The Atkin Paper Series
Let us include them in our
civil peace
Sarah Kilany, ICSR Atkin Fellow
June 2012
About the Atkin Paper Series
Thanks to the generosity of the Atkin Foundation, the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) offers young leaders from Israel
and the Arab world the opportunity to come to London for a period of four months.
The purpose of the fellowship is to provide young leaders from Israel and the Arab
world with an opportunity to develop their ideas on how to further peace and
understanding in the Middle East through research, debate and constructive dialogue
in a neutral political environment. The end result is a policy paper that will provide a
deeper understanding and a new perspective on a specific topic or event.
Author
Sarah Kilany joined ICSR as an Atkin Fellow for Spring 2012. Sarah holds an MA
degree from Webster Graduate School-London in International Non-Governmental
Organisations and a BA from the Lebanese American University-Beirut in Political
Science International Affairs. She has been involved in civil society work in Lebanon,
particularly with a community centre in Fanar, Lebanon Voix de la Femme Libanaise.
She assisted in the development of a youth centre created for young people in the
area to have a safe haven. She also helped organise and coordinate awareness
sessions such as family planning, household violence protection, child education
and vocational training sessions for the women of the area.
Editor
Dr Peter R. Neumann
Director, ICSR
Editor
Dr Ahron Bregman
King’s College London
Editor
Jeni Mitchell
King’s College London
Editorial Assistant
Katie Rothman
ICSR
To order hardcopies or contact the editor,
please write to [email protected]. All papers in
the Atkin Paper Series can be downloaded
free of charge at www.icsr.info
Introduction
“We included Palestinians in our civil war – it is time to include them in our
civil peace.”
Nassib Lahoud, Former Lebanese MP
(1992 – 2000)
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) defines a Palestinian refugee as ‘any person whose normal place of
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who
lost their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict’.1 By the
end of 1948, almost 800,000 Palestinian refugees had already settled in the five
neighbouring countries surrounding Israel. Lebanon absorbed nearly 100,000 of
them, offering land where camps could be built. Today there are 425,640 Palestinian
refugees registered in Lebanon; with 260,000 – 280,000 residing there, some 25,000
have been granted Lebanese citizenship and almost 200,000 have left over the
years. Sixty two per cent of them reside in twelve refugee camps spread across
Lebanon.2
Each country of refuge has chosen different legal and political approaches to
regulate the presence of Palestinian refugees but they are in each case still treated as
second-class citizens – and Lebanon continues to be the worst offender. Palestinians
have been barred from working in syndicated jobs such as law, engineering and
medicine; they are prohibited from owning real estate or bequeathing property to
their children; and they are not allowed access to public services such as education
and health care. The international community, NGOs and human rights watchdogs
have consistently called upon the Lebanese government to act on the humanitarian
situation within the refugee camps and to grant the residents civil rights (including
the rights of property ownership, employment, social security and freedom of
association). However, the Lebanese government and parts of Lebanese society still
oppose the granting of such rights to the Palestinians.
The aim of this paper is to show that the current status quo is problematic for
both the refugees and for Lebanon itself. The paper is divided into three sections.
The first explains two key factors that have shaped the current socio-economic
situation of Palestinians in Lebanon and gives an overview of their current living
conditions. The second section explains why it would be advantageous to change
the status quo. The final section offers recommendations to the Lebanese authorities,
1
2
UNRWA, ’Palestine Refugees’. Accessed 3 February 2012. http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.
php?id=86.
Haddad (2000). Of this number, 260,000-280,000 hold residency, some 25,000 were granted
Lebanese citizenship and almost 200,000 have left over the years.
1
as well as local and international civil society, on possible future actions and how
to change the status quo for the better.
The socio-economic status quo
for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
Origins and overview
O
f the many factors contributing to the poor socio-economic situation of
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, I believe two are the most critical: the
contentious Palestinian-Lebanese relationship and the Lebanese legal
instruments that regulate the presence of the refugees. This section examines
each factor before evaluating the current status quo for Palestinian living conditions
in Lebanon.
