Local Government:
Balancing Diversity and Uniformity
BY DAVID WILSON
THE Labour government came to power in 1997 having stated in its
manifesto that ‘local decision-making should be less constrained by
central government, and also more accountable to local people’. At the
same time, the erosion of local authorities as direct service providers,
which took place under the Conservatives from 1979 to 1997, did not
seem likely to be suddenly or dramatically reversed. The manifesto
observed: ‘We see no reason why a service should be delivered directly
[by local councils] if other more efficient means are available.’ Those
who expected an uncritical return to an alleged ‘golden age’ of direct
service delivery by elected local government were to be disappointed.
Under New Labour there has been no return to local authorities as near
monopolistic service providers; provision continues to be shared with a
range of partners. Indeed, ‘partnership’ is increasingly becoming the
most accurate description of local service delivery. The advent of
employment zones, health action zones, education action zones, New
Deal for Communities, Sure Start and similar ventures reflect the
government’s desire to embrace collaboration between agencies as a
way of joining-up hitherto fragmented services in order to meet community needs more effectively.
The government has shown itself committed to maintaining a ‘mixed
economy’ of service provision; it has also repeatedly stressed the ‘community leadership’ role of elected councils. As Tony Blair explained:
‘Local authorities will still deliver some services but their distinctive
leadership role will be to weave and knit together the contribution of
the various local stakeholders.’1 Yet this community leadership has not
been defined. Nor has the government decided whether it involves largescale service delivery.
The government’s early encouragement of experimentation and pilots
showed signs by 2000 of giving way to an increasingly prescriptive
approach, backed up by legislation and elaborate inspection arrangements (as in political management, in Best Value, and even in public
consultation). It claims that this is necessary to counter the forces of
reaction within local government and keep the reform momentum
going. Stoker expresses the dilemma thus: ‘There is a danger that the
reform programme is seen as external and imposed. Equally there are
considerable vested interests that make a wholly bottom-up approach
unviable.’2 Yet one of the major lessons of the Conservative years was
쑔 Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government 2001
Parliamentary Affairs (2001), 54, 289–307
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that change imposed by the centre, without consulting with local
authorities, was prone to implementation failure and likely to produce
a number of unintended consequences. This ‘top-down/bottom-up’
tension remains at the heart of Labour’s modernisation programme; it
characterised developments in the year 2000.
New political structures
The development of new political structures at local level has been
central to the modernisation agenda. The Local Government Act 2000
confirmed the three widely-canvassed models of directly-elected mayors,
leaders and cabinets, and directly-elected mayors plus city managers.
But (following pressure from the Liberal Democrats in the House of
Lords) it also provided a fourth option for small local authorities with
a population of 85,000 or less (21% of councils), namely to retain a
revamped committee system if, following consultation, such a system is
desired by the local population. The Local Government Act 2000
therefore effectively compels all but the smallest councils to introduce
new political management structures. The government has also retained
a reserve power to deal with councils that fail to develop any reform
plans or neglect to implement their reform proposals. In addition, 5%
of the local electorate have the right to trigger a referendum on the
elected mayor option. This option was first exercised in September 2000
when the Berwick upon Tweed council received such a petition. Its
architect was an independent councillor who expressed ‘frustration at
the direction the local authority was going in’. The legislation gives the
council one month to respond to the petition, after which the referendum must be held within six months or within two months of the
referendum regulations, which are expected early in 2001. Local Government Minister, Hilary Armstrong, expressed her pleasure ‘that people are exercising their rights under the new legislation and have started
the process that will bring about real changes in local government’. At
the time of the Berwick petition, the only local authority which had
formally agreed to hold its own referendum on the directly-elected
mayor option was Birmingham City Council.
London was treated separately. Labour’s election manifesto promised
a referendum on proposals for an elected mayor and strategic authority
for London. The referendum was held in 1998 and the proposals
approved by 72 to 28%, but on a low turnout of 34%. The necessary
legislation was passed in 1999 and in May 2000 Ken Livingstone,
standing as an independent after the Labour Party had selected Frank
Dobson as its candidate, was elected. The 25-member Greater London
Assembly was elected at the same time, with Conservatives and Labour
each winning nine seats, the Liberal-Democrats four and the Greens
three, so that no party had overall control. London, however, may be
seen as a special case and may have little impact on whether other cities
decide to have elected mayors or otherwise change their structures.
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A major effect of the Local Government Act 2000 is that some form
of executive leadership will very soon become the norm in the vast
majority of local authorities. This has created a tension inside the
authorities between those who see the new legislation as elitist (invariably backbench councillors) and those who favour more streamlined
administration (normally those in leadership positions). Backbenchers
(now termed ‘non-executive councillors’) are fearful of being further
marginalised in the new world of executive government. Increasingly, it
seems, decision-making will reside with the few; the overwhelming
majority of councillors are destined to inhabit a new world of scrutiny
committees and will be encouraged to develop their ‘representative’ role
further.
It is, however, possible to argue that the government’s proposals in
the new Act are elitist only in internal terms, not in relation to the
wider public. This is especially true of the mayoral model, where the
public is able to vote directly for one individual. Critics who emphasise
the elitism associated with executive leadership invariably focus on
internal government arrangements, not on the broader relationship
between local government and the public. There nevertheless remains a
potentially serious tension between the public participation strand and
the elected mayor/cabinet government strand of the modernisation
agenda. Public participation relies heavily on the openness of committee
agendas and the ability of the media to spot issues. If more issues
disappear into a mayor/cabinet office for decisions, it will become much
harder to extract details about policies. Levels of meaningful consultation and participation are then likely to decline. In one-party authorities, there will be particular pressure on backbenchers to keep criticism
to a minimum and thereby avoid divisive public discussion in scrutiny
committees.
