I
n June this year the words of Oscar Wilde’s Lady Bracknell should have rung in Barack Obama’s ears.
To paraphrase the good lady, to lose one American general charged with running a vicious foreign
war maybe regarded as a misfortune, however to lose two looks a lot like carelessness.
It is this approach, a policy Petraeus played a key role in drafting,
bewildered if amused response from his closest aides.
which will shape the general’s actions in Kabul. In accepting the
However, it is not primarily his media skills or his legitimacy on
job, Petraeus now faces a series of daunting challenges. Most
Capitol Hill that led to Petraeus’ appointment but his development
importantly, he has to lead the fight against an adversary, the
of the US military’s counter-insurgency doctrine. Obama, in
Obama sacked General Stanley McChrystal, US Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in June 2010 just as
Taliban, whose constant military innovation since their initial defeat
belatedly agreeing to the McChrystal plan and sending an extra
America’s involvement in Afghanistan became its longest running foreign war. Given the amazingly indiscreet comments McChrystal and
in 2001 has seen them increase the effectiveness of their tactics
30,000 troops to Afghanistan, has overtly placed his hopes for a
his staff made to a free-lance journalist as they got drunk in a Parisian bar, the President had little choice. However, only a year earlier, the
and strategy and the geographic reach of their insurgency. If this
resolution of America’s Afghan problem on the ability of counter-
Obama administration had sacked his predecessor, General David McKiernan. McKiernan was replaced to clear space for a new, more
were not a big enough challenge, the standing of the United
insurgency doctrine to deliver stability.
aggressive American policy towards the ongoing conflict that also made room for McChrystal himself. However, the high profile sacking
States’ chosen partner in Afghanistan, the government led by
of two senior generals in the space of a year combined with the very public divisions within Obama’s Afghan team point to a drift in
Hamid Karzai, has continued to decline since his appointment in
Petraeus, upon returning for his second tour in Iraq in 2005,
policy which has failed to achieve its stated aims and has rapidly lost public confidence. The Afghan conflict looks to be for Obama
the aftermath of the invasion and overthrow of the Taliban. The
was given the task of writing the US military’s first new counter-
what Iraq was for George W. Bush, a deeply unpopular foreign policy adventure that eats away at the President’s popularity and policy
Karzai administration’s reputation for corruption reached its nadir
insurgency doctrine for twenty years. He deliberately based the
programme. With this in mind, when faced with managing the fallout from the McChrystal debacle, the White House called General
with the blatant electoral fraud that accompanied his victory in
Army’s new COIN manual on historical case studies of previous
David Petraeus, the same man, who to all appearances, rescued Bush from his Baghdad quagmire.
the 2009 presidential elections. To add to Petraeus’ problems
COIN campaigns and peppered it with quotes from celebrated
the Obama White House remains deeply and publicly divided
COIN gurus like David Galula and Robert Thompson.
OBAMA’S AFGHAN POLICY
on how best to extract itself from Afghanistan. Vice-President
These COIN theorists have an almost Foucaultian obsession
When appointing Petraeus, Obama made it very clear that this
The removal of McKiernan and his replacement by McChrystal
counter-terrorism strategy to limit the cost of the US presence in
with state power. Galula see the state as ‘the machine for the
was a change in personnel not policy. Given the machinations
triggered a wide-ranging policy review. This saw McChrystal
the country. Ambassador Eikenberry sent a series of damming
control of the population’, which is unsurprisingly placed at the
the administration had gone through to arrive at its current
promoting a counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy organized around
telegrams back to Washington in November 2009, setting out a
core of the COIN manual Petraeus wrote for the US military.
policy this was hardly a surprise. Obama’s own election campaign
an even greater commitment of US forces. In opposition to this
powerful case against the COIN strategy that was promoted by
‘Political power is the central issue’ it argues from the start.
sought to contrast the ‘good’ war in Afghanistan, as a war of
Vice-President Joe Biden and the US Ambassador to Kabul, Karl
McChrystal. These were subsequently leaked to the New York
‘COIN … involves the application of national power in the
necessity triggered by 9/11, against the ‘bad’ war in Iraq pursued
Eikenberry, openly lobbied for a less ambitious approach. After
Times giving further credence to those like the Vice- President
political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
unnecessarily and ineptly by an ideologically zealous Bush
three months of semi-public squabbling and indecision, Obama
who see the application of COIN doctrine as a costly and
fields and disciplines’. ‘The primary objective of any COIN
administration. This contrast led Obama to send a further 21,000
backed McChrystal’s aggressive application of COIN doctrine to
unworkable policy.
operation is to foster development of effective governance by a
troops to Kabul once he got into the White House. Two months
Afghanistan with 30,000 additional troops. If there was any doubt,
after his inauguration, Obama sought to rally public opinion
the announcement of this new policy by Obama in a speech
around this increased commitment by claiming he was in pursuit
at the WestPoint Military Academy in December 2009, makes
of ‘a clear and focused goal’ ‘to confront a common enemy that
Afghanistan very much his war.
threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people
of Afghanistan and Pakistan’.
