War, Peace and Conflict Resolution: Towards an Indian Ocean Model
Author(s): John House
Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 3-21
Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/621864
Accessed: 16-07-2015 09:06 UTC
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resolution:
towards
War,peace andconflict
an IndianOceanmodel
JOHN HOUSE
Mackinder
Road,Oxford
Halford
Professor
ofGeography,
University
ofOxford,
Mansfield
OX1 3TB
MS received1 September1983
(PresidentialAddressdeliveredat theAnnualConferenceoftheInstituteofBritish
Geographers,Durham,January1984)
ofpoliticalgeography
thereis littleconcernwiththestudyofwarandthecausesofwar,threats
ABSTRACT. In theresurgence
ofinternational
A geographical
to peace,and conflict
resolution.
contribution
mustbe set withintheories
butthereis
relations,
on warand peace studiesmustalso be takenintoaccount.A
a place forinductive-empirical
literature
case-studies.A growing
in the IndianOcean is outlined,
forsystemsimulation
of interactions
at all scale levelsand forall politicalactors,
framework
in theinterests
of tensionmanagement.
thecharacter
and significance
oftheIndianOcean as
The stagesof analysisare,first,
ofthesuperin theimageplansandbehaviour
theobjectives
and interaction
and,secondly,
spacesofdecision-takers;
interpreted
thedegreeofco-operation
states.The interrelationships
are
amonglittoral
powerswitheach other,withclientstatesand,finally
of policy.Sovietand U.S. policies
set withinthecontextofchanging
events,focusedon theuse ofsea poweras an instrument
arecontrasted,
in theirimpacton littoral
statesandon theUnitedNationsZoneofPeace proposals.
IndianOcean,Sea power,Systemsimulation,
KEY WORDS: Politicalgeography,
Conflict
resolution.
Phoenix-like,politicalgeographyis seen to be risingfromits ashes. Like so manytwinkling
stars,itemson researchagendasproliferate
(Taylor,1982), whilstshortlya proposalto establish
a Commissionto study'Problemsof the worldpoliticalmap' will be consideredby the IGU
ExecutiveCommittee.The ashes too are stirring,
since continuity
has alwaysmatchedchange
in the oldest and most enduringbranch of geography.Yet in the renaissance,even the
resurgenceof political geographythere are missingingredients,fallow fields and totallyissues. Whereare today'scounterparts
of the synopticvision,themasterly
ignoredfundamental
or a Mahan? Wherein political
of
time
and
a
radiated
Mackinder
globalinterpretation
space,
by
are
to
be
found
or
structures
behavioural
modelsof comparable
systems
geography
explanatory
to thosein otherbranchesof humangeography?It is truethatthereis progress
sophistication
to report.Saul Cohen's geostrategicconceptions(1973; 1982) indicateone line of advance,
in the extensionof traditionalgeopolitics.Wallerstein'sanalysisof the worldsystem(1974)
and the role of the capitalistworldeconomy(1979) underlinethe interpretative
and
strengths
internalcoherenceof the politicaleconomyviewpointin the studyof international
affairsat
the globalscale.
Yet the greatestgap of all remains,and to fillit is a dauntingtask: concernwithwars
and thecauses ofwar,withthreatsto peace and theneed to resolveor abateinternational
tension
throughconflictresolution.Althoughtheworldis passingthroughan almostuniquelyturbulent
phase, geographershithertohave given littleattentionto war and peace studies,eitheras a
fieldofresearch,or in empiricalcase studies(House, 1983). Withprogeneralinterdisciplinary
in
war
and
studies
gress
peace
takingplace, withoutgeographicalinputs,in the fieldsof interTrans.Inst.Br. Geogr.
N.S. 9: 3-21 (1984) ISSN 0020-2754
Printed
in GreatBritain
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4
JOHN HOUSE
nationalrelationsanalysis,and studiesdevotedto thetheoryand practiceof conflictresolution,
position.
politicalgeographyrisksbeingonce morerelegatedto an exceptionalist
The opportunity
is thereforpoliticalgeographers,since the spatial dimensionand the
ofproblemissuestendto be eitherignoredorhabituallyunderplayed
geographicaldifferentiation
other
by
specialists(Gottmann,1982). To defineand explorea potentialgeographicalcontriThe
butionwe need to know much more on the state of the art among otherpractitioners.
of
theories
a
structured
set
of
offers
international
relations
(Frankel,1973a,p. 28),
loosely
study
grouped around: the study of power and conflict;social communicationat all scale levels
(Boulding,1962)
(cybernetics);or an analysisin systemterms.The studyofpowerinteraction
conflictas a generalsocialprocess,withnegative(dissociative)and positive(associatinterprets
model (Deutsch, 1963) analysestheflowofcommuniive) aspects.The social communications
cations among actorson the international
stage, balancingadaptivebehaviourwitha refusal
method(Kaplan, 1967), thoughlimitedas yet
to adapt or to take heed. The systems-analytic
in
forformulating
in explanatory
terms
is
useful
power,
organizational
hypothesesfromcomplex
forthinkingabout
data. For politicalgeographyit furtheroffersthe most usefulframework
the scale-level problem,with nested levels of spatial analysis.Finally,the linkageapproach
(Rosenau, 1969) is a limitedbut usefulwayof studyingrecurrent
sequences of behaviourthat
in
in
and
are
This input/output
reacted
to
another.
one
interpresystem(scale-level)
originate
tationalso permitsthe integrative
studyof domesticpoliticsand foreignpolicy,by regarding
each sphereas a systemin interaction.Such specificexaminationof actual transactionflows
adds depthto the moreabstractsystems-analytical
approach.As in geographyso too in interbutrather
are rarelyseen as complementary,
nationalrelationsstudiesalternative
methodologies
as competitive,the empiricalvyingwith the nomothetic,the quantitativewiththe intuitive,
or the theoreticalwiththe applied.
