“It’s a Man’s World” but Mothers Make Kings and Daughters Become
Queens: The Politics of Power in “Democratic” Nigeria
Onyeka Antoinette Nwabunnia Advisor: Mary Moran, ALST Lampert Fellowship Summer 2016 –Fall 2016 1
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………… 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………. 4
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………… 5
CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA ………………………………………………….9
LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………………. 13
FEMINIST POWER THEORIES
PATRON-CLIENTELE PRECOLONIAL NIGERIA COLONIAL NIGERIA INDEPENDENCE TO THE 4TH REPUBLIC
METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………...42
RESULTS DISCUSSION ……………………………………………………..46
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
2
Abstract :
This study explores young Nigerian women's conceptualization of power
in Nigeria. Power is essential for understanding any political arena. My
research uncovers the construction of power in Nigeria and the ways in
which young women situate themselves. The point of this study is to shed
light on the seemingly low rates of women's electoral representation in
Nigeria. Using a qualitative approach, I conducted 29 interviews of both
young men and women between the ages of 18 and 31. All of my
respondents were middle class university educated people in Abuja and
Lagos Nigeria. The findings indicate that the political sphere is so
delegitimized that young women root themselves in other forms of authority. 3
Acknowledgements: Thank you to WARDC, NTWF, Mommy, Daddy, Uncle Pat, Uncle Nchee,
Aunty Chinelo, Chisom, Uncle Nazobu, Aunty Ijeoma, Big Mommy,
Mogambo, Adrielle, Madison, Natasha, Professor Moran, and the Lampert
institute for the consistent support throughout my journey. 4
Introduction
Politics is an important arena for decision-making, and those who hold political
office get to decide how to allocate resources (Paxton & Hughes 2016, 3). Politicians are
able to impact social institutions through law and policy because political power is one of
the most valuable goods (Paxton & Hughes 2016, 3). For both of these reasons, many
would argue that women’s representation within formal political intuitions is necessary.
But what happens when political power is no longer viewed as a social good? Or when
gender specific roles are viewed as having a social good? Though the construction of
power put forth by Paxton and Hughes is valid, it is exclusionary. In order to properly
understand the issue of women’s political representation within other non-European
countries such as Nigeria, it is necessary to first develop an understanding of the way
power is constructed. Nigeria’s lagging numbers in women’s representation is directly
attributed to the construction of power. Power in Nigeria is very much a manifestation of
pre-colonial and colonial legacies, militarization, and patron-clientele politics.
Focusing close attention to colonialism, militarization, and patron-clientele political
system in Nigeria, I argue that Colonialism and militarization aid in the
institutionalization of Eurocentric gender identities (Steady, 2005; Okonjo, 2005;
Sudarkasa, 1986; Mba, 1989), while patron-clientele political systems delegitimize
political power in the eyes of young Nigerian women. Though colonialism and
militarization introduced and solidified European notions of gender and the public vs.
private spheres, these structures did not wipe away pre-colonial notions of power. As
such, gender relations and constructions are far more complicated than male vs. female or
5
man against woman. My own project gains meaning from my ability to limit the
imposition of European gender ideologies onto Nigeria. Gender can be described as a
metaphor of power relations, but across the continent, gender is not the sole form of
power relations acting at any given moment in time. First understanding that there are
competing forms of power relations within countries like Nigeria, makes space for other
forms of authority and activism that may not be defined or recognized by western
theories.
Distancing myself from previous research on women in Nigerian politics, I argue that
political power in Nigeria is so delegitimized that young women find difficulty actively
running and participating in the formal sphere. Most importantly, young women harness
their social authority as sisters, mothers, and daughters to enact change by playing the
supportive role in civil society organizations, advocacy groups, and the family. This
empowerment. Though women find authority through their gender identity, their
conceptualization of power provides an avenue by which power may work against them.
