Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A
return to Realpolitik or rapprochement with
Russia
September 8th, 2016
Iulian Mihalache
Junior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
[email protected]
Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies
20-22 Wenlock Road, London N1 7GU, United Kingdom
www.cgsrs.org ⏐ [email protected]
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
Iulian Mihalache 2
Executive Summary
“Principled pragmatism” is a new EU foreign policy concept outlined in the EU
Global Strategy launched in June 2016. It signals that the EU must adapt to a
“rapidly changing environment”, and insert a dose of political realism in its foreign
policy while continuing to uphold its principles. However, principled pragmatism
does not tell us whether EU values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union,
such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will take
precedence over a pragmatic Realpolitik analysis of the situation, and decisions will
likely be taken on a case-by case basis.
This paper looks at principled pragmatism from the perspective of the EU’s
relationship with Russia. The fact that the Global Strategy calls this relationship
“interdependent” indicates an intention to appease Russia rather than continue to
deter it. There is a danger that principled pragmatism entails in this case that the
EU is more interested in a rapprochement with Russia than the terms of this
rapprochement. Recent positions of member states and statements of officials
show that there is a lack of unity among the EU27 on a Russia strategy, in terms of
foreign, energy and trade policy. This is damaging the EU’s credibility as a global
power and encourages Russia to continue its belligerent approach in its Near
Abroad.
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Iulian Mihalache 3
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
Introduction
The EU Global Strategy, launched by the European Action
suits the conditions that really exist, rather than following
Service (EEAS) in June in the shadow of the Brexit
fixed theories, ideas, or rules”.
referendum is an important and long-awaited document
In effect, principled pragmatism does not tell us whether
meant to set out the EU's foreign policy priorities for the
EU values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union,
years to come. Foreign policy is and for the foreseeable
such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect
future will still be a core competence of the member
for human rights will take precedence over a pragmatic,
states, which often have diverging agendas for their
Realpolitik analysis of the situation. If anything, the
relations with third parties. Hence, the Global Strategy is
wording suggests that the EU will take a case-by-case
more of an outline of the EU’s core interests and
approach rather than judge all situations by the same
principles driving its interaction with the outside world
standard. For instance, the recent policy towards Turkey
than a comprehensive description of specific common
revealed the EU’s pragmatic side: The migrant deal
priorities. However, in the context of geopolitical turmoil
prioritised the member states’ perceived interest in
in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods and
limiting migration over basic human rights and the
internal debates about the future of Europe, the Global
Copenhagen criteria , while the perceived need to
Strategy sought to update the EU’s approach in a “rapidly
support President Erdogan in the wake of the failed coup
changing
has trumped criticism of the human rights violations he
environment”,
despite
the
significant
1
discrepancies between the member states.
committed in its aftermath.
One foreign policy concept that has recently become a
Principled pragmatism does not
buzzword in the European debate and has made its way
in the Global Strategy is “principled pragmatism”. This
paper focuses on this concept which is particularly
noteworthy, due to the desired shift from traditional EU
idealism to an approach combining this idealism with
political realism. This paper assesses the implications of
principled pragmatism between the EU and Russia, as EU
foreign policy currently lacks a consistent Russian strategy
in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and
aggression in Eastern Ukraine.
The concept of principled pragmatism
and the European debate
In the Global Strategy, the concept of principled
tell
us
enshrined
European
whether
in
EU
values
the
Treaty
on
Union,
such
as
freedom, democracy, the rule of
law and respect for human
rights will take precedence over
a pragmatic Realpolitik analysis
of the situation
pragmatism is vague and lacks clarity. The Strategy
merely states that the EU “will be guided by clear
Indeed, recent debates on the of future EU foreign policy
principles. These stem as much from a realistic
confirms a shift towards more pragmatism, as compared
assessment of the strategic environment as from an
to the idealism enshrined in the previous, 2003 European
idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. […]
Security Strategy, which argued in its chapter on strategic
Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in
objectives of the EU that “the best protection for our
the years ahead.” (Mogherini, 2016, p. 16) The phrasing
security is a world of well-governed democratic states”
lacks conceptual clarity and seems to be an oxymoron:
(Solana, 2003, p. 37). This is evident in the review of the
Looking at the terminology, according to the Cambridge
European Neighbourhood Policy, which had been based
dictionary, “principled” means “always behaving in an
on the assumption that the EU’s power of attraction and
honest and moral way” while pragmatism has the
economic carrots can effect policy change and has been
opposite meaning of behaving “in a sensible way that
criticised for its “rather naive, Eurocentric attitude”
1
Rules established in 1993, defining whether a country is eligible to join
the EU or not.
