CODE CONSTRUCTION ACT
WORKSHEET
Introduction
1. The Code Construction Act is found in the Government Code,
2. The purpose of the Code Construction Act is
Special Provisions
3. If a statute states that the time period is a “year” and does NOT specify what a
year is, how is a year defined?
4. A defendant convicted at trial in a non-record municipal court must file an appeal
bond with the court within ten days. If the trial and conviction occurred on
November 15, 2001 (Thursday), what day is the last day an appeal bond may be
filed timely?
5. If a statute read, the Judge “may” throw the gavel across the courtroom; does the
Judge have to throw the gavel? Why or why not?
6. If the following two separate and irreconcilable bills concerning alcohol-related
offenses were both passed in the last legislative session, which of the two would
prevail as law?
1.
“…in addition to the costs on conviction imposed by this article and
article 102.016, a person convicted of an offenses under Chapter 49,
Penal Code, shall pay $100 on conviction of the offense.”
(Enactment Date: July 1, 2005)
2.
“…in addition to the costs on conviction imposed by this article and
article 102.016, a person convicted of an offenses under Chapter 49,
Penal Code, shall pay $50 on conviction of the offense.” (Enactment
Date: May 1, 2005)
7. Articles 35.01 and 45.027(c), C.C.P. are both provisions that deal with a juror
who fails to appear. Article 35.01 states that a fine not to exceed $50 may be
assessed, but Article 45.027(c) states that the fine may not exceed $100. Which
provision do municipal courts follow and why? (Hint: 311.026, G.C.)
GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 3. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
SUBTITLE B. LEGISLATION
CHAPTER 311. CODE CONSTRUCTION ACT
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 311.001.
Construction Act.
SHORT TITLE.
This chapter may be cited as the Code
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.002.
APPLICATION.
This chapter applies to:
(1) each code enacted by the 60th or a subsequent legislature
as part of the state's continuing statutory revision program;
(2) each amendment, repeal, revision, and reenactment of a code
or code provision by the 60th or a subsequent legislature;
(3)
each repeal of a statute by a code;
(4)
each rule adopted under a code.
and
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.003. RULES NOT EXCLUSIVE. The rules provided in this
chapter are not exclusive but are meant to describe and clarify common
situations in order to guide the preparation and construction of codes.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.004. CITATION OF CODES.
preceded by the specific part concerned.
A code may be cited by its name
Examples of citations are:
(1)
Title 1, Business & Commerce Code;
(2)
Chapter 5, Business & Commerce Code;
(3)
Section 9.304, Business & Commerce Code;
(4)
Section 15.06(a), Business & Commerce Code;
(5)
Section 17.18(b)(1)(B)(ii), Business & Commerce Code.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
1985, 69th Leg., ch. 117, Sec. 13(b), eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
and
Amended by Acts
Sec. 311.005. GENERAL DEFINITIONS. The following definitions apply
unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a
different definition:
(1)
"Oath" includes affirmation.
(2) "Person" includes corporation, organization, government or
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, and any other legal entity.
(3) "Population" means the population shown by the most recent
federal decennial census.
(4)
"Property" means real and personal property.
(5)
"Rule" includes regulation.
(6) "Signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a
person with present intention to authenticate a writing.
(7) "State," when referring to a part of the United States,
includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, and insular possession
of the United States and any area subject to the legislative authority of the
United States of America.
(8)
"Swear" includes affirm.
(9) "United States" includes a department, bureau, or other
agency of the United States of America.
(10)
"Week" means seven consecutive days.
(11) "Written" includes any representation of words, letters,
symbols, or figures.
(12)
"Year" means 12 consecutive months.
(13) "Includes" and "including" are terms of enlargement and
not of limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms does not
create a presumption that components not expressed are excluded.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
1989, 71st Leg., ch. 340, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1989.
Amended by Acts
Sec. 311.006.
INTERNAL REFERENCES.
In a code:
(1) a reference to a title, chapter, or section without further
identification is a reference to a title, chapter, or section of the code;
and
(2) a reference to a subtitle, subchapter, subsection,
subdivision, paragraph, or other numbered or lettered unit without further
identification is a reference to a unit of the next larger unit of the code
in which the reference appears.
Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 131, Sec. 1, eff. May 11, 1993.
SUBCHAPTER B. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
Sec. 311.011. COMMON AND TECHNICAL USAGE OF WORDS. (a) Words and
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of
grammar and common usage.
(b) Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular
meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed
accordingly.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.012. TENSE, NUMBER, AND GENDER.
tense include the future tense.