Distinguishing between power and authority, I define authority as a form of power that is
perceived as legitimate within an existing social structure. Authority may exist even
within a specific hegemonic power structure. 42.7%, 17.6%, 12.4%, 11.0%, 10.9%, and 5.6%, represent the percent of women’s
representation in Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria (InterParliamentary Union, 2016). Though most of these West African countries have more
than 10% women’s representation, Nigeria, the country with the largest population on the
continent falls far behind. Throughout Nigerian History, Nigerian women have played an
6
active role in politics. Notwithstanding, since the age of colonialism from 1885-1960,
women's political authority and participation has decreased, in part due to the
reconfiguring of traditional structures (Gabriel, 2015). Nigerian women “constitute over
60% of the Nigerian electorate, the 2006 census puts Nigerian women at about half the
population of the entire country”(Gabriel, 2015), meaning women tend to vote in larger
numbers. This level of activity is not unique to current day Nigeria.
Historically,
Nigerian women have repeatedly mobilized and organized as a means of addressing the
issues most important to them. The reality is that today Nigerian women are extremely
active in voting, NGO’s, church groups, and market women’s groups. Women as a
collective mobilized for change against the colonial governments, organized as a means
of protecting their interests and their families, and held political authority based on their
collective identity as market women, mothers, and wives.
Today Nigerian women seem to be both actively and forcefully receding from the
formal political arena. Though limited, the collective authority of Nigerian women as
voters should translate into votes for other women. As a means of unraveling the
difference between the percent of women who vote and the limited number of women in
elected office, I engage with feminist understanding of power. Taking a Feminist
approach to analyzing women’s representation in Nigeria implies a study of gender and
politics. In effect, a study of gender and politics in Nigeria seeks to reveal, understand
and explain gender inequalities in politics across states, markets, and civil society
(Ackerly and Jacqui 2008, 139). In Moya Lloyd’s article, Power, Politics, Domination,
and Oppression, Lloyd presents four conceptions of power within the feminist literature
7
(Lloyd 2013, 111). These theories are power as a resource, power as domination, power
as capacity and power as productive.
No one feminist theory of power can be applied to Nigeria because each has its
limitations. In my analysis, parts of each theory working in tandem with each other
provide a more coherent depiction of power in Nigeria. Davina Cooper’s construction of
power as productive as well as relational and in conversation with resources provides a
more nuanced understanding of power that can be applied to the Nigerian state, leaving
space for the ways in which young women in Nigeria define their authority.
Understanding how young Nigerian women experience power provides an avenue for
exploring the seemingly complex state of gender relations in Nigeria. Most importantly,
at the center of modern politics is power, and since power and gender are inadvertently
related, conceptualizing power in Nigeria provides insight into the position of both men
and women.
Though I challenge Paxton and Hughes’s understanding and conception of political
power, it is undeniable that countries all over the world have realized the necessity of
having women in electoral and appointed offices. By the 2000s, Scandinavian and
Northern European countries, reached between 35 to 45% women’s representation (Baur
and Britton 2006, 1). Unfortunately for the Scandinavian and Northern European nations,
through a constitutional electoral quota, Rwanda quickly usurped their platform (Baur
and Britton 2006, 1). Outside of surpassing Western countries, with a parliament of over
60% women, Rwanda’s position is quite unique for the continent of Africa. Though no
other countries within the continent exceeds 60% women’s representation, countries such
8
as South Africa, Mozambique, and Uganda have within 30-40% women’s representation
(Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). Many academics debate the meaning of
representation in Rwanda (Longman, 2006; Burnet 2008). Though I recognize the very
complex debates around women’s representation in Rwanda, “the makeup of political
figures in a country highlights who is legitimated to make society and community wide
decisions”(Paxton 2007, 3). In a long-term sense women’s representation has the ability
to change previous societal norms and present new possibilities for young women and
girls.
