State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region

UNIVERSITY OF MAURITIUS RESEARCH JOURNAL – Volume 22 – 2016
University of Mauritius, Réduit, Mauritius
State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta
Region: An Overview
Sunday Inyokwe Otinche*
Department of Public Administration
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University
Niger State
Nigeria
E-mail: [email protected]
Paper accepted on 11March 2016
Abstract
The Nigerian economy is primarily dependent on oil revenue and as such the
armed struggle in the Niger Delta has negative consequences on the nation’s
economy. Oil exploration has destroyed the environment and the sources of
livelihood of the inhabitants of the oil producing communities hence the armed
struggle by the youths as a way of putting pressure on government and oil
companies to solve the problem. The paper examines the causes of the Niger
Delta uprising within the rationality of who gets what, when and how to
underscore the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by stakeholders to solving
the problem. The paper relied on primary and secondary data to do a content
analysis of the subject matter and concluded that the lukewarm attitude of the
stakeholders
in
the
oil
industry
towards
solving
the
problem
of
underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region is responsible for the incessant
violence in the region. The paper recommended that the programmes for
development of the Niger Delta should be backed up with the right political will
so that sustainable solutions can be sought for solving the problems of alienation,
underdevelopment and militancy in the Niger Delta.
Key Words: Militancy, Amnesty Programme, Underdevelopment, Alienation,
Degradation
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S I Otinche
Contextual Background
Beside politics, geography defines the context of human existence in terms of
settlement pattern and occupation. The Niger Delta region is located along the
salt and fresh water swamp and partly along the tropical rain forest zone and has
large deposit of the black gold (crude oil). The Niger Delta region is partly
defined by politics and geography. From the political dimension, the Niger Delta
region comprises Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Ondo and
Rivers states is fishing and farming. By geographical interpretation, the region
lies along the southern coastline of the Atlantic Ocean and at the tributaries of
river Niger which flows from the Futa Jalon highland in Sierra Leone through
Mali and Niger to Nigeria within a stretch of 4,100 kilometers. The Niger Delta
region is the largest wetland or delta in Africa and the third largest in the world.
The Niger Delta region has large deposit of alluvial materials, an oil deposit and
wetland that makes its location strategic to the political economy of Nigeria and
the world at large. It lies at latitude 50N of the equator and extends to the Gulf of
Guinea and the Bight of Benin and Biafra in a distance of between 26,000km2 to
300,000 km2 (Iloje, n.d; Ashton Jones,1995; Osuntokun, 1999). The size of the
Niger Delta is about 3% of the total land mass of Nigeria. The geographical
survey carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in
2001 reveals that the Niger Delta covers about 40,000-70,000km2 and traverse
the distance of 560km or 75% of the entire coastline of Nigeria. The Niger Delta
region is qwaterlogged and lies less than six meters above the sea level with high
rate of water salinity, coastal erosion, flood and tide (World Bank, 1995),
In terms of geomorphology and climatic condition, the Niger Delta region falls
into the upper Delta ecological zone. The ecosystem of the Niger Delta is defined
by this ecological divide (Fayemi, Amadi and Bamidele, 2005) which
conditioned their occupation and settlement pattern (Ashton-Jones, Arnolt and
Douglas, 1998). The Niger Delta region has an estimated population of about 20
million and a youth population of about 70%. The predominance of the youth
population influenced the process of youth agitation and militancy in the Niger
Delta region. The quality of life index in the region is described in terms of
poverty, unemployment, alienation, frustration and aggression which are
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
products of the high rate of underdevelopment in the region. The lack of attention
paid to the development of the Niger Delta region by the federal government and
the oil companies made the quality of life in the Niger Delta poor and catalytic to
conflict. The militant uprising came as reaction against injustice and the political,
economic, socio-cultural deprivation and alienation orchestrated by government
and the oil companies. This phenomenon undermined the basic principle of
government which implies that a group of people or communities have mutually
agreed to live together under one form of political organization and
administrative institution to share the resources in the political entity equitably
among themselves. As in all political entities, laws are put in place to regulate
and maintain conducive order of social, economic and political co-existence and
interdependence. Supportive evidence for this assumption is provided by Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau (Appadorai 1968) and Samuel Huntington (1993) among
others. The rule of political engagement is defined by the constitution which is
document whose content is mutually endorsed by members of the civil society.
The abuse of the rules of engagement and even development and its effects on
the Niger Delta accounts for the militant uprising in the Niger Delta region and
conflicts in the world at large. This is worse in societies where ethno-religious
identity and discrimination formed the baseline for political interaction and the
distribution of national resources. To this end, Dudley Seer argued that the
violence and instability in Nigeria is a necessary and inescapable condition in the
creation of the political order and is thus intimately bound up with the process of
modernization
and
political
development
(FRN:
Federal
Republic
of
Nigeria:2002). The pressure to modernise and develop the community and the
human capital placed much premium on government beyond the level
accommodated by political interest and left in its wake political alienation and
the armed struggle in the Niger Delta. The militant uprising means that the
institutional platforms put in place by government to address the problem of
underdevelopment in the Niger Delta are inadequate and ineffective. Until the
introduction of the Amnesty Programme by the Yar’ Adua administration, the
militant uprising in the Niger Delta was hardly surmounted by government. This
underscores the effectiveness of the amnesty programme to addressing the
challenges of human capital development in the Niger Delta hence its
sustainability will yield sustainable result.
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Theoretical Background
The theory adopted for this paper is the theory of the Conspiracy of the Equal.
The theory is developed by author of this paper with a view to providing a new
intellectual horizon for interpreting, analysing and understanding the dynamics of
the armed struggle in the Niger Delta region. The theory also broaden the
intellectual horizon for understanding and interpreting the social context of
governance, social injustice and revolt orchestrated by man in a bid to determine
and justify who gets what, when and how out of a nations resources. Embedded
in the theory is the phenomenon of alienation, aggression and the attempt to
address the problem through armed struggle. The baseline for this theory is the
phenomenon of political, economic and social alienation characteristics of
capitalism and phenomenal to the elite theory. The argument provided by elite
theorists like Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Robert
Michels (1876-1936) and Ikelebe (1984) among others are correlated with the
assumptions of the theory of the conspiracy of the equal hence its review for
study.
The theory of the Conspiracy of the Equal is premised on the assumption that
society is organized on the basis of class category and governed along lines of
class inequality and injustice. The class structure and its associated injustices are
expressed in political, economic and social terms and this is used to define the
material, intellectual and political influence of individuals and groups in society.