A contentious relationship
The present situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is not independent from
the sensitive and controversial history between the refugees and the Lebanese. In
the wake of the 1948 war, those forced to flee from towns in Northern Palestine such
as Haifa, Acre, Safad and the Galilee region sought refuge in Lebanon.3 This large
influx of Palestinians seeking to settle all over Lebanon obviously altered already
sensitive demographics, as Lebanon is home to eighteen different sects and has a
confessional political system.
Another major incident affecting the Lebanese-Palestinian relationship was the
expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) the umbrella organisation for
eight different Palestinian militant groups from Jordan in 1970, at the order of King
Hussein. At this time the organisation had only one goal – which was to continue to
pursue its armed struggle against Israel. With Yasser Arafat as leader, the group used
Jordan as their base for their activities. In 1970, the Jordanian military was ordered
to push the PLO out of Jordan and into Lebanon.4
The absence of a strong central government in Beirut made Lebanon an ideal
place for the PLO to relocate. Palestinian activists settled in south Lebanon and their
leaders established headquarters in the capital.5 Arafat spread the headquarters
between the areas of Sabra, Chatila, and Fakhani in West Beirut so as to strengthen
the political and financial unity of the different organisations under the PLO umbrella
– having all of the Palestinian militant groups operating from one place, rather than
being spread out within different Arab countries, solidified their political linkages
with each other and enabled them to communicate and act rapidly and in a united
fashion. Another bonus was that Beirut was brimming with foreign correspondents
and media outlets and this helped to put the Palestinian cause on the international
3
4
5
2
Morris (1990).
Bregman and El-Tahri (1998).
Bregman (2002), 146.
3
map.6 In addition, the sectarian divide in the country at the time allowed the
Palestinian leadership to solidify their political presence by forming an alliance with
the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) a left-wing Muslim party that opposed the
right-wing Christian alliance. Finally, when the PLO relocated to Lebanon they were
allowed to form local committees in the refugee camps – composed of Palestinians
only – to care for the camp residents. This escalated and the PLO became the main
provider of services in the camps, from electricity and sanitation to schooling and
employment.
A third major event affecting the current socio-economic situation of the
Palestinian refugees was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. One of the primary
goals of the operation was to expel the PLO from Lebanon, thus putting an end
to the Palestinian attacks on Israel that were being launched from the south of the
country. In this, Israel did succeed: the PLO was ousted. However, the expulsion
of the PLO had a knock-on effect, as most of the socio-economic institutions that
were affiliated with it were either shut down or lost their sources of income.7 In the
refugee camps, residents were left without all the basic services and employment
opportunities that the PLO provided.8 A second, more political outcome was that
the absence of the somewhat secular PLO created a power vacuum in the camps,
allowing more radical parties and organisations to take control, including Islamic
groups operating at the time (such as Jund Al Sham, Usbat Al-Ansar, and Fatah
il Islam).
are 10,000; the US Committee for Refugees estimated 16,000 (World Refugee
Survey, 2003); and the Danish Refugee Council, which carried out a survey in 2005,
estimated the number to be 3,000. Their lack of identification further hampers them
in obtaining education, work or travel.11
Another factor controlling present living conditions is the Casablanca Protocol.
This regional treaty is the main legal covenant regulating the presence of the
Palestinian refugee diaspora in Arab countries. The Protocol sets clear guidelines for
the treatment of the refugees within the League of Arab States (LAS):
1.
Whilst retaining their Palestinian nationality, Palestinians currently residing in the land
of XXX have the right of employment on par with its citizens.
2.
Palestinians residing at the moment in XXX in accordance with the dictates of their
interests, have the right to leave and return to this state.
3.
Palestinians residing in other Arab states have the right to enter the land of XXX and
to depart from it, in accordance with their interests. Their right of entry only gives
them the right to stay for the permitted period and for the purpose they entered for,
so long as the authorities do not agree to the contrary.
4.