A risingbody of literatureand methodin war and peace studiesalso needs to be taken
intoaccount.Some majorstudies,includingthe CorrelatesofWar project(Singer,1981; Small
and Singer,1982), are highlyquantitativein character,seekingto establish'whatthe incidence
of war has been and what conditionscorrelatewith its presence, absence or magnitude'
(O'Loughlin, 1983). Though no consistenttheoriesof conflicthave yetemergedit seems 'that
traditionalgeographicinterestin location and strengthas predictorsof war involvement
are well-founded'(Van der Wusten, 1983). The Dimensionalityof Nations (DON) project
(Rummel,1977, 1979) studiesnationsas social units
In attridividedintotwospaces: behaviorand attribute.
whosebehaviorcan be analytically
bute space nationsare locatedin termsof theircharacteristics
(social, political,economic,
etc.) and in behaviorspace, dyadsof nationsare locatedin termsof theirintermilitary,
actions (co-operation,conflict,avoidance,etc.) ... Its strongpointsare its measuresof
of domesticto international
absoluteand relativedistancesbetweenstates,its relationship
in
its
of
a
behaviorist
element
events, incorporation
policymakers'evaluations,its clear
tests of hypothesizedcauses of international
conflictand its examinationof formaland
functionalregionsat the globalscale. (O'Loughlin, 1983)
Alongsidesuch majorprojectsthereare smaller-scalestudieson war and peace, focusing
on: the relationships
betweenmembersof the interstate
respectively
systemand the frequency
of wars betweenthem (Wallensteen,1981); the significance
of territorial
disputesamongthe
causes of war since 1945 (Weede, 1975); and the distribution
and explanationof internalwars
withinthe Third Worldcountries(Kende, 1978). Though at thisstageit is prematureto think
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IndianOceanmodel
resolution:
Conflict
5
of applicationsfromthese studies to war avoidance strategiesthereis a clear need forgeoin thisnovel and vitalresearchfield.Two broadavenues of advance for
graphicalinvolvement
indicated: the constructionand calibrationof time-space models
seem
geographers
political
diffusion
and contagionanalysismorefully;and thatwhich
(O'Loughlin, 1983), incorporating
followshere, the empirical-inductive
relationshipsat the macro-scale,
studyof international
in this case the Indian Ocean and its littoralstates, set withinthe contextof superpower
involvement.
TENSION MANAGEMENT: AN INDIAN OCEAN MODEL
forthe geographical
It mustbe emphasizedthatwhat is presentedis an interimmethodology
affairs.It is altogether
prematureto visualize
analysisof a macro-scaleproblemin international
an integratedsystemsmodel embracingthe myriadcomplexitiesof international
relationships
in time and space of so large and differentiated
a segmentof the global surface.The most
forsystemssimulationof the reciprocalactions
that is attemptedis to establisha framework
timeand space.
ofpoliticalactorsand theirenvironment,
embracingthedimensionsofstructure,
of particularpoliticaleventsor decisions,have earlier
the significance
Partsof the interaction,
been exploredby iterativegamingprocedures(Graubardand Builder,1982), whichincidentally
also offera veryusefulteachingdevice forpoliticalgeographers.
betweenpoliticalactors,at all scaleThe completesystemof transactions
and interactions
and
is
within
the
unit
levels,internally
political
externally, impossiblycomplexto modelin its
A
framework
can, nevertheless,be postulatedand disaggresystems
entirety(Simon, 1970).
The model
of
withinsegmentsofenvironment.
cover
between
actors
to
sets
relationships
gated,
framework
conditionsthe mentalmaps of geostrategicdecision-takers.Such mentalmaps are
made up from'image plans'. These may be both positiveor negativesets of presuppositions,
political,economic,social, strategicor tacticalin character,the visual and logical attributes
of the geographicalmind (Henrikson,1980). When set withincultural-historical
as well as
there
is
some
to
'Behaviour
Mackinder's
spaces'
similarity
'organizer'concept.
spatialcontexts,
are the geographicalfieldswithinwhich activityis generatedand diffused,the 'horse-sense'
conceptofMackinder,thespheresofinfluenceto others.The constructive
purposeofthemodel
framework
is to improvetensionmanagementin the nationaland international
communities,
to increaseadaptiveand diminishmaladaptivebehaviour.In particular,sea powerwill be exand relationship
to proposalsfordemilitarization
counter-actions,
plored,withits ramifications,
or denuclearizationof the Indian Ocean.
The stages of analysis(Fig. 1) are: i) the characterand significance
of the systemframe,
the Indian Ocean; ii) objectivesof: externalpowers,the littoralstates and the international
community;iii) the sets of interactionsbetween: externalpowers with each other,external
powerswithlittoralstates,and of littoralstateswitheach other;iv) the degreeof effectiveness
and the extentof positivetensionmanagementachieved,by wars,threatsof force(including
sea power), bases, militaryor economicaid, treatiesor alliances; v) an evaluationof system
and the settingof thiswithina widerglobalcontext.
stability,or instability
The system frame: the Indian Ocean
In ordersof magnitude,arounda 4000 X 4000 mile ocean, therelives one-thirdof the world's
population,one-quarterof UN membersand most Third World countries;and on mostdays
20 per cent of worldshippingis in transit(Fig. 2). The oil resourcesof the Persian Gulf,
and theirvitalimportanceto theWesternWorldfurther
the tankerdistribution-routes
underpin
the global significanceof the Indian Ocean. Yet views differon its strategicworth(Bowman
and Clark,1981). Externalpowers,particularly
theU.S.A. and theU.S.S.R., perceivea perhaps
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6
JOHN HOUSE
OUTSIDE
LITTORAL AND
HINTERLAND POWERS
POWERS
IMAGE PLANS
Political
Economic/Social
Strategic/Tactical
BEHAVIOUR SPACES
Ocean logistics
ClientStates, allies
Adversaryareas
Conflict
Contiguity
<Cooperation
Ocean frontage/space
PROJECTION
Naval/Military Diplomacy
Armstransfers
Foreign aid
Trade
Cultural/Educational training
INTERACTION
Superpowers
Otheroutsidepowers
Littoral& HinterlandStates
Each other
Superpowers
Other outside powers
forsystem
in theIndianOcean
simulation
1. A framework
FIGURE
illusoryIndian Ocean unity.To the Soviets'the Indian Ocean and the countriesroundit are
graduallybecomingan independentgeopoliticalentity'(Davidov and Kremenyuk,1973). To
theUnited Statesaccordingto AdmiralZumwalt,'The Indian Ocean has becomethe area with
the potentialto produce majorityshiftsin the global power balance over the next decade'
(Mugomba, 1976, p. 18), whilstto Cohen (1973, pp. 63-5) theIndianOcean was 'an eventual
thirdgeostrategic
character'.On theworldscale, however,the
region,witha globe-influencing
Soviet strugglewiththe West had its epicentrein Europe,but 'a struggleof willswas increasinglydisplacedto the peripheryof the international
system'(Dismukesand McConnell, 1979,
Terms
and
included
used
'the
of the powerstruggleof our times'
fulcrum
p. 285).