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
Iulian Mihalache 4
(Lehne, 2014) European Council President Donald Tusk
interests overlap” (ibid., p. 33). Given the context, this
mirrored many of the member states’ governments when
language hints towards appeasement. While expressing
he criticised the EU for “confronting reality with all kinds
the need for a closer transatlantic partnership, deepening
of utopias. A utopia of Europe without nation states, a
the cooperation with NATO and deepening trade and
utopia of Europe without conflicting interests and
investment with China, the relationship with Russia is the
ambitions, a utopia of Europe imposing its own values on
only one the Global Strategy calls interdependent.
the external world (Tusk, 2016).” The EEAS has recently
come to terms with that, and seems to have shifted its
This choice of wording is dubious, considering the almost
discourse from imposing values on neighbours to
full lack of cooperation on political and security issues
partnerships on a more equal footing. According to High
since 2014. Economically, too, the statement is far-
Representative Federica Mogherini, “[a] true partnership
fetched. Russia is only the fourth largest trading partner
can never be built on one party determining the rules of
of the EU, after the US, China and even Switzerland, with
the game or the content of the story you want to tell
a share of 6% of the EU’s total trade in 2015. By
together. Partners are equal, have to be” (Mogherini,
comparison, in the same year, the share of the US in the
2015). This hints that principled pragmatism will imply a
EU’s total trade was 18% and China’s was 15%. While
different kind of relationship with the countries the EU
the volume of trade with Russia was higher before the
deems vital to its interests.
mutual sanctions, reaching 10% in 2008, the US and
China were still much more important partners to the EU
Principled pragmatism towards Russia?
(Eurostat Press Release, 2016). Furthermore, in 2015, out
of all EU member states, Russia was the main trading
The question of interdependence
partner only to Lithuania and the second main partner
This paper analyses the EU’s possible approach towards
only to Latvia (ibid.). Trade between the EU and Russia is
Russia in light of the EU’s recent shift towards principled
mainly limited to a few fields. On the one hand,
pragmatism. Will principled pragmatism imply a return to
traditional EU exports to Russia include machinery and
Realpolitik? Will it involve increased cooperation with
transport equipment, pharmaceuticals and agricultural
NATO with the goal of deterring further Russian
products. On the other hand, Russian exports to the EU
incursions in its “Near Abroad”, strengthening support for
are dominated by raw materials, in particular oil and
Eastern
smooth
natural gas, making the EU the main trading partner of
extension of sanctions, and taking steps to reduce
Russia. The EU is the most important investor in Russia,
imports of Russian gas? Or will it rather mean that the EU
with up to 75% of FDI stocks in Russia coming from EU
will try to appease Russia, judging that the main interest
Member States (DG Trade, 2016). Thus, EU ­ Russia trade
for Europe in such tumultuous times is avoiding any
relations can be hardly depicted as interdependent.
escalation? There is a danger that the latter option will be
Rather, it is Russia that needs to rely on the EU,
preferred, despite the effects this could have on the
considering its dependence on the EU market for its
security of eastern member states and on Eastern
natural gas and oil and on EU FDI. Furthermore, the fact
partners European trajectory, not to mention on values
that the EU exports high skill, technology-intensive
such as democratisation, rule of law and human rights.
products, while Russia exports raw materials subject to
Most likely, these questions have not been answered and
price fluctuations adds to the uneven economic
the EU’s approach will depend as much on domestic
relationship.
Partners’
European
aspirations,
a
politics as on international developments. However, a
closer reading of the EU Global Strategy and a review of
recent events and statements show that a pattern is
The Global Strategy and Energy
Union ­ birds of the same feather?
emerging.
A key question is what principled pragmatism will entail
The Global Strategy criticises Russia’s illegal annexation
with regards to energy policy, as this is the only field in
of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine and
which it could be claimed that some EU member states
calling the relationship with Russia “a strategic challenge”
are dependent on Russia. Russia’s energy strategy is an
(Mogherini, 2016, p.33) the EU Global Strategy states
integral part of its foreign policy. It aims to maintain and
that the EU and Russia have an “interdependent”
deepen Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies in
relationship and that the EU will “engage Russia to
order to increase its economic and geopolitical influence
discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our
(Umbach, 2014). Supply disruptions have been part of
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
Iulian Mihalache 5
Russia’s strategy towards Ukraine, leading to severe
complaints from high-ranking EU officials such as
shortages in some EU member states in the winters of
Commission President Juncker as well as Eastern
2006 and 2009. Some Central and Eastern European
European member states (Baczynska & De Carbonnel,
countries are extremely vulnerable to potential supply
2016). This would increase total Western European
disruptions in the gas transiting Ukraine: Bulgaria imports
dependence on Russian gas. Also, since Nord Stream
100% of its annual gas consumption from Russia, the
bypasses Ukraine, Russia would drastically increase its
Czech Republic 99%, Slovakia 95%, Hungary 89% and
influence in Ukraine and eastern EU member states
Poland 53%. The Baltic States and Finland also imported
because it would be able to cut gas supply there when
their entire annual natural gas consumption from Russia
pricing disputes arise or if there was a political need.