Palestinians who are at the moment in XXX as well as those who were residing and
left to the Diaspora, are given, upon request, valid travel documents. The concerned
authorities must, wherever they be, issue these documents or renew them without
delay.
5.
Bearers of these travel documents residing in LAS states receive the same treatment
as all other LAS state citizens, regarding visa and residency applications.
Legal restrictions
The second variable affecting the socio-economic situation is the legal factor.
There are several legal limitations affecting the current living conditions of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, including the registration procedures, the Casablanca protocol,
restrictive national Lebanese laws, and the reciprocity law.
Lebanese registration formalities divide Palestinian refugees into three
categories. The first includes those who have been legally registered with both
UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities. According to a 2006 UNRWA report, there
are 406,342 people registered with UNRWA, most of them classed as refugees.
The second category includes Palestinian refugees that are only registered with
the Lebanese authorities. The European Union’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
estimates this category to be anywhere between 10,000 – 40,000 refugees9;
UNRWA claims that the Lebanese Ministry of Interior has ‘unofficially’ confirmed
that these refugees number 13,000.10 The third category is non-ID refugees – those
who did not register with any international organisation or local authority at the time
of their arrival. Different sources indicate dissimilar estimates: in March 2003, the
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) issued a report estimating there
6
7
8
9
10
Friedman (1998).
AUB/UNRWA (2010), 3-4.
Weighill and Shehadi (1997).
Amnesty International (2003).
UNRWA (2006).
The Lebanese government ratified the treaty in 1956 with reservations on all
five articles. For Article One, they restated that Palestinians residing in Lebanon are
granted the right of employment, together with the right of keeping their Palestinian
nationality, in accordance with prevailing social and economic conditions in the
Republic of Lebanon. For Article Two, the phrase ‘on equal terms with the Lebanese
citizens and in accordance with the laws and regulations in operation’ was added.
With Article Three, the phrases ‘(whenever their interests demand it)’ and ‘allowing
Palestinians into Lebanon is conditional upon their obtaining an entry visa issued by
the concerned Lebanese authorities’ were added.12 As for Articles Four and Five,
Lebanon opted out of these and did not sign or ratify them.
Another legal restriction facing the Palestinian refugees is that they are denied
access to public education, social security benefits and public health services.
11Ibid.
12 Proceedings of Casablanca Protocol, Morocco. Accessed 12 February 2012. http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/publisher,LAS,,,460a2b252,0.html.
4
5
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and UNRWA-contracted medical
centres are the only hospital care that is open to them. Unlike in Jordan, Syria, the
West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA is forced to provide secondary education to young
Palestinian refugees as in Lebanon they do not have the right of entry to secondary
public schools and private secondary schools are unaffordable for most refugees.
The reciprocity law is another legal restriction governing the Palestinians. It
states that citizens of another country residing in Lebanon enjoy the same treatment
and rights as Lebanese citizens. However, stateless Palestinians remain victims
of this law, which governs both employment and social security in Lebanon.
Lebanese law classifies Palestinian refugees as foreigners that require work permits.
Furthermore, the Lebanese labour law stipulates that only members of Lebanese
syndicates are allowed to work in skilled professions, such as engineering and
medicine. Stateless Palestinians are also denied the right of ownership of private
property and transfer as per the amended Presidential Decree 11614 which was
passed in January 1969. This prohibits persons who do not carry a citizenship
issued by a recognised state from owning property in Lebanon. It also goes so far
as to deny them the right to transfer purchased properties to their inheritors.13 When
it comes to the right of association, which means forming civil society organisations
(CSOs), there is only one strictly Palestinian organisation that is allowed to operate
within Lebanese territory: the PRCS. Other NGOs must be recorded as Lebanese
CSOs, which means they have to have a majority of Lebanese employees.14
What is the current status quo
of the Palestinian refugees?
