The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988
Rationality and State Decision-Making
by Galen Stephenson
Psychohistorical Interpretation
•  Saddam as a war-lover; Stoessinger argues:
–  “Certainly there were other reasons for Saddam's
actions, but these were always subordinate to his
main motive: conquest”
–  “...absolute evil … may well be beyond rational
explanation.”
–  “[the war lover] … thrives on the lives of innocents like
the young Iraqi and Iranian soldiers. … The war lover
needs war without end … And only when he dies or is
slain does liberation come”
Theoretical Implications
•  Stoessinger's Thesis of War: War is caused by
the internal-psychology of state-leaders.
–  “I am less impressed by the role of abstract forces,
such as nationalism, militarism, or alliance systems.
… The personalities of leaders, on the other hand,
have often been decisive.”
Testing
•  If Saddam's personality as a war-lover was the
decisive factor, then:
–  Hypothesis #1: Conflict would not have occurred with
alternate leadership in Baghdad.
–  Hypothesis #2 - We should see uninterrupted conflict
throughout Saddam's rule.
•  Testing assumptions
–  Did misperception lead to the war?
–  Was that misperception caused by personality?
1968-1979: Iran-Iraq rivalry and the inevitability
of confrontation in the Gulf
“...the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must." - Thucydides
Balance of Power in the Gulf
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1969 – Iran abrogates border
treaty with Iraq, begins backing
Kurdish insurgency
1970 – Operation ‘Peace
Roll’ (US/Iranian arms deal)
1971 – British withdraw from Gulf,
Iran siezes islands
1972 – Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship (USSR/Iraqi arms deal)
1974/1975 – Iran/Iraq border
skirmishes. Baghdad forced to
sign Algiers Accord.
Early-70s – Iran projects power
throughout region, lending military
assistance to numerous nations.
Mid/Late-70s – Unprecedented
levels of arms-sales to Iran.
• 
• 
• 
1970s – A polarity drives Persian
Gulf States to pursue power.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi:
–  “...with the impotency of the
United Nations … a country which
is not prepared for these
emergencies would be the loser.
Nevertheless, we cannot allow
ourselves to be taken by surprise.
One day the friend on whom we
are counting might not be around.
So this must not result in
annihilation of our country, and
because of that we are shopping
for arms, the best
everywhere.” (Cooper and Bishop)
Complementary role of national
world-view and role conceptions.
• 
• 
Iran’s Expansion
Gulf Defense Spending
12
10
($ Billion USD)
• 
Late-1970s – Balance of power
favors Iran; Tehran emboldened to
pursue hegemony.
“All these new deliveries … provided
Iran with a formidable military
arsenal, capable of sustaining
conflict at very high levels of violence
and at sides far distant from Iranian
territory. (Cooper and Bishop, 2000)
“ … Iran could easily develop into a
mini-superpower, mighty even
enough to defend itself against
Soviet, or eventually U.S
interventions …” (Cooper and
Bishop, 2000)
1971 – Iran seizes Persian Gulf
Islands:
–  “Iran's ruler ignored British
warnings-the huge arms
deliveries from the USA already
made him more potent than any
eventual task force the Royal
Navy could then deploy against
Iran.” (Cooper and Bishop,
2000)
8
6
4
2
0
1967
1970
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
IranExportIraq
Gulf Oil
Value
25
20
($ Billion USD)
• 
15
10
5
0
1967
1970
1972
1973
1974
Iran
1975
Iraq
1976
1977
1978
The View from Baghdad
•  National experience of Iranian expansion create mental
models for:
–  Image of adversaries intent
–  Image of available strategies – necessity of self-help
–  “Meanwhile, the Shah's Gulf policy did not fail to make its impact
on Iraq. Baghdad … broke off relations with Tehran and London
and turned more and more towards Moscow.” (Cooper and Bishop,
2000)
•  Iran and Iraq on collision course
–  Rise of Iran as a potential-hegemon destabilizes region,
increases attractiveness of aggression to all actors.