concepts
(Kaushik, 1972, p. 9); a 'universalflank'(Dept. Extra Mural Stud. 1973, viii), both to the
Asian inlandcontainment
conceptof Spyckmanand to Brezhinshki's'arc of crisis'throughthe
Middle East intoAfrica.Yet these are almostentirelyexternalconceptions,and by strategists
at that,lookingat a vast ocean space not centralto the superpowerbalance and, even so, sufof manysmall-scale conflicts
ficiently
large and diverseto have given rise to a proliferation
fromwhichexternalpowershave rarelystoodaside.
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Jordan
Iraq
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Iran
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Egypt
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Mah..divel.
Uganda
62-
65
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76
Tanzania o
So
":
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Matay
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1 .6 6Non-aigned
2. IndianOcean states:datesofindependence,
FIGuRn
classified
byyearanddecadeofoccurrence
3. IndianOcean states:politicalalignments
FIGuRn
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E
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FIGuRE4. UnitedStatestradewithIndianOceanstates(1982)
FIGURE5. U.S.S.R. trade withIndian Ocean states (1982) Source:IMF (1983) Directionof tradestatistics
yearbook
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00
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mls
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FIGURE6. Japanese trade withIndian Ocean states (1982)
FIGURE7. U.K. trade withIndian Ocean states (1982) Source:IMF (1983) Directionof tradestatistics
yearbook
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10
HOUSE
JOHN
Few observershave regardedthe littoralstatesthemselvesas reflecting
anykindof unity.
In Australianeyes (Vaili,1976, p. 31) 'the Indian Ocean is not a unit.It consistsof countries
which have great diversityof race, politics,strengthsand opportunities',
a kind of ethnic,
and
cultural
chessboard.
Wall
asserted
that
the
Indian
Ocean is 'neither
religious
(1975, p. 139)
economicallynor sociallycoherent,nor are many states in it'. Such states are oftennewlyindependent,unstable and vulnerablewith lack of connectivity(linkages) to others.Hayes
fivequite distinctsub--areas,
each witha different
(1974, p. 1) identifies
geographical,cultural,
economicand politicalcharacter.Yet, ironically,
it was the threatto peace and securityarising
fromthe intrusionand activitiesof the naval forcesof both superpowersthatled in 1971 to
the firstUN-sponsored Zone of Peace proposals,on behalfof the littoralstates.A sense of
collectiveIndian Ocean identityunderexternalthreathas developedfurther,
in the meeting
of 44 littoraland hinterlandstatesin 1979, and the mostrecentre-iterationof the UN Zone
of Peace proposalsin 1982. Yet dissentionand diversity
have neverbeen set aside.
The political actors on stage
Withsuch incompatibility
and varietyofimageplanstheinteraction
inbehaviourspaces is inevitablycomplex.The imageplans of externalpowers,includingBritain,France,Japanand China
as well as thetwosuperpowers
are,in each case, a uniquemixofpolitical/ideological,
economic/
social and strategic/tactical
ingredients.Their behaviourspaces encompassan appreciationof
ocean logistics,includingaccess fortrade,the searchforbases, recruitment
and supportfor
clientstatesor allies,and counteraction
towardsadversarialstatesand theirexternalprotectors.
The projectionof such policyplans is directedto maximizingadaptivebehaviourin thesystem,
to the advantageof the instigator.
The projectionof such policy plans is cumulative,thoughnot necessarilyregularor
the spatial
incapableof beingset intoreverse(e.g. Somalia,Egypt). One methodofillustrating
outcomeof outsideinfluenceexercised(Fig. 3) is to chronicleand date specificevidence(treatto
ies, agreements,includingdefenceagreements).Thereafter,and much moreexhaustively,
ofthebar-graphsmapped
analyseunfoldingevents(oversomethreedecades). The proportions
thusillustratethe strengthof influenceby outsidepowerson the politicalgamingboard.
The means of bringinginfluenceor ratherleverage,to bear include: trade (Figs. 4, 5,
6 and 7), especiallythaton preferential
terms;overseascreditsor grants,withan overtlypolitical
of
the
IMF or the worldbankingconsortia;armstransfers
unlike
the
terms
purpose (Fig. 8),
on
which
reliable
data
is
hard
to
find
(Fig. 9),
(Tahtinen,1977), and the U.S.S.R. contribution
is certainlyunderstated;naval or militarydiplomacy,particularly
the exerciseof sea power;
and cultural/educational
or trainingprogrammes.
SEA POWER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
of sea powerby thesuperpowers,
Settingaside the nucleardeterrenceproblemthe deployment
in particular,has become so widespreadand commonin the past decade or so thatit presents
a specialkindofreal and growingthreatto peace (Alford,1980). This threatto peace is increasinglyfeltby a majorityofthelittoralstatesofthe IndianOcean and, forthatreason,is extracted
fromthe maze of transactions
forseparateconsideration.
under
different
tenetsand rulesofthe gamesincethewritings
ofMackinder
Although
very
or Mahan sea powerremainsflexible,visible,universaland persuasive(Luttwak,1974; Bull,
1975; Cable, 1981). Figure 10 illustratesthe degreesof naval suasion,in supportof policies
of eithersea controlor sea denial.
