formal political leadership of the opposition, the National Transitional Council (NTC) set itself
at the top of the hitherto popular movement. Basically, it was dominated by representatives
and defectors of the former regime on the one hand and local councils emerging in the
liberated areas on the other (Lacher 2011, 142; Tempelhof and Omar 2012, 3-4). The NTC
was criticized by rival opposition groups for claiming leadership without having participated
in the fightings (Talmon 2011, 2-4). For instance, the ‘February 17th Youth Movement’
criticized the NTC. The Movement was composed of young, urban, middle-class citizens
often holding a higher degree (Tempelhof and Omar 2012, 5-6). The armed groups within
the opposition illustrated the striking heterogeneity:
“[The] armed forces comprise approximately a thousand people, accounting for the
actual trained armed forces that defected from the Gadhafi military. There currently
are no reliable data on the number of rebel fighters. Early popular impressions of the
rebels indicated that the fighters were drawn from a broad cross-section of society,
from the bread baker to the jihadist to the urban law student. (…) Two trends have
emerged in the structure of the militias: large and organized units that coordinate
with the NTC, and smaller, looser groups that perform various activities (Tempelhof
and Omar 2012, 6).”
A slowly emerging civil society and the diaspora have been also identified as stakeholders
during the Libyan uprising. While the first struggled with organizational challenges, the latter
was criticized for having been absent when the battles took place on the ground (Tempelhof
and Omar 2012, 7). Religion constituted yet another cleavage within the opposition
movement. While the well-funded and politically ambitious Muslim Brotherhood insisted on
having participated in the violent revolt by providing aid or food to the fighters, Salafists
claimed their renouncement of violence. Given the volatile post-conflict transitional phase, a
jihad movement was identified as another religiously defined stakeholder in the arena: the
so-called Libyan Fighting Group (LIFG) (Ashour 2011, 377-397; Blanchard 2011, 34-37). The
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various and overlapping tribal and ethnic divides constitute another important cleavage.
According to Tempelhof and Omar (2012), there are 2,000 tribes, divided into 140 main
tribes out of which about 50 hold power in terms of socioeconomic and political decisionmaking processes (Tempelhof and Omar 2012, 8-10). In terms of military capabilities, the
anti-state forces were loosely coordinated and organized. Under the umbrella of the
National Liberation Army (NLA), the opposition forces were characterized by their lack of
military training and organization. This low tactical capacity constrained the prospects to
wage a full-scale war against Qaddafi’s security forces (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 38). The
NLA was composed of approximately 8,000 defected officers from the former Libyan
National Army (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 38). Originating from the east, headquarters were
based in Benghazi until the fall of Tripoli (International Crisis Group 2011c, 19). The majority
of rebel fighters were equipped with small arms such as assault rifles, homemade mortars,
and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). In the course of conflict, the rebels accessed a variety
of heavy arms like a frigate, combat aircraft, battle tanks, and armored vehicles. However, in
most cases the rebels were unable to use the equipment. Cordesman and Vira (2011)
explained:
“Particularly during the early phase of the war it quickly became apparent that the
rebels had extremely low technical capacity to employ captured high-end equipment.
(…) As a result, regardless of their enemy, opposition forces [were] only really able to
conduct fighting utilizing light arms, manageable perhaps in urban defense, but
disastrous for open offensive combat (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 44).”
Furthermore, rebel fighters were constantly running short of weapons and ammunition.
Even direct military aid by France in late June 2011 did not change their inferiority towards
Qaddafi troops. Despite relevant strikes against the Tripoli-based Qaddafi-forces, the rebels’
military capabilities were not enough to significantly change the tactical imbalance to the
opposition’s favor (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 46). The same holds true for the
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organizational capabilities. Given the lack of cohesion, right from the beginning in late
February the reporting lines of command and control lacked structure. This referred to
leadership, operational tactics, communication mechanisms, and logistics. The different
types of units (i.e. soldiers, shabab, jihadists) often operated autonomously and were thus
exposed to flanking maneuvers of the royalist state forces. The fragmented leadership within
the NLA resulted in distrust and dissatisfaction among the frontline commanders and
soldiers (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 38). The NATO intervention beginning on 19 March 2011
changed the overall setting. Based on three dimensions (i.e. arms embargo, no fly zone,
actions to protect civilians), the air strikes were expanded from attacking marginal targets to
major regime centers (Cordesman and Vira 2011, 47; International Crisis Group 2011b, 28).
