WestCoastAircraft Labor
and an AmericanMilitary-Industrial Complex,1935-1941*
JacobVander Meulen
In 1935ReubenFleetwentwest.His Consolidated
Aircraft Companyhadbuilt warplanes
in Buffalo for thirteenyears--trainersat first, then big Navy flying boatsafter 1929.But like
otherlabor-intensive
industies duringtheDepression,
the aircraftbusinesswasbad.Themarket
was stagnant,investnentscarce,competitionandlossesruinous.Worse,Fleet'sworkers,now
with New Dealbacking,organized
to fight his wagecuts.In Buffalo, 1,000aircraftworkers
struckConsolidated
andthe nearbyCurtissAeroplaneplant.Curtissoptedto defendits arbitrary
workplacerule throughendlessanti-unionlitigation.Fleettook the capital-flightapproach,
thoughin his casethe term hada more literal meaningthan usualas seaplanes
from Lake Erie
andtheNiagaraRiver now alighteduponSanDiegoBay.t
rRecordsof FederalLaborUnion #18286
[Buffalo],"StrikesandAgreementFile, 18981953,"P86-1659,Recordsof the AmericanFederationof Labor,UniversityPublicationsof
America.Fleet'stiny firm becamethe Consolidated-Vultee
Corporation(Convair)drningthe
war and later evolvedinto a building block of GeneralDynamics,the Cold War military
conglomerate.
* JacobVanderMeulenis Professorof Historyat DalhousieUniversity,Halifax,Nova
Scotia.
An earlierversionof this paperwaspresentedat a Deparfinentof History colloquiumat the
Universityof Washingtonin April, 1996. For comments,criticismsandencouragements
the
authorwould like to thank William Berman,BartonBernstein,JenniferClibbon, Mark Leff,
NelsonLichtenstein,Michael Sherry,LawrenceStokes,andRobert Ziegel' Thanksalsoto the
SocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilof Canad4the NationalAir and Space
Museum,the William J. KaiserFamily FoundationandtheFranklinD. RooseveltPresidential
Library for financial support.
Fleet'sstategy,the laborpoliciesof otherWestCoastaircraftbuilders,andthe
experiencesof their workersin the yearsbeforePearlHarboroffer a studyin the politics and
dynamicsof industial unionismin the late New Deal andDefenseperiods.They also illuminate
the sfuctural" locational,andtechnologicalevolutionof aircraft manufactweduring a key phase
in the industry's formation andcontributionto West Coastregionaldevelopment.Paradoxically,
experiencesof industrialistsandworkersin this dynamicnew indusbrypoint aswell to the
conservativenatureof the nation's new military-industrialcomplexfor warplanes.Traditional
valuesand patternsof limited govemancesurvived,evenasthe Americanstatevastly extended
its socialreachthroughmassivespendingon warplanes.Key to this conservative
political
frameworkwasthe weaknessof aircraftlabor,especiallyon the WestCoast.
By the Fall of Francein 1940,demandfor military aircrafthadbecomeunlimited.More
than half the U.S. munitionsdollar went to military aircraft and over half the warplanescame
from the WestCoast.Fleet'swestwardmovewaspart of the aircraftindusty's tilt to Southern
California.ln 1935,North AmericanAviation alsomovedto the "southland,"joining Douglas,
Lockheed,Northrop,andVulteein Los Angeles.Thesefirms, alongwith Boeingin Seattle,
cameto dominatewarplanemanufactureasbig Army andNavy contractstransformedthem from
a scatteredgroup of minor companiesto an industryemployingnearlyhalf a million peoplein
1941,andone-and-a-half
million by 1944.
West Coastaircraft firms, andthe vendors,subcontractors,
and workerswho served
them,formedthe heartof America'svastsupplybasefor airpower.This new,military
dimensionof political economyremaineda critical,ongoinglink in the state-society
relationship.
Generatingair power hassincebeena main activity of the federalgovemment.Yet its social,
political, and institutional history remainsobscure,especiallyin comparisonto the literatureon
welfareand regulatorysystemsandthe otherwaysthe stateintervenesin the nation's socialand
economiclife.2
The socioeconomics
of military supplyarekey to the development
of modernstatesand
economies.The particularpatternsthey nssumewithin varioussocietiessuggesthow a nation's
military institutions andactivities,at homeandabroad,areasmuchthe productsof its social
imperatives,and
baseandpolitical cultureastheyareof changingtechnologies,
bureaucratic
TheWestCoastaircraftindus@'slocationand
confrontationswith othernationsandpeoples.3
complex;the typesof warplanesit
strucftue;its transformationinto a wartimemass-production
produced;the federalagenciesandpoliciesfor aircraftproduction;the evolutionof air power
doctrine--allreflectedthe values,practices,andtensionsof Americansocialandpolitical life.
ReubenFleetalwaysclaimedthat Californiasr:nshineandSanDiego'sta:rconcessions
' The historicalliteratureon U.S.military politicaleconomyusuallyfocuseson issuesof
scienceand technology.Official Army, Nur.y,andAir Forcehistoriesof economicand industrial
mobilizationdwell almostexclusivelyon periodsof war andon institutionalmatters.Some
importantstudiesareI.B. Holley,Jr., Bu)'ingAircraft: MaterielProcurement
for the Army Air
Forces(Washington:1962);R.E. Smith,TheArmy andEconomicMobilization(Washington:
1959);B.F. Cooling,GraySteelandBlue Water:TheFormativeYearsof America'sMilitaryIndustrialComplex.1881'1917(Flamden,
Conn:1979);M.R. Smith,ed.,@
TechnoloeicalChange(Cambridge,Mass.:1985);B.J. Schulman,From CottonBelt to Sunbelt
(NewYork: 1991)esp.135-173;A. Markusen,et d, TheRiseof the Gunbelt:TheMilitary
Remaopinsof lndustrialAmerica(New York: 1991);R. Lotchin,FortressCalifomia 1910-1961
(NewYork: 1992);M.S. Sherry,In the Shadowof War: TheUnitedStatesSincethe 1930s(New
Haven:1995)
3 W.H. McNeill, The Pursuitof Power(Chicago:1982);C. Tilly, Coercion.Capital-and
EurooeanStates.AD 900-1990(Cambridge,Mass.:1990);J. Brewer,The Sinewsof Power:
War.Money.andthe EnglishState.1688-1783(NewYork: 1988);G. Best,War and Societvin
Revolutionar.v
Europe.1770-1870(Leicester:1982);A.S. Milward, War. Economyand Societv
1939-1945(Berkeley:1979);T. McNaugher,New Weapons.Old Politics(Washington:1989).
4
and accessto tidewaterpromptedhis move.Actually, classconflict in Buffalo andthe wageand
of his workersdrovehim west."A 50-dayshike in Buffalo sentme to
union consciousness
SouthernCalifomia," he privately explained.aExtremeprice competitionand labor intensity
definedthe youngaircraftindustry.In 1935,wagesasa shareof valueaddedby manufacture
to textiles,the classiclabor-intensive
stoodat 50.1per cenl--awagecomponentcomparable
industry.5
ln aircraft,laborcostsdeterminedfinancialhealthandFleetsawhis besthopefor
limiting thesein the Southland,widely-knownas"the white spotof the openshop."Aircraft
firms alreadytherepaid wages20 to 40 per centlessthanthe industry'snationalaverageand
to managerialprerogativeon labormatters.These
werelargelysparedNew Deal challenges
on the ability of workers
wereonly impticit in New Deallaborpolicy anddepended
challenges
to organizeand act. Acrossthe United States.,obstaclesto efflectiveunionswere formidable
enough,but in SouthernCalifomia theywere unique.Underthe leadershipof Harry Chandler,
publisherof the Los AngelesTipes. a regionalbusinesscultureof belligerentanti-unionism
flourished.Employergroupswerewell-fundedand unusuallycohesive.They utilized anti-union
andruthlessandwereaidedby the policeandthe courts.Suchpower,
tacticsboth sophisticated
in combinationwith a rich supplyof transientand conservativeworkersfrom the depressed
4 Fleetrecordedby J.C.Ward,presidentof FairchildAircraft, in "Notesof Meeting"with
July 15, 1941,Reel
SidneyHillman, co-directorof the Office of ProductionManagement,
of the AeronauticalChamberof Commerce(ACC), the industry'strade
32.3.0,records
IndustriesAssociation,Washington,D.C.
in the library of the Aerospace
association,
5 The value addedfigure includesaircraft enginemanufacture,which was far more
mechanizedthan airframesandremainedon the EastCoast.To wagesmust be addedsalariesfor
non-productionemployees,engineersandsupervisors,whosenumberswere very high in aircraft,
makingup about35 per centof the workforce.SeeJ. VanderMeulenPoliticsof Aircraft:
Building an AmericanMilitar.v Industry.(Lawrence,Kan: 1992) 48.