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ELo-
S250
I
0
IIUSSR
China
-PRep.of
10
,,,
0 5001,000
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, ,oo
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USSR
O1
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m 500s5
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<2
P. Rep. of China
aid to lessdevelopedcountries
FIGURE 8. Overseas creditsand grantsby socialist countries(1954-77) Source:CIA (1978) Communist
oftheFree World(WashingtonDC)
and
FIGURE 9. Arms transfers(1967-76) Source: U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency (1978) Worldmilitary
expenditures
armstransfers,
1967-76, Publ. 98 (WashingtonDC)
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12
HOUSE
JOHN
ACTIVE
LATENT
DETERRENT
SUPPORTIVE
BENEFICIAL
(alliesencouraged)
US & Soviet US NavyoffBengal
nuclearsubs (1971) & N. Yemen
(1979); SovietNavy
offSomalia(1970)
ADVERSE
(alliesoverreact)
Israeliseizureof
Golan Heights;
invasionof Lebanon
(1982); Vietnamese
invasionof
Kampuchea(1978)
SUPPORTIVE
COERCIVE
POSITIVE
(compellence)
RN:Mozambique
Ship visits:
US 7thfleet; Channel,
USSR Eskadra Falklands,(1982)
5
NEGATIVE
(deterrence)
US Navy
taskforces:
Nicaragua
(1983);
SirteGulf,
Libya
(1983)
ofsea power:a typology
FIGURE10. The political
1974,Table 1)
(basedon LUTrWAK
applications
The use of sea powerwithintheinternational
systemis thusapplicablein tensionmanageor
menteitherin an adaptive(system-maintaining) maladaptive(system-destroying)
manner,
throughthe worldoceans as a neutralplace d'armes.The naval superpowers(Cottrell,et al.,
1981) have in realitymanyinterestsin common,yetin theIndian Ocean thecontrastsbetween
are instrucSoviet and Americannaval policies,image-plans,behaviourspaces and interaction
of
Peace
continued
on
the
Zone
U.N.
as
1982
the
Committee
in
a
as
realm
late
where,
tive,
to perceivea dangerousand growingthreatto peace and securityof the littoralstates.
Soviet Strategies
Image plans (political) Giventhepaucityofopenly-discussedinternalevidencetheinterpretationof Soviet Indian Ocean intentionshas to relyon eventanalysisand reasonedconjecture.
Hence westernwriters(Jukes,1972; Dismukesand McConnell,1979) havetendedto exaggerate
and misinterpret
theentryand continuedpresenceoftheRed Fleet in theIndianOcean, followof the traditionalocean guardian,Britain,after1968. The suspicions
the
withdrawal
ing upon
fromsuch as AdmiralGorshkov(1979), thoughPresident
wereenhancedbyboastfulstatements
Breshnevhad made it clear as earlyas 1971 that he was not committedto the ambitionsof
a clique of Soviet admirals;moreover,the U.S.S.R. defenceestablishment
continuedto be
dominatedby the army.Nevertheless,Westernpoliticianscontinuedto view the Red Fleet
'almostexclusivelywithina war-relatedconceptframe'(Dismukesand McConnell,
deployment
1979, p. 291). The realitywas that the U.S.S.R. was enhancingher global statusand from
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IndianOceanmodel
resolution:
Conflict
13
1961 on had deliberately
developeda seven-oceannavy(Fairhall,1971). Witha globalstrategy
combiningthevisionsof Mackinderand Mahan (Cottrelland Burrell,1972, p. 6) SovietIndian
Ocean policybecame a complexof military,strategic,economicand politicalconsiderations,
thoughno vitalinterestswereinvolved.
In 1968 ForeignMinisterGromykodefinedSoviet interestsas: freedomof commerceand
navigation;freedomof the high seas; access to the biologicaland mineralresourcesof the
oceans; anti-pollutionmanagement;and aid to theless developedcountries.It was also pointed
out (Kudryavtsev,1974, p. 117) thattheIndian Ocean 'offered
the onlynon-freezing
sea route
the
Trans-Siberian
overburdened
in
and
Soviet
Black
the
(supplementing
railway)linking
ports
Azov seas withthosein the Far East',--and not onlyforpeacefulcommercialpurposes!With
an averageof one hundredSoviet cargovessels a monthtransiting
the ocean and a substantial
2
fleet
1973
on
16
the
>
fishing
(1948 Mt,
Mt) regularly
present
highseas therewerelegitimate
interestsfortheRed Fleet to protect.Geopoliticians(Cottrelland Burrell,1972, p. 334) stressed
a moresinistermotive,the need to outflankChina and shieldthe Indian Ocean fromChinese
incursions,whilstconcurrently
applyingpressurewithininlandAsia.
The Arab-Israeliwar of 1967 was a watershedin Indian Ocean politics,and thereafter
the rules of the strategicgame changed,and superpowernaval rivalrybecame endemic.To a
and exploitation,
largeextentit was an indirectstruggleforThirdWorldclients,theirprotection
in whichthe U.S.S.R. substitutedrealpolitik
forideologicalpurity(Bezboruah,1977, p. 141).
Instead of homogeneouspartisanshipcompetitivepluralismhad to be accepted,as the Soviet
had to deal withestablishedgovernments
and parties.The new local war doctrine
government
meanta sacrificeof ideologicalgoals in the expectationof gainsin influence.In thisthe display
of sea powerwas an activeinstrument
of policy,bybothsuperpowers.
'Wouldthepoliticalshape
and complexityof the Third World have been the same ifthe Soviet navyhad been the only
navypractisingcoercivediplomacysince 1967?' (Dismukes and McConnell, 1979, p. 300). An
question!
intriguing
mustreston doctrinalpronouncements,
Naval doctrine and practice Here too interpretation
naval operationsundertaken,
modusoperandi,
withobserverand targetviews.
together
identifying
The pattern,frequencyand compositionofregularnaval deployments
suggestsa symbolictripwire,a modestthoughdeliberatelyvisiblepresence,inadequatefordistantforwardprojection.
An essentiallydefensiveposturedoes not,however,precludeopportunist/assertive
intervention
to tip local mainlandbalances when Soviet interestsare at stake,as in Somalia during1970.
Area familiarization
for Soviet crews involvesflag-showingand goodwillvisits to countries
withclose ties, or thosewithcommerciallinks.In thisway the U.S.S.R. transfers
the physical
presenceof warshipsintothe psychologicalpresencein themindsofdecision-takers(Dismukes
and McConnell, 1979, p. 287).
