The Retarded Science of International Strategy
Author(s): T. C. Schelling
Source: Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1960), pp. 107-137
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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MID
1
W EST
JO U R N A L
OF
VOLUME IV
NUMBER
Political Science
MAY
2
1960
T. C. SCHELLING
Harvard University
The RetardedScienceof
International
Strategyz
to the diof conflict-corresponding
line is
dividing
verse meaningsof the word "conflict"-a main
betweenthose thattreatconflictas a pathologicalstateand seek
and those thattake conflictfor granted
its causes and treatment,
and studythe behaviorassociatedwithit. Among the latterthere
is a furtherdivisionbetweenthose that examinethe participants
regardto both" rational"
in a conflictin all theircomplexity-with
and "irrational" behavior,conscious and unconscious,and to
motivations
as well as to calculations-andthosethatfocus on the
more rational,conscious,artfulkind of behavior. Crudelyspeaking,the lattertreatconflictas a kindof contest,in whichthe participantsare tryingto " win." A studyof conscious,intelligent,
sophisticatedconflictbehavior-of successfulbehavior-is like a
sense.
searchforrulesof " correct" behaviorin a contest-winning
We can call thisfieldof studythestrategyof conflict.'We can
AMONG
DIVERSE
THEORIES
* This paper was originallypresentedto a conferenceon "International
Relations in the Mid-twentieth
Century,"at NorthwesternUniversity,April, 1959.
'The term"strategy"is taken,here,fromthe theoryof games,which distin-
107
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108
T. C.
SCHELLING
be interested
in it forat leastthreereasons. We miaybe involved
in internain a conflictourselves;we all are, in fact,participants
tionalconflict,and wantto " win " in somepropersense. We may
wish to understandhow participantsactually do conduct themof " correct" play
selvesin conflictsituations;an understanding
may give us a bench markfor the studyof actual behavior. We
may wish to controlor influencethe behaviorof othersin conflict,and want thereforeto know how the variablesthatare subject to our controlcan affecttheirbehavior.
we seriously
If we confineour studyto the theoryof strategy,
restrictourselvesby the assumptionof rationalbehavior-notjust
of intelligent
behavior,but of behaviormotivatedby a conscious
calculationof advantages,a calculationthatin turnis based on an
explicitand internallyconsistentvalue system.We thuslimitthe
applicabilityof any resultswe reach. If our interestis the study
of actual behavior,the resultswe reachunderthisconstraintmay
of realityor a caricature.
proveto be eithera good approximation
Any abstractionrunsa riskof thissort,and we have to be preparedto use judgmentwithanyresultswe reach.
The advantageof cultivating
thearea of " strategy" fortheoretical developmentis not that,of all possibleapproaches,it is the
one thatevidentlystaysclosestto the truth,but thatthe assumptionof rationalbehavioris a productiveone. It givesa gripon the
subjectthatis peculiarlyconduciveto the developmentof theory.
It permitsus to identifyour own analyticalprocesseswith those
in a conflict;and by demanding
of the hypotheticalparticipants
certainkinds of consistencyin the behaviorof our hypothetical
we can examinealternativecourses of behavioracparticipants,
cordingto whetheror nottheymeetthosestandardsofconsistency.
The premiseof " rational" behavior" is a potentone forthe productionof theory. Whetherthe resultingtheoryprovidesgood
or poor insightinto actual behavioris, I repeat,a matterfor subsequentjudgment.
guishesgamesof skill,games of chance,and games of strategy,the latterbeing
those in which the best course of action for each player dependson what the
of the
otherplayersdo. The termis intendedto focus on the interdependence
about each other'sbehavior.This
adversaries'decisionsand on theirexpectations
is not the militaryusage.
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
109
But in takingconflictfor granted,and workingwith an image
of participants
who tryto " win," a theoryof strategydoes not
interestsamong
deny thatthereare commonas well as conflicting
the participants.In fact, the richnessof the subject arisesfrom
the fact that,in international
affairs,thereis mutualdependence
as well as opposition.Pure conflict,in which the interestsof two
antagonistsare completelyopposed, is a special case; it would
arise in a war of completeextermination,
otherwisenot even n
wrar.For this reason,"winning" in a conflictdoes not have a
strictlycompetitivemeaning;it is not winningrelativeto one's
adversary.It means gainingrelativeto one's own value system;
and thismay be done by bargaining,by mutualaccommodation,
and the avoidanceof mutuallydamagingbehavior. If war to the
finishhas becomeinevitable,thereis nothingleftbut pureconflict;
butif thereis any possibility
of avoidinga mutuallydamagingwar,
of conductingwarfarein a way that minimizesdamage, or of
war ratherthan waging it,
coercingan adversaryby threatening
the possibilityof mutualaccommodationis as importantand dralimited
maticas the elementof conflict.Conceptslike deterrence,
as well as negotiation,are concernedwith
war, and disarmament,
thecommoninterestand mutualdependencethatcan existbetween
in a conflict.
participants
Thus strategy,in the sensein which I am usingit here,is not
applicationof force but with the
concernedwith the efficient
exploitationof potentialforce. It is concernednot just with enemieswho dislikeeach otherbut also withpartnerswho distrustor
disagreewitheach other. It is concernednot justwiththe division
of gains atid losses betweentwvoclaimantsbut also with the possibilitythat particularoutcomes are worse (better) for both
of game
claimantsthancertainotheroutcomes.In theterminology
"
conflictsare not constantinternational
theory,mostinteresting
sum games" but " variable-sumgames": the sum of the gains of
the participants
involvedis not fixedso thatmorefor one inexorably means less for the other. There is a common interestin
reacliingoutcomesthatare mutuallyadvantageous.
To studythe strategyof conflictis to take the view thatmost
conflictsituationsare essentiallybargainingsituations.They are
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110
T. C. SCHELLING
situationsin wlhichthe abilityof one participantto gain his ends
is dependentto an importantdegree on the choices or decisions
that the other participantwill make. The bargainingmay be
explicit,as when one offersa concession;or it may be by tacit
maneuver,as when one occupies or evacuatesstrategicterritory.
It may,as in the ordinaryhagglingof the market-place,
take the
statusquo as its zero pointand seek arrangements
thatyield positivegainsto bothsides;or it mayinvolvethreatsof damage,including mutualdamage,as in a strike,boycott,or price war, or in
extortion.
Viewing conflictbehavioras a bargainingprocessis usefulin
keeping us from becoming exclusivelypreoccupied eitherwith
the conflictor with the common interest.To characterizethe
maneuversand actionsof limitedwar as a bargainingprocessis to
emphasizethat,in additionto the divergenceof interestover the
variablesin dispute,thereis a powerfulcommoninterestin reaching an outcomethatis notenormously
destructive
of valuesto both
sides. A " successful" employees'strikeis not one that destroys
theemployerfinancially;
it mayevenbe one thatnevertakesplace.
can be trueof war.
Somethingsimiilar
I
The idea of " deterrence" has had an evolutionthatis instructiveforour purpose. It is a dozen yearssincedeterrencewas articulatedas the keystoneof our nationalstrategy,and duringthose
yearstheconcepthasbeen refinedand improved.We havelearned
thata threathas to be credibleto be efficacious,
and thatits credibilitymaydependon thecostsand risksassociatedwithfulfillment
for the partymakiingthe threat.We have developedthe idea of
makinga threatcredibleby gettingourselvescommittedto its fulthroughthestretching
of a " tripwire" acrosstheenemy's
fillment,
path of advance, or by makingfulfillment
a matterof national
honorand prestige-asin the case, say, of the FormosaResolution.
We have recognizedthata readinessto fightlimitedwar in particularareasmnay
detractfromthe threatof massiveretaliationby
preserving
the choice of a lesserevil if the contingencyarises. We
have consideredthe possibilitythat a retaliatorythreatmay be
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
111
morecredibleif the meansof carryingit out and the responsibility
forretaliationare placed in the handsof thosewhose resolutionis
strongest,as in recent suggestionsfor "nuclear sharing." We
have observedthatthe rationalityof the adversaryis pertinentto
the efficacyof a threat,and thatmadmen,like smallchildren,can
oftennot be controlledby threats.We have recognizedthatthe
are availefficacyof the threatmay depend on what alternatives
able to thepotentialenemy,who, if he is notto reactlikea trapped
lion, must be left some tolerablerecourse. We have come to
realize that a threatof all-out retaliationgives the enemyevery
incentive,in the eventhe shouldchoose not to heed the threat,to
initiatehis transgression
with an all-outstrikeat us; it eliminates
lessercoursesof actionand forceshimto choosebetweenextremes.