)
Fl."tl."rd, addedup to especiallyhard-goingfor orgnizedlabor.6
SouthernCalifornia's right-wing anti-laborpolitical culturefaceda rangeof new
challengesand hadweakenedsignificantly by the late 1930s.But by then,aircraft manufacturers,
their firms asactivebeneficiariesin the Southland's
led by DonaldDouglas,hadestablished
movement.Douglashadgonewestfrom Clevelandinl920 with Harry Chandler's
open-shop
andfinancialaid.ReubenFleetwantedhis shareof SouthernCalifomia'scompetitive
assqrances
By spring 1936,hehada workforceof 1,600,wagebills 45 pet centbelowthe
advantages.
spiesamonglocal membersof the IntemationalAssociationof
industry's average,and
MachinistsandtheAmericanFederationof Labor.T
The openshopalsopromptedthe movein 1934of North AmericanAviation (NAA) from
Baltimoreto Los Angeles.NAA's president,JamesKindleberger,listedL.A.'s attractionsfor the
directorsof this GeneralMotors-controlledcompany,which eventuallybecamethe Rockwell
Corporation.Kindlebergercitedthe bright,wann sunshineagainstBaltimore'schilly wintersand
humidsunmers;the virtual freeland offeredby L.A.'s Mayor;andthe proximity of Army and
Navy airbasesandadvancedtestingcentersat the Guggenheimand Caltechlabs.But he stressed
6 L. & R. Perry,Historyof theLos AngelesLaborMovement.1911-1941
(Berkeley:1963)
(London:
1990)106197-201;M. Davis,Ciqvof Ouartz:Excavatingthe Futue in Los Angeles
in UrbanAmerica
120 F. Dorurer,Protectorsof Privilege:RedSquadsandPoliceRepression
of the Committeeon Educationand
(Berkeley:1990)59-64;HearingsBeforea Subcommittee
Labor.(RobertLa Follette,Jr. Civil LibertiesHearings),76thCongress,3rd Session,Jan.1940,
"Los AngelesIndustrialBackground,OpenShopActivities,"pts 52,53,57,58,64. Seealso
CareyMcWilliams,SouthernCaliforniaCounfiy:An Islandon the Land (New'York: 1946)and
in Califomia(NewYork: 1996).
Dreams:The GreatDepression
Kevin Star, Endangered
7 R. GottliebandI. Wolt, ThinkingBig: The Storyof the Los AngelesTimes.(l,lew York:
1977)185,215;LeoImblum,lnternationalAssociationof MachinistsGrandLodge
Nov. 25, 1935;Jan.2 andFeb.2l,1936,Reel
to A.O. Wharton,IAM President,
Representative,
341,Recordsof theInternationalAssociationof Machinists(LAM),StateHistoricalSocietyof
Wisconsin.Madison.Wisc.
6
the openshopandlow costof labor.'ol-osAngelesis by tadition an openshoptown," he wrote,
pointingto the smashingof the SanPedrodockyardstrikeby the Los AngelesPoliceDeparftnent
(LAPD) andto a Los AngelesTimesarticle heraldingthe defeatof the aircraft labor movement
in 1934.These"showeddecidedlythatthe unionshaveno footholdin Los Angeles."Moreover,
"almost all the workmenin this district areAmerican-born[which] eliminatesa sourceof labor
disturbancethat frequentlyoriginatesin the foreign element."8
Stiffcost competitionandprimitive laborrelationsseemout of placein a hightechnologyindustryso relianton somuchspecialexpertise,self-startingworkerinitiative, andso
manycraft skills. For most aircraft manufacturersandair power advocates,they seemed
unnaturalaswell. To them,the industry's"naturaldrift" seemedtowardan integratedcartel.e
Theycitedrapidly risingresearchanddevelopment
(R&D) costs,the market'soverwhelming
dominanceby a singlemilitary client, the patentrights that would accrueto a small group of
leadingfirms, and the desirabilityfor nationalsecurityreasonsof stable,advancedandreliable
aircraft makers.
But the aircraft industry's "naturaldrift" dependedon the political processand
Congressmen
who would haveto abdicatetheir controlover all aspectsof the government's
dealingswith military suppliersandgive up an old ideal of how capitalismshouldand shouldnot
be organizedthat wasfar from the idealof managedcartels.Anti-trustpopulistson Congress's
E Los AngelesTimes.Aug. 19, 1934;J.Kindleberger,'North
AmericanAviation,Inc. Report
on GeneralAviation Manufacturing,"Aug. 30,l934,Box 30, Papersof EdwardStettinius,Jr.,
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville,Va.
e The term comesfrom an NRA Research
andPlanningDivision study,*Aircraft
ManufacturingIndustry,"Apr. 4,1934,box 6045,Recordsof theNationalRecovery
Administration,RecordGroup9, NationalArchives.
'*lllt .-yoornrnitteeshadno sushintention.Reps.Carl Vinson andJohnMcSwain, andSgnatgls
HueyLong,William Borah,GeraldNye, RobertLaFollette,Jr., andHomerBone,urmong
others,
saido'no"to the industry's"natural drift." They imposedtheir own versionof statecapitalismon
it, onemore attunedto an earlier eraof republicanproprietarycapitalism.They controlledand
regulatedthe industry's structuraldevelopmentby settingmilitary contractingrules.They
wantedthis "industry of the future" to be a preservefor the waning idealsof economic
individualism,price competition,the limited state,and"democratictechnology."
Theaircraftindusfly'sstructuraldevelopment
political andideological
underscores
factorsin institutionalandtechnologicalchange.Congress's
military andnavalcommittees
insistedthat the indusfiy not degenerateinto an "Aircraft Trust" beholdento "Wall andPine"
which would surelyplunderta:<payers
andfomentwar. Congressilenwantedto avoid what
many Americanslater decriedasthe "military-industrialcomplex." They assumedthat the nearly
half billion dollars wastedon the World War I aircraftprogramhad beendueto comrption and
fraud, ratherthan a disastrouslymisguidedeffort to mass-produce
aircraft accordingto Henry
Ford's factorymethods.Congressmen
wantedto punishthe industry,keepit competitive,and
make'ocollusion"betweenbusinessmen
andmilitary ofEcersasdifficult aspossible.They
forbadecost-pluscontractsandadvancepaymentsanddismissedclearevidenceof the industry's
financial hardship.They obliged Army andNavy businessofiicers to enforceopenbidding in
military contractswhich amountedto 75 per centof the marketfor aircraft designand
production.Congresswould not allow contractingoffrcersto recognize"intellectual property" in
warplanes.By denyingpatentclaimsto aircraft designs,which the companiesfinanced
themselveshoping to win military contracts,Congresscanceledthe only leveragethe companies
8
might havehad over their market,thusthwartingthe industry's"naturaldrift" toward
concentration.Congress'sregulationof a price-competitiveaircraft industryduring the interwar
yearswztsa victory for the antitnrstideologicalcunent, with long-lastingresultsfor American
military political economy.
For the streamof independentlywealthy"air minded"newcomersattractedto a life in the
glamorousnew "industryof poweredflight,'few barriersto enfiryexistedbeyondbasicexpertise
anda level of R&D investnent still within the reachof smallfirms. Theresultswere overand suspicionamong
losseson military contracts,secretiveness
capacityandover-competition,
firms, hostilemilitary-industrialrelations,andthe primitive laborpoliciesthat madethe openshopbusinesscultureof SouthernCaliforniaso attractive.Congress'sbusinessenvironmentand
the industry'slabor-intensitymadelow wagesandcompletemanagerialprerogativeover
working conditionscritical to the survival of aircraft firms. ReubenFleetwent to SanDiego with
which he hadwon in a hardcompetitionwith Sikorsky
a fixed-pricecontractforNavy seaplanes
in ConnecticutandMartin in Baltimore.Evenwith the Southland'slowerwagebills, he would
behardpressedto coverproductioncosts,let alonewhathe hadput into the flyrng boat'sdesign.
OtherCaliforniaaircraftfirms werealsofirmly fixed within Congless'scontractingrules,
evenif their distancefrom New Deal Washingtonhelpedthemavoid its far more ephemeral
termson laborpolicy. DonaldDouglaslost moneythroughmostof the 1930s,dueto baddeals
with airlines, but mainly becauseof contractingrules which maderecoveryof developmentcosts
animus
reinforcedDouglas'sdeep-seeded
on warplanesimpossible.Suchbusinesspressures
towardorganizedlabor,a feelingalsoprevailingamongthe Southland'selite,who worked
througha local network of sbrilly reactionarybusinessandboostergroups,suchas the
Merchants& MarrufacturersAssociation(M&M), SouthernCalifornians,htc., andThe Neutral
Thousands
(T.N.T.).
Thesegroupscountedon subsidiesfrom Chandler'snewspaper
empireandthe L.A.
Chamberof Commerceaswell assupportfromjudges,districtattorneys,the L.A.P.D.andL.A.
Countysheriffs.Douglasrelied on suchunifiedclasspower.His SantaMonicaplantwasn't
oryanrzed
until 1944.In 1933-34,hehadbrief troublewith his men,who, encouraged
by the
NationalIndustrialRecoveryAct of 1933(NIRA), demanded
wageincreasesfrom subsistence
levelsandthe right to negotiatethetime they spentbuildingthe sleeknew DouglasCommercial
3. Theyaveraged65 hoursa weekwith no overtime.Evenifjurisdictional disputesamongthe
andMachinistshadnot short-circuited
Carpenters
theDouglas-men's
appealsto the American
Federationof Labor (AFL), a union at Douglaswould havebeenaboutaslikely asone among
thepressmenat Chandler'sLos AngelesTimes.Douglassimplyfued the "ringleaders,"federal
law (NIRA Section7a)nonvithstanding.r0
In early 1937,Douglasandhis Northropsubsidiaryfoundthemselvesin a deepbind.