In July 2000 the government bowed to criticism and instructed local
authority executives that they must meet in public when making ‘key’
decisions: this applies to key decisions by mayors, individual executive
members or officers. The change was designed to prevent politicians
exploiting a possible loophole and avoiding open meetings by delegating
decisions to a single member. The government’s climbdown followed
lobbying by the Campaign for Freedom of Information, the Society of
Editors and others, concerned that a move from the traditional service
committee system to a cabinet system would mean crucial decisions
taken by fewer people behind closed doors. The Local Government
Minister in the Lords, Lord Whitty, explained that ‘where a decision
will have any significant impact on the community, the electorate
involved should be able to exercise that decision. That means that it
must be made openly and in public’. The issue merits close attention in
the future: open decision-making structures have long been an integral
feature of local democracy.
Under the Act, regulations will be made to allow executive functions
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to be delegated to area committees. Ministry draft guidance states that
functions should only be delegated to area committees as part of a
comprehensive scheme and that the central executive must remain
ultimately responsible for all executive functions, since it is the accountable leadership of the council. It is unclear how far this can be achieved
in practice.
The Act also incorporates a new ethical framework which provides
clear rules for both councillors and officers and puts in place a rigorous
mechanism for tackling any infringements. Councils will have to establish their own standards committees and will be required to adopt a
statutory Code of Conduct for councillors, meeting standards set by
central government and endorsed by Parliament. While part will be
mandatory, they will have limited scope to tailor their codes to local
circumstances. A new independent body, the Standards Board, will be
set up to investigate all written allegations of a councillor failing to
observe the council’s Code. If an investigation concludes there is a case
to answer, a separate case tribunal will be convened: it will be able to
impose penalties ranging from public censure, through to suspension
from committees or from the council, to disqualification from the office
of councillor for up to five years. The provision for surcharge of
councillors and officers whose wilful misconduct has led to financial
loss to the council will be repealed in the light of the new Act. Finally,
as with the Code for councillors, an Employees Code will be put in
place for council staff and will be included in their terms and conditions
of employment. Enforcement action for council employees will be dealt
with through disciplinary arrangements and existing employment law,
not through the Standards Board. In many respects, this new ethical
framework may be seen as overly bureaucratic but largely toothless.
A major driving force behind the modernisation of local political
management structures was governmental disenchantment with the
traditional service committee system which, as the 1998 White Paper
Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People observed, was
‘designed over a century ago for a bygone age, [and] is no basis for
modern local government’.3 Committees, according to the Labour
government’s critique, involved councillors spending too much time—
unproductively—in too many meetings, while the real policy decisions
were being made elsewhere, in party groups, behind closed doors, and
with little if any public input. They were said to confuse the executive
and representational roles of councillors—hence the government’s
desire to separate councillors’ executive (policy-making) and representational roles. Dynamic executive leadership at local level is what the
Labour government is seeking, but there is a real danger that local
decision-making could become increasingly elitist as more power resides
with the few. The role of backbench or non-executive councillors could
soon be limited to being champions and representatives of their communities with very little meaningful say in the direction of policy.
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New powers and responsibilities
The 1998 White Paper Modern Local Government: In Touch with the
People promised to ‘enshrine in law the role of the council as the elected
leader of their local community with a responsibility for the well-being
and sustainable development of its area’. It also proposed to introduce
legislation ‘to place on councils a duty to promote the economic, social
and environmental well-being of their areas and to strengthen councils’
powers to enter into partnerships’. This was not included in the 1999
draft bill but, largely as a result of intense lobbying by the Local
Government Association, the power (not duty, as in the White Paper)
to promote economic, social and environmental well-being was
enshrined in the new Act.
The Act gives expression to ideas of community leadership developed
by local government itself. It recognises that councils have a wideranging set of concerns extending beyond the services for which they
are directly responsible—such as the crucially important role played by
Birmingham council in 2000 during the threatened closure of the
Longbridge car manufacturing plant. Interestingly though, as noted
earlier, the 2000 Act did not introduce a duty to promote well-being
but simply the powers to do it. This has concerned some advocates of
local democracy, but local authorities now have for the very first time a
statutory power of community leadership: ‘to promote the economic,
social and environmental well-being of their area’ and the significance
of this should not be minimised. It might not sound very remarkable,
and in most other European countries (where there is frequently a
power of ‘general competence’) it would not be. But for at least the
more proactive and forward-looking British local authorities it offers
an unprecedented opportunity to respond to the particular needs of
their localities.
The new power will allow councils to act for the benefit of the whole
or any part of the area, for residents and those ‘present’ in the area.
They can also act outside their areas in order to promote the well-being
of their own area. However, there are prohibitions, restrictions and
limitations on their powers in legislation and regulations; and they
cannot raise money, whether by a tax, borrowing or charging. Further,
the Secretary of State can restrict activities by order, and councils must
have regard to guidance on using the power. That said, the Secretary of
State also has power to amend or repeal legislative requirements that
prevent or obstruct its exercise and the government has made a commitment to consider this regularly with the Local Government
Association.