We have learnedthatthe threatof massivedestruction
may deter
an enemyonlyif thereis a corresponding
implicitpromiseof nondestructionin the event he complies,so that we must consider
whethertoo greata capacityto strikehimby surprisemay induce
himto strikefirstto avoid beingdisarmedby a firststrikefromus.
And recently,in connectionwiththe so-called" measuresto safeguard againstsurpriseattack," we have begun to considerthe
relationof mutualdeterrence
to disarmament.
is nothow complicatedtheidea of deterrence
What is impressive
how
has become,and
carefullyit has been refinedand developed,
buthow slow theprocesshasbeen,how vaguetheconceptsstillare,
and how inelegantthe currenttheoryof deterrenceis. This is not
said to depreciatethe effortsof people who have struggledwith
the deterrenceconcept over the last dozen years. On strategic
mattersof which deterrenceis an example,thosewho have tried
to devise policies to meet urgentproblemshave had littleor no
help froman already existingbody of theory,but have had to
literacreatetheirown as theywent along. There is no scientific
tureon deterrencethatbeginsto comparewith,say,the literature
Asiaticflu,elementary-school
on inflation,
reading,or smog.
those who have grappledwith ideas like deterFurthermore,
motivated
rence,being
largelyby immediateproblems,have not
primarilybeen concerned with the cumulativeprocess of developinga theoreticalstructure.This seemsto be true not only
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112
T. C.
SCHELLING
and journalistsbut of the morescholarlyas well.
of policy-makers
or thatof the editors,the
Whetherit reflectsthe scholars'interests
literatureon deterrenceand related concepts has been mainly
preoccupiedwith solvingimmediateproblemsratherthan with a
methodologyfor dealingwith problems.2We do not even have
a decent terminology;occasional termslike " active" and " passive" deterrencedo not beginto fillthe need.
How do we account for thislack of theoreticaldevelopment?
I thinkone significant
factis thatthe militaryservices,in contrast
to almost any other sizable and respectableprofession,have no
academiccounterpart.Those who make policy in the
identifiable
edufieldsof economics,medicine,publichealth,soil conservation,
counterscholarly
their
can
identify
readily
or
law,
criminal
cation,
partin the academicworld. (In economicsthe numberof trained
people who are doing researchand writingbooks compareswell
with the numberengagedin economicpolicy or administration.)
But whereis the academiccounterpartof the militaryprofession?
Not on any greatscale in theserviceacademies;theseare undergraduateschools,devoted mainlyto teachingratherthan to research. Not-or not yet on any greatscale-in the complexof war
within the
colleges and other advanced educationalinstitutions
militaryservices;thesehave not developedthe permanentfaculty,
the researchorientation,and the value systemrequiredfor sustaindtheoreticalthinking.
in thiscountryhasbeen
Withintheuniversities,
strategy
military
and politicalscithe preoccupationof a smallnumberof historians
entists,supportedon a scale thatsuggeststhat deterringthe Rus2There are some excellentexamplesto the contrary,like C. W. Sherwin,
"SecuringPeace Through MilitaryTechnology,"Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists,XII (May, 1956), 159-164.And Sherwin'sreferencethere to a paper by
by militaryproblems,
WarrenAmsterremindsus thatwhen theoryis stimulated
as so much of it currentlyis, it may not receive open publication.There are
undoubtedly,also, serious editorial obstacles; journals in internationalaffairs
audience,and articleswith high theoappeal to a dominantlynon-theoretical
reticalcontentmustoftenbe purgedof it and focusedon immediateproblems.
The recentdevotionof an entireissue of ConflictResolutionto Anatol RapoTheoryof War "
essayon " Lewis F. Richardson'sMathematical
port'smagnificent
sign in the otherdirection.The Journalof ConflictResolution,
is a heartening
I (September,1957), 249-99.
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
113
as enforcing
siansfroma conquestof Europe is about as important
the antitrustlaws. This is not said to disparagethe accomplishments,but to emphasizethat within the universitiesthere has
department
or line of inquiry
usuallybeen no directlyidentifiable
and the role of
thatcan be associatedwiththe militaryprofessions
force in foreignrelations. (ROTC programshave recentlybecome a limitedexceptionto thispoint,at least to the extentthat
they induce the organizationof pertinentcoursesin historyand
now
programsand institutes
politicalscience.) The defense-studies
foundon a numberof campuses,and the attentiongivento internationalsecurityproblemsby the foundations,are a novel and
researchinstisignificant
development.New quasi-governmental
tutionslike The RAND Corporationand the Institutefor Dehelpingto fillthe need; but forour
fenseAnalysisare importantly
presentpurposetheycan be citedas evidenceof how recentis the
responseto the need.
One may ask whetherthe militaryservicesthemselvesmight
not be able to produce a growingbody of theoryto illuminate
ideas like deterrenceor limitedwar. Afterall, theorydoes not
have to be developedsolely by specialistsisolatedin universities.
preparedto makeeffective
If themilitaryservicesare intellectually
use of militaryforce, it mightseem that they are equipped to
theorizeabout it. But here a usefuldistinctioncan be made betweentheapplicationof forceand the threatof force. Deterrence
is concernedwith the exploitationof potentialforce. It is concerned with persuadinga potentialenemythat he should in his
own interestavoid certaincourses of activity. There is an important differencebetween the intellectualskills required for
carryingout a militarymissionand for using potentialmilitary
capabilityto pursuea nation'sobjectives.A theoryof deterrence
would be, in effect,a theoryof the skillfulnon-use of military
forces,and forthispurposedeterrencerequiressomethingbroader
than militaryskills. The militaryprofessionsmay have these
broaderskills,but theydo not automaticallyhave themas a result
and thoseprimaryresponof meetingtheirprimaryresponsibilities,
sibilitiesplace full-timedemandson theirtime.3
The lack of a vigorousintellectualtraditionin the fieldof militarystrategy
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114
T. C. SCHELLING
A new kindof inquirythatgave promise,fifteenyearsago, of
leadingto such a theoryof strategyis game theory. Game theory
is concernedwith situations-gamesof " strategy,"in contrastto
games of skill or games of chance-in which the best course of
actionfor each participantdependson what he expectsthe other
participants
to do. A deterrentthreatmeetsthisdefinition
nicely;
it works only because of what the otherplayerexpectsus to do
in responseto his choice of moves,and we can affordto make
the threatonly because we expect it to have an influenceon his
choice. But withrespectto international
strategy,the promiseof
game theoryis so far unfulfilled.Game theoryhas clarifiedconceptsand has been enormouslyhelpfulin theformulation
of problems,but its greatestsuccesseshave been in otherfields. It has,
on the whole, been pitchedat a level of abstractionthathas not
yet made contactwith the elementsof a problemlike deterrence.4
II
The idea of deterrencefiguresso prominently
in otherareas of
conflict-otherthaninternational
affairs-that
one mighthave supposed the existenceof a well-cultivated
theoryalreadyavailableto
be exploitedfor international
applications.Deterrencehas been
an importantconceptin criminallaw for a long time. Legislators,
discussedby BernardBrodie in the firstchaptersof his Strategyin
is forcefully
the MissileAge (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1959). Pertinentalso is
ColonelJosephI. Greene'sforwardto the ModernLibraryeditionof Clausewitz's
On War (New York: Random House, 1943). ". . . During most of the years
betweenthe greatwars,the two highestschoolsof our Armywere limitedto a
selectedto attendthem.
singlecourseof someten months'durationforall officers
. . . There could be no timeat eitherplace for studyof the long development
of militarythoughtand theory.. . . If ever more extensiveperiods of higher
trainingbecome possiblein our Army-periodsof two or threeyears'durationthe greatestof the militarythinkerswould surelydeservea course of studyin
themselves."(Pp. xi-xii.)