Contemporary Nigerian Political Structure: In 1979 all Nigerian women were guaranteed their right to participate in active
politics; that is, elections and voting (Agbalajobi 2010, 77). Even with this guarantee,
Nigerian women have run for political offices at relatively low rates and have struggled
to support each other (Damilola 2010, 77). Being on the ground, I recognized there
wasn’t a centralized push among women for formal leadership. Nigerian Women’s Trust
Fund (NWTF) in Abuja is one of the only organizations that focus solely on women’s
leadership in formal sectors. While In Lagos, Women Advocates Research and
Documentation Center (WARDC) was a women’s advocacy group that attempted to
address several issues such as legal rights, maternity health and care, as well as politics.
Leadership represents one of many focuses of the organization. Many of the
organizations, receive the bulk of their funding from foreign external sources. The
government as a collective entity pays little to no attention to the goals of these
9
organizations. This is not to say individual politicians don’t find a means of donating or
supporting the missions of both WARDC and NWTF. Moreover, in 2006 Nigeria implemented a national gender policy (National Gender
Policy). As a means of encouraging development and economic growth, the national
gender policy was intended to provide a framework that would address gender equality.
The Nigerian Gender Plan insists on a 35% target number of women in elected offices by
2015 (Safir and Alam, 2). The government has done little to nothing to support the
movement of women into the formal arena. Women’s representation is usually in the
hands of the president at any given time. Presidents such as Olusegun Obasanjo and
Goodluck Jonathan, are praised for appointing many more women than previous leaders.
While current Pres. Buhari, faces the same criticism he faced when he was a military
ruler, for actively ostracizing women from leadership offices. Because parties
theoretically act as the channel through which all Nigerians may find their way into
representative politics, women’s representation is dictated by the structures in the parties.
Political parties are the machines by which political patronage becomes intrinsic to the
political structure. Because patronage tends to benefit the ruling elite men, women tend to
take a back seat within political organizations, and the few who do make it face ridicule
and hardship. Today women hold 9 out 109 Senate seats and 24 out of 352 seats in the
House of Representatives. Lastly, Nigeria has never had a female governor or president.
The graphs below depict the gender makeup of elections for Governor, Deputy Governor,
Senate and House of Representatives. 10
Gender Break Down of
Electoral Candidates:
Governor/ Deputy Governor
Women
(87)
23%
Gender Break Down of
Electoral Candidates: Senate
Women
(122)
16%
Men(6
25)
84%
Men
(293)
77%
(Safir and Alam 2015)
(Safir and Alam, 2015)
Gender Break Down of Electoral
Candidates: House of
Representatives
Women
(267)
15%
Men
(1507)
85%
(Safir and Alam, 2015)
In accordance with the data from the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and
Security depicted above, Nigeria is a proclaimed Democratic state with an executive
branch and a legislative branch. The legislative branch is made up of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Compared to the House of Representatives’ 360 seats,
the senate is comprised of 108 electoral seats, 3 for each of the 36 states. In the 2015
elections, around 200 women ran for electoral office yet only 8 women are in the senate
and 24 in the house. These numbers are relatively low when considering that over 1,000
men stood as candidates for Nigerian national elections. Since Nigeria's Independence and the end of colonialism, Nigeria has witnessed a
succession of 4 republics. The 4th republic in 1999, ended military rule and brought
about democracy and the supposed characteristics of freedom and equality. According to
11
Monica Mark of the Guardian, the Afrobarometer, “a pan-African, non-partisan research
network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, and related
issues and more”, found that since 2002 support for gender equality has increased from
68% to 73%. In fact in Nigeria, “ a majority of citizens did not believe their governments
were doing well in the battle to empower women” (Mark 2016, 1). Yet there exists a gap
between their personal analysis of gender equality and the facts of female political
representation. Since Nigeria became a Democratic Republic there has been a steady fluctuation of
women in formal political office. Image 1b depicted below shows the number of women
who occupied office between 1999 and 2011. These numbers show that women have
increasingly become a part of formal political office. Women Elected to Public Office 1999-2011 (Image 1b): Much of the literature on female political representation in Nigeria focuses on
colonialism (Abidogun, 2007), barriers to politics (Chuku 2014, Nwabunkeonye 2009),
and the experiences of older women who have already made it into politics (Alubo,
12
2011). Though I do not debate the results of previous research on women and politics in
Nigeria, my own research approaches this same subject through the theoretical
framework power. Literature Review:
Previous research on women in African politics ranges from the role of women in
development, to civil society organizations (Tripp, 2012), and to notions of citizenship
(Van Allen, 1972). The study of gender and politics in Africa has evolved and helps to
explain the increasing rates of female legislative representation, the role of women in
conflict, state policies and processes regarding women’s rights, women and patronage
politics and the role of traditional authorities (Tripp, 2012). These new conceptualizations
of women in African politics have brought about strong debates. In reference to women’s
representation, questions are raised about the relationship between increased women’s
representation and gender equality within the society (Devlin and Elgie, 2008; Baur and
Burnet, 2008). In any thorough analysis of women in African politics, the social location
of the African woman and all of her contexts must be apparent.