A
round the world, refugee communities are among the most vulnerable of
populations. In many developing countries, legal frameworks that protect
them as residents or workers are weak, and the communities remain
disadvantaged. Lebanon is not an exception. Legal restrictions and the contentious
history between the Lebanese and the Palestinians have led to dire socio-economic
conditions which have hampered the social mobility and potential prosperity of the
refugees. Numerous studies have been conducted on the situation of the Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon; most have labelled the population as marginalised, socially
excluded and discriminated against.15
A large majority of the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon is
unemployed. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines the unemployed
as ‘persons above a specified age who are available to, but did not, furnish the
supply of labour for the production of goods and services. When measured for a
short reference period, it relates to all persons not in employment who would have
accepted a suitable job or started an enterprise during the reference period if the
opportunity arose, and who had actively looked for ways to obtain a job or start an
enterprise in the near past’.16 This definition, however, falls short twice when applied
to the Palestinian population in Lebanon: it includes only those actively looking
for a job and so excludes workers that have been discouraged from looking and
those who are working informally. The unemployment rate amongst the Palestinian
population in Lebanon – if measured according to ILO standards – is 6 per cent;
however, if the unemployment definition was expanded to include all Palestinians
who are of working age, not studying and not too ill to work, the rate rises to 37
per cent.
The unemployment rate remains the same throughout the twelve refugee
camps. An economic survey of households in the camps conducted by the American
University of Beirut (AUB) shows that of the 63 per cent of Palestinian refugees
that are employed in Lebanon, 93 per cent do not have a contract, 21 per cent
are employed seasonally and 28 per cent are employed in government, CSOs, or
services such as health and education. The rest – employed in the private sector
15
13
Shafie, Sherifa, ‘Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’. Accessed 21 February 2012. http://http://www.
forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-lebanon/fmo018.pdf.
14Ibid.
6
16
National Socio-Economic Household Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, conducted by
the AUB in cooperation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), covering 2,501
Palestinian households, interviewed in 2010. Households in camps as well as gatherings were
interviewed, in a total of 32 localities. For full study, see UNRWA & AUB, Socio-Economic Survey
of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, AUB/UNRWA (2010).
ILO, ’Employment and Unemployment’. Accessed 12 March 2012. http://www.ilo.org/global/
statistics-and-databases/statistics-overview-and-topics/employment-and-unemployment/lang--en/
index.htm.
7
work in the service or construction industries.17 The report also touches upon the
gender aspect of unemployment and states that ‘a key element in explaining the low
employment rate is the fact that few women work’.18 There is a striking discrepancy
between the percentage of men and women that are employed – 65 per cent and
13 per cent respectively – with women making up only 18 per cent of the Palestinian
refugee workforce. Interestingly, most of the Palestinian women that do work
hold high-status employment (such as legislators, senior officials or managers) in
comparison to Palestinian men, who are mostly employed in elementary occupations
and lower-status jobs.
Despite severe and restrictive policies, most Palestinian households report
that at least one person per household works full-time. Most of the Palestinians
who successfully find work do so in one of the twelve refugee camps or in the
neighbouring areas and suburbs that surrounds the camps. As noted before,
Palestinians work mainly in services, construction, industry, transport, and agriculture
jobs. The below table provides a comparative view of sector wide employment of the
Lebanese and Palestinian working populations.
UNRWA as the sole supplier of medication. The effect of this is clearly shown in the
socio-economic survey conducted by AUB and UNRWA, where the most frequent
visits of Palestinian refugee patients were to UNRWA clinics (32%), followed by
private clinics (24%), PRCS (10%), hospitals (9%), and hospitals subcontracted with
UNRWA (9%).20
Table 1 shows a comparison between the percentages of Palestinian and Lebanese
employed in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction.19
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Construction
Palestinian workers
13%
11%
19%
Lebanese workers
12%
6%
9%
Construction and agriculture employ mostly paid-daily workers.