Retumson the DC-3 projectfinally materialized,only to be absorbedby Douglas'sonerous
military contracts.In thatperiod,Douglasspent$730,000on navaldesignsbut recoveredonly
A $3.7million contractfor 118torpedobomberswas
$259,000from theNaW Departrnent.
goingto costthe company$275,000,not countingR&D. Northrop'sA-17 armyattackproject
wasin the red, andDouglashadjust begunproductionof the B-18mediumbomberaftersigning
10To denythe uniform desireamongaircraft workersfor organizationalong industrial
lines
andto defendits old craft ideologyandjurisdictional claims,the IAM prevaileduponthe AFL
ExecutiveBoardto stampout everysparkof militancy in aircraft during the earlyNew Deal. For
the [AM's sorry history in the earlyaircraft industryand for detailson the Douglasworkers,see
IAM Reels330,334,341,355;
Recordsof FtU #18286;andboxes6045-6047,
NRA Records.
l0
permifiedno
a fixed-priceArmy contractthat hadbeenbasedon l2-month-oldcostestimates,
advancepayments,andincludedsignificantpenaltiesfor latedelivery.For local andWall Street
investors,nothing could havebeenworsefor the firm than its statusasthe nationosleading
warplanecontractor,with a $29 million backlog.Yet Douglasneededtheir financingfor
that hadalreadyincreasedhis workforceto 5,600at SantaMonicaand 1,100at
expansions
Northropin El Segundo.tl
The lastthing Douglasneededwaslabortrouble.Fornrnatelyfor him, the labor
movement'srenewedferment,spunedby the WagnerAct (1935)andthe riseof the Congressof
(CIO),waseasilyneutralizedat his plants,whichhadbeentargetedby
IndustrialOrganizations
the weakbut hopefulCentralLaborCouncilof Los Angeles.Somemenclaimingto be itinerant
CIO organizerssuddenlyfoundjobs at Douglas.Theysoughtout a smallgroupof mechanics
who hadjust receiveda charterfrom the new United Auto Workers(UAW). Pointingto the
currentmodel at Flint, Michigan,whereGeneralMotors workerssuccessfullywagedtheir
400 Douglas-men
to
famoussit-downstrike for unionrecognition,these"organizers"persuaded
andseniorityrights.Theyoccupiedthe plant for threedays,
sit down for a raise,time-and-a-half,
but becamefrightenedaspolice massedaroundit. Theywerepromisedspecialattentionfrom the
National Labor RelationsBoard andno hand-cuffsif theygaveup. On the way out, all were
arrestedandcuffed by police carryingtommy-guns.The "professionalagitators"and"industrial
termites,"asDouglasdescribedthem,werereleased,exceptfor twenty of the original UAW-men
rr "statusof Contractsat Douglas,"Feb.26, 1937,Box 4, classified,Secretaryof War
Records,1932-42,enfry207,RecordGroup107,NationalArchives;Hearingson H.R. 7777,
75thCong.,lst sess.,
Aug.5-12,1937,1709-1748.
l1
who endureda frve-weekstayat the L.A. CountyJai1.12
Into the l94}s,labor organizerscitedmemoriesof this debacleasthe main obstacleto
renewedefforts at Douglas.The bestamongthem wasWyndhamMortimer, former UAW vicepresidentanddirectorof theFlint sit-down,who hadbeenbanishedto L.A. by the UAW
executivefor his vigorousdefenseof grassroots
union{emocracyandhis communistlinks. He
had no doubtthat Douglashad fomentedthe sit-down,sendingin agentsprovocateurto stir up
the workersandexposeunionists.The strike'sleadersturnedout to be on the payrollof the
Bodell DetectiveAgency,which SenatorLaFollette'scommitteeon civil libertieshadshownto
be financedby the M&M to helpfirms "obtainguardor spyservicesat a reducedrate."r3
Mortimeralsounderstood
that suchrevelationsonly compounded
the intimidationof
worker.militancy.Theysimplyunderscored
the socialpowerof the Douglas-Times-M&MLAPD aris: The links werewell known.Bill HenryandAl Rochlen,Harry Chandler'saideswho
hadwooedDouglasfrom Clevelandin 1920,now servedhim asdirectorsandexecutives;and
LAPD ChiefJamesE. Davis,who established
the notoriousLAPD RedSquadin the 1920s,and
whosebrutalandsadisticwaysfinally costhim hisjob in 1938,foundimmediatenew
employmentin chargeof "plantprotection"at Douglas(seeFigure1).ta
tt Seethe accountin Perry& Perry,Los AngelesLabor. 447-450;*500,000
Workers,"164;
C.F.Grow,IAM GrandLodgevice-president,
to,A,.O.Wharton,Feb.27,|937,IAM Reel330;
Douglasquotedin Los AngelesTimes.Sept.8, 1937.
13Mortimer,"Reporton the Aircraft Situation,"Oct.3, 1939,Box
15,HenryKraus
Collection,WalterReutherLibrary,WayneStateUniversity,Detroit.Quoteon Bodell from
Perry& Perry,Los AngelesLabor.403.
14 On the sit-downleader,seePerry& Perry,Los
AneelesLabor. 503,512;RosePesotta,
BreadUponthe Waters(NewYork: 1944)347-349;Seealso"The lndustrialUnionist,Southern
CaliforniaDivision," July 14, t939, Box 2, WalterReutherCollectionandthe Oral Historyof
RichardColeman,ReutherLibrary;GottliebandWolt, ThinkingBig. LBS,2Z|.
-<
(J)reants
At%IVJIIAAA'ff
$nfi
rlAArlir\AnW
^rfi *t1
A1fi ATr\rA.r.rrrv.%u......../.r&r.......!.,.,.,....r...r,r
K
Do You EarnEnough
WillYourBudgei
Siandli?
lor lnE/
Couldn'tYou Usea
Musl SheAlways
New Model?
DrudgeLileThis?
HOW THEYC,4NCOMETRUE
ThereDreamsAre Realiiies
{or 4,000,000
CIO Families!
Why Shouldn'iThey Be More ThanDreamsio yours?
Do You NeedNew
Al
They Can! Tfie ChoiceLies Wilh yos!
.l
9lolnes /
lrrtara.t
r%ararr..r1.rar.rrtiJ.rr.r.rrrt....rr....r...ror...rr.rr.r.atrrr.....rt.t.........
Vote C.LO.!
.€PO
Figurel. Handbilldistributedat aircraftplantsin Los Angeles,1940-1941@ox4, AshbyC.
McGraw Collection,ReutherLibrary).
t2
Fighting organizedlabor andmaintaininglow wageswere essentialbusinesstactic,sin
aircraftbecauseof Congress's
conftactingrules,evenif, asin the caseof Douglas,suchtactics
couldmeanfiring skilledmetalworkers--among
thenation'svery best.Suppressed
labor
translatedinto savingsfor taxpayerswho acquiredmilitary aircraft below real cost.Low wages
were key to the viability of the price-competitivewarplanebusinessdemandedby populist
legislatorson behalf,ironically,of the"little man."Pressure
for unrestrictedmanagement
rights
to cut costshadbasicresultsin the way productionevolved,the typesof planesproduced,andin
how their usesin warfarecameto be understood.
Throughthe interwaryears,the only hopefor profits in this businesswas in production
work. In designwork Congressinsistedthat firms bepaidno morethanpricessetbeforethey
built actualprototypes,despiteinevitablecostover-runsthataveraged
40 per cent.Firmshoped
theselossesmight be coveredin productionwork. But productioncoststoo wereunpredictable
and the Army and Navy maintaineddownwardpressureon unit pricesby their right to seekbids
on productionfrom firms which hadnot investedin the designs.Thus,the imperativesfor
aircraft firms were to minimize developmentcost,designaircraftthat could be easily
reproduced,andreorganizethe shopfloor to resembleunskilledautoassembly.Thesewere
elusivegoalsasmodestfunding for warplanesandthe dynamismof aeronauticskept small-batch
ordersinevitable,while building airframesand high-performanceenginesinvolved
complicationsfundamentallydifferent from thoseof autos,appliances,and the like.
The equationbeganchangingafter 1936asintemationaltensionsmounted.Congress
appropriatedmore fundsfor largerorders.More importantly,warplaneexportssoared,providing
a profitable safetyvalve for the industry,especiallywhenthe British andFrenchshoppedfor all
l3
warplanesmeantthat
theycouldbuy beginningin 1938.Thesenewbulk marketsfor obsolescent
the manufacturerscould act more effectivelyupon the managerialimperativesoftheir industry
imposedby Congress.
andproduction.R&D
Theyshavedasmanycostsaspossiblefrom design,management,
andBritish fighterswhile America'slead in strategic
fell significantly behind German,Japanese,
bombersfrozefor five yearsaroundthe 1935BoeingB-17Flying Forfressdesign.Thebuilding
partsbeganand correspondedwith major
up of a supplynetwork for innumerablesub-contracted
developmentsin cost-controland accounting.Shopfloor mecharizationandrationalization
of metalproceededapaseasthe industrytook new stepsin the speed-upandmanagement
andinstallationwerebrokendown sothatthey
working tasks.Jobsin aluminum.manipulation
couldbe easilymonitoredandfilled by the unskilled.Duringtheseyearstheindustryshedmuch
warplanes.15
of its craft-basisandbuilt aninfrastrucnrefor mass-produced
which weremuch facilitated
Workerswere passiveparticipantsin thesedevelopments,
by their political marginalization.ln aircraftplantsacrossthe land, they toiled for minimal wages
andwithout representation.Aircraft manufacture,so reliant on a wide rangeof craft skills, bore
few marks of a culture of worker solidarityor point-of-productionjob controlthat shapedother
metal-workingindustries.r6The limits to managerialprerogativeseemedonly to be the natural
15In late 1938,Douglasmanagedthe remarkablefeatof reducingits needfor skilledworkers
wrote Major A.J.
to ten per cent.Ninety per cent'odonot requirespecialskill or experience,"
Lyon to HarryHopkins,FDR's White Houseaide,Nov. 3, 1938,Box 34, Louis JohnsonPapers,
University of Virginia Library. The majority of workerscould now be of the "semi-moronic
t;rpe,"asJamesKindlebergerof NAA put it to the Fair LaborStandards
Boardin Dec. 1938.See
"Statement..."in Box22, ThomasMcNettPapers,ReutherLibrary.