(b)
singular.
(c)
(a)
Words in the present
The singular includes the plural and the plural includes the
Words of one gender include the other genders.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.013. AUTHORITY AND QUORUM OF PUBLIC BODY. (a) A grant of
authority to three or more persons as a public body confers the authority on
a majority of the number of members fixed by statute.
(b) A quorum of a public body is a majority of the number of members
fixed by statute.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.014. COMPUTATION OF TIME. (a) In computing a period of
days, the first day is excluded and the last day is included.
(b) If the last day of any period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period is extended to include the next day that is not a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
(c) If a number of months is to be computed by counting the months
from a particular day, the period ends on the same numerical day in the
concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun,
unless there are not that many days in the concluding month, in which case
the period ends on the last day of that month.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.015. REFERENCE TO A SERIES. If a statute refers to a series
of numbers or letters, the first and last numbers or letters are included.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.016. "MAY," "SHALL," "MUST," ETC. The following
constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears
necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different
construction is expressly provided by statute:
(1)
"May" creates discretionary authority or grants permission
(2)
"Shall" imposes a duty.
(3)
"Must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent.
(4)
"Is entitled to" creates or recognizes a right.
(5)
"May not" imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with
(6)
"Is not entitled to" negates a right.
(7)
"Is not required to" negates a duty or condition precedent.
or a power.
"shall not."
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 220, Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 1997.
SUBCHAPTER C. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Sec. 311.021. INTENTION IN ENACTMENT OF STATUTES.
statute, it is presumed that:
In enacting a
(1) compliance with the constitutions of this state and the
United States is intended;
(2)
the entire statute is intended to be effective;
(3)
a just and reasonable result is intended;
(4)
a result feasible of execution is intended;
(5)
public interest is favored over any private interest.
and
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.022. PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES. A statute is
presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.023. STATUTE CONSTRUCTION AIDS. In construing a statute,
whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may
consider among other matters the:
(1)
object sought to be attained;
(2)
circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3)
legislative history;
(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws
on the same or similar subjects;
(5)
consequences of a particular construction;
(6)
administrative construction of the statute;
(7)
title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
and
Sec. 311.024. HEADINGS. The heading of a title, subtitle, chapter,
subchapter, or section does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.025. IRRECONCILABLE STATUTES AND AMENDMENTS. (a) Except as
provided by Section 311.031(d), if statutes enacted at the same or different
sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of
enactment prevails.
(b) Except as provided by Section 311.031(d), if amendments to the
same statute are enacted at the same session of the legislature, one
amendment without reference to another, the amendments shall be harmonized,
if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are
irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails.
(c) In determining whether amendments are irreconcilable, text that
is reenacted because of the requirement of Article III, Section 36, of the
Texas Constitution is not considered to be irreconcilable with additions or
omissions in the same text made by another amendment. Unless clearly
indicated to the contrary, an amendment that reenacts text in compliance with
that constitutional requirement does not indicate legislative intent that the
reenacted text prevail over changes in the same text made by another
amendment, regardless of the relative dates of enactment.
(d) In this section, the date of enactment is the date on which the
last legislative vote is taken on the bill enacting the statute.
(e) If the journals or other legislative records fail to disclose
which of two or more bills in conflict is latest in date of enactment, the
date of enactment of the respective bills is considered to be, in order of
priority:
(1)
the date on which the last presiding officer signed the
(2)
the date on which the governor signed the bill;
(3)
the date on which the bill became law by operation of law.
bill;
or
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts
1989, 71st Leg., ch. 340, Sec. 2, eff. Aug. 28, 1989; Acts 1997, 75th Leg.,
ch. 220, Sec. 2, eff. May 23, 1997.
Sec. 311.026. SPECIAL OR LOCAL PROVISION PREVAILS OVER GENERAL. (a)
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, the
provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.
(b) If the conflict between the general provision and the special or
local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as
an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the
later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision
prevail.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.027. STATUTORY REFERENCES. Unless expressly provided
otherwise, a reference to any portion of a statute or rule applies to all
reenactments, revisions, or amendments of the statute or rule.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 131, Sec. 2, eff. May 11, 1993.