The forthright
natureof Soviet naval writingswould logicallylead to more aggressive
stancesagainstthe imperialists.Indeed, afterthe Britishwithdrawalfromeast of Suez in 1968
(Darby, 1973) the Sovietnaval staffhawkishly
urgedan activedeploymentof a navaltaskforce
in the Indian Ocean (Jukes,1972, p. 11). With the U.S. PolarisA3 missiles,deployedafter
1964, witha rangeof 2500 miles,therewas an urgentneed to extendthe Red Fleet's capacity
to cover and interdictsuch hazards, especiallyin the ArabianSea. Crisis operations,mainly
in responseto majorU.S. 7thFleet initiativesin the 1970s (Fig. 11) meantthe 'close embrace'
or shadowingpolicyto limitthe U.S. Navy's freedomof action. Both anti-carrierand antisubmarinewarfaretaskforceswereassembledad hoc.As theTridentclass of U.S. submarines,
withmuch greatermissileranges,comes into operationthe ArabianSea will lose its value as
an offensive
base and theIndianOcean willbe oflittlesignificance
in theglobalnuclearbalance.
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FIGU 11. Indian Ocean: armed conflict(1948-83)
FIGuUn 12. Ocean strategy:naval and airfieldfacilitiesof the U.S.S.R. and Western powers, indicatingthe areas of potential
deploymentof forces
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resolution:
Indian Oceanmodel
15
Conflict
Behaviour spaces The spatial outcome of Soviet Indian Ocean policies is reflectedin the
patternand strengthof alignments(Fig. 3), emphasizingthe treatieswith Mozambique,
The attemptsat hegemonyin the
India, Somalia (until 1974), Ethiopia,Iraq and Afghanistan.
Horn of Africa(Gorman, 1981) led to a totalreversalof U.S. and Soviet clientstates after
the Ethiopianrevolutionof 1974 and the Ogaden warwithSomalia. Most Sovietnaval concentrationhas been in and aroundbases in the Gulf of Aden and the lowerRed Sea, withnaval
exercises(code-namedOkean, 1975) practisinginterdiction
of the oil routeand shippinglanes
in general.Otherwise,naval activityis on the high seas, lackingshorebases, and relyingon
fleetanchoragesand mooringbuoys (Fig. 12). Under potentialwar threatthe Soviet priority
would no doubt be to controlthe 'choke-points'of the Straitsof Hormuz (Ramazani, 1979),
Bab el Mandeb and the Cape route(McEwan, 1979). In peacefultimesthe policyofleverage
and increasingdependencyof clients(Fig. 3) will continue,thoughtherehas alwaysbeen too
littleon offerin economicterms.Sovietarmsexportsto theIndianOcean countrieshave proved
an inadequatethoughinflammatory
substitute.
United States strategies
Image plans (political) Under an open democraticsystemthe differencesand conflicts
betweenactorsin theU.S. politicalarenaare moreapparent.There would,however,be general
concensusthat,fortheWesternpowers'access to theseas is vitalforeconomicsurvival,whereas
forthe Soviets it is a bonus' (Cottrell,1981, p. 30). On the otherhand, untilthe 1970s, few
in the U.S.A. saw the Indian Ocean as any kind of vital interest.Sri Lanka is 11 500 miles
distantfromboth New York and San Francisco,and to the Americanson a scale of 1 to 10
the Indian Ocean rankedonly 2 to 3 (Vili, 1976, p. 186). Initially,thereseemed littlemerit
in seekingto replace a Britishpresencewherepolicies had been 'manipulative,and catalytic
ratherthan garrison-like
or fora sustaineddefence'(Martin, 1969, p. 413). Indeed, through
the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had soughta continentalrimlandcontainmentpolicyaround
the U.S.S.R., in supportof regionaltreaties,such as CENTO or SEATO. The withdrawal
of Britishforcesand the approachthereafter
of Sovietnaval unitsin theIndianOcean, together
with a generalerosionof post-colonialstability,presageda dramaticchange in U.S. policies
for that area. PresidentNixon's Guam doctrineenunciatedin 1969, in pursuitof a balance
of powermorefavourableto the U.S., requireda moreactivestance in the Indian Ocean but
fora naval presencewere moreambiguous.Melvin Laird, Defense Secrepolicyjustifications
in
claimed
1972, 'our strengthin the Indian Ocean is not so much in maintaininga large
tary,
ratherin our abilityto move freelyin and out of the ocean as the occasion
but
standingforce,
and our interestdictate'. But to what purpose?A policingrole aimed at the preservationof
of goodpeace; to maintainthebalance ofpowerand influence;to retainor restorethereservoir
will towardsthe U.S.A.; or to secure and protecteconomicinterests,particularly
petroleum
and the oil routes?(Mugomba, 1976, p. 22).
Afterthe Arab-Israeliwars of 1967 and 1973 and the Indo-Pakistanwars of 1965 and
1971 U.S. politicalinterestand naval involvement
in the Indian Ocean escalatedsharply,and,
at the same time,became internally
morecontroversial
amongU.S. politicians.The realpolitik
of Kissingerand Schlesingerwas based on the threatto Westernoil supplies,thoughonlyten
per cent of U.S. suppliescame fromthe Gulf: thusthe need to seek reliablepoliticalrelations
withoil-suppliers;findand arm reliableregionalpartners,withoverwhelmingly
tragicresults
in Iran; or increasinglyto 'go-it-alone'; witha slow but increasingarmsbuild-up and naval
deployment.By the mid-1970s these policies were receivedwitha risingdissentin the U.S.
Congress,comparableto thaton present-daypolicies in CentralAmerica.On the one side in
1974-5 werelinedup thePentagonand theDefenseDepartment;on theother,theWhiteHouse
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HOUSE
16
JOHN
of PresidentCarterand State Department(untila trade-off
withDefenseofthe Salt II negotiaThe
and
a
of
were lengthyand bitter(U.S.
debates
tions)
bevy Congressmen.