It A striking contrastto the Americansituationis H. Chapman,StateCapitalismand Working
ClassRadicalismin the FrenchAircraft Indusbry.@erkeley:1991).
14
pol*t at which workerscould not Ged, house,clotheandtransportthemselves,andthus Standup
in theplants.
This wasequallyso evenat WestCoastplants--Lockheed,
Boeing,andReubenFleet's
Consolidated--where
the old craft union, the IntemationalAssociationof Machinists(IAMAFL), got contracts.Thesefirms pursueda co-optstategytowardunionismin contrastto
Douglaswho truly relishedthe battle,orderinghis reluctantexecutivesto fight unions"until they
arewhipped." After the 1937Douglassit downandthe appearance
of UAW-CIO organizersin
the Southland,FleetandRobertGross,presidentof Lockheedin Burbank,suddenlysigned
agreements
with the Machinistsdespitetheir weakpresence
in theplants.rT
FleetandGrossfeared"CIO-ism" whichfor themmeantBolshevism.But they worried
aboutperceptionsin Washingtonof Douglas'sobstinateandillegal style.Still, theyneededsway
on the shopfloor--Consolidated
for a newNavy seaplane
contract,andLockheedfor its Electra
airliner and its plan to penetratethe military marketwith new mediumbombersandinterceptors
(P-3.8Lightning).The Machinistscooperated.
Therise of JohnL. Lewis' CIO meantthatthe
vision of industrialunionismandits challenges
to the traditionsof craft elitism couldno longer
be throttled throughthe AFL ExecutiveBoard.The staleandhide-boundIAM GrandLodgein
Washington,D.C. grudginglycondonedcontractsfor the unskilledin aircraft,lesson behalfof
workersthan"on accountof the CIO," that "rottenorganization,"asthe IAM's presidentput it.
The Machinistsacceptedthe companies'bids for "protectionagreements,"one weekvacation,
It Seethe 1937correspondence
amongWharton,IAM agentsin SouthernCaliforni4 andthe
newIAM lodgesat LockheedandConsolidated
in IAM Reels,46,330,338,341;
quotationfrom
G.C.Castleman
to Wharlon,Mar. 6, 7937,Reel338.
15
anda wagehike of a full six cents!18
Even if thesewere not sweetheartdealswith virtual companyunions,the outcomefor
workerswould havebeenmuch the same,given the patterningof the Southland'saircraft labor
marketby Congress'sprice-competitive
rules;the cyclic nafi.reof military contracts;
California'sendlessdraw asthe "Meccafor transients";andDouglas'sdominationof standards.
As earlyas Summer1937,with losseson his Naly work looming,ReubenFleetwasbacksliding,
layrngoffand rehiringto cut wages.He scrapped
the contact thenext year.re
At Lockheed,while IAM officialspraisedthemas"modemandfar seeing,"executives
participatedin an illegal blacklist managedby the secretiveSouthemCalifomia Aircraft Industry
Association(SCAIA). Personnelmanagers
monitoredworkersflowing in andout of the plants
papersthat measured
the worker'sability,pastunion
by numericalcodeson clearance
job at ten to
involvement,andlastwage.If deemedworthy,workersgot a take-it-or-leave-it
twenty centsless.The SCAIA generatedothercost-cuttingtactics,suchaspartssubcontacting
paid, in
to "sweatshops"in the barrios;and"gyp schools"whereyoungmenandteenagers
effect, to work in the plants.Recruitedwith the promiseof "aeronauticaltraining," their "tuition"
ran ashigh as $600.They were shownriveting, taughtthe "communistic"and"un-American"
fundamentalsof tradeunionism,put to work in the plantsat a "learner'srate" for a few months,
18Grow to H. Brown,Sept.19,1937,IAMReel330;E. Dowellto Wharton,July 7,1937,
Reel46. EvenForhrnemagazineraisedan eyebrowoverthe LockheedIAM lodge'sbusiness
agent,a former detectivenamedCharlesTigar.*500,000Workers,"164.
te Perry&Perry, Los AnselesLabor399;D.H. Stoneto Wharton,Dec. 12,lg37,IAM Reel
31; Lodge#1125to Wharton,May 20,1937,Reel341;"Aircra^ftEmployersEmployMohawk
Valley Formula""UnitedAutomobileWorker.Jan.22,1938,AerospaceVerticalFile, Reuther
Libranr.
t6
and ttren laid off to rnake way for ttre next graduate.2o
Boeingin Sgattlewasn't pmty tosuchschemes.
But ils a warplanecompetitorits
prospectsweredirectly determinedby them.Underthe wealthyWilliam E. Boeing,the firm had
beenthe nation's bestmanagedand financedaircraft firm. But asthe Depressionwore on two
misfortunescaughtup with the Boeingcompany:the eclipsein the air transportmarketof its
revolutionaryModel 247 by the evenbetterDouglasDC-3; andthe relativestrengthof the
Seattlelabormovement.Boeingcompounded
thesecostsby beingtruly innovativein military
aircraft--abasicbusinesserrorunderCongress'scontractingterms.In 1934-36,it spentlarge
sumsdevelopingthe B-17 with no guarantee
of recoveryandwith the assurance
thatthe design
couldnot bepatented.Yet Boeingforgedahead,infatuatedwith the military implicationsof the
new "multi-engine" and confidentthat this startlingnew craft had won it the marketfor heavy
bombers.In 1936,its executiveshopedto avoidthe labormovement'sturbulenceandsecureand
expandits workforceof 1,100for the expectedflow of B-17 orders.Theyturnedto Seattle
Machinists,dealingan 81-centaveragewage-2} centsabovethe nationalnorm--theclosed
shop,time anda half, grievanceprovisions,etc.,in exchangefor no-strikepledges,no splitsof
workersalongcraft lines, andmost important,IAM commitrnentsto organizefirms that could
competeto build B-17s,especiallyDouglasandConsolidated
in California.2l
Few doubtedthat theArmy wouldfind somewayto let B-17 productionto Boeing,given
20J.H. Washburnto Wharton,Dec.27,lg37,IAM Reel
329;Lynchto Wharton,July 11,
1938,Reel34r;T. McNettto Poesnecker,
Nov. 26, 1938,Reel355;Mortimer,"Reporton
Aircraft Situation."SeeJ.R.Wilburn, "social andEconomicAspectsof theAircraft Industryin
MetropolitanLos AngelesDuring World WarIf," Phddiss.,Universityof Californi4 Los
Angeles,1971.
21Sandvigen,
'oReportfor the weekApril 25, 1936,'IAM Reel
355.
l7
theFlying Fortress'snaturalhomeon therain-soaked
DuwamishWaterwayzrmongthejigs, dies,
designers,and craftsmenwho built its prototypes.But few Air Corpsoffrcersmisunderstood
eitherthe thrustof Congress'srules,andthethreatof possibletime in Leavenworth,if they
didn't adhereto the spirit of advertisedbiddingandextractpricereductions.The Southland's
low wagesformedthe backdropfor constanthagglingbetweenBoeingandthe War Department,
aswell as steadylossesfor the firm, the freezingof the B-17 designinto the war years,and
Boeing'sunwillingnessseriouslyto pursueR&D for an "ulha long range"pressurizedbomber
(B-29).The Army's lack of commitnentto theheavybomber,its meagerordersfor the B-17,as
well as its continuedlargeinvestrnentin obsolete,but easilyreproduced,
two-enginebombers
like Douglas'sB-18,arebestexplainedby the competitivepressurefrom the Southlandrather
thanby bureaucraticand doctrinalconflict over the valueof strategicbombing.The weapons,
forcestructure,anddoctrinesof Americanair powerreflectedlow-costbusinessrulesfor
military aircraft andthe willingnessand ability of the industy to operateunderthem.22
.
In 1934,BoeinghopedthattheNationalRecoveryAdministrationwould approvea o'code
of fair competition" for aircraft andeliminatethe competitivespacein wagedifferentialsthat
sustainedCongress'scontractrules.But anti-trustattackson the aircraft industryfrom Capitol
Hill weretoo shrill andthe industy's tradeAobby
goup muchtoo weak.Boeing'snew hopethat
theIAM might do thejob wassimilarlydashed.IAM officialsat Boeingregularlycomplained
22See"The Developmentof the HeavyBomber1918-1944,"
Air HistoricalStudiesno. 6,
U.S.Air Force,August1951,Library,Bolling Air ForceBase,WashingtonD.C. For bitter
complaintsby GeneralsH.H. Arnold and F.H. Andrewsthat aircraft contractingrules impeded
bomberdevelopmentanddoctrineaswell asindependent
statusfor an air force,see1937-40
correspondence
anddatain 452.1,classified,bullcy,Box717, Army AdjutantGeneral(AAG)
Files, 1942-1944,RG 18,NationalArchives.
18
*tor*tthe G'and Lodge's"cornpletelaok of truo oooperation,"andfailure to sendorganizelsand
moneyto L.A. ooWe
axestalematedwith Boeinguntil otherplantsare arganrzedand abasicscale
setfor the industry...wehaveto makea much grcatereffon beforethe industy getstoo big for
us." For them,the way to moveBoeingworkersbeyondpayscalesstill on par with unskilled
lumberworkerswasthroughan aggressivesingleaircraft union for the entire West Coast.But
for the GrandLodge,this approachsmackedtoo much of ClO-styleindustrialunionismand
would lead to yet anothernationalunion.23
Only the specterof aircraftworkersorganizedby the CIO promptedthe IAM to greater
activism.In early 1938,"to overcomeandoffsetthe unwarantedeffortsof the CIO," the Grand
Lodgefinally authorizedtwo BoeingMachiniststo campaignin California.Throughtheseyears,
the war yearsandbeyond,workers' interestswerecasualtiesof the desultoryeffort in aircraft by
both the IAM andUAW, and by ongoing"fratricidal war" betweenand within them too.
