Jounrloarufcm
s
pVisad
W1l19.VoC N. 19-28
1.
19
A COMMENTARY ON SCHON'S VIEW
OF REFLECIION
PETER P. GRIMMEIT, Unftesiry of British Columbia
We could come at a criticism of Sch6n's work in numerous ways. We
could, as Shulman does, pinpoint the dangers of Sch6n's dichotomy between
technical rationality and professional knowledge and call for a third book that
resolves the dichotomy through a deeper set of principles.' Or we could pick
up Fenstermacher's point that, although Schbn's portrayal of knowing-inaction is convincing, it does not contribute to a new epistemology of practice 2
If we wish to adhere to the rules of parsimony and generality, we could argue,
as Hills and Gibson do, that reflection-in-action and technical rational performance differ only in the degree to which the linguistic-conceptual systems in
use are developed.' In reflection-in-action, underdeveloped systems restrict
professional practice to a form of technical rationality limited to generating
an array of alternative problem solutions.
We could also evaluate Sch6n's work, not In terms of technical rationality,
but in relation to the competing alternatives that researchers have proposed
to take its place in the last 40 years. Selman maintains that Schon is entering
a contested field when he attempts to replace technical rationality with his
"epistemology of practice."'
The literature now has many critiques representing divergent perspectives. Here I place Sch6n's conception of reflection in a context relative to
other work on reflection undertaken in the field of education.
'Lee S. Shulman, "The Dangers of Dichotomous Thinking in Education," in Reflection in
Teacher Education,ed. Peter P GrimmeSt and Gaalen L Erickson (New York Teachers College
Press, 1988), pp. 31-38.
zGary D. Fensteracher. "The Place of Science and Epistemology in SchOn's Conception of
Reflective Practice," in Reflection in Teacher Education ed Peter P Grimmnet and Gaslen L
Eridcson (New York Teachers College Press, i988), pp. 39-46.
'RLJean Hills and Carol Gibson, "Reflections on Schln's The Relectiv Pryacttioner," in
Reflection in Teader Education, ed Peter P. Grimmett and Gaalen L Erickson (New York
Teachers College Press, 1988), pp. 147-175.
'Mark Selman, "SchOn's Gate Is Square, but Is It Ar?" in R7aecaon in Teacher Eduation
ed Peter P. Grimmett and Gaalen L Eridckson (New York Teachers College Press, 1988),
pp 177-192.
20 20
Symposium:
Reflection
Sympopsiwn. Sdi6n's
5cbdn's View
Viewr of
offteection
PLACING SCHON'S CONTRIBUIION IN PERSPECTIVE
The study of reflective practice in teacher education essentially concerns
how educators make sense of the phenomena of experience that puzzle or
perplex them. The purpose of the endeavor is the pursuit of meaning as
distinct from the pursuit of truth or fact.' Because teaching involves the
interaction of complex human beings capable of creating an inordinate num
ber of ways of characterizing phenomena experienced in a diverse social and
linguistic culture, questions of meaning precede questions of truth. In accen
tuating this point, Guba writes, "Human behavior is rarely, if ever, context
free, hence knowledge of human behavior individually or in groups is nec
essarily idiographic, and differences are at least as important as similarities to
an understanding of what is happening" How subjects attribute meaning to
phenomena is an important object of inquiry. One form of knowledge, then,
in this research genre represents educators' explication of meanings and
understandings as they teach and as they examine others' teaching. The pur
pose is neither to predict nor to explain, rather, it is to explore phenomenologically how educators create what Shulman has described as the "wisdom
of practice" in the complex, dynamic world of teaching.7
Elsewhere, my colleagues and I have conceptualized research on reflec
tive practice according to three basic perspectives derived from asking, How
is knowledge, derived from research or practice, viewed in terms of its
contribution to the education of teachers. Or, is this knowledge seen as an
external source for mediating action in the sense that it directs teachers in
their practice, or is such knowledge regarded as infonning practice as teachers
deliberate among competing alternatives for action, or does such knowledge
constitute one source of information that teachers use metaphorically to
tappreendpractice as they reconstruct their classroom experiences? For each
perspective, the relationship between knowledge and reflection is considered
in terms of the three basic categories. ( ) the source of the knowledge reflected
on; (2) the mode of knowing that the particular conception of reflection
represents, and (3) the use that knowledge is put to as a result of the reflective
process.