until recently (Chyong & Tcherneva, 2015).
Additionally, since the Russian ­ Turkish rapprochement,
3
negotiations have started again on Turkish Stream
In this context, a common EU energy policy is much
(Basboga, 2016). This project, envisioned by Russia to
needed, and has been formally launched by the Juncker
replace South Stream, could open doors for further
Commission in February 2015 as the Energy Union. The
Russian gas to Southern Europe, particularly Italy, a key
main
energy partner to Russia.
goals
include
achieving
supply
security
by
diversifying Europe’s sources of energy and a fully
integrated European market to enable free energy flows
Overall, principled pragmatism in energy policy will have
across member states, as a means of further reducing
to entail some measure of compliance with the provisions
dependence from Russia (Siddi, 2016). Indeed, several
of the common energy policy. The construction of
positive results have been reached in recent years. For
interconnectors, the inauguration of new LNG terminals
instance, Lithuania and Poland built LNG terminals which
and the liberalisation of gas markets are useful measures
recently became operational (Denková, 2015), and the
which go a long way towards limiting Russian influence
proposed Balticonnector pipeline between Finland and
in Europe. However, for some EU member states such as
Estonia should connect the two countries’ grids in 2019
Germany and Italy, a pragmatic energy policy means
(Smedley, 2016). Furthermore, the South Stream pipeline
maintaining cooperative relations with Russia and even
project transporting Russian gas through the Black Sea
enhancing them.
towards Austria was cancelled by Gazprom due to noncompliance with European legislation (Gotev, 2014).
Thus, so far, there is still a discrepancy between stated EU
goals and the policies of EU member states. The notions
The notions of principled
of principled pragmatism and interdependence which
pragmatism and
odds with the EU’s Energy Union. It remains to be seen
interdependence which have
made their way in the Global
Strategy seem to be at odds
have made their way in the Global Strategy seem to be at
whether powerful states and energy companies could
derail the Energy Union and push the Commission into
giving the green light to projects such as Nord Stream 2.
Should this happen, the security of Eastern and Central
Europe, as well as the credibility of the EU’s foreign and
energy policy would suffer.
with the EU’s Energy Union
Lack of European unity on a Russia
However, member states are sometimes impeding the
development of the Energy Union, something which
plays into Russia’s divide et impera
2
strategies. For
instance, Germany is planning to double the capacity of
the Nord Stream sub-sea pipeline which takes Russian
gas through the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, despite
2
Divide and rule
strategy
There are several member states in the EU which would
like to appease Russia rather than pursue a credible policy
of deterrence. The most important EU member state
which has had an ambiguous stance towards Russia since
the 2014 aggressions is Germany, where public discourse
3
Due to the opening of Nord Stream, Russia transported in 2014 only
53% its gas exports to Europe, compared to 80% in 2009, through Ukraine
(Umbach, 2014)
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
Iulian Mihalache 6
has focused on dialogue and the easing of sanctions. For
lifting EU sanctions against Russia, while a non-binding
instance, German Ambassador to the US Wolfgang
Dutch referendum rejected the Ukraine ­ EU Association
Ischinger recently appreciated that “Russia is not
Agreement. These votes took place in the context of
particularly interested in dialogue at the moment but we
proven Russian funding for extremist parties in both
should shower it with offers” (Karnitschnig, 2016). More
countries (Foster, 2016).
worryingly, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
undermined the logic of NATO deterrence before a large
On the other hand, the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden,
military training exercise in Poland in June 2016, stating
Poland and Romania have taken a tough stance towards
“what we shouldn’t do now is inflame the situation
Russia during the last two years. Geographic proximity
further through saber-rattling and warmongering. […]
and a history of conflict made these countries see their
Whoever believes that a symbolic tank parade on the
eastern neighbour as a major security threat and push for
alliance’s eastern border will bring security is mistaken.
