FRAMING
INNOVATION POLICY
FOR TRANSFORMATIVE
CHANGE: INNOVATION
POLICY 3.0
Johan Schot, W. Edward Steinmueller
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU)
University of Sussex
DRAFT – Version 2
18 October 2016
FramingInnovationPolicyforTransformativeChange:
InnovationPolicy3.0
JohanSchot
W.EdwardSteinmueller
SciencePolicyResearchUnit(SPRU)
UniversityofSussex
DRAFT,Version2
Updated:18October2016
Acknowledgements:
WehavebenefittedfromdiscussionswithparticipantsinSPRUcollaborationsinColombiasponsoredby
Colciencias,withparticipantsintheSPRU-AfricaEngagementweekandwithcollaboratorsinaMarieCurie
proposalforadvancedgraduatetrainingintheareaoftransformationalinnovation.Inaddition,wewould
liketothankRobinMansell,BenMartin,JordiMolas-Gallart,MatiasRamirez,IsmaelRafols,AdrianSmith
andBlancheTingforcommentsonearlierdrafts.
1
Contents
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................3
Framing1:InnovationforGrowth.........................................................................................................4
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention...................................................................................5
Framing1:InnovationModelandActors..........................................................................................6
Framing1:PolicyPractices.................................................................................................................7
Framing1:AlternativeorCounterFramings.....................................................................................8
Framing2–NationalSystemsofInnovation..........................................................................................9
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention.................................................................................10
Framing2:InnovationModelandActors........................................................................................11
Framing2:PolicyPractices...............................................................................................................13
Framing2:AlternativeorCounterFramings...................................................................................14
Summary..........................................................................................................................................14
Framing3:TransformativeChange......................................................................................................15
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention.................................................................................17
Framing3:InnovationModelandActors........................................................................................18
Framing3:PolicyPractices...............................................................................................................19
Framing3:AlternativeorCounterFramings...................................................................................20
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................20
References............................................................................................................................................22
2
Introduction
Publicpolicies,includingthosedirectedatscienceandtechnology,arisefromunderstandingsofpast
experiencewithactions,reflectionsoncontemporarychallengesandperceptionsoffuturepotentialsfor
action.Thepast,presentandfutureareinterpretivelyconnectedbypolicyscholarsandpractitionersaswell
asmanyothersasaguidetoanalysisandaction.Theseinterpretiveconnectionsproduceforcefulframings–
interpretationsofexperience,orderingofpresentcircumstancesandimaginationsoffuturepotentialities
whichprovidethefoundationsforpolicyanalysisandactionandhaveapowerfulinfluenceonthe
imaginationofpotentialsandopportunities(Goffman,1974;BenfordandSnow,2000;Taylor,2003).
Framingsevolveovertimeandtheychangeastheybecomeperceivedasinadequatetocurrent
circumstances.Becausetheyinfluencepeoples’imaginations,theyalsoextendbeyondthepublicpolicy
spheretoinfluencethemobilisationandactivitiesofnon-governmentalorganisationsaswellastheprivate
enterprisesectorandevenfamiliesandindividuals.
Inthecontemporaryworld,despiteimportantimprovementsinlifeexpectancyandmaterialwelfarein
countries,persistentproblemsofeconomiccrisesandrisinginequalitycoincidewithagrowingrealisation
thatcurrentmodelsformeetingourbasicneeds–whetherinfood,energy,mobility,materials,wateror
resourcesmoregenerally–areunsustainable.Theavailableframingsofscienceandtechnologypolicythat
evolvedquiterecentlyinhistoricaltermssinceWorldIIremainrelevant.However,theydonotprovide
perspectivesonhowtomanagetheconsequencesofthesocio-technicalsystemofmoderneconomic
growthtowhichtheycontributedandofwhichtheyareapart.Moderneconomicgrowthisgeneratedbya
socio-technicalsystemscomplexbaseduponindustrialmassproductionandindividualizedmass
consumptionwhichextensivelyemploysfossilfuels,isresourceandenergyintensiveandproducesa
massiveamountofwaste.
Ourviewisthatthreeframingsrelatedtoscienceandtechnologypolicycanbedelineated,twoofwhichare
availableandaresystematicallyemployedinpolicydiscourseandaction.Eachoftheseframingsinvolvesa
modelofinnovationwhichdefinestherolesofactorsanddescribesactionsthatmaybetakentoaddress
goalsthatarealsopartoftheframingsweexamine.Thethirdframingremainsunder-developedalthoughit
hasexistedinthebackgroundofpolicydiscussionsformanyyears.
Thefirstframingfocusesoninnovationforgrowth,tappingthepotentialofscienceandtechnologyfor
prosperityandextensionofasocio-technicalsystembaseduponmassproductionandconsumption.Itarose
asthesocio-technicalsystemscomplexofmoderneconomicgrowthemerged–twocentralfeaturesofwhich
Kuznets(1973)identifiedasscience-basedindustryandsustainedimprovementinfactorproductivity.1In
termsofscience,technologyandinnovationpolicy,however,thisframingremainedtacitorunarticulated
untilaftertheSecondWorldWarwhenitwasextendedtocreateanewvisionfortheroleoftheStateinthe
writingsofVannevarBush(1945)andothers.
Thesecondframing–nationalsystemsofinnovation-emergedduringthe1980stoaddresssomeofthe
consequencesforindividualnationstatesoftheexperiencewithmoderneconomicgrowth–the
intensificationofinternationalcompetition,globalization,theprospectsofbeingleftbehind,andthe
promiseofcatchingup.Similartothefirstframing,someofthefeaturesofthesecondframingwerepresent
inanunarticulatedforminearlieryearswithgreaterinfluenceonthepracticethanontherationaleor
theoryofscience,technologyandinnovationpolicy.Thispaperarticulatesbothrationalesmoreclearlyand
putsthemintohistoricalcontext.
1Kuznets(1973)identifiedsixcharacteristicsdefiningmoderneconomicgrowth.Theotherfourwererapidpopulation
growth,structuraltransformation(primarilyurbanisationandtheshiftfromagriculturetomanufacturingandthento
services),changesinideology(e.g.secularisation),theincreasedglobalreachofdevelopedcountries(partofwhatis
nowreferredtoasglobalisation),andthepersistenceofunderdevelopment(atthetimeofKuznetsarticle,the
persistenceofnon-moderngrowthexperienceamongthreequartersoftheworld’spopulation).
3
Athirdframing–transformativechange-isinthemakinganditsoutlineshavebecomeclearerinrecent
years.ThehistoricalbackgroundiscapturedmostrecentlyintheUNSustainableDevelopmentGoals
publishedin2015.Theseincludeendingpovertyandreducinginequalityinallitsformseverywhere,and
promotinginclusiveandsustainableconsumptionandproductionsystems,fullandproductiveemployment
anddecentworkforall,andmanymore.2Thisthirdframinginvolvesaquestioningofhowtousescience
andtechnologypolicyformeetingsocialneedsandaddressestheissuesofsustainableandinclusive
societiesatamorefundamentallevelthanpreviousframingsortheirassociatedideologiesandpractices.
Theemergenceofanewframingdoesnotnecessarilyreplaceexistingframings.However,framings
competewithoneanotherfortheimaginationofpolicymakersand,ultimately,citizens.Thelegitimacyof
rationalesandargumentsforparticularpoliciesandtheactionsthatfollowfromthemisinfluencedbythe
prevalenceandunderstandingoftheframings.Ouraiminthispaperistoexaminethehistorical
developmentofallthreeframings,illustratinghoweacharisesasaresponsetochangingsocialand
economiccircumstances.Ultimately,wecontendthatresearch,experimentation,andreflectiononthethird
framingshouldbeapriorityinanyconsiderationofinnovationpolicy.Thispaperisabouttheframingof
science,technologyandinnovationpolicyatahighlevelofabstraction.Wethinkitisimportanttoarticulate
andassesstheseframingssincetheyhavepervasiveimpactsonpractice,yetneverfullyshapewhatis
happeningontheground;actualpracticemightreflectmixturesofalltheseframes.
Framing1:InnovationforGrowth
ConcernsaboutthefutureoftheindustriallydevelopedeconomiesmanifestedthemselvesfollowingWorld
WarII.Thepotentialforthere-emergenceofunemployment,inflation,andeconomicinstabilitywasfeared
andtherolesofthestateinmobilisingandconductingthewareffortlegitimisedstateinterventionthat
previouslyhadbeenviewedsceptically,particularlyintheBritishandAmericancontext.Substantial
variationacrosscountriesinthestate’ssupportforresearchanddevelopment(R&D)priortothewarexisted,
butwithafewexceptions,suchasagriculturalresearchintheUSandEurope,theseeffortswereadirect
consequenceofthestate’sroleinparticularactivitiessuchasdefence,telecommunications,medical
research,geologicalsurveys,andcivilengineeringworks.3Followingthewar,andbecauseoftheensuing
ColdWar,therewasenthusiasmforanexpandedstateroleinconductingscientificresearchwhichwas
expectedtobringindustrialbenefits.Therewasalsopublicenthusiasmandoptimismthatsciencewould
bringbenefitsnotwithstandingtheroleofscienceincreatingnuclearweapons.
Abroadconsensusemergedthatthestatecouldandshouldplayanactiveroleinfinancingscientific
researchonthepremisethatnewscientificdiscoverieswouldtickledowntopracticethroughappliedR&D
bytheprivatesector.Itwasalsorecognisedthatsciencewasmakingsubstantialcontributionstothe
modernisationofindustry–replacingcraftpracticesandtraditionswithacontinuationandintensificationof
scientificmanagementasarticulatedinTaylorismandFordism.Typically,duringthe1950s,scienceand
inventionwereviewedasdistinctactivities.Asdistinctactivities,therewerealsoabasisforadivisionof
labourbetweenthestateandprivateenterprise.Insocialhistories,bothscienceandinventionwere
discussedintermsofthe‘heroic’orPrometheanoriginatorwithfamiliardebatesabouttherelative
influenceofindividualsandgroups.4
Attentiontotheissuesofappliedresearchandtechnologicaldevelopmentandtheirtreatmentasan
investmentbyfirmssuggestedshortcomingsinthefocusoninventionwhichemphasiseddiscoveryand
discoverers.Fortheseinvestmentstoberecouped,commercialisationofinventionwasrequired.
Commercialisationwouldonlyhappenifaninventionweretobepurchasedbyasignificantnumberof
customers.Ineffect,theframingdescribingtheoriginsandnatureofinventioninheritedfromthepastwas
undergoingchange.Initially,thisinvolvedafocusonR&Dasaninvestmentandledtoquestionsaboutthe
2
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
SeeTindemans(2009)andMoweryandRosenberg(1989)
4
Forexample,contrastBernal(1939)withthelargenumberofencomiumsforinventorssuchasFordandEdison.
3
4
rateofadoption(orpathofdiffusion)ofnewproducts.Tocapturetheseprocessesandtodistinguish
inventionfromthemorecomplexprocessesofappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisation,the
wordinnovationbegantobeemployed.5Thesimplestdefinitionofinnovationiscommercialisedinvention.6
Inthelate1950sthepopularimaginationfavouringtheeconomicbenefitsofscienceprovokedareexaminationoftheroleofscientificandtechnologicalknowledgefrombothempiricalandtheoretical
perspectives.Empirically,therelationbetweenthefactorsofproductionandthegrowthofeconomic
outputwasre-examinedbyAbramovitz(1956),Solow(1957)andothers.AbramovitzandSolow
demonstratedthatthecontributionoflabourandcapitalgrowthfellfarshortofexplaininggrowthin
economicoutput,leavingalargeresidualwhichSolowattributedtotechnologicalchangeandwhich
Abramovitzreferredtoas“somesortofmeasureofourignoranceaboutthecausesofgrowthintheUnited
States”,(p.11).Intermsofscienceandtechnologypolicy,thisworkseemedtoconfirmthebenefitsthat
sciencewasprovidingtotheeconomy.Thefindingswerereinforcedbytheappearanceofnovelartefacts
suchasmassmarkettelevisions,passengerjetairlines,and,moredarkly,intercontinentalballisticmissiles.