Congressional
over the developmentof
Congr. House, 1971, 1974, 1975, 1979; Senate, 1975), particularly
a substantialU.S. naval and air base on Diego Garcia, a nodal island in the BritishIndian
a politicalunitcreatedin 1965. As trenchantly
Ocean Territory,
put in 1975 byChesterBowles,
formerU.S. ambassadorto India 'Only those who liked Vietnamwould love Diego Garcia'.
forDiego Garcia ,
Initiallyin 1975, the U.S. Senate rejectedthe increasein appropriations
Indian Ocean policywas dominatedby the Pentagonand the Defense Departbut increasingly
ment. AdmiralElmo Zumwalt (1974), a redoubtableU.S. counterpart
of the Soviet Admiral
Gorshkov,claimedthat'the Indian Ocean has become a focalpoint forU.S. foreignaid and
has a growingimpacton our own security'.Congresswantednaval armslimitationtalkswith
the Soviets, but it was the Pentagonand the U.S. Navy, with'a grandocean strategy'and
in the place of gunboats,to 'influencelocal warsor threatsto peace'
the use of aircraft-carriers
thatwon the day.
Naval doctrine and practice From 1945 to 1967 the U.S. had had a world-widemonopoly
in naval powerand diplomacy,but no presencein the Indian Ocean untilafter1968; in 1972
the 'chopline'of the U.S. 7th Pacificfleetwas extendedwestwardsto the shoresof Africaand
the Middle East. Though the nearestfleetbase was at Subic Bay in the Philippinestherewas
a chain of fortified
island bases stretching
back across the Pacificto San Diego. Though the
naval policywas assertedto be one of graduateddeterrance,based on a strategicmobilityconcept of the wide-rangingcarriertask force,it came to be more one of crisisentriessuch as
those of 1967, 1971, 1973, 1976, 1979, each withits immediatethreatto peace, and many
in the eventpoliticallycounterproductive.
The carriertaskforcedeployments
wereto influence
that
them
local
there
little
evidence
of
did
so.
is
conflicts,
particular
though
any
The U.S. navalposturein theIndianOcean is thusone ofstrategicdeterrence,
sea control,
of
the
value
of
a
on
littoral
states
and the
naval
diplomatic
projection powerashore,
presence
warfarebarriers(ASW) againstthe Sovietnavy(Holst, 1975, p. 3).
creationof anti-submarine
but increasIn pursuitof such objectivesthe controlof ocean 'choke-points'is fundamental,
has
to
an
Middle
the
Indian
been
viewed
as
the
backdoor
unstable
Ocean
East, rather
ingly
than as a realmin its own rightor the maritimeback-up to a vanishedAsian rimlandcontainmentpolicy.Priority
forMiddle East policyculminatedin 1979 in the Carterdoctrine,which
The Carterdoctrinestatedthat'an attemptby any
followedthe SovietentryintoAfghanistan.
outside powerto gain controlof the Persian Gulf regionwould be regardedas an assault on
the vital interestsof the U.S.A. and any such assault would be repelledby use of any means
force'.To bolstersuch a doctrinean enhancedU.S. navalpresence
necessary,includingmilitary
in the Indian Ocean and the creationof a Rapid DeploymentForce forland operationswere
shiftin regionalgeopoliticalmomentum!
but two of the ingredients.
Trulyan effective
Behaviour spaces Once more the evidenceon politicalalignments(Fig. 3), trade (Figs 4,
5, 6 and 7) and armstransfers
(Fig. 9) illustratethe spatialworkingout and degreesofsuccess
in strategicpolicies.The strategicislandconcepthas complemented
the U.S. navalpreference
which
on thehighseas, withouttheunstableand complicating
constraints
formaximummobility
the politicsof mainlandbases would imply.Nevertheless,the U.S. has soughtwell-located
land bases whereverpossible,withtreatiesand agreementsforshorefacilities(Fig. 12). Not
or counter-bidding
this has been partof an off-setting
game in oppositionto the
infrequently
U.S.S.R.
Though the U.S. had pouredvast volumesof economicaid into Saudi Arabia,Iran and
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resolution:
Indian Oceanmodel
17
Conflict
Ethiopia fromthe 1950s onwardsit was optimistically
prematureforthe Defense Secretary,
Melvin Laird, to claim in 1974 that 'countriessuch as Pakistan,Iran, Saudi Arabia,Kuwait
and Ethiopia all feel a sense of securityby our additionalpresencein the area'. Tell it not
in Teheran or Addis Ababa!
The upgradingofthe U.S. base on Diego Garcia has been thefocusof growingdiscontent
in India, increasinglyalarmedby superpowernaval rivalry.
among littoralstates,particularly
The abilityto sustain 13 pre-positionedmerchantships, to provide30-days supportfortwo
U.S. carriertask groupsand the back-up for a land-based Rapid DeploymentForce seems
a farcryfromthe originalconcept(Bezboruah,1977, p. 63) of 'gaininga littlebalancingtime
fornaval units'.
Superpower interaction:the turbulentdecade (1970 on)
Figure 11 shows the incidenceof armed conflictamong the Indian Ocean littoralstates and
the accompanyingcrisisdeploymentsof naval force,which in all cases but one, Somalia in
1970, wereAmerican.From 1946 to themid-1970swarsin Vietnamand theMalaysianconflict
withIndonesiamade South-East Asia the cock-pitof conflict(Leifer,1980). Troubleson the
bordersof India occupied the centreof the stage duringthe 1960s, involvingwarswithChina
in 1962 and with Pakistanin 1965 and 1971. In the 1970s local wars focusedon the Horn
of Africa,SouthernArabiaand betweenUganda and Tanzania. The Middle East has remained
in turmoilwithArab-Israeliwars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. The Iran-Iraq conflicthas
continuedin bloodyfashionsince 1980. The closerand larger-scaleU.S. carriertaskforcesupIt inevitablyprovoked
portsteadilybecame morepronouncedand, to some, morethreatening.
a balanced Sovietcounter-response.
Figure 12 shows the cumulativespatial impactof superpowernaval strategies,and by
implicationthe highrisksof a continuingbuild-up. The U.S. 7th fleethas a patternof bases,
solidlyfoundedat Subic Bay and in WesternAustralia,extendingwest throughthe strategic
island of Diego Garcia, to more tenuousand uncertainfacilitieson the Africanand Arabian
mainlands.The Soviet fleetcan occupystrategicbases at Aden and in the southernRed Sea,
but the facilitiesat Umm Qasr (Iraq) are inoperativeat present.Sovietfleetbases, in the Black
Sea, at Danang and Camrahn Bay in Vietnam, and Vladivostockare very far distantfor
or resupply.Hence the need forfleetanchoragesand mooringbuoys (Fig. 12).
reinforcement
Yet witheach crisisdeploymentof U.S. carriertask forcesin the 1970s the Soviet fleethas
matchedthe implied threatby an anti-carrierstrikegroup. Though 'close embrace'tactics
have been characteristic
no belligerentoutcomedeveloped.This is not thena simplecold war
warrior's'zero-sum'gamematchingshipforship. It is theoutcomeofa complexaction/reaction
process in which both navies are in the business of crisis management,but only within
the contextof a wider global policy. An extension,indeed, or similargames played in the
the Pacificand the Atlanticoceans, but witha difference.