'Robe Donmoyer, "The Rescue From Relativism. Two Failed Attempts and an Alternate
strategy," EucamonalRemarc 14 (December 1985): 13-20.
6Egon Guba, "Criteria for Assessing the Trustworthiness of Naturalistic Inquiries," EducationalCommtmunkais and TecnologcwJo
na29(No. 2, 1981): 4
ee S. Shulman, '"TheWsdom of Prctice Managing Complexity in Medicine and Teaching,"
in Tafs to Teadtesa ed. David C Berliner and Barak V Rosenshine (New York. Random House,
1987), pp. 369-386.
Peter P Grimme Allan M MacKinnon, Gaalen L Erickson, and Theodore J. Riecken,
efecve Practice in Teacher Educ
in Ancotoagig Reqect" Practice.An
ation,"
tn
of ie and Eaxneg
rs, ed Robert Houston, Renee Clift, and Marlene Pugach (New York
Teachers College Press 1989).
PeterP. Grimmet PeterP.Grimmeit
21
Reection as Instrmentally Mediating Action
This first perspective represents a view of reflection as a process that
leads to thoughtful, mediated action, it usually involves carrying out research
findings and theoretical formulations of education in practice. From this
perspective, the purpose of reflection is instrumental.the reflective process
helps teachers replicate and emulate classroom practices that empirical research
has found effective. The knowledge source in this type of reflection is usually
an external "authority." Educational researchers, journal articles, and researchtested theories of education are regarded as knowledge sources rather than
actual situations of classroom practice. The knowledge must be represented
primarily in a propositional format, thus, the mode of knowing'is tewcnological.° Propositional knowledge is reflected on and then applied to practice in
an instrumental manner. In this conception of reflection, knowledge directs
practice.
This perspective describes a conception of reflection as thoughtfulness
about action-contemplation that leads to conscious, deliberate moves, usually taken to apply research findings or educational theory in practice. The
use of the word apply is significant here, those subscribing to this conception
of reflection seem to hold an associated technological view of educational
theory and research findings about teaching. In this view of teflection, we
could expect the knower (in this case the person reflecting on the knowledge)
to use knowledge to direct or controlpractice. We could expect the knower
to ensure that his practice conforms to what research has found to have
positive effects on student learning. Therefore, the researchers espousing this
perspective are optimistic. they assume that changes in teachers' practice can
be brought about through this kind of reflection. But they do refer to technical
limitations in bringing about reflectivity among education students, such as
the lack of time afforded in teacher-education programs to reading research
journals. A further distinguishing feature of researchers in this perspective is
their propensity to view "new information" as coming solely from "authorities" who publish in journals-rather than from the practice situation itself
Reflection as DeliberatingAmong Competing Views of Taacing
A second perspective in teacher education proposes a conception of
reflection based on deliberation and choice among competing versions of
"good teaching." The reflective process here involves considering educational
events in context and anticipating the consequences of different lines of action
taken from these competing versions of good teaching. In this perspective,
'Karen Kepler Zumwalt, "Research on Teaching. Policy Implications for Teacher Education,
in Policy Making in Education, 81st Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education,
Pan I, ed. Ann leberiman and Milbrey W. McLaughlin (Chicago. University of Chicago Press,
1982), pp. 215-248.
22 22
Symposium:
Sch6n's View
Reflection
Symposium. Scb~n's
View of
qfRe/kction
external authority is also a source of knowledge, but the understanding of
that knowledge is usually mediated through teaching colleagues and the
context of the actual teaching situation. The mode of knowing is deliberatie.
practitioners choose from among competing views of good teaching and
anticipate the consequences of the different lines of action derived from these
competing views.Y0 Knowledge about teaching has a relativistic quality. The
practitioner uses an "informed eclecticism" in her practice." Research knowl
edge in this kind of reflective process nfonns, not directs, practice.
Those who subscribe to this perspective of reflection are distinguished
by their attention to the context of educational events and by the idea that, in
reflecting about particular events in context, one deliberates between and
among competing views of teaching and examines each in light of the con
sequences of the action it entails. Thus, those espousing this perspective tend
to subscribe to an eclectic view of knowledge, the test of which lies in the
benefit of its consequences for student learning.