Thesignificanceoftheresidualprovokedanincreaseinsocialscientistandpolicymakerinterestinthe
processesoftechnologicalchange.Italsoledtoare-examinationoftherationaleforpublicinterventionin
theresearchenterprise.
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention
Theexplicitrecognitionthatinvestmentwasrequiredforinnovation,combinedwiththeempiricalinsight
thatinnovationortechnologicalchangewasthesinglelargestfactorineconomicgrowth,presenteda
theoreticalquestionforeconomists.ItwasinthiscontextthatNelson(1959)andArrow(1962)askedthe
question–Aretheincentivesofmarketactorsadequatetoproducethesociallydesiredlevelofscientific
knowledge?Theirnegativeanswerreflectedthenatureofscientificknowledge(thechallengesof
‘appropriating’orowningit)andthelogicofthemarket(afirmexpendingcoststhatwillequallybenefit
rivalsisnotmakingarationaleconomicdecisionsincetherivalscanfreerideandobtainacostadvantage
fromnotmakingtheresearchexpenditure).7Thus,economictheoryprovidedarobustrationaleforthe
publicsupportofonlyacomponentofinnovation(discoveryorinvention).Ineconomicslanguage,discovery
andinventionweresaidtohavethefeaturesofapublicgood,akintoroadsorsewersanditwasreasonably
well-acceptedthatpublicgoodssufferfrom‘marketfailure’–theinadequacyofmarketincentivesto
producethematthedesiredlevelorquality.8
Thequestionofwhetherasimilarmarketfailuremightapplytothelatterstagesoftheinnovationprocess–
appliedresearchandcommercialisation–wasnotaddressedbecauseitwasassumedthattheseinthese
laterstages,theknowledgewouldbeappropriable–appropriationofbenefitscouldbeprotectedbytrade
secrecy,intellectualproperty,orsimplybymaintainingacompetitiveleadpreventingrivalsfromquickly
imitatingsuccessfulinnovations.9
5
Foreconomists,whoweredevelopingthetheoryofproductiontoreflectthecontributionsoftechnology,thebroader
termstechnicalortechnologicalchangewereemployedinparallelsinceitalloweddiscussionofbothinnovations
representingnewproductsandimprovementsinprocessesforproducingproducts.Later,thetermsprocessand
productinnovationsbegantobeusedastypesoftechnologicalchange.
6
ThiswasaparticularconcernofChrisFreemanduetohisinterestinthesocialfunctionsofscience(Bernal,1939)and
theneedtodistinguishbetweeninventionandcommercialisationofinvention.WhileFreemanwasnotthefirstto
makethisdistinction,hewasinfluentialingettingthisestablishedduetothesuccessofFreeman(1974).
7
Bothoftheseassumptionswerelaterquestioned.Mostdramatically,thepublicgoodnatureofsciencewas
questionedbyCollins(1974)andlaterbyCallon(1994).Rosenberg(1990)observedthatfirmsdidinvestin‘nonappropriable’sciencewiththeirownmoney,perhapsbecausethiswasanecessaryconditionforemployingscientistsor
integratingtheirscientistswithinscientificcommunitiesandnetworks.
8
Substantialdebatescontinuedinpoliticaleconomyconcerningwhichgoodswerenecessarilypublicgoodswiththose
oflibertarianorneoliberalviewscontestingvirtuallyeverycandidate,includingscience,seee.g.Kealey(1998)
9
Exceptionstothisruleincludeddefencewhereplanningmostoftendominatedmarketcompetition,medicalresearch
whichwasseenasinherentlypublic,andagriculturewhereaconsiderableshareofadvancewasthoughttostemfrom
morewidespreadadoptionofbestpractice.
5
Policymakerscontributedanadditionalfeaturetothefirstframingbysponsoringmissionorientedresearch,
acontinuationand,insomecases,anextensionofthepreviousroleofgovernmentresearchfundingfor
governmentactivities.Technologiesweredevelopedtowagewar–atomicweapons,radar,jetaircraft,
ballisticmissiles,andcomputerswerefurtherdevelopedfor‘defence’andadaptedtocivilianapplication.
Themostimprobableoftheseadaptations,thecivilianuseofballisticmissiles,wastransformedintoaspace
programmeandaspaceraceparallelingthePost-Wararmsraceinnuclearweapons.Policymakerdefinition
andpursuitofmissionswasmotivatedbynationalprestigeandideologicalcompetitionbetweenthestate
socialismofthethenSovietUnionandChinaandthecapitalismoftheWest,ratherthanbyeconomic
returnsonpublicinvestment.Scientistsalsobenefittedfromtheirperceivedcontributiontowarefforts.The
physicistRobertWilsonrespondedtoaquestionfromaUSSenatorconcerningthedefence(mission)value
oftheproposednewacceleratoratFermilab,atthetime,thelargesthighenergyphysicsresearch
installationintheworld-”Inthatsense,thisnewknowledgehasalltodowithhonourandcountrybutithas
nothingtododirectlywithdefendingourcountryexcepttohelpmakeitworthdefending”(Wilson,1969).
Economistsandpolicymakerswerenottheonlycontributorstothefirstframingofscienceandtechnology
policy.Awarenessofthepotentiallynegativeconsequencesofscientificdevelopmentwas,inthe1950s,
limitedtoafewareassuchastherisksofnuclearwarandradiationexemplifiedbythe‘DoomsdayClock’
regularlyupdatedonthecoveroftheBulletinofAtomicScientists.However,thepublicationof,forexample,
SilentSpring(Carson,1962),andtheLimitstoGrowthreportbytheClubofRome(Meadows,Meadows,
Randersetal.,1972)openedamuchwideragendaofsocialconcernaboutthepotentiallynegative
consequencesofthenewproductsofscience.Duringthe1960s,considerableanxietyaboutandprotest
againstthepossibleconsequencesofscienceforpublichealthandsafetyand,ultimately,environmental
quality,emerged.Policymakersrespondedtothesedevelopments,oftenreluctantly,bydevelopingnew
regulatoryagenciesormakingimportantchangesinthoseagenciesthathadbeenestablishedinanearlier
era.Forexample,theUSFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA),whichhadbeenestablishedin1906tolicense
pharmaceuticalproductsandsetstandardsforfoodstandards,begantoregulatetheeffectivenessand
safetyofpharmaceuticalsaftertheworldwidethalidomidedisaster.10
Framing1:InnovationModelandActors
ThemodelofinnovationunderlyingFraming1isthecommercialisationofscientificdiscoverywitheachof
theprocessesfollowingdiscoverydrivenbytheeconomiclogicofinvestmentandfinancialreturninthe
potentialmarketfortheinnovation.Thisframingreflectsamodernistconfidenceintheinevitabilityof
progressandaneconomicrationaleforthesocialwelfarebenefitsofchoiceacrossarangeofcompetitively
massproduced(andhencerelativelyinexpensive)goods.Itisexpectedthatthisscience-ledprocesswill
contributesubstantiallytolongtermeconomicgrowthandprovidenumerousbusinessopportunities.
Somewhatreluctantly,thisframingallowsformistakeswhicharethemselvesattributedtoshortcomingsin
scientificknowledgethatcanberemediedwithfurtherresearch.Ingeneral,regulationofthesepotential
mistakes–theiranticipationandcorrection–isoutsidethemainmodelofinnovation.Regulationis,forthe
mostpart,appliedaftertheresearchprocessiscompletedandatthepointwhenproblemsareexperienced
intheadoptionanduseoftheinnovation.Toidentifytheseproblems,governmentsusetechnology
assessmentexercisesandcreatespecificagencieswhichinformParliaments(Vig.andPaschen,2000).Yet
thesetechnologyassessmentactivitiesarenotseenasacorepartofascience,technologyandinnovation
policy,butasausefuladd-onatbest.Anexampleofex-postproblemsolvingisCFC(chlorofluorocarbons)
whereaninnovationthatimprovedthequalityofrefrigeration11eventuallywererecognisedasahazardto
theozonelayerandproductionwasproscribedbyinternationaltreaty(MontrealProtocolonSubstances
10
ThiswasdonewithKefauverHarrisAmendmentorDrugEfficacyAmendment,a1962amendmenttotheFederal
Food,Drug,andCosmeticAct.
11
CFCsalsoreplacedtherefrigerantssulfurdioxideandmethylformatethatwould,inthecaseofleakage,bedirectly
hazardoustohumanhealth.
6
thatDepletetheOzoneLayer,1987).12Concernsaboutthebroaderimplicationsfortheenvironmentor
humanhealthandwelfareofthepathofscientificadvancewereviewedsomewhatfatalisticallyasthecost
ofprogress.Theyweremostlymarginaliseduntilthelate1970sand80swhenincidentssuchasozone
depletionresultingfromCFCsandtheThreeMileIsland(1979)andChernobyl(1986)nuclearaccidents
occurred.
Theactorsinthisinnovationmodelhaveacleardivisionoflabourandresponsibility.Scientistsareexpected
topursuetheadvanceofscientificunderstandingwithonlyincidentalattentiontothepotentialcommercial
valueoftheirdiscoveries13,topublishtheirworkfullydisclosingthemethodsandfindings14,andtoassume
thatthosetakinguptheirdiscoverieswillusetheminasociallyresponsiblemanner.Thepublicsectoris
expectedtofundscientificresearchgenerouslyandtoregulatesciencetoassureitsopennessandto
encourageself-regulationofscientificmisconduct(e.g.falsifyingresultsormakingunjustifiedclaims)bythe
scientificcommunity.Thepublicsectorisalsoexpectedtoofferameansforidentifyingproblemsarising
fromtheapplicationofscienceandtoreferthesetoexpertsinthescientificcommunityforevaluationand
solutions.Theroleoftheprivatesectoristotransformscientificdiscoveriesintoinnovationswhichwill
supportsustainedlongtermeconomicgrowth.Inthe1960s,itwasassumedthatthecompetencetodothis
wouldexistprimarilyinlargeincumbentcorporationswhowouldbeabletobuildtheindustrialresearch
capacitiestoperformtheappliedresearchanddevelopmenteffortsnecessarytocommercialisescientific
discovery.Towardstheendsoftheperioditbecameclearthatanewgroupofactors,newtechnologybased
firms(NTBFs)hademergedandwiththemanincreasinginterestinthenatureofentrepreneurshipand
entrepreneursthatSchumpeterhadwrittenaboutearlierinthecentury.
Framing1:PolicyPractices
Thefirstframingencouragedanexpansiveviewofthebenefitsofresearchbut,nonetheless,policy
practitionershadtonegotiatethepoliticalprocessthroughwhichresearchfundsareallocated.The
policymakerdefinitionofmissionsandmissionledresearchprogrammesdiscussedaboveweremost
apparentintheUSwhereseverallargegovernmentalDepartments(defense,energy,andhealth15)have
continuedtosponsorbasicandappliedresearchandinFrancewhereatomicenergyandmedicalresearch
epitomisedadirigisteapproachtoscientificadvance.Thepoliticaladvantageofmission-ledresearchisthat
thefundingofbasicscientificresearchcanbejustifiedintermsofitscontributiontospecificobjectives
ratherthanrelyingsolelyonthesomewhatvaguerpromisethatscienceultimately(inthelongrun)brings
prestigeorculturalbenefits.