In the Indian Ocean
Mediterranean,
sea powerprimarily
or
for
the
of
client
states
favours
uncommitted
thirdparties.An
competes
mix
of
liberation
fanaticism
and
racism
fuelsinternal
nationalism,
movements,religious
unholy
and international
conflicts.All too oftenU.S. involvement
has seen her interests'paintedinto
a corner'(Bowmanand Clark, 1981, p. 10) in defenceof an indefensible
statusquo.
Since the aim of the game is minimizelosses ratherthan maximizegains,opportunities
forthe diplomaticexploitationofthe use of naval powerare constrained,
the superpowersinhiand
As
in
each
efforts
other's
biting
neutralizing
poker,though,as thestakes
(Bull, 1975, p. 7).
are loweredmoreplayersenterthe game, morelimitedlocal conflictsensue, and the risksof
are escalated.
generalconflagration
It is possibleto arguethatthe interestof bothsuperpowerswouldbestbe servedbyseeing
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18
HOUSE
JOHN
the Indian Ocean as a 'regionof dissociation'(Labrousse, 1980, p. 25), peripheralto a global
balance of powerand an implicitdetentegoingas farback as Yalta. Competitionwill be controlled,unlessvitalinterestsare threatened,and the balance of powerwill be preserved.Thus,
thereis an underlying
althoughthereare surfaceantagonismsand warlikedeployments
super(Bowman and Clark, 1981, pp. 132-3). Indeed, bothsuperpowersshare
powerunderstanding
not a fewcommoninterestsin the Indian Ocean: to conscribe,if not controlregionalconflicts
and the excesses of revolutionary
and to limitthe
movements;to limitnuclearproliferation;
law. The proposed12-mile territorial
progressiveenclosureof the oceans underinternational
sea would close critical'choke-point'straits;200-mile ExclusiveEconomicZones (EEZs) and
the archipelagicconceptwould further
greatlyrestrictnaval freedomof actionin peace time.
Thus a shared interestin systemmaintenanceemphasizesthe need forquiet, bilateral
resourceand developmentdiplomacy(Bowmanand Clark,1981, p. 147). To this,a naval arms
limitation
counterpart,
agreementfortheIndian Ocean wouldbe an important
thoughnuclearsubmarines
would
have
had
to
be
excluded
(SSBNs)
powered
(Salt Agreements).Some steps
in thisdirectionweretaken;in 1972 therewas jointadherenceto theIncidentsat Sea agreement,
and naval armslimitationtalkswere begun 1977-8, but failedeven to definebases, the type
of arms,or the equivalenceof ships, and were suspendedsinedie in 1979. Events tookover
and in the early1980s the threatsto peace in the Indian Ocean have neverbeen greater.
THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES
Three states
Image plans are as variegatedas the mosaic of geographicaldifferentiation.
are of outstandingsignificance:S. Africa,Australiaand India; to these mightbe added the
OPEC countries. South Africa, the Gibraltar of the Southern
economically-powerful
Hemisphere(Mugomba,1976,p. 24), carriesthegreatestmineraland industrialresourcepotentials, whilstracialismand apartheidare amongthe greatestforcesforits internaldestruction
of the Cape route,the Simonstownnaval
(Spence, 1970). Ironically,the strategicsignificance
centreare vital,butpoliticallyrenouncedbytheWest.
base and the Silverminecommunications
Australia,buttressedby the ANZUS pact, has one-thirdof her coastlinein the Indian Ocean
and fiftyper cent of overseastradetransitsthroughthere.During the 1970s, the Australian
Governmentbecame increasinglyconcernedabout securityrisksto her rich westernmineral
province.A forwardstrategicpolicywas pursued(Australia,Fed. Parlt. 1972) and, by implication the cover affordedby the ANZUS pact was extendedto include the Indian Ocean
(Australia,Fed. Parlt. 1974, 1976), thoughin the earlystageswithAmericanreluctance.India
has pursuedambivalentpoliticalpolicies,bothtowardsthesuperpowers
and fellowlittoralstates
(Panikkar,1957; Braun,1972). Wars,withChina in 1962 and Pakistanin 1965 and 1971 made
forcaution.Though claimingto be non-aligned,a treatywas signedwiththeU.S.S.R. in 1971,
partlyto offsetChineseand UnitedStatesinfluencein Pakistan.As themostdevelopeddeveloping country,India had the industrialcapacityto generateforeignaid programmesand, after
Australia,possessesthe mostpowerfulnavyon theIndian Ocean. Non-alignedor neutralIndia
Indian Ocean arc.
is a logical,if not uncontestedpotentialleaderof the northern
Most littoralstateswere freshlyindependent,in searchof an identityand a place in the
of theirlegitimacy.Internally,manylacked cohesion,
world,above all needingconfirmation
in
eithernationally,
or religiousterms.Economicbackwardness
and vulneraracially,or tribally,
bilityof a post-colonialsocietywere furtherweakenedby inept democraticlegacies, or the
rulers(Wall, 1975). Externally,fearsof hegemony,ancient
unstableregimesof authoritarian
'encirclement'
or
antagonisms,
tradingrivalriesinclinedsome statestowardsgreatpowerassociation. Amongthe weakestand mostvulnerablelittoralstateswerethe scatteredisland groups,
in theirnarrowly-based
to divertrade,withfewopportunities
permeableto worldfluctuations
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resolution:
IndianOceanmodel
Conflict
19
or tourism(Ostheimer,1975; Hourbert,1981). Some had strategic
sifyinto manufacturing
assets to offer,'insecuremicro-statesin a strategically-festooned
ocean', but onlytheMaldives
and eventhenat theexpense
thereby,
(Gan), Diego Garcia and theCocos Islandsreallyprofited
of theirinhabitants.