Amended by Acts
Sec. 311.028. UNIFORM CONSTRUCTION OF UNIFORM ACTS. A uniform act
included in a code shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states that enact it.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.029. ENROLLED BILL CONTROLS. If the language of the
enrolled bill version of a statute conflicts with the language of any
subsequent printing or reprinting of the statute, the language of the
enrolled bill version controls.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.030. REPEAL OF REPEALING STATUTE. The repeal of a repealing
statute does not revive the statute originally repealed nor impair the effect
of any saving provision in it.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.031. SAVING PROVISIONS. (a) Except as provided by
Subsection (b), the reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute
does not affect:
(1)
taken under it;
the prior operation of the statute or any prior action
(2) any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or
liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred under it;
(3) any violation of the statute or any penalty, forfeiture, or
punishment incurred under the statute before its amendment or repeal; or
(4) any investigation, proceeding, or remedy concerning any
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; and
the investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or
enforced, and the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed, as if the
statute had not been repealed or amended.
(b) If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is
reduced by a reenactment, revision, or amendment of a statute, the penalty,
forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according
to the statute as amended.
(c) The repeal of a statute by a code does not affect an amendment,
revision, or reenactment of the statute by the same legislature that enacted
the code. The amendment, revision, or reenactment is preserved and given
effect as part of the code provision that revised the statute so amended,
revised, or reenacted.
(d) If any provision of a code conflicts with a statute enacted by
the same legislature that enacted the code, the statute controls.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.032. SEVERABILITY OF STATUTES. (a) If any statute contains
a provision for severability, that provision prevails in interpreting that
statute.
(b) If any statute contains a provision for nonseverability, that
provision prevails in interpreting that statute.
(c) In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability
or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or its application to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the
statute are severable.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Sec. 311.034. WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. In order to preserve the
legislature's interest in managing state fiscal matters through the
appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of
sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous
language. In a statute, the use of "person," as defined by Section 311.005
to include governmental entities, does not indicate legislative intent to
waive sovereign immunity unless the context of the statute indicates no other
reasonable construction. Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the
provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a
governmental entity.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1158, Sec. 8, eff. June 15, 2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1150, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.
Reading and Interpreting Statutes
Excerpt from
The Municipal Judges Book
2012
Reprinted with permission from the Texas Municipal Courts Education Center
TMCEC MUNICIPAL JUDGES BOOK
Often, as an individual becomes experienced in researching legal questions,
many gray areas of the law that do not reflect a specific statute or precedent
to follow will be encountered. When this occurs, examining secondary source
materials may be helpful.
VI.
Reading and Interpreting Statutes
A statute, often referred to as legislation, is a statement of a legal rule enacted
by the Legislature and signed by the Governor.
A.
Code Construction Act
The Code Construction Act, now codified in Chapter 311 of the Government
Code, applies to all laws passed from the time of the 60th Legislature
including amendments, repeals, revisions, or reenactments of any provision
of all Texas statutes, including the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal
Code. It is, in essence, the law on how to read the law. The rules of
construing statutes are contained in the Code Construction Act
B.
Monitoring, Locating, and Reading New Legislation
The Texas Legislature meets in regular session every two years in the oddnumbered years for 140 days. The regular session starts on the second
Tuesday in January. The Texas Constitution allows the Governor to call
special sessions when needed, but these sessions cannot exceed 30 days and
may only consider legislation specified by the Governor. Like most other
states, Texas has a bicameral system with a 31-member Senate and a 150member House of Representatives. State senators and representatives are
elected from single-member districts to serve four-year and two-year terms,
respectively.
A proposed law is called a bill. It may be drafted by a legislator or by the
Texas Legislative Council, a state agency that provides bill drafting services,
research assistance, computer support, and other services for the House and
Senate. Attorneys, lobbyists, and citizens may also draft bills that may only
be introduced by a legislator or be substituted by a legislative committee.
In both houses, bills must be heard at three readings, be assigned to a
committee, and go through a process of committee review and floor action.
The bill may be amended at many steps throughout the process, but the final
enrolled bill that is sent to the Governor for signature must be agreed upon by
both houses.
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TMCEC MUNICIPAL JUDGES BOOK
Most bills are amended frequently; thus, it is important that court personnel
understand how to read proposed legislation. Underlining indicates new
language that is to be added to a statute or law. “Strike-thru” indicates
language to be deleted or changed.
Sample Senate Bill
S.B. No. 519
AN ACT
relating to the period during which a motion for a new trial in a criminal
proceeding in a justice or municipal court must be made.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Article 45.037, Code of Criminal Procedure, is
amended to read as follows:
Art. 45.037. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. A motion for a new trial
must be made within five days [one day] after the rendition of judgment
and sentence, and not afterward.
SECTION 2. The change in law made by this Act applies only to a
judgment in a criminal proceeding entered on or after the effective date of
this Act. A judgment in a criminal proceeding entered before the effective
date of this Act is governed by the law in effect on the date the judgment
was entered, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect September 1, 2011.