•  1970s Persian Gulf defined by: border-conflicts, threat perceptions
(security dilemma).
•  Inexorably linked with available power – oil wealth critical to creating
viable strategies for aggression.
•  Balancing inevitable
1979-1980: The Iranian Revolution Opportunity and Transition in the Gulf
“ [this confidential Baath-party note] analyzed the … shah's role in … acting
as the policeman of the Persian Gulf. It went on to emphasize that that with
the collapse of the shah's regime and that of the armed forces, Iran would
no longer be able to play the role it had up to that time. Therefore, Iraq
would be the only country that could fill the vacuum with respect to matters
relating to the security of the Persian Gulf …” (Tehrani, 19)
Revolution as Threat
•  Images (world-view) of Tehran’s intent shape Baghdad’s
reaction.
–  General Hamdani:
•  “When the Islamic Revolution flared up in Iran, one of its primary
goals was to spread into Iraq … Iranian intelligence began stirring
up Iraqi Shia'a, which made up 60 percent of the population …
Thus, Iraq confronted major aggression. … There were more than
1,000 border violations by Iranian forces into Iraq … There was a
general belief among Iraqi leaders that the situation would persist
until overall security collapsed in Iraq, and then Khomenei's
Revolutionary Army would launch an attack.” (Saddam's Generals,
2010)
–  General Makki:
•  Iraq felt threatened, as if someone had entered the room with a
contagious deadly disease. This was not the first time Iran had
threatened us. It had threatened Iraq during my childhood. My father
commanded the 3rd division against the Shah's army. I had the
same feeling [of existential threat] both times. Iran and Iraq have
never had good relations. We fear Iran will one day overthrow us, so
we take precautions” (Saddam's Generals, 2010)
–  1979/1980 Confrontation functions as iteration of “game” played
with Iran throughout 1970s
Revolution as Opportunity
• 
“Rather than a strong Iran facing a weak
and isolated Iraq, a strong Iraq appeared to
face a weak and divided Iran.” (McLachlan,
28)
“With the demise of the Shah, The Iraqi
leadership saw its opportunity for revenge
coming. The break in Tehran/Washington
relations caused by the seizure of the U.S
embassy, a large scale weakening of the
Iranian armed forces, ... and Nojeh coup,
were all closely monitored by the Iraqis and
played their role in helping Saddam to
make up his mind. At the time, Iraq's
economic outlook was very promising …
After the isolation of Egypt … the Iraqi
prestige in the Arab world rose to its peak,
and relations with Gulf monarchies were at
their most cordial.” (Cooper and Bishop,
2000)
Gulf Oil Export Value
25
20
($ Billion USD)
• 
Iranian hard-power wanes
–  Revolutionary purges hamstring
readiness
–  International isolation saps Iran’s
ability to sustain high-intensity warfare
15
10
5
0
1967
1970
1972
1973
1974
1975
Iran
1976
1977
1978
1979
Iraq
Gulf Defense Spending
12
10
($ Billion USD)
• 
8
6
4
2
0
1967
1970
1972
1973
1974
Iran
1975
1976
Iraq
1977
1978
1979
1980
Evaluating Baghdad’s Decision-Making
• 
Dominant strategy depends on world-view:
–  “The corps and division commanders were convinced that war was inevitable,
because Iran's continuous attacks were threatening Iraq's security, but they
disagreed with the plan.”
• 
Saddam’s Power calculations depart from those of the professional Iraqi military.
–  Saddam judged his military subordinates by two criteria. The first lay in his belief
that Bedouin tribal courage and loyalty were the most important attributes of
successful military leadership.” (Saddam's Generals, 2010)
–  General Makki: A question was raised at that conference about the army’s
preparedness for war. Everyone was thinking about Iran, its post-1979 threat,
and defending against the Iranians. Everyone was anxious about the possibility
of war. General al-Khazraji argued that the political situation made him think we
would go to war, but that we would require two years to prepare and train.