Going by Marxist assumption, society is made up of three pyramidal class
structure such as the upper, middle and lower classes. Each class is defined by
implicit economic and political interest that is ideologically selfish, bias and
discriminatory. In this case, a class is defined by the relative equal opportunity
enjoyed by members of each class in terms of wealth, power, political placement
and decision making rights. Indeed, the upper class controls the infrastructure of
governance in society and defines the rules of engagement for members of all
classes. The rule of engagement among groups is associated with political
intrigue, persuasion, force and conspiracy to outwit the other. Political interaction
among individuals and groups across classes is relative deceptive based on their
ideological disposition. The equal in the context of this paper are likened to
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
Mosca’s (1939) political elites, Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1961) lion and fox and
Robert Michel’s (1915) oligarchies. The ideological premise upon these class
categories operate is subjective, diversionary and exclusive. Arising from the
Pareto’s (1935) hypothesis and Linz’s (2006) assumption, the equals use force
and persuasion to control of the distribution of funds, circulation of information,
promotions and political power and in the process alienate and exploit the
resources of the state. The conspiracy to alienate others is structured along class
line and class boundary. The class boundary defines the limit of class interest and
class goal. The goal defines the means to achieving the class goals hence the
collective commitment to the pursuit of class interest. This is the basis for the
control and retention of political power by members of the ruling political party
or ethnic group beyond the time equity limit that accommodate the political,
economic and social interest of other groups as it is in Togo, Congo DR,
Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. In these societies and periods under
consideration, political power is structured to alienate other political or ethnic
groups.
In many countries in Africa, political power is appropriated as an ethnic resource
and held in trust for the ethnic group that controls political power. The group or
class with higher conspiratorial skill gains control of political power and used
such resources to wittingly and covertly restrict the access of other groups to
political power. The privileged members of the dominant ethnic, religious and or
political group used their resources to secure control of state power and therein
place restriction on access to power and the common wealth on members of the
out-group. This is evident where political power is exercised with ethno-religious
bias. The exercise of political power with ethno-religious bias in Nigeria has
burdened the Nigeria project with the assumption that some ethno-religious
groups are destine to rule perpetually and some are destine to be ruled
perpetually. This has increase the burden of alienation of ethno-religious groups
and fuelled conflict of higher magnitude like it is Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi
and Congo Dr. In this context, politics is seen as a conservative game associated
with the political conspiracy to outwit, exclude, discrimination and alienate
others. In a nascent democracy where the winner-takes-all phenomenon
predominates, the ruling political party used irrational political principle to
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distribute political appointment and other economic resources in favour of its
members at the expense of member of the opposition party. This type of political
alienation leads to the rigging of election, ballot box snatching and electoral
violence to win election by all means. According to Otinche (2015), alienation
has many dimensions: self alienation, alienation of the poor by the rich, the poor
by the poor, alienation shrouded in religious obligations/hypocrisy and the
alienation of labour by labour. These types of alienation are rooted in the political
and economic commitment of the self, individual, parents, religious institutions,
government and labour and are engendered by the alienation from education. In
attempt to address the injustices, social and political platforms for violence and
armed struggle are dependably used. The process of the armed struggle and
conflicts in terms of the recruitment and training of ethno-religious foot soldiers
for the struggle is financed by ethno-religious leaders. The armed struggle is an
instrument for securing greater political concession from the group that controls
political power.
The conspiracy to retain control of political power by the northern oligarchy led
to the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election claimed to have been
won by M.K.O. Abiola under the platform of the Social Democratic Party (SDP),
the Yoruba agitation against the annulment and the emergence of Olusegun
Obasanjo as president on May 29 1999, the armed struggle in the Niger Delta and
the emergence of Ebele Goodluck Jonathan as Vice President in 2007 and
President in 2011, the Boko Haram insurgency and the emergence of President
Muhammadu Buhari as President on May 29 2015 as well as the agitation by the
Igbo for a sovereign state of Biafra as a prelude to the possibility of an Igbo
Presidency in 2023. Obe (2015) argued that renewed agitation for the sovereign
state of Biafra brought to the fore the flaws in the Nigerian federation. These
intriguing political situations emanates from two dialectical phenomena, the
conspiracy to retain political power and the conspiracy to gain access to political
power. This can also be explained within the intricate but interconnected political
design to possess by distabilisation. The Yoruba uprising after the annulment of
the June 1993 presidential election, the armed struggle in the Niger Delta, the
Boko Haram insurgency and the Biafra uprising are political tools designed by
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
political and ethno-religious gladiators to reverse the trend of alienation and gain
control of political power by distabilisation. Conservative democratic philosophy
upholds the believe fact that one political or ethnic group should not hand over
political power to another political or ethnic group on a platter of gold. The
intrigue associated with the conservative political principle recognizes the
strategy to gain control of political power by distabilisation (militant agitation) as
the case in Burundi shows. This is more so where incumbent leaders in mostly
Africa do not understand the principle that underlie liberal democracy, free
political competition and electoral majority vote and the fundamental principle of
political change and inter-party political transition. Realistically, the dependence
on this negative resource as an effective tool to gain control of political power
reveals the paradox of nation building in Nigeria and Africa at large. In a multiethnic and multi-religious nation like Nigeria, the constitution cannot
accommodate all the paradoxical issues associated with governance and nation
building. Some of the issues that have strained ethno-religious and political
relations in Nigeria can be better resolved from the moral point of view. Morality
provides the calculus for political leaders to navigate the political scene and make
political accommodations for others irrespective of constitutional provision.
Political morality brought Adam Oshiomhole an Auchiman to power as governor
in Edo state, Yahaya Bello, an Ebiraman as governor of Kogi state, Emmannuel
Udom an Eketman as governor in Akwa Ibom state and Ben Ayade, a Betteman,
as governor in Cross River state against the political paradoxes that surround
their emergence. The moral benefits of retaining Emmanuel Udom and Yahaya
Bello as governors in Akwa Ibom and Kogi states respectively outweigh the
political benefits of using judicial rationality to nullify the elections irrespective
of the legal foundation to do so. These moral calculi have resolved the problems
of alienation in these states and if undermined would create more problem than
imagine. As Otinche (2015) argued, what is morally right might be politically
wrong and what is politically right might be morally wrong. Across the world,
the crisis of nation building and the attendant conflicts emanates from politicoeconomic alienation. Alienation as a social construct identified by Karl Marx
reveals the devastating effect of discrimination in political, economic and social
relations in society. Governance by alienation separates man from his physical
and mental state of being and the social processes to which he is a part and to
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which his personality is enhanced. Governance by alienation is responsible for
the gross underdevelopment, environmental degradation and poverty in the Niger
Delta region. It is a feature of capitalism that seeks to promote political,
economic and social exclusion and exploitation from the premise that some
people, ethno-religious and political groups and or nations should be made poor
for others to be made rich (Otinche, 2015). This false consciousness creates
subjective economic conditions that distorts and split off man’s personality from
his ego, integrity, personality, physical and material well-being and stimulate the
ego to resist the status quo ante. The basis for alienation is access to capital and
political power and restriction to capital and political power. The poverty and
aggression it engenders distorts the processes of development and nation building
given the resort to mechanisms of self-defense like corruption, violence,
militancy, insurgency, kidnapping and law arbitrariness. According to Ollman
(1971), laws are concerned with patterns of reciprocal effect. In this context, the
reciprocal effect of alienation is the intermittent and persistent conspiratorial
revolt against the state.