Health care in the refugee community in Lebanon – where public resources
are not enough to cover the national health needs of the Lebanese population as
well as the Palestinian refugees – is still not a guaranteed right. This is another area
in which the Palestinian refugee community remains disadvantaged. UNRWA, the
PRCS, NGOs and private clinics are the main health care providers to the Palestinian
refugee community. UNRWA – which remains the primary care provider for this
community – has 29 health centres spread throughout the country; they are located
mainly around the areas and towns of the refugee camps. The centres offer medical
services ranging from consultations to treatment of chronic diseases. It is the only
provider that gives the refugees’ primary, secondary and tertiary care. The PRCS and
NGO health centres provide primary care to the refugee community – which leaves
17
18
19
AUB/UNRWA (2010), 7.
Ibid., 10.
Khalidi, Aziza. Working Unprotected. Report. 2008. http://www.association-najdeh.org/pdf/
Presenting%20the%20result%20of%20Palestinian%20refugees/Working%20Unprotected.pdf.
8
20Ibid.
9
Why is it advantageous to change
the status quo?
T
his section attempts to highlight key facts about the Palestinian workforce
in Lebanon, how it is positively impacting the Lebanese economy, and how
a change to the current status quo could be even more advantageous to
Lebanon as well as to the Palestinian refugee community.
The right to work – a key to self-reliance – is first and foremost a right that
enables individuals to live in dignity.21 Of all the most basic civil rights, the right to
work is the one that has the most ripple effects. Allowing a person to work means
that their survival is guaranteed and so is the survival of their families, which in turn
leads to economic and social development. Granting the Palestinians the right to
work without any limits would benefit Lebanon’s economy, restore their dignity and
allow development of the refugee community in Lebanon.
The Lebanese state has taken two positive steps since 2010 in addressing
the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and their employment status and
opportunities. For the first time, the legal status of the Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon was formally addressed by Parliament in legislation that was passed in
August 2010. The amended law mainly strikes out the reciprocity clause when it
comes to employment and work-related social security benefits and work permits.
Article 59 of the Labour Law was amended to allow Palestinian refugees the right
to work, with the exception of self-employed professions.22 This marked a step
forward in the Lebanese – Palestinian relationship. The amended labour laws
included those that regulated job restrictions, work-related accidents and retirement
indemnities. The changes now allow Palestinian refugees to claim free work permits
for employment in the private sector, to which they pay contributions while working.
The amendment was met with mixed feelings by Palestinian leaders and
activists ranging from praise to scepticism and criticism. Ziad Sayegh, an expert
on Palestinian refugee rights, considered the amended law a step forward from the
previous situation where Palestinians were barred from all but the most menial of
jobs. In an interview with the BBC he went so far as to say that the new legislation
would make a difference: ‘for the first time, it actually gives them some legal rights’
and ‘if an employer treats a Palestinian worker badly, he can now go to court and
complain’.23 Sayegh, however, also agreed with some of the sceptics that the law
would have little effect on changing the overall social and economic situation of
the refugees.
21
22
23
10
Sengupta, Arjun, François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health & Human Rights. Accessed 24 March
2012. http://www.harvardfxbcenter.org/.
Lebanon. Parliament. Amendment of Article 59 of the Labour Law. Accessed March 20, 2012.
amendmentofarticle59ofthelebaneselabourlaw.
Muir (2010).
11
Palestinians are still unable to work in the public sector or in syndicated liberal
professions such as medicine, law or engineering.24 Adding to the disappointment
of many, the law also makes no change in terms of access to public services such
as education and health. ‘They spent a long time on discussions which emptied the
law of any real meaning, and I wish they – the members of the Lebanese parliament
– had put it off so we could push for a better version’ said Suheil Natour, spokesman
for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).25
There are three essential facts one needs to know about the Palestinian refugee
community in Lebanon when arguing for a change in their status quo: they represent
a small number compared to other foreign workers; they spend what they earn in the
country; and they are part of the informal economy, including illegal employment and
the black market.