(Saddam's Generals, 2010)
–  General Hamdani: “A gathering of senior officers discussed the decision to
invade Iran on 6 July 1980. Two members of the political command asked
Saddam Hussein, ‘The Iraqi Army has 37 brigades. If all of these brigades attack
Iran where will we get our reserves? There is a major risk here. We will be taking
a considerable chance.’ Saddam did not want to admit that Iraq possessed
insufficient forces or that such a move might represent a mistake so he
responded, ‘The unannounced reserves are the Iraqi people.’” (Saddam's
Generals, 2010)
1980-1982: Iraq’s Offensives
Objectives and Constraints
• 
Baghdad’s Strategic Objective: Annex
Iran’s south-west Khuzestan province.
–  Power Transition: Successful operation
would force the recognition of an Iraqdominated regional security order.
• 
Couched in pan-Arab / nationalist
ideology, but were dictated by
necessities of the balance of power.
–  Saddam Hussein, June 1980:
• 
• 
“We send our salutations to the struggle
of the combatant people of Arabistan
[Khuzestan] who, in their fight for
freedom against the racist clique that
has deprived them of their basic rights
and aspirations …” (Tehrani, 1993)
“We now have the military strength to
take back three islands in the Persian
Gulf occupied by the Shah. We have
never remained idle since the
occupation…and have constantly
prepared ourselves militarily and
economically to recapture
them.” (Tehrani, 1993)
• 
The objective of a war-lover, as per
Stoessinger?
–  “Far from achieving a quick victory,
Saddam had to settle in for a long war”
• 
Or, the objective of a war-lover
operating within the constraints of
rational calculation?
–  “Initially, this military move was
intended to establish Iraq's military
superiority among the Persian Gulf
states and to destroy the Khomeini
regime. Within a week, however, it
became clear that despite the relative
weakness of Iran's armed forces, the
war would not cause Khomeini to lose
power, but would in fact help him
consolidate his rule. Recognizing this
unexpected development, Hussein
scaled down his objectives,
concentrating on pressuring Iran to
accept a cease-fire in place” (Farhang,
1985)
Rethinking Stoessinger’s Theory
•  Hypothesis #1: Alternate leadership would have kept
Iraq out of war.
–  False: Baghdad consensus about Iranian threat creates space to
use force absent Saddam.
•  Hypothesis #2: Saddam was unconstrained in his
aggression
–  False: Saddam kept Iraq out of war when it didn’t offer utility.
•  Testing assumptions
–  Perception of balance of power plays key role in operational
conduct of war, determines when and how Iraq attacks.
–  Personality vs. Identity: Is misperception caused by individual or
collective world-views?
•  Former indicates war is anomaly
•  Latter indicates war is inevitable
Works Cited
•  Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. Vintage Books, 1994.
•  McLachlan, Keith. "Analysis of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord,
1979-1980." The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Farhang
Rajaee. Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993. Print.
•  Anvari Tehrani, Ibrahim. "Iraqi Attitudes and Interpretation of the
1975 Agreement." The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression.
Farhang Rajaee. Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Print.
•  Cooper, Tom, and Farzad Bishop. Iran-Iraq War in the Air. Atglen,
Pa: Schiffer Military History, 2000. Print.
•  Woods et al. “Saddam's Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq
War.” Institute for Defense Analysis. 2010
•  Farhang, Mansour. “The Iran-Iraq War: The Feud, the Tragedy, the
Spoils. World Policy Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4. Fall, 1985. Jstor
Invasion of Kuwait
Paul Russell
Background
ž Iraq
Owed Massive War Debts - $70
Billion
ž The Iraqi Government Didn’t Think It
Should Have to Pay the Money Back
ž Kuwait Was One of the Nations It Owed
Money To
ž Iraq Also Viewed Kuwait As Part of Its De
Jure Borders
Invasion
ž On
August 2nd, 1990,
Iraqi Troops Crossed
the Kuwaiti Border,
Quickly Capturing the
Whole of the Country
ž Iraq Claimed That It
Was Acting to Stop
Kuwait From Stealing
Iraqi Oil
Why did Iraq invade Kuwait?