In another dimension, the theory of the conspiracy of the equals reveals the trend
of political interactions between elites and non-elite group. The elites are persons
who by virtue of the strategic position they occupy in society influence political
outcomes regularly and substantially to their advantage Higley (n.d). The elites
have the organized capacity to initiate and bring about political changes and or
fuelled political conflict with much vigour. They are persons at the top of the
pyramid of political, economic, and social power (Putnam, 1976) and consist of
senior politicians, rich businessmen, senior civil servants, senior military officers,
traditional rulers and academic professors with varying degrees of influence in
political and social organizations of society. The elites in the ethno-religious
groups where the Arewa Consultative Forum, the Odua Peoples’ Congress, the
South-South Peoples Assembly, the Movement for the Emancipation of the
People of Niger Delta and the Movement for Actualisation of the Sovereign State
of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) had
surreptitious relationship with the agitators in Nigeria. They may also have given
surreptitious supports to military regimes
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
witnessed in the past in Nigeria. Military coup is justified by the conspiracy to
rule by force and to undermine democracy values. However, in a liberal
democracy, government thrives on the conspiracy to rule by political intrigue,
consensus building, political bargaining and trade-off. These values established
the ethical foundation for democratic growth, institution building and nation
building.
There are three dimensions of conspiracy. The first conspiracy manifest as the
conspiracy of the equal of the upper class from the dominant ethno-religious and
political group in control of political power against the equal of the alienated
ethno-religious and political group-political outcast. The second dimension is the
conspiracy of the equals of the upper class against the equals of the middle and
lower class: the less privileged in society. The third conspiracy is the conspiracy
of the equal at the middle and lower social class of the pyramid against the equals
of the upper group. Each class conspiracy is subversively anti-class. Underlying
this assumption is the fact that society is organized on the basis of class interest
which is bias. Generally, political conspiracy can be neutralized by the law of
persuasion and or imposition. The former appeals to the conscience of man and is
morally self-restraining. This is a potent force in the fight against corruption,
discrimination, alienation and violence. The later is compulsive and radically
revolutionary and it is invoked when the former fails to bring the desired moral
change in society. It can also be used as deterrence to violence and deployed as
law arbitrariness or substitution by elimination. The late General Sani Abacha
invoked the rule of law arbitrariness and substitution by elimination on Ken Saro
Wiwa and the eight Ogonimen (the Ogoni nine) that were in the vanguard of the
Niger Delta struggle. Substitution by elimination helps establish a moral sociopolitical order in society that has suffered from chronic moral degeneracy. But in
the case of the Ogoni nine, it created more problem than it seeks to achieve hence
political alienation cannot be sustained through the invidious use of substitution
by elimination but by consensus building and trade-off. Generally, political
conspiracy breeds alienation, discrimination, discontent, frustration and
aggression hence its tendency to disrupt the nation building projects. It leads to
the abuse of due process, the rule of law, rule of political engagement and abuse
of power. These political fundamentals are at variance with spirit of justice,
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equity and fairness hence Rauf Aregbesola, Governor of Osun state, argued, the
essence of power is not the privilege it carries but what it can be used to achieve
for the people over whom it is exercised (Adeosun, 2015). He argued that for a
leader to enjoy absolute loyalty from the citizens he must be guided by their
interest. The consideration given to the interest of the people is a deterrent to
alienation and corruption. Corruption revolves around the conspiracy to alienate
the masses from the common wealth. In the past, allegation of corruption was
mobilised by the military to overthrow incumbent regimes. The overthrow of the
civilian regime by the military or a military regime by a military junta falls
within the rational principles that one political class was alienated by another
political class within the military and civilian class. Intrinsically, the coups and
counter-coups that Nigeria witnessed between January 15, 1966 and May 29,
1999 was informed by the conspiracy to gain control of power by a cliché within
the political class and the military organisation. The decision is taken on the basis
of mutual interest and common partisan military inclinations to use force and
coercion in the state building process. The social acceptance of military regimes
in the past underscored the conspiratorial assumption by the elites that peace and
progress, political stability and development flow from the barrel of the guns and
it is ideologically driven. In an ideal democracy, people unite to pursue common
political goals from an ideological point of view. Ideology provides the visionary
framework for political action, national integration, consensus building,
institution building, good governance and sustainable development. In another
dimension, ideology provides less flexible platform for political displacement by
election and or military coup. In most cases, it is dogmatic, oppressive and
subversive and predisposed to suppress, supplants and retains political power
over a dynastic period. The cases in Russia (1917-date), Italy (1922-1925),
Germany (1933-1934), North Korea (1946-date), China (1949-date), Cuba
(1959-date) and Iran (1979-date) are significantly evident of ideological
commitment to nation building. Ideological commitments lead to the
displacement and elimination by substitution of a ruling cliché if the ruling cliché
is prone to the underdevelopment a nation. Political discrimination breeds
political alienation, political disagreement, political violence, civil wars and
political instability of the types witnessed in Burundi, South Sudan, Congo DR
and Cote d’ Ivoire among others. The solution this problem lies in consensus
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
building, political bargaining, trade-off and the formation of broad based political
coalition on the basis of mutual trust (Burton and Higley, 1987). Consensus
building and trade-off led to the attainment of political independence by Nigeria
on October 1st 1960, the end of the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), the
emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as president on May 29, 1999-May 29 2007
after the June 12 1993 election controversy and the Ebele Goodluck Jonathan as
the premium from the Niger Delta struggle. In a related development, Pareto
(1935) argued that an upheaval (sic trade-off) of this kind eventually brings a
substantially different body of persons to elite (sic equal) status (sic power); and
change the political and economic institutions relevant to its interest in
fundamental ways. This levelling up phenomenon is sometimes resisted by a
cliché that controls state power hence political bargaining and trade-off are often
granted on the basis of test of strength of political strength of intimidation.