After the close of the session, all of the laws passed during each session are
published in volumes referred to as session laws. The West Group prints each
session’s laws in paperback in chronological sequence. After the legislative
session, the laws are then incorporated into Vernon’s Texas Annotated Civil
Statutes and Codes.
The Texas Municipal Courts Education Center offers a legislative issue of
The Recorder: The Journal of Texas Municipal Courts following each
session. This publication summarizes all of the pertinent legislation affecting
the municipal courts.
Summaries of new laws of general interest to cities are also found in the
newsletter of the Texas Municipal League. Copies of enrolled bills passed by
each session are available online at the Texas Legislative Council website
(www.tlc.state.tx.us).
The Texas Legislature Online website (www.capitol.state.tx.us) allows for
the viewing and downloading of Texas statutes, codes, and Constitution.
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Users can also research filed bills, read current and past legislation, and find
out more about the legislative process.
In addition, there are commercial providers of recent legislation. The services
offered by these providers vary from paper copies of bills, online services
with full text of bills, legislative tracking, record votes, weekly bulletins,
committee schedules and reports, floor calendars, clipping services, and
more.
VII. Reading and Interpreting Cases
When researching a legal question, it is imperative that the researcher look
for related case law. As discussed earlier, the term case law refers to the idea
that the opinions from cases have precedent and therefore can be binding
authority for judges deciding a matter of law. Judicial opinions also have an
affect on how a statute is applied. Judicial opinions can declare a statute
unconstitutional, giving guidance and direction as to how that law would then
be applied.
A.
Parts of a Case
Whether the case is read as a slip opinion (an individual court decision
published separately as soon as it is rendered), on an advance sheet (a
pamphlet of court decisions circulated prior to the bound volumes), or in a
bound volume, the following elements of a case are usually there. Refer to
the case on the following page to see the parts of a case labeled.
1.
Name or Title of the Case
Cases generally are identified by the names of the parties to the lawsuit, for
example, the citation Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) indicates that the
parties involved are Tate and Short.
Some cases are shown as In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967), which signifies
that there were no adversary parties in the proceeding. Such a designation
usually indicates a habeas corpus case, a guardianship matter, a contempt
case, disbarment, a bankruptcy, or a probate case. The Gault case, for
instance, involved a juvenile. The words In re mean in the affair; in the
matter of; concerning.
Cases may also be shown as Ex parte Minjares, 582 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978). Ex parte means that a special proceeding was involved. Here ex
parte means by or for one party; done for; on behalf of. This case involved an
appeal from an order entered by a county court at law denying the
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PART 1
CODE CONSTRUCTION ACT−CHAPTER 311 OF THE GOVERNMENT CODE
A.
Purpose
The Code Construction Act, found in Chapter 311 of the Government Code (G.C.), applies to all
laws passed since the 60th Legislative Session, including amendments, repealed sections,
revisions, or reenactments of all provisions of Texas statutes. The purpose of the Code
Construction Act is to help courts ascertain and appropriately enforce the legislative intent of
statutes. Courts do not have the power to legislate, but they do have a duty to adhere to statutory
provisions and rules. The Code Construction Act helps courts reasonably construe statutes so that
they implement procedures, follow rules, and properly handle cases in accordance with general
principles of law.
B.
Code Construction Act Rules
1.
Words and Phrases
According to the Code Construction Act, words and phrases should be read in context and
interpreted according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have
acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, are
read to include that meaning. Sec. 311.011, G.C. Moreover, Article 3.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure states that words, phrases, and terms used in the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be
used and understood in typical common language, except where specifically defined.
2.
Tense, Number, and Gender
When reading a statute, words in the present tense are intended to also include the future tense.
Singular words includes the plural and vice versa. Words of one gender are also meant to include
the other gender. Sec. 311.012, G.C.
3.
Counting Days and Months
The general rules for the computation of time are explained below.
a.
Days
When figuring a period of days, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. If the last
day of any period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is extended to include the
next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Sec. 311.014(a) and (b), G.C.
Some municipal court procedures, such as appeals, have time deadlines that require courts to
consult Section 311.014 for instruction on counting time periods. For example, defendants
convicted at trial in a non-record municipal court must file an appeal bond with the court within
10 days. The court would not count the first day−the day judgment was entered−but it would
count the last day unless it fell on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. If it fell on one of those
days, the 10 day period would be extended to include the next working day of the court.