Workerswere "kept dizy by affrliation disputes,"and madecynicalby the constantsniping
amonglabor officials. IAM organizersknew how counterproductivewasthe "sameold AFL
blah,"the endlessred-baitingof CIO-men,but felt compelledto meetchargesthat they
themselves
were'odiatnond-wearing,
Buick-driving,apple-polishing,
companystooges."2a
Suchfutile strife only compoundedthe basicproblemfacedby organizersin Southern
23McNett to \Mharton,Mar. 28,lg3T,Poesnecker
to McNett,Jr:ne30, 1938,IAM Reel355;
McNettto Wharton,Dec. 10, 1937;Sandvigento Wharton,Dec.3, 1937,Reel329; Whartonto
Sandvigen,
Dec.27,1937;Whartonto all vice-presidents,
April 19, lg37,Reet330.
2aPerry& Perry,Los AngelesLabor. 442;Lynchto Wharton,June24,lg38,IAM
Reel329;
McNettto Sandvigen,
May 16,1938,Box 1, McNett Collection;Mortimer,"Reporton Aircraft
Situation";Mortimerto JohnL. Lewis,Nov. 24, 1939,Box l, MortimerCollection;L.
Michenor, "Reportfor Region6, April -July, 1939,"Box 2, Bill Williams Collection,Reuther
Library.
I9
Califomia, "the essentialthing," asoneMachinistput it, "the completelack of interestof the
workmenin the aircraft industryhere."While total employmentin the Southland'saircraft
industrygrew to nearly25,000by mid-1939,thosewho tumedup at unionmeetingsandpaid
duescould be measuredin the handfuls.Organizerscomplainedaboutthe transienceof aircraft
workers,the dispersionof their homesthroughoutthevastL.A. region,their youthand
inexperience
with unionism,andthe endlessdistractionsof the "GoldenWest."2s
Therewasthe Southland'smesmerizingclimateandbeaches;
Hollywood'sdream
factoriesandpersonalitycults;the hoursin the carin this "drive-in,parking-lotcivilization," as
one Machinistput it. Therewerebizare local movementslike Moral Rearmament,Ham and
Eggs,andTechnocracy--ageneralstateof bewildermentthat seemedespeciallyto absorbyoung
rural migrantswho had comeWestthinking of "possiblefame" in Hollywood, but insteadwound
up "building dive bombersin the Land of Oz," asFortunemagazineput it. FrushatedIAM
organizerssneeredat the "rank andfilth," the"dumbworkers,""thesesunworshipers,"'oa
spinelesslot...celerypickers...satisfied
with starvationwages.We mustwait for the increasein
food prices,clothing,andrentto starrrethemout of their holes."26
Organizersmarveledat how classconsciousness
andmilitanoy,evenappealsto the
25Michenor,"Reportfor Region6..."
26*City of Angels,"Fortune.(March l94l) 98,163,179.
LynchandMcNett to Wharton,Mar.
14,1938;McNettto H. Lundquist,Sept.29,1939;Lpch to Lundquist,May 22,I939,IAM Reel
329.Inmid-1941,Californiaaircraftworkerswere99 per centwhite males(WASP)at a median
ageof 24. The freedomfrom division amongthe workersalongrace,ethnic,andgenderlines,
however,did not translateinto union solidarity; "WageRatesin the California Airframe
Industy, 1941,"Monthly LaborReview.54 (March1942)560.L.A. firms wereprejudiced
againstfemale,Black, Latino, and "h;phenated-Americans,"aswell asJewishworkers,the
latterfor "naftrally beingintellectuallyinfatuatedwith communism."*City of Angels,"98, 163,
179.
20
^a'a6tn{rlar ^tLio (...
Eiguro 1), rvere eotratered by urorkerg' identificatiOg With thg ngW
technolory, the firms, andthe particularaircraftthey built. "The aircraftsmanhasa pride in his
industrynot found in any otherline," eventhoughaveragewageswere30 centsmore in local
autoplants. "A machinistworking in our indusfiy, when askedhis occupation,doesnot answer
oIam a machinist,'but rather,'I am with Douglas
Aircraft."'Workersproudlyconsidered
themselves"the ultimate in skilled craftsmanship."They snubbed"grey-beardunionists,"and
seemedmoreinterestedin the thrills, status,andpatrioticcontributionsof theirjobs building
warplanesthanin the amountof "filthy lucrein their Fridayenvelopes."
In theseattitudes,they
resembledtheir employers,andthosewho, despiteCongress's
onerousterms,investedin the
aircraftindustry.27
Traditional individualist andpatriotic values,alongwith their youth, industrial
inexperience,andthe uniquethrills anddistractionsof building aircraft andliving in the
Soutiland, explainmuch of the workers' apathy,despitebroadernationalcurrentstoward
industial unionism.They alsohelp explainthe failure to generateeffectiveunionsandworker
representationwithin the emergingmilitary-industrialcomplexfor warplanes.Also important
werecyclicalwork patternsin aircraftandongoinghigh-unemployment
depression
conditionsin
SouthemCalifornia into the DefensePeriod,aswell asthe imperativestoward order and
managerialcontrol inherentin an evolving large-scalemass-production
industy. And badly
divided local andnationallabor leaders--oftencomrpt, unimaginative,and./orincompetent--
27Stoneto wharton,Dec. 12, 1937,LAM Reel
31; McNettto Sandvigen,
sept. 13,lg3g,
Box l, McNett Collection;M. PerlmanTheMachinists(Cambridge,
Mass.:1961)109;L.H.
MichenorOral History, 17,ReutherLibrary;A. Allen & B. Schneider,Industrial
Relationsin the
CaliforniaAircraft Industry,(Berkeley:1956)6-7.
i'ir
l?--r.
'-
I
.!'
I
'l
:.
Figrue2. From CIO handbilldistributedat aircraftplantsin Los Angeles,1938-1939@ox 2,
V/alterReutherCollectiorgReutherLibrary).
2l
r!6eeJ ot.t-ole.
too, especially as national leaders increasingly suppresse d TLabormilitancy as the
underthe 76th Congressseemedto
war emergencymountedand asa hardeningatmosphere
mandatesubmissionto the political needsof FDR andthe DemocraticParty.Nevertheless,
employerrepressionat the grassrootswascritical. Organizersattributedworker apathymainly to
it-the anti-unionbelligerencyof employersled by Douglas,Fleet,the M & M, andthe Los
AngelesTimes.Illegalspies,yellow-dogcontracts,discriminatorylayoffs,companyunions,
propaganda,
memoriesof the Douglas"sit down,""goontactics"andburly armedguardsled by
the likes of ex-LAPDChief Davis,"cowedandintimidated"workers,keepingthem"scaredto
death,"astwo committedMachinistsput it in 1938.28
In Los Angelesand SanDiego,theNationalLaborRelationsBoard,PublicContracts
Boardof the Labor Departrnent,andthe Lalollette SenateCommitteebarelydeterredsuch
CorpsandNationalYouth
illegalpractices.Nor weretheycheckedby the Civilian Conservation
Administration,which soughtto intervenein aircraftlabor after Munich andFDR's commitment
grumbledaboutthe freemarketin aircraft
air powerin Fall 1938.Manufacturers
to large-scale
boomingwarsalesand
contractsthat minimizedtheir profits;but astheycontemplated
ooNew
Dealers,"theyhailedfreemarketforcesand
involvementin their laborrelationsby liberal
persuadedgovernmentofficials of their ability to draw adequatelow-cost labor. The Army and
Navy agreedon the needto keepNew Deal socialagenciesatbay,andweregenerallysatisfied
2ELynchandMcNettto Sandvigen,
Feb. 13, 1938,IAM Reel329.For contrastingaccounts
of thebrakeson industrialunionismin the lateNew Deal,seeR. Zieger,The CIO. 1935-1955
of New Deal
(ChapelHill: 1995);A. Brinkley,TheEnd of Reform:The Transformation
Liberalism(New York: 1995);N.Lichtenstein,Labor'sWar at Home:The CIO in World War II
(New York: 1982):M. Davis, "The Baren Ma:riageof AmericanLabor andthe Democratic
Party,"in Prisonersof the AmericanDream(London:1986);C. Tomlins,The Stateandthe
Unions(NewYork: 1985)
22
with the industy's capacityandprogressin streamliningproductionandexploiting the labor
supply,especiallyin the Southland.2e
Meanwhilein Seattle,Califomialabor standards
took their toll on Boeing'swarm
relationwith LAM Lodge#751.With a mere$2 million in sales,1938proveddisastrousfor
Boeing.Only 13 B-l7s hadbeenbuilt andpaid for well belowcostby the War Deparftnent
which continuedto dither on whetherit would takeanymore.FDR's urgentcall for heavy
bombersin early 1939brokepolicy deadlockon strategicbombing,but alsohadthe effectof
hardeningattitudestowardmilitary contractingin the isolationist76th Congress.The Air Corps
wasobligedto engagein the "usualcompetitions."Monthsof delaysandhagglingfollowedas it
tried to shavethe unit costof the FlyingFortress.