African gender theorist Ogunyemi believes that the social location of simply being
African is greater than being a woman. She privileges the African identity over gender
identities and experiences. For Ogunyemi, gender and colonialism/neocolonialism are
competing structures where one has more power than the other. Her argument loses sight
of the fact that gender is hopelessly connected to larger systems such as colonialism, and
globalization. In direct opposition to Ogunyemi, Lewis believes colonialism greatly
affected the lives of men and women, but gender discrimination should not be ignored for
13
the sake of afrocentrism (Lewis 2005, 385). Essentializing the African identities and
experiences, loses sight of the clearly defined gendered discrimination that affects some
African women’s everyday realities.
The biggest challenge facing conventional scholarship is its apparent attempt to
explain the African woman’s narrative through Western-European ideological paradigms.
Regardless there has been a concerted interest to nuance theories as a means of
thoroughly understanding the African woman in all of her relationships. Though the
interest on women in African politics has advanced over the years, there is still so much
unknown. Today, we still do not quite know what women’s power looks like in
authoritarian and semi authoritarian states (Tripp, 2012). Understanding regime types
helps to contextualize the structural implications for women and men in many African
countries. For researchers Chimobi Omoke and Stephen Ojeka, Nigeria is still an
authoritarian regime though they officially transitioned to a democracy in 1999 (Phillips
and Ojeka, 2011). Though I follow their argument, I believe classifying Nigeria as an
authoritarian regime oversimplifies and ignores the advancements Nigeria has made since
1999. Democracy does not replicate itself the same way in every country and state. The
transplantation of European standards of democracy unto colonial subjects was a failure
in both Latin America and Africa. An analysis of democracy using European standards
rather than regional standards of democracy will neglect the social, cultural and political
pasts of the countries. Nigeria does have formal democratic institutions (Ngarhodjim
2007, 79). 14
Unfortunately, these institutions falter under the weight of political patronage
leading to unfair elections, infractions on civil liberties, and dominance by the ruling
party and incumbents (Tripp, 2012). Rather than label Nigeria as having a specific regime
type, my analysis will depict my respondents understanding of Nigeria’s regime type.
Research has shown that there is a link between regime types and issues pertaining to
gender equality (Tripp 2013, 529). The formal institutions of free and fair competitive
elections can coexist with the informal practices of patronage and corruption (Diamond
2002, 138). The World Bank measured the quality of governance in countries around the
world. Nigeria ranked in the thirteenth percentile on rule of law, control of corruption,
political stability and violence, only five percent of countries scored lower (Diamond
2002,145). Firstly in the case of Nigeria, the regime type is very much a manifestation of
oil and patronage politics (Levan, 2014), militarization, and colonial-cultural impact. As
systems, these three structures both construct and inform power in Nigeria.
