8
Does Hume succeed in establishing a ‘standard of taste’? If he does, how authoritative is this
‘standard’ as a measure of aesthetic value?
This essay argues Hume successfully creates a standard by which one can compare aesthetic
tastes, but that it’s unclear whether this standard should be considered to accurately track
aesthetic value. The essay begins by explicating Hume’s motivation for, and construction of,
a standard of comparison between aesthetic tastes. After finding the standard viable, the essay
then outlines how Hume argues the standard should be considered a measure of aesthetic
value through his analogy with accepted normative standards of sensory accuracy. The essay
raises two objections against this argument, the first being that, rather than confirming a
normative aesthetic standard, the analogy actually raises doubt about the idea of a sensory
normative standard. The essay then finds Hume might admit this doubt without severely
weakening his account. The second, and seemingly more effective objection raised by the
essay, is that Hume’s argument wrongly assumes the sentiments produced by an unaffected
aesthetic faculty are always the most representative of aesthetic value. The essay ends by
considering and rejecting possible responses to this objection, and therefore concludes that
Hume does not show the standard of taste always tracks aesthetic value.
Hume distinguishes between expressions of ‘judgment’ and ‘sentiment’1; sentiments being
defined as non-cognitive reactions to objects; judgments as propositions concerning the
nature of objects. Whereas judgments, in virtue of having “a reference to something beyond
themselves”2, can be considered right or wrong to the extent that they correctly describe some
state of the world, sentiments in and of themselves (not to be confused with their expression)
have no truth evaluable content, as they mark only the relation between objects and “faculties
of the mind”3. Because of this, “a thousand different sentiments, excited by the same object,
are all right”4, or, perhaps more accurately, are no more or less right than each other. Hume
claims expressions of aesthetic value are matters of sentiment5, so an assertion of some
object’s aesthetic value is an expression of the nature of one’s perception of that object, not a
claim about a property inherent in that object. Given this, the idea that there exists a fact of
the matter about whether or not some object is of aesthetic worth becomes questionable,
making the metaphysical status of what Hume terms, “real beauty”6, unclear. As Hume
writes, “to seek the real beauty, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real
sweet or bitter”.
1
Hume, On the Standard of taste, ST7.
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
2
9
Yet, although this intuition (that aesthetic taste is non-cognitive and relative) is a compelling
one, there exists an equally compelling but seemingly incompatible counter-intuition: that
some objects or works are simply more aesthetically valuable than others, and that in virtue of
this, expressions of taste have normative value. The counter-intuition therefore claims it’s
possible (and probable) that some assertions of aesthetic value will be more legitimate than
others, and that some will hold authority on aesthetic matters. Hume recognizes the existence
of this disposition “to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of
men may be reconciled”7. He observes that in many contexts, the idea that some expression of
taste is as legitimate as another seems “absurd and ridiculous”8, most notably when it is
claimed some widely commended work possesses more value than some paradigm of the
same genre or medium. The competing strength of both intuitions therefore results in the
confusing situation that, on the one hand, there seems no coherent concept of a non-relative
aesthetic value, whilst on the other, some aesthetic objects, and therefore assertions of
aesthetic taste, seem unquestionably more valuable than others.
It is this confusion that motivates the establishment of a standard of taste. The problem of
forming such a standard, however, is that there can be no reference to facts in justifying one
sentiment as more legitimate than another. In response, Hume suggests a naturalistic solution,
whereby normative value can be derived from analysis of the faculty by which one produces
aesthetic sentiments9. Despite the variance observed in reactions of sentiment, “there are
certain general sources of approval or disapproval”10, and often a majority consensus in at
least the type of sentiment, if not the specific quality, affected by an objected. This suggests
an underlying similarity in all human’s faculty of aesthetic taste, and that differences in
aesthetic reaction may not be due to any inherent, unchangeable difference in these faculties.
Instead, Hume claims that it is “the least exterior hindrance…or the least internal disorder”11
which elicits changes in the kind of sentiments produced. Differences in sentiment are thus
the result of distorting conditions or affected aesthetic faculties. Under ideal conditions, with
an unaffected faculty, every person should elicit a similar aesthetic reaction to some object or
work. Therefore, Hume argues, the sentiment that would be produced under ideal and
unaffected conditions can act as a standard for comparison.
Before assessing whether this standard can be considered a viable method of tracking
aesthetic value, it should be noted that Hume does appear to have successfully established a
7
Ibid, ST6.
Ibid, ST8.
9
Ibid, ST12.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid, ST10.