Similarly,althoughtheunderlyingmarketfailuremodelonlyjustifiespublicinvestmentforscientificand
technologicalknowledgethatisapublicgood,theframingthatresearchisthesourceoflongtermeconomic
growthledpolicymakerstorespondfavourablytothesupportofalltypesofresearch.Thisleadtothe
creationofmanypolicyinstrumentsaimedatstimulatingR&Dincludingfavourabletaxtreatmentanddirect
subsidiesemployedhorizontallytospecificindustriestoencouragecompetition.Inaddition,nationshave
attemptedtocreatefavourablebusinessclimatesforbusinessinvestmentonthepremisethatashareofthis
investmentwouldflowtoinnovationactivities.TherecognitionofthesignificanceofNTBFsinfostering
12
TheMontrealProtocolisanexampleofincompleteregulationsinceitdidnotprovidemeasuresforsequesteringand
destroyingexistingstocksofCFCs.SoonelineofinvestigationinFraming1isregulatoryeffectivenessfromwhichideas
aboutthe‘precautionaryprinciple’follow.
13
AninterestingrevisionofthispartofthemodelwassuggestedbyStokes(1997)whosuggesteditmightbepossible
todistinguishbetweenlinesofscientificresearchwhichmightbe‘use-inspired’(e.g.Pasteur’sinvestigationsintothe
mechanismsoffermentation)fromthosethatare‘pure’(e.g.Bohr’sinvestigationofenergystatesinatoms)
14
SeeDasguptaandDavid(1994)foraninterpretationofscientificdisclosureasanalternativesystemtoappropriability
forgeneratingsocialwelfare.
15
TheunusualstructureoftheUSgovernment(comparedtocentralisedparliamentarydemocracies)severstheusual
relationshipbetweenhighereducationandsciencepolicy.IntheUS,themajorityofuniversitiesareestablishedand
financedbyindividualstatesoftheunion.TheverysubstantialincreaseinFederalfundingforresearchgreatly
benefittedseveralofthese(e.g.UniversityofCaliforniaandtheuniversitiesestablishedbytheMorrillActof1862,
whichprovidedaone-offgrantofsubstantiallandfromtheFederalgovernment)aswellasseveralleadingprivate
universities(MIT,Stanford,Harvard,ChicagoandColumbia).SeeGeiger(1993)
7
innovationledtotheideathattaxationoncapitalgainsfromtheelevationofequityvaluesshouldalso
receivefavourabletaxtreatmenttoencouragefurtherinvestmentinthesefirms.Comparisonofthelevels
ofR&Dinvestmentbetweencountriesbecameanimportantindicatorguidinggovernmentpolicywhichlater
becameanexplicitpolicyintheEuropeanUnionwiththeaspirationofachievinga3%ofGDPaverage
researchintensityacrosstheEU(EuropeanCommission,2010).
Yetwhilegovernmentsarepositiveaboutpublicfunding,almostnocountrycanaffordtodoeverythingin
scienceandtechnology.Choicesarenecessary.Thisledtothedevelopmentofmechanismsformaking
choicesbetweencompetingalternatives.Aprominentmechanismwhichdevelopedduringthe1980sand
90swastechnologyforesight(MartinandIrvine,1989).Theseactivitiesmadeitpossibletobringsocietal
considerationsintotheselectionprocess,butinpracticesupplyfactors(perceivedtechnological
opportunities)oftendominated.Foresightoffersaprocessapproachtotheselectionofprioritieswhichthen
allowsgovernmentstoleavetheresponsibilityforselectiontothecompaniesinvolvedwhichfitsthe
rationaleofaFraming1approach.
Toensurethatthedivisionoflabourbetweenscientificresearchasapublicgoodandtheprivate
appropriabilityofappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisation,policyactionstostrengthenand
extendintellectualpropertyprotectionwereundertaken.TheUShasbeenparticularlyaggressiveinthis
areawiththeestablishmentoftheCourtofAppealsfortheFederalCircuit(1982)withaprincipalremitto
reviewpatentlitigation,extensionstothepatentlifeforpharmaceuticalproducts(1984),andtakinga
leadingroleintheTradeRelatedAspectofIntellectualProperty(TRIPS)agreementincorporatedinthe1994
UruguayRoundoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT).Providingtheinputsforscienceand
innovationthrougheducationisanotherroleofgovernment.Educationforresearchcareerswasacommon
policyaimthroughoutthefirstframingperiodandhascontinuedmorerecentlywithanemphasisonSTEM
(science,technology,engineeringandmathematics)subjectsandacorrespondingre-alignmentofeducation
fundinginseveralcountries(e.g.theUK)toreflectthispriority.
Learningfrompolicypracticewasparticularlyimportantbetween1960and1990.Thepetroleumcrisisof
the1970shighlightedtherelianceofvirtuallyallcountries’dependenceontheimportofpetroleumto
operatethemassproductionanddistributiontechnologiesthatarosefromthefirstframing.Itgaverisetoa
newmissionorientedpolicyintheUSandothercountriesseekingtoreduceenergydependenceandthis
contributedtotheearlydevelopmentofrenewabletechnologies.
Framing1:AlternativeorCounterFramings
Thefirstframing’sdepictionoflargescalescientificenterprisejoinedwithlargeenterpriseorcomplexecosystemsofNTBFswasverydominantintheUSandEurope,butitposedamajorchallengeforlessdeveloped
countrieswhichlackedtheresourcestoconstructthesocio-technicalsystemthatwasrequired.Sagasti
(1980)arguedthatthiswasproducingtwocivilisations,onethatgeneratestheknowledgeandderives
principalbenefitsfromitandtheother(i.e.thedevelopingworld)seeminglypassivelyreceivingapartofthis
knowledgeandtherebyadiminishedcapacityforsovereigntyandself-determination.Inaddition,the
technologiesdevelopedbythis‘firstcivilisation’werethemselvesseenasdisadvantageous(Stewart,2008).
Thesecounter-framingofthebeneficialnatureofscientificprogressandinnovationinthedeveloped
countrycontextledtoresponsesbyscholarsandpolicymakersinthelessdevelopedcountries.Following
theearlierworkofRaulPrebisch(1950)andHansSinger(1950),adoctrineofimportsubstitutionleda
numberofcountries,particularlyinLatinAmerica,towithdrawfromthegeneraltrendtowardmoreliberal
internationaltradetariffsinordertobuildinfantindustries.Thesametypesofpolicieswereemployedin
EastAsia,perhapswithagreaterdegreeoftargetingofspecificindustriesandwithaclearintenttobuild
exportcapacityratherthanimportsubstitution.Althoughlargelyabandonedbythe1990s,manyconcluded
thatthesepolicieshadpositiveeffectsintheEastAsiancontextandsomearguedthatthesepolicieshad
positiveimpactsintheLatinAmericancontext,e.g.Colistete(2010).16DevelopmentsrelatedtoSchumacher
(1974)andStewart’s(1973)argumentcallingforanappropriatetechnologymovementattemptedto
16
Inbothareas,internationalpressureswereimportantreasonsfortheabandonmentofthepolicies.
8
harnessresearchprocessestoproducetechnologiesthatwouldbemoresuitableinthedevelopingcountry
context.17Forthemostpart,innovationscomingoutofthismovementwereveryrudimentary(e.g.better
ovensforusinglocalfuels)andgenerallyfellshortoftheexpectationthattheywouldprovidesignificant
additionstotheincomeofdevelopingcountrypeople.Nonetheless,ideasfromthissocialmovementreappearinwritingsaboutfrugalinnovation(Radjou,PrabhuandAhuja,2012),innovationfromthebottomof
thepyramid(LondonandHart,2004),andinclusiveinnovation(Chataway,HanlinandKaplinksy,2014).
Framing2–NationalSystemsofInnovation
TheemergenceofFraming2wasaresponsetotheperceivedincompletenessofthefirstframingandtothe
someoftheconsequencesofpursuingthismodel.Thepost-WorldWarIIgrowthexperiencethatcontinued
withrelativelyminorinterruptionsuntiltheoilshocksofthe1970sandtheseriousrecessionof1981(often
referredtoinEuropeasaneconomiccrisis)intensifiedcompetitionbetweencountriesandhighlighted
differencesinnationalindustryinnovativeandproductiveperformance.Italsobecamemoreapparent
duringthe1980sthattheconvergencebetweenhigherandlowerincomecountrieswasoccurringatamuch
slowerratethancouldbeexplainedusingthefirstframe’spremisethatscientificandtechnological
knowledgewasaglobalpublicgood–inprinciple,availabletoeveryoneintheworld.Anexplanationofthis
stateofaffairs,consistentwiththefirstframing,wasthattherichercountrieswereholdingbackscientificor
technologicalknowledge,therebyexcludingothercountriesfromutilisingthisknowledgetoengageina
catching-upprocess.18ThisideawascontestedbySoete(1985)whoobservedthattheindustrialstructureof
technologybasedcompaniesoftencontainedsmallerormediumsizedfirmsthatwereableandwillingto
selltechnologies(e.g.licensepatents,selladvancedcapitalgoods,orbeacquiredatpriceslowerthanthe
implicitcostsofreproducingtheirtechnologies).
TheseconundrumsintheapplicationofFraming1ledscholarstore-examinethelinearmodelofinnovation
thatunderlaythisframing.Fourimportantmodificationswereindicated.First,ratherthanaglobalpublic
good,itwasrecognisedthatscientificandtechnologicalknowledgeoftencontainedimportanttacit
elements.Theknowledgedidnotfreelytravelovergeographicalandculturaldistances,butinsteadwas
sticky(VonHippel,1994).Second,theabilitytoabsorbknowledgefromtheworldwidenetworkofresearch
andresearchersdependsonabsorptivecapabilities(CohenandLevinthal,1989)whichrequireprior
experienceinrelatedresearchandapplication.Third,‘absorptivecapacities’wereoneofarangeofsocial
capabilitiesthatstemmednotonlyfromthelevelofeducationbutalsoitsqualitiesandthesocialcapability
ofentrepreneurship.19Fourth,thecharacteroftechnologicalchangewasrecognisedasbeingcumulative
andpath-dependent(David,1975;Arthur,1983).Abalanceexistedbetweenmajordisruptiveinnovations
thatalterthetrajectoriesofsearchandimprovement,andcumulativeinnovationsthatreinforceand
strengthenexistingmethods,ofteninwaysthatraiseimportantbarrierstonewtechnologiesthatmightbe
more,ormorerapidly,disruptivethanwithoutthesecumulativeimprovements.Thesemodificationswere
seenascomplementarytothegrowingempiricalrecognitionthatinnovationisofteninitiatedbyusers(von
Hippel,1988)orthroughfeedbacksamongappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisationactivities
inwhatKlineandRosenbergtermedachainlinkmodelofinnovation(KlineandRosenberg,1986).
Thesemodificationsoftheunderlyingmodelofinnovationsuggestedthatimportantinternational
differencesmightexistinthecapacitytoinnovateandfocussedattentionontheprocessesoflearningand
therelationbetweendifferentorganisationsinasociety.Freeman(1988)andLundvall(1992)employedthe
termnationalsystemsofinnovation.Thenationalsystemsofinnovationapproachdirectedattentiontothe
17
SeealsoKaplinsky(2011).
