December 18, 2014
Issue No: 14/45
European Economics Analyst
Economics Research
Sovereign purchases and the ‘purity’ of monetary policy
ECB sovereign purchases: From ‘whether’ to ‘how’
Huw Pill
Notwithstanding the political and legal obstacles posed by the Euro area’s
fragile institutional structure, we now anticipate that the ECB will
commence sovereign QE in the coming months. The debate in the
Governing Council has shifted from being about whether to start
purchasing sovereign debt to how to conduct those purchases.
+44(20)7774-8736 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs International
Motivated by the price stability mandate
Dirk Schumacher
Mindful of a possible political and legal backlash to the potential crossborder fiscal impact of sovereign purchases, Mr. Draghi has been careful to
present QE as a “pure” monetary policy action, motivated solely by pursuit
of the ECB’s price stability objective. From this perspective, what matters
are policymakers’ intentions: the end justifies the means, trumping other
considerations (including political sensitivities about cross-border
distributional effects and monetary financing). In the words of Mr. Draghi,
“Not to pursue our mandate would be illegal”.
Kevin Daly
+44(20)7774-5908 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs International
+49(69)7532-1210 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs AG
Andrew Benito
+44(20)7051-4004 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs International
Alain Durré
+33(1)4212-1127 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs Paris Inc. et Cie
Lasse Holboell Nielsen
Concerns about cross-border impact have not disappeared
QE-sceptics have an alternative definition of a ‘pure’ monetary policy
action in mind, one that emphasises the need to minimise the cross-border
fiscal and distributional side-effects of monetary measures. Even if
resigned to the inevitability of sovereign QE, such sceptics continue to seek
ways to limit the potential cross-border fiscal implications of sovereign
purchases, in a manner that may still influence policy design. The
underlying tension would not disappear with the start of QE.
+44(20)7774-5205 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs International
Pierre Vernet
+44(20)7552-0428 [email protected]
Goldman Sachs International
Bold base case, but variant risks disappointment
Our base case assumes that Mr. Draghi will implement sovereign QE
boldly, so as to address downside risks to price stability. But we entertain a
variant scenario where Mr. Draghi seeks compromise with the QE-sceptics
(e.g., by agreeing not to pool fiscal risk on the ECB’s balance sheet in
exchange for a faster pace of balance sheet expansion). Such a
compromise has the potential to disappoint markets, which seek a decisive
step towards Fed-style monetary activism.
This is our last European Econom ics Analyst for 2014. We w ish all our clients
and readers season’s greetings and best w ishes for 2015. Our next issue w ill be
published in early January.
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification
and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Global Investment Research
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Sovereign purchases and the ‘purity’ of monetary policy
Having been sceptical in the past, we now expect the ECB to expand its asset purchases to
government debt in the first quarter of 2015.1
But the argumentation behind our previous scepticism remains intact. Implementing
sovereign QE in a multi-country monetary union raises issues that do not arise in unitary
jurisdictions (such as the US, the UK or Japan).2 Underlying the well-known legal and
institutional hurdles to sovereign purchases by the ECB lies a fundamental political
question: how should the potential cross-country distributional effects of sovereign QE in a
monetary union with many national fiscal authorities be managed?
Faced with declining longer-term inflation expectations (Exhibit 1) and a weak economic
outlook, ECB President Mario Draghi has understandably decided to press ahead with
sovereign purchases despite this unresolved question, so as to expand the ECB’s balance
sheet more rapidly in an effort to contain deflation risks.
Yet, mindful of the potential political and legal backlash to such an approach in core
countries (particularly Germany), Mr. Draghi has presented his motivation for moving
forward with care. Echoing earlier comments by Vice-President Vitor Constancio, at his
December press conference he emphasised that further easing measures would represent
“pure monetary policy”.
In today’s Weekly, we explore the content of “pure” monetary policy:
 Defined on the basis of intention, a pure monetary policy operation is one motivated
solely by pursuit of monetary policy’s objective (namely price stability): this
focuses attention on policy targets. We see this definition underlying Mr. Draghi’s
recent remarks. And with headline inflation low and declining, additional policy easing
– including sovereign purchases – (easily) satisfies this criterion.
 Defined on the basis of impact, a pure monetary policy operation is one designed to
minimise fiscal and distributional side-effects (particularly those that have clear
cross-country implications, which are likely to be most politically sensitive within a
monetary union).3 This definition shifts focus away from the target and rationale of
policy action towards the specifics of the measures implemented. In this context, the
purity of sovereign purchases as a monetary policy action is more open to question.