Through colonialism, a gendered binary for women’s roles and men’s roles were
institutionalized in the public realm. These binaries were cemented by militarization and
formalized through patron-clientele politics. According to Michael L. Ross, “Oilproducing countries in the Middle East are particularly slow to adopt gender reforms
relative to others” (Ross 2008,107). In Oil, Islam, and Women, Michael Ross posits that
the underrepresentation of women in the labor force and government is directly attributed
to oil and not to religion. Ross believes his study on the Middle East can very well
explain the low status of women in Chile, Nigeria, and Russia. Nigeria’s increased
dependence on oil as a source of revenue, made Nigeria a state characterized by
15
competition for resources (Smith 2005, 733). During the oil boom, the Nigerian
government consolidated state control over the oil industry and centralized the
distribution of resources (Smith 2005, 733). The country's economic resources continued
to move under state control, putting public resources in private hands. This centralizing
of power under the oil industry, further explains the hegemonic order in Nigeria. Thanks
to colonialism’s efforts, women have been successfully limited in their reach for formal
leadership. Because politics has become more and more driven by the control of oil
wealth, a minority of men holds power. It would be wrong to generalize and assume that all men benefit from the oil rich
power of the state. The reality of the situation is the centralization of oil under the state
brings about widespread corruption and poverty. This is not just a reality for women but
for men as well. Previous researchers have coined the term hegemonic masculinity as a
means of addressing those men that do not actively benefit and are in fact being
oppressed by the ruling masculine identity (Connell and Messerschmitt 2005, 835).
Hegemonic masculinity is the form of masculinity that is culturally privileged at any
given moment in time. In Nigeria, the hegemonic masculine are politically connected,
wealthy, Christian/Muslim, heterosexual, Hausa/Yoruba/Igbo, married and male.
Religious leaders, military leaders, politicians, and businessmen personify these model
forms of masculinity. Later on, my interviews will reveal the ways in which the
hegemonically masculine in Nigeria cause friction between women advocating for rights
and poor and middle class young men. 16
The hegemonic masculinity exacting control over politics in Nigeria is directly
involved in politics. A better term rooted in African conceptions of hierarchy is the “Big
Man”. The big man represents the actors in a political system whereby individuals and
personal relationships dictate interactions (Rosberg and Jackson 1984, 425). The system
of patron-clientele allows for the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few
(Rosberg and Jackson 1984, 425). According to research done on Clientelism and
democracy in Nigeria, “in developing democracies parties are the instruments of
clientelistic networks and coercive mobilization”. Politicians owe loyalty to their patrons,
godfathers, and other big men and not to the laws, institutions, or constituencies
(Diamond 2002, 145). Nigeria is a complex country marked by fierce elections and
governance rooted in violence and corruption (Heilbrunn 2005, 129). As I describe them,
the hegemonic masculine men or elite patrons and politicians have made economic
growth and social opportunities as secondary to societal domination and rewards of
political office (Heilbrunn 2005, 130). Heilbrunn supports his argument through the
example of the 2005 bidding round for mining leases governing offshore and onshore oil
blocks. During the second round negotiations for these blocks, the local and state politics
entered the picture. These deals involved patrons of networks of men operating at the
highest level of national parties. While studying political party funding, researchers found
that these clientele networks of political parties function through godfathers. These
godfathers are major party funders, and fully control the Nigerian political terrain (Kura,
2011). Godfatherism manifests itself out of patronage. More recent research on women
and politics in Nigeria, points to godfatherism as a constraint on women’s ability to enter
17
formal politics (Nwabunkonye, 2014;Agbalajobi 2009). The emergence and strength of
godfatherism and “big man” politics is attributed to the stronghold they have over
Nigeria’s most important resource, oil. Other barriers keeping women out of formal political office are the questions of
finance, religious and cultural beliefs rooted in patriarchy, and women’s own internalized
oppression (Nwabunkonye, 2014; Abubakar and Ahmad, 2014). Nwabunkonye argues
women’s low participation may also be attributed to lack of support from family, media,
and other women. Nwabunkonye fails to expand on the lack of unity amongst Nigerian
women. Moreover, he does not acknowledge the ways in which women maintain some
authority. Agbalajobi (2016) argues that women do not appear in public spaces because
they are considered to be weak while men are described as being stronger. He found that
customary practices help to undermine women’s self-esteem, thereby making women
accept that they are the weaker gender. Agbalajobi’s researched did not provide
qualitative evidence. Though these ideas may in fact be true to some extent,
socioeconomic class, education, and exposure to political organizations must influence
opinions in some capacity. By essentializing the experiences of women, he supports a
dominant European narrative of the African woman as oppressed.