'Jessie Bernard,writingon "The Theory of Games as a Modem Sociology
of Conflict,"gives a somewhatsimilarappraisalbut adds that "we may expect
that the mathematics
requiredto make a fruitfulapplicationof the theoryof
gamesto sociologicalphenomenawill emergein the not-too-distant
future."The
AmericanJournalof Sociology,LIX (March, 1954), 418. My own view is that
and thatthe theoryof strategy
are not in the mathematics,
the presentdeficiencies
fromtoo greata willingnessof social scientiststo treatthe subject
has suffered
as thoughit were,or shouldbe, solely a branchof mathematics.
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
115
jurists,lawyers,and legal scholarsmightbe supposed to have
subjectedtheconceptto rigorousand systematic
scrutinyformany
generations.To be sure, deterrenceis not the sole consideration
involvedin criminallaw, nor even necessarilythe mostimportant;
still,it has figuredprominentlyenough for one to suppose the
existenceof a theorythatwould take into account the kindsand
sizes of penaltiesavailableto be imposedon a convictedcriminal,
the potentialcriminal'svalue system,theprofitability
of crime,the
law-enforcement
system'sabilityto apprehendcriminalsand to
get themconvicted,the criminal'sawarenessof the law and of the
probabilityof apprehensionand conviction,the extentto which
different
typesof crimeare motivatedby rationalcalculation,the
resolutenessof society to be neitherniggardlynor soft-hearted
in the expensiveand disagreeableapplicationof the penaltyand
how well thisresoluteness(or lack of it) is knownto the criminal,
the likelihoodof mistakesin the system,the possibilities
for third
partiesto exploitthe systemfor personalgain, the role of communicationbetweenorganizedsocietyand the criminal,theorganizationof criminalsto defeatthe system,and so on.
It is not only criminals,however,but our own childrenthat
have to be deterred.Some aspectsof deterrencestandout vividly
and self-discipline
in child discipline:theimportanceof rationality
on the partof the personto be deterred,of his abilityto comprehend the threatif he hearsit and to hear it throughthe din and
determination
to fulfillthe threatif need
noise,of the threatener's
of the threatenedparty'sconvictionthat
be-and, moreimportant,
the threatwill be carriedout. Clearerperhapsin child discipline
than in criminaldeterrenceis the importantpossibilitythat the
will hurtthe threatener
as much as it will
threatenedpunishment
the one threatened,perhapsmore. There is an analogy between
a parent'sthreatto a child and the threatthata wealthypaternalisticnationmakesto the weak and disorganizedgovernmentof a
poor nationin,say,extendingforeignaid and demanding" sound"
economicpoliciesor cooperativemilitarypoliciesin return.
And the analogy remindsus that,even in international
affairs,
deterrenceis as relevantto relationsbetween friendsas between
potentialenemies. (The threat to withdrawto a "peripheral
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116
T. C.
SCHELLING
strategy"if France failedto ratifythe European Defense CommunityTreaty was subject to many of the same disabilitiesas a
threatof retaliation.)The deterrenceconceptrequiresthatthere
be bothconflictand commoninterest
betweenthe partiesinvolved;
it is as inapplicableto a situationof pureand completeantagonism
of interest
as it is to thecase of pureand completecommoninterest.
Betweentheseextremes,
deterring
an ally and deterringan enemy
differonly by degrees,and in fact we may have to develop a
more coherenttheorybefore we can even say in a meaningful
way whetherwe have more in common with Russia or with
Greece,relativeto the conflictsbetweenus.5
The deterrenceidea also crops up casuallyin everydayaffairs.
Automobiledrivershave an evidentcommoninterestin avoiding
collisionand a conflictof interestover who shallgo firstand who
shallslamon his brakesand let the otherthrough.Collisionbeing
about as mutualas anythingcan be, and oftenthe only thingthat
one can threaten,the maneuversby which one conveys a threat
of mutualdamage to anotherdriveraggressingon one's rightof
way are an instructive
exampleof the kind of threatthatis conveyed not by words but by actions,and of the threatin which
the pledge to fulfillis made not by verbal announcementbut by
losingthe power to do otherwise.
Finally,thereis the importantarea of the underworld. Gang
war and international
war have a lot in common. Nations and
outlawsbothlack a systemof enforceablelaw to helpthemgovern
theiraffairs.Both engage in the ultimatein violence. Both have
an interestin avoidingviolence,but the threatof violenceis conthatracketeers,as well as gangs
tinuallyon call. It is interesting
of delinquents,engage in limitedwar, disarmamentand disen'It may be importantto emphasizethat,in referring
to a "common interest,"
I do not mean thattheymusthave what is usuallyreferredto as a similarity
in
theirvalue systems.They may justbe in the sameboat together.They may even
be thereonlybecauseone of themperceivedit a strategicadvantageto get in that
position-tocouple theirinterestsin not tippingthe boat. If being overturned
togetherin the same boat is a potentialoutcome,giventhe arrayof alternatives
availableto both parties,they have a " commoninterest"in the sense intended
in the text. "Potentialcommoninterest"mightseem more descriptive.Deterrence,for example,is concernedwith couplingone's own course of actionwith
the other'scourseof actionin a way thatexploitsthatpotentialcommoninterest.
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
117
gagement,surpriseattack,retaliationand threatof retaliation;
they
worry about "appeasement" and loss of face; and they make
alliancesand agreementswith the same disabilitythatnationsare
subjectto-the inabilityto appeal to higherauthorityin theinterest
of contractenforcement.
There are consequentlya numberof otherareas available for
study that may yield insightinto the one that concernsus, the
internationalarea. Often a principlethat in our own field of
interestis hidden in a mass of detail,or has too complicateda
is
structure,or that we cannot see because of a predisposition,
field
it
in
another
where
and
easierto perceive
enjoys simplicity
vividnessor wherewe are not blindedby our predispositions.It
may be easier to articulatethe peculiar difficulty
of containing
a Mossadeq by the use of threatswhen one is freshfroma vain
attemptat usingthreatsto keep a smallchild fromhurtinga dog
or a smalldog fromhurtinga child.
None of theseotherareasof conflictseemto havebeen mastered
be used
by a well-developedtheorythat can, with modification,
affairs.Sociologists,includingthose
in the analysisof international
that study criminalbehavior in underworldconflict,have not
traditionallybeen much concerned with wlhatwe would call
the strategyof conflict.Nor does the literatureon law and criminologyrevealan appreciablebody of explicittheoryon the subassertthatthereare no handbooks,textject. I cannotconfidently
books, or originalworks on the pure theoryof blackmailcirculating in the underworld;but certainlyno expurgatedversion,
showinghow to use extortionand how to resistit, has shownup
as " New Ways in Child Guidance,"in spiteof the demandforit.,
III
would " theory" in thisfieldof strategyconsistof? What
VWhat
questionswould it try to answer? What ideas would it try to
unify,clarify,or communicatemore effectively?To begin with,
it should definethe essentialsof the situationand of the behavior
in question. Deterrence-tocontinuewith deterrenceas a typical
" Progressis being made. Daniel Ellsbergincludeda lectureon "The Theory
and Practiceof Blackmail,"and one on "The PoliticalUses of Madness,"in his
Boston,March
serieson The Art of Coercion,sponsoredby the Lowell Institute,
1959.
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118
T. C.
SCHELLING
thechoicesthat
withinfluencing
concept-isconcerned
strategic
hisexpectapartywillmake,and doingit by influencing
another
himwith
tionsof how we will behave. It involvesconfronting
by
determined
be
will
evidenceforbelievingthatour behavior
hisbehavior.
forthetwoparticipants
ofvaluesystems
Butwhatconfiguration
a
game theory--makes
of
language
in
the
"payoffs,"
the
-of
threatcredible?How do we measurethfemixtureof
deterrent
"
a " deterrence
requiredto generate
andcommoninterest
conflict
and whatmeansof
is required,
situation?What communication
kindof " raWhat
the evidencecommunicated?
authenticating
of
knowledge
tionality"is requiredofthepartyto be deterred--a
and to
an abilityto perceivealternatives
his own value system,
(or an inan abilityto demonstrate
calculatewithprobabilities,
abilityto conceal) his own rationality?
ofpromises?