Councils have a duty under the Act to prepare a community strategy
that must not only promote the well-being of their area but also
contribute to the achievement of sustainable development in the UK.
The Act permits them to modify the strategy from time to time. In
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preparing the strategy, they must consult and seek participation; they
must also have regard to guidance. The Secretary of State has powers
to modify the requirements of other plans to facilitate effective community planning.
The National Assembly for Wales has the same powers as the
Secretary of State, except in relation to amendment of legislation or
modification of plans. Here, however, an order cannot be made without
consultation or without the consent of the Assembly. The Assembly can
also make proposals for change to the minister and can itself make
orders in specified circumstances. Parts of the Local Government Act
1972 and the economic development provisions of the Local Government Housing Act 1989 were the most important laws repealed by the
new Act. In effect, it has provided local authorities with a new legal
framework which offers them the opportunity for more innovative local
leadership.
The Local Government Act 2000 received royal assent in July, but
in order to get the Bill through the House of Lords the government
was obliged to back down over the repeal of the section 28 ban on
‘promoting homosexuality’. It also had to drop commitments to introduce an executive/legislative split for all councils, as well its policy to
allow council executives to meet in private. By the time the bill
received royal assent, its original 73 sections had increased to 109 and
over 1,000 amendments had been included. It paved the way for a
complete shake-up in local government structures and facilitated the
introduction of the first directly-elected mayors outside London. Birmingham was the first local authority outside London to commit itself
to a referendum, scheduled for October 2001. The government was
hopeful that it would be joined by other local authorities which had
expressed a strong interest, notably Liverpool, Bath and North East
Somerset, Cambridge, Lewisham, Oxford and Watford. While it
emphasised that it did not plan to use its powers to force councils into
coordinated referendums, ministers believed that a ‘referendum day’
would help to boost turnout.
The ‘modernise or perish’ message to local authorities was clear and
unambiguous during 2000. Ironically, however, while the Blair government granted them a form of general competence (by the 2000 Act), it
also remained highly directive. The development of inspection and
regulatory powers by the centre—particularly the special improvement
teams or ‘hit squads’ to address serious failings in education and social
services standards—has caused much concern. From the beginning of
its period in government, there were clear signs of a firm ‘top-down’
approach in relation to authorities deemed not up to scratch. In October
1997 the government served notice on councils with sub-standard social
services. Attacking one of them, Cambridgeshire, Paul Boateng, junior
Health Minister, observed: ‘Those who persistently fail the vulnerable
have no place in public life or the public service. The Secretary of State
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will be ready to use his powers to intervene in the running of social
services in the county, should this be necessary.’ As Len Duvall, chair
of the newly formed Improvement and Development Agency, put it
(July 1999): ‘Death by inspection and hit squads lies in wait for
authorities not up to scratch.’
The government has created additional inspectorates, notably a new
Best Value Inspectorate (incorporating a Housing Inspectorate) which
came into operation on 1 April 2000 under the auspices of the Audit
Commission. It sits alongside established Inspectorates such as HM
Inspectorates of Constabulary, the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, HM Fire
Service Inspectorate, the Social Services Inspectorate and the Office for
Standards in Education (Ofsted). In the year beginning April 2000
about a thousand Best Value inspections were scheduled—a substantial
addition to an already extensive inspection and audit regime.
There are increasingly clear signs that the inspection regime is biting.
For example, following an Ofsted report about Hackney LBC in 1999
the Secretary of State directed that two educational functions—school
improvement and language support—were so far below standard that
they should be contracted out. In April 2000 the private commercial
organisation, Cambridge Education Associates, took over the management of school services in Islington in the first wholesale privatisation
of an education service: the contract runs for seven years. Islington
council retained a few services such as adult and early-years education,
but lost all its schools service.
In June 2000 the government announced its biggest privatisation of
education services so far. Leeds lost its control over education in the
city. All school services are to be transferred to a new, joint-venture
non-profit company (with public and private sector managers) following
a critical Ofsted report in February 2000. The School Standards Minister, Estelle Morris, observed: ‘This is a radical and innovative solution
to address the serious weakness identified in the Ofsted report.’ The
chair of the new company will be chosen by Education Secretary, David
Blunkett, from a list of preferred candidates submitted by the council.
Zero tolerance of failure at local level characterises the Blair government: Cambridgeshire, Hackney, Islington and Leeds are but four
examples of the way in which inspection regimes are changing the face
of elected local government.
In July 1999 the government signalled its commitment to a coordination of inspection agencies’ work in a more systematic manner when
it established a Best Value Inspectorate Forum for England—an attempt
to ‘join-up’ a hitherto fragmented set of agencies. Made up of the heads
of the inspectorates mentioned above, the Forum has focused on the
need for more programmed coordination and on how best to target
inspection resources on those areas where the risks are greatest. At its
launch, John Prescott observed: ‘Effective external inspection will play
a key role in making sure people get the quality of service they want at
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a price they are willing to pay.’ Inspectorates have become an integral
part of the government’s drive for modern local government.