Mary Moran (2012) and Judith Van Allen (2007) stated that women’s authority in
Liberia and Botswana, which may take the form of the authoritative mother. By
uncovering mother as a legitimate form of authority, they deconstruct western
conceptions of feminism and feminist activism. To many, the role of mother has
influence over the public sphere but Agbalajobi makes no mention of these instances.
18
Later Agbalajobi argues that women perceive politics as a “dirty game”(2010). Though
the term “Dirty game” is used widely throughout my transcripts, I would say that politics
is a dirty game because of political corruption. Nigerians experience and reside within an
undeniably corrupt political sphere. Relying on western understandings of political power
and gender as a means of addressing women’s underrepresentation, Agbalajobi loses the
voices of women and perpetuates the system of victimization. At the center of politics is power (Omotola 2005, 35). The interconnected nature of
gender, power, and politics are dynamic (Lloyd 2013; Omotola, 2005). Rather than
surface level policies and quotas, for gender work to be effective it must be placed within
the context of power politics (Omotala 2005, 34). Political realist Morgenthau argued that
power is anything that “established and maintains the power of man over man and covers
all social relationships that serve that end” (William 2004, 633). For Barry, power is the
ability to make others acquiesce to ones desires (Barry 2003, 323; Barry, 2002; 162-163).
At the foundation of political realism is Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes articulates that people's
natural inclination is to hold power over others (Held 1989, 59). Hobbes argued that the
“greatest of human powers is that which is composed of powers of most men united by
consent in one person” (Weinstein 1971, 163). Because power is relative, in the presence
of those who have more power a person is rendered powerless. This conception of power
is at the heart of material feminist and radical feminist power theory. Because these men
influence current feminist theories, power theories are rooted in white conceptions of
society and power.
19
The power conceptualized by these men is exclusionary and masculine in nature.
Moreover, their analysis viewed women as always victims. While denying white
women’s power in society, these Eurocentric masculine frameworks were blatantly
unaware of power relations within an African context (Carver 2004, 2). Feminists and
gender researchers continued to perpetuate the ignorance toward African women’s
positions. When talking about gender research in Africa, South African gender and
postcolonial studies researcher, Desiree Lewis, argues, “Much of gender research draws
extensively on the discipline of anthropology, and the predominant emphasis in many
gender initiatives on the continent remains technocratic and developmentalist” (Lewis
2005, 381). The issue with anthropologically based studies on gender in Africa are their
fixation with custom, and modes of life, making the dominant image of women in Africa
as stagnant in place and time, and lacking their own real history (Lewis 2005, 383;
Steady 2005, 315). Essentially these distinct analyses of African Women by western
anthropologists were focused on the strangeness of these women, defining African
women as a categorical other. These analyses made gross assumptions about the
experiences of women, assuming African women were the ultimate victims. Being
cognizant of the intrinsic bias in western feminist thought, my research is critical of
feminist power theories.