Gerschenkron(1962)hadhighlightedtheadvantagesofeconomicbackwardnessforrapideconomicgrowthbynoting
thepotentialforlargeincrementstoproductivityandoutputbyadoptingtechniqueswellknowninwealthier
economies.Duringthe1960sand1970stherehadbeenconsiderableoptimismconcerningtheprospectsfor
‘technologytransfer’asakeycomponentofdevelopmentstrategy.
19
Thepromotionofentrepreneurshipisoftenastandinforpro-businessandanti-governmentpoliticalsentiments(i.e.
thefavouringofprivateratherthanpubliccollectiveaction).However,italsoreflectssocialnormsregardingtaking
initiativeanddepartingfromexistingpracticesofteninvolvingthebuildingofnewbusinesses.
18
9
variousconfigurationsoforganisationsconcernedwiththegenerationandutilisationofscientificand
technologicalknowledge.Centraltothisideawasthatsomeconfigurationsmightbemuchmoreeffective
thanothers.Thus,thesemightcontributesubstantiallytotheexplanationofwhyveryunevenratesof
productiveandinnovativeperformancewereobservablethroughouttheworld.Inparticular,Freeman
(1988)suggestedthatJapanhadmadeimportantorganisationalinnovationsinthegenerationandutilisation
oftechnologicalknowledgewhichexplaineditsabilitytocatchupandovertakecompaniesinadvanced
manufacturingsectorssuchasautomobilesandtelevisions.
IntheversionofnationalsystemsofinnovationofferedbyFreeman(1987,1988),thesesystemshada
nationalcharacter,reflectingdifferencesininstitutionsandpolicies.InLundvall(1985,1988),thecentrality
ofcapabilitiesforlearningwasadditionallyemphasisedasanationalcharacteristicthatappliedtocountrybasedorganisations.Thejustificationforageographic-politicalboundingofthesesystemswastwofold:
institutionsandpoliciesarelargelyestablishedatanationallevelandknowledgedoesnottraveleasily
outsidethesocio-culturalmilieuinwhichitiscreated.Furtherdifferentiationofsystemsofinnovation
thinkinginvolvedanemphasisonthe‘stickiness’ofknowledgesuggestingregionalsystemsofinnovationor,
alternatively,cognitivealignmentcreatedbycommonparticipationinanindustryanditstechnological
problemsregardlessofnationality,leadingtosectoralsystemsofinnovation.20
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention
Thesocio-historicalcontextofthesystemsofinnovationliteratureisimportant.Itaroseinanattemptto
explaintheinsurgenceofEastAsianeconomies,firstJapan,thenthefour‘tigers’(Taiwan,Korea,Singapore,
andHongKong)and,mostrecently,China.Onewayofthinkingaboutthishistoricalcontextistofocuson
thefurtherdevelopmentoftheinternationalisationoftradeandfinancethatwasoccurringinthelattertwo
decadesofthe20thcentury–thebeginningsofprocesseswhicharenowcollectivelyreferredtoas
globalisation.21
Fromaneoliberaleconomicperspective,globalisationisseenasthespreadofaninternationalsystemof
liberaltradeandinvestmentcreatingthebasisforinternationalcompetitionand,hence,efficiencyin
productionanddistribution.22However,thereareimportantqualificationstothepositiveinterpretationsof
thisperspective–theprocessesofglobalisationsimultaneouslyhaveallowedmillionsofpeopletoimprove
theirmaterialwellbeingandimpoverishedmillionsofothers.Whilemanyofthelessdevelopedeconomies
havemademajorstridesintotalnationalincome,thedistributionofthisincomewithincountrieshas,in
manycasesworsened,andthegapbetweentheincomeoftherichernationsandthepoorestnationshas
widened(Keeley,2015;vanZanden,Baten,d’Ercoleetal.,2014).FromtheperspectivesharedbyFraming1
and2,growthofoutputandemploymentisofcentralimportanceinthefutureeconomicwelfareof
countriesandtheircitizens.Fallingbehindingrowthraisesthespectreofdeclineandadownwardspiralin
whichacountrybecomeslessabletocompeteininternationalmarketsand,becauseofincreasingimports,
tomaintaindomesticmarketsintradedgoods.Acentralrationaleforgovernmentinterventionisthe
maintenanceofcompetitiveness–agoaloftenstatedinmercantilisttermsasbecomingevermore
competitiveinordertostimulatecontinuousgrowththroughexportswhilepreservingadominantsharein
domesticproductionfordomesticconsumption.23Inmanycountries,thedisplacementsstemmingfrom
globalisationhaveproducedapoliticalcompetitivenessagendatheeconomiclogicofwhichis,atbest,
questionable(Krugman,1994).
20
ThevarietiesofsystemsideasisexaminedinEdquist(1997).
Amongthemanydevelopmentsaccompanyingglobalisationistheincreaseintheinternationalmovementofgoods.
Ameasureoftheintensificationofglobalisationisthegrowthofcontainerisedshippingoverthelast20yearswhichhas
grownfrom40millionto180millionTEU(twentyfootequivalentunit)(UNCTAD,2015:19)
22
TheliberalperspectiveisexemplifiedbyFriedman(2005)
23
Ofcourse,thisraisesthesameproblemswitheconomicsustainabilitythatSmith(1960[1776])observedwithregard
toearliermercantilistpracticesandthatledthenandinthefollowing150yearstoperiodicepisodesoftariffincreases
andbreakdownsininternationaltrade.
21
10
Thenationalinnovationsystemapproachiscomplementarytoacompetitivenessagenda,basedupontrade
advantageratherthannationalprestigeormilitarypower.Advocatesofthisagenda(whichremains
influentialtoday)arguethatinnovationbroadlyrequiresgovernmentinterventioneithertopreserveorto
expandthecompetitiveadvantageofdomesticfirms.Therationaleofthecompetitivenessagendaretainsa
Framing1perspectivetotheextentthatinterventionsarelimitedtopre-competitiveresearch,i.e.the
creationofknowledgeupstreamofproductdesign.Thislimitationislargelyduetoconcernsaboutstate
supportorquasi-mercantilistpolicieswhichwereproscribedtocreatealevelplayingfieldininternational
tradecompetition.Anumberofscholarshavearguedfor(Graham,1994)andagainst(CohenandNoll,1991)
thisextensionofstateactors.IntheEntrepreneurialState,Mazzucato(2013)focussesontheneedfora
Framework2systemsapproachthatfocussesontherolehighlevelrisk-taking(beinganinvestoroffirst
resort)thatdifferentpublicorganisationshaveplayedinregionsthathavesucceededinachieving‘smart’
innovation-ledgrowth.Inlookingforward,shearguesthatrewardsfromsuccessesinthisprocessshouldbe
sharedasequitablyastheriskstaken.AkeycontributionofMazzucatoistodrawattentiontothe
shortcomingsoftheinnovationsystemsfocusontheinteractionbetweenthemultipleactorswithout
questioningthenatureoftheactorsthemselves.Inparticular,theproblematicwaythatthepublicsectorhas
beentheorisedhasledtoinnovationpolicieswhichsetafirstpriorityonthegenerationofnewknowledge
andassumethattheprocessesofcommercialisationanddiffusionwillbesuccessfullyaddressedby
commercialincentives.Thiscallsattentiontothepossibilityofsystemicfailureiffinancialisationhasledto
theabsenceofpatientfinanceandtoexclusionofthepublicbenefitandhencegreaterinequalitybecause
theleadrisktakingroleofthepublicsectorhasbeenignored.Ineffect,thisprocesssocialisesrisksinorder
toprivatiserewards.
Intermsofthegovernanceofpolicyinterventions,Framing2suggeststhedesirabilityofalliancesand
coordinationamongtheactorswithintheinnovationsystemtoavoidsystemfailure–thelackof
cooperationandcoordination.Avarietyofothersystemfailuresispossibleincludingcapturebyvested
interestsofgovernmentpoliciesaimedatfacilitatingresearchandinnovationandthecreationofcartels
underthebannerofimprovedresearchcooperationandcoordination.Inthisframing,theseshouldbe
relegatedtothe,oftenseparate,regulatoryministriesoragenciesofnationalgovernmentswhich,duetothe
competitivenessagendaoftenhavebeenunwillingtoactagainstdomesticconcentrationsofeconomic
powerduetofearsoflossofcompetitivenessinrelationtootherlargemultinationalcompanies.24
Framing2:InnovationModelandActors
Despiteitsinclusionofawiderangeofactorswhoareseenashavingagencytoimproveinnovationsystems,
Framing2sustainsthegovernmentandproducer-centricperspectiveofFraming1.Althoughusersare
specificallyidentifiedasapossiblesourceofinnovationinthemodelofinnovationunderlyingFraming2,and
user-producerrelationsareseenaskey,theagencyofuserstoaffectthedirectionornatureofinnovation
generallyhasnotbeenconsideredasamatterforpolicy,andusersarenotmobilisedorperceivedas
innovativeactors.
TheunderlyingmodelofinnovationinFraming2,however,wasfundamentallyrevisedwithimportant
implicationsforpolicypractice.Itmovedawayfromalinearunderstandingofinnovationtowardsamore
interactivemodelasisexemplifiedbythechain-linkedmodel.AkeyrelevantworkdistinguishedaMode1
andMode2structureofknowledgeproductionsimilartoourtwoframings(Gibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyet
al.,1994).ThisworkdistinguishedfivefeaturesofMode2knowledgeproduction:1)knowledgeis
increasinglyproducedinthecontextofapplication,252)transdisciplinarity,themergingor‘inter-penetration’
24
Forexample,in1999,theUSrepealedtheGlassSteagallAct(1933)whichhadregulatedconcentrationofbanksdue
totheexistenceoflargeforeignbanks.Somehavearguedthatthiscontributedtothesubsequentproblemsindealing
withtheUS-initiatedbankingcrisisandglobalrecessionof2008althoughthisremainscontroversial.
25
AccordingtoGibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.(1994)knowledgeproductionwasbecomingmore‘sociallydistributed’
andhad‘transcendedthemarket’(p.4)althoughtheirworkcontinuestofocusondistinctionsbetweenuniversityand
industryproducersofknowledgewithonlyanobliquereference(p.37)tovonHippel(1976,1988)that‘thepresenceof
potentialbuyersandusersdirectlyinthecontextsofdevelopmentinfluencethedirectionthatinnovativelinesof
11
ofdisciplinaryframeworkstoproducenewcommonframeworksforresearchinthecontextofapplication
(p.29),3)heterogeneityandorganisationaldiversity,reflectingtheincreasingdiversityofactorsinvolvedin
knowledgeproduction,4)socialaccountabilityandreflexivity,involvingawiderrangeofexpertsinthe
researchprocesstoaccommodateethicalandenvironmentalconcerns26,and5)qualitycontrol,the
observationthattraditionaldisciplinarypeerreviewofwhatconstitutesgoodsciencebecomesmore
complexasknowledgeisproducedinthecontextofapplicationratherthanwithinestablisheddisciplines
andtheirself-referentialnorms.Gibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.(1994)suggestedtheneedfor
institutionalreformwithparticularattentiontotherelationshipsbetweendirectgovernmentresearch
efforts(e.g.inpublicresearchlaboratories),industrialresearchanduniversityresearchtostimulatethe
creationofnetworkstofacilitatecoordinationandcooperation.Thisfocusoninstitutionallinksand
interactionsresonatesverywellwithFraming2,thenationalsystemofinnovationapproach.
