Globalization and the Origin of New Terrorism: Perspectives and Challenges*
Dr. Arvind Adityaraj
Associate Professor
P.G. Department of Political Science
College of Commerce
(a constituent unit of Magadh University, Bodh Gaya)
Patna-800020, Bihar, India.
*An Article for Presentation at the 23rd International Political Science Association’s
Conference, scheduled to be held in Montreal, Canada from 20- 24 July 2014 in the Panel
Violence and Politics, Session CS04, Comparative Politics and Institutions.
Introduction:
Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon that develops over time, gradually changing its shape and
activities. It is carried out by various organizations in the service of different ideologies.
is the direct product of the glorification of violence and is one of the most serious problems faced
by the world. It holds the democratic structures to ransom. Terrorists do not threaten just a nation
or a people or an individual, they are literally at war with the rule of law, with the norms and
ideals of civilization itself. Terrorism implies recourse to intimidation by the use of violence for
pressurizing a government and society into accepting a radical political or social change. It is
geographically widespread and ideologically assorted. It thrives on fear psychosis. Scores of
countries today are bleeding from terrorism of one hue or another. Terrorists have their spiritual
and intellectual role models in a galaxy of heroes featuring Sorel, Mao, Fanon, Marcuse,
Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Guillen, Osama Bin Laden and several others. Terrorism implies
those acts of violence which seek to implant terror in the minds of the people in general and the
supporters and members of a governmental establishment in particular. The methods employed
may be threats to murder, assassination, kidnapping for ransom, hijacking of passenger aircrafts,
throwing bombs or resorting to indiscriminate firing in a crowded place, attacking passenger
trains and buses and gagging the press etc. Celeb Carr in his book The Lessons of Terror points
out that terrorists are in a state of perpetual mobilization, they have undergone military training
and are fully organized, they possess effective intelligence service, the protection of a state, cell
based operative system that are remarkably difficult to crack1. A terrorist is technologically
sophisticated, global and his cause is transnational. He mobilizes opinions in his favourably
tapping people living in different countries who have the same culture, religion and political
aspirations.
The New Terrorism:
Terrorism has quantitatively and qualitatively changed from previous years. Globalization
process widened the support for terrorism. As globalization created negative consequences and
marginalization of some groups and global social and economic inequalities, terrorism gained
more support from many marginalized people in different nations, and became more global. As
stated by Kronin frustrated populations are against the US-led globalization. People at the lower
end of the social and economic spectrum realized that they cannot have equal shares in the global
world, their demands are not recognized by the strong nations and started to show reactions.
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These reactions became threatening as they have started to give support to terrorism against
globalization. According to Kronin, the ones left behind or threatened by the US-led
globalization increasingly felt the need to assert their identity against the forces of homogeneity
threatening by terrorism.
The terrorists groups while fighting against globalization also benefit
from its consequences. Using the technological advances in communication, these groups can
easily contact and operate. Regardless of its agents being an individual- an individual terrorist or
a terrorist group, today terrorism threatens the entire globalized world. Whether it is Gurr and
Coleman‘s ―third wave of vulnerability‖ or Rapoport‘s ―fourth wave of terrorism,‖ contemporary
terrorism is a significant departure from the phenomenon even as recently as during the Cold
War. The US National Security Strategy has recognized terrorism, in the memorable phrase ―the
crossroads of radicalism and technology,‖ as the predominant security threat in the post-Cold
War world. The cataclysmic impact of 9/11 on both the American strategic consciousness and
the international security environment can scarcely be overstated. Those attacks resulted from a
combination of cultural, political, and technological factors and were a revelation to the world of
the emergence of the new terrorism.
The means of the ―new‖ terrorism are also assumed to be radically different from the
past. The premise is that because the ends of the new terrorism are unlimited, so, too, are the
means that groups espousing these goals are willing and able to use. The new terrorists are
supposed to be dedicated to causing the largest possible number of casualties among their
enemies. According to Walter Laqueur, ―The new terrorism is different in character from the old,
aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the
elimination of large sections of the population.‖2 According to Steven Simon, "Religiously
motivated terrorism, as Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation first noted in 1997, is
inextricably linked to pursuit of mass casualties."3 Presumably for the ―new‖ terrorists the means
have become an end in themselves.