ž
In Saddam’s own words:
• At the end of the Iraq-Iran war
[1988], as Iraq began the
rebuilding process, the price
of oil was approximately $7
per barrel.
• Iraq could not possibly
rebuild its infrastructure and
economy with oil prices at this
level. Kuwait was especially at
fault regarding these low oil
prices. Kuwait was doing the
US a favor by lowering the
prices in exchange for
security.
Saddam understood this as a
conspiracy against Iraq.
ž
Prices of Crude Oil
• December 1978 $14.95
• December 1979 $38.00
•
•
•
•
(Iranian Revolution)
Average 1988 $14.87
April 1990 $34.46
(Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)
April 2004 $48.71
(US invasion of Iraq)
Sources: "Saddam states reasons for Kuwait
invasion.” gulfnews.com.
Illinois Oil & Gas Association
Why did Iraq invade Kuwait?
(cont’d)
Source: "Saddam states reasons for Kuwait invasion.”
ž
In Saddam’s own words:
• Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result of support received
during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam stated these were not loans and were
supposed to be free aid from these countries.
The countries had originally used the word "loan" as a formality only to
disguise the purpose of the funds from Iran. When Iraq was informed the
money was actually from loans, Iraq held discussions with these countries,
including Kuwait, in order to resolve these debts.
Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not
secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.
• Saddam stated that twice he discussed a change in oil prices to $25 per
barrel. Once, when the price per barrel reached $50, he told the oil
producing countries that they should not take advantage of the industrialised
nations. Saddam asked them to reduce the price to $25.
When the price dropped to $7 per barrel in 1989-90, Saddam called for an
increase to $24-25 per barrel. In Saddam's opinion, this price would not
burden the consumer or hurt the producer.
Why did Iraq become an enemy of
the US and vice versa?
ž
In Saddam’s own words:
• First, the "Zionist power and influence in the United States
dictates the US foreign policy. Any country viewed as a threat
to Israel, such as Iraq, becomes a target of the US 'conspiracy'.’’
• Secondly, the US, being the only super power, is now viewed as
attempting to dictate its will to the rest of the world including
Iraq. When countries do not agree with United States, such as
Iraq, they become its enemies.
• The third reason the United States made Iraq its enemy is for
economic purposes. Certain entities within the United States,
including weapons manufacturers and elements in the
military, favour war due to the financial profit which can be
reaped. America discovered the war in Afghanistan was not
enough to sustain the profit making of the military-industrial
complex of America. Thus, the war began with Iraq.
Source: "Saddam states reasons for Kuwait invasion.” gulfnews.com.
Declared Reasons
ž In
Addition to
Claiming to Seek to
Stop Kuwaiti Drilling,
Iraq Claimed Several
Other Casus Belli.
ž Sought to ‘Redress
Flawed Regional
Borders’
ž Remove a Corrupt
Government
Stoessinger’s View
ž Stoessinger
Claims That the Invasion of
Kuwait Was A Blatant Grab For Power.
• Cites Iraqi War Debt, Saddam’s Lust For Power,
and The Advantages Of Controlling Iraq
• Also Views Saddam as Someone Willing to Take
Extraordinary Risks.
Personality of Saddam
ž ‘Absolutely
Evil’
• Saddam was a ‘War
ž A
Lover,’ who fought
because he could
Simplistic View
• Saddam did have
mental issues, but he
was not an enigma
ž Malignant
Narcissism
Theories Behind Invasion
ž Marxian
• Vast Economic Resources in Kuwait
ž Boundaries
• Restoring What It Viewed As Its Rightful Borders
ž Misperceptions
• Thought the Western World Wouldn’t Intervene
ž Groupthink
• Had a Habit of Executing Advisors Who
Disagreed With Him
Works Cited
ž
Post, Jerrold M. Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology
Profile, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Web.
Accessed 11/15/12.
ž
[S. d.] "Saddam states reasons for Kuwait invasion.” gulfnews.com.