Best Value
The full Best Value regime came into operation for all local authorities
in England from 1 April 2000 and in Wales three months later. It was
one of the priorities for the Labour government and received statutory
backing in the 1999 Local Government Act. This changed the service
delivery regime from one that required putting a limited number of
services out to tender (Compulsory Competitive Tendering, CCT) to
one that now requires the demonstration of efficiency and effectiveness
for all services—known as Best Value. As with other policy areas, pilot
schemes were used as learning vehicles. While Labour’s modernisation
strategy has clear elements of a top-down approach (legislation, inspectorates, White Papers and pamphlets from the Prime Minister have
provided both direction and drive for a change programme), there is
also, as Stoker4 has pointed out, a significant bottom-up dimension to
the government’s modernisation strategy: ‘Bottom-up approaches have
been encouraged in a variety of ways. First, a variety of pilots, zones
and experiments have been launched ranging from Best Value pilots to
Education Action Zones. Within the first two years of the Labour
government at least ten different schemes have been launched, with
over 100 individual projects in various localities. Some authorities have
four or five pilots or zones within their boundaries.’
Labour pledged in its manifesto to abolish one of the Conservative
Party’s flagship policies, CCT, and introduce a new Best Value regime.
First details of the new policy were provided in the Twelve Principles
of Best Practice published in 1997. The nature of Best Value was
further developed in a green paper (1998) and in the White Paper
Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People (1998); Best
Value proposals were an integral part of the 1999 Local Government
Act, requiring all English and Welsh authorities to implement the policy
from 2000 onwards.
The first Best Value pilots involved 40 local authorities and two
police forces in a two-year programme starting in April 1998. Martin5
saw piloting as having three major objectives: it enabled central government to assess the likely impact on service quality and costs of applying
the Best Value framework to all local authorities; both central and local
government saw it as an opportunity to test out what works and to
disseminate good practice to other local authorities; and it facilitated
the building of a broad base of support for the Best Value framework
among key stakeholders at both national and local level. Under Best
Value there is a duty on local authorities to run their services by the
most effective and efficient means available, balancing quality and cost.
From 2000, they have greater discretion than hitherto in choosing the
delivery mechanisms, but the Best Value framework has a continuing
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emphasis on competition. Although external tendering is no longer
formally required, it could be argued that the place of competition in
local government has been strengthened through the introduction of
Best Value in 2000 because it involves all services rather than the
restricted list covered by CCT legislation. This theme was pursued at
the Labour Party conference in September 2000 when Mick Graham
(National Secretary of the GMB) told delegates: ‘I regret to say some
councils are committing blue murder under the guise of best value. We
see some councils using best value as CCT mark two.’
Under the new Best Value regime each local authority is obliged to
assess its priorities and draw up a programme of performance reviews.
Their purpose is to ensure that continuous improvements to all services
are made, not just those where there are serious shortcomings. Each
authority is obliged to explain why the targets have been set and why it
has chosen a particular route to meet them. What have become known
as the ‘4Cs’ are central to such reviews which must: challenge why and
how a service is being provided; invite comparisons with others performance across a range of relevant indicators; consult with local tax
payers, service users and the wider business community in the setting of
new performance targets; and embrace fair competition as a means of
securing efficient and effective services. Given the government’s emphasis upon ‘joined-up’ government a fifth ‘C’, collaboration, should
perhaps be added, reflecting the increasingly important role of multiagency partnerships and collaborative networks at local level. As the
third of the ‘4Cs’ emphasises, the Best Value regime is firmly rooted in
the government’s democratic renewal strategy, since public consultation
is an integral part of determining local priorities.
In Scotland all 32 unitary authorities (rather than selected ‘pilots’)
were obliged to operate a Best Value regime earlier than in England. An
important message from Scotland was that Best Value processes are
only one influence on service standards. A more fundamental constraint
on organisational performance is the level of financial resources, something which ‘remains unaddressed’ in Scottish local government.6 It also
remains unaddressed in England and Wales.
By the end of 2000, Best Value was operating in Scotland, England
and Wales, but it is still in it is early days. Boyne7 reminds us that it
involves important political questions, the most important of which is
‘best value for whom?’ The local politics of the system includes struggles
between a variety of interests: between those of local authority staff and
residents; between service recipients and taxpayers; between client
groups for different services. The emphasis on consultation/involvement
suggests that these issues could ideally be resolved through greater
public participation since this has the potential to deliver services which
are more responsive to local preferences.
The new Inspectorate began work in April 2000. Despite extensive
local ‘piloting’ at the experimental stage, the final version of Best Value
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brings with it a high degree of central prescription and pressure towards
uniformity. As Boyne notes,8 all local authorities ‘must adopt internal
management processes that closely resemble conventional models of
rational planning’. Checking, monitoring and evaluation are pivotal.
The balance between central direction and local discretion remains.
These tensions were highlighted by Local Government Association
chairman, Sir Jeremy Beecham, in late 1999: ‘While we accept the need
for some centrally set targets, local authorities need more say in how
these are determined to ensure diversity and flexibility are not stifled.’
Different stakeholders have differing aims and objectives. There were
few signs in 2000 that the top-down/bottom up dilemma had been
satisfactorily resolved, although John Prescott chose to emphasise at the
Labour Party conference in September that local government had
become ‘our partner’ and was not ‘the enemy within’.