 Reconciling these two definitions of the ‘purity’ of monetary policy actions is not
trivial. Even if sovereign purchases are set to start in the first quarter, differences in
the interpretation of QE are likely to persist among members of the ECB’s
Governing Council. These differences will continue to influence the design,
presentation, implementation and ultimately the effectiveness of sovereign QE in the
coming quarters, especially should ‘hawks’ maintain an ongoing criticism of such
measures.
In short, commencing sovereign purchases is not the end of the story. Issues that we have
flagged in the past when discussing the likelihood of sovereign QE have not disappeared.
They remain relevant to the design of new easing measures. And they remain contentious.
Even with sovereign QE, the New Year promises (more) interesting times.
1
2
3
See: “Dovish speech from Draghi - ECB sovereign QE in 2015H1 now more likely than not,” European Views
November 21, 2014 and “Low take-up of December T-LTRO; we expect sovereign debt QE announcement in
March,” European Views December 11, 2014.
See: “ECB sovereign QE: Challenges to the conventional narrative,” European Economics Analyst 14/38.
As we have discussed in the past, monetary policy always has distributional consequences and fiscal implications.
But the resulting political concerns are particularly acute in the Euro area, where governments are accountable to
national electorates and the cross-country distributional impact of sovereign purchases aligns with natural (and still
deep) intra-Euro area political fissures.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
2
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Exhibit 1: The downward drift in longer-term inflation expectations motivates further
monetary policy easing
Implied expectations of annual HICP inflation, %pa
3.0
%yoy,
10-day avg.
2.5
2.0
1.5
ECB's definition of price stability
Inflation swaps 5y5y
ECB's SPF Inflation forecast 5year ahead
1.0
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source: ECB, Bloomberg
From ‘whether’ to ‘how’
With large and persistent economic slack weighing on inflation developments and inflation
expectations, there has been a longstanding case for macroeconomic stimulus to boost
aggregate demand in the Euro area. Fiscal initiatives have been hamstrung by a
combination of governance failure at the area-wide level and lack of fiscal capacity in those
stressed countries burdened by an overhang of excessive legacy debt. The responsibility
for reviving growth has therefore fallen largely (and excessively) on monetary policy.
The ECB has responded by lowering policy interest rates to their lower bound, providing
low-cost funding to banks via longer-dated and targeted LTROs, and purchasing private
assets (covered bonds and ABS). But thus far the ECB has refrained from making
purchases of sovereign debt, even though – based on experience elsewhere – this is widely
seen as a natural further easing step.
In previous work, we have argued that the cross-country distributional impact of sovereign
purchases by the central bank in a multi-country monetary union raises the political (fixed)
cost of starting QE. In an uncertain macroeconomic environment, higher fixed costs
increase the option value of waiting before engaging in sovereign purchases. On this
reasoning, the unique institutional setting of the Euro area serves to explain why the ECB
has been a laggard in making sovereign purchases relative to its peers in other (unitary)
jurisdictions, such as the US or Japan.
But with concerns about a downward ratcheting of longer-term inflation expectations being
exacerbated by the sharp decline in oil prices (raising the concern that negative headline
inflation prints early next year will seep into wage- and price-setting behaviour and create a
self-fulfilling downward deflationary spiral), we believe Mr. Draghi has decided there is now
an urgent need to act. Notwithstanding the political and legal obstacles posed by the Euro
area’s fragile institutional structure, we anticipate that the ECB will commence sovereign QE
in the coming months. The debate in the Governing Council has shifted from being about
whether to start purchasing sovereign debt to how to conduct those purchases.4
4
Whether to start sovereign QE is a binary question. Opinions in the Governing Council can be divided neatly into
‘yes’ or ‘no’ camps. But how to conduct sovereign purchases is a multi-dimensional issue: what maturity? which
countries’ debt to buy? in what proportions? how to present? etc. Recent reports of new and unanticipated
‘dissent’ within the Governing Council need to be read in this light. (There is now more to dissent about, even
among those who agree sovereign QE in some form is required.)
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
3
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Devil in the detail
For those Governing Council members concerned about the potential cross-country fiscal
impact of sovereign QE (notably Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann), any decision to
commence purchases of government debt represents a significant setback.