Specifiorenforcement
Whatis theneedfortrust,
damage,needone also guarantee
cally,in additionto threatening
or doesthis
is forthcoming;
thedamageifcompliance
to withhold
of" payoffs
" involved?What" legal
dependon theconfiguration
structure
is needed
orinformation
system,
communication
system,"
enforceable?
promises
to makethenecessary
" fulfilla threat;or
thathe will " probably
Can one threaten
ofa
will? Whatis themeaning
thathe certainly
musthe threaten
"
is
clear
if
that, he
threatthatone will " probably fufillwhenit
it afterthe
to fulfill
retainedany choice,he'd haveno incentive
what are the devicesby whichone gets
act? More generally,
be knownto
thathe would otherwise
to fulfillment
committed
makesthe threat
thatif a commitment
shrinkfrom,considering
it neednotbe carriedout? Whatis
credibleenoughto be effective
if any,betweena threatthatdetersactionandone
thedifference,
a second
thatcompelsaction,or a threatdesignedto safeguard
partyfromhisown mistakes?Are thereany logicaldifferences
threats?
andextortionate
disciplinary,
amongdeterrent,
who has
affected
by a thirdparticipant,
How is thesituation
withthosealready
interest
andcommon
ofconflict
hisownmixture
system,
whohasaccessto or controlofthecommunication
present,
in one senseor another,
whosebehavioris rationalor irrational
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withone
who enjoystrustor somemeansof contractenforcement
or anotherof thetwo principals?How are thesequestionsaffected
by theexistenceof a legal systemthatpermitsand prohibitscertain
of conactions,thatis availableto inflictpenaltyon nonfulfillment
fromthe particitract,or thatcan demandauthenticinformation
pants? To what extentcan we rationalizeconceptslike " reputation,"" face," or " trust,"in termsof a real or hypotheticallegal
value systems,
of the participants'
system,in termsof modification
of the playersconcernedto additional
or in termsof relationships
real or hypothetical?
participants,
This briefsampleof questionsmay suggestthatthereis scope
forthe creationof " theory." There is somethinghere thatlooks
theory,communication
of gametheory,organization
likea rnixture
theory,theoryof evidence,theoryof choice, and theoryof colof " strategy": it
lective decision. It is faithfulto our definition
takes conflictfor granted,but also assumescommoninterestbetween the adversaries;it assumesa " rational" value-maximizing
mode of behavior;and it focuseson the factthateach participant's
" best" choice of action dependson what he expectsthe otherto
do, and that " strategicbehavior" is concernedwith influencing
another'schoice by workingon his expectationof how one's own
behavioris relatedto his.
There are two points worth stressing.One is that, though
" strategyof conflict" soundscold-blooded,thetheoryis not conapplicationof violenceor anythingof the
cernedwiththeefficient
a
theoryof aggressionor of resistanceor
essentially
sort;it is not
of wvar.Threatsof war, yes, or threatsof anythingelse; but it
is the employmentof threats,or of threatsand promises,or more
of one's own behavioron thebehavior
generallyof theconditioning
about.
of others,thatthe theoryis
as betweenthe conSecond, such a theoryis nondiscriminatory
as
between
its applicabilityto
flict and the common interest,
potentialenemiesand its applicabilityto potentialfriends.The
theorydegeneratesat one extremeif thereis no scope for mutual
no commoninterestat all even in avoidingmutual
accommodation,
disaster;it degeneratesat the otherextremeif thereis no conflict
and reachingcommongoals.
at all and no problemin identifying
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120
T. C. SCHELLING
But in the area between those two extremesthe theoryis noncommitalabout the mixtureof conflictand commoninterest;we
can equallywell call it the theoryof precariouspartnership
or the
theoryof incompleteantagonism.7(In anotherpaper it is pointed
out that some centralaspects of the problemof surpriseattack
in international
affairsare structurally
identicalwith the problem
of mutuallysuspiciouspartners.8)
Both of thesepoints-theneutralityof the theorywith respect
to the degreeof conflictinvolved,and the definition
of " strategy"
as concernedwith constraining
an adversarythroughhis expectation of the consequencesof his actions-suggestthat we might
call oursubjectthetheoryof interdependent
decision.
IV
Threats and responseto threats,reprisalsand counter-reprisals,
limitedwar,armsraces,brinkmanship,
surpriseattack,trusting
and
cheating,can be viewed as eitherhot-headedor cool-headedactivities. In suggesting
thattheycan usefullybe viewed,in thedevelopment of theory,as cool-headedactivities,it is not assertedthat
they are in fact entirelycool-headed. Rather it is assertedthat
the assumptionof rationalbehavior is a productiveone in the
generationof systematictheory. If behaviorwere actuallycoolheaded, valid and relevanttheorywould probably be easier to
createthan it actuallyis. If we view our resultsas a benchmark
forfurther
approximation
to reality,not as a fullyadequatetheory,
we shouldmanageto protectourselvesfromthe worst resultsof
a biased theory.
Furthermore,
theorythat is based on the assumptionthat the
participantscoolly and "rationally" calculate their advantages
accordingto a consistentvalue systemforcesus to thinkmore
7In using the word "threat" I have not intendedany necessarilyaggressive
or hostileconnotations.In an explicitnegotiationbetweenfriendsor in tacit
or of reducedcooperation,
cooperationbetweenthem,the threatof disagreement
expressedor implied,is a sanctionby which they supporttheir demands,just
an offeris enforcedby threatof "no sale."
as in a commercialtransaction
8"The Reciprocal Fear of SurpriseAttack,"the RAND Corporation,Paper
P-1342,to be includedin T. C. Schelling,The Strategyof Conflict(Harvard
UniversityPress).
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thoroughlyabout themeaningof " irrationality."
Decision-makers
are not simply distributedalong a one-dimensionalscale that
stretchesfromcompleterationalityat one end to completeirrationalityat the other. Rationalityis a collectionof attributes,
and
departuresfromcompleterationalitymay be in many different
directions.Irrationalitycan imply a disorderlyand inconsistent
value system,faultycalculation,an inabilityto receive messages
or to communicateefficiently;
it can implyrandomor haphazard
influencesin thereachingof decisionsor the transmission
of them,
or in the receiptor conveyanceof information;
and it sometimes
merelyreflects
thecollectivenatureof a decisionamongindividuals
who do not have identicalvalue systemsand whose organizational
arrangements
and communicationsystemsdo not cause themto
act like a singleentity.
As a matterof fact,manyof the criticalelementsthatgo into
a model of rationalbehavior can be identifiedwith particular
types of rationalityor irrationality.The value system,the communicationsystem,the information
system,the collectivedecision
process,or a parameterrepresenting
the probabilityof erroror
loss of control,can be viewed as an effortto formalizethe study
the commander
of " irrationality."Hitler,the Frenchparliament,
of a bomber,the radar operatorsat Pearl Harbor, Khrushchev,
and the Americanelectorate,may all sufferfromsome kinds of
" irrationality,"
but by no meansthe same kinds. Some of them
can be accountedforwithina theoryof rationalbehavior. (Even
theneurotic,withinconsistent
valuesand no methodof reconciling
them,motivatedto suppressratherthanto reconcilehisconflicting
goals, may for some purposesbe viewed as a pair of " rational"
entitieswith distinctvalue systems,reachingcollective decisions
througha voting process that has some haphazard or random
element,asymmetrical
communications,
etc.)
of an assumptionof "rational"
The apparentrestrictiveness
behavior-ofa calculating,value-maximizing
strategyof decisionis mitigatedby two additionalobservations.One, which I can
only allege at second hand, is that even among the emotionally
unbalanced,among the certified"irrationals,"thereis oftenobserved an intuitiveappreciationof the principlesof strategy,or
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122
T. C. SCHELLING
at least of particularapplicationsof them. I am told thatinmates
of mentalhospitalsoftenseemto cultivate,deliberatelyor instinctively,value systemsthatmakethemlesssusceptibleto disciplinary
threatsand more capable of exercisingcoercion themselves.A
carelessor even self-destructive
attitudetoward injury-" I'll cut
a veinin myarmifyou don'tletme . . ."-can be a genuinestrategic
advantage;so can a cultivatedinabilityto hear or to comprehend,
or a reputationforfrequentlapsesof self-control
thatmake punitive threatsineffectualas deterrents.(Again I am remindedof
my children.) As a matterof fact,one of the advantagesof an
explicittheoryof "rational" strategicdecision in situationsof
mixedconflictand commoninterest
is that,by showingthestrategic
basis of certainparadoxicaltactics,it can displayhow sound and
rationalsomeof the tacticsare thatare practicedby theuntutored
and the infirm.It may not be an exaggerationto say that our
sophisticationsometimessuppressessound intuitions,and one of
the effectsof an explicittheorymay be to restoresome intuitive
notionsthatwere only superficially
" irrational."