Beacon councils
In December 1999, 42 ‘Beacon Councils’ were designated by the Blair
government in line with its modernisation agenda. The scheme, which
became operational in 2000, is aimed at identifying ‘excellent’ performance in local government and then providing opportunities for all local
authorities to share this experience through feedback such as open days,
publications, conferences and seminars. Hilary Armstrong was keen to
emphasise that ‘gaining Beacon status is not the end of the process for
these councils, it is just the beginning. All councils can learn from the
Beacons’ experience’.9
There was a total of 269 applications from 211 bidding councils for
the first round. Of these, 68 were shortlisted by the Beacon Council
Advisory Panel. It recommended 46 councils but ministers reduced this
by four. Braintree and Knowsley had been selected for their planning
services, but the government believed they were ‘not quite strong
enough’ to merit Beacon status. Both fell below the government’s target
for planning application turnaround, currently 80% in eight weeks;
Bristol and Southwark had been selected for services focusing on
helping care leavers but were dropped because of critical Ofsted reports
subsequently released after the advisory panel had agreed its
recommendations.
Seven themes were selected for the first round: community safety;
education; housing; modernising planning; modern service delivery;
social services; and sustainable development. The aim is that these
Beacons will help local authorities find out what is possible in service
performance for a particular function, how the best local authorities
are doing for it and methods for improving one’s own standards.
Essentially, both the Beacon council scheme and Best Value have the
same objective—to raise performance.
The scheme is not without its problems. There are signs that councils
classed in the lowest tier performance when measured against Beacon
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criteria are becoming disenchanted with it and increasingly pessimistic
about their prospects of achieving Beacon status. The non-innovation
culture that persists in some local authorities could be further
entrenched. Nevertheless, Beacon councils remain an integral part of
the process of establishing excellence at local level and a second tranche
is set to come on stream in 2001. Interestingly, though, the number of
authorities applying dropped sharply for the second tranche. In 1999
the ministry received 269 applications from 211 councils, but in 2000
only 173 applications from 123 councils. In the new tranche, town
centre regeneration was the most popular category with 31 authorities
submitting bids, while the fewest proposals (10) were received for foster
care. The County Councils Network argued that, if greater flexibility
was not introduced, the counties may well lose interest in the scheme.
Hilary Armstrong nevertheless emphasised the continuing importance
of Beacons in the eyes of the government: ‘Through Beacon councils
and Beacon services we can stimulate and encourage innovation. We
can promote difference in local government, making sure that councils
which use their existing powers will enjoy greater freedom to innovate
even further. Beacons are not an expression of elitism. They are a means
by which the pace of modernisation can be set by the fastest, not held
back by the slowest.’10
Public participation
The Blair government chose to tackle low levels of political interest on
two fronts: devising ways of raising voting turnout and advocating new
methods of consultation/ participation. As regards the former, turnout
in the 1998 and 1999 local elections was very poor (29% and 32%
respectively): the Representation of the People Act 2000 allowed the
government to choose a small number of local authorities (32) and
experiment with new voting arrangements: different voting days, electronic voting, weekend polling, mobile polling stations, early voting,
and blanket postal voting. Gateshead’s all-postal voting in two wards
was deemed ‘strikingly successful’ by the returning officer: a Liberal
Democratic-dominated suburb and a Labour-dominated inner-city ward
were chosen as contrasting areas: turnout in the first rose from 30 to
63%, and in the second from 19 to 46%, while practically unchanged
at 27% in the rest of the borough. In a similar vein, Norwich’s
experiment with all-postal ballots in two wards also resulted in an
11.85% average increase in turnout. For the rest, experiments had
minimal impact. Indeed, turnout in Watford actually dropped from 36
to 27% in the weekend voting pilot. Even with wholly-postal ballots,
however, there remains a cautionary note: postal voting in New Zealand led to massive increases in participation initially, but this later
declined. Changes in the ‘mechanics’ of voting cannot in themselves
combat the voter apathy at local level which seems endemic in contemporary Britain. This is unlikely to change until voters believe that the
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local political system is more relevant to their everyday lives. As
Pratchett observes,11 ‘Voter apathy and a general culture of indifference
to local politics calls into question both the extent to which councils
can claim to represent their communities and their broader legitimacy
to govern.’ A turnout of around 30% in the May 2000 local elections
and of only 34% in the high profile Greater London Authority mayoral
election (in which Ken Livingstone became Britain’s first directly elected
mayor) did little to allay fears about the chronic state of local representative democracy as we enter the new millennium.
Alongside initiatives to boost representative democracy at local level,
the government also sought to enhance public participation. The mode
most assiduously developed by the previous Conservative governments
was in relation to service use: in terms of assessing service quality (e.g.
through satisfaction surveys and Charter initiatives) and in terms of
contributing to service management (e.g. though more powerful school
governing bodies and forms of tenant management). The customer was
sovereign. Public participation is also central to New Labour’s modernisation programme. It is at the heart of the Best Value agenda (albeit
as a management tool to improve service delivery rather than as a
vehicle to enhance democracy). It has become significant in numerous
policy areas: e.g. the obligation to consult voters on the local model of
executive leadership. There is, however, a real danger because of the
battery of legislative requirements facing contemporary local authorities
(e.g. implementing Best Value, enacting executive leadership, developing
partnerships with other governmental agencies). By contrast, there are
relatively few legislative requirements for local authorities to go down
the public participation route. Given the pressures on councils, enhancing public participation could very easily become marginalised, with
polls and surveys taking precedence over more extensive and deliberative methods. To quote Leach and Wingfield:12 ‘It would not be difficult
in the current legislative context for local authorities to concentrate
their energies on customer-orientated methods which, it can be argued,
do little to improve political participation in local government. Indeed,
it is possible to argue that they distract from political participation
because they enable individuals to interact with public bodies as customers rather than citizens, thus avoiding the messy complexities of
politics.’