Reklcton as RecontruingEpqoience
A third perspective in teacher education includes conceptions of reflection as the reorganization or reconstruction of eperience that leads to
(1) new understandings of action situations, (2) new understandings of self
as-teacher in terms of the cultural milieu of teaching, and (3) new understand
ings of taken-for-granted assumptions about teaching (derived from a critical
theoretical stance). For each of these aspects, the source of knowledge for
reflection is the context of the action setting and the practical application of
personal knowledge. Puzzlement and subsequent reflection about a practice
situation lead to a mode of knowing that could be described as dialectical.
Practitioners become knowing when they engage in a conversation with either
the situation or the presuppositions that guide action in a practice setting. In
this view of the reflective process, knowledge is emergent and often depicted
as metaphorical.12 Understanding a situation is often a matter of "seeing as,"
a process in which practitioners recast, reframe, and reconstruct past under
standings to generate fresh appreciations of the puzzlement or surprise inher
ent in a practice situation. In this perspective, knowledge, including personal
understandings of practice situations, transforms practice.
Reconstructing action situations. The chief feature of this aspect is the
degree to which the act of problem setting in an action situation is made
problematic in and of itself. Here, reflection is a way a teacher can either
"Ibid
"Joseph J Sdcwab, The Practical A Languagefor Curikcu/um (Washington, DC. National
Education Assoation, 1969).
"George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metapbors We Lfie By (Chicago. University of Chicago
Pres 1981).
PeterP. Gr/mmea Peter
P. Grimmett
23
23
attend to features of the situation that were previously ignored or assign new
significance to features that were previously identified In either case, reflection involves recasting situations in light of clarifying questions, reconsidering
the assumptions on which previous understandings of a situation were based,
and beginning to rethink the range of available potential responses. Studies
grounded in this aspect of the reconstruction-of-experience perspective on
reflection have in common the degree to which the act of problem setting in
an action situation is made problematic. In this process of reframing the
practice setting, teachers are able to bring new meanings and ways of seeing
to problems in their practice. Therefore, the role that knowledge plays in this
conception provides the knower with metaphors that permit him to apprecde
and transfonn practice situations.
Reconudingself-as-teacberLiterature grounded in this aspect of reflection as the reconstruction of experience focuses on the individual's view of
herself as a teacher rather than on a reconstruction of the practice setting.
Much of the work in this genre expects teachers to become more aware of
the cultural milieu they are operating in, and thus, the studies tend to be
phenomenological or hermeneutic in orientation, aimed at providing
interpretive accounts of how teachers structure their knowledge and their
worlds of practice. Those who hold to this conception of reflection argue that
experience, as embodied in our personal biography, constitutes both the
content and consequence of reflective thinking. Reflection is a process responsible for shaping and restructuring our personal knowledge about teaching
as well as about life. This reconstruction of self-as-teacher enables the knower
to appreciate and transform her understanding of her cultural milieu.
Reconstructing takenfor-grantedassumptionsaboutteacbing This final
conception of reflection in teacher education consists of reconstructing takenfor-granted assumptions about teaching. Reflection, according to this literature, is a way to practice critical theory with an emancipatory interest-it
allows a practitioner to identify and address the social, political, and cultural
conditions that frustrate and constrain self-understanding." Critical reflection,
then, begins with questions such as, To what ends, and in whose interest, is
knowledge being used? Literature grounded in this third aspect has focused
on how teachers explicate the taken-for-granted assumptions and humanly
constructed distortions that constrain and frustrate practice. All forms of
knowledge, especially personal knowledge, are regarded as "the social reconstruction of reality," the uncovering of which is essential for human emancipation.'4 Reflection is the process by which the emancipation occurs through
'Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interas trans Jeremy J Shapiro (Boston
Beacon Press, 1971).
"Peter Berger and Thomas Ludcmann, 7be Soal Comaunston ofRealty A 7)bte in he
Sodoy of Knowuedge (New York: Doubleday, 1967)
24 24
Reflection
Symposium:
qofReflectio
Scbn'; View of
Synposlfum: Scbt5n's
the explication of taken-for-granted assumptions. Knowledge in this conception provides the metaphors that allow teachers to appreciate critically their
practice in a manner that transforms their understanding of the political,
institutional, social, and moral constraints impinging on the practice of
teaching.