The secondobservation
is relatedto thefirst.It is thatan explicit
theoryof " rational" decision,and of the strategicconsequences
of such decisions,makesperfectlyclear thatit is not a universal
advantagein situationsof conflictto be inalienablyand manifestly
rationalin decision and motivation.Many of the attributesof
rationrality,
as in severalillustrations
mentionedearlier,are strategic
disabilitiesin certainconflictsituations.It may be perfectlyrationalto wish oneselfnot altogetherrational,or-if thatlanguage
is philosophically
objectionable-towish forthe power to suspend
certainrationalcapabilitiesin particularsituations.And one can
suspend or destroyhis own "rationality,"at least to a limited
extent;one can do thisbecause the attributes
thatgo to make up
rationalityare not inalienable,deeply personal,integralattributes
of the humansoul, but include such thingsas one's hearingaid,
the reliabilityof the mails,the legal system,and the rationalityof
onee'sagentsand partners.In principle,one mightevade extortion
equallywell by drugginghisbrain,conspicuouslyisolatinghimself
geographically,
gettinghis assetslegally impounded,or breaking
the hand thathe uses in signingchecks. In a theoryof strategy,
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123
of
several of these defensescan be representedas impairments
if we wish to representthemso. A theorythatmakes
rationality
rationalityan explicitpostulateis able not only to modifythe
postulateand examineitsmeaningbut to takesomeof the mystery
"
out of it. As a matterof fact,theparadoxicalrole of " rationality
in these conflictsituationsis evidence of the likely help that a
systematictheorycould provide.
analysisof strategicbehavior
The resultsreachedby a theoretical
are oftensomewhatparadoxical;theyoftendo contradictcommon
in the example
senseor acceptedrules. It is not true,as illustrated
thatin theface of a threatit is invariablyan advantage
of extortion,
if thefactof beingrationalor irrational
to be rational,particularly
cannotbe concealed. It is not invariablyan advantage,in the face
systemin good order,to have
of a threat,to havea communication
or to be in full commandof one's own
complete information,
actions. Mossadeq and my small childrenhave already been reby theburningof bridges
ferredto; butthesametacticis illustrated
behindoneselfto persuadean adversarythatone cannotbe induced
to retreat.An old English law that made it a seriouscrime to
pay tributeto coastal piratesdoes not necessarilyappear either
cruel or anomalousin the lightof a theoryof strategy.It is interestingthat politicaldemocracyitselfrelies on a particularcomof authenticevidence
municationsystemin which the transmittal
is precluded:the mandatorysecretballot is a schemeto deny the
voterany meansof provingwhich way he voted. Being stripped
of his power to prove how he voted,he is strippedof his power
to be intimidated.Powerlessto provewhetheror not he complied
witha threat,he knows-and so do thosewho would threatenhim
would be unrelatedto the way he actually
-that any punishment
voted.
The well-knownprinciplethatone shouldpick good negotiators
to representhim and then give them complete flexibilityand
themselves
authority-aprinciplecommonlyvoiced by negotiators
as itsproponents
suggest;the power
-is by no meansas self-evident
of a negotiatoroftenrestson a manifestinabilityto make concessions and to meet demands.9Similarly,while prudencesuggests
of foreignaid presentsnumerousexamples. See for
"The administration
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124
T. C. SCHELLING
leavingopen a way of escape when one threatensan adversary
with mutuallypainfulreprisal,any visiblemeans of escape may
make the threatless credible. The very notionthatit may be a
strategicadvantageto relinquishcertainoptions deliberately,or
even to give up all controlover one's futureactionsand make his
responsesautomatic,seemsto be a hard one to swallow.
Many of these examplesinvolve some denial of the value of
knowledge,control,or freedom
rationality,
skill,resourcefulness,
of choice. They are all,in principle,validin certaincircumstances;
the logic
and comprehending
but seeingthroughtheirstrangeness
behindthemis oftena good deal easierif one has formalizedthe
analogiesin other
problem,studiedit in the abstract,and identified
contextswhere the strangenessis less of an obstacle to comprehension.
Anotherprinciplecontraryto one's firstimpressionconcerns
the relativevirtuesof clean and dirtybombs. As BernardBrodie
of deterrence
hassaid," When we considerthespecialrequirements
with its emphasison the punitiveaspect of retaliation,we may
bombs. Since the emphasismust
finda need even forsuper-dirty
be on makingcertainthat the enemywill fear even the smallest
one wantsthese
numberof bombsthatmightbe sentin retaliation,
bombsto be, and thusto appear beforethe event,as horrendous
as possible."10 As I have remarkedin anotherpaper,thisconclusion is not so strangeif we recognizethe " balance of terror" as
the
simplya massivemodern versionof an ancient institution,
exchangeof hostages.":
Here perhapswe perceivea disadvantagepeculiarto civilized
modern studentsof internationalaffairs,by contrastwith, say,
Machiavellior the Chineseof a thousandyears ago. We tend to
identifypeace and stabilitywith trust,good faith,and mutual
respect.To the extentthatthispointof view actuallyencourages
exampleT. C. Schelling," AmericanForeign Assistance,"World Politics,VII
(July,1955),607-26.
in theMissileAge (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
10 BernardBrodie,Strategy
Press,1959),p. 295.
in Klaus Knorr (ed.),
I`T. C. Schelling,"SurpriseAttackand Disarmament,"
NATO and AmericanSecurity (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1959),
pp. 176-208.
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125
trustand faith,it is good. But where trustand good faithdo not
existand cannotbe made to by our actingas thoughtheydid,we
may wish to solicitadvice fromthe underworld,or fromancient
workwhentrustand good
on how to makeagreements
despotisms,
faithare lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of
contract. The ancients exchanged hostages,drank wine from
the absenceof poison,met in public
tl1esameglassto demonstrate
placesto inhibitthemassacreof one by theother,and even deliberof authenticinforately exchangedspies to facilitatetransmittal
mation. It seemslikelythat a well-developedtheoryof strategy
could throwlighton the efficacyof some of those old devices,
suggest the circumstancesto which they apply, and discover
modernequivalentsthat,though offensiveto our taste,may be
desperatelyneeded in the regulationof conflict.
V
The foregoingdiscussionis about mattersthat,even withoutthe
body of theory,are by now fairlywell underhelp of a systematic
stood. Let me hastenon to a samplingof problemsthatare,in my
by no meansunderour intellectualcontrol.
judgtment,
is a tacticthathas been deploredand extolledin
Brinkmnanship
the press-more deplored than extolled-but to my knowledge
rarelyanalyzed.12I do not mean the tactic of simplythreatening
war or retaliationin the face of aggression,where the threatis a
genuineone that the enemywould expect us to carry out; nor
do I meansheerbluff.What I have in mindis the deliberatecreation of a recognizableriskof war, a riskthatone does not completelycontrol. I meanthe deliberatetacticof lettingthe situation
get somewhatout of hand,simplybecause its being out of hand
maybe intolerableto the otherpartyand forcean accommodation
on his part. I do not have in mind particularhistoricinstances,
in thissense has actually
and am not claimingthatBrinkmanship
it
has
been extolledand dewhen
occasions
the
on
been played
plored. But the occasionswhich have recentlygiven rise to the
12 But see Paul H. Nitze, " Brinkmanship
and the Avertingof War," in Military
Policy Papers (WashingtonD. C.: The WashingtonCenter of Foreign Policy
Research,mimeograph),pp. 51-4.
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126
T. C. SCHELLING
term certainly,unless all the discussionwas vacuous, were instanceswhen somethingwas being done or some circumstances
were created or permittedto exist that deserve close scrutiny.
Whetherwe end up wishingto play the brinkman's
game,or only
to recognize it when it is played against us, or to understand it
when it is playedby an ally whom we do not completelycontrol,
it stilldeservesanalysis.