For example, if the trial and conviction occurred and judgment was entered on a Wednesday, the
10th day would fall on a Saturday. Thus, the defendant would have until the following Monday
to give notice of an appeal and post an appeal bond, except if Monday were a holiday, it would
be extended to Tuesday.
b.
Months
By contrast, when computing a number of months by counting a set number of months from a
particular day, the period ends on the same numerical day of the final month as the day of the
month from which the counting begins. If there are not that many days in the concluding month,
then the period ends on the last day of the concluding month. Sec. 311.014(c), G.C.
4.
Reference to a Series
If a statute refers to a series of numbers or letters, the first and last numbers or letters are
included. Sec. 311.015, G.C.
5.
Intention in Enactment of Statutes
In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:





there is compliance with the U.S. and Texas Constitutions;
the entire statute is intended to be effective;
a just and reasonable result is intended;
a result possible of execution is intended; and
the public interest is favored over private interest.
Sec. 311.021, G.C.
6.
Statute Construction Aids
Section 311.023 provides that whether or not a statute appears on its face to be ambiguous, a
court, when interpreting statutes, may consider among other matters the:







object or purpose sought to be achieved;
circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
legislative history;
common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar
subjects;
consequences of a particular construction;
administrative construction of the statute; and
title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that in discerning legislative
intent or purpose, they focus on the literal text of the statute in question because “it is the only
thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the
Governor for [his] signature.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The
Court held that “although Section 311.023 of the Government Code invites, but does not require,
courts to consider extra-textual factors when the statutes in question are not ambiguous, such an
invitation should be declined.” Under this line of reasoning, the Court of Criminal Appeals will
only look to the factors described by Section 311.023 if the statute in question is ambiguous.
7.
Statute Heading
When researching a particular topic in any code, the chapter, article, and section headings can aid
in finding certain information. The title headings, however, are not intended to limit or expand
the meaning of a statute. Sec. 311.024, G.C. For example, Article 27.14 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is titled “Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere in Misdemeanor.” The heading seems to
imply that only rules on those particular pleas are contained in the statute, yet the statute also
provides guidance on the filing of a sworn complaint when a plea of not guilty is entered.
8.
Severability of Statutes
Severability provisions, or savings clauses, save part of a statute when other parts are declared
unconstitutional. Section 311.032 provides that “if a statute contains a provision for severability,
that provision prevails in interpreting that statute.” Therefore, should a court declare part of a
statute containing a severability provision unconstitutional, the other parts would still be valid if
they are self-sustaining and capable of separate enforcement without regard to the invalid
portion. Some statutes have a provision for non-severability, which means that if part of the
statute is declared unconstitutional, the whole statute is invalid. Other statutes do not contain
severability clauses. If any provision of one of those statutes or their application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the
statute if the provisions can be effective without the invalid provisions or application. Sec.
311.032(c), G.C. Hence, the provisions of those statutes that are not held invalid are severable.
An example where a court declared a whole act unconstitutional is Meshel v. State, 739 S.W.2d
246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). This case held that the “Speedy Trial Act” (Chapter 32A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure) was entirely unconstitutional. Hence, no portion of Chapter 32A
could be enforced. Eighteen years later, in 2005, the Legislature finally repealed Chapter 32A. It
should be noted, however, that municipal court defendants still have a constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
Since case law interprets statutes or declares statutes or portions of statutes unconstitutional, it is
important to research all sources of law when trying to determine how to interpret or apply a
certain statute.
9.
Latest in Date of Enactment
The Legislature has the opportunity to change all codes, including the Code of Criminal
Procedure and Penal Code, each time it convenes. If two laws conflict, but one is more recent
than the other, the more recent law applies. Sec. 311.025(a), G.C. This is referred to as the “date
rule.”
If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same session, the amendments shall be
harmonized if possible so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are irreconcilable,
the latest in date of enactment prevails. Sec. 311.025(b), G.C.
Thus, as entire statutes are intended to be effective and a result feasible of execution is intended,
courts should first attempt to reconcile amendments. If the statutes or amendments are so
conflicting that they cannot be harmonized, then courts must look to the date of enactment to
determine which statute/amendment prevails. Generally, the date of enactment is the date on
which the last legislative vote is taken on the bill. Sec. 311.025(d), G.C. Conflicting statutes and
amendments are not a rarity; there is a need to determine the latest in date of enactment between
conflicting bills almost every session.
10.