But this group is likely to treat such an outcome as an individual battle lost, rather than as
an unconditional surrender. While accepting the case for further monetary easing to
address downside risks to price stability, this wing of the Governing Council remains
averse to any mutualisation of fiscal risks via the ECB’s balance sheet – an eventuality that
was not foreseen in the Maastricht framework for monetary union. In their view, a “pure”
monetary policy operation is one that minimises any associated fiscal or distributional
impact.
In seeking to limit scope for cross-country risk pooling and potential cross-border transfers,
the naysayers have thus far attempted to limit ECB sovereign purchases to zero. With the
inflation outlook deteriorating and Mr. Draghi’s determination to move forward to
sovereign purchases evident, this position has become economically and institutionally
untenable.
Even if Mr. Weidmann and his caucus continue to oppose sovereign purchases, Mr. Draghi
commands a majority in the Governing Council and, at his December press conference, he
made clear that a decision to move forward did not require unanimity. On our reading, the
minority recognises this reality, and is resigned to its implication.
But resignation to sovereign QE from the ECB does not imply that attempts to restrict its
cross-border fiscal implications are over. Other limiting mechanisms exist, including:
 The size of purchases could be limited. Indeed, in previous judgments the German
constitutional court appears to have ruled out an ‘open-ended’ commitment to
purchase of sovereign assets.
 Central bank holdings of government bonds could enjoy senior status, offering
protection against sovereign default. By nature, any such seniority would subordinate
the remaining private-sector holders. The counterproductive nature of such
subordination became painfully evident in the context of purchases of Greek
sovereign debt under the securities market programme (SMP) back in 2010-11. On this
basis, at his December press conference Mr. Draghi appeared to rule out this
approach: “we don't want to cause unintended monetary policy tightening in
choosing forms of seniority that would be counterproductive”.
 Central banks could be indemnified by governments and/or EU agencies (such as
the European Stability Mechanism, ESM) against losses on their holdings of sovereign
debt, in a manner akin to the protection provided by HM Treasury to the Bank of
England in the context of the latter’s asset purchases. Such an approach shifts the
question of how fiscal risks are distributed across countries from the central bank
domain to the realm of governments. On the one hand, this ensures that decisions are
properly legitimated by the political process. On the other hand, coming to a decision
would face the same political challenges as listed above, arguably in a more difficult
context. (Indeed, limiting these discussions to independent central bankers may be
attractive precisely because it circumvents such a fraught political negotiation.)
 Most pertinently, pooling of fiscal risk inherent in sovereign purchases could
simply be avoided via institutional mechanisms. This appears to be an area of live
debate in the design of ECB sovereign QE. Speaking earlier this week in Frankfurt, Mr.
Weidmann – in a speech broadly sceptical of sovereign purchases – argued that QE
could lead to an undesirable mutualisation of risks across Euro area countries “unless
the purchases were limited to countries with the highest credit-worthiness or each
central bank bought bonds of its own government at their own risk”.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
4
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
In our base case, we anticipate that the conservative caucus on the Governing Council will
achieve little success in imposing such limits on the potential fiscal and distributional
implications of sovereign purchases.5 Yet – as is evident from Mr. Weidmann’s remarks
this week – that is not to say that it will not try.
Recent statements – not just from Mr. Weidmann, but also from Mr. Coeure – suggest that
the debate surrounding the design of ECB sovereign QE is still open on a number of these
issues. It remains possible that some of the limitations listed above are introduced, with
national central bank purchases of only the bonds of their own governments at their own
risk the most likely manifestation of an aversion to fiscal risk pooling. It goes without
saying that the introduction of any such limitations could have substantial market
implications, particularly in the sovereign space. The devil is in the detail – and scope for
disappointment relative to our forecast of a more aggressive implementation of sovereign
QE persists.
The best of intentions
That said, our baseline forecast assumes that ECB sovereign purchases will be: (1) large (in
the range of EUR500bn to EUR1trn); (2) on a pari passu basis with the private sector; (3)
without government indemnification; and (4) pool fiscal risks at the area-wide level.6 While
we expect the initial announcement of sovereign QE to be capped in size, communication
(drawing on US experience) will likely point to the possibility of successor programmes
should needs dictate, thereby opening the door to open-ended purchases in practice.
This aggressive baseline follows from our view that, now that Mr. Draghi has decided to
move forward with sovereign purchases, he will do so boldly. Having decided to pay the
high fixed political cost of starting QE in a multi-country monetary union, Mr. Draghi is
likely to seek to amortise that cost across a sizeable purchase programme. Moreover,
exploiting announcement effects – in an attempt to shift longer-term inflation expectations
and weaken the exchange rate – is among the most powerful transmission channels of
sovereign QE in the Euro area. If the ECB acts as we expect, it will seek to exploit this
channel to the full. Boldness is therefore key.