deterrence as a common Russia strategy, in particular
[…] We are well-advised to not create pretexts to renew
after the events of 2014. For instance, strengthening the
an old confrontation. [It would be] fatal to search only
NATO’s military presence in the east, with four new
for military solutions and a policy of deterrence”. (ibid.)
battalions, was a key priority for the Baltic states and
Internal debates on the usefulness of sanctions are
Poland at the 2016 Warsaw Summit (McNamara, 2016).
equally permeated by dovish attitudes. Influential
Romania will host a multinational brigade and proposed
Minister President of Bavaria Horst Seehofer recently
a failed common NATO fleet in the Black Sea in order to
argued in favour of phasing out sanctions, as a “bloc
deter Russia. Poland and Romania are supporting NATO’s
mentality is not suited for these times” (ibid.).
open-door policy and the strengthening of its eastern
flank (Atlantic Council, 2015). All these EU member
Part of Germany’s ambiguity towards Russia can be
states have been supporters of the EU’s Eastern
explained by the fact that exports to Russia totalled 38
Partnership, in itself a Polish ­ Swedish initiative, in order
billion euros in 2013 - the highest in the EU. Furthermore,
to facilitate a European perspective for the partner
Germany gets more than 30% of its oil and gas from
countries.
Russia. However, this does not amount to much as
supporters of the extension of Russian sanctions (Amos,
German-Russian trade volume is less than half of
2016).
Additionally,
they
have
been
staunch
Germany’s trade with Poland (Gressel, 2016). Germany is
also committed to Energiewende, the transition to a low-
The question of deterrence versus appeasement seems to
carbon economy. Thus, economic national interest
create rifts between member states on a geographical
cannot explain the desire for appeasement. Instead,
basis: those closer to Russia see it as a threat and are
other less objective factors have been put forward, such
expecting a harder policy while the ones who are not on
as the institutional memory of seeking détente with the
the frontline do not prioritise it as a security concern and
Eastern Bloc during the Cold War through Ostpolitik, the
believe the EU should make the first step towards the
long history of a less assertive foreign policy due to the
normalisation of relations.
collective memory of Nazi aggression in World War II and
broader questions about whether a more assertive
international role and projecting military power should or
Conclusion
should not be a German goal (e.g. Techau 2016; Gressel,
The birth of principled pragmatism means that the EU’s
2016; Karnitschnig, 2016).
idealism has come to terms with the reality in the EU’s
neighbourhood. That being said, it is unclear whether
Other countries in the EU, such as Italy, Greece and
values will take precedence over interests, and the Global
Hungary have taken a more lenient approach, choosing
Strategy suggests that the EU will take a case-by-case
to maintain good relations with Russia and arguing for
approach. The EU still needs to better define its common
the removal or revision of sanctions in negotiations with
interests and have a more coherent approach to the
other EU member states (Rankin, 2016). Furthermore,
interests versus values debate.
politicians and public opinion in some important EU
member states are becoming increasingly pro-Russian, a
When it comes to the future of EU ­ Russian relations, the
trend coupled with the rise of Euroscepticism. For
fact that the Strategy calls this relation “interdependent”
instance, in April 2016, France's lower house of
is worrying. It signals that for some EU member states
parliament adopted a non-binding vote in favour of
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
and the EEAS, principled pragmatism in this situation
Iulian Mihalache 7
stronger and more credible and its member states safer.
means that they are more interested in a rapprochement
At the moment, there is a chasm between member states
with Russia than the terms of this rapprochement. In
with diverging views on Russia. The ambivalence shown
effect this entails appeasement rather than deterrence or
by important member states such as Germany and Italy is
a Realpolitik approach. There is a danger that EU foreign
detrimental as it gives Russia an incentive to continue its
policy will slowly forget Russia’s unacceptable behaviour
aggressive policies. Principled pragmatism should at least
and that support for the defence of member states in
mean that member states are consistent with stated EU
proximity to Russia and for the European future of
goals ranging from Russian compliance with the Minsk
Eastern Partnership countries will decrease.
agreement to the Energy Union. The lack of consensus
on such goals only encourages Russia to try to further
Unity is needed among EU member states, as a coherent
divide EU countries.
Russia strategy would ultimately make EU foreign policy
Copyright © 'The Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies’(CGSRS) 2016
Iulian Mihalache 8
Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to realpolitik or rapprochement
with Russia
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Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies
20-22 Wenlock Road, London N1 7GU, United Kingdom
www.cgsrs.com ⏐ [email protected]
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