Despite the above, participatory initiatives remain important elements
of the contemporary scene. While the agenda frequently looks radical,
traditional methods, such as public meetings and consultation documents, co-exist alongside more innovative methods, such as referenda,
citizens’ panels and focus groups. New methods of deliberative participation such as citizens’ juries, visioning exercises and issue forums,
well-used in 2000, require those involved to reflect deeply on issues and
to enter into some discussion over the final decision. These methods
seek out cross-sections of people, ideally representative of the popu-
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lation as a whole (or specific sectors), but those chosen are not
delegates: they come together to hear evidence and discuss (or develop)
policy options within a particular field, and to offer detailed advice to
councillors as the final decision-makers. The relatively intense involvement of participants in these contrasts with minimalist levels through,
e.g. opinion polls. The contemporary picture therefore is a complex
web, reflecting diverse forms of citizenship and representation.
While the government recognises the value of public participation in
relation to service delivery, enhanced participation is also part of an
explicitly political agenda incorporating broader issues of democratic
renewal: it means providing local people with the opportunity to shape
local services and involving them (including the business community) in
policy formulation. In themselves, however, such schemes do not necessarily result in policy impact. They guarantee nothing—other than
making the authority concerned look progressive! Indeed, participatory
initiatives might actually be counter-productive in raising expectations
amongst participants that are not then met.
Other tensions remain: there is often an implicit assumption that
communities are homogeneous entities which can achieve consensus
through discussion of their preferences. This is frequently not so, and
encouraging more participation can emphasise differences within communities, lead to greater parochialism and exacerbate cleavages. As
Pratchett observes: ‘Failure to develop the appropriate mix of direct,
consultative, deliberative and representative mechanisms will leave the
renewal process impoverished and incomplete.’13 There is, nevertheless,
more to evaluating the impact of participatory initiatives than examining policy impact. There are other, if more ambiguous, benefits in terms
of local authority learning and citizen education. In 1970 Pateman put
the case thus: ‘The major function of participation in the theory of
participatory democracy is . . . an educative one, educative in the very
widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of
practice in democratic skills and proceedures.’14 Into the new millennium, citizen education remains an important dimension of proposals
to enhance participation.
Beetham15 reminds us that the term ‘participation’ is too vague a
concept to serve as an equivalent for ‘democracy’ in the absence of any
specification of in what form, by whom or to what effect. He recalls
that the most participatory regimes of the twentieth century ‘were
communist systems, so-called people’s democracies; yet that participation delivered little popular control over the personnel or policies of
government’. Likewise, Parry and Moyser16 emphasise that a participatory democrat will not seek only to maximise participation but to
equalise it: ‘Participation and democracy are inextricably and conceptually linked but the relationship is far more complex than might be
implied by a simple equation between greater participation and greater
democracy.’ Ironically, a Labour government that in the year 2000 is
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keen for councils to promote participation is also insisting upon more
elitist executive leadership in all but the smallest authorities. It has also
retained extensive powers for itself at the centre.
A financial stranglehold?
Despite the ‘general competence’ provisions of the Local Government
Act 2000, the government has not relaxed its financial grip on local
authorities. Indeed, within its extensive modernisation programme there
have been few positive developments in the field of finance. The Local
Government Act 1999 abolished ‘crude and universal capping’ of local
authorities, but there is now a set of reserve powers that enables
ministers to limit what they decide are ‘excessive’ annual tax increases.
In other words, central government retains the power to intervene in
specific local authorities on terms which it determines.
The government’s Spending Review in July 2000, did, however, have
a number of positive dimensions. There was more money, and fears
that ‘front line first’ policies (which bypass elected local authorities)
would be adopted on a grand scale were allayed. Councils can now
expect their Standard Spending Assessments to rise faster than inflation
over the next three years. Nationally, the control total rises by 5.56,
5.66 and 5.97% respectively in each of the next three years. But
although the overall size of the cake has increased, the distribution of
these resources is changing. The share of resources that support capital
financing is set to rise from 3.51% to 4.79%—an increase of 36%,
between 1998–99 and 2003–04. At the same time, however, the share
of resources devoted to environmental, protection and cultural services
(critical for district councils) falls from 18.2 to 17%—a decline of 6%
over the same period. Education continues to command a larger and
larger share of the overall resources, while the share for highway
maintenance has continued to fall.
Interestingly, the 2000 national Budget introduced ‘direct payments’
to schools to top-up their budgets from the local education authority.
Primary schools received between £3,000 and £9,000 depending on
their size. Special schools received £15,000 regardless of their size.
Secondary schools with less than 600 pupils received £30,000; with
between 601–1200 pupils £40,000; over 1200 pupils, £50,000. This
practice is to be further developed in the future, sounding alarm bells
for those who fear it is a small but significant step in the complete bypassing of local education authorities. Indeed, in 2000 the Conservative
Party announced its ‘Free Schools’ plan which would allocate entire
budgets direct to school heads, by passing local education authorities
and effectively ending local government’s role in education provision.