In preparing the ground for such bold action, in recent weeks Mr. Draghi has repeatedly
argued that aggressive measures are required to achieve the ECB’s price stability mandate
in current circumstances. And achieving price stability trumps all other considerations,
including sensitivities about the cross-border distributional implications of sovereign
purchases (and those articles of the Treaty governing this issue). This rhetoric reached an
apogee in the concluding sentence of Mr. Draghi’s December press conference: “Not to
pursue our mandate would be illegal.”
Behind this strong language lies the view that commitment to preserving the integrity of
the Euro in its current form – the essence of ECB President Draghi’s commitment to do
“whatever it takes” back in July 2012 – ultimately entails all participating countries being
prepared to underwrite one another. By implication, if adoption of the Euro is to be seen as
truly irreversible, then fiscal risks were in practice pooled at the outset of monetary union
(whatever the Treaty may have envisaged or governments thought at the time). As an
independent central bank with a price stability goal, the ECB should leave fiscal and
distributional issues to one side and simply implement monetary policy in pursuit of its
area-wide objective.
In short: the end justifies the means. Such an approach points to a commitment to deliver
aggressive action, including substantial sovereign QE, in the coming months.
5
6
See: “Low take-up of December T-LTRO; we expect sovereign debt QE announcement in March,” European
Views December 11, 2014.
See: “Ten questions on ECB sovereign QE,” Global Viewpoint 14/04.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
5
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Such thinking is underpinned by the first of our definitions of “pure” monetary policy
rather than the second: policy actions must be governed solely by pursuit of monetary
policy’s price stability objective, even if cross-border fiscal and distributional side-effects
result. At his December press conference, Mr. Draghi commented on possible future
sovereign purchases thus: “The policies that we are discussing today address the risk that
low inflation for too long a time would feed into medium-term inflation expectations. …
This is pure monetary policy. … In normal times, we would address this risk by lowering
nominal interest rates. But in extraordinary times … we signal the monetary policy stance
through changes in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank“ (emphasis added).
All in the eye of the beholder
At present, Mr. Draghi has the whip hand in the Governing Council, with a majority in place
for sovereign QE. In this context, we view the debate on whether sovereign purchases will
take place as essentially over. The open question at this point is how such purchases will
be implemented.
Our base case assumes that Mr. Draghi acts boldly. If downside risks to price stability are
seen to intensify, acting aggressively and urgently to anchor longer-term inflation
expectations securely at levels consistent with the ECB’s mandate is the natural policy
response. Sovereign QE is likely to be an important part of that action.
But implementing sovereign QE in a multi-country monetary union faces complications
that do not arise in unitary jurisdictions such as the US or Japan. Some Governing Council
members remain concerned about the potential cross-border fiscal and distributional
implications of sovereign purchases. These complications and concerns have not
diminished as a result of the intensification of deflationary risks. And they are likely to
continue to influence policy decisions.
Mr. Draghi may simply press ahead with the bold approach we anticipate, relying on the
faith placed in him by markets to signal that legal and institutional obstacles emphasised
by some of his Governing Council colleagues will be overcome. As experience with the
OMT demonstrates, Mr. Draghi has proved masterful in guiding market sentiment in such
circumstances. And there is no suggestion his mastery has diminished of late. Such an
approach would bolster our confidence in our base-line policy forecast.
But a variant scenario could emerge if Mr. Draghi wished to broaden support for
substantial sovereign purchases (so as to manage concerns in core countries and permit an
increased pace of ECB balance sheet expansion). For example, he may attempt to manage
concerns about possible cross-border fiscal and distributional effects by choosing not to
pool sovereign credit risks at the area-wide level, but rather leave them on the respective
national central bank balance sheets. Recent statements by leading Governing Council
members suggest such considerations remain under discussion.
Such an outcome would likely come as a disappointment to market participants, with
potential implications for asset pricing. More fundamentally, this variant scenario suggests
that the unique institutional set-up of monetary union – and the different interpretations of
how it should operate in today’s challenging environment – will continue to influence
monetary policy decisions. Starting sovereign QE is not the end of the story, but simply the
start of a new chapter.