Stressing tbe action setting. This conceptualization of differing perspectives on reflection displays the wide divergence of understandings extant in
the field of teacher education. It also provides one way of placing Schon's
particular conception in perspective. His view of reflection is not concerned
with a conscious thoughtfulness designed to mediate (if not sometimes impede)
action, he is not specifically encouraging practicing teachers to deliberate
among competing alternative views of what research suggests constitutes
effective teaching. Rather, he regards reflection as the reconstruction of expe
rience-not primarily for purposes of explicating the cultural milieu of the
teachers' world or taken-for-granted assumptions and humanly constructed
distortions embedded within the social, political, and moral context of schoolsbut for purposes of apprehending practice settings in problematic ways
Clearly, in the context of Schon's conception of reflection, action settings
precipitate puzzles or surprises for the professional practitioner His focus is
on how practitioners generate professional knowledge in and appreciate
problematic features of action settings. Therefore, Schon's contribution to
reflection is distinctively important. He builds on and extends Dewey's foun
dational properties of reflection in a manner that is clearly different from how
ct itical theorists (e.g., Habermas, Van Manen), critical action researchers (e g.,
Carr and Kemmis, Smyth), and investigators of teachers' cultural milieu (e g,
Clandinin, Connelly and Clandinin, Elbaz) conceive of the process of reflec
tion. ' The reflection that Sch6n focuses on takes place in the crucible of
action. Sch6n's marked emphasis on the action setting sets his work apart
RAISING SOME QUESTIONS
Implicit in this contextualization of Sch6n's work is the view that knowledge derived from research on teaching is not in itself in contradistinction to
practitioners' reflection merely because it may or may not emanate from a
"Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Hwnan Inrerest, trans Jeremy J Shapiro (Boston
Beacon Press, 1971 . Max van Manen, "Linkmng Ways of Knowing With Ways of Being Practical,"
Curnulum Inqu.y 6 (No. 3, 1977. 205-228; Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis, Becoming
Ceal.Knowing Thbrougb Action Resamrb (Philadelphia Falmer Press, 1985), W John Smyth,
Reflearmf in Action (Geelong, Victoria. Deakln University Press, 198'). D Jean Clandinin, Ciass
room Practice. Teader Images ifnAaon (Philadelphia Palmer Press, 1986), F Michael Connelly
and D. Jean Clandinin, "Personal Practical Knowledge and the Modes of Knowing Relevance for
Teaching and Learning," in Learningand Teacbhing the Ways of Knowing, 84th Yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education, Pat II, ed Elliot W Eisner (Chicago- University of
Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 174-198, Freema Elbaz, Teacher Thinking A Study of PracticalKnoul
edge (London: Croom Helm, 1983).
P. G,*mneu
PeterP. Crhnea Peter
25
25
technical rational paradigm, rather, it depends on the purpose the knowledge
is used for and the context it is used in. Why does Sch6n develop the bold
contrast between technical rationality and professional knowledge? If we focus
on the purpose and context of knowledge use, we can then understand more
fully the sharp, sometimes unrealistic, dichotomy between technical rationality
and professional knowledge that he postulates Schon uses technical rationality
as a rhetorical device to portray the unmindful aping of natural science
paradigms in the social sciences (sometimes referred to as scientsm) that
seems so pervasive in the professional schools of universities. He is not so
much setting technical rationality against professional knowledge as he is
contrasting the use of knowledge in accordance with the norms of technical
rationality and knowledge derived and used reflectively in the acti6n setting.
He is essentially bringing our attention to the "Veblenian bargain" that professional schools have entered into. deriving knowledge from the higher schools
for the problems of the lower ones, professional schools prefer an appearance
of science to the rigorous examination of practice. He is attempting to redress
the balance in our understanding of educational phenomena so that the view
that measurement, modification, and statistical manipulation constitute the
ways of conducting inquiry is appropriately divested of its de facto sacrosanct
status.
Schdn does not, however, explicate his use of technical rationality in this
way. The sharply drawn dichotomy comes across as bifurcated thinking that
distracts the reader's attention from the deeper issues he is raising to the
oversimplified contrast he has set between technical rationality and professional knowledge. In the process, this dichotomy becomes like a red herring
drawn across Sch6n's trail of searching for an appropriate description of the
growth of professional knowledge in competent practitioners. This lack of
definitive purpose in characterizing technical rationality and professional
knowledge is unfortunate because it detracts from the essense of Schbn's
account
A second question has its genesis in a series of studies in medicine that
Shulman reports on the theme of "the wisdom of practice."' 6 He had fully
expected medical practitioners to use conservative inductive strategies in
diagnosis so that they would proceed systematically by ruling out alternatives
in a step-by-step process. To his amazement, Shulman found that medics
produced a first hypothesis within 30 seconds of the patient's first description
of the ailment and followed within a minute with two other hypotheses.