Generally, political consensus is reached by groups on the basis that the equal
treatment of individuals and groups promote social justice, peace and progress
hence the efficacy of the amnesty programme in taming the tide of militant
agitation and the restoration of peace to the Niger Delta region and the
improvement on the revenue base of government from the sale of crude oil.
Remote Causes of the Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta
In the quest for self sufficiency in the production of human needs, man has tamed
the natural environment to his advantage hence the exploitation of solid and
liquid mineral resources like oil in the Niger Delta for the benefit of man. This
human activity had negative effects on the environment and has raise concern
about sustaining the health of the rural inhabitants. The armed struggle in the
Niger Delta is as a result of the negative impact of oil exploration on the
environment and the politics of underdevelopment introduced due to the
imperialism of oil trade. Gunboat diplomacy was deployed by the British to
achieve imperialistic goals leading to the dethronement of Kings like William
Dappa Pepple of Bonny Kingdom, Jaja of Opobo and Nana Olomu of Itsekiri
Kingdom of Warri among others by the British. This pave way for the
expropriation of the economic resources of the local people, the destruction of
indigenous political institutions, and the institution of violence and coercion
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political structure in Nigeria and the Niger Delta. A crisis of legitimacy sets in
and this resulted to violent attacks by the native population to restore economic
and political control of their political community. In the face of this struggle the
existing political institutions were replaced with the western European type
(warrant chiefs and native authorities) and subjected to imperial control. This
vitiated the power of the people to hold their rulers accountable. The climax of
the economic and political imperialism introduced by Taubman Goldie and
Frederick Lugard brought economic monopoly, the imposition of illegal tariff on
local produce and wide spread economic hardship that compelled King William
Koko of the city state of Nembe to organize violent uprising against the colonial
state. The British war ships deployed to quell the uprising brought the town of
Brass and other fishing communities to ruin in 1895 similar to the invasion of
Odi by the Obasanjo administration in the year 2000 with high causality figures.
This was ostensibly done to create economic niche for the firm owned by
Taubman Goldie which was later renamed the Royal Niger Company. The
company grew into an imperial government and facilitated the colonization of
Nigeria from the 1900 (Onwubiko, 1972) onward. To this end, land and its
imbedded resources were appropriated by the colonial state via the Mineral Act
of 1914 which vested all colonial land and minerals in the hands of the British
Crown and the colonial state. This paves way for the forces of colonial and neocolonial capitalism to exploit mineral resources with utter disregard to
environmental safety and sustainability and wellbeing of the inhabitants. In
Plateau state of Nigeria hallowed minefield as landmarks of tin mining distorted
the landscape of arable lands used by the rural inhabitants for farming. No
attempt was made reclaim the land and adequate compensation was not paid to
the rural inhabitants whose land has been devastated. This is the case of Oloibiri
in River State where abandoned oil wells has made the environment susceptible
to pollution and the inhabitants to health hazard
From the political dimension, the refusal of the British colonial government and
the leaders of the three dominant political parties – the Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) and the
Action Group (A.G) to grant ethnic minority groups some measure of political
and economic freedom in 1957 (Nnoli, 1977) means that agitation against
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
political and economic injustice in the Niger Delta is inevitable. The Willink
Commission was set up to allay the fears of the minority but the solution
proffered by the commission to minority right was politically rational than
economic. The alienation and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region has
historical reality with British colonialism and imperialism of oil trade. The
Nigerian state and the oil companies paid little attention to the sociological
values of the people of the Niger Delta region. Notably, their culture, traditional
healthcare system, native religions and beliefs system were desecrated and
destroyed. The conflict is partly a reaction to the loss of their traditional values
and the need to restore the cultural identity of the Niger Delta people.
The Immediate Causes
The Nigerian state did very little to improve the living conditions of the people of
the Niger Delta region in terms of human capital and infrastructural development.
The lack of attention paid to the welfare of the people by the Nigerian state
engenders the conflict in the Niger Delta. The lack of basic social amenities and
the inability of the federal government and the oil companies to fulfill their social
responsibility mandate to the Niger Delta people undermined the Fundamental
Objective and Directive Principle of State Policy enshrined in Section 2 (17) of
the 1999 constitution. Explicitly, subsection 17 (d) states that government shall
exploit the human and natural resources for the good of the community (FRN:
1999). Under subsection 17(f), the constitution mandate the government to
ensure that Nigerians are protected from any form of exploitation and moral and
material neglect. Section 140 (1) of the 1963 Constitution mandate the federal
government to pay 50% of the royalty or mining rent to the mineral producing
community (Omoweh, 2001). The Niger Delta people have no access to good
sources of drinking water, hospital, school, and good means of transportation and
communication, electricity and recreation facilities. This is an aberration of the
doctrine of corporate social responsibility which bestowed enormous
responsibility on the government and the oil companies to provide basic facilities
for the people. According to Kaliski (2001) government, corporation,
organization or individual has a social responsibility to society. Investigations
have revealed that both the Nigerian state and the oil companies adopted the
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negative approach to social responsibility. Oil companies like Shell, Mobil,
Chevron and Agip which are major stakeholders in oil business in the Niger
Delta have renege on providing social amenities to the host communities. The
inability of the oil majors to invest part of the profit generated on social
investment in the host community aggravated the social problems their bad
relationship with the Niger Delta communities. This has negative implications on
government-oil company-community relations. The bulk passing between the
federal government and the oil companies over the underdevelopment of the
Niger Delta is a fall out of the Land Use Decree of 1978, the Oil Pipeline Act of
1990, the Petroleum Act of 2004, the Nigeria Mineral/Mining Act of 2004
(Omoweh, 2001), the Mineral Act of 1914, the 1967 Oil Decree and which
vested the right to land and its mineral resources on the federal government.
Hence, the neglect in the development of the Niger Delta region was justified by
political rationality that surrounds the equity holdings between government and
the oil companies. In the same vein, the conflict is justified by the social
rationality that violent agitation secured political and economic concession for
the agitators.