The 2000 budget also saw important developments in the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme. This had been established by the
Conservative government in 1992 and allowed public authorities to
make contracts with private sector bodies for their provision of public
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service infrastructure. Contractors get their return on the investment
through the revenue streams arising from their service operations. The
1998 White Paper, Modern Local Government: In Touch with the
People, emphasised the centrality of the PFI: ‘The government regards
the development of the PFI for local authorities as a high priority. The
PFI is an important option within the process of seeking best value in
the delivery of local authority services.’ The Chancellor’s spending
review in July 2000 saw PFI funding worth more than £4 billion
announced. The funds will be allocated by six sponsoring departments
which include for the first time the Department of Culture, Media and
Sport. Some 13 new projects were announced on 1 August 2000: e.g. a
new primary school and better library/community facilities in Bolton,
250 new affordable homes in Selby, Sherburn and Tadcaster. To quote
Hilary Armstrong: ‘Public/private partnerships like these are providing
investment for much-needed improvements in our local public services.’
By August 2000, 139 projects from 92 different authorities had been
endorsed.
Under Labour, the PFI scheme has become big business. It has
obvious attractions to central government, notably private funding of
capital projects, though such advantages may be offset by concessions
which might have to be made to attract private contractors (e.g.
removing Value Added Tax liability to reduce the costs). Under Labour,
schools in particular have been the subject of a number of high-profile
PFI deals (e.g. in Sheffield). The policy is, however, still regarded with
some hostility inside local government. While elected members might
be attracted by the political benefits associated with revamping crumbling schools, many senior officers believe PFI to be an expensive
accountancy trick, with the public mortgaging its own assets when it
could borrow the finance more cheaply itself. Despite such reservations,
PFI is central to many of the major partnership initiatives currently in
place. The attractions to a local authority badly in need of capital
investment are obvious; there is also the added value which private
sector firms can bring through design innovation, while some of the
long-term operating risks (e.g. higher maintenance costs) can be transferred to the contractor. While the government has made a number of
organisational adjustments to the operation of PFI (creating a new
procurement agency, Partnership UK, and an Office of Government
Commerce), it remains enthusiastically committed to this method of
financing local partnerships.
In its Spending Review in July 2000 the government announced a
plan to offer local authorities the opportunities to enter into new
Public Service Agreements (PSAs). These will allow individual authorities to sign up to what the government terms ‘challenging targets’ for
key national and local priorities in return for operational flexibilities
and rewards for success. The aim is for local PSAs to build on the
foundation provided by Best Value with a view to encouraging inno-
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vation and commitment to better performance. In establishing the
scheme, the government worked closely with the Local Government
Association which will continue to be involved in its developing and
monitoring.
The PSA prospectus was sent out in summer 2000 to seven local
authorities with which the government had held initial scoping discussions: Camden, Kent, Milton Keynes, Norfolk, Sunderland, Stocktonon-Tees and Warwickshire. Interested authorities were to submit initial
proposals by the end of September 2000. The prospectus was also sent
to other potential pilot authorities that were identified by the Local
Government Association, with an additional month to submit proposals. The government expects that the pilot phase (2000–02) will involve
around 20 local authorities, ahead of a planned wider roll-out in
2002–03.
PSAs represent a further extension of the pilot principle. Local PSAs
are, in essence, a partnership agreement between individual local
authorities and the government, intended to improve key outcomes
more quickly and/or to a higher level than would otherwise be the case.
The pilots will each receive a £50,000 grant to help them draw up and
monitor their PSA, and they will be able to apply for ‘pump-priming’
funds worth up to £1 million. Councils that achieve the agreed targets
will receive additional grants of up to 2.5% of their budget requirement
for 2000–01. In return, they will have to set around 12 key service
outcomes, most of which will be based on the targets set out in the
national PSA for local government. Indeed Dennis Reed, Local Government Information Unit director, argued: ‘Local PSAs are concluded on
the ground rules set and strictly controlled by government and have
very little to do with local priorities.’ The PSA strategy focuses attention
on issues of local democracy, notably the importance of local choice in
meeting national priorities.
As well as the above experimentation there have been some beneficial
changes to the capital regime, e.g. that which now allows 100% of nonhousing capital receipts to be used. Overall, however, the changes have
certainly not amounted to giving local government a new basis of
accountability. As we have seen, while the 1999 Local Government Act
abolished ‘crude and universal capping’, the minister retains reserve
powers. Finance still remains a major source of tension between central
government and local authorities. Lowndes17 summarises the position
thus: ‘For central government there is no way in which a “trusting”
relationship with local government can be equated with significant
increases in financial autonomy. For many local government leaders,
the retention of reserve capping powers and the tightly restricted
discretion over business rates provide further evidence of the government’s refusal to turn the rhetoric of trust into reality.’
In September 2000 the government published a Green Paper entitled
Modernising Local Government Finance. Fears that local education
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authorities would be completely by-passed proved unfounded as the
government announced that money for schools would not be ringfenced to prevent local authorities from controlling the cash. Indeed, in
his speech at the party conference the Secretary of State, David Blunkett,
emphasised his commitment to involving councils in education: ‘We
intend to work with local authorities to ensure their [skills] can be used
to good effect. No government in its right mind would attempt to fund
all the country’s schools from Whitehall.’ The Green Paper also proposed regular funding-formula reviews; safety valves of non-ring-fenced
grants for under-funded councils; local freedom to vary business rates.
It also discussed extending the power to charge for discretionary
services. This is expected to be used mainly in connection with the new
power to promote community well-being which allows councils to
provide new services but not charge for them: this proposal would
provide local authorities with the ability to charge.