Working simultaneously with three or four hypotheses as an organizing frame
work, the medical practitioners asked questions that gathered information to
confirm a particular hypothesis rather than to disconfirm it:
'"-eS. Shulman, 'he Wisdom of Practice Managing Complexity in Medidne and Teadcing,"
in Ta/ks to Teadas, ed David C Berliner and Barak V Rosenshine (New York Random House.
1987), pp. 369-386.
26 26
Symposium:
Reflection
Symposhm:: Scbdn's
Sab)6W View
View of
OfReflection
Inductive processing where early judgmerts were withheld, where one first gathered
all the information one would need and only then began to diagnose, was by and large
a myth. The wisdom of practice proceeded otherwise.'7
In the final analysis, Shulman failed to find evidence of general competence in medical diagnosis. Rather, medical diagnostic expertise was case- or
domain-specific:
Knowing that a physician was excellent in diagnosing diseases of the gastrointestinal
tract was no help in predicting his or her competence with hematological or neurological complaints. Basic problem-solving strategies and procedures were remarkably
similar across all physicians (a finding strikingly parallel to that of de Groot regarding
different levels of chess expertise). The appropriate
question was not "Who is a good
8
physician?" but "When is a physician good?"'
When Shulman reported these findings to the medical community, they expected
strong resistance. Instead, the physicians were pleased to hear an account of
medical problem solving that squared with how they worked and, at an
individual level, were relieved to know that they were not alone in practicing
in a manner deemed illegitimate by medical schools.
We can compare Schan's work on reflective practice to Shulman's.?9
Schon's work is similar in that he has studied how practitioners function in
action settings and uncovered that they do not follow the procedures and
strategies often sanctioned by professional schools. One possible explanation
for the current attention being paid to Sch6n's work is that it squares with the
reality of the world of practice, and practitioners experience a sense of relief
that their knowledge of this world is legitimate. Sch6n's work differs, however,
from Shulman's "wisdom of practice" work Whereas Shulman has developed
specific case knowledge in medicine and education, Sch6n has described a
general process, reflection-in-action, in all professions. This general process
of reflection is essentially analagous to the basic problem-solving processes
that Shulman found in all the physicians he studied.
Two important differences remain, however. First, Shulman found significant contextual effects, thus underscoring the importance of specificity of
case knowledge in each professional domain. He has since proceeded to
develop case studies in the specific educational domain of teachers' pedagog
ical content knowledge. Unlike Shulman, Schbn has not entered first hand the
specific practice setting of teachers but has stayed at a fairly general level of
description. He appears to be addressing the question, Who or what is a
reflective practitioner? Shulman, however, would argue that the important
"Ibid. p. 373.
*'bid.,pp. 373-374.
"Donald A. Sd6n, bThe
Releate Practiioner.How Profeionals Think in Action (New
York.Basic Books, 1983}, Donald A. SchOn, Educating thbeReflective Practitioner Toward a Neu
DesignforTeairngandLenmbng in the Professos (San Frandsco Jossey Bass, 19V8): Donald
A Schdn, "Coaching Reflective Practice," inReflectionin Teaerdducatn,ed Peter P Grimmetn
and Gaalen L Eridcson (New York:Teachers College Press, 1988), pp 19-29
PetsrP.Gr/mmet PeterP. G,*nmett
__
27
n27
question is, When is a practitioner reflective? Schfn does indeed address the
question of wbere a practitioner is reflective-in the action setting-and this
focus allows him to posit a general process that goes across different professional domains. But the process is of limited value In responding to the uben
question.