Generally, the dialectics of oil politics in Nigeria revolves around the interest of
the Federal government and the interest of oil companies. In the joint venture
agreement in the oil sector, the Nigerian government and the oil companies have
unequal stakeholders’ status. The federal government provides the political
environment for crude oil exploitation, the oil companies the technology and
financial capital required for the oil exploitation. Given the joint venture
agreement (JVA), the development of the Niger Delta region is the collective
responsibility of government and the oil companies and the resources obligations
for development defined by their equity status. The bulk passing between the
Nigerian government and the oil companies angered the Niger Delta youths in
the face of the devastation of the environment due to oil exploration. The multistakeholder nature of the oil business makes it difficult to define the boundaries
of social responsibility. There is a contractual agreement between the major oil
companies like Shell, Mobil, Agip and Chevron among others with Oil Servicing
Companies (OSCs) like Seismographic Services Limited, Flopetrol Nigeria
Limited, Halliburton, Bariod Nigeria Limited, Anadri Nigeria Limited, Dowell
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
Schumberger and Sedco Nigeria Limited. The OSC are contracted by the major
oil companies to provide critical services in the oil industries. Since their services
are recognised by law, they also should have borne some degree of social
responsibility to develop the host communities. The origin of the OSC is traced
to the United States governments Anti-Trust Law of 1911 that seek to break the
monopoly of oil companies. In Nigeria, oil servicing companies have no
leasehold but work in partnership with the major oil companies. They are
responsible for the finding and wining of oil blocks, transportation and storage of
the extracted crude oil on behalf of the major oil companies. In the contractual
relationship, the OSCs are committed to the major oil companies and as such care
less about the protection of the environment of the oil producing communities.
The reckless attitude of the OSCs in oil prospecting in the Niger Delta region
(NDR) and the continued flaring of gas accounts for the high rate of
environmental pollution and degradation in the NDR (Azaiki, 2001; Nwaomah,
2009). The gas flared has adverse effect on the environment and the health of
man. The oil companies have shown less commitment to halting gas flaring.
Rather, they embark on the invidious strategy of divide and rule and
accumulation by dispossession. Pretentiously, the Nigerian government enacted
the Gas Re-Injection Decree in 1979 to halt the degradation of the environment
to no avail. The result is a buildup of anti-state and anti oil company
consciousness and sentiment.
It is argued that the inequitable distribution of oil resources and the
underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region are responsible for the armed
struggle in the Nigeria Delta (FRN, 2003). The distribution of oil resources is
done through a revenue sharing formula and the principle of derivation. This is
defined by subjective political realities that reduced the percentage of derivation
from 50% in the 1960s to 13%. Attempts to review the principle of derivation to
50% have generated controversies in National Political Reform Conferences as
was evident in 2005 due to the unyielding attitude of political actors. The
agitation for resource control was aggravated by the exposure of the Niger Delta
youths to the influence of oil money on the development of the Federal Capital
Territory Abuja when they came to Abuja in 1994/1995 to promote the selfsuccession bid of late General Sani Abacha as a democratic president. The pent-
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S I Otinche
up frustration, anger and feelings of abandonment and the execution of Ken Saro
Wiwa and eight other Ogonimen had a social facilitation effect on the armed
struggle in the Niger Delta region. From the liberal perspective, the armed
struggle in the Niger Delta region is a democratic struggle for economic justice.
The reluctance by government and stakeholders in the oil industry to respect the
basic tenets of economic democracy is one of the major causes of the armed
struggle in the area. The prime position of oil resources to the political economy
of Nigeria and the host communities had influence their attitude to the conflict.
The approach adopted by government to resolving the Niger Delta problem was
dynamics and persuasive and coercive.
State Response to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta
The federal government of Nigeria is a major stakeholder in the management of
conflicts in society. Sometimes, the federal government adopts the coercive or
the persuasive approach in line with political, economic and social contingencies
that gave rise to the uprising. The response of government to the management of
the Niger Delta crisis is coercive and persuasive.
The Coercive Approach
The government of Nigeria has monopoly control over the use of power and this
is deployed by the president in a coercive or persuasive manner. The
circumstances for government intervention and the character of political
leadership are major determinant in the exercise of power. In relation to the Niger
Delta, the coercive approach adopted by government to solving the Niger Delta
question is a product of political rationality and class interest in political
ideology. Political power is deployed for arbitrary use when the revenue base of
the ruling class is threatened by popular or sectarian revolt. The revenue from the
sale of crude oil accounts for about 80% of Nigeria’s revenue. The Nigerian
budget is prepared based on the predetermined reference price of crude oil in a
fiscal year (FRA: Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007). The policy of government to
manage oil resources by accumulation by dispossession in line with bourgeois
class ideology accounts for the revolutionary ferment that pitted the Niger Delta
169
State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
youths against the federal government and the oil companies wherein the Joint
Military Task Force (JMTF) were deployed to quell the militant uprising.
The agitation in the Niger Delta assumed a violent dimension in the 1990s.
Notably, the Ogoni Bill of Rights was launched in 1990 to empower the Ogonis
in the struggle to control the economic resources embedded in their land. In
response to this development, the military regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi
Babangida promulgated the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree in May
1993. The made criminal any agitation by any minority ethnic group against the
Nigerian state a treasonable offence punishable by death. Police and military
personnel were deployed to protect oil installations and enforce peace in the
Niger Delta region. Warships were deployed to the Nembe, Ogbia and Southern
Ijaw communities in Bayelsa state to protect the onshore and offshore oil
facilities and to crush any violent uprising. For instance, the protest by the
Umuechem community in Rivers State in 1989 against the degradation of their
environment and the blockage of access road to Shell’s oil and gas fields was
repelled by the military in a manner that led to the death of five (5) policemen
and 30 villagers (including a traditional ruler Chief Odu and his three wives). The
entire village was destroyed. Leaders of Movement for Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP) like Ken Saro Wiwa and eight Ogoni men were arrested,
detained and brutally murdered by the General Sani Abacha military
administration in utter neglect of the appeal for clemency from the international
community. It was alleged that military operations was funded by Shell (purchase
of arms for the police) to reinforce the invidious strategy to accumulate by terror
the oil resources in the Niger Delta region (NDR). This is corporate
irresponsibility.
Persuasive Approach
One of the strategies adopted by the Nigerian government to address the problem
of underdevelopment and relative deprivation in the Niger Delta region was the
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960. The
failure of NDDB to make significant progress in the development of the NDR
170
S I Otinche
and the subjection of the principle of derivation to the dialectics of political
realism undermined the vision to attain the goals of development in the NDR. In
October 1974, the General Yakubu Gowon military administration reviewed the
principles of derivation from 50% to 45% and 20% (Aja and Emerise 2000). In
1982, the National Assembly further reduced the proportion of mining rents and
royalties accruable to states from 20% to 5% (Adedeji, 1992). In the same
manner, the Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida military regime reduced the derivable
fund from 5% to 1.5% and subsequently to 3% in May 1992. The Babangida
military administration also set up the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development
Commission (OMPADEC) in place of the Presidential Task Force of 1988 via
Decree No. 23 of 1992. The Commission was saddled with the responsibility to
develop the NDR. The effectiveness of the Commission to meet up with the
enormous task of development in the region and the results achieved is as
subjective as opinions on the subject matter. OMPADEC was replaced by the
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000.