General vs. Specific Statutes
General statutes are ones that apply to all courts unless there is a specific statute that makes an
exception. Article 45.002 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that municipal court
proceedings are to be conducted according the rules in Chapter 45. If, however, there is not a rule
in Chapter 45 that applies, the court must apply other general provisions in the Code of Criminal
Procedure to ensure that the objectives of Chapter 45 are met. Within Chapter 45 or even outside
of the Code of Criminal Procedure altogether, whenever two provisions seem to cover the same
topic and one is specific to municipal court, the court must follow the specific provision. Section
311.026(a) provides that if a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, the
provisions shall be interpreted, if possible, to give effect to both. But, if the conflict is
irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision.
Sec. 311.026(b), G.C. This is referred to as the “rule of the specific.”
The following list gives examples of this “rule of the specific” using Chapter 45 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and its rules that apply specifically to municipal courts but not to county or
requesting courts.






Articles 27.01 and 45.018 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules regarding
charging instruments. Article 27.01 states that the primary pleading (charge) in a
criminal action by the State is the indictment or information. Article 45.018 provides
that a complaint is a sworn allegation charging the accused with the commission of an
offense. Since Article 45.018 is located in the specific chapter for municipal and
justice courts, municipal court defendants are charged by complaint instead of by
indictment or by information.
Articles 45.019(b) and 45.019(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules
regarding complaints. Article 45.019(b) provides that a complaint filed in justice
courts must allege that the offense was committed in the county in which the
complaint was made. Article 45.019(c) provides that a complaint filed in municipal
courts must allege that an offense occurred in the territorial limits of the city.
Article 35.15(c) and 45.029 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules on
peremptory challenges. Article 35.15(c) provides that in misdemeanor cases both the
State and the defendant are entitled to five peremptory challenges each. Article
45.029, however, provides that the State and defendant are each entitled to three
peremptory challenges in municipal court jury trials. Because the latter provision is
located in Chapter 45, it controls in municipal courts.
Articles 35.01 and 45.027(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules
regarding a juror’s failure to appear. Article 35.01 provides for a fine not less than
$100 or more than $500. Article 45.027(c) provides for a fine not to exceed $100.
Because the latter provision in located in Chapter 45, municipal courts must follow it.
Articles 35.23 and 45.034 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules for juries.
Article 35.23 provides authority for a court to permit jurors to separate before a
verdict in a misdemeanor. Article 45.034 states that a jury in municipal court is to be
kept together until it agrees to a verdict, is discharged, or the court recesses.
Section 311.014 of the Government Code and Article 45.013 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provide rules for computation of time. Section 311.014 states that the
computation of time does not exclude Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays unless

the last day of the period falls on one of those days. Municipal courts, however, have
a specific provision regarding the filing of documents by mail. Article 45.013
provides that a document is timely filed if it is mailed first class in a postage prepaid
envelope properly addressed to the clerk on or before the date the document is
required to be filed. The clerk must receive the document within 10 days after the
date the document is required to be filed with the clerk. Article 45.013 defines “day”
to not include Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. That specific provision prevails
for items received by mail.
Section 38.10 of the Penal Code [Failure to Appear (FTA)] creates an offense for
defendants who fail to appear to answer for a criminal charge, assuming additional
elements are met, while Section 543.009 of the Transportation Code [Violate Promise
to Appear (VPTA)] creates an offense for defendants who fail to appear to answer for
a Rules of the Road offense. As VPTA is a more specific charge, if the defendant
could be charged with VPTA, then the defendant must be charged with that specific
offense over the general offense of FTA.
An example of a general statute is Article 35.16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides reasons for why a judge may grant a motion to remove a juror for cause. This statute
does not state specifically that it applies to all courts, but because Chapter 45 does not provide
specific rules for municipal courts on this subject, Article 35.16 applies to municipal courts.
Another example of a general statute is Article 17.38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
states that the rules in Chapter 17 (regarding appearance bonds) apply to any court, judge,
magistrate, or other officer who requires bail of a person accused of an offense or of a witness in
a criminal action. Since Chapter 45 does not contain specific rules for setting appearance bonds,
municipal judges must use Chapter 17 rules for setting bonds. Chapter 45 does, however, have
specific rules regarding appeal bonds for convictions being appealed from municipal court.
Excerpt from the Clerks Study Guides, Level II Ch. 4, Code of Criminal Procedure and Penal Code, 2013, reprinted
with permission from the Texas Municipal Courts Education Center
Page 1
CURLEY JAMES BOYKIN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 1539-89
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
818 S.W.2d 782; 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 204
October 9, 1991, Delivered
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
PRIOR HISTORY:
As Amended November 13, 1991.
Petition for Discretionary Review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals; Harris County.