I thinkthe idea can probablybe givensome meaning.I would
suggest that it entails a particular kind of threat. It is a threatthat
if the adversaryproceedswith the contemplatedaction,or if he
failsto desistfroman actionhe has alreadyinitiated,we may-not
we will-proceed with the penaltyor the retaliation,
the penalty
or the retaliationbeing of a lind thatis painfulor costlyto us.
But the essenceof the problemof a threatis to make it stick,to
be credibleand persuasive;and the purelyverbal threatthat we
may or may not respond,when in fact it is clear thatwe should
prefernot to ifthe contingencywere upon us, and when we have
clearly left ourselvesthe option of abstainingif we preferto
abstain,may be an unpersuasiveand impotentthreat.Justas one
needsto be committed
in someway to thepainfulact of retaliation
when he makesthe threatthat he certainlywill retaliate,so one
needsin someway to makeclearthathe is committedto a probawhen he saysthathe mayfulfillthethreat.
bilitvof retaliating
The essenceof theproblemseemsto be a kindof controlledloss
of control:puttingoneselfin a positionwhereone mayor maynot
factorsare not entirelysubject to
respond,but the determining
one's own control. A mechanicalillustrationmightbe a faulty
ordersto proceedwith
communication
systemthatwould transmit
the fearsomeaction even if one intendedto transmitcontrary
orders,and thatwould do so withsomerecognizableand appreciable probability.The bureaucraticequivalentmightbe to rely on
a local commanderor officialwho is not altogetherreliable. In
general,theidea is thatone getsin a positionin whichit is clearto
the otherpartythat one can probably,but not certainly,avoid
theunhappyconsequence.
How to do this,and when it can be advantageousto confront
the adversarywith a fractionalexpectationof reprisalratherthan
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127
with the certaintyof it, requiresanalysis. I amninclinedto think
thata deterrent
threatusuallywantsto conveythe certaintyof the
actionthreatened,
whilewhatwe mightcall a " compellent" threat
will usuallywantto be fractional.The difference
isbetweenthreateningto do somethingif, and threatening
to do somethinguntil.
The difference
has to do with whetherone is tryingto preserve
the statusquo or to induce an adversaryto change his mode of
action. But thoughthismay be correct,it is not nearlythe whole
story.
The False-AlarmDeterrentThreat. In general one wants an
alarm-and-response
systemagainstsurpriseattack that minimizes
the dangerof initiating
war by falsealarm,i.e., thatminimizesthe
danger of misinterpreting
evidence and hasteningone's own
counter-strike
when in fact no enemystrikeis coming,and that
minimizesthe enemy'sfear that one is doing just that. But is
this always true? I am led to this questionby consideringtwo
observationsor hypotheses.One is the hypothesisthatour threat
of massiveretaliationmay not have been very crediblein recent
years,when the threatof counter-retaliation
has been awesome;
the second is the observationthatthe Sovietbloc has not engaged
in nearlyall the mischiefthatit mighthave, that in fact it may
have been " deterred."Neitherof thesehypothesesis well-estabto ask what
lished,but supposingthemto be trueit is interesting
the
may have deterredthe Sovietsif
the massively
principalthireat,
retaliatory
threat,has not been persuasive.
A possibleansweris thatthe Soviets,while not reallybelieving
in our deliberateresolutionto retaliatemassively,
have been uneasy
or inadvertently
thatwe mightirrationally
about thepossibility
get
involvedin the initiationof a big war, or initiatesome dynamic
processthatcould onlyend in eithermassivewar or massiveSoviet
withdrawal.In otherwords,whilebelievingthattheUnitedStates
mightnevercoolly resolveto retaliatemassivelyforanythingshort
of an attackon thiscountry,theRussiansmay not have been confidentthatwe can altogethercontrolour own actions. The argumenthereis a littlelike thepointmade above about Brinkmanship.
A mechanicalanalogy may help. Suppose the Russians have
observed that wheneverthey undertakebold aggressiveaction,
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128
T. C. SCHELLING
tensionrises,and when tensionriseswe take certainactionslike
puttingretaliatoryforces on extraordinary
alert. Suppose they
believe what they have so frequentlyclaimed,namely,that the
alertstatusof some of our retaliatory
forcesis fraughtwithpossibilitiesof accidentalwar, whetherthroughtheiraccidentor ours
or throughthe mischiefof a thirdparty. In that case they may
estimatethat bold aggressionon theirpart raisesappreciablythe
riskof all-outwar, becauseit in some fashionincreasesthe danger
thatwe will precipitatewar whetherwe intendto or not. The
resultmay be that they are deterrednot so much by what we
say as by how we behave,and not so much by how we preferto
behave as by how we in fact behave,consideringthe inevitable
imperfections
of a politicaland militarydecisionsystem.
or notthiis
Whecther
is a plausibleinterpretation
of contemporary
deterrence,
thereis a possiblemechanismherethatis a degreemore
compli-cated
thantheusual notionof deterrence
would suggest,the
usual notionbeing a verbalthreatthatone eitheris or is not expected to carry out, with the finaldecisionbeing recognizedas
withinone's completecontrol."3
as a Tactic in Policy. A relatedissueconcernsriskRisk-taking
in limitedwar. It has oftenbeen arguedthat
taking,particularly
the advantagein limitedwar is with the partythat is the m-ore
willingto incur risksof enlargingthe war. Offhandthe idea is
both simple and persuasive. Two adversariesmaneuveragainst
each other,each aware thatbolder and morevigorousmaneuvers
maybe locallyadvantageousbuteach awarethatbold and vigorous
maneuversincurtheriskthatthewar will not remainlimited.The
argumentsimplysays that,of the two participants,
the one more
willingto take risksis freerto engagein bold and vigorousmaneuvers,and thereforeenjoysa local advantage. An enlargedwar,
if it eventuates,engulfsthemboth; relativelyspealing theremay
be no disadvantage,
if the largerwar comes,in havingit provoked
by one's own actionsratherthanthe other's. Relativelyspeaking,
the advantagethusgoes to the bolderparticipants.
An analogyis the wide berthaffordedto hot rods and taxicabs
" This idea, togetherwiththe conceptof " brinkmanship
" discussedabove, is
more fullydevelopedin the author'sforthcoming
book.
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INTERNATIONAL
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129
on the highway. These are the driverswho are willingto take
risks;conservative
driversslow down,hugthecurb,yieldtherightof-way,or get out of the centerlane when theysee an oncoming
car thatis recognizedas thetypedrivenby a lessresponsibledriver.
is known
But theconceptis not so simple.If thebold risk-taker
to be a risk-taker,
and can be recognizedas such,what he does is
not risky;the driverof the hot rod is yieldedso much room to
maneuverthat the riskshe runs may be no greaterthan those
accepted by driverswho are branded as conservative.Furthermore,if one can arrangeto behaveriskilyand to makehismode of
behaviorknown to the other party-if he can be comnittedto
riskybehavior,the commitment
knownto his adversary-"risky"
behavioris a safe and conservative
tactic even for thosewho preferto avoid risk. Justas one may incura commitment
to retaliate
in the beliefthat a persuasivecommitment
will make the threat
credible,a crediblethreatwill be heeded,and theriskof havingto
carryit out will be nil,so one can commithimselfin all prudence
to a mode of " riskybehavior" that,when recognizedand anticipated, forces the other party to accommodatehimself. Thus
riskybehaviormay not be risky,any morethan a threatis risky,
if it is crediblybroughtto the attentionof the otherparty.
This idea is relatedto the Brinkmanship
mentionedabove. It
suggeststhat the meaningsand consequencesof riskyaction are
to be analyzedin termsof threatbehavior,and that an aversion
or proclivitytoward riskshould not be considereda fixedparameter of behaviorbut a strategicvariable subject to deliberate
manipulation.