The NDDC was saddled with the responsibility to develop the human and the
material components of the Niger Delta region through the implementation of
goal-oriented programmes. The commission activities is funded by the 10%
monthly deduction from the Federation Account due to oil producing states, 3%
of total budget of oil and gas processing companies, 50% of the ecological fund
allocated to the oil producing states and proceeds from NDDC assets and foreign
assistance (FRN, 2003:211). Although the NDDC had made remarkable progress
in the development of the Niger Delta region, patronage politics has affected the
achievement of its goals. Under the Yar’ Adua administration, the Ministry of
Niger Delta was established to oversee the development of the region. The result
of this intervention is limited due to the narrow scope of stakeholders’
participation. This means that the development of the Niger Delta region requires
a multi-stakeholder approach or intervention. The oil companies have provided
some social amenities like clinics, schools and roads for some communities in the
region but they fall short of regional need and the best practice mechanism for
policy intervention. The international best practice in oil exploration requires
government and the oil companies to plough back a significant percentage of the
profit generated from business activities in the NDR into the development of the
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
region, halt gas flaring and the proper manage exhausted oil wells. This is
handled with technical negligence. The technical inability of government to carry
out regular catholic maintenance of flow lines and conduct environmental impact
assessment of oil spillage on the environment is questionable. This tragic
situation eroded the confidence the people of the NDR have on government and
the oil companies.
Many committees were set up by the federal government to assess the level of
underdevelopment and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta and to
identify measures to ameliorate them. Some of those committees are the Belgore
Report of 1992, the Etiebet Report, the Poopola Report of 1998 and the
Ogomudia Report of 2001 among others. In November 2008, a Technical Report
on the Niger Delta was submitted to Yar’Adua administration (FRN: RTCND,
2008:1-162). However, Omoweh (2001) and Buzan (1983) argued that the Vision
2020 report of 1996 failed to address the issue of environmental degradation in
the Niger Delta region. These policy measures undertaken by the federal
government was not accompanied by concrete measures to reverse the trend of
underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. Until recently, the attitude of the federal
government and the oil companies to the development of the NDR was lukewarm
due to two contradictory trends. The first contradiction is the claim by the major
oil companies that they pay taxes to government and are therefore not responsible
for the development of the host community. This is made worse by the splitting
of oil fields into offshore-onshore fields. By this consideration, the intervention
by the oil companies in the provision of social amenities like tarred roads, market
stalls, medical centre, boreholes, and blocks of classrooms, generator sets,
cassava grinding machines and scholarship is a mark of philanthropy. Other areas
of intervention are agricultural extension services, fish farming, cassava farming,
and palm and pineapples plantations, fertilizers as well as plantain/banana
suckers. In the 1960s, Mobil, Agip and Shell implemented community
development projects in Eket, (Akwa Ibom) Okpai (Delta state) and Bori (River
state) respectively. Shell invested in oil palm, cassava and fish farming. In
partnership with the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), Shell promotes the production of cassava. The project which was
valued at $20 million was financed by $15.5 million equity contribution from
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S I Otinche
Shell and $4.5 million from USAID. In the same vein, Shell had through
theWorld Bank funded the Niger Delta Environmental Survey with the sum of
$100 million. These interventions arenot adequate compared with the degree of
environmental degradation caused by oil exploration, oil spillage and gas flaring.
The impact of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta is acknowledged by
Azaiki (2013). The impact of these interventions on food security in the Niger
Delta and Nigeria at large cannot be undermined. The development of the NDR
is a dual mandate for government and the oil companies and this is in line with
the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) designed by Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. The stake of the Nigerian government in
the oil industry is managed by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC).
The Niger Delta Commission lacked of fund to finance development projects.
The commission is underfunded and its operations undermined by patronage
politics. However, the introduction of the Integrated Master Plan for the
development of the Niger Delta by the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua
administration and the established the Federal Ministry of the Niger Delta to
facilitate the development of the area is a demonstration of the right political will
to address the Niger Delta problem. Embedded in the master plan is the Amnesty
Programme introduced on 26th June 2009 to rehabilitate the Niger Delta militants.
A 60-day period of grace was allowed for armed youths to surrender their
weapons in return for state pardon. Guns arms and ammunition (about 2, 700)
used by the militants were handed over to the federal government in return for
state pardon. Okoli (2013) reported that the ex-militants handed over 2,760 arms,
287,445 ammunitions, 3155 magazines, 1090 dynamite caps, 763 explosives and
sticks of dynamites and 18 gun boats to the Presidential Committee. The
Amnesty programme involves a phased process of demobilization, disarmament,
rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR). The first phase involves demobilization
and disarmament by the militants, the second phase, rehabilitated and the third
phase the reintegration of the militants into the society through capacity building
in vocational centers established in Rivers, Cross River and Delta states. Most of
the ex-militants have undergone training in Ghana, South Africa, the Philippines,
Russia, Ukraine, India, the United Arab Emirates,
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
Dubai and the United Kingdom in welding and fabrication, entrepreneurship,
carpentry and plumbing electrical installation, oil drilling and Information and
Communication Technology. The programme is coordinated by the Ministry of
Niger Delta, the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the National
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and the Small and Medium Scale
Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN). A presidential Amnesty
Committee (PAC) was also assigned to oversee the effective implementation of
the amnesty programme. The sum of N50 billion (US$145 million) was budgeted
for the training of twenty six thousand (26,000) registered ex-militants. This was
increased to N68 billion when the number of ex-militants increased to 30,000.
The oil companies gave the sum of $30 million in support of the amnesty
programme. The militants were placed on a monthly allowance of sixty five
thousand (N65, 000. 00) naira. However, the Amnesty granted the Niger Delta
militants surreptitiously led to agitation for the granting amnesty to members of
the Boko Haram sect and the emergence of many militants groups prospective to
enjoying amnesty from government. The attempt to solve the Niger Delta
militancy through the amnesty programme has been politicized with the rhetoric
that endanger the sovereignty of Nigeria if consideration is given to the
relationship between the government of Benue state and the concerned armed
robbers that surreptitiously surrender their arms to the state government for state
pardon in 2015 under the governor Samuel Ortom’s administration.