General
Petraeus
goes to
Kabul
By Toby Dodge
Photo credit: www.wired.com
Biden has made little secret of his backing for a very minimal
legitimate government’.
DAVID PETRAEUS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Unsurprisingly, two years later when Petraeus took over command
So is Barack Obama correct to place his hope for a successful
of US forces in Iraq, he took his COIN manual with him to
conclusion of the American military presence in Afghanistan in
Baghdad as the blueprint for the new Iraqi strategy. Similarly,
David Petraeus? Petraeus certainly has the requisite skill set needed
within a month of arriving in Kabul, Petraeus issued a twenty-
for the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force
four point ‘Counter-insurgency Guidance’ to all NATO forces in
in Afghanistan. Firstly, he is an extremely able communicator
the country. Mirroring the Army’s COIN Manual and counter-
and has developed powerful links with America’s legislators on
insurgency doctrine more generally, the guidance placed the civil
Capital Hill. His legitimacy in Washington and more broadly across
power of the Afghan state at the centre of Petraeus’ approach.
American public opinion is probably at its height. In September
2007, Petraeus was hauled back to Washington from Baghdad
WHAT LESSONS FROM IRAQ?
to testify in front of Congress and, in effect, justify George
Bush’s ‘surge’. He faced sceptical questioning from both Barack
However, Obama’s new-found belief in the ability of counter-
Obama and Hilary Clinton and an aggressive attack on his probity
insurgency doctrine to triumph in Afghanistan may yet founder
from campaigning organisations opposed to the war. Petraeus’
on two outstanding issues. The first is whether the application of
testimony steadied nerves in Washington and the reduction of
COIN doctrine was responsible for the decline in violence in Iraq.
violence in Iraq under his watch means he currently has as much if
There is no doubt that a dramatic reduction in civilian murders
not more legitimacy than the politicians he serves.
coincided with the start of the counter-insurgency campaign in
February 2007. In January 2007, an estimated 3500 civilians were
Petraeus is also a skilled media operator, courting journalists,
killed across Iraq, by June 2009 the monthly figure had dropped to
giving them access to his inner circle and facilitating numerous
340. What is more difficult to ascertain is exactly why this dramatic
‘battlefield circulations’ for leading members of the fifth estate.
reduction occurred and whether it remains sustainable in Iraq let
Indeed, it may well have been McChrystal’s attempt to replicate
alone applicable to another country.
Petraeus’ approach to the media that led to the presence of
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journalist Michael Hastings in the Paris bar. In contrast, the
The US military’s own explanation stresses the change in tactics
likelihood of Petraeus being politically indiscrete with journalists let
triggered by the surge: the move away from large military
alone getting drunk is so remote that its mere suggestion brings a
operations targeting the insurgency, to population protection
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COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN
and counter-insurgency doctrine. This analysis focuses not only on the sharp increase in US troops
Finally, the politics surrounding the Karzai government in Kabul
are, if anything, worse than those surrounding the Maliki
numbers but also on their location amongst the Iraqi population, in small forts or Joint Security
What, if any of the competing arguments about the reduction
government in Baghdad from 2006-2010. Iraq, in 2005 and
of violence in Iraq can be applied to the current situation in
2010, managed to carry out national elections where electoral
Those analysts who have been sceptical about this explanation
Afghanistan? Petraeus’ twenty-four point ‘Counter-insurgency
fraud had little or no role in the eventual outcome. The national
look instead to the widespread population transfers triggered
Guidance’ issued after he arrived in Kabul clearly stresses similar
elections of 2010 saw sections of Iraqi society who were previously
by the sectarian warfare that dominated Baghdad until 2007.
military tactics to those used in Baghdad. NATO forces are urged
marginalized and supporters of the insurgency, seeking to
The main militias operating across Baghdad before 2007,
to ‘live among the people. We can’t commute to the fight’. They
mobilize and influence government through the ballot box. This
the Badr Brigade and Jaish al Mahdi, deliberately set out
must ‘secure and serve the population’ and ‘hold what we secure’.
was sadly far from the case in Afghanistan in 2009. Ambassador
to drive Sunni residents from mixed neighbourhoods and
Beyond the tactics of stationing American troops amongst the
Eikenberry, in his leaked telegram, damned the Karzi government
Baghdad altogether. Estimates vary on how many people were
population what other lessons could be imported from Iraq?
as an inadequate strategic partner for any COIN campaign,
Stations scattered across Baghdad and its suburbs.
which shunned ‘responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether
displaced in this sectarian warfare, but the US military puts it
at 350,000. Of these, an Associated Press survey carried out in
Attempts to reproduce the role that the Anbar Awakening
defence, governance, or development.’ He added for good
March 2009 estimated that only sixteen percent have returned
played in Iraq can be seen in the funding of informal indigenous
measure that,
to their former homes.