ArelatedlineofresearchandpolicyadvocacywithinFraming2hasbeenpresentedusingthetermTriple
Helix(EtzkowitzandLeydesdorff,1997;Etzkowitz,1998,2008)–thelabelreferstotheincreasinglyintertwinednatureofgovernment,industry,anduniversityresearchefforts.SimilartoGibbons,Limoges,
Nowotnyetal.(1994),scholarsparticipatingintriple-helixstudieshavesoughttomapandanalysethenew
formsofcooperationemergingbetweeninstitutions,toconsiderprocessesofgovernancethatalignthe
interestsofthesedifferentinstitutionsandtoprovideguidancetoeachtypeofinstitutionastohowthey
mightenactreformsthatwouldmakenationalsystemsofinnovationfunctionmoreeffectively.An
importantelementoftriple-helixresearchhasbeenthepremisethatuniversitiesshouldbecomemore
entrepreneurial,fosteringnewcompanyformationthroughspin-offsandlicensingtechnologyproduced
throughuniversityresearch.
Thedifficultiesintransferringknowledgebetweenlocationsprovokedare-examinationofgeographical
localisationeffects(Gertler,2001).Initialstudieshighlightedtheexistenceofindustrialclusters(Castellsand
Hall,1994)suggestingpoliciesaimingtoconcentrateactivitiesofaparticulartype,e.g.theMalaysian
multimediacorridor(Bunnell,2002).However,laterstudiesfoundthatgovernanceissueswereofcritical
importanceanddifficulttoreproduce(Cooke,2001)andthatproximityinseveraldifferentsenseshadthe
potentialfordetrimentalaswellaspositiveeffects(Boschma,2005).
Aparallellineofinvestigationfocussedontheeffectsofcognitiveproximityandalignmentandparticularly
onthesignificanceofthecumulativenatureoftechnologicalchange.Fromthisperspective,knowledgeis
acquiredthroughsituatedlearningratherthanfromthetransmissionandreceiptofinformation.An
influentialcontributioninthisareasuggestedthatorganisationalandsocietalarrangementsforimproving
learningthroughexperienceandinteractionarecentralingeneratingandutilisingknowledge(Lundvall,
1985,1988,1992).IntheKoreancontext,LinSuKimalsomademajorcontributionsindicatinghowlearning
couldbeusedeffectivelyinacatchingupcontext(Kim,1999).
Intermsofactorsandinnovation,Framing2reflectsperceivedchangesintheprocessesbywhichapplicable
knowledgeisgeneratedandexchanged.RatherthanbeingalinearflowfromsciencetoappliedR&Dto
commercialisation,knowledgeisgeneratedthroughinteractionamongthe(morediverse)actorsinnational,
sectoralandregionalinformationsystems.Theseinteractionsinvolveaprocessofinteractivelearningand
thebuildingofcapabilitiestoabsorbandadaptknowledge,ofteninfluencedbyphysicalandcognitive
proximity.Fortheseprocessestobeeffective,alignmentoftheseactors’objectivesandcapacitiesfor
interactionisnecessary.Withinthismodel,considerableattentionispaidtoexemplarssuchasSiliconValley
(Kenney,2000)orRoute128(Saxenian,1996)intheUSortheCambridgeshireareaofEngland(Garnseyand
Heffernan,2005).Thereis,however,littleconsensusastohowthismodelmightbeinfluencedbypolicy.
researchwilltake.’Infact,vonHippeldocumentsinthesetwoworksthatitwasuserswhoweredirectlyresponsible
formanymajorinnovationsinthescientificinstrumentandotherfields.
26
ThisforeshadowsourdiscussionoftheseissuesinFraming3.ThediscussionofthisinGibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyet
al.,(1994)(pp.7-8andinbriefreferencethroughoutthework)suggeststhatmechanismsofaccountabilityand
institutionsforreflexivitywerealreadyinplace.However,almostnoevidenceisofferedforthisconclusion
12
Framing2:PolicyPractices
Thelackofacademicconsensusregardingtherelativeeffectivenessofdifferenttypesofinterventionsbased
onaFraming2perspectivehasledtoconsiderablevarietyinactualpolicypractices.Centralgovernments
haveundertakensubstantialeffortstobuildtechnopoles(e.g.SophiaAntipolisinFrance(Longhi,1999))and
sciencehubs(e.g.TsukubusciencecityinJapan(Tatsuno,1986).Regionalauthoritieshaveattemptedtorevitaliseareasbymakinginvestmentsinnewtechnologybasedfirms,e.g.ResearchTriangleinNorthCarolina,
US(LinkandScott,2003).Theseeffortshavehadmixedsuccessandthetimehorizonforsuccessfulnational
orregionaldevelopmentappearstobeverylongrelativetothetenureofpoliticaldecisionmakerswho
initiatesuchplans.
Policiesthataimtoimprovethecoordinationandalignmentamongdifferentactorsininnovationsystems
havebeenundertakeninmanycountries.Theseofteninvolvefundingconditionality,e.g.researchfunding
ontheconditionofparticipationwithotherorganisationsinanetwork.Suchconditionalfundinghasbeen
appliedtouniversity,corporate,andpublicresearchlaboratoryfunding.Exemptionsfromcompetition
policyguidelineslimitingmeetingsandcollaborationsamongfirmsinspecificindustrieshavealsobeen
enactedinordertoencourageresearchnetworkformation.Foresighthasalsobeenusedandadvocatedasa
toolforbettercommunication,moreeffectivecoordination,developmentofconsensusandgenerationof
commitment(MartinandJohnston,1999).
OneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofFraming2isthegreaterroleascribedtoagencyascomparedto
Framing1and,accompanying,thisisagreaterinterestinentrepreneurship.Thenatureoftheentrepreneur
wasacentralissueinthewritingsofSchumpeter(Schumpeter,1947,1949).However,itwasnotuntilthe
1980sthataspecificfocusonpoliciescultivatingentrepreneurshipinvolvingtheformationandgrowthof
newfirms,particularlythoseinvolvingtheuseofnewtechnologiesstartedtobeacentralconcernofpolicy.
Promotionofnewtechnologybasedfirms(NTBFs)27sitsuneasilywithneoliberalviewsoftheefficacyof
marketsandwhichsuggestsfirmsizeisirrelevanttothedegreeornatureofinnovativeness(Kulickeand
Krupp,1987).However,whenissuesofagencyareconsideredexplicitly,thefocusanddriveofsuchfirms,
alongwiththepersonalitiesoftheirentrepreneurialfounders,suggestsareasonforspecialconsiderationof
thesetypesoffirmsingovernmentpromotionpolicies.Suchpoliciesalsoreflectthegrowingconcernfor
employmentandtheassociatedobservationthatsmallandmediumsizedfirms(SMEs)comprisethe
majorityofemploymentinmosteconomies.Althoughinmanycontexts,thisismoreofaproblemthanan
advantage(SMEsgenerallydonothavetheresourcesormarketpresencetoengageinR&Dorthelarge
scalepromotionofnewtechnologiesandoftenhavelowerlevelsofproductivitythantheirlargerrivals),the
identifyingfeatureofNTBFsistheirpioneeringofnewtechnologies,someofwhichproducerapidgrowthin
employmentandoutput.NTBFsalsocontributetothelargernationalsystemofinnovationbycreatinga
greaterdegreeofdiversificationandspecialisation,enablinglargerfirmstoselectfromapopulationoffirms
withmanymorenewideasthanmightbeproducedsolelythroughinternalR&Dprocesses.
Framing2alsosuggestsarenewedpolicyfocusontheissuesoftechnologicaldiffusionortakeup.The
systemsapproachemphasisestheconnectionbetweensupplyanddemandwhichistakentobemediatedby
non-marketaswellasmarketprocesses.Manymoderntechnologiesinvolvecoordinationbetweenfirmsin
sectorssuchasaerospace,electronics,COPS(complexproductsandsystems,suchasflightsimulators)and
zeronetcarbonemissionbuildingsinvolvingnotonlysubstantialscientificandtechnologicalknowledge;but
knowledgethatisdistributedacrossawiderangeofspecialisedfirms.Inorderforthesesectorstodevelop
andflourishtherelationshipwiththeircustomersneedtobesufficientlystabletosupportinvestmentwhile
thenetworksoffirmscomprisingthesesectorsneedtobeadequatelycoordinated.Issuesofdemandand
coordinationwereoftenaddressedhistoricallythroughgovernmentprocurement.Whilegovernment
procurementremainsimportant,privatesectordemandfortheproductsandservicesofthesesectorshas
increaseddramatically(inpartduetotheprivatisationofpreviousgovernmententerprisesin
telecommunicationsandtransport).Privatisationnotonlyintroducesmarkets,italsorestructuresthenonmarketrelationswithinthesesectors.Governmentshaveachoicewhethertheserestructuringsare
27
Asadescriptivecategory,NTBFsalreadyexistedinreviewsofindustrialperformance.
13
conductedinalaissezfairefashionorinvolvearoleforgovernmentregulation,promotion,and
interventions.28
GovernmentpolicypracticesintheFraming2involveeducationandtrainingoftheworkforcewiththeaim
ofsupportingtheabsorptivecapacitiesoffirmsandotherorganisations.Absorptivecapacityisoneof
severaltypesofnon-marketcapabilitiesthatbecomevisiblewhentheanalysisofknowledgegenerationand
distributionisdeepenedbeyondthelinearmodelembodiedinFraming1.29Indevelopingeconomies,the
appropriatedirectionofeducationalandskillstrainingpoliciesofteninvolvestheachievementofparticular
instrumentalskillsinscienceandtechnologyandanengagementwithpost-colonialortraditionalheritages
thearedifficulttoreconcilewithaspirationsfordevelopmentandidentityinacontemporaryworld(Freire,
1970).Intheindustrialisedeconomies,thereisacontinuingtensionbetweenlaissezfaireeducationpolicies
andskillsandlabourforcedevelopmentpoliciesthatprovidegreaterresourcesforparticulartypesof
education(e.g.USpoliciesundertheNationalDefenseEducationAct(1958)orvariousreformsoftheUK
educationsystemaimedatproductivityandskillsattainment(MachinandVignoles,2015)).
Framing2:AlternativeorCounterFramings
Thenationalsystemsofinnovationandrelated(sectoralandregional)frameworksarestructuredaround
knowledgesharingandcollaborationamongorganisationsemployingprofessionalresearchers.A
consequenceofthisisthatthebroadersocietaldiscussionoftechnologicaloptionsanddirectionsisnot
integratedintotheoperationofnetworks,evenwhenthesenetworksareestablishedastheresultof
governmentintervention.Ineffect,thenationalsystemofinnovationframingcontinuesthetechnocratic
politicsoftheinnovationforgrowthframing(Framing1).Bothframings,ascommonlyemployedinpolicy
discussion,shareanimplicitunderstandingthatthereisasinglebestpathforscientificandtechnological
development.Thispathmightbeinflectedbyethicalorenvironmentalconstraints,butthereisnota
multiplicityofpathsorcriteriabywhichtoevaluationscientificandtechnologicaldevelopments.The
alternativeorcounterframing,anelementofFraming3,isthereforeonethatexplicitlyintroduces
participatoryanddemocraticprocessesthatareempoweredtoidentifyalternativesandtoinfluenceortake
decisionsregardingthesealternatives.