TheAir CorpschallengedBoeingwith Californiacosts,which struckwith considerable
forcein the shapeof Consolidated's
B-24 heavy-bomber
prototype(Liberator)andits estimate
of unit prices30'40 per centbelowthe B-17. The Air Corpssooncommittedenormousresogrces
to the inferior B-24, mainlybecause
of the Southland'slow wages,whichits designreflected.In
September1939,a contractfor 38 B-l7s wasfinally signedbut Boeingfoundit impossible..to
producethe aircraftwithout a loss."Only a Reconstruction
FinanceCorporationloansustained
cashflow andkept Boeingsolvent.Still, in Spring1940,the banksholdingBoeing'sloans
vetoedasr.rnprofitable
anothercontractfor 42B-17s.rc
2e"Minutes,ACC Annual
Meeting,"Jan.26,1939;..Minutes,
ACC Executivecomm.
Meeting,"Mar.2l, 1939,ACC 19.08.3;"Initial Reportto the president"by the
InterdepartmentalCommitteeon Aircraft Labor, and*Confidential Sunreyof the Aero-Engine
andAircraft Industries,"Bureauof LaborStatistics,June,1939,ACC 22.40.5.ForAir Corps
aqProvalof developments
in L.A., seeGen.GeorgeBrett'sreporton his inspectiontor:r,Apr. 15,
1939,004.4,ser.I, class,Box 64, AAG 1939-42.
30For detailson B-17
andB-24contracting,seeBrettto Amold, Mar.25,1939;..Airplane
23
[---fu^tly,
Do.i'rg raotrairted ite powerful inclinations for R&D. It also contained its
labor bills ttoough deskilling andpay cuts,at leastto the extentthat capitalfor new equipment
could be generatedandthat suchmovesdid not provokethe Boeingworkersto "pull the pin"
andstrike.IAM negotiatorsbowedto Boeing'splight, but discontentwith their conciliatory
approachgrew amongthe workers.Suspicionsroseasrumorsspreadofthe IAM's sweetheart
dealsin the Southlandand of its plansto split Boeingalongcraft lines and excludethe semi-and
Erswell as
by the CIO,the UAW, HarryBridgesof the Longshoremen,
unskilled.Encouraged
Caucus"for Boeing
PacificNorthwestpacifist,socialist,andcommunistgloups,a'oProgressive
in late 1938to competefor localoffices.Fromthatpoint,the lodge's
Lodge#751 emerged
into factionalturmoil until the IAM Grand
affairs and the energiesof activistsdegenerated
Lodgepr:rgedthe Boeingmilitantsin Spring1941.31
The three-yearconflict left a texturedrecordof tradeunionpolitics,radicalmovementsin
the Northwest,andparanoiaon the right andleft duringthe lateNew Deal andDefenseperiods.
Therewerethe electionvictoriesin Lodge#751of "known commierats" and"pro-Soviets;"the
hopesof aspirantsto the IAM's internationalpresidencythat they might ride the militants' coattails in what hadbecomethe IAM's biggestsinglelodge;the intriguesby UAW-menMortimer
who hopedto jump-starttheir stalledcareersandthe UAW's
and RichardFrankensteen
campaignfor a nationalaircraft union by oustingthe Boeinglodgefor the CIO. Therewasthe
CostData,"Apr. 15,l939,box 7931'
P.G.Johnson,Boeingpresident,to Arnold, Mar.28, 1940,
box745,452.1,seriesII, class.,AAG 1939-42;Arnoldto Johnson,
Apr. 2,1940,Box 3C, Secret,
Secretaryof War Records.SeealsoC.L. Bentleyto H. Brown,actingIAM president,Aug. 23,
l939,lAM Reel34l.
on negotiationswith Boeingfrom fall 1938to spring1939,IAM
" SeeIAM correspondence
Reels329,355,32,33.
24
inevitablesnow-ballinto "witch hunts,"andreamsof testimonyfrom IAM "trials" of suspected
communists.Therewasthe crucial aid in ferretingout and discreditingmilitants providedby the
the FBI, War
SeattlePoliceDeparfinentand City Council,the SeattlePost-Intellieencer.
Department,and White House.32
Therecordsof this sordidstoryareleavenedsomewhatby workingmen'scompeting
whores,"o'flannelmouths,"
vitriol: the claimsthat opponentswere"stool pigeons,"o'company
"sexperverts,""enemiesof theworking class,"
"Jewsof unknownorigins,""rattlesnakes,"
on the bodyandmind of the
mostcolossalabortioneverperpetrated
everyonefirthering oothe
workingman.""How long,oh Lord, how long,will cleanAmericanworkersallow themselvesto
be infestedwith vermin?DELOUSENOW!" All shareda senseof a betterlife for Boeing
workersif only opponentswould somehow"go fuck themselves."33
The recordsrichly preservea storyof aircraft labor militancy underrepression,but one
that by 1941seemsincidentalto the emergingmilitary-industrialcomplex.Whetherradicalsor
led Lodge#751,the'omarket"had determinedworkingconditionsat Boeing.It
conservatives
expressedpopulist political economyappliedthroughmititary contractinglaw. Its
competitivenessand cost-minimizingdynamicspushedthe indusbrytoward a mass-output
posture,well beforelargeordersmaterializedand visionsof overwhelmingair power congealed
32 Undersecretary
of War RobertPatterson
to AttorneyGeneralRobertJackson,Mar. 11;
Jacksonto J. EdgarHoover,Mar. 20; Ass. Sec.of War for Air RobertLovettto Arnold, Mar.22,
1941,in Box 2, Recordsof the Officeof the Undersecretary
of War,Dec. 1940--Mar.1943,
classified,
RG 107.
33E.V. Dennett,of the WashingtonStateIndustrialUnion Council--ClO,to Mortimer,Nov.
24,1939,Box 1, MortimerCollection;"CommrxristLeadersExposed,"TheAero Mechanic.
IAM Lodge#751. Oct.23,1940;Lundquist,"DearBrotherMembers,"Nov. 19, 1940;J. Duncan
to Brown,Nov 17,23,1940,IAM Reel32;"Unearthed
at Last!TheCIO MasterSell-Out,"no
date1941,Reel33; Seealsodocumentsin Box 29, Roy M. Brown Collection,ReutherLibrary.
25
into dootine dudng the late 1030s.Eig ordersonly supplemented
the rndustry'sdynamics,They
also endedefforts by someNew Deal 4genciesto intervenein the ballooningbut wrstable
aircraft industry.By the late 1930s,suchinterventionwas increasinglyfrownedupon by
Congressandby businessleaders,who had grown deeplywary of politics and the stateand now
worried if an independentbusinesssystemwould survivewar mobiliz-ation.Inthis context,such
corporatistschemesasWalterReuther's1940plan for joint directionof the autoandaircraft
industriesby labor,management,
andgovemmentwereeasilycurbedin Washington.3a
Spendingon warplanesandothermilitary goodshadhappyresultsin the defeatof the
publicpolicy in America.After the electionof the anti-NewDeal
Axis, but alsofor conservative
76th Congressandthe sharpeconomiccontractionof 1937-1938,
policy deadlockedbetweenthe
clearneedfor ongoingandmuch moreaggressiveeflorts by the stateto stimulatedemandanda
voluntaristpolitical culturefor which suchinterventionwasanathema.35
Massivemilitary
spendingmeantAmericanscould havetheir Big Statethroughthe backdoor. It meantno new
federalagenciesor powersto aggravateCongressandthe separatestatesand minimal
interferencein fields of establishedcommerce.36
And the aircraft industrywas ready--poisedfor
34R. Polenberg,"The Declineof theNew Deal, 1937-1940,"
andD. Brody,"The New Deal
andWorld War II," in TheNew Deal:TheNationalLevel.J. Braeman,R. Bremner&D. Brody,
eds.(Columbus:1975)282-286;G. Kolko, Main Currentsin ModemAmericanHistory.(New
York: 1976)155;A. Brinkley,"The Ideaof the Stateo"in TheRiseandFall of the New Deal
Order.S. Fraser& G. Gerstle,eds.(Princeton:1989);N. Lichtenstein,The Most DangerousMan
in D..etroit:Walter Reutherandthe Fateof AmericanLabor(New York:1995)154-174.
'5 On the political andideologicaldeadlockof the lateNew
Deal,seeS. Fraser,LaborWill
Rule: Sidne],Hillman andthe Riseof AmericanLabor(l,IewYork: 1991)399-416andBrinkley,
Fnd of Reform.passim.
36For suggestions
on the conservative
appealsof "military-Keynesism,"seeT. Skocpoland
M. Weir, "StateStructuresandthe Possibilitiesfor KeynesianResponses,"
in Brineingthe State
Back In. P.B.Evans,et al, eds.(NewYork: 1985)108;J. olson, Savingcapitalism:The
Reconstnrction
FinanseCorporationandthe New Deal. 1933-1940(Princeton:1988);E.W.
26
os contactingrules.
massproduction-byCongress
The indusfiy expandedexponentiallybut its basicstructureremainedintact as"dollar-ayear" businessmenappointedto key military andcivilian wartimepostskept their administrative
distancethroughthe duration,evenon labormatterswherethe industry'sworst crisesdeveloped.
Annualturnovernearing100per cent,low workermorale,high absenteeism--all
stemmedfrom
the pre-warprimitivism of industrialrelations,especiallylow wages.To overcome"wagedrag"
for a groupof workersnumberingnearlythreemillion in 1943threatened
inflation andwould
leavetoo stronga precedentfor violatingbusinessvoluntarism.The government'sresponse
was
to wait for turmoil to build in particularplants,for unionsfinally to win recognitionfrom the
National War Labor Board,andthen to appointcommittees,hold lengthyhearings,write reports,
andthenpossiblyinstitutein adhoc wayslocal schemes
for relief.37
Thesewartime patternsemergedin the Southlandalreadyduring the DefensePeriod,
especiallyin the eventssr.urounding
the greatstrike at North AmericanAviation in Los Angeles,
the mostdramaticepisodeof labordisturbances
in 1941,andtheir repression.