In numbers, the Palestinian refugee community represents a relatively small
group occupying sectors of the economy where they compete with other foreigners
or with a minimal Lebanese workforce. The Lebanese workforce amounts to around
1.1 million workers; the Palestinian workforce of 85,000 constitutes a modest 3 – 5
per cent. If Palestinian workers are excluded from the non-Lebanese workforce, there
are estimated to be around 600,000 foreign workers (including 200,000 Syrians) in
Lebanon. That means that there are almost three times less Palestinian workers than
Syrian workers. Therefore it can be seen that there is a stark contrast to the nonPalestinian work force, and the Palestinians represent a numerically modest fraction
of this and pose no threat to job opportunities for Lebanese workers.
Through active engagement in the local economy and consumption Palestinian
refugees contribute to the Lebanese economy. Unlike other migrant labour groups,
Palestinian refugees, as long-term residents of Lebanon, show a large pattern of
consumption. They consume a wide range of Lebanese goods and services, such
as food and private medical care.26 More than 90 per cent of Palestinian refugees
residing in Lebanon spend all their income in Lebanon, contributing directly to the
Lebanese economy.27
Another significant element is that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are often
forced to work illegally as the numerous employment regulations set by the state
give them little choice to do otherwise. Some politicians argue that the Lebanese
economy cannot sustain allowing Palestinians to work in syndicated jobs; however,
removing employment restrictions would only normalise the already existent situation
– as the Palestinian refugees are already working. So why not grant them the right
to work and the same protections that Lebanese workers have, and then we could
see how the Lebanese economy and society might flourish. At the moment neither
the Lebanese employer nor the Palestinian employee has any incentive to follow the
current legal channels – so they remain in the “informal Lebanese economy”. Recent
studies such as the one conducted by Sawan Abdul Rahim, Assistant Professor in
the Department of Health Promotion and Community Health at AUB,28 into these
exclusionary policies show that they have not been successful in barring Palestinians
from participating in the Lebanese workforce. The study highlights the failure of
legal restrictions put in place by the Lebanese government for those working in
syndicated jobs.
What are the advantages of granting Palestinians the right to work in
syndicated jobs? First, it would improve automatically their working conditions and
safeguard them from exploitation, unfair dismissal, fines or jail. At the moment their
undocumented and unauthorised work exposes them and leaves them open to
be taken advantage of – employers can withhold their wages or impose arbitrary
redundancies and they have no means to oppose this and nothing to protect them.
Illegally employed Palestinians receive lower wage returns on their education and
occupation in comparison to Lebanese workers. Almost all individuals in the study
sample work without a permit, so they are actually illegally employed.29 With regards
to those with work permits, 6.5 per cent of individuals currently working reported
having the special license – this amounts to 81 individuals. Palestinians that work
full-time often have to resort to tweaking the truth to get their jobs; FAFO found
ways that Palestinians get around this.30 For example, lawyers often practice under
the term ‘judicial consultant’ within a Lebanese law firm or Lebanese doctors sign
prescriptions written by Palestinian doctors.
Legalising employment in the liberal professions would also be beneficial to
Lebanese professionals. Aside from income tax and participation in the country’s
economic cycle, liberal professionals working inside the refugee camps are not
subject to Lebanese regulations. Whilst in Beirut in March 2012 I conducted an
interview with a liberal professional of Palestinian nationality who was born and
raised in Lebanon, who wishes to stay anonymous due to the delicacy of the subject
matter. He informed me that doctors are not subject to authority inspections. For
example, clinics inside the camps are not under the threat of health or hygiene
scrutiny. He added that some patients who go to clinics inside the camps are of
Lebanese nationality seeking primary and cheap medical care. Legalising work for
Palestinian professionals would protect Lebanese professionals as they would not
have to compete with lower wages and the doctors and clinics would be subject to
health inspections.
The following paragraph will further explore other advantages of changing
employment laws for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Some politicians argue that
given the current economic situation in the country i.e., debt and unemployment ̶
the ‘Lebanese economy cannot sustain granting these privileges to Palestinians’.31�
However, the truth is that as much as the Palestinian community is dependent
on the well-being of the Lebanese economy, the Lebanese economy itself is
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Hersh (2010).
Muir (2010).
Khalidi (2008).
Lamb (2010).
12
Abdul Rahim (2010).
Khalidi (2008), 159.