The Political Economy of the Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta
Economic need is central to man’s socio-cultural and political existence. It is the
most fundamental needs identified by Abraham Maslow and acknowledged by
Schuman and Oluf 111 (1988). Economic resources enable man to satisfy his
physiological need for food, shelter and clothing and to also provide basis
security for himself. It enhances the esteem of man and helps him actualize his
dreams. A sound economic foundation gives man the leverage to practice his
religion, maintain his cultural identity and finance his political projects.
Economic foundation defines the class structure of society and the well-being of
individuals. In support of this view, Ake (1981) argued that Those from the
economically privilege groups tend to be more better educated, have higher
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S I Otinche
social status and are more successful professionally and politically. This had
produce inequality, which tend to reproduce itself in society. Those who are
economically privilege tend to be interested in preserving the existing social
order and those who are disadvantaged by the social order, partially in its
distribution of wealth, have strong interest in changing the social order
particularly its wealth distribution patterns (sic like the Niger Deltans). In so far
as there is economic inequality in a society that society cannot have political (sic
economic) democracy because political power will tend to polarize economic
power. In addition, a society where a high degree of economic inequality exists
must necessarily be repressive. This repression arises from the need to curb the
inevitable demand of the have-nots for resource redistribution.
The demand by the people of the Niger Delta for the equitable distribution of the
oil resources snowballed into the armed struggle. To this extent, economic
injustice defines the context and content of the armed struggle and the morality
that sustain the armed struggle against the morality that preserved the existing
inequality in the distribution of oil resources in Nigeria. The existing socioeconomic order that promotes illiteracy, unemployment, poverty and inequality is
preserved by the comprador and metropolitan elites for their selfish interest. The
militant activities in the Niger Delta region, the North East and the Kidnapping in
the South East have turned Nigerian into a theatre of terrorism and insurgency.
Many expatriate workers are reluctant to accept job offers in Nigeria for safety
reason. This has negative implications on foreign direct investment to the Niger
Delta region, the north east and Nigeria in general. This has also weakened the
economic foundation upon which democracy is built. Realistically, the
implementation of development programmes in these regions has been disrupted.
Contractors abandoned their project sites for fear of attack by the militants. Many
expatriate workers were abducted and huge amount of money paid as ransome to
secure their release. Some of the known cases were the payment of N1.4billion
by the Group Managing Director of the Nigeria National Petroleum Company
(NNPC) Alhaji Abubakar Lawal Yar’ Adua to the militants (Ogbodo, 2008). In
the same vein, MEND received the sum of N70 million from Agip as payment
for the release of four (4) expatriate workers. The kidnapping of nine Philpinos
prompted President Gloria Arroyo of Philliphines to place travel ban on her
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
nationals to Nigeria. This was a dangerous diplomatic trend. Some lives were
loss in some of the encounters with the militant and the intervention by
government. The invasion of Odi community by the Obasanjo administration was
a national holocaust. The loss of lives occasioned by the invasion contravenes the
United Nations Declaration on Human rights of December 10, 1948 which
promotes the dignity of the human person and the Common wealth values ratified
on March 13, 2001 (Commonwealth Modules on Youth Development Work,
2001).
Many attacks were launched on oil installations, oil workers kidnapped by the
militants for ransome and petroleum pipeline vandalized to siphon crude oil for
sale. The growing dimension pipeline vanadalism and the oil for arms deal
between the militants and their agents exposed the international dimension to the
armed struggle in Niger Delta. The militancy in the Niger Delta provided ready
market for conflict entrepreneurs involved in the oil-for-arms deal. Many
multinational firms like Niger Dock Company, a ship building company were
accused of arm racketeering in the Niger Delta region. The artistry displayed by
militants in the use of weapon of warfare leaves much room for suspicion on the
involvement of international agents in the training of the militants. This
complacent relationship endangers the sovereignty of the Nigerian nation and
exposes the volatility of the Nigerian nation to external threat. The militancy in
the Niger Delta has social facilitation effects on the Boko Haram insurgency in
the North East and the agitation for the sovereign state of Biafra by the
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB).
The contingent effects on the emergence of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as
President in 2011 and President Muhammadu Buhari as President in 2015 put to
rest the assumption that the Igbo agitation will never be suppress unless the Igbo
nation is made the president of Nigeria in 2023. The ironic situation in the Biafra
agitation is that the ghost of Biafra still lives with us and may continue to live so
long as the Igboman is discriminated against in the access to the presidency
sharing formular. The arrest of the leaders of militant groups like Alhaji Mujahid
Asari Dokabo (NDPVF), Ralph Uwazurike (MASSOB), Ganiyu Adams,
Fredrick Fashuen (OPC); and Nmandi Kanu (Azu, 2015) is less remedial to
solving the crisis in the same vein as the blood of Ken Saro Wiwa and the eight
176
S I Otinche
Ogonis dissolved in the Niger Delta struggle by late General Sani Abacha and
Mohammed Yusuf did not subdue the agitation against injustice. These Saro
Wiwa and Mohammed Yusuf incidences show that the truth for man stand for
and fight for cannot be dissolved in his blood. In the same vein, the arrest and
detention of Ateke Tom in the year 2005, the attendant invasion of police stations
and the State Criminal Investigation Department (SCID) to secure his release and
release of about 125 to 300 prisoners by the militants undermined the military
capability of the Nigerian government and the principle of civil policing.
Describing the military sophistry displayed by the militants, Agbo (2007) argued
that:Gun blazed, car windscreen (sic were) shattered, police vehicles set ablaze,
women and children scurried for cover, stray bullets hit the unfortunate and the
skyline of old Port Harcourt darkened from the bonfire of yet another blow-out
between the youths of Niger Delta and the Nigeria state.
This attack left many casualty figures in its trail with about eleven cars burnt and
four persons death in the encounter. One of the negative consequences of the
militant activities in the Niger Delta is the loss of crude oil and national revenue
to theft through the vandalisation of petroleum pipeline and the shutdown of flow
stations by militants. Between August 2005 and January 31, 2007, the Nigerian
government lost 660,000 barrels of crude oil daily out of its 2.4 million barrel
OPEC quota allocated to government. This is valued at about $572 million.