In Spring1940,it
seemedthe aircraftindusty hadfoundits bonanzawhenFDR calledfor 50,000warplanesand
whenCongressmadehugeappropriations
andrevisedcontractinglaw to allow negotiatedprices,
iost-plus contracts,and advancepayments.But manufaqtuersremainedskepticalof the new
Hawley, "The New Deal andthe Anti-BureaucraticTradition," in R. Eden,ed.,The New Deal
andits Legacy.(New York: 1989)77-92.
37Dnringthe first hatf of 1943,theL.A. plants
hired 150,000directworkers,but payrolls
increasedby only 12,000.Only 15per centof laborlossesweredueto the draft.At goeing
during the sameperiod, a staggeringturnoverrateof 120per centprevailed.The main culprit
was a minimum wageof 67 centscomparedto 95 at the shipyards."Manpoweras a Limiting
Factoron AirplaneProduction,"by the Aircraft War ProductionCouncil,Aug. 1,1943,004,
classified,bullqy,Box 15,AAG 1942-44.
27
of fieirfirms and wotdorces; the scareof their
nhi# in theb forhnes-The staggenngexpansion
the strugglefor
new contacts in relationto their meagercapital; the dilution of management;
involved-all producednew anxietiesespeciallywhen
supplies;the welterof federalagencies
addedto the broadimponderablesof their industry'sfate at war's end.
Then too, "left wingersandradicalagitatorsandwriters," in Douglas'swords, continued
persisted
of death."And basicfinancialuncertainties
as'omerchants
to attackthe manufacturers
wary of Congressand
despitethe new contractingrules.The War andNavy departrnents,
tradition, usedcost-plusrarely andwith reluctanceuntil after PearlHarbor.And profit caps
reducedreturnsto an actualtwo per cent--littlefor the R&D the firms' futuresreliedon.38Firms
mainly worried aboutan "escalator"tying aircraft pricesto inflation. The Army andNavy
wantedto take advantageof the "wagedrag" cultivatedby aircraftfirms over the yearsand
insistedthat the escalatorbe basedon an index for laborin the durablegoodssector.But the
firms neededan index specificto aircraftto relievepent-upwagepressureand competitionfor
workersfrom better-paylngindustries.ln late 1940,the averagewagein auto was 96 cents,84 in
steel,and only 74 in affiame.3e
An aircraft index was "admittedlymore accurate,"wrote onehigh official, but Donald
Nelsonof the NationalDefenseAdvisoryCommittee,formerlyof SearsRoebuck,arguedthat it
would encouragelabor disputesand"a skyrocketingof wages[and] inflation which all of us are
labordisputesseemedinevitable.Led by Donald
seekingto avoid." But for the manufacturers,
38Douglasto T.A. Morgan,president
of SperryCotp.,Apr. 3, 1941,ACCReel'33.I2.L7;
(19a0);
Brettto Lovett,June5, 1941,Box 80, Lovett
Bulletin
5000.
TreasuryDepartment
Records.
3e"Wage Ratesin the Califomia Airframe lndustry, 7941,"Monthl), Labor Review. 54
(March 1942)562.
27
qf (heir frrrnsandvforkforces;(hESg3lEOfthsir
ehi* in thair,farttuua TLa a+aggeitgerapanreion
new contacts in relationto their meagercapital;the dilution of management;the strugglefor
supplies;the welterof federalagencies
involved-all producednew anxietiesespeciallywhen
addedto the broadimponderables
oftheir industy's fateat war's end.
Thentoo, "left wingersandradicalagitatorsandwriters,"in Douglas'swords,continued
to attackthe manufacturersas"merchantsof death."And basicfinancial unce'rtaintiespersisted
despitethe new contractingrules.The War andNavy departments,wary of Congressand
tradition, usedcost-plusrarely andwith reluctanceuntil after PearlHarbor.And profit caps
reducedreturnsto an actualtwo per cent--littlefor theR&D the firms' futuresreliedon.38Firms
mainly worried aboutan "escalator"tying aircraft pricesto inflation. The Army andNavy
wantedto take advantageof the "wage drag"cultivatedby aircraftfirms over the yearsand
insistedthat the escalatorbe basedon an index for laborin the durablegoodssector.But the
firms neededan index specificto aircraftto relievepent-upwagepressureand competitionfor
workersfrom better-paytng
industries.Inlate 1940,the averagewagein autowas96 cents,84 in
steel,and oriy 74 in airframe.3e
An aircraft index was "admifiedlymore accurate,"wrote onehigh official, but Donald
Nelsonof the NationalDefenseAdvisoryCommittee,formerlyof SearsRoebuck,arguedthat it
would encouragelabor disputesand"a skyrocketingof wages[and] inflation which all of us are
seekingto avoid." But for the manufacturers,
labordisputesseemedinevitable.Led by Donald
38Douglasto T.A. Morgan,president
of sperrycotp., Apr. 3, rg4l, ACCFteel33.l2.r7;
TreasuryDepartmentBulletin 5000.(19a0);Brettto Lovett,June5, 1941,Box 80, Lovett
Records.
" "WageRatesin the CalifomiaAirframelndusfiy, 7941,-Monthly LaborReview.54
(March 1942)562.
29
t'ven fhe rnr.eaqerfive-cent wage increaee accepted by Thomas caused constematiqg
amongSouthlandaircraftfirms which had signedhugefixed-pricecontracts.The strike also
spurredo'anti-strike"sentimentin Congressandthe newsmediaandpromptedthe War
Departmentand the new Office of ProductionManagement(OPM) to pay more attentionto
aircraft labor. At the OPM, co-directorHillman insistedthat the UAW take greatercontrol over
aircraft locals. He met with the manufacturers,but little cameof it becausethey feared
"dominationby Mr. Hillman andthe laborgroup"andmisunderstood
Hillman's wage-repressive
goals.At anyrate,for Kindleberger,presidentofNorth AmericanAviation (NAA), "Hillman's
schemesarenot worth a dannn,"unlessWashingtonrelentedon an aircraft escalator.Without
this relief, the UAW's attemptsto centralizecontrolwould havelittle effect,too, because"it is
well knownthat localunionsdo not paymuchattentionto nationalorganizations
on the question
of strike,"particularlywhenbasicwork placepressures
rosethe waytheywereat his sprawling
new plantin Inglewood,nearthe L.A. urport.az
Efforts by Mortimer andUAW-activists at NAA to channelthesepressuresfinally
overc{Lme
L.A.'s uniqueworking-classinertiato forcea March 1941NLRB election.UAW
Local #683won anddemanded
grievanceprocedures,
the closedshop,controlovertraining,and
a "living wage."Its rallying cry became*75 and10,"a newminimumwith ten centincreases
after monthly periodsuntil workersreachedparity with otherindustries.To Kindlebergerthis
platform was both impracticalmanageriallyandwholly distastefulideologically;it was also
+z ccg4lprExecutiveBoardMinutes--Aircraft
Organizational
structure,"Dec. 16-20,1940,
Box 18,GeorgeAddesCollection,ReutherLibrary.Seecorrespondence
betweenfirms andthe
ACC in ACC Reel 32.02.5;Kindlebergerto J.J.Jouett,presidentof the ACC, Jan.6, 1941,ACC
Reel32.03.0.
30
financiallyuntenablewtlesscostscouldbepassedon. ln Springl94I,its averagewagehovered
at 75 cents.NAA had fallen behindscheduleon fixed-priceArmy andLend Leasecontractsfor
AT-6 Texantrainers(Harvard),B-25 bombers(Mitchell),andthe earliestmodelsof the P-51
fighter(Mustang).The firm couldonly stonewall.On May 23, membersof #683voted5,810
against21,0to strike.a3
The conundrumat NAA offeredno obviousway out, asthe National DefenseMediation
Boarddiscoveredwhile ponderingit in Washington.It prevaricated,
postponingmeetingsand
hearings.A top level schemeseemedafootto forcethe issueat NAA andmakea high-profile
exampleon the nationalwaveof "defensestrikes,"which by Summer1941had cost2 million
man-days."The next two weeks,"accordingto historianNelsonLichtenstein,"were amongthe
mostdecisivein 20th-centurylaborhistory."On June5, impatientworkersstruck,blocking
NAA's gateswith 4,000pickets.Companyguardsandthe LAPD nervouslymindedthe
perimeterof chainlink fencescloudedin tear-gas.TheWhite House,OPM,and War Department
then deployedtheir main weapons--red-baiting
and the 15thInfantry. From Washingtonthrough
the nationalmediaflowed claimsthat thestrikewas in factaKremlin-sponsored
insurrection.
On the 6th, ColonelDwight David Eisenhowerof the D( Army Corpsreceivedordersto divert
troopsdestinedfor the Phillippinesandposition them at March Field andFort MacArthur.e
43"The North American'Way,"Fortune,(March
l94l);'oNotesfor memoto the President,"
June6, 1941,Box 9, "StimsonSafeFile"; o'Causes
of Delaysin Deliveryof CombatPlanes,"
Feb. 17, 1941,Box 3, enty 254,Undersecretary
of War Records.