8
10
way of discerning between assertions of aesthetic value, through the possibility of considering
modal claims in aesthetic disagreements. Two parties could consider, counterfactually, had
they viewed some object under the same conditions and with an equally functioning faculty,
disagreement about the value of that object wouldn’t have arisen. This allows one to place
aesthetic sentiments into one of two categories: those that are made with unaffected faculties
in ideal conditions, and those that, were it not for faculties affected by defect or unideal
conditions, would match sentiments of the first category. Therefore, irrelevant of any
comment about the value of each category, Hume does create a standard that differentiates
between sentiments, which can be used to discuss and evaluate aesthetic objects. It is only
when Hume makes the further claim that assertions derived from an unaffected faculty hold
authority on aesthetic matters, that the more contentious proposition of a true measure of
aesthetic value is raised.
Hume’s primary argument for the idea that the distinction between affected and unaffected
faculties is normative, is by analogy. He reduces discussion about aesthetic normativity to
discussion about perceptual normativity in general, observing, “the appearance of objects in
daylight, to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even while
colour is [a matter of sentiment].”12 The phrases ‘good-sighted’ and ‘visually-impaired’ (or
any distinction of sensory accuracy) arguably presuppose the idea that unaffected visual (or
sensory) faculties produce the most legitimate sentiments. So, given that assertions of
aesthetic value are as much expressions of sentiment as claims to visual accuracy, unaffected
aesthetic faculties can be considered “sound” whilst affected faculties, “defective”13.
Therefore “the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of a taste”14, and
from this one can “derive an idea of the perfect beauty”15. Hume’s use of the word ‘idea’
perhaps acknowledging that the kind objectivity created by the standard still does not pertain
to matters of fact. It is important to note that Hume does concede a slight misalignment
between visual and aesthetic standards, in that due care is required to ensure an unaffected
aesthetic faculty and claim a truly authoritative sentiment. “A perfect serenity of mind, a
recollection of thought, a due attention to the object”16 are the conditions deemed necessary,
and these are developed through a cultivation of a variety of characteristics, such as “good
sense and a delicate imagination”17, “improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and
cleared of all prejudice”18.
12
Ibid, ST12.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, ST10.
17
Ibid, ST25.
18
Ibid, ST23.
13
11
Although the analogy between visual and aesthetic sentiments may hold in the sense that it
shows both sentiments can be affected, and can be made to match unaffected sentiments by
counterfactual analysis, it’s not clear that this does much to help the claim that affected
aesthetic sentiments are of a lower normative standard. This is because the analogy seems to
give a too simplistic account of what can and can’t affect visual faculties. Whilst it is true that
“the appearance of objects in daylight, to the eye of a man in health”19 is sufficient to act as a
normative standard for everyday practice, the standard denoting visual accuracy becomes
much more stringent in other contexts. For example, if one is unfamiliar with the objects
perceived, or is in a time critical situation, good light and a healthy visual faculty seem
insufficient to ensure one’s sentiment constitutes an ideal representation. This entails that, in
some circumstances, the supposed ‘ideal visual judge’ might fail to set the standard for visual
accuracy. As a result, whereas Hume’s analogy is intended to demonstrate aesthetic
normativity by highlighting the existence of a visual normativity, what it seems to do instead
is raise questions about the coherence of visual normativity by highlighting the dubiousness
of aesthetic normativity. Therefore, the analogy doesn't successfully demonstrate that
afflictions to an aesthetic faculty must make the sentiments produced by that faculty
normatively worse.
In response, Hume might admit that his analogy shows sensory faculties, just as aesthetic
ones, are subject to complex cultivation before they can be considered to produce unaffected
sentiments. However, this admittance doesn’t threaten the idea of a normative standard of
taste, it just shows that an everyday conception of a standard of visual accuracy fails to
appreciate finer differences between visual sentiments, and that, in reality, true judges of
visual accuracy as rare as true judges of aesthetic value. Hume might suggest it is the objector
who assumes a too simplistic account of the difference between affected and unaffected
faculties. Closer analysis of the text shows Hume does not require that true judges of taste
cultivate their faculties (visual or aesthetic) to such an extent that they are completely
unaffected, or that the idea of a kind of ideal tabula rasa faculty is even realizable. Instead,
Hume claims the standard is derived from a majority consensus of judges, whose sentiments
can differ quite extensively 20. It is not that the standard of taste can be deduced from one
person’s reaction to an object (although this may be possible), but that a composite picture of
the ideal aesthetic sentiment is built from an amalgamation of the sentiments produced by
cultivated faculties. Therefore, Hume’s argument doesn’t require that cultivated aesthetic or
visual faculties be totally unaffected, only that a substantive consensus can be reached. It
seems an everyday conception of a standard of visual accuracy is sufficient for this; therefore
19
20
Ibid, ST12.