Forty-four attacks were carried out on oil facilities in 2006 and 19 in the first
quarter of 2007. About 1,000 people were killed in the first nine months of 2008
and by 2009 the export of crude oil fell from 2.6 million barrels to 1.6 million
barrels per day (bpd). This affected revenue earnings of the federal government,
the supply of gas to power generating stations and erratic power supply. The
resort to the use of generators as alternative source of energy supply increased
the cost of business and service provision. As a result, the USA and Britain in
collaboration with the Nigerian government opted for an Arm-for-money deal
with the militants in order to put an end to the Niger Delta crisis. The JTF noted
that through the efforts of progress-minded groups, organizations and persons in
the USA, the grimly degree of our pains, poverty and plight has become a subject
of discussion on high profile desk (Ajaero and Azubuke 2006). Over 300 guns
were surrendered to government. Many companies like Michelin, Wilbros, Elf
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State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
and Shell closed shop for fear of attack by the militants. Specifically, Shell
abandons many oil wells and shutdown all its western operation leading to a loss
of 340,000 barrels out of the overall 660,000 barrels for security reason (Alaibe,
2010). Many jobs were also lost and the prospects to open new wells jeopardised.
To confront the security challenge in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government
deployed thirteen worships and four assault boats to Bonny Island to protect the
crude oil export terminal. This came in the wake of the attack by the militants on
the Bonga oil field in 2008. The Bonga oil field produces 200, 000 bpd. Under
Governor Peter Odili, the Rivers state government donated 50 operational
vehicles to the state police command to enhance their response mechanism to
militant activities at the expense of social services. The cost of the deployment of
two warships NNS Nwamba and NSS Ologbo with 50 personnel’s on board is
high in operational terms. The cost of the Niger Delta militancy is enormous as
shown table 1 below:
Table 1: Overview of the Cost of Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta
S/N
Casualty figure
Victims
Month
Perpetrator
1
Agip H/Q P/H
Feb. 2006
MEND
2
Nine killed;
policemen
Loss N40m
State
of
Occurrence
P/H
Feb. 2006
MEND
P/H
3
N500 million
Dawoo
operational
facility Okirika
3 banks names unknown
Feb. 2006
MEND
P/H
4
Kenechukwu
commissioner
Feb. 2007
MEND
Anambra
5
N50
million
ransome paid by
Anambra state
government
-
7 Phillipino
Feb. 2007
MEND
Delta
6
-
Feb. 2006
Unknown
P/H
7
-
Feb. 2006
Unknown
P/H
8
3
policemen
killed & staffs
wounded
I American I British
kidnapped
Nine Wilbros workers
kidnapped
Elf Obagi flow station
attacked
Dec. 2006
Unknown
militants
Unknown
8
son
to
178
9
I Pengassan staff
Nelson Ojei
Oct. 2006
10
Seismic
crew/shot down
12kbd
13 soldiers killed
Shell seismic crew
Feb. 2007
Nigerian government
Oct. 2006
12
2
killed;
7
abducted & N10
million ransom
paid
2 private security guard
killed EA shallow water
Oct. 2006
13
60 oil worker
kidnap; 800,000
barrel
loss;
12000 bpd &
872000 bpd loss
by govt.-value
N240 b.
I German oil
worker
SPDC, 500, 000 barrel;
Mobil Agip, Chevron
372 barrel
Oct.
2006
16,
Gludo Shiffauph
Aug.
2006
5,
Total loss of
Agip by Jan.
2007 – N200 m
ransom;
paid
N130
m
to
secure release of
hostage workers
5
workers
kidnapped
12 killed; 3
policemen killed.
1 militant killed
– 3 rifle and 1
machine
recovered – 7
policemen – 3
policemen
Loss 500, 000 barrel per
day
5 killed – 2
security guards,
1
pregnant
woman 2 others
11
14
15
16
17
18
S I Otinche
Bayelsa
state.
Unknown
SagbamaBayelsa
state
Joint
Cowthorm
revolutionar channel in
y
council Akuka
(JRC)
Toru/Degem
a
LGA
Rivers state.
Niger Delta Essan
freedom
Akpan
fighters
Estate, Eket
NDFF
Akwa Ibom
state
Oporoma,
Bayelsa
state
MEND
Bayelsa
-
Movement
of the Niger
Delta people
(MONDP)
-
Express Oil Nig. Ltd
March 2008
Gunmen
Police; civilian
January
2008
Militants
Shell flow station in
Oloma area
April 2007
Dec. 2007
Ilaje LGA
Ondo state
Hotel
president
P/H;
Birokiri
police
station
Eclenkwo;
Okrika
police
station
P/H
179
1,
Militants
-
State Response To The Armed Struggle In The Niger Delta Region: An Overview
19
Attack on Bonga
oil field,
20
9 militants
-
June
2008
29,
Aug. 2006
-
JFT
Offshore
Niger Delta,
Delta state
Bayelsa
state
Source: Survey Research, 2015: See also Alaibe, 2010; Vanguard, July 26,
2008.
The cost of the armed struggle in human and material terms is enormous.
Prominent personalities like Isaac Adaka Boro, Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 others loss
their lives in the course of the struggle. The invasion of Odi and Okerenkoko in
Bayelsa and Delta states respectively recorded high casualty figure. The high rate
of refugees, collapse of economic activities and increase in poverty rate are part
of the unpleasant experiences of the armed struggle. On the other hand, the cost
of the operation to government is high.
Conclusive Remarks
The Niger Delta occupies a central place in the political economy of Nigeria and
the world. The extent to which the crisis situation in the region was managed had
negative effect on the revenue base of government and the Nigerian economy in
general. Nigeria is a nation blessed with large reserves of natural resources but
the dialectics of the politics of who gets what, when and how that undermines
equity, fairness and justice hence the militant uprising. The militant uprising
threatened the growth of the Nigerian democracy and nation building project and
placed the corporate existence of the Nigerian nation on a precariouspolitical
terrain. It is instructive to state that the amnesty programme should be managed
in a transparent and accountable manner. Genuine and sustainable programme of
human capital development should be organized for the youths in the Niger Delta
region by the oil companies and government to forestall any violent agitation
against injustice of any kind in future. The relative peace in the Niger Delta today
may be truncated if effort to sustain the tempo of development is jettison by
government and the oil companies. The oil companies should be more committed
to developing the oil communities.Best practices mechanism should be adopted
in the exploration of oil resources to reduce the rate of environmental degradation
associated with it. The amnesty programme fund should be judiciously utilized so
180
S I Otinche
that the objective to which it is meant for could be achieved. The nonpayment of
allowances to the ex-militants leading to mass protest and the blocking of the
nations’ highways is not a welcome development. It is not an understatement to
say that great injustice has been done to the people of the Niger Delta region by
Nigerian government and the oil companies. Such economic injustice is the
fodder for the Boko Haram insurgency in the north east. Militant uprisings
endanger national love, mutual coexistence, tolerance and peace in a multi-ethnic
and multi-religious society like Nigeria. If it is not well managed may lead to the
disintegration of Nigeria in future because foreign agents may take advantage of
the situation to sow irredeemable seeds disintegration.
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