44FDRto StimsonandKnox, June4, l94l,Box
15,"StimsonSafeFile"; N. Lichtenstein,
"Californiais not Detroit," unpub.manuscript,1977,10.For military preparations
andthe roles
of FDR, J. EdgarHoover,et al, see"Military Possession
& Operationof NAA, Inc.,611414l,Box 2,.004,seriesII, bulky,classified.,AAG Records;seealsoFraser,LaborWill Rule, 465-68;
Lichtenstein,Labor's War. 53-66;Ziege4The clo 127-130;w. Mortimer,Qggan[ze!(Boston:
1971)174-187;"PresidentRooseveltBreaksA Strike,"Life. June23,l94l; J.R.Prickett,
31
at davn on Jtne9 of toops withbayonetsbrokethe strike. The Army
The aOOenance
truckedlocal UAW leadersto Fort MacArthur wherethey werestrippedand interrogated.But
red-baitingand arrestingtheir leadershad minimal efflecton the workers,whosehardshipsand
numbersmadeallegedcommunistplots abstractandirrelevant.Theywere fortunateto have
leadersskilled in the art of workermobilization."The only subversiveelementin the whole
strikesituation,"Mortimerwrote,"is the 50 centsperhourpaidin aircraft."Workerscontinued
massingoutsidetheplantand5,000votedto continuethe strikedespitetheir leaders'ousterby
the UAW executive.a
UnderFDR's executiveorder,Army officersoversawplantmanagement.
Theyopened
negotiationsbetweenNAA andnewly appointedUAW-men, but soonfound that chaoticshopfloor conditionsandlaborstrife,communistleadersor not, wouldpersistuntil the worker's
demands,at leaston wages,were substantiallymet. In Washington,the pushingandhauling
continued.Hillman calledfor wagestabilizationin aircraft,but RobertPatterson,Undersecretary
of War andformerWall Streetassociate
of Secretary
of War HenryStimson,rejecteda national
aircraft cost escalatorin military contacts. lnflation wasalwaysthe main tlreat, but so too were
the implicationsof sucha broad,integrativeapproachby the government.
Both seemed
unnecessary
now that presidentialordersand bayonetsat NAA had intimidatedorganizedlabor
into a virtual no-strikepledgenationwide,and sincethe U.S. aircraftindustryremained70 per
centunorganized.Also, giant "gleen field" aircraftplantswere sproutingin traditionally fallow
"CommunistConspiracyor WageDispute?:The 1941Strikeat North AmericanAviation,"
PacificHistoricalReview,50(1981)215-33.
45"Historic StrikeOn!" North AmericanNews.
June1941;Mortimerto P. Murray,June30,
1941,Box 11,ReutherCollection.
32
gound for organizedlabor, suchas Texas,Georgi4 Kansas,Oklahoma"andNebraska.Patterson
told the manufacturersthat wageincreaseswould be consideredin final audits,but only on a
basis,With suchassurances,
NAA reluctantlyrelentedandagreedto a 60 cent
case-by-case
minimum, rising to the still sub-par75 centsafter threemonths.a6
federalofficials,but no aircraftworkers,met in
On July 9,l94l,the manufacturers,
Washingtonto discussdevelopments.ExtendingtheNAA "yardstick" to other Southlandfirms
consideration
of case-by-case
seemedinevitableandtheyreceivedthe sameinformalnssurances
told the firms "not to be
on extracosts.SidneyHillman, widely hailedas'il.abor'sStatesman,"
too generouswith labor-keepeverythingin secret."ReubenFleet,buildingfixed-priceB-24s,
asked"Can we do lessthanNAA?" "Yes," repliedLabor's'Statesman',"if you canget away
with it.'47Fleetdid his bestto "get awaywith it" through1941.But his frustrationswith
turnover at his plant andthe managerialchallengesconnectedwith openinga giant new complex
in Fort Worth, Texas,led him to complaincontinuallyandpublicly to the War Deparhnent.Top
Aircraft
officialsthere,led by RobertLovett,resolvedto ousthim from confrolof Consolidated
andreplacehim in lg42byThomasMercerGirdler,the notoriouslyanti-unionLittle Steel
executive.
Aircraft firms in the East,Mid-West,and Southbalkedat proposalsto extendanNAA-
a6Pattersonto Hillman,June20,l94l,Box 4; Undersec.of War Records,class.,enfry254,
RG 107;Patterson
to Jouett,June16,1941,ACC Reel30.82.5;R.J.Pwcell,"LaborPoliciesof
the NDAC andthe OPM," SpecialStudyno.23, (Civilian ProductionAdministration,
Washington,D.C.: 1946)232-235.
a7Douglasto Stimson,July 19,1941,Box 94; "LaborAgreementBetweenWar andNavy
Deparhnents,"
July 9, lg4l,Box 92,LovettRecords;LosAngelesTimes.Au5.7,1941;Fleet
and Hillman quotedby J.C. Ward, presidentof Fairchild Aircraft, "notesof a meeting,"July 9,
1941;J.E.SchaeferofBoeing-WichitatoJouett,
July22,Aug.8, 1941;ACCReel32.3.0.Phone
transcript,Fleetto Lovett,Oct. 18, 1941,Box 91, LovettRecords.
JJ
ofcost
incree,cetotheb
nlants-Longexoeiencemadethemsuspectthemililrqy'sassurances
consideration,andmany continuedto imaginea conspiracyamongWashington'swar agencies
andthe "Hillman goup." Wronglysensing"ulterior motives,"firms evenresistedattemptsby
the Bureauof Labor Statisticsto gatherdataon which to basenationalpolicy.aEEachfirm
struggledseparatelyto minimize wagelevelsandcollectivebargaining.
Backingthem in Washingtonwerethe National War Labor BoardNSfLB) andthe
Office of Price Administration.Theseoffrcesmaintainedthe hardline on aircraft wagesand
pricesand stalledunion recognitionandthe bargainingprocessyearafter yearat aircraft plants,
evenwhen the military protestedthat this threatenedvital projects--suchasthe B-29
Superfortress.
TheNWLB evenresistedextendingto otherfirms the schemefor job
classificationspreparedby the SouthernCaliforniaAircraft Industy Associationand
implementedacrossthe Southlandin 1941.Rigidjob descriptions,
shop-floorrules,andfutile
grievanceprocedureswere setby firms hopingto streamlinemanagement
andwork flows.
Executivesformulatedthe plan with the completelack of input from workers.Still, the NWLB
deemedits nationalextensionan unnecessarilyheavy-handed
approachto the confusionsand
complicationsof aircraftlabor.ae
Payand worker's rights were basicallyfrozen for the war's duration.Aggressive,
o8G.W. Vaughan,Curtiss-Wrightpresident,to Jouett,
Oct. 9, l94l;ACC Reel 32.3.0.
"Jouett,J.H.--Teletype
Messages,"
Sept.9-30,1941,ACC Reel31.91.8.Jouetthada better
the labor
Sasp of the conservativemotivesof policy-makersin Washington,predicting'othat
policies of our administrationwill remainso apatheticasto precludeany stabilizationeffort."
Jouettto L.D. Bell of Bell Aircraft, Oct. 8, 1941,ACCReel32.3.0.
aeLaborwas "not a workingparfrrerin war productionplanning,"
Purcell,"Labor Policies,"
31,234.SeealsoFraser,LaborWill Rule.455;H.J. Harris,The Rightto Manage:lndustrial
RelationsPoliciesof AmericanBusinessin the 1940s(Madison,Wisc.: 1982)4l-60.
34
integratedapproachesto aircraft laborproblemsneverseemedto be calledfor. The labor supply
wasturbulent,but manageable.Largepools of unemployedmigratoryworkersandwomanpower
weretappedandprovidedcompetentand generallycontentworkers.Pressurefrom below was
practicallyabsentasworkerslimited their proteststo quitting andasplantsremainedlargely
unorganizedby the UAW or IAM, which continuedflailing awayatone another.
lnertia definedfederalpolicy in the military-industrialcomplexfor aircraft,the outcome
of clashing,yet mutuallysupportive,anti-stateanxietiesamongmanufacturers,
"dollar-a-year
men," and congressmen.
Aircraft supplycould be organizedin waysthat did not underminethe
traditionsandpracticesof businessprerogativeandvoluntarismbecauseof theindustry'sprewar dynamicsanddeepsocialbase,especiallyon the WestCoast.Thesemeshedideallywith the
vision of large-scale
air power.Iindeed,
the industy's prewarnature--geared
towardoutputrather
thanthe sophisticationof aircraft--encouraged
that overblownanddestructivedoctrine.so
Suchwasthe industy's potential,the thrustof the wartimeprogftrm,andthe extentof
Americanmaterialresources
that workersbuilt some300,000warplanes,supplemented
by the
equivalentin sparepartsof about80,000.By mid-1943,atime of multi-facetedcrisisfor U.S.
aircraftproductionandnew calls for comprehensive
statist reorgarization,Los Angelesaircraft
plantsalone werefuming out morewarplanesthanthe Axis war economiescombined.One
aircraft worker nicely capturedthe conservativeimplicationsof this tremendousoutput when he
complainedin a letter to SenatorHarry S. Trumanaboutwasteat the plant wherehe worked:"It
is very fornrnatethat this countrycanproducemoregoods,war or otherwise,by accidentthan
to On airpower
doctrine dr.ring the period, seeM. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power:
The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven:1987).
35
a'ny ^thar a^rntr1r itr tha twatld oan ptoduee on purpose,"Sl
from thelabor
herliain Washin$on'sapproach
to the urcraftindustystemmed
supply'sdepth,competence,
andtranquility.Millionsof workersmadepossible
thetop-tobottomtransformationof U.S. manufacturingfor Americanairpower.Theyunderwrotethe
military-industrialcomplex'sconservative
ideologicalandinstitutionalframework,which helped
keepviable a political cultureof voluntarismandthe limited state.
tt M.E. Blaketo Truman,2l August
lg43,Box 671,Recordsof the SenateNationalDefense
Committee(TrumanCommittee),RG 46, National Archives.