Thisalternativeframingsuggeststheneedtoopenupprocessofchoicetomarginalisedactorstoprovide
themavoiceandinfluenceoverwhatpathsarefollowedinresearchanditsfunding.Thisissuehasbeen
takenupmorerecentlybyDutrénitandSutz(2014),Lundvall,Joseph,Chaminadeetal.(2009)andothers
whodrawonanationalsystemofinnovationapproach,butaskwhythisapproachgiveslittleattentionto
theproblemsofdevelopingcountries.Theircentralconcernisthatthenationalsystemofinnovation
approachisleadingtosocialexclusion,andtheystress,theneedforparticipatoryapproachessoasto
democratiseknowledgeproduction(DutrénitandSutz,2014).Thecallformoreandwiderparticipationis
alsopresentincriticismsanddebatesinEuropeandtheUS.Ithasledtosuggestionsforpolicypracticesuch
asConstructiveTechnologyAssessment,InteractiveTechnologyAssessmentandParticipatoryTechnology
Designtohelpintheidentificationofoptionsandconsequencestoexistingtrajectoriesofdevelopmentand
change(Rip,T..J.MisaandSchot,1995)
Summary
Asnotedearlier,framesarepersistent.Thefirstframingofscienceandtechnologypolicy,basedonthe
premisesthatscienceisthebasisforlongtermeconomicgrowth,andthatinnovationlargelyinvolvesthe
commercialisationofscientificdiscovery,ispresentincontemporarydiscussions.Manyofthepolicy
28
Apurelaissezfaireapproachisraresincegovernmentstypicallyremaininvolvedinissuessuchasstandardisationand
regulationaswellasbeingmajorcustomersintherestructuredsectors.
29
Capabilitiesfornetworkingincludingsupplierandvaluechainmanagement,marketdevelopmentandknowledge
managementareotherexamplesofsuchnon-marketcapabilities.Althoughsomepartsofthesecapabilitiescanbe
acquiredthroughmarkettransactions,thechoicesinvolvedinthesetransactionsthemselvesrequirecapabilitieswithin
thefirmororganisation.
14
practicesdevelopedwithinthisframingoftheissuesarestillpracticedalthoughsomehavebeensubjectto
modificationascompetingframingsofeconomicpolicysuchasneoliberalismhavesoughttolimitstateaid
andtofavourmarketovercollectiveactioningovernmentpoliciesmoregenerally,includinginnovation
policy.Representativesofthescientificcommunitycommonlyarguethattheindependenceofmembersof
thiscommunitytopursuecuriositydrivenresearchisaprimevalueandisresponsibleforprofoundly
importantinnovations,aperspectivethatisconsistentwiththefirstframing.AmongthoseNTBFs
establishedinthemiddleofthe1970sand1980sthathavesurvived,somehavegrownintomajor
multinationalcorporationsalthoughmanyofthesearelocatedintheinformationandcommunication
technology(ICT)sector.WhiletheICTsectorhascontributedconsiderablytoeconomicgrowthitdoesnot,
itself,employpeopleinproportiontoitsturnover.30
Scientificdiscoveriesclearlyremainimportantinopeningnewopportunitiesforeconomicgrowthalthough
contemporaryunderstandingoftheresearchprocesssuggeststhat,inadditiontotheheroicentrepreneur,
manyresearcheffortsinvolvelargeteamsandinter-organisationalcoordination,featuresthatarelargely
outsidethefirstframingwhichisnotmuchconcernedwiththeorganisationalstructureofresearch
processes.ImportantexceptionstothisincludeLangrish,Gibbons,Evansetal.,(1972)andSPRU’sProject
Sappho(CurnowandMoring,1968).Thesereflectionsonpolicypracticestemmingfromthefirstframing
haveledtoquestionsaboutthefocusonR&D.Itwasarguedthatitisimportanttolookathowtheresults
ofresearcheffortsareusedandabsorbedintheeconomy.Thesecondframingemergedaimedatboosting
theabsorptivecapacitybyentrepreneursandthroughinstitutionallinkages.
Overtimeithasbecomeclearthattheprocessesoftechnologicalchangeareuneveninbothtimeandspace.
Clustersofinnovationsthatrestructureparticularsectorshavebeencharacterisedasdisruptiveormajor
innovationsbecauseoftheireffectsonincumbentfirmsandjobs.Althoughthegeneraloptimismsuggested
bythefirstandsecondframingsregardingthesocialwelfareimpactsofthesechangesprevailedthroughout
the20thcentury,theextentofincomeinequalityinhighincomecountrieshasincreased.Anumberof
middleincomecountriesappeartobetrappedintorelianceonnaturalresourcebasedgrowthandtrade,
andalthoughtheBRICgroup(Brazil,Russia,IndiaandChina)isapartialexception,manylowerincome
countrieshavemadelittleprogressincatchingup.Allofthesedevelopmentssuggestthatthefirstand
secondframingsareunsatisfactoryforavarietyofactorsandareparticularlyfocussedonarelativelylimited
periodofhistoricaldevelopment(thelatterhalfofthe20thcentury).Duringthis,periodparticularcountries
emergedasleadersinscience-basedgrowth,eventhoughwithinthesecountriesincomedisparitiesoften
remainedlarge.Inaddition,theclimatechangeeffectsofgreenhousegasemissions,theenvironmental
effectsofthevolumeofhouseholdandindustrialwaste,andotherexternalitiesproducedbythepatternof
growthenvisagedinthefirstframinghavesuggestedthattheregulatorymodelboltedontothebasic
innovationmodelisunabletoaddresstheseexternalities.Itisnotonlytherateoftechnologicalchange,but
itsdirectionwhichisenergyandmaterialintensive,andnotinclusiveenough.Thesefeaturesarenoteasily
encompassedinthefirstandsecondframings.
Framing3:TransformativeChange
Overthelastdecades,scienceandtechnologyhavecometobeframedasstrategicresourcesforindustry
andgovernment.Investinginthemwouldboosteconomicgrowth,evengreeneconomicgrowth,andhelpto
reduceinequality.Thebenefitsofthisgrowtharetobere-investedinscienceandtechnology.Whether
thesepositivebenefitshappendependsonstateinterventionsincegovernmentshavetoensurethatclean
technologiesreceiveahighpriorityandfairerincomedistributionmeasuresneedtobetaken.Stimulating
R&Dandbuildingnationalsystemsofinnovationmightbeameansofgainingcompetitiveadvantageinthe
shorttermandinthelongrunifgovernmentscontinuetoinvestintherightdirection.However,thisisonly
sowhenweassumenation-states,despiteglobalisation,havethepowertodirectscienceandtechnology,
30
TheICTsectorclearlystimulatesbothjobcreationanddestructioninothersectors.Forexample,directdial
telephoneshavelargelyeliminatedthejobofbeingatelephoneoperatorwhilethisandrelatedtechnologieshaveled
tothecreationof‘callcentres’whichemployverysubstantialnumbersof‘operators.’
15
areinthepositiontoorganizethedistributionfunctioninanadequateway,andarenotcapturedand/or
corruptedbyotherinterests.Thepotentialerosionofthepowerofnation-states,however,isnotthemain
challenge.Amorefundamentalchallengeisthenatureoftheinnovationprocessitself.
Science,technologyandinnovationpoliciesareoftenbasedontheassumptionthatinnovationisaforcefor
creatingabetterworld.31Theideaisthatdevelopingnewtechnologieswillleadtopositiveoutcomesand
thatremainingexternalitiescanbemanagedthroughregulation.Itisrecognizedthattechnology
developmentmightleadtosomebadoutcomesintheshortterm,suchasunemploymentinsectors
experiencingrapidtechnicalchange,butinthelongtermeveryonewillbenefitsincenewhighqualityjobs
willbegenerated.ItwasforthisreasonthatSchumpeterregardedtechnicalchangeasaprocessofcreative
destruction.AsSoete(2013),however,remindsus,innovationmayalsoleadtodestructivecreation,
benefitingthefewattheexpenseofthemany,leadingtolowqualityjobs,andcreatingmoreproblemsthan
itsolves.Manytechnologiesaredeeplyimplicatedinasetofpersistentenvironmentalproblems.They
contributetothecurrentresource-intensive,wastefulandfossilfuelbasedparadigmofmassproductionand
massconsumption(Meadows,RandersandMeadows,2004;Bardi,2011;Steffenandetal,2015).
Thedoublesocialandenvironmentalchallengeforscience,technologyandinnovationpolicyisnowbeing
recognizedbymanygovernmentsandotheractors.ThroughinitiativessuchasHorizon2020,theEUexpects
innovationtoaddressanumberofwell-chosensocietalchallengesandithasalsoembracedthenotionof
ResponsibleResearchandInnovation(RRI).32The2015LundDeclarationexplicitlyprioritisestraininganew
generationofresearcherswhowillhavetheskillstoaddressgrandsocietalchallengesunderpinnedbyan
excellentresearchbase.33AlsothenewlysigneduniversalParisclimatechangeagreementhassetthe
ambitiousgoaltoreachzeronetcarbonemissionsinthesecondhalfofthecentury,andtheUnitedNations
(2015)hasformulated17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),callingforgreenerproduction,increased
socialjustice,afairerdistributionofwelfare,sustainableconsumptionpatternsandnewwaysofproducing
economicgrowth.
Notwithstandingthisshiftinemphasis,manyscience,technologyandinnovationpoliciesarestillbasedon
the20thcenturysupply-driveninnovationmodelwhichtakescompetitionbetweennationsandsupportfor
R&Dandnationalsystemsofinnovation(Framings1and2)asthemainentrypointsforpolicymaking.
Thinkingcreativelyabouthowinnovationcoulddirectlyaddressenvironmentalchallengesaswellasthe
additionalissueofsocialchallengesisrarelypresent.Evenifpoliciesstarttobeaimedataddressingthese
challenges,asmanygovernmentsarepresentlydoing,itisunclearhowtoimplementsuchpolicies(see
KuhlmannandRip,2014).
Itisclearthatdeliveringontheeconomic,environmentalandsocialchallenges,thethreepillarsof
sustainabledevelopment,willneedafundamentalchangeinthesocio-technicalsystemsforfood,energy,
material,mobility,healthcare,andcommunicationprovision.Innovationpolicyfortransformativechange
needsthereforetofocusmuchlessonproducts,processes,firms,andR&D,butontheachievementof
systemswidetransformations,sinceoptimizationofexistingsystemswillnotbeasufficientanswer(OECD,
2015).TherequiredsystemswidetransformationmightbecalledaSecondDeepTransition(Schot,2016;
SchotandKanger,2016).Thetransitionisdeepbecauseitinvolveschangingasetofdeeplyembedded
directionssharedamongseveralsocio-technicalsystems.Thesedirectionshaveledtohighlevelsofwealth
andwelfareinanumberofcountries,butalsohaveleftmanypeopleinthedevelopingworldbehindand
currentlyarecontributingtowardsincreasedinequalitywithintherichandhighlyinnovativecountriesas
well.Theyalsoleadtoincreasingresourceintensity,carbonlock-in,andsevereecologicaldegradation.
ThesedirectionswerecreatedduringtheFirstDeepTransitiontoindustrialmodernity.Themagnitudeof
socialandtechnicalchangesrequiredforaSecondDeepTransitionimpliesenteringanewphaseinthe
historyofindustrialization,industrialcapitalismandperhapsevenmodernityifthisthirdframingistotake
hold..
31
Exceptionsincludemilitarysecuritywheretheoperativegoalisbetterstatedasavoidingworsestatesoftheworld.
EuropeanCommission,KI-31-12-921-EN-C
33
https://www.ukro.ac.uk/authoring/researcher/Documents/151215_lund_declaration.pdf
32
16
Theactionsneededforsystemwidetransformationcanbetranslatedintonewpublicmissions,yetthiswill
notbesufficient.Thisisbecausepublicinvestmentonitsownwillnotbringaboutthenecessarysystem
transformation(KuhlmannandRip,2014;Foray,MoweryandNelson,2012).Missionorientedpoliciesmay
evenbecounter-productiveifthemissionsarenotformulatedinanopen-endedwaythatencourages
creativityanddiversity.Systemstransformationrequiresabroadchangeprocesswhichgivesthe
developmentofthesesystemsnewdirectionsaimedataddressingsocialandenvironmentalchallenges.In
thisframing,itisimportanttoconsiderhowtocombinetechnologypushanddemandpullinstrumentsand
toconsiderpolicymixesratherthansinglepolicyinstrumentssoastoachievepolicycoordinationacross
government(KivimaaandKern,2016;RoggeandReichardt,2016).