COUNSEL: Allen Tanner, Houston, Texas, for Appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., D. A. & Cheryl Boyd & Alex Azzo, Asst. D. A's., Houston, Texas, Robert Huttash, State's Attorney, Austin, Texas, for the State.
JUDGES: En Banc. Campbell, Judge. McCormick, Presiding Judge, dissenting opinion joined by White, Judge. Miller,
Judge, dissenting opinion.
OPINION BY: CAMPBELL
OPINION
[*783] OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant, Curley James Boykin, was charged with, and a jury found him guilty of, delivering a simulated controlled substance while expressly representing that substance to be cocaine. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1)
(1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1614-1615, ch. 306, § 2). The trial court assessed punishment at imprisonment for ten years. The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove appellant expressly represented the substance to be cocaine. Boykin v. State, 779 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989).
We granted the State's petition for discretionary review, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 200(c)(1), in
order to consider whether the evidence was indeed insufficient. To answer this question, we must determine whether,
under Article 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), a representation involving only slang terminology can ever be an express representation. In other words, the evidentiary sufficiency question is, in this context, actually a question of statutory construction.
We will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
[*784] Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial established the following: At approximately 7:00 p.m., May 28, 1988, an undercover police officer was driving an unmarked vehicle down McNeil
Street in Houston when appellant, who was standing alongside the street, motioned for him to pull over. The officer
drove to the side of the street and stopped. Appellant then walked up to the vehicle and asked the officer what he
"needed". The officer responded that he needed to buy a "ten-cent rock". Appellant told the officer that he had only
"twenty-cent rocks" for sale. The officer then agreed to buy a twenty-cent rock and gave appellant a twenty-dollar bill.
Appellant left and returned shortly thereafter with a rock-like substance, which he displayed to the officer. The officer
accepted the substance and left the area. Subsequent chemical analysis revealed the substance to be soap. The evidence
at trial established also that at the time of the offense, in certain parts of Houston, cocaine was referred to as "rock",
"stone", "coke", or "crack", "depending on the area of town" one was in.
The court of appeals held the evidence insufficient to prove appellant's guilt under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), which was, as noted previously, the statutory provision under which appellant was charged and
tried. The court of appeals explained:
The state has the burden of proving each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because an
element of the offense charged in this case was that appellant "expressly represented the substance to be a controlled
substance, namely cocaine," the state had the burden of proving this beyond a reasonable doubt. Even viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish that the appellant expressly
represented the substance to be cocaine. The record reflects that the appellant used the term "rock," apparently a street
name for cocaine, which constituted a representation, under § 2(a)(2), that would lead a reasonable person to believe the
substance to be a controlled substance. The appellant, however, was not charged with committing the offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance under the circumstances described in § 2(a)(2).
Boykin at 136 (citations and some punctuation omitted).
At the time of the alleged offense, Article 4476-15b 1 provided in relevant part:
§ 1. DEFINITIONS. In this Act:
(1) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as given that term in Section 1.02, Texas Controlled Substances
Act. . . . 2
(2) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual or constructive transfer from one person to another of a simulated controlled substance . . .
***
(4) "Simulated controlled substance" means a substance that is purported to be a controlled substance, but is chemically different from the control led substance it is purported to be.
§ 2. DELIVERY PROHIBITED.
(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally. delivers a simulated controlled substance
and the person:
(1) expressly represents the substance to be a controlled substance (or)
(2) represents the substance to be a controlled substance in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled substance.
(Emphasis added.)
1 Article 4476-15b was repealed in 1989 and reenacted as Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 482.
2 At the time in question, the Controlled Substances Act was contained in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4476-15. It
defined "controlled substance" as "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor listed in Schedules I through V or
Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of this Act." In 1989 the Controlled Substances Act was repealed and reenacted as
Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 481.
In its brief to this Court, the State argues that the evidence at trial did show that appellant expressly represented the
[*785] substance in question to be cocaine. The State contends that slang terms "are frequently as specific in their
meanings as [is] the scientific nomenclature utilized by chemists and the Texas Legislature [in the Controlled Substances Act]", and that, therefore, it is sometimes possible for a person to expressly represent a substance to be a controlled
substance simply by using slang terminology. The State concludes that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support
appellant's conviction because there was some evidence that, at the time and place in question, "rock" was an accepted
term for cocaine.
In his response brief, appellant contends that a representation of a substance as a controlled substance is express, for
the purposes of Article 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), only if that representation involves use of a term listed in the Controlled
Substances Act.
The issue presented is, then, whether Article 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), criminalized representations involving only slang
terminology.