Tiltness (2007).
Lamb (2010).
13
dependent on the work, capabilities and human resources of this skilled and hard
working community. Although Lebanon is already rich in human capacities, the
Palestinian refugees have enriched the country with a wealth of human capital that
has supported the country in its recent history and they have the capacity to sustain
themselves given the fact that they are not as mobile as the Lebanese due to their
refugee status (thus, they are less likely to emigrate or move elsewhere to look for
work).32As a large percentage of Lebanese steadily continue to leave the country
for study and employment, serious gaps are being created in Lebanon’s economy,
especially as there is already a high demand for skilled and unskilled labour. So it
would seem that the gap is actually getting bigger and it is the Palestinian refugees
who are willing and able to fill this gap. For example, Lebanon has a shortfall of
nurses and other health professionals – a gap that could be closed if Palestinian
refugees were allowed to work in liberal professions.33
Around 350 professionals registered within the Palestinian General Union of
Doctors are ranging from specialists, to general practitioners, to pharmacists —
these professionals would be useful for the Lebanese.34 In addition, almost all of
the working Palestinian refugees are employed in small establishments, considered
the mainstay of economic growth in Lebanon (as is usually the case in developing
economies). Palestinian refugees are also active in establishing small businesses
themselves (inside and in the surrounding towns and suburbs of their refugee camps
and in Palestinian-dominated suburbs) that have the potential to contribute to
economic growth.
Another positive way that the Palestinian community in Lebanon has been
contributing to the local economy is through remittances. Both the Lebanese
economy and the Palestinian community are dependent to some extent on
remittances – for example, from the emigrant population working in the Gulf
countries. Almost 26 per cent of households in the refugee camps have at least one
immediate family member residing outside of Lebanon; out of this number, almost 67
per cent have permanently migrated and the rest have relocated for work. Reports
show that out of this 26 per cent, 56 per cent receive not constant but intermittent
aid, while the rest receive regular financial support. In quantitative terms, the size
of remittances throughout the twelve refugee camps is estimated to be $62 million
per year.35 Therefore, migrant refugees continue to contribute to the Lebanese
economy either from the money flowing back from the Gulf States or Europe to their
relatives or through the money that they spend when visiting their families. They
also contribute to the local economy as the funds channelled through UNRWA and
other NGOs go into the Lebanese economy too. Despite the fact that since the Oslo
Accords international and regional funding has been directed to the West Bank and
Gaza, the refugee population in Lebanon still receives a substantial amount of aid.
Khalidi (2008), 75.
Samaha, Noor (2012).
Samaha, Noor. “Two Steps Back for Palestinians in Lebanon.” The Executive. Accessed February 12,
2012. http://electronicintifada.net/content/two-steps-back-palestinians-lebanon/9027.
35Ibid.
Either through development projects or welfare services international aid contributes
to the consumption of both goods and services within the Lebanese economy. 36
32
33
34
14
36
Ibid., 111.
15
How to change the status quo?
W
ith due consideration of the factors leading to the current status quo, and
with due consideration of the current impact of the Palestinian refugee
workforce in Lebanon on the Lebanese economy as a whole, the following
recommendations are addressed to the Lebanese government, UNRWA, and civil
society organisations actively engaged in Palestinian civil rights campaigns:
16
•
Civil society organisations advocating civil and cultural rights should combine their
efforts and focus on the right of employment for Palestinian refugees.
•
Community organisations should launch a series of awareness campaigns informing
employed or self-employed Palestinian men and women about their labour rights
and create programmes advocating for and protecting entrepreneurship in the
refugee camps.
•
Civil society organisations, internationally and locally, should conduct research on
the Lebanese and Palestinian labour markets (both supply and demand sides) so as
to discover the competitive advantage of the Palestinian population. In an attempt
to match the skills needed by the local economy and the ones provided by its
workforce, a survey highlighting the gaps in the labour pool would help Palestinians
find jobs and the Lebanese economy to fill its labour gaps.