Al Nisr Publishing, July 21, 2009. Web. Accessed 15 Nov 2012.
ž
Harak, Simon. "Why DID Iraq Invade Kuwait? -- A Brief History.”
Marquette University. Web. 27 Nov 2012.
Image Credits
http://tinyurl.com/8y8bn27
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/kuwait_map_01.jpg
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/maps/map_images/
ottoman_empire.gif
Foreign Involvement in
Saddam’s Wars:
Motivations and Explanations
By Jacob Beeders
Background: United States
America had played a role in
overthrowing Mohammad Mossadegh,
a liberal democratically elected
president, to install the conservative
Shah
United States had provided extensive
support to the Shah of Iran, providing
aid ranging from humanitarian to
military
Shah seen as a stalwart against the
threat of communism, despite his flaws
Following the Iranian Revolution and
the Embassy Hostage Crisis (1979),
America dramatically reoriented its
policy towards Iran
Background: USSR
USSR had supported the regime of Iraq prior to the war
against Iran (1980-1988) and had furnished their military
arsenal
Iraq became one of the Soviet’s key regional allies after Egypt
left their sphere of influence
The Soviets opposed the anti-communist Shah, but were
indecisive towards the new revolutionary regime
On one hand the new regime was openly anti-Western, but on
the other hand it sought to export Islamic revolution and was
against the Soviet role in Afghanistan
The Iran-Iraq War: International
Involvement
United States Support for Iraq
Both states, Iraq and Iran, were officially under a UN arms embargo
US Was officially neutral in the conflict
United States, along with several other Western powers provided Iraq with military
support in order to prevent an Iranian victory
Iraq was perceived as a potential counterweight to the revolutionary regime in Iran
Sent its navy in 1987 to patrol the Persian Gulf in order to allow the unimpeded
transportation of oil that was threatened by Iranian advances
Donald Rumsfeld was sent as
an envoy to establish direct
diplomatic contact with
Saddam
United States Support for Iran
Iran-Contra affair:
America clandestinely sold weapons to Iran, with Israel as an
intermediary, in order to secure the release of hostages held in
Iran
The proceeds of these sales went to fund anti-communist rebels
in Nicaragua
Its reveal caused a significant scandal within the government as
questions rose as to how extensive involvement was within the
administration
Soviet Involvement
Originally cut off arms supply to both sides in compliance
with UN ban
Tried to maintain ties with both nations unsuccessfully
Provided support to Iraq as the war went on, perceiving
Iran’s ideology of Islamic revolution as a threat,
particularly in regards to central Asia and the Afghanistan
conflict
Theoretical Explanations:
Conservative Theory of War
The balance of power preserves stability within the
international system
If no particular country or faction is superior, war will be
discouraged
The balance of power in turn was something worth fighting
for in order to ensure lasting peace
Many people within the Reagan cabinet could be considered
conservatives or “realists”
Theoretical Explanations:
Conservative Theory of War, Cont’d
By intervening with military support on the side of the Iraqis the
balance of power could be conserved, by preventing an all out
Iranian victory
Iran could export its revolutionary ideology across the region,
disrupting the favorable balance of power
“If Iran and Iraq go to war, it would be too bad if one of them
would actually win”- Henry Kissinger
Intervention was not to ensure victory by any side, rather to
prevent any side from truly loosing
Similar motivations for Soviets, who saw an Iranian victory as a
potential threat to stability of system
Saddam’s Invasion of
Kuwait: International
Responses
Desert Shield
UN Security Council passed a unanimous vote calling for a
withdrawal from Kuwait, with even the USSR voting in favor
A massive coalition of thirty nations was formed, including
NATO and Arab League nations
In 1990, after receiving an invitation from the Saudi King
Fahd, the US sent 200,000 troops to protect the country from
Saddam’s perceived aggression
Another 250,000 were sent following that, to which Saddam
reciprocated with his own troop build up
UN security council set six week deadline for Saddam to
withdraw
Desert Storm