Thus the contemporary terrorists are also thought to be significantly more inclined
than traditional secular groups to use WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Jessica Stern, for
example, argues that the risk of terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against
civilians is growing not only because of the increased availability of such weapons but because
of changes in terrorist motivation: ―A new breed of terrorists – including ad hoc groups
motivated by religious conviction or revenge, violent right-wing extremists, and apocalyptic and
millenarian cults – appear more likely than the terrorists of the past to commit acts of extreme
violence.‖4
The ―old‖ terrorism is considered to be much more restrained and specific in
targeting. The traditional terrorist, according to Brian Jenkins‘ now famous aphorism, wanted
people watching, not people dead. Hoffman describes the old terrorists as selective and
discriminating.5 Benjamin and Simon are of the view that earlier terrorists used ―carefully
calibrated violence‖ because they knew that excessive brutality would deny them the place they
sought at the bargaining table. These terrorists imposed restraints on their actions because they
aimed to change the attitudes of audiences who could help them achieve their goals. Their
audiences and reference groups were tangible and present. They were limited by their
dependence on constituencies and by their political interests. Their pursuit of legitimacy in
effect, restrained their behavior. However, the ―old‖ terrorists were not always discriminating in
their choice of targets. Levels of selectivity and restraint vary across groups and across time, but
not necessarily according to a religious-secular or past-present divide. The French anarchists of
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the 1880s bombed restaurants frequented by the bourgeoisie in order to show the working class
who the true enemy was. ―No bourgeois is innocent‖ was their slogan. The history of anarchism
in Spain was particularly violent. Nationalist groups have also caused mass casualties. In 1946,
the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by Zionist extremists killed 91 and injured 45
persons6. During the Algerian war, the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) attacked Europeans
indiscriminately, leaving bombs in cafes, on beaches, in soccer stadiums, and at bus stops in
Algiers during the famous ―Battle of Algiers.‖ Their bombs often killed Algerians as well as
Europeans.
Globalization and Terrorism:
The process of globalization, which involves the technological, political, economic and cultural
diminution of boundaries between countries across the world, has insinuated a self-interested,
inexorable, corrupting market culture into traditional communities. Many see these forces as
threatening their way of life. At the same time that globalization has provided a motivation for
terrorism, it has also facilitated methods for it such as computerization, digitization, satellite
communication, optic fiber and internet. What world is witnessing today is global insurgency
which is an organized movement of non-state actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures or
societies on a global level with the ultimate goal of establishing a new world order. Global
insurgency applies not to a single terrorist organization but collectively to many terrorist
organizations throughout the world. These organizations have established a global,
interconnected network of operations that often provides mutual aid and support in which it is
difficult to isolate a particular group of faction without drawing linkages to other organizations
that provide direct support, indirect assistance, or pursue similar goals. Terrorist organizations,
ranging from those with global reach to local influence, support one another in an interconnected
fashion. With modern communication technology and ability to move in open societies, theirs is
a ―virtual nation‖, which possesses many of the instruments of power, including informational,
military and economic means. Radical Islamic belief and a common abhorrence of Western
culture tie these organizations together.
Terrorists are now able and willing to develop network forms of organization
for the same reason that businesses are. The information revolution, by lowering the cost of
communication, allows the organizations to push functions outside a controlling hierarchical
structure. Organizations can thus flatten out their pyramids of authority and control and approach
a network form, a group of more or less autonomous, dispersed entities, linked by advanced
communications and perhaps nothing more than a common purpose. Motivating or compelling
the move from hierarchy to network is the advantages that an organization acquires as it
transforms itself. It becomes more flexible, adaptive and resilient because each of its units senses
and reacts on its own in loose coordination with the others. This multiplies the opportunities for
the organization to learn, making it more flexible and adaptive. The organization becomes more
resilient because if one or even several of its constituent entities are destroyed, the others carry
on. A network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by decapitation. In the case of the
terrorists, the loosely linked autonomous entities that make up a network might be individuals,
such as Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing and the
Bojinka plot7 and is currently serving two life sentences, or cells such as those involved in the
leaderless resistance of the Christian Patriot Movement in the United States. Leaderless
resistance is a system of organization that is based upon the cell organization, but does not have
any central control or direction or instruction, as would those who belong to a typical pyramid
organization8.The entities making up terrorist networks might also be large, more formal, even
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hierarchical organizations that work together without any common hierarchy or central
commanding authority between them. Whatever the components of the network, what makes it a
network is the absence of this central authority or control.9 It is this feature that gives networks
their flexibility, adaptivenesss and resilience, allowing them advantages over any government.