Feminist theorists have searched for other theories as a means of understanding the
relationships between men and women, women and women, and men and men (Lloyd
2013, 111). These alternative theories are, power as a resource, power as domination,
power as capacity, and power as production. In connection to theorists such as Hobbes,
20
liberal feminists tend to view power as a resource. Power as a resource refers to
something people have that enables them to do things or to get others to do things for
them. It is unquestionably about the distribution and access to state institutions. Liberian
feminists’ understanding of power is constructed around the term inequality. Inequality
dominates liberal feminist discourse because they claim that women are discriminated
against on the basis of sex. Under their structure, there is an unequal distribution of
resources. This unequal distribution is at the root of women’s oppression. Because liberal
feminist believe power should be defined in terms of access to resources, they follow the
same western logic that argues power is an important social good that has been denied to
women (Allen 2008, 3). An exemplary articulation of power as a resource is found in
liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and the Family. Okin argues
that the burdens of familial life are unequally distributed between husbands and wives
(Okin 1989, 5). These socially constructed inequalities impede upon self-development, as
well as physical and economic security. For liberal feminists, in order to give women power, “we must redistribute this
resource in more equitable ways”(Allen 2008, 3). In response, liberal feminist Iris Marion
Young argues that power is relational not something to be possessed or redistributed. The
resource distributive approach tends to see power as a dyadic and ignores the broader
social, cultural and institutional systems at work (Young 1994,35). In the case of Nigeria,
understanding power as a resource alone , implies ignoring systems such as colonialism,
militarization and, patronage. For both Young and Foucault (1980), power exists in
action and as such, it is dynamic in nature and representative of processes and
21
interactions. Echoing Young’s critique of power as a resource, Mary Dietz argues “when
power is perceived in terms of access to social, political or economic institutions other
possibilities like the more radical one that power has nothing to do with access to
institution at all are left out” (Dietz 1998, 380). Rather than distribution, those who wanted to focus on the relationships between men
and women, defined power as domination or oppression (Young, 1994; Lloyd, 2013;
Allen, 2008). To proponents of power as oppression, women are subordinated as a result
of economic, political, and ideological factors working in tandem (Lloyd 2013, 115).
Both radical feminists and materialist feminists share this understanding of power as
domination. At the center of their understanding of power is patriarchy. According to
Amy Allen, radical feminists “understand power in terms of a dyadic relationship of
dominance/subordination analogous to the master and slave relationship” (Allen 2008, 5).
The author of Redstocking Manifesto argues that “all power structures throughout history
have been male dominated and male oriented. Men have used their power to keep women
in inferior position…. All men have oppressed women” (Lloyd 2013, 127). Patriarchal
power is dualistic ensuring that men dominate and women submit (MacKinnon 1987, 3).
Within the globalized setting of patriarchy, masculinity is described as freedom
domination and command while femininity is subjection, subordination, and obedience.
For these feminists, power is depicted as domination, coercion, and power over, making a
strikingly different argument than liberal feminists (Lloyd 2013, 116). Radical and
materialist feminist theorists argue that in fact power is an essentially male or virile form
of power. MacKinnon argues that female power in society is a misnomer because power
22
that is hierarchical, dominant, and authoritative is essentially male power (MacKinnon
1987, 52-53). Finally, for these types of feminist thinkers, the only way to address
women’s domination is for patriarchy to be overthrown (Jaggar 1983,28). Dismantling
the whole system entails not only legal reform but conscious raising, demonstrations,
protests, and provisions for women (Lloyd 2013, 120). For radical feminists, sexual
domination is the most pervasive ideology ingrained in power (Millett 2000, 25).
Patriarchy is a universal experience that is felt by women all over the world in the some
form and capacity. This line of reasoning applied in an African context fails to make
sense of the multiple levels of hierarchy within communities.
In essence, gender is not the only means by which societies are ordered but rather
one of many factors or principles (Kalu 1993, 229). Especially in the case of Nigeria, at
the same moment that researchers depict hierarchies based on gender, there are also age
grade hierarchies within the communities. Some theorists go the extra step to deny the
gender inequality in pre-colonial Africa, as well as deny the existing prevalence of
inequality among men and women. In the works “Womanism: the Dynamics of
Contemporary Black Female Novel in English”, Ogunyemi posits that African women
and men have always been united in a common fight against colonialism (Ogunyemi
1985, 63).