1991 the “use of force” resolution was passed in the US congress,
authorizing the president to go to war
When the deadline passed and Saddam remained in Kuwait,
America began a campaign of bombing
Air campaign was wildly successful, debilitating the Iraqi army,
effectively the only war that was won through air power
Saddam attempted to divert attention by firing Scud missiles at
Israel, hoping to garner Arab sympathy
Ground campaign followed, hitting Iraqi troops from multiple sides
Iraqi forces were routed, retreating in haste along the “highway of
death”
Desert Storm Cont’d
With Iraqi forces routed, there was an
almost “unopposed” route towards
Baghdad, and in turn the decapitation of
Saddam’s regime
Despite this, President Bush declared a
ceasefire on February 27, to the disdain of
some of his top generals
Was wary of expanding beyond the UN
mandate, and endangering the coalition
War-weariness: didn’t want to be bogged
down in another extensive war, Vietnam
Still encouraged domestic opposition groups
to revolt, who expected American support
Saddam crushed these uprisings ruthlessly
Aftermath
Saddam was still in power after wars, was able to suppress
opposition
Committed “ecological terrorism” as his forces retreated from
Kuwait, torching vast oil fields
Iraq continued to be under intense sanctions, which Saddam used
as an international shock tactic, letting his own people starve by
withholding aid
Saddam and UN played cat and mouse game over hidden weapons
caches
Was able to locate some due to defection of Saddam’s son in law
America and Britain bombed sites when inspectors were barred
Causes of Conflict: Misperception
Stoessinger emphasizes this point
Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, America gave the impression
that they would not intervene militarily to defend Kuwait
Saddam thought that Bush’s escalations were bluffs leading up to
the offensive
Within America’s strategic community it was believed that Saddam
wouldn’t go to war over Kuwait, would withdraw to preserve
himself
Corroborated by Saudi ambassador “If Saddam had to choose
between his own neck and leaving Kuwait, he would act to save his
own neck”
Believed he would act rationally, flaws in RAM
Saddam believed his forces were invincible and that his opponents
would crack at his resolve
Personalities of Leaders/
Individual Psychology
Saddam was a “war-lover” precluding him from making decisions
in a rational manner
Stemming from personal history, deprivations and abuse
Cast himself in almost messianic terms, as a modern day
Nebuchadnezzar expelling foreign invaders, fighting the “mother of
all battles”
Both Thatcher and Bush drew on their image sets and operational
milieu formed from experiencing Hitler's aggression during WW2
“It’s naked aggression”
“It’s good versus evil; we have a clear moral case here; nothing like
this since World War II; nothing of this moral importance since World
War II”
Marxist/Hegemonic Theories
Reason for war were far from altruistic, rather was motivated to protect
Western economic interests
By invading Kuwait, Saddam possessed a significant amount of the
worlds oil, and if he were to invade Saudi Arabia that portion would
only increase
America and its allies sent troops because Saddam could strike at their
economic lifeblood
America was willing to ignore the crimes of Syria and Hafez Assad, a
coalition member, but not Saddam?
Hama massacre, occupation of Lebanon
America was far less decisive in acting against Saddam’s atrocities
against his own people following the war
Less economic incentive
GRIT and Desert Shield/Storm
UN was able to achieve a unanimous vote in authorizing
action against Saddam, without the threat of Soviet veto,
indicative of a policy shift
US secretary of state and Soviet foreign minister issued joint
statement denouncing Iraqi aggression
Did this despite their former strategic partnership with Iraq
The Soviets, following Gorbachev’s policy of détente, believed
through positive unilateral diplomatic actions America would
reciprocate with goodwill and economic support
Stimulus response
Works Cited
Battle, Joyce. "Shaking Hands with Saddam
Hussein." National Security Archive. George Washington
University, n.d. Web. 26 Nov. 2012.
"Iran-Iraq War Facts, information, pictures |
Encyclopedia.com articles about Iran-Iraq
War." Encyclopedia.com | Free Online Encyclopedia. N.p., n.d.
Web. 28 Nov. 2012.