While globalization has helped remove many of the restraints that state
sponsorship once imposed, terrorists can still enjoy the funding and protection that sponsorship
provides. Another factor of globalization that benefits terrorism is targeting: ―In today‘s
globalizing world, terrorists can reach their targets more easily; their targets are exposed in more
places, and news and ideas that inflame people to resort to terrorism spread more widely and
rapidly than in the past.‖10 Among the factors that contribute to this are the easing of border
controls and the development of globe-circling infrastructures, which support recruitment, fundraising, movement of materiel, and other logistical functions. In addition to international political
changes, developments in organizational practice have enhanced the lethality of terrorists. As
corporations have evolved organizationally, so have terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups have
evolved from hierarchical, vertical organizational structures, to more horizontal, less commanddriven groups. Terrorist leadership is derived from a ―set of principles that can set boundaries
and provide guidelines for decisions and actions so that members do not have to resort to a
hierarchy. They know what they have to do‖. The organizational designs may ―sometimes appear
acephalous (headless), and at other times polycepalous (Hydra-headed).‖11 Paul Smith observed
that the multi-cellular structure of Al Qaeda gave the organization agility and cover and has been
one of its key strengths12.This flexibility has allowed al Qaeda to establish bases using
indigenous personnel all over the world. It has infiltrated Islamic nongovernmental organizations
in order to conceal operations13. Jessica Stern recently commented on Al Qaeda‘s ability to
maintain operations in the face of an unprecedented onslaught: The answer lies in the
organization‘s remarkably protean nature. Over its life span, Al Qaeda has constantly evolved
and shown a surprising willingness to adapt its mission. This capacity for change has
consistently made the group more appealing to recruits, attracted surprising new allies, and—
most worrisome from a Western perspective—made it harder to detect and destroy14.
With the onset of the twenty first century the concept of terrorism is subjected to a
revision in relation to goals, capabilities and dimension of threats. This terrorism is distinguished
from the old by a new structure, a new kind of personnel and a new attitude towards violence.
The new structure, facilitated by information technology, is a network of amateurs. An
established government‘s disadvantage when confronting amateur networked terrorists is the
apparent increased willingness of ‗new terrorists‘ to inflict mass casualties. They often come
together in transitory groupings with an increased willingness to cause mass casualties. The
amateur participation suggests that ‗new terrorists‘ no longer need state sponsorship as much as
their predecessors did15. This trend among terrorists to eschew direct connections with state
sponsors has had several advantages for the enterprising extremists. They no longer have the fear
of refraining from the use of extreme methods for the fear of alienating political support.
Terrorist groups are more likely to maintain support from ―amorphous constituencies‖. They can
now more easily appeal to an ethnic or religious Diaspora or to political sympathizers around the
world. They can also more easily get their message to a world-wide audience or to the people of
the country or countries they deem most important in their struggle. Through the world-wide
web, they have access to important sources of information.
The ‗new terrorism‘ idea gained further momentum with the 1995 Aum
Shinrikyo‘s16 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway and the bombing of the federal building in
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Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh. Growing awareness of the extent of the Al Qaeda
conspiracy caused more alarm, especially after Osama Bin Laden moved from the Sudan to
Afghanistan and called for jihad against the United States in 199617. The 1998 bombings of
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Yemen in
2000, and the discovery of the millennium plots18 strengthened the perception of a new threat.
Since 2003, the global spread of suicide bombings against civilian targets has contributed to the
feeling that terrorism has changed fundamentally.
There exists another set of scholars on terrorism who maintain that the
departure from the past is not as pronounced as new terrorism proponents think. Today‘s
terrorism is not a fundamentally or qualitatively ―new‖ phenomenon but grounded in an evolving
historical context. Contemporary terrorism shares many of the characteristics of past terrorism.