Despite the relevant effect of the NATO intervention, it is controversial to what extent this
contribution played a major role to the early rebellion four weeks after the first bloody
clashes had taken place between the opposition and regime forces. The question of
leadership reflected the difficulties of such a heterogonous setting. Except for the common
goal of overthrowing Qaddafi, there was no long-term agenda each of the different
opposition factions would have agreed upon. Instead, a variety of actors pursued a variety of
often overlapping own agendas determined by regional, tribal, ethnic, political, or other
interests. Moreover, as the overview of the fragmented military opposition has shown, the
means to enforce a specific agenda failed due to internal rivalries and lack of mutual trust.
There was no hierarchical, well-organized commando structure provided with operational
capacity, experience, or logistics empowering leaders to outmaneuver rivals and convince
low-level recruits. Furthermore, the different opposition groups did not depend on a specific
leading individual in order to ‘survive’. In Mid-February 2011 there was no leader present to
‘convince’ the protesters and future rebels to take up arms against Qaddafi. In summary,
opposition forces in Libya radicalized their agenda and means primarily because of structural
and imminent grievances (i.e. reasons). They felt excluded from the revenues of the
country’s oil wealth, they felt unheard by the government, and they responded by
militarization to the state’s relentless violent repression. The lack of leadership (i.e. resolve)
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and the diffuse organizational structure and inexperience with heavy weaponry (i.e.
resources) was compensated for by the NATO’s support.
Syria
In contrast to mass protesters ousting autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, only few
observers expected Syria to follow in early 2011. For over 40 years Syrians had suffered from
similar socio-economic challenges that had triggered social unrest elsewhere. However,
President Bashar al-Assad enjoyed confidence by the public (Phillips 2012, 37). Beyond the
relatively positive image of Assad, the regime featured several characteristics that made
violent protest unlikely. For instance, these included a foreign policy largely in tune with
public opinion, a weak civil society, or the absence of abject poverty of the kind that exists in
Yemen (International Crisis Group 2011d, 2-3). Nevertheless, since 15 March 2011 more
than 160.000 people have been killed and between eight and ten million have fled civil war
to adjacent countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (Gallagher 2014, 2). By
taking a closer look at the genesis and course of the various ‘Arabellions’, it becomes obvious
that people’s willingness to carry the protests did not only stem from different socio-cultural
backgrounds but were also motivated by different grievances. Anderson (2012) illustrated
this variety which can be well applied to the Syrian context:
“The demonstrations in Tunisia spiraled toward the capital from the neglected rural
areas, finding common cause with a once powerful but much repressed labor
movement. In Egypt, by contrast, urbane and cosmopolitan young people in the
major cities organized the uprisings. Meanwhile, in Libya, ragtag bands of armed
rebels in the eastern provinces ignited the protests, revealing the tribal and regional
cleavages that have beset the country for decades (Anderson 2012, 2).”