MorerecentworkbyMazzucato(2015;2016)haslookedatthebroaderimplicationsformissionoriented
investments,innotjustfixingmarketorsystemfailures,butinactivelyshapingandcreatingmarkets.Her
workhasfocussedonthepossibleuseofmission-orientedthinkingtoconsiderbigproblemsaroundsocietal
challenges,fromclimatechangetoageing(MazzucatoandPerez,2015;MazzucatoandJacobs,2016;).
BuildingonherworkontheEntrepreneurialState(2013),shefocusesontheorganisationaldimensionsthat
arerequiredforpublicorganisationstosteerdirections,evaluatedynamicchangewhichisverydifficultto
captureintraditionalcost-benefitanalysis,andwelcometrialanderrorinanopenendedandevolutionary
processofinnovativechange.Inordertodoso,newformsofpartnershipsarerequiredbetweenpublic,
privateandthirdsectoractorsthatcreatemore‘symbiotic’partnerships,onesthatcantacklechallenges
together,andsharerewardsaswellasrisks.Howtogetcivilsocietyengagedinthisprocess,bothin
deliberatingandsettingthe‘direction’andintakingpartofthepartnershipsisakeychallengeforthis
agenda.
Providingnewdirectionsforsocio-technicalsystemschangeinvolvesprocessesofopeningupawiderange
ofchoicesbeforeeventuallyclosingdowntheoptionstobepursued.Transformativeinnovationpolicymust
involveadaptability,reversibility,learning,andanticipatingagreaterdiversityofoptionswithoutturningtoo
easilyandquicklyto“for”or“against”argumentsregardingspecificoptions.Thisapproachtopolicyshould
enableexperimentationwithoptionsbeyondthenarrowboundariessetbyincumbents.Itshouldbebased
onscientificadvicefromabroadrangeofperspectivesanditshouldnurtureopportunitiesforstakeholders
tochallengedominantviews.Sinceinnovationpolicynecessarilyinvolvestensionsanddisagreementsand
facesdifficulttrade-offsamongtheinterestsofdifferentgroups,thegovernanceoftransformative
innovationneedstoinvolvepolicyprocessesthatprovideameansofnegotiatingthesedifficultieswithout
losingsightofdemocraticidealsforsocialtransformation(Stirling,2008,2009)
Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention
WhileinFraming1and2itisassumedthat,withtheexceptionofnegativeexternalities,theprocessof
innovationiscompatiblewithsocialwelfareandprogress,Framing3raisesquestionsaboutthe
shortcomingsofscience,technologyandinnovationinaddressingissuesofsustainabilityandpovertyor
inequitableincomedistribution.Theseshortcomingsmaybeseenaslargeexternalitiesthataresubjectto
regulationasinFramings1and2.However,Framing3encouragesadeepersetofquestionstobeasked
concerningthecompatibilityofcurrentsocio-technicalsystemsofprovisionwithsocietalgoalsand,
ultimately,aboutthegovernanceofinnovationprocesses.
Thisrationaleforthistypeofinnovationpolicywhichiscentredonsocio-technicalsystemchangedraws
uponScienceandTechnologyStudies(STS)insightsintothecontingentnatureoftechnologies.Some
scholarsobservethattechnologiesareconstructedbypowerfulactorsintheirworldviewand/orinterests
(Winner,1977;Noble,1984;Mirowski,2002),andthatalternativeinnovationsofferinggreaterpotentialfor
socialinclusionormoreequitablepatternsofincomedistributionoftenlacksponsorshiporagency.STS
scholars,inparticular,aregenerallyscepticalthatscienceandtechnologyinvestmentsareconsistentwith
socialandenvironmentalvaluesandoftheabilitytoachievethesevaluesthroughmarketregulationorprice
controls.Forthesescholars,aswellasmanyothers,achievingthesealternativesrequiresascienceand
technologypoliticsthatopensupspaceforsocietallearning,publicdebate,deliberationandnegotiation(Rip,
T..J.MisaandSchot,1995;Schot,2003).Anearlyexpressionofthisrationalenotesthatoursocio-technical
systemisfundamentallytoxictothenaturalenvironmentandhumanprospects(Mumford,1934;1964)and
17
thatthisislargelyduetotheconcentrationofpowerinactorswhoarethemselvesdisconnectedfromthe
naturalworldandordinarysocialrelations.Thismeansthatafundamentaltransformativechangeis
required,onethatinvolvesthedemocratisingofcontroloverinnovationproductionanddiffusionandthe
creationofnegotiationspacesormarketnichesforalternativetechnologiestobecomeestablished,capture
imaginationsandwinconstituenciesamongactorsthatwouldotherwisebeexcluded.
Thecentralfocusofthethirdframingistheachievementoffundamentalsystemicchangeintheinterestsof
social,economicandenvironmentalsustainability.Thereisarangeoftypesofpoliciesthatcancontributeto
thissystematicchange.Theemergingfieldofsocio-technicaltransitionresearchbuildinguponevolutionary
economicsandSTSfocusesonhowtoachievetransformativechange(Grinetal.,2010;Markard,Ravenand
Truffer,2012).Inthisfielditisarguedthatsubstantialprogressmaybemadebyprotectingandenlargingthe
spacesinwhichsocialandtechnologicalexperimentationisconductedenablingtheemergenceof
alternativeswhich,inturn,garnerconstituenciesandadvocatesfortheirbroaderimplementationand,
ultimately,forsystemchange.Itmayalsobenecessarytodevisemeansofdirectlydisruptingincumbent
systemsduetotheirmonopolisationofresourcesanddominationofvisionsofwhatispossibleanddesirable,
andtheiractiveresistancetosystemchange(Geels,2014).
Framing3:InnovationModelandActors
Framing3aimstochangesystemsthataresocio-technicalconfigurations.Severalelements,includingskills,
infrastructures,industrystructures,products,regulationsandpolicies,userpreferences,andculturalfactors
areunderstoodtoco-evolvetogetherinasocio-technicalsystem.Thecomponentsofthesystemstendto
alignedandreinforceeachother,makingthemdifficulttochange.SystemInnovationreferstoradical
changeinalltheelementsoftheconfiguration,andtotheprocessofdevelopingthenewconfigurationand
embeddingitinthebroadereconomyandsociety(foranoverviewseeRipandKemp,1998;Grinetal.,
2010).Systeminnovationalsoinvolvessocialinnovation,sincethefocusisnotonlyonthetechnological
components,butonallthecomponentsincludinguserpreferences,policiesandtheperceptionofthevalue
andculturebyactorswithinthesystem.Systeminnovation,inthiscontext,involvesnewtechnologies,butit
alsomightinvolvethere-useandremakingofoldtechnologiesaswellaslow-techoptions.System
innovationinvolvesmultipleactors,includinginnovativecivilsocietyactors,whoplayacrucialroleincoconstructionofnewsystems(OudshoornandPinch,2003;Schot,2016).Systeminnovationpracticeshave
beenpursuedthroughoutthehistoryofFraming1and2policies,butmanyoftheactorsandsystem
componentshavealwaysbeenbeyondthescopeoftheinnovationmodel(primarilycentredoneconomic
justifications)underlyingtheseframings(Steinmueller,2010).
IntheinnovationmodelunderlyingFraming3,thereisnosinglebestpathwaytosustainability,income
equityandothersociallydesirablegoalsawaitingdiscovery.Instead,theprocessofsysteminnovation
(embodyingtechnologicalchangeanddiffusionortakeup)involvesactorsinnegotiatingalternative
pathways,eachwiththepotentialforsettingatrajectoryforsystemchange(Stirling,2009).Inthisframing
themodelofinnovationmustbeexperimentalbecause,attheoutset,nopathwayisknowntobefitfor
purposeinmeetingsocialgoalsorfeasibleinlargescaleapplication(SchotandGeels,2008).Itisonly
throughtheaccumulationofexperiencebyvarietyofactorswithdifferingmotivationsandprioritiesthata
pathwaywhichisfitforpurposecanbeidentified.Theaimofexperimentationissystemicchangeinformed
byscepticismthatmarginalchangesinexistingsystemsislikelytobeeffectiveinmeetingsocialgoals.
ItisimportanttostressthatFraming3isnotprincipallyamodelofscienceandtechnologyregulation.
Instead,itfocusesoninnovationasasearchprocess,guidedbysocialandenvironmentalobjectives,
informedbyexperienceandthelearningthataccompaniesthatexperience,andawillingnesstorevisit
existingarrangementstode-routinizeexistingthemsoastoaddresssocietalchallenges.Aclaimunderlying
Framing3isthattheinnovationprocessislikelytobeeffectiveinachievingthesegoalsifitisinclusive,
experimentalandaimedatchangingthedirectionofsocio-technicalsystems.Thisdepartsfromthefocusof
Framing1onR&Dinvestment,andtheenlargementofflowsofusefulknowledgeinwhichinteractions
betweengovernmentandthescientificcommunityarecentral,withsomeadditionalattentiontoissuesof
diffusion.ItalsodepartsfromtheFraming2systemfocuswhichisdirectedatboostingtheabsorptiveand
18
learningcapacityofthesystemofinnovationbybuildingnetworksofknowledgeamongproduceranduser
organisations,stimulatingthealignmentandcoordinationoftheseorganisationsinanefforttoproduce
technologicalchange,andfacilitatingentrepreneurship,butintheserviceofthegoalsofgrowth,
employmentandinternationalcompetitiveness.
BothFramings1and2viewsocialandenvironmentalgoalsasbeingachievedthrougheconomicgrowthand
thepossibilityofre-distributionofsurplusesgeneratedbyproductivityimprovementsandbyacapacityfor
technocraticelitestoregulateexternalitiesintheserviceofsocialandenvironmentalgoals.Bycontrast
Framing3involvesdeliberatingandexploringthesesocialandenvironmentalgoalsandunderlyingvalues
andembeddingtheminprocessesofsystemicchange.Deliberationprocessesgiverisetocommon
commitmentstoasearchforeffectivesolutionstosocialandenvironmentalchallengesandtorecognition
thatthesesolutionsnecessitateexperimentationandlearningaboutunderlyingassumptionsandvalues.
Framing3givesrecognitiontothefactthatassumptionsandvaluesareco-producedintheseprocesses,they
areemergentincharacterandarefurthershapedandconsolidatedintheprocessofsystemchange.
Framing3:PolicyPractices
Becauseoftheimportanceofsearch,experimentationandlearning,policypracticesinFraming3involve
findingmeanstofacilitateandempowerthoseengagedintheseprocesses.Technologicalchangehas
alwaysinvolvedaprocessofsearch.However,inthisframingitisessentialtoreflectonsocialand
environmentalneedsandthesearchprocesshastobeguidedbyimprovementsinanticipationofcollateral
effectsandconsequences.Developingprocessesthroughwhichanticipationmightbefeasibleisapriority
forbringingFraming3intopractice.Someguidanceontheprocessesthatfacilitateanticipationisavailable
inthepracticesdevelopedinconnectionwithForesightactivitiesandthoseoftechnologyassessmentgroups.