•
The international community should continue showing its engagement in the
Palestinian refugee problem by continuing to fund UNRWA adequately, adjusting
the funds provided to the needs of the organisation.
•
UNRWA should employ more Palestinians. Currently, only 20 per cent of its
employees are Palestinian refugees. As an alternative, UNWRA could train
Palestinian refugees, teaching them the skills needed by the organisation and
thereby increasing their employability too.
•
The Lebanese state should create a special status for Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, between refugees and citizens. With due consideration to the delicate
Lebanese politico-sectarian balance, the Lebanese state must grant all rights but
political rights to its Palestinian refugee population.
•
The Lebanese government should amend its reservations to the Casablanca
Protocol. The most effective and efficient way for the government to make changes
that would actually impact the current living conditions of the Palestinians in Lebanon
is by tackling the issue in a comprehensive way. Amending the laws one by one
17
when each syndicate has its own specific set of legal regulations is ineffective and
time-consuming. Instead, the Lebanese state should simply amend its ratification of
the Casablanca Protocol.
•
The Lebanese government should launch a media campaign to explain to the
Lebanese people the importance, urgency, and advantages of changing the current
conditions of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.
Bibliography
in and around the Refugee Camps in
Lebanon’, Conflict, Security & Development,
vol. 10, no. 5 (2010).
Abdul Rahim, Sawan. ‘The Cost of Being
Palestinian in Lebanon’, Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies, 5 November 2010.
Moris, Benni. 1948 and After: Israel and the
Palestinians. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Muir, Jim. ‘Lebanon Grants Palestinian
Refugees Right to Work’, BBC, 17 August
2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-11004945.
Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars: A History
since 1947. London: Routledge, 2002.
Bregman, Ahron and Jihan El-Tahri. The Fifty
Years’ War: Israel and the Arabs. New York:
TV Books, 1999.
Samaha, Noor. ‘Two Steps Back for
Palestinians in Lebanon’, The Executive.
http://electronicintifada.net/content/twosteps-back-palestinians-lebanon/9027.
American University of Beirut / UNRWA.
Socio-Economic Survey of Palestine
Refugees in Lebanon. December 2010.
Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to
Jerusalem. London: HarperCollins, 1998.
Shafie, Sherifa. ‘Palestinian Refugees in
Lebanon’. http://http://www.forcedmigration.
org/research-resources/expert-guides/
palestinian-refugees-in-lebanon/fmo018.pdf.
Haddad, Simon. ‘Sectarian Attitudes as
a Function of the Palestinian Presence in
Lebanon’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Summer
2000.
Tiltness, Age. ‘Characteristics of the
Palestinian Labour Force in Lebanon’,
Institute for Labour and Social Research
(FAFO). 2007.
Hersh, Joshua. ‘Palestinians in Lebanon
Win Right to Work’, The National, 18 August
2010. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/
middle-east/palestinians-in-lebanon-winright-to-work.
UNRWA. ‘The Latest Developments in the
Living Conditions of Palestine Refugees in
Lebanon’, 2006.
Weighill, Marie-Louise and Nadim
Shehadi. Palestinians in Lebanon. Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Khalidi, Aziza. Working Unprotected. 2008.
http://www.association-najdeh.org/pdf/
Presenting%20the%20result%20of%20
Palestinian%20refugees/Working%20
Unprotected.pdf.
Knudsen, Are J. and Sari Hanafi. Palestinian
Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the
Levant. London: Routledge, 2011.
Lamb, Franklin. ‘Palestinians Work, Lebanon
Wins’, Al Ahram Weekly, 21 July 2010. http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1007/op13.htm.
Long, Taylor and Sari Hanafi. ‘Human (in)
security: Palestinian Perceptions of Security
18
19
About ICSR
ICSR is a unique partnership of
King’s College London, the University
of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya (Israel), and the Regional
Centre for Conflict Prevention Amman
(Jordan). Its aim is to counter the growth
of radicalisation and political violence
by bringing together knowledge and
leadership. For more information, see
www.icsr.info
www.icsr.info