Second, although Shulman's basic hypothetico-deductive approach to
problem solving is analogous to Sch6n's general process of reflection, it is
not always viewed in this way. Because Dewey is generally undert:ood to have
characterized reflective inquiry (the influence of which Schin has acknowledged publicly) as an inductive mode of cognitive functioning and because
Schfin emphasizes the uniqueness of each practice setting, some critics question his proposing for educational practitioners a process he discovered in
the architectural design studio.m As Selman points out, much of Sch0n's
theorizing seems to be based on aesthetic exemplars, and strategies found to
be effective in one particular setting cannot be assumed to be effective in
other professional settings that are less obviously aesthetic. These writers
attempt to hoist Schfn on his own petard when they suggest that Schdn is
doing the very thing he criticizes so vehemently in the technical rational
tradition. SchOn is stating, however, that reflection is a basic process that
appears to be an essential part of all professional domains, but it finds its
specific expression in the context of each domain or practice setting. What he
has not yet done is to offer a first-hand description of reflection-in-action in
the specific domain of teacher education.
This discussion allows me to raise two questions. Why is Schon's contribution misunderstood? Where do we go to enhance our understanding of
teachers' professional knowledge in education? Schfin's contribution is misunderstood because he has not distinguished the general features of
reflection in action that pertain to how competent practitioners solve problems in action settings (which he has documented in his two books on
reflective practitioners) from the context-bound expression of these very
features within a specific professional domain such as education (which, his
1988 chapter notwithstanding, he has not described in any detailed way).
Where, then, do we go to enhance our understanding of teachers' professional
knowledge in education? Consistent with the work of both Shulman and
Schan, we must issue a clarion call for using constructs that have emerged
from the intensive naturalistic case studies of teachers-in-action. Our understanding of how teachers make sense of practice settings would be enhanced
by also looking at the work of Yinger, who documents how teachers improvise
'_Geraldine Gillis, "SchOn's Reflective Practitioner AModel for Teachers?" in RAwec*/n in
reacherEducat.on ed Peter P. Grimmett and Gaalen L Erickson (New York Teachers College
Press, 1988), pp. 47-53, Mark Selman, "Schon's Gate Is Square, but Is It Art?" in Reflecon in
Teacher Educaftion ed. Peter P. Grlmment and Gaalen L Erdcsoon (New York. Teachers College
Press, 1988), pp. 177-192.
28 28
£88:Scb6n's
Symposft
477posum.
Scbn's VIEw
View of
of Reflection
R9?eeanon
in the conversation of practice, at the work of Russell and his colleagues, who
examine how teachers learn the professional knowledge of teaching, at the
work of Kilbourn, who explicates how teachers reflect on teaching, and at the
important work of Shulman in developing case studies of teachers' pedagog
ical content knowledge.2' The intent here is not to downplay the importance
of Schon's thinking-his work stands in the tradition of Dewey, Hawkins,
Piaget, Wittgenstein, Lewin, and Vickers, among others. He is a major theorist
who has stimulated much lively debate and empirical research. Rather, the
intent is to show where Schon's work can and cannot specifically help us as
we grapple with the thorny question of what constitutes professional knowl
22
edge in teacher education.
PElER P. GRIMMETr is Assistant Professor and Director of the Centre for the
Study of Teacher Education, Universityof British Columbia, 2125 Main Mall, Vancouver,
British Columbia V6T 1Z5, Canada.
21
Robert Yinger, "The Conversation of Practice" (paper presented at the Working Conference
on Reflective Teaching, University of Houston, October 1987}, Thomas Russell, Hugh Munby.
Charlotte Spafford, and PhylUiss Johnston, 'learning the Professional Knowledge of Teaching
Metaphors, Puzzles, and the Theory Practice Relationship," in Reflection in Teacher duaton,
ed Peter P. Grimmnet and Gaalen L Erickson (New York Teachers College Press, 1988), pp. 6789, Brent Kilboumrn, '"Reflecting on vignettes of Teaching," in Relection in Teacher Fduaion,
ed Peter P. Grimmert and Gaalen L Erickson (New York Teachers College Press, 1988), pp 91
111, Lee S Shulman, '"The Wisdom of Practice. Managing Complexity in Medicine and Teaching,"
in Talks to Teachers, ed David C Berliner and Barak V Rosenshine (New York. Random House.
1987), pp. 369-386
Zi wish to acknowledge the critical feedback given by my colleagues Gaalen Erickson. Allan
Macdtnnon, Ted Rieden, and Jean Hills in writing this commentary Their insights have greatly
improved the quality of the piece. Any flaws in the argument presented, however, are solely my
responsibility.
Copyright © 1989 by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development. All rights reserved.