Behind these different interpretations of how the single monetary policy should operate lie
two different definitions of what constitutes “pure” monetary policy in the Euro area.
As with beauty, the ‘purity’ of monetary policy is in the eye of the beholder.
Huw Pill
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
6
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Key European Indicators
Financial conditions have eased sharply in Norway in the
past few weeks, but have tightened in the UK
Business sentiment has stabilised recently
European business sentiment
European financial conditions
Index
Jul. 2008=100
102
70
Eur o a rea
UK
Sweden
Norway
Tighter
Conditions
100
Index
65
60
55
98
50
45
96
Eur o a rea Co mpo site PMI
40
UK Compo site PMI
94
Switzer land Manufactur ing PMI
35
Swede n Manu facturing PMI
92
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
30
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Source: Markit, SVME, Swedbank, Goldman Sachs Global Investment
Research
Our Euro area Current Activity Indicator points to growth
of 1.0%qoq annualised
Our UK Current Activity Indicator is consistent with
growth of 3.1%qoq annualised
Euro area GDP, Current Activity Indicator
UK GDP and Current Activity Indicator
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
% qoq
annl.
-4
-6
-6
Eur o cai - full set
-8
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
UK cai - full set
-8
gdp qoq a nnl
-10
-12
% qoq
annl.
-4
gdp qo q a nnl
-10
14
15
-12
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Bank lending rates to companies are showing greater
signs of convergence, particularly in Spain
We expect Euro area inflation to remain subdued in the
coming months and UK inflation to fall further
% pa, interest rates on business loans up to €1mn with
maturity between 1 and 5 years
Inflation forecasts
7.0
%
Eur o area HICP
UK CP I
% y oy
6
5
6.0
GS Forecast
4
3
5.0
2
4.0
3.0
1
Ger ma ny
France
Italy
Spa in
05
06
07
08
0
09
10
11
12
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
13
14
15
-1
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Source: Eurostat, ONS, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
7
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
Main Forecasts
Economic Forecasts
Euro area
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
UK
Switzerland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway*
Poland
Czech Republic
Hungary
GDP
(Annual % change)
2014
2015
2016
Consumer Prices
(Annual % change)
2014
2015
2016
Current Account
(% of GDP)
2014
2015
2016
Budget Balance
(% of GDP)
2014
2015
2016
0.8
1.3
0.4
-0.4
1.3
3.0
1.8
1.9
0.8
2.6
3.3
2.4
3.2
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.2
-0.1
1.5
0.0
-0.3
0.4
2.0
0.0
0.5
-0.2
2.0
6.9
-1.0
1.7
-0.6
-4.7
9.8
5.7
6.5
8.4
-1.0
-0.6
1.4
-2.6
0.2
-4.4
-3.0
-5.5
-5.1
-0.1
-2.0
1.0
4.5
-2.4
-2.9
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.2
1.6
2.8
1.5
2.7
1.6
2.2
2.9
2.1
2.1
1.4
1.8
1.4
0.6
1.6
2.8
1.9
3.2
2.0
3.0
3.5
2.8
2.7
0.6
1.0
0.7
0.0
-0.1
1.2
0.0
0.4
0.7
2.1
0.8
1.6
0.8
1.2
2.1
1.2
0.1
0.6
1.9
0.9
1.5
1.6
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.7
1.9
6.1
-1.0
1.8
-0.3
-4.4
9.1
4.9
6.6
8.2
-1.6
-1.1
0.7
1.9
5.4
-0.9
1.9
-0.4
-4.1
8.4
4.5
6.9
8.5
-2.2
-1.2
0.1
-2.5
-0.5
-4.3
-2.8
-4.4
-3.4
0.2
-1.5
-2.2
-2.9
-2.3
-2.8
-1.8
0.1
-3.8
-2.2
-3.0
-1.6
0.4
-0.7
-2.6
-2.8
-2.4
-2.9
*Mainland GDP growth
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Interest Rate Forecasts
%
Current
Euro area
UK
Sweden
Switzerland
US
Canada
Australia
Japan
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
3M
10Y
0.1
0.7
0.6
1.9
0.3
1.0
0.1
0.3
0.2
2.2
1.2
1.8
2.8
2.9
0.2
0.4
3 Month Horizon
Forward
Forecast
0.1
0.7
0.6
1.9
0.2
1.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
2.3
1.3
2.0
2.7
2.9
0.2
0.4
-0.1
1.1
0.5
2.4
0.2
1.4
-0.3
0.7
0.3
2.6
1.7
2.4
2.4
3.6
0.2
0.7
6 Month Horizon
Forward
Forecast
0.2
0.7
0.7
2.0
0.2
1.1
-0.1
0.3
0.4
2.3
1.3
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.2
0.5
-0.1
1.2
0.5
2.5
0.1
1.5
-0.3
0.7
0.3
2.8
1.7
2.5
2.2
3.7
0.2
0.7
12 Month Horizon
Forward
Forecast
0.2
0.8
0.9
2.1
0.2
1.1
-0.1
0.3
0.9
2.5
1.4
2.1
2.5
3.0
0.2
0.5
-0.1
1.3
0.8
2.8
0.1
1.5
-0.3
0.8
0.9
3.0
1.7
2.8
2.2
3.8
0.2
0.8
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Bloomberg. Close 17 December 2014, mid-rates for major markets. We are currently using March 2015, June
2015 and December 2015 contracts for 3-month forward rates
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
8
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
European Calendar
The German Manufacturing PMI rebounded in December
Focus for the Week Ahead
70
The last two weeks of the year see limited data releases.