The networked structure of the new terrorism differs little from the structure of the old terrorism.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, was itself an umbrella group, like
Hizballah19, whose dominant faction, Fatah, did not have a monopoly of power and whose
constituent parts have had different relations with each other, splintering and adhering and
developing different policies and strategies. One analyst of the PLO has spoken of it as a
‗network of relationships.20‘ Furthermore, the PLO was networked externally, by some reports,
with up to 21 different organizations that the PLO had previously trained or supplied with
weapons and other logistical support.21 Marxist or left-wing revolutionary groups also became
network-like as ideological differentiation lead to structural complexity. Many of these groups,
such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), were, despite the hierarchical connotation of the word
‗army‘, not very hierarchical at all. The RAF spawned second and third generations haphazardly
and remained more a collection of terrorists sharing a common purpose than a hierarchical
organization.
However, the magnitude of violence and lethality, extensive use of information
technology to disseminate ideology and indoctrinate and to mold the mind the youth in their fold
and of course the business like network structure clearly point towards the significant departure
of ―old terrorism‖ to ―new terrorism‖
Religious Terrorism:
The growth of religious terrorism and its emergence in recent years as a driving force behind the
increasing lethality of international terrorism shatters some of our most basic assumptions about
terrorists and the violence they commit. It also raises serious questions about the continued
relevance of much of the conventional wisdom on terrorism particularly as it pertains to potential
future terrorist use of WMD22. There is growing recognition by scholars and the intelligence
community that the current international terrorist threat does not come from organizations
motivated by nationalist grievances or separatist goals (such as the IRA, ETA, Fatah, LTTE,
PKK, and others). Instead, the main threat is that of radical Islamic terrorism primarily aimed at
promoting a radical religious world view. Hoffman stresses that while religion was an
inseparable component of many terrorist organizations in the past, the dominant motivation for
their actions was political rather than religious. This is not the case with Al-Qaeda and other
radical Islamic organizations today. For them, religion is the most important component defining
their activities, ideology, characteristics, and recruitment methods. According to James
Thomson, ―Religions are very effective at guiding in-group morality and out-group hatred. They
minimize the fear of death by spreading the belief in an afterlife reward for those who are dying
in a holy war etc23.‖
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Radical Islamic terrorism, part of the Global Jihad movement, includes acts
perpetrated by many organizations, groups, and cells around the world. The brand name that Al
Qaeda established and then managed to franchise after the 2001 attacks on the United States has
been dramatically successful. The leaders of Al Qaeda, through a few spectacular attacks, field
training, motivation and shrewd media manipulation, created out of a small organization a brand
that has been embraced with enthusiasm by alienated Muslims in many parts of the world. Al
Qaeda has become a ‗network of networks‘; it is a ‗movement‘ that embraces disparate, and
often contradictory, objectives among groups that have little to do with each other, except that
they now share a general sympathy for a new global caliphate, among their other objectives. Few
of them are committed only to the creation of a new caliphate, but they believe they share
common enemies. As an organization, after the elimination of its supreme leader Osama Bin
Laden, Al Qaeda now hardly exists, and yet it is a rallying cry; it instigates very few terrorist
attacks itself, and yet it inspires them and is the incarnate enemy to many in Western countries.
The Al Qaeda Core organization continues to exist in the Afghan–Pakistan border region. But it
is now almost certainly of marginal operational significance24.
There are also terrorist organizations that combine religious grievances with nationalpolitical motivations, such as Hamas. On the one hand, Hamas derives its ideology from the
same narrative and background as Al-Qaeda, based on the early religious global ideology of the
Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time though, Hamas seeks to achieve the nationalistic goal of
destroying Israel and creating a Palestinian state in its place.
Al Qaeda, its allies in the Global Jihad movement, other radical Islamic terrorist
organizations, and the radical Islamic networks and cells of the West, all believe in one divine
mission, which calls upon them to spread their radical beliefs throughout the world25. In seeking
to achieve this mission, they believe it is permissible and necessary to make use of violence and
terrorism, and that they are fighting a ―defensive war‖. They are against every aspect of
modernization, including democratic forms of government, liberal values, and even modern
technology that threaten the way of life they strive for – a radical Islamic caliphate governed by
Sharia law. It is also important to note that the threat of Global Jihad is not, as many tend to
think, a war between Islam and other religions. Rather, it can be understood as a war of cultures
– the culture of radical Islam against the outside world; or the culture of radical Islam against the
culture of the ―infidels,‖ as Islamists call all those who do not share their world view26.