Statutory Interpretation
When we interpret statutes such as Article 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), we seek to effectuate the "collective" intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation. Camacho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App 1989). We do so
because our state constitution assigns the lawmaking function to the Legislature while assigning the law interpreting
function to the Judiciary. See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1.
When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the
literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. We do this because the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the
legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the Governor for her signature. We focus on the literal text
also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind
when the statute was enacted into law. There really is no other certain method for determining the collective legislative
intent or purpose at some point in the past, even assuming a single intent or purpose was dominant at the time of enactment. Yet a third reason for focussing [sic] on the literal text is that the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect
that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.
Thus, if the meaning of the statutory text, when read using the established canons of construction relating to such
text, 3 should have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Smith v.
State, 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990). "'Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.'" Coit v.
State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991) (quoting Ex parte Davis, 412 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967)).
3 See, e.g., 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 329-348 (1953). It should be remembered that the canons of construction are
no more than rules of logic for the interpretation of texts.
There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: where application of a statute's plain language
would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally. Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980). When used in the proper manner, this narrow
exception to the plain meaning rule does not intrude on the lawmaking powers of the legislative branch, but rather
demonstrates respect for that branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way.
If the plain language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather ambiguous,
then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to consider, in arriving at a
sensible interpretation, such extratextual factors as executive or administrative interpretations [*786] of the statute or
legislative history. 4
4 Although Section 311.023 of the Texas Government Code invites, but does not require, courts to consider
extratextual factors when the statutes in question are not ambiguous, such an invitation should be declined for
the reasons stated in the body of this opinion. See also Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237
(Tex.Cr.App. 1990) (legislature may not interfere in core judicial functions); Sparks v. State, 174 S.W. 351, 352
(Tex.Cr.App. 1915) ("Where the meaning of the (statutory) words used is plain, the act must be carried into effect according to its language, or the courts would be assuming legislative authority."); J. Thomas, Statutory
Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis. 191, 211 n. 85 (1966) (interpretation statutes that "seek[] to control the attitude or the subjective thoughts of the judiciary" violate the separation of powers doctrine).
This method of statutory interpretation is of ancient origin and is, in fact, the only method that does not unnecessarily invade the lawmaking province of the Legislature. The courts of this and other jurisdictions, as well as many
commentators, have long recognized and accepted this method as constitutionally and logically compelled. See, e.g.,
West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1146-1147 (1991); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 112 L. Ed.
2d 608, 111 S.Ct. 599, 604 (1991); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2574-2575,
105 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 61 L. Ed. 442 , 37 S.
Ct. 192 (1917); Republicbank Dallas v. Interkal, 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. 1985); Sparks v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 263,
174 S.W. 351, 352 (Tex.Cr.App. 1915); E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes § 164 (1940); H. Black, Handbook on
the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws §§ 24-27, 85 (1896); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §§ 46.01-46.07 (1984 & Supp. 1991); 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 2.2 (1986); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 322 (1953).
Analysis
In our view, the meaning of § 2(a)(1) should have been plain to legislators reading it in context at the time of its
enactment. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 348 (statutory text must be understood in context). And a literal application of its
plain language does not lead to absurd consequences. Thus, we may not go beyond the text of the statute in interpreting
it.
Section 2(a)(1), by its literal wording, criminalized only "express" representations. The dictionary defines "express"
as "clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable." Black's Law Dictionary 580 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, §
2(a)(1) required a representation the meaning of which is absolutely unmistakable. only a representation employing a
term listed in the Controlled Substances Act can ever truly meet this requirement. Representations involving slang terms
cannot be thought of as unmistakable, for the meanings of such terms change from time to time, from place to place,
and sometimes even from person to person. Representations utilizing the statutory controlled substance terms are, on the
other hand, unmistakable at all times and in all places.
This interpretation of § 2(a)(1) is also persuasive given the textual context, since § 2(a)(2) clearly does encompass
representations involving only slang terminology. If we interpreted § 2(a)(1) in the way the State suggests, then §
2(a)(2) would be essentially superfluous. It would be illogical to presume that the Legislature intended a part of the
statute to be superfluous.
We hold, therefore, that, for the purposes of Article 4476-15b, § 2(a)(1), an express representation is one using the
terms listed in the Controlled Substances Act. Thus, § 2(a)(1) did not criminalize representations using only slang
terms. It follows, then, that the evidence at appellant's trial was insufficient to prove his guilt under § 2(a)(1). Plainly,
the State prosecuted appellant under the wrong statutory provision.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Editor’s Note: Dissent Omitted