The ArmsRace. The " armsrace " is usuallya journalistic
term;
but thereare real or potentialphenomenato whichthe conceptof
" arms race " is relevant. The basic idea is a dynamicfeedback
system,in which each of two or more participants
is spurredto
seek greatermilitarypotencyby the fact that his adversariesare
doingthe same thing. The result,if each side is indefinitely
motivated toward even a slightsuperiorityover his adversary,is a
continualprocessof expansion.And if each side feelsthatit must
have a greaterrelative superiority,the greateris the absolute
level of arms on both sides,the processmay accelerateinto an
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130
T. C. SCHELLING
explosion. But it is also possiblethatthe urge towardsuperiority
becomeslessif one side or theotherbecomescontentwitha degree
of inferiority;
the processmay thenreach a stablestoppingplace.
This possibilitywas pointed out by Lewis F. Richardson,who
constructed
an explicitmodelof a particularkindof dynariicarms
race situation.14
Whethertheurgeto greaterarmaments
getsmoreintenseor less
intenseas the level of armaments
growson bothsidesmay depend
on the psychologicalpeculiaritiesof individualsand on the nature
of the politicalprocessesin the countriesconcerned. It also must
depend on the economicsand technologyof militaryforcesand
of war. One hearsit said thatif we have the capacityto obliterate
life altogetherin the Soviet Union thereis no need to be able to
do it severaltimesover. This notion,and some of the meanings
given to the concept of " nuclearplenty,"suggestthat thereare
importantforcestendingto limitthe armsrace, i. e., tendingto
make achievablesome stableequilibriumif the personaland political processesof decisionare cool-headedand rational.
There is a specialreasonforlookingmoresystematically
intothe
dynamicsof a modernarms race, with special attentionto the
technologyand the motivationunderlyingit. The reason has to
do withthe widespreadinterestin disarmament.If we take " disarmament"not in its traditionaland literalsense of reducingthe
aggregatelevel of armaments(measuredsomehow) but ratheras
a generictermcoveringmeasuresto reducethe likelihoodof war,
we have to inquirewhethera disarmament
schemeis likelyto be
more successfulif it involvesmore arms,less arms,or different
typesof arms.15An importantconditionof a successful" disarmament" schemeis thatit shouldlead to some kind of stableequilibrium,or at least one not too unstable. That is to say, it should
" See AnatolRapoport," Lewis F. Richardson'sMathematical
Theoryof War,"
Journalof ConflictResolution,I (September,1957), 249-99. For empiricalevidence that an "arms race," loosely defined,can reach an equilibriumor taper
off,see Samuel P. Huntington," Arms Races: Prerequisitesand Results,"in
Carl J. Friedrichand Seymour E. Harris, eds., Public Policy (Cambridge:
GraduateSchool of Public Admiinistration,
1958),pp. 41-86.
16 For an example involvingmissilenumberssee T.
C. Schelling," Surprise
in Knorr,op. cit.,pp. 184-5.
Attackand Disarmament,"
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131
lead to a situationin which the urge on each side to accumulate
additionalmilitaryforcesor to accumulateforcesof a " wrong"
of military
kindis notirresistible,
giventhelevel and configuration
forceon the otherside. Stabilitymay also depend on thisequilibrium'snot beingtoo sensitiveto changesin forcelevels,to errors
in the estimateof each other'sforces,or to technologicalchange;
the systemmusthave a certainamountof toleranceto errorsand
disturbances.
in whethera cool-headed
One ought,therefore,
to be interested
calculation,taling into account the natureof modernweapons,
the degree of suspicionor of confidenceon both sides,the uncertaintyon each side of what the otheris doing and the general
uncertaintyof scientificand technologicaladvance, discoversa
stableequilibriumanywhere,and if so whetherit occursat a high
or a low level of armaments.One oughtalso to considerwhether
stabilitymightbe morereadilyachievablewith particularsortsof
weapons, and whethera reductionof arms of one kind might
wisely be accompaniedby a permittedincreasein armsof a differentkind. Certainlyin dwelling on the problem of surprise
attackone is struckwiththegreaterstabilityof a situationin which
forcesthan of a
both sides have relativelyinvulnerableretaliatory
situationin whichbothsideshave vulnerableforcesthatare specially designedto seek out each other'sstrikingforces. One may
conclude-somewhatin the spiritof the argumentfordirtybombs
mentionedearlier-thatthe horrendousanti-populationweapons
are more conduciveto stabilitythan weapons designedto strike
each other'smilitaryforces.
We maynever,by buildingsimpleand explicitarms-race
models,
developa theoreticalpictureof realityin whichwe have any great
in thisway discovernew possiconfidence;wvemay nevertheless
bilitiesas well as some inconsistencies
in ideas thathave not been
rigorouslyexaminedbefore. Since almostany seriousreferenceto
an armsrace is likelyto reflectan introspective
explorationof an
implicit" model,"thereseemsto be everyadvantagein makingthe
models explicit.
UnintendedWar. An armsrace is a leisurelyand relaxedphenomenoncomparedwith anotherdynamicfeedbackprocessthat
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132
T. C. SCHELLING
has been talkedabout duringthe last few years. This is the race
to strikefirstwhen one side fearsthatthe otheris about to launch
an attack. This is the problemof " inadvertentwar," or " acciwar by mutual
dentalwar," war by mistakeor misunderstanding,
panic. Intuitivelythe processis an easy one to describe,and both
Khrushchevand Gromyko seldom miss an opportunityto describeit. One side or the othergets some suspiciousevidencein
his warningsystem-seagullsor meteorsreflectedon the radar
screenare the stockexample. Justin case it is an incomingattack,
the alertedpartysendsoffa strikingforcesubject to recall. The
otherside sees this,respondsby sendingoffa strikingforceof its
own, also perhapssubject to recall. Each side's responseto the
other'sprecautionarymeasuresconfirmsthe other'sworst fears;
becomesinevitable.
and war by mutualmisapprehension
The pictureis a vividone, and thelogic seemsat leastinternally
consistent.Whetherthe militaryforcesof the two sides would
in factrespondin thatfashionis of courseanotherquestion.It may
be difficult
to build a usefulmodel of thisprocesswithoutaccess
to specializedknowledgeabout technologyand tactics. Neverthelessthereis a phenomenonherethatdeservesto be understood,
and to the extentthatwe can come to gripswithit withoutrelying on classifiedknowledgewe may reach some useful results.
There may be at least some aspectsof the problemthat we are
unawareof but thatemergeclearlywhen we tryto work out the
processsystematically.16
It is interesting
to pose thisquestion:h-owwould we go about
provingto theSovietUnion thatwe were not engagedin a surprise
attackwhen in factwe were not but theythoughtwe mightbe?
And how mightthey prove to us thattheywere not initiatinga
surpriseattackifin facttheywerenotbutthelyknowthatwe were
afraidthattheymightbe? The motivationheremay be to convey
is in findinga meansto authenticatethe
the truth;the difficulty
answerto thiskind
factsthatone alleges. Ultimatelyan effective
of question,if thereis a solutionto the problem,will depend on
"6ArthurLee Burnshas recentlyexploredthisproblem,withsome interesting
results,in The Rationaleof CatalyticWar, ResearchMonographNo. 3, Center
1959.
of International
Studies,PrincetonUniversity,
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
13 3
technicalfacts. But thereare severallinesof inquiryfortheoretical and empiricalanalysisthatis notconfinedby specializedknowledge. One is to see whethercomparableproblems-problems
that
have similarunderlyingdynamicstructures-arise
in otherwalks
of life,and whethersome usefulideas can be identifiedin other
areas that may have some applicabilityto this particularinternational problem. There may be some dimensionsof the problem
thatwe are missing,
but thatwe shallbecomeaware of as we study
structurally
similarsituationsin radicallydifferent
contexts.This
seemsto be one of the manykindsof situationsin whicha reliable
meansof exchangingauthenticmessagesquicklybetweenheadsof
opposinggovernments
could perhapsclearup somemisunderstandings. There is a suggestionherethatthe role of communication
in
conflict,includingthe communicationof authenticevidence,deservesimaginative
and systematic
study.
This sampleof problemsis biased,reflecting
relationsbetween
powverful
adversaries.I offerit only as evidencethat thereis a
scope forsome systematic
theoreticaldevelopment,
not as a representativesampleof thefield. Problemsof alliance,of cost-sharing,
and of nuclear sharingdo not seem methodologicallydifferent;
nor do the techniquesof workingthroughagents,delegates,puppets,or particularallies,as in the U. S. relationto Formosa,or the
Sovietand Chineserelationto North Korea. The role of neutrals,
mediators,and referees,particularlywhen they are given some
controlover the communication
system,also fitsinto thisgeneral
field. And, as already emphasized,in additionto problemslike
deterrenceand coercionthereare problemsof devisingenforceable
agreements.