Many in the radical Jihadi movement recognize that they will not be able to succeed
in their worldwide campaign in the near future. Therefore they aim, as a first stage, to create
localized radical Islamic revolutions, primarily in Arab and Islamic countries. In fact, the
majority of Global Jihad attacks over the past several years occurred in countries of the Arab or
Islamic world, such as Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and
Indonesia. The goal of such attacks is to destabilize local regimes and create political unrest,
establishing the conditions necessary for radical movements to take control of the country‘s
government. A large percentage of these attacks target tourist destinations, serving a dual
purpose – they cause Western causalities and damage a primary source of income for the
targeted Muslim country. Such attacks seriously undermine a country‘s ability to provide critical
services to its citizens, ultimately leading to criticism, unrest, and government instability27.
Attacks against Western targets – such as in New York, Washington or even London, Madrid
served the same purpose; they deter Western countries from being involved in an Islamic
campaign or providing military assistance and economic support to non-fundamentalist Islamic
governments. Consistent with the method of modern terrorism and Global Jihad strategy, fear of
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terrorist attacks felt by Americans, British, and other western citizens is meant to translate into
pressure on decision-makers to change their policies and adopt a policy of isolationism,
consequently weakening non-radical Muslim governments that would otherwise be supported by
western governments. A significant achievement of this strategy was the shift in the Spanish
elections following the series of terrorist attacks on four commuter trains in Madrid in March
2004, in which 191 people were killed and over 1,500 injured. The attacks came three days
before general elections, apparently leading to the defeat of the incumbent party that had been
leading in opinion polls. The new government decided to pull out Spanish troops deployed in
Iraq. Without western support, aid, and involvement, it is difficult for non-radical Arab and
Muslim governments to stay in power, which ultimately promotes the strategic goals of the
Global Jihad movement28.
The dynamic nature of the terrorism phenomenon has also been represented by AlQaeda‘s changing methods of operation and organizational structure. Until the 11September
2001 attacks, Al-Qaeda operated as an organized hierarchy with a top leadership level, a midrank level, and a lower level of activists carrying out orders and directives from above. As such,
the September 11 attacks were carried out as a result of an organized decision-making process
and complex preparations over a long period of time. However, Al-Qaeda experienced a shift in
organizational structure post 9/11, partly in response to the American military campaign that
followed the attacks. The occupation of Afghanistan, the destruction of the organization‘s
administrative and operational infrastructure, loss of support from the Taliban and a significant
amount of manpower, and the demolition of training camps, recruitment offices and facilities,
effectively forced Al-Qaeda to change its structure and method of operation. Without
autonomous territory in Afghanistan from which to operate, or freedom of movement for the
organization‘s leaders and activists, the hierarchical structure of the organization and the control
level of the organization‘s leadership over its activists were severely damaged29.
Apart from direct, organized, and hierarchical processes of carrying out attacks,
following the campaign in Afghanistan, the majority of Global Jihad attacks were carried out by
affiliate organizations belonging to bin Laden‘s network, part of the “International Islamic Front
for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” Other attacks were carried out by independent Jihadist
organizations that actively support Al Qaeda‘s world view. Such ―indirect attacks‖ are often
initiated by Al Qaeda‘s leadership, and on certain occasions are even supported by Al-Qaeda on
the operational level. Ultimately though, the attacks are perpetrated by organizations functioning
as proxies of Al Qaeda30.
In the past several years, Al Qaeda has undergone an additional developmental
process. In addition to its reliance on proxy organizations to conduct terror attacks, Al Qaeda has
focused on spreading its ideology through international media, mosques, and Islamic community
centers, and – most significantly – through the world wide web. The organization seeks to inspire
young Muslims around the world and especially in Western countries, to perpetrate attacks in
their immediate environment. This phenomenon, known as ―homegrown terrorism,‖ is the
current trend in radical Islamic terrorism. It works to influence the hearts and brainwash the
minds of many young people around the world – first- and second-generation Muslim
immigrants, converts to Islam, and others – creating a radicalization process within various
Muslim communities. This method of operation is not a substitute for direct attacks in the 9/11
model or even for indirect attacks through proxies; rather it functions in addition to these
methods. Homegrown terrorism constitutes a dangerous threat to western society because it is
carried out by Western citizens in their own countries. These local activists have a clear
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advantage over external actors: they are embedded within these societies, know the society‘s
weak points better than others, can move about freely, know the local language, and operate
alone or as part of small local networks that are often very difficult to infiltrate. Marc Sageman
explains how such networks are assembled: ―A group of people can be viewed as a network, a
collection of nodes connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are attached to
more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These, more connected nodes, called
hubs are important components of a terrorist network‖31.