Revised estimates for Q3 GDP growth will be published in
France and the UK. Business confidence for December
will be released in Italy and Belgium.
On January 2, Manufacturing PMIs for December will be
published
throughout
Europe.
The
Euro
area
Manufacturing PMI for December rose from 50.1 to 50.8 on
the flash estimate, on the back of a sharp increase in the
German Manufacturing PMI.
Index
65
60
55
50
45
40
Eur o a rea
France
35
Ger ma ny
30
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Economic Releases and Other Events
Country
Time
(UK)
Economic Statistic
Period
Forecast
Previous
GS
Cons.
mom/qoq
yoy
Dec
Jan
Dec
Dec
Nov
—
—
—
—
+GBP15.0B
-1
+8.8
+95
+2.7%
+GBP14.8B
-2
+8.7
+94
+2.6%
+GBP7.1B
—
—
—
—
—
Nov
Dec (Flash)
—
—
—
—
—
-11.6
+3.4%
—
Fri 19 Dec 2014
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Norway
United Kingdom
00:05
07:00
07:45
09:00
09:30
GFK Consumer Confidence
GFK Consumer Confidence
Business Confidence
Unemployment Rate
PSNB (nsa)
08:00
15:00
M3 - Money Supply
Consumer Confidence
07:45
07:45
09:00
09:30
09:30
14:00
GDP
Consumer Spending
Retail Sales
GDP
Services Output
BNB Business Confidence
Q3 F
Nov
Oct
3Q F
Oct
Dec
—
—
—
+0.7%qoq
—
—
—
—
—
+0.7%qoq
+0.2%mom
—
+0.3%qoq
-0.9%mom
-0.1%mom
+0.7%qoq
+0.8%mom 3m/3m
-6.1
+0.4%yoy (Flash)
-0.2%
-0.5%
+3.0%
—
—
08:00
KOF Leading Indicator
Dec
—
—
98.7
—
—
—
—
—
—
Dec (Flash)
Nov
Dec
-0.7%yoy
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
96.3
-0.5%yoy
+2.5%yoy
—
—
—
—
—
—
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec (Final)
Dec (Final)
Dec (Final)
Dec
Nov
Nov
—
—
—
—
47.9
51.2
50.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
52.7
51.3
54.7
49.0
47.9 (Flash)
51.2 (Flash)
50.8 (Flash)
53.5
+GBP59.4K
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
-2.6%
Mon 22 Dec 2014
Switzerland
Euro area
Tue 23 Dec 2014
France
France
Italy
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Belgium
Wed 24 Dec 2014
Switzerland
Mon 29 Dec 2014
—
Tue 30 Dec 2014
—
Spain
Euro area
Italy
08:00
09:00
09:00
—
HICP Inflation
M3 - Money Supply
Istat Business Confidence
Wed 31 Dec 2014
—
Fri 2 Jan 2015
Sweden
Norway
Spain
Italy
France
Germany
Euro area
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
—
07:30
08:00
08:15
08:45
08:50
08:55
09:00
09:30
09:30
09:30
—
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
PMI - Manufacturing
Mortgage Approvals
M4 - Money Supply
Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Economic data releases are subject to change at short notice in calendar. Complete calendar
available via the Portal —https://360.gs.com/gs/portal/events/econevents/.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
9
December 18, 2014
European Economics Analyst
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10