Thefocusoftheireffortsisoftendirectedatlargescalecommercialapplicationaimedatcatchingthenext
waveoftechnologicalopportunitywhichmayopennewpossibilities,asintechnologyassessmentof
nanotechnologyorbiotechnology.InFraming3,theaimofanticipationistoidentifyareasfor
experimentationand,indoingso,toexaminetheconsequencesthatmayfollowintermsofenergyand
materialsuse,thejobslikelytobecreated,andtheeffectsontheenvironmentoftheintroductionofnew
physicalartefactsorinformationprocessesthatmaybeproduced.Anticipatorydeliberationaimsnotat
producingblueprints,butatgeneratingmultiplepossibilitiesanddiversepathways.Itaimstosustaina
processofcollectivesearchandlearningratherthanashorttermassessmentbasedonnarrowcriteriaand
yes/notypedecisionmaking.
Anticipationisbynaturespeculative.Whileitcanprovidebroadoutlinesofpossibilitiesitcannotforesee
thedetailsthatcometolightonlythroughexperimentationandlearning.Thus,whileessential,anticipation
mustbejoinedwithexperimentationwithinarangeofpossibilitiessuggestedbyanticipationexercises.Isit
bettertorecyclethantorepairandupgrade?Whatagriculturalpracticeswillproveviableasalternativesto
currentrelianceoffossilfuelsforenergy,fertilisers,transportandprocessing?Whatpracticeswillbemost
effectiveinachievingcarbonneutralbuildingsandinfrastructures?Thesequestionscanonlybeanswered
throughexperimentationatascalewellbeyondthatoftheR&Dlaboratory.Itcallsforsocietal
experimentation.Itisonlythroughactualpracticethatexperienceanddeeplearningaregeneratedandthat
theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofaparticularinnovationpathwaycanbeidentifiedandremediedby
revisionorbychoosingadifferentdevelopmentpathway.Deeplearningoccurscollectivelyandenables
changesincognitiveframesandassumptionsandisakintosecond-orderlearning(SchotandGeels,2008).
Societalexperimentationmustincludegrassrootsinnovationwithcommunitiesandcivilsociety(Smithand
Seyfang,2013).Framing3envisagesthatitgrowsandnurturesnewpathwaysand,intheprocess,challenges
incumbentfirmsandgovernmentagenciesthatarealignedwiththem(regimeactors)inpreservingthe
existingtrajectory.Itentailspoliticalstrugglesaroundthenewgoalofsustainabilityanditrequires
incumbentfirmstogothroughprocessofstrategicreorientation(GeelsandPenna,2015).Theroleof
intermediaryactorsinadvocatingcompetitiveniches,newvisionsandpoliciesiscrucial(Kivimaa,2014),asis
theconstructionofnetworksembracingbothnicheanddominantregimeactors(Diaz,Darnhofer,Darrotet
al.,2013)
19
Theneedforanticipation,experimentation,learning,andtheformationofbridgingnetworksandalliances
suggestsnewinstitutionalarrangementsandgovernancestructuresthatcutacrossgovernments,markets,
andcivilsociety.Italsosuggestsinvolvingpublicandprivatefinanceandnewwaystoshareandappropriate
thegainsinknowledgefromtheseactivities.Inadditiontothesenewinstitutionalarrangements,waysto
betterconnectexistinginstitutionstoachievecoordinationandtorecordandlearnfromprocessesof
anticipationandlearningareneeded.Thiswillrequirenewsetsofskillsforbridgingthesocialsciencesand
thescience,technologyengineeringandmathematic(STEM)fieldswhichhaverecentlybeenapriorityin
manycountriesseekingtorespondtotheimperativesofinternationalcompetitionandeconomicgrowth
throughproductivityincrease.Whenthegoalssetforofsocio-technicalsystemsreflectarangeofsocialand
environmentalneedsandmoreinclusiveideasaboutsocialwelfare,bridgingbetweenwhatispossibleand
whatisdesirablewillrequireindividualswithcapabilitiesforbridgingsocialandscientificandtechnological
domains.Thisimpliesare-orientationofeducationpolicyand,ultimately,apedagogythatisconsistentwith
thedesiredtransitiontomoresustainableoutcomes.
Framing3:AlternativeorCounterFramings
AprimaryalternativeorcounterframingtoFraming3isthatitispossibletoaddressthesocialand
environmentalchallengesthroughtheimplementationofcapital-intensivesolutions(e.g.centralizedenergy
productionwithbigwindandsolarfarms,theexpandeduseofnuclearenergyandfurtherdevelopmentofa
globalvaluechainofwasteproducts;geo-engineering)andtechnologiesthataimtomitigateex-postthe
impactsofcarbon-intensivedevelopment(e.g.carboncaptureandstorage).Inthisalternative,actorsfocus
ontheeconomicgrowthagenda,whiledistributionalconsequences(socialandecologicalcosts)areof
secondaryimportance.Alongthispaththereisthedangerthatitsocial,political,andecologicalleadto
economicstagnation,increasesinsocialequality,warforresources,increasesintheoccurrenceofnatural
disastersandmoreforcedmigration.Forthiscounterframingtoachieveitsaims,powerfulforceswould
needtobeinplacetopreventandmitigatedisastersandconflicts,compensateforsocialexcesses,and
underwritethelegitimacyofthesysteminordertoavoidpotentiallycatastrophicoutcomes.Giventhehigh
ecologicalandsocialcoststhatwouldneedtobeabsorbed,thisframingimpliesconstructinganew
relationshipbetweenthestate,themarket,andcivilsociety,andmostlikely,newformsofpro-activeand
entrepreneurialstateactiononnationalandaswellascitylevels,strongrelationshipsbetweenthestateand
business,andnewtechnocraticsupranationalstructuresensuringglobalcoordination.Theseseemunlikely
inviewofthedifficulttoachievesuchchangesinresponsetorecentsocialandeconomicchallenges.
Conclusion
Rethinkinginnovationpolicyistimely.Manyresearchcouncils,governmentsandinternationalorganizations
worldwidewantinnovationtoaddresssocietalorgrandchallenges.ThegrowingimpactofResponsible
ResearchandInnovation(RRI)isasignthatthesechallengesarebeingtakenseriously.Yethowtodesign,
implementandgovernchallenge-ledinnovationpoliciesisfarfromclear.Mostinnovationpoliciesarebased
onthe20thcenturysupply-driveninnovationmodelwhichtakescompetitionbetweennationsandsupport
forR&Dasthemainentrypointforpolicymakingwithoutthinkingcreativelyaboutthebroadersuiteof
innovationpoliciesthatcouldbeputinplace.Inthepost-WorldWarIIperiod,twomaininnovationpolicy
framingshavedeveloped.
Thefirstframingportrayedinnovationpolicyasprovidingincentivesforthemarkettoproducesociallyand
economicallydesiredlevelsofscienceknowledge(R&D).Thisismainlyimplementedbysubsidiesand
measurestoenhancetheappropriabilityofinnovationthroughintellectualpropertyprotection.Foresight
wasdevelopedtoidentifyareasinneedofsupportandvariousformsoftechnologyassessmenthavebeen
20
establishedtoexaminenegativeexternalitiesandtoprotectsocietywhentheimpactsbecomeaproblem.
Regulationisthenanoptionthatcanbeputinplace.Thisframingidentifiesthemostimportantelementof
innovationasthediscoveryprocess(invention)andthelinearmodelinwhichtechnologyisregardedasthe
applicationofscientificknowledgeisprivileged.Thelinearmodelprivilegesdiscoveryoverapplicationpartly
becausetherewardsofapplicationareassumedtobecapturedthroughanadequatelyfunctioningmarket
system.Onlyinthecaseofmarketfailure,isgovernmentactionrequired.
Thesecondframingaimstomakebetteruseofknowledgeproduction,supportcommercialisationand
bridgethegapbetweendiscoveryandapplication.Thisframingmakescentralvariousformsoflearning,
includinglearningbyusing,producingandinteracting,linkagesbetweenvariousactors,absorptivecapacity
andfirmcapabilityformation,andentrepreneurship.Therationaleforpolicyinterventionissystemfailure:
theinabilitytomakethemostoutofwhatisavailableduetomissingormalfunctioninglinksinthe
innovationsystem.Innovationpolicyfocuses,forexample,ontechnologytransfer,buildingtechnology
platformsandtechnologyclusterstostimulateinteraction,andhumancapitalformation.Inthismodel
foresight,technologyassessmentandregulationareadd-onstothecoreactivityofpromotinginnovationon
theassumptionthatanyinnovationistobeencouragedsinceinnovationisseenasthemotorforproducing
economicgrowthandcompetiveness.
Athirdframeforinnovationpolicy,transformativechange,takesasitsstartingpointthatthenegative
impactsorexternalitiesofinnovationcanbegreaterthanthepositivecontributions.Thisframefocuseson
mobilisingtheinnovationprocesstoaddressawiderangeofsocietalchallengesincludinginequality,
unemploymentandclimatechange.Itemphasizespoliciesfordirectingsocio-technicalsystemsinsocially
desirabledirectionsandembeddingprocessesofchangeinsociety.Itentailstheexplorationofsociotechnicalsystemchangeinvolvingastructuraltransformationingovernancearrangementsamongthestate,
themarket,civilsocietyandscience,togetherwithexperimentationandsocietallearning,responsible
researchandinnovation,andaconstructiveroleforforesightaimedatearlyshapingoftheinnovation
processesandonacontinuingbasis.Innovationpolicyfortransformativechangeaimsto:
•
Broadentheconceptofinnovationbeyonditstraditionalfocusoninventiontoincludeinnovationand
theimpactsarisingfromembeddinginnovationinsociety-thinkingfarbeyondsupportforR&Dandthe
prioritisationofspecificresearchavenues.Innovationpolicyshouldsupportconstant‘tinkering’andthe
re-makingofsocio-technicalsystemsaswellasthedevelopmentofnewservicesandorganisational
modelstomeetsocialandeconomicchallenges.Policyformationandimplementationnecessarily
involveawiderangeofactorsfromfirmsandotherknowledgeproducinginstitutionstousers,NGOsand
governments.
•
Providedirectiontoinnovation.InFraming3innovationpolicyisnotaboutsettingpriorities,butabout
improvingtheprocessofopeninguptoawiderangeofchoicesandgivinggreaterattentiontothe
rationaleforclosingdownoptions.Innovationpolicyshouldallowfordeeplearning,challengesto
dominantviews,andnurturingagreaterdiversityofoptions.Itshouldenableexperimentationwith
optionsbeyondthoseemergingwithinthenarrowboundariessetbyincumbentinstitutions–publicand
private.Itshoulddrawuponscientificadvicefromabroadrangeofperspectiveswhichnecessarily
involvesconflictandpoliticalstrugglessinceitinvolvestheassessmentoftrade-offsamongtheoptions
favouredbydifferentgroups.Itinvolvesensuringthatgovernancearrangementsaremadecompatible
withtheseaims.
Onelastnote--Framings1and2emergedandweredevelopedmainlyintheUSandEurope,andhavebeen
criticisedfromadevelopmentperspective.Bothframesassumethatdevelopingcountriesneedtocatch-up
andthatscience,technologyandinnovationpolicyisatoolforthisprocess.Frame3doesnotassumethat
innovationsandsocio-technicalsystemchangewillnecessarilycomefromtheGlobalNorthorthatother
countriesneedtoplaycatch-upwiththoseinnovations.Onthecontrary,theassumptionisthatboththe
GlobalNorthandGlobalSouthmustbeinapositiontocontributetotransformativechangeandthatmutual
learningcanbebeneficial.Inthisframing,itisclearthatdiversepathwaysarepossibleandthatlocal
generationandadaptationwithinacomplexprocessofsystemtransformationshouldbeembraced.
21
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