As earlier noted, the internet serves as a critical modern technology that in many
cases connects various nodes of a terrorist network. Radical Islamic internet websites, blogs,
forums, and chat rooms create virtual radical Islamic communities, facilitating the spread of
materials of incitement, supporting the radicalization process and bridging geographic barriers.
The internet allows such radical activists to circumvent censorship and prepare recruits to carry
out attacks. Instead of the physical training facilities it lost in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda has begun
using ―cyber replacements‖ in order to recruit and train terrorists. The internet provides the
organization direct access to a much larger pool of potential activists, all without the ability of
government authorities to effectively monitor or thwart their activities32.
Another source of concern stemming from the dynamic processes of modern
terrorism is the possible use by Global Jihad organizations of nonconventional measures
[Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)] in their attacks. Religiously
motivated terrorists are thought more likely to conduct mass casualty attacks because, unlike
politically motivated terrorists, they are not constrained by the fear that excessive violence will
offend some constituency, since they care only about a small circle of the elect. Nor, for this
reason, unlike politically motivated terrorists, is their intent to pressure or persuade their
opponents. For religious terrorists, the world is divided into ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, and the latter are to
be destroyed. Today, the world is essentially witnessing an extended process of transition from
modern terrorism to postmodern terrorism. While studies indicate that past and current use of
CBRN and WMD by terrorist groups is actually quite rare, many in the intelligence and
academic community expect the trend will continue and even grow as radical Islamic terrorist
organizations, who see themselves as fighting a total war to save Islam from the infidels – and do
not hesitate to commit suicide in carrying out their attacks – will imitate these methods in an
attempt to maximize the number of casualties in their attacks and heighten anxiety among the
target population.
Challenges and Recommendations:
Global security has been affected by a transformation of the nature of war and the transition from
old to new terrorism, which presents markedly different challenges than traditional terrorism.
Effectively coping with the phenomenon of terrorism requires local and international action on
two levels; addressing both terrorist‘s motivation and their operational capabilities. It is a state‘s
responsibility and duty to protect its citizens, and so it must work to reduce terrorist
organization‘s operational capabilities through preventative and offensive action (and sometimes
also defensive action) based on intelligence resources. With the development of modern
terrorism and its continuing international reach, the physical and moral damage incurred by
terrorist acts has increased to such an extent that it arguably threatens the proper functioning of
open society, the world economy, and the maintenance of humanitarian and liberal values and
hence, making counter-terrorism efforts all the more crucial.
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Measures to Effectively Counter the Threat of Terrorism and Global Jihad Networks:
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First and foremost it requires a well-coordinated and multidisciplinary campaign that
takes advantage of all possible resources – intelligence, economic, security related, and
diplomatic. It is important to recognize that it takes a network to defeat a network, which
is only possible if the world community agrees together on the nature of the terrorist
threat, prioritizing counter terrorism on their national agendas and coordinating in all
their efforts. As a prerequisite, the international community must agree on one
international objective and comprehensive definition of terrorism, which is not broad or
vague, that refers to terrorism as an outlawed method of operation that no goal can
justify. The implications of such efforts – which require the cooperation of the academic,
security, and intelligence communities – lie in the perpetuation or termination of the
threat; only when such coordination is established can the world community deal
effectively with the operational capabilities of the Global Jihad movement and the
modern terrorist threat.
Establishing an alliance of countries that share the common goal of effectively countering
global terrorism would be one step in creating a broad-based and international response
to terrorism. Such an alliance could reflect the NATO model.
A 3D strategy has to be designed to combat terrorism on three fronts. The first is to defeat
existing terrorist organizations by using all instruments of power directed at destroying
their ability to survive and operate. The second is to develop the international instruments
and mechanism that will deter future acts of terrorism and preclude state and non- state
actors from providing support, sponsorship and sanctuary to terrorist organizations. The
third is to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism and to banish any expectations that
terrorism will result in political, ideological or material gain.