Distance and diversitymade for an inchoatesense of regionalism.Objectivesmightbe
held in common:to retainnationalpower; to maximizeeconomicstandards;ensurenational
status(Cottrelland Burrell,1972, p. 68). All theserequired
securityor enhanceinternational
assistancefromoutside,in economicand technicalaid, supportfromneighboursand a naval
than
presence,perhapsas a securityumbrella.Yet regionalissues weremoreoftencompetitive
of disparatecolcomplementary:
competingnationalisms;religiousrivalries;the after-effects
onialismand competitionformilitary,
strategic,politicalor economicadvantage(Bowmanand
Clark, 1981, p. 3). Inter-regionaltrade and politicalinteractionare both still limitedand it
notconvergent(Alford,
has been arguedthatpresenttrendsamonglittoralstatesare divergent,
1980, p. 16). A systems-basedanalysis(Simon, 1970) showedthat:a strongpositivecorrelation
existedbetweenthe numberof transactionsbetweenpairs of statesand the degreeof amity;
a clear relationwas foundbetweenindustrialcapacityand the capacityto react vigorouslyin
the regionalsystem;and the regional61litessupportedincreasedregionalco-operation.This
was because thereexistedonly a moderateperceptionof an externalthreat;a high domestic
demand for increasedresourceallocationfavouredco-operation;and there were fears that
increasedinternaldefenceexpenditurewould add even moreto international
tension.
A United Nationsreport(1971a) underlinedthat
the vast majorityof littoraland hinterland
states(oftheIndianOcean) are stilldeveloping
and
economically,socially
politically--with
greatpotentialforlocal conflicts.Involvement
of the GreatPowerswouldbe in no-one's interest.Anyattemptto deriveadvantagewould
lead to counter-moves.Any attemptby a littoralstateto gain undue supportby a Great
Powerleads to anotherstateseekingcountervailing
supportfromanotherGreat Power.
Yet the diplomaticgame ignoredsuch a universaltruth.Adherentsto Marxistdialecticswere
fromthe non-aligned,and both frombelieversin the westernconstructof a
differentiated
balance of power,or any sense of democracy,howeverdebased. A fewwantedall outsiders
removedfromthe Indian Ocean; othersfearedremovalwouldincreasetensionamongregional
powers; whilstyet othershad fearsof aggressionand thus feltthatthe need of protectionby
some externalpower.
The Zone of Peace proposals
As earlyas 1964 at the Cairo Conferenceof Non-AlignedNations an 'atom-freezone' was
demandedforthe Indian Ocean. As recentlyas 1981 at a similarDelhi conference'graveconcernwas expressedoverthe military
build-up of the Great Powersin the IndianOcean against
the expresswishes of the littoraland hinterlandstates'. Little had changed,however,in the
had reignedsupreme.The 1971 proposalsby Sri
meantime;both confusionand self-interest
Lanka (UnitedNations,1971b), witha suspiciouseye on Indianhegemony,appearedto include
armslimitationamong littoralstates. Since 1972 an ad hocUnited NationsCommitteeon the
Indian Ocean (annual) has keptthe Zone of Peace proposalsunderconstantreview,expanding
froman initialrepresentation
of 20 littoralstates,to 44 littoraland hinterlandstatesin 1979;
curiously,China, Greece and Japanwerealso members.Dissentionruledon all sides and 'systematiccollectiveuniversalsecurity'remainsas far away as ever. India refused'a reasonable
militarybalance' and destroyedthe denuclearizationproposalsby explodinga nucleardevice
in 1974. Australiadeclined to take part and South Africawas refusedentry.The U.S.A.
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20
JOHN HOUSE
favouredfreedomof the seas policy,whilstthe U.S.S.R favouredthe Zone of Peace proposals,
but acted in a contrarymanner.It is becomingrecognizedthatthe eliminationof superpower
navies depends on the global balance of powers; that the U.N. objectivesof arms limitation
and reductionof regionalrivalriesare vague enoughto be ignored,and indeedfailto recognize
deteriorating
regionalrealities;whilstthe clauses on peaceful settlementof disputes or the
renunciationof force,are at most devoutlyto be wishedforbut unlikely,giventhe history
of the past fewdecades.
IN CONCLUSION
All evidencepointsto a growingand disseminatedthreatto peace fromthe actionsofthe superpowersand theirclientstatesaroundthe IndianOcean. Though themajorriskis of continuing
limitedwars,thecumulativeand assertiveuse ofsea power,mostnotablybytheU.S.A., backed
up by the Rapid DeploymentForce on land in 1981, introducesexternalrisksofa globalorder.
The matchingof U.S. 7th fleetcrisisdeploymentsby the Red Fleet anti-carrierand antisubmarinewarfaretask forcesseems to presage the greatestdangers,but is probablywithin
knownand acceptedrulesof the superpowergame.
Littoraland hinterland
statesaredisunitedon almosteveryissue,includingsecurity,
peace,
the
or
There maybe innategeographical
disarmament,
banningof outsidepowerinvolvement.
reasons forthis, of distance and diversity,but this opens the way to outside interventions.
the use of sea power,in novel forms,is one of the mostpolitically
Amongsuch interventions
potent.
The situationis so complexand fraughtwithtensionsthatany systemsimulationmust
remaina generalframework,
withstructural,
spatialand temporalinputsand impacts.An event
or sequence of eventsmaybe calibratedwithinsuch a framework.
Iterativegamingsimulation,
has thus farprovedthe mostrealisticmethodof tracing
involvingplayersas decision-takers,
betweendifferent
sets of actorsat severalscale-levels.Scenariowritingor Delphic
interaction,
methodshave been the mostuseful,but the involvement
in such issues
of politicalgeographers
of war and peace has scarcelyyetbegun.
REFERENCES
ALFORD,
old issuesand newchallenges(London)
J. (ed.) (1980) Sea powerand influence;
FED. PARLT.(1972) Rept.on theIndian Ocean regionJt.Comm. For. Aff.(Canberra)
AUSTRALIAN
FED. PARLT.(1974) The strategic
AUSTRALIAN
positionoftheIndian Ocean (Canberra)
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