VI
The essentialidea in a game of strategyis that each person's
best choice of actiondependson what he expectsthe otherto do,
and thatone can therefore
constrainthe behaviorof anotherparty
his expectationof how oneselfwill behave. The
by constraining
supremeobjective,then,is to adopt a mode of behaviorin response to the other'sbehaviorthat,when persuasivelycommunicated to the other,causes himto preferthe choice of action that
we should like him to prefer. That is, we try to make our be-
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134
T. C.
SCHELLING
havior conditionalon his in such a way that when he evaluates
the optionsavailableto him,takinginto account the behaviorof
ours thatgoes with each of his choices,he voluntarilychooses a
courseof actionfavorableto us.
The analysisof this kind of strategyis clearestin those cases
where one's behavior can be made almost mechanicallyconditional on the other's. If one could always arrangeto incur an
irrevocablelegal commitment
to behaveas he allegeshe will behave
-to carryout all of his threatsand promises-theelementsof the
situationwould be clear-cut.But whatmakesthesubjectintriguing
is preciselythe difficulty
of makingone's behaviorso manifestly
conditionalin a particularway on the behaviorof one's partner
or adversarythat the partneror adversarywill take for granted
preciselythe behaviorpatternthatone has designed.What makes
it a littleunreasonableto threatento drop hydrogenbombs on
Moscow everytimethe Russiansinsultus is principallythatwe
cannot arrangeso that we have to, and knowingthat we don't
" Get out
have to theyknow thatwe won't. At an intersection,
of my way or I'll crash into you," is usually an unreasonable
threatnotbecauseit would damageone's own car too,but because,
for thatvery reason,the threatenedpartyknows that the threat
can arrangeto have to
will not be carriedout. If the threatener
carry it out, by gettingup so much speed that the collisionis
unlessthe second partygets out of the way, the threat
inievitable
becomesmeaningful.But in additionto the physical,mechanical,
and legal commitments
that one can incurin relationto a stated
patternof response,thereare also threats,promises,and rules of
the game that are observedfor reasonsthat,though "rational,"
are ratherintangible.
Consider Quemoy, Berlin,the continuingdistinctionbetween
nuclearand otherweapons,or the difference
between,say, East
German troops and Soviet troops in the event of a European
limitedwar, or the diplomaticrecognitionof CommunistChina.
about events,actions,or distinctions
What is significant
like these
is thattheycannotbe evaluatedon theirmeritsalone. They have
that transcendthe local or
a symbolicsignificance-connotations
issues.
It
is
not
technical
usually argued that Quemoy must be
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INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY
1 35
defendedfor its own sake, but that one should not retreatfrom
Quemoy when subjectedto pressurebecause to do so will create
expectationsboth in our enemiesand in our allies (and perhaps
to
even in ourselves)thatwould be enormouslydisadvantageous
us. There is probablymoresubstanceto the " meritsof the case "
in Berlin;nevertheless,
the attentionthatBerlingetsis due to the
sharedon bothsidesof the Iron Curtain,that
generalrecognition,
whathappensin Berlinwill be a signof whatshouldbe expectedto
happen elsewhere.The significanceof discoveringsome Chinese
among the North Koreans, or the explosionof nuclearweapons
in a limitedlocal war, would be mainlyin the expectationsthat
theycreate,not in the local militaryor civilianimpact.
Speaking more generally,concepts like " challenge," "status
quo," " overtact," " sanctuary,"and the limitsthatare found in
limitedwar,are all psychologicalor symbolic.They are essentially
arbitrary.That is, they get theirsignificancefromthe fact that
people believein theirsignificance.If people thinkthatthe introductioninto a limitedwar of a particularnew weapon is an innovation,or a challenge,or a breachof therules,it is. And if people
do not thinkso, it is not.
role,in a theoryof conflict,
There is consequentlyan important
for such symbolicand exceptionalphenomenaas tradition,precedent,convention,and unwrittenlaw. Conflictbehavioris constrainedby sanctionsof this sort. Not only do traditionand
precedentand symbolicissues constrainbehavior,they can be
invokedin the developmentof a strategy.The sanctionthatone
can invoke on his own mode of behavior,on his declaredmode
of responseto the other party's behavior,is often a symbolic
or precedent,whetherthe fearof breaking
sanction;it is tradition,
a precedentor the fearof creatingone.
thatprecedentor traditioncan have forceeven
It is interesting
in regulatingrelationsbetweenadversarieswho recognizeno common legal systemor common value system. The concept of
limitedwar is an excellentexample. For the mostpart,the limits
in limitedwar are tacitratherthanexplicit,supportedby no legal
systemand no formalagreements,observedby adversarieswho
would not trusteach otherwith any such limitseven if they did
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136
T. C. SCHELLING
existon paper,and that oftenarise by a processthatis not altogethersubject to the consciouscontrolof the participants.Particularlimitssimplybecome investedwith a kind of recognized
authority,
in thesensethateach side recognizesthatthe othermay
not transgressit until it has been transgressed.Even national
boundaries,it should be noted, have only this kind of statusin
of the
timeof war; it is not the legal but thesymbolicsignificance
penetration
of a nationalboundary-thechallengeto the territorial
integrity
of a country-thatmakesit evidentto both sidesthatan
froman
attackon the homelandof eitheris qualitativelydifferent
attackon each other'smilitaryforcesin thirdareas.
intuitive
are essentially
Furthermore,
thoughthelimitsthemselves
and symbolic,and though they may discriminatebetween the
participantsin a conflict,they cannot necessarilybe treatedas
"irrational" factorsin strategicdecisions. Limited war is not
necessarily"irrational" for eitherparty,if the alternativemight
have been a war thatwould have been less desirablefor both of
them. Nor is it irrationalto evaluatethe diplomaticrecognition
of CommunistChina as though it were charged with symbolic
significance,
ratherthan just a technicallegalisticact, if in fact
everyonedoes evaluateit as a signratherthanas a legal technicality.
While it is not rationallynecessaryto considera particularcase
to be a "test case," the recognitionthat a particularissue has
becomea testcase can be rational.
The elusivequalityof thesesymbolicissues,and theserestraints,
seemsto be due to a peculiarkind of inadvertentpsychological
in a conflict.If the Yalu River
cooperationamongtheparticipants
is to be viewedas a " limit" in theKoreanWar thatwas recognized
is to be analyzednot in terms
on bothsides,itsforceand authority
of thejointunilateralrecognitionof it by bothsidesin the conflict
-not as somethingthatwe and theChineserecognizedunilaterally
and simultaneously-but
as somethingthatwe " mutuallyrecognized." It was not just thatwe recognizedit and theyrecognized
it,but thatwe recognizedthattheyrecognizedit,theyrecognized
that we recognizedit, we recognizedthat they recognizedthat
we recognizedit,and so on. It was a sharedexpectation.To that
extentit was a somewhatundeniableexpectation;if it commands
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INTERNATIONAL
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137
our attention,and we expect it to be observed,and we expect
the Chinese to expect us to observe it, we cannot unilaterally
fromit. In thatsense,limitsand precedents
detachour expectations
and traditionsof this kind have an authoritythat is not exactly
in a conflict;they
grantedto themvoluntarilyby the participants
or focal power of theirown.
acquirea magnetism
This,
This subjectis one thatneeds to be betterunderstood.17
relations,
again,is a subjectin whichparallelsbetweeninternational
interracialrelations,relationsbetweengangs,and even traditions
of the sportingfield,mightbe exploited. Limited warfareand
daresand challengesseemto be as relevantto juvenilefightsas to
conflictbetweennations;and if the essenceof the conceptseludes
us in one context,perhapswe can usefullysearchforit in another.
it see my papers,"Bargaining,Communica17For an attemptto understand
tion, and LimitedWar," Journalof ConflictResolution,I (March, 1957), 1936, and "The Strategyof Conflict: Prospectusfor a Reorientationof Game
Theory,"Journalof ConflictResolution,II (September,1958), 203-64.
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