Global terrorists pose a unique threat because they view the entire world as their
battlefield. With extensive support networks and financing, global terrorists are likely to
obtain weapons of mass destruction. They might also use them, being free from the moral
constraints that often restrict a nation-state‘s freedom of action. Global terrorists pose
unique challenges as they expand their influence to numerous like-minded terrorist
organizations. Their broad appeal to individuals, organizations, and states creates a
virtual nation, spanning entire continents. Hence, sharing resources is critical in terms of
global, regional, and state efforts to defeat terrorist organizations and to achieve the
abolishment of terrorism as a method for political change.
When responding to the threat of terrorism, the coalition partners should understand that
the terrorists do not attack simply to inflict damage on specific targets but to solicit a
response that will further their cause. The true battle is over the hearts and minds of the
people whom the terrorists are trying to influence. Misapplied or misdirected retaliation
may prove to be counter-productive. Therefore, short-term gains in the effort to defeat
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terrorist organizations must be carefully weighed against the longer-term battle for the
hearts and minds of the larger population.
Anticipation, initiative, and pro-action are the keys to achieve success. Proactive
engagement by the simultaneous use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
resources to undermine terrorist groups and their support and sanctuary, while deterring
their plans and attacking their assets, is critical. Diplomatic pressure ranging from
negotiations, incentives, and international condemnation to loss of diplomatic status—
should be employed to end support for terrorism.
Five centers of gravity common to all terrorist organizations are: leadership, ideology,
financial support, sanctuaries, and command and control capabilities. Destruction,
elimination, or disruption of any of the five will severely impede the ability of terrorist
organizations to function. Improve intelligence capabilities to identify sanctuaries and
share that information to assist states in defeating terrorism on their soil.
Develop technologies and capabilities that improve border control mechanisms and share
them with states around the world, focusing on information and data systems that help
prevent undesirables from crossing borders.
Develop training and assistance programs to aid states and international organizations in
their efforts to deny terrorist organizations sanctuaries and safe havens.
Terrorist organizations rely on digital communications system. The Internet in particular
poses serious challenges because of the anonymous nature of the network. User
identification names can be changed as often as necessary and public locations such as
Internet cafes and libraries provide capabilities with no return address. While this center
of gravity may be difficult to influence, it represents an essential capability for terrorist
organizations to operate in a global fashion. Remote and isolated terrorist cells must be
directed from a centralized but distant location. Global communications systems enable
this dispersed network of operations. Nevertheless difficult to affect, to disrupt terrorist
command and control systems research and development of methods to detect, track, and
confront terrorist organizations needs to be encouraged.
Conclusion:
The fight against terrorism has become a priority for all the nations. It is well established that
there exists an interconnection between security and globalization in the context of terrorism in
its new avatar . Security has become so complex and multi-dimensional that traditional national
border-setting type of security perception is not capable of recognizing new threats that
transcend the national borders.. Global terror as well as other risks in the twenty first century
requires cooperation for security. Terrorism has undergone dramatic changes in recent years. The
categorical fanaticism that is apparent in terrorist organizations across a spectrum of belief
systems is a major part of this change. In the past, terrorists were more likely to be dominated by
pragmatic considerations of political and social change, public opinion, and other such factors.
Today, terrorists bent on death and destruction for its own sake, is more commonplace than ever.
In addition, the statelessness of today‘s terrorists removes crucial restraints that once held the
most extreme terrorists in check or prevented them from reaching the highest levels in their
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organizations. Terrorists can still enjoy the funding and shelter that only a national economy can
mobilize, but they are on their own to a greater degree in greater numbers than in the past.
Organizationally, terrorists are using the non-hierarchical structures and systems that have
emerged in recent years. Finally, the growing level of threat, its international scope, its lethality
and the possible use of nonconventional terrorism necessitate future multidisciplinary research in
the field and a more cohesive international response.
Notes and References:
1. Swagato Ganguly, ―Terror Through the Ages‖ a book review article in the Literary
Section of The Sunday Statesman (Kolkata), 2 June 2002.
2. ‗The Madarssa Scapegoat‘, The Washington Quarterly, 29, 2 (Spring 2006), p.122.