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The Syrian uprising was triggered by short-term catalytic events such as the toppling of Ben
Ali and Mubarak earlier that year. Similar to the Libyan and other civil war contexts,
structural resentments had evolved prior to that. Phillips (2012) highlighted the composition
of the protesters and later rebels: “The uprising can be partly explained by examining who
has and hasn’t been willing to rebel against Assad (Phillips 2012, 37).” Accordingly, the
background effect of the social and economic inequalities was crucial that had evolved
during Hafez al-Assad ruling, Bashar’s father, as part of a divide and rule strategy. Building a
large socialist state that provided employment and subsidies, Hafez’ regime (1971-2000) was
backed by the working class and peasantry. This segment of society was constituted by Sunni
Arabs which made up 60 percent of society. Likewise, he won over the support of non-Sunni
minorities such as Christians (10 percent), Druze (3 percent), and his own Alawi sect (10
percent) by promoting a secular Arab nationalist identity. The military and the ruling Ba’ath
party became the crucial pillars of the state expansion. In turn, Kurds (15 percent) and the
former Sunni ruling elite were excluded. Along came landowners and merchants that
opposed Hafez’s socialist policies (Buckley 2012, 89-90; Phillips 2012, 37). This divide and
rule system provided the regime with a broad popular base. However at the same time, the
different divisions that held this system were fostered (Buckley 2012, 89-90; Phillips 2012,
38). The fragile nature of this construct surfaced after Hafez passed away in 2000 and Bashar
inherited his power. Launching a series of liberal economic reforms, Sunni workers and
peasants were alienated as subsidies to the poorest were cut and public sector employment
decreased. A harsh discrepancy between the poor Sunni and the rich Alawi stoke
resentments as the growing GDP was not transformed into a broad distribution of wealth.
Phillips found: “Rather than genuine liberalisation, those close to power amassed huge
fortunes (…). This new generation of [mostly Alawi] crony capitalists were visibly excessive
(…) fuelling resentment among the formerly supportive Sunni Arab poor (Phillips 2012, 38).”
In addition to these ethnic ties of support, yet other conflict-fueling factors affected the
onset, which were beyond the regime’s influence. These were a major drought between
2007 and 2010 which led to a significant migration wave from rural areas towards the cities.
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Given the long-term effects of the demographic boom of the 1980s and Bashar’s
liberalization policies shrinking the state, the labor market in the cities was difficult (Wieland
2011, 47-48; Phillips 2012, 38). Furthermore, with the shrinking of the state, the funding and
influence of the army and the Ba’ath party was impaired. As such, the indoctrination of the
youth became less (Phillips 2012, 38). Bashar himself contributed to the alienation of young
Syrians in the attempt to keep growing Islamic conservatism out of politics. He encouraged
the Sunni communities to preach a more conservative form within mosques and at Friday
prayers. This move would eventually backfire as the very Friday prayers became the focal
point of demonstrations (Wieland 2011, 51-53; Buckley 2012, 89; Phillips 2012, 38). The
incentives for violent unrest against the state were further substantiated by the Tunisian and
Egyptian ‘success stories’ in early 2011. Copying the means of those popular mobilizations
(e.g. social media, Friday prayers), the demand for dignity was voiced by the Syrian
opposition as well. This was more the case after Qaddafi’s fall in Libya in late 2011. The call
within the opposition for militarizing the anti-state efforts was voiced louder (Buckley 2012,
88-89; Phillips 2012, 38). Despite the relevance of these catalytic events, the regime’s violent
reaction to the protests probably posed the most conflict-fueling factor at all. In terms of
capabilities, the political as well as the military arm of the opposition remained weak. Landis
(2012) described the shortcomings as follows:
“The Free Syrian Army (FSA) being assembled in Turkey under the leadership of
Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad is no match for the Syrian Army. Although armed opponents
of the regime are an important development, their size, structural limitations and
predominantly Sunni character make them a minimal threat. They have limited
command and control, no dependable communications, and offensive capabilities
that are restricted by their lack of heavy weapons. They do not yet present a real
danger or alternative to the Syrian military (Landis 2012, 73).”
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Although announcements were made by the U.S. state department and the British foreign
office that military capabilities of the Syrian opposition were going to be supported, these
efforts did not have similar effects as the no-fly zone established by the NATO during civil
war in Libya in 2011 (Ruys 2014). Moreover, the exile political arm, the Syrian National
Council (SNC), remained far from getting control over the FSA. Quite the contrary, the
increasing number of local armed opposition cells in Syria work independent from each
other and get more autonomous the longer the conflict is not resolved (Stevenson 2014).