At present, councils need government approval before they can
borrow money for capital expenditure. The Green Paper will allow
more flexibility to decide how muchthey want to borrow within ‘potential limits’. Hilary Armstrong observed: ‘I want to end the situation
where responsible local authorities have to get permission from central
government every time they want to borrow to invest in their community. We have already given councils greater responsibility for borrowing
to fund capital investment for the supplementary business rate and for
fees and charges, but in close consultation with the people they serve.’
The Green Paper had a three-month consultation period. Hilary
Armstrong maintained that councils were ‘not likely to see a bill before
the next general election’. While the paper steps back from the ringfencing of education grants, it insists on greater delegation to schools
‘in the future’—with the current 85% of funding going direct rising to
90%. Elsewhere, the sticks and carrots regime continues: on the one
hand there is the freedom to charge a supplementary business rate, on
the other hand no end to the government’s reserve powers on capping
is suggested. No significant change to the central-local balance of
funding is being proposed.
Central and local government have competing expectations and
priorities. For central government, greater autonomy and increased
powers will only come for local authorities once they have demonstrated their commitment to change. Throughout Labour’s period in
office, Tony Blair has used the language of ‘rewards’ for those prepared
to embrace the modernisation agenda: ‘Where councils embrace this
agenda of change and show that they can adapt to play a part in
modernising their locality then they will find their status and powers
enhanced.’ At the same time he emphasised: ‘If you are unwilling or
unable to work to the modern agenda then the government will have to
look to other partners to take on your role.’18 Sticks and carrots remain
the order of the day in 2000—the development and strengthening of
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inspectorates and the imposition of specific forms of local executive
leadership show this threat to be more than empty rhetoric.
Despite the new ‘general competence’ powers enshrined in the Local
Government Act 2000, local authorities believe that they have only
limited opportunities to develop their own ways of working unless they
are given greater financial autonomy. At the same time, central government insists that local authorities must earn such increased autonomy
by demonstrating their willingness to work in new ways. Local authorities will, in the future, be judged not solely by the services they deliver
but, increasingly, by their capacity to lead a process of social, economic
and political change at community level. While Britain has a government that is committed to devolution and that genuinely believes in the
idea of greater public participation at local level, a strong streak of
centralism remains.
Conclusion
The process of ‘modernising’ local government has produced a number
of major tensions. First, a ‘top-down/bottom-up’ tension—can democratic renewal be ‘designed in’ to a new system of local government or
must it be allowed to develop organically? Second, a ‘national standards/local variation’ tension—how can local embeddeness be balanced
against the priorities of a reforming government which wants to see the
wholesale development of change in a particular direction? Third, a
‘participation/representation’ tension—will institutional change
designed to encourage on the one hand direct participation, and on the
other hand executive leadership, actually undermine incentives to
engage in traditional representative politics?
In the complex world of local governance, a world populated by
hundreds of non-elected single purpose bodies, the Local Government
Act 2000 provides opportunities for progressive local authorities to
take on a leadership role. Despite legislative change, however, John
Stewart argues that there remains a tension in Labour government
policies ‘between a commitment to decentralisation and an emphasis on
inspection, centrally developed procedures and powers of intervention’.19
This can be analysed as the tension ‘between building the capacity for
diversity and a perceived necessity for uniformity’.20 Whatever the
pressures from the centre, local distinctiveness will continue to exist:
the tensions outlined above show few signs of disappearing.
1
2
3
4
T. Blair, Leading the Way: A New Vision for Local Government, Institute of Public Policy Research,
1998.
G. Stoker, ‘Remaking Local Democracy: Lessons from New Labour’s Reform Strategy’, paper at the
University of Manchester, 1999.
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Modern Local Government: In Touch
with the People, 1998.
G. Stoker, op. cit.
Local Government
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
307
S. Martin, ‘Picking Winners or Piloting Best Value? An Analysis of English Best Value Bids’, Local
Government Studies, Summer 1999.
A. Midwinter and N. McGarvey, ‘Developing Best Value in Scotland: Concepts and Contradictions’,
Local Government Studies, Summer 1999, p. 99.
G. Boyne, ‘Introduction: Processes, Performance and Best Value in Local Government’, ibid., p. 14.
G. Boyne, ‘External Regulation and Best Value in Local Government’, Public Money and Management,
2000, 20(3), p. 7.
H. Armstrong, ‘The Key Themes of Democratic Renewal’, Local Government Studies,Winter 1999,
p. 24.
Ibid., p. 23.
L. Pratchett, ‘Introduction: Defining Democratic Renewal’, ibid., p. 3.
S. Leach and M. Wingfield, ‘Public Participation and the Democratic Renewal Agenda: Prioritisation
or Marginalisation?’, ibid., p. 57.
L. Pratchett, op. cit., p. 13. See also L. Pratchett, ‘New Fashions in Public Participation: Towards
Greater Democracy?’, Parliamentary Affairs, October 1999 for the methods and trends in public
participation.
C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge UP, 1970, p. 42.
D. Beetham, ‘Theorising Democracy and Local Government’ in D. King and G. Stoker (eds), Rethinking
Local Democracy, Macmillan, 1996, p. 33.
G. Parry and G. Moyser, ‘A Map of Political Participation in Britain’, Government and Opposition,
1990, p. 169.
V. Lowndes, ‘Rebuilding Trust in Central/Local Relations: Policy or Passion’? Local Government
Studies, Winter 1999, p. 130.
T. Blair, op. cit.
J. Stewart, The Nature of British Local Government, Macmillan, 2000, p. 289.
Ibid., p. 290.