3. Simon, America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange, 2000. Simon and Benjamin state
that ―A distinguishing characteristic of many religiously motivated terrorists….is their
overriding interest in killing‖, p.171.
4. 48 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),
p. 8.
5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 197.
6. J. Bowyer Bell, Terror out of Zion (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1977), p. 172.
7. The Bojinka plot was a planned large-scale three phase Islamist attack by Ramzi
Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The attack would involve a plot to
assassinate Pope John Paul II, an air bombing of 11 airliners flying from Asia to the
United States and their approximately 4,000 passengers, and a proposal to crash a plane
into the CIA's headquarters in Fairfax County, Virginia. Despite his careful planning and
the skill of Ramzi Yousef, the Bojinka plot was disrupted after a chemical fire drew
the Philippine National Police's (PNP) attention on January 6–7, 1995. Before the plot
was disrupted, Yousef detonated test bombs in a mall and theater, injuring scores of
people, as well as Philippine Airlines Flight 434, killing one person and nearly causing
enough damage to result in the destruction of the aircraft. Endnote 7 of Chapter 5 of
the 9/11 Commission Report states that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "says bojinka is not
Serbo-Croatian for 'big bang', as has been widely reported, but rather a nonsense word
he adopted after hearing it on the front lines in Afghanistan."
8. Louis Beam, ‗Leaderless Resistance’, available on
http://www.crusader.net/texts/bt/bt04.html,
9. On the differences between networks and other forms of organization, see Francis
Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, The Virtual Corporation and Army Organization
(Santa Monica: RAND 1997) pp.4–24.
10. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism (Washington: GPO, 2000).
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11. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, ―Networks, Netwar, and
Information-Age Terrorism,‖ in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al.,
MR-989-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), p. 51.
12. Paul J. Smith, ―Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New
Realities,‖ Parameters, 32 (Summer 2002), 37.
13. Ibid., p. 37
14. Jessica Stern, ―The Protean Enemy,‖ Foreign Affairs, 82 (July/August 2003).
15. David Tucker, ―What‘s New about the New Terrorism and how dangerous is it‖.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (Autumn, 2001) pp. 1-14.
16. Japan‘s sect of Aum Shrinrikyo (supreme truth) acquired worldwide notoriety after its
members planted nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995 killing twelve persons and
harming several others, is a mysterious group of pseudo-religious fanatics who are
pathologically obsessed with the idea of destruction. They hold the view, albeit
imprecisely, that the present day world must be destroyed wholly to enable the new one
to arise out of its ashes.
17. Martha Crenshaw, The debate over ―New‖ vs. ―Old‖ Terrorism‘, Article prepared for the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois,
August 30 – September 2, 2007.
18. The Year 2000 attack plots, also known as the Millennium Plot, were a series of terrorist
attacks that were planned to occur on or near January 1, 2000, with the bombing of four
sites in Jordan, the bombing of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and the
bombing of the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68).The first two plots were foiled by law
enforcement agencies; the third was aborted after a mistake occurred. While the various
attacks were planned to occur around the same date, there is no evidence that the three
plots were coordinated in any way.
19. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, ‗Networks, Netwar, and Information
Age Terrorism‘, in Zalmay M. Khalilzad and Jon P. White (eds.) The Changing Role of
Information in Warfare (Santa Monica: RAND 1999) p.95.
20. Helena Cobban, The Palestine Liberation Organisation, People, Power and Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984) p.140.
21. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (note 5) pp.84, 113.
22. Ibid.
23. J. A. Thomson, Killer Apes on American Airlines or How Religion was the Main
Hijacker on September 11, In Violence or Dialogue; Psychoanalytic Insights on Terror
and Terrorism, eds. S. Varvin and V.D. Volkan London: International Psychoanalytical
Association.
24. Michael Clarke and Valentine Soria, Terrorism; The New Wave, Rusi Journal,
August/September 2010. Vol. 155, No. 4, pp.24-31.
25. M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
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26. Boaz Ganor, Trends in Modern Terrorism, D. Weisburd et al. (eds.). To Protect and to
Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism, Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009.
Pp.11- 42.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. M. Sageman, op. cit. (Ref. No. 22)
32. D.D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda‘s Use of Denail and Deception,
Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (3): 367-388.
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