The political leadership of the opposition remained divided as well. The SNC failed to contain
divisions within the opposition as well as to unite with competing factions (Stevenson 2014;
Wieland 2011, 54-59; Landis 2012, 74-76). In summary, the opposition radicalized in Syria
because of ethnically defined socio-economic grievances of the Sunni majority, the spillover
effects of the Arab Spring movements in adjacent countries, and most crucially by the
indiscriminate violent response of the regime (i.e. reasons). Neither huge organizational and
military capabilities (i.e. resources), nor charismatic leadership uniting the masses were
crucial to the genesis and sustenance of the oppositional struggle (i.e. resolve).
Conclusion
The comparison between popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria has shown that the
state’s reaction determined first whether opposition forces radicalized their agenda. Each of
the heterogeneously composed and spontaneously organized protest movements started
out nonviolently. Despite different socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, the call for
political changes (e.g. inclusion, distribution of wealth) unified the segments of society
against the ruling power. ‘Reasons’ alone made people get to the streets. The moment the
state authorities struck down the demonstrators by violent means, the radical factions
within the protest movements opted for a violent response themselves. This is when
organizational and military capabilities (i.e. resources) as well as charismatic leadership (i.e.
resolve) came into play. In the case of Egypt, this radicalization process was inhibited by
Mubarak’s resignation and the military’s eventual decision to allowing mass demonstrations.
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Issues of military capabilities and leadership thus were secondary or even irrelevant to the
opposition forces. This is in contrast to the dynamics that led to civil wars in Libya and Syria.
There President Qaddafi and Assad never attempted to reach consensus with the opposition
forces but rather played the military card right from the beginning. The more the conflict
was waged with violent means, the more the opposition forces did radicalize. Although the
relationship remains controversial, the NATO intervention sent an ambivalent message to
the opposition in Damascus, Homs, and elsewhere as people expected the West to establish
a no-fly zone in Syria as well. Regardless of the specific militarization processes, be it by
direct (e.g. NATO) or indirect support (e.g. training, small-arm shipments), the regime’s
relentless violent repression had and would made negotiations illusory. While central
leadership among the different and fragmented opposition forces both in Libya and Syria did
not play a decisive role in mobilizing the armed struggle, military and organizational
capabilities became crucial the longer the conflict(s) were waged. The recent escalation of
violence in Syria particularly shows that once the adversaries are armed de-escalation
processes become unlikely with duration (Lesch 2013).
Against this backdrop, the analysis holds two implications for future research. First, going
beyond the agency perspective only, there is yet another relevant difference between
radicalization and de-radicalization processes in Egypt, Libya, and Syria: the question of
space. Early opposition and later armed resistance was organized in Benghazi and not in
Tripoli, while the same phenomenon was found in Syria where Homs constituted the
regional stronghold of opposition forces right from the start. This is in contrast to Egypt,
where the uprising was predominantly focused on Cairo and to lesser extent to Alexandria.
In light of this, more research needs to be done on the geographical origin, organization, and
sustenance of public unrest. So far, most studies have focused on the physical opportunity
structure provided by mountainous terrain or jungle areas (Buhaug, Cederman, and
Gleditsch 2014). The urban/rural and capital/non-capital dimension seems to have been
neglected in the Arab Spring literature. Second, despite its advantages to grasp a (violent)
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conflict in its entirety, the Triple-R concept does not allow for capturing decision-making of
policymakers on top level. As such, in future studies the questions of reasons, resources, and
resolve would have to be modified. For instance, reason could be framed in terms of rational
cost-benefit considerations (e.g. willingness to stay in power). Resources could be
understood as a general support variable (e.g. public legitimacy, ties to military, foreign allies
etc.). Resolve might then be framed according to some form of inner circle of advisors (e.g.
influential ministers or bureaucrats etc.). Although such a modification is conceptually
possible, it is still very challenging to access top-level decision-makers to obtain by
qualitative data. Official statements usually constitute the primary source of information,
while qualitative interviews are only very seldom made possible.
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