Ibid, ST29-31.
12
the manner of cultivation of the aesthetic faculty suggested by Hume is also plausibly
sufficient.
One might accept that Hume successfully shows how the improbability of a completely
unaffected aesthetic faculty does not threaten his argument. As the standard can be deduced
from an amalgamation of sentiments, the affections and differences that remain in even
cultivated faculties are of minor concern. Despite this, it seems Hume’s analogy still depends
upon a questionable underlying assumption: that the sentiments produced by the most
cultivated and least affected faculties are always the most representative of the ideal
sentiment. If one assumes the ideal aesthetic sentiment, as in the case of visual or other
sensory sentiments, is always unaffected, then this is of course true. However, it can be
questioned whether this is always the case in aesthetic matters. Depending upon the object
under consideration, the reaction of a person with a deeply personal or historical connection
to an artwork may very plausibly be of much higher value than the reaction of a person with a
less affected faculty, but no connection at all. Therefore, in some cases an affected faculty
may be necessary to discover the standard of taste. Examples of deeply political works seem
relevant, such as Picasso’s Guernica; the full aesthetic value of which may not be accessible
without a sufficient emotional attachment to its subject. Indeed, it seems plausible to say that
when confronted with a work such as Guernica, many people feel they can only truly
appreciate that work’s aesthetic value if they ‘step into the shoes’ of those for who the work
has more significance. This suggests that on many occasions counterfactual analysis of
sentiments is performed, but that it occurs in the opposite direction to that which Hume
claims; from unaffected to affected sentiments.
Hume might reply that part of the cultivation of an aesthetic faculty includes an awareness of
the elements necessary for fully appreciating some aesthetic object. Therefore, on the
occasions that an affected faculty is most capable of appreciating aesthetic value, that faculty
is actually the most ‘unaffected’, in the sense that it is least obstructed by inappropriate or
insignificant connections with the work. However, admitting that the qualities required for an
unaffected faculty vary according to the object under consideration appears to weaken
Hume’s argument, as it entails there is no one standard from which all aesthetic value can be
judged. It therefore seems the aesthetic value of a great many objects is best appreciated with
a (genuinely) affected faculty. Levinson appears to agree with this conclusion, arguing that
because, prima facie, there seems nothing irrational about preferring the standard of aesthetic
value denoted by affected faculties, Hume must show “why a person who is not an ideal critic
should rationally see to exchange [his sentiments for those preferred by others with differing
13
aesthetic faculties]”21. Levinson constructs a response on Hume’s behalf, centered on the idea
that the constitution of ideal critics entails, on balance, that viewing their sentiments as a
representation of the ideal entails the highest probability of gaining “a satisfaction ultimately
more worth having than what one gets from [affected sentiments]” 22. However, this could be
admitted whilst maintaining that, for some aesthetic objects, ideal critics will always fail to
fully appreciate aesthetic value, no matter their ability to detect aesthetic value in other
situations. Therefore, even if the standard of taste is a reliable indicator of aesthetic value, it
cannot be considered the definitive authority.
This essay began by showing that, given the assumption of a universally similar aesthetic
faculty, a standard of taste can be established by reference to an ‘ideal’ sentiment produced by
a totally unaffected aesthetic faculty. The essay showed how Hume agues that this standard is
normative, and can therefore be used to track aesthetic value, through analogy with the way in
which sensory (specifically visual) normative standards are derived from counterfactual
comparison with the sentiments produced by an unaffected faculty. The essay objected that
this analogy assumes an overly simplistic conception of an unaffected visual faculty, and that
analysis shows sensory normative standards are as questionable as a standard of taste. After
concluding that Hume could admit this objection without significantly altering his account,
the essay raised an alternative objection: that Hume wrongly assumes the least affected
aesthetic faculties always produce the most legitimate assertions of aesthetic value. The essay
considered two possible responses to this objection, but found neither conclusively shows
‘ideal’ sentiments must be deemed the authority on aesthetic value. Therefore, the essay
concludes that Hume’s standard of taste, whilst providing a standard for comparison, does not
necessarily determine aesthetic value.
2528 Words.
Bibliography:
- D. Hume, Of the Standard of Taste, Four Dissertations, 1777 edition, www.davidhume.org.
- J. Levinson, Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.
60, No. 3, 2002, pp. 227-238.
21
22
Levinson, Hume’s Standard of Taste, III, p230.
Ibid, V, iii-iv.