forces or village militias in Afghanistan. Indeed, a contributing
factor to McKiernan’s removal was said to be his reluctance to
‘Beyond Karzai himself, there is no political ruling
In addition, there is an argument to suggest that once the
pursue this policy. However, the Anbar Awakening’s influence
class that provides an overarching national identity
surge started in early 2007, the US military inadvertently
was not primarily military. The movement represented a decision
that transcends local affiliations and provides reliable
solidified this population transfer. They replaced the makeshift defences erected by communities
General Stanley McChrystal
by key communities in north-west Iraq to break an alliance of
partnership. Even if we could eradicate pervasive
with concrete blast walls designed to impede the flow of both suicide bombers and militias. It is this
in Afghanistan.
convenience with radical Islamists and associated foreign fighters.
corruption, the country has few indigenous sources of
sectarian division of the city that some analysts argue reduced inter-communal violence. In effect, the
Photo credit: www.guardian.co.uk
It was triggered by the actions of the radicals themselves and not
revenue, few means to distribute services to its citizens,
death squads won, creating religiously homogeneous communities that were walled off by the US
by US policy. When faced with both radical Islamist oppression
and most important, little to no political will or capacity
military. Those backing this explanation would suggest there is a causal link between the increase in
and a growing civil war, those involved in the Anbar Awakening
to carry out basic tasks of governance.’
bombings in Baghdad in March and April 2009 and the removal of a number of security walls by the
turned to the US as the least worst option. It is hard to see a
Iraqi government.
similar dynamic reoccurring in Afghanistan in spite or because of
Obama has publicly committed his administration to a target date
US policy.
of June 2011 to begin reducing American military commitments in
The third explanation for the decline in both civilian and military casualties is the so-called ‘Anbar
Afghanistan. With the problems faced by Petraeus in implementing
Awakening’. In 2006, a number of residents of the north-western province of Anbar rose up against
As with Iraq, there is a clear sectarian dynamic at play in the
a counter-insurgency strategy it may well be that over the next
al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, seeking to drive them from their communities. Petraeus, upon his arrival
Afghan conflict. After 2001 the US and the international
year he will strive to hold the ring and try to prevent any increase
in Iraq, was quick to see the potential of this movement. He set up the Sons of Iraq programme,
community overtly backed specific sub-national groups to the
in the Taliban’s power and simultaneously apply pressure on
which paid volunteers to man checkpoints across Baghdad and the north-west of Iraq, effectively
exclusion of others. The comparison here is the prominence given
Karzai to temper government corruption. Petraeus’ prestige in
encouraging former insurgents to turn against al Qaeda, in return for support and resources. The
in Iraq after 2003 to formerly exiled politicians associated with
Washington and media skills may calm American unease with the
Awakening movement undoubtedly reduced the numbers of Iraqis who actively or passively supported
religious parties and the key role assigned to groups involved
conflict in Afghanistan. This combination, along with the new
the insurgency against the Americans in Iraq. However, the sustainability of this phenomenon is
in the Northern Alliance in the post-2001 Afghan government
coherence Petraeus will bring to Afghan policy, may deliver enough
open to question, as the Iraqi government disarmed and disbanded the Sons of Iraq organisations
and army. However, in both Afghanistan and Iraq this led to the
breathing space in Afghanistan to allow Obama the chance of
and arrested key leaders. This action has undoubtedly contributed to rising suspicion and resentment
alienation of key sections of society from the new political order
gaining a second term as president. Once re-elected, much the
towards the Iraqi government amongst the communities affected.
in Baghdad and Kabul, driving Iraq into civil war and fuelling the
same as George W. Bush before him, he would have the political
insurgency against Kabul. Attempts to broaden out the basis
scope and experience to return to his greatest foreign policy
The fourth reason for the decline in violence was the role of one of its key proponents, Muqtada al
of the Iraqi government from 2005 to 2009 proved to be little
problem with enough time and forethought to find a new policy to
Sadr and his militia, the Jaish al Mahdi. As the surge began, Sadr quickly realised he and his forces
more than cosmetic. It remains to be seen if US policy could
extract the United States from a war he did not start but certainly
would be one of its key targets. In response he de-mobilised his fighters and fled to Iran. After intra-
build a government more representative of the population. The
did commit to end. ■
Shia violence between the Jaish al-Mahdi and the Badr Brigade he declared an outright ceasefire in
more aggressive deployment of US military forces in Iraq from
August 2007. This allowed both US and Iraqi forces to target the more radical and violent operatives
2007 onwards caused one of the drivers of violence, Muqtada al
***
in Sadr’s movement and break their capacity for widespread violence.
Sadr and his militia the Jaish al Mahdi, to declare a ceasefire and
Dr Toby Dodge is an Associate of the IDEAS Middle East
embark on a partial de-mobilisation. There is no sign whatsoever
International Affairs Programme and Reader in International Politics
However, in keeping with his own COIN manual, Petraeus whilst in Iraq, made it clear that sustainable
that the US surge in Afghanistan is likely to trigger a similar
at the School for Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary,
stability could only be delivered by political means. This type of grand political bargain has yet to
response from those involved in the insurgency there.
University of London.
emerge in Iraq and given the current post-electoral stalemate in Baghdad there are no signs that it will
do so anytime soon.
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