Because ideas such as universal subordination of women or separation of public and
private spheres do not necessarily exist in the African contexts, new methods of research
must be developed or implemented (Steady 2005, 317). Researchers interested in the
study of Africa must ensure to apply theories that make space for the experiences of
23
African Women. Steady believes that gender research in Africa should encompass one or
more of the following: “historical perspective, holistic perspective, multidimensionality,
multiple time frames, multiple levels of analysis, multiple identities and realities, and
comparative method” (Steady 2005, 324). Though feminist power theories are relevant
for understanding the dynamics of structures and relationships around the world, only
power as productive and power as capacity truly make room for the African woman’s
narrative. These two conceptions of power provide a platform that incorporates both the
historical perspective and levels of analysis. These theories provide a framework for
analyzing “imported ideologies, religions, educational systems, and other aspects of the
superstructure to the oppression of African masses” (Steady 2005, 325).
Comprehending power along the lines of radical and materialist feminism assumes
white western women’s experiences as universal. Because they presented women’s
oppression as the most prominent and fundamental form of oppression, issues of class,
sexuality, and race were ignored (Crenshaw 1991, 1246). In the case of Africa, this
construction of power leaves no room for women’s agency. These feminist theorists were
rooted in their own realities of being white, middle class women. In the ethnographic
study African Market Women, Gracia Clark interviews a series of Ghanaian women who
participate in commerce within the Kumasi market. Clark studies these women and
situates them within the context of their histories, understanding their gender
relationships in terms of kin, economic production, and religion. According to Clark,
analyzing the Akan on the basis of male-female relationships would distort the image of
the structure of their society.
24
Clark’s research found “the Asante have a matrilineal organization which gives
women authority and support within their birth families, regardless of their marital
status”(Clark 2010, 6). For Clark, there are gender hierarchies, but those hierarchies do
not work alone, but instead are in relationship with other forms of hierarchies. In this
way, gender works in relation to other things such as age grade, religion, and ethnic
group. Critics of “power over” theorists insist that the subordination-domination
discourse is far too simplistic (Lloyd 2013,119). A more thorough analysis of power
needs to recognize the power both personal and political that women hold (Elshtan
1993,110). For Elshtan, conceiving of power in such negative terms leaves no room for
the types of authority rooted in the personal. The personal in Nigeria takes the form of
mothers, wives, and daughters. Moreover, radical and materialist theorists overlook
women’s psychological participation in their own submission, as well as the fact that not
all men achieve the standards set by the system of patriarchy. My research depicts that
Nigerian women help to alienate other women from political leadership roles. Most
importantly, at the same time that a woman is subordinate to a man due to ethnic
affiliation, marital status, or wealth she could be superior to other men, and women.
Because societies uphold one form of masculinity at any given time (Raewyn Connell
1987, 109), all men may not actively benefit from the system of patriarchy. Essentially
individual’s not just women submit to authority.
Most research on gender essentialized African women by creating the binary
opposition between western and African women (Lewis 2005, 384). Effective gender
research understands that “woman” as a category encompasses a variety of different
25
social locations, making space for the Igbo women of Nigeria, the Ashanti of Ghana, or
the Zulu of South Africa. Therefore, Gender means different things to different people
carrying the ideologies of the socio-cultural context in which they reside (Steady 2005,
319). Gender is defined as the meaning society attaches to the biological parts that
determine sex. For the purpose of my research, gender is understood as the political
meaning Nigerians attach to masculinity and femininity. Once we understand social
location, we can begin the process of deconstructing western ideologies pertaining to
power. African women derived power not just from formal political institutions similar to
the United States, but from religious systems and secret societies (Steady 2005, 317).
Being a more positive form of power, “Power as capacity” or “power to” takes into
account African women’s social locations. For Dorothy Emmet and Hannah Arndt, there
is a difference between the coercive form of power, power over, and the non-coercive
form, power to (Lloyd 2013, 120). Power as capacity disassociates from domination and
towards action in concert. With this definition, power is a woman-centered theory that
stresses an appreciation of power as energy, capacity, and potential (Radtke and Stam
1994, 7). Though this is an alternative to other forms of power, a feminist theory of
power is not just power as women understand it currently but also how they understand it
once they have gone through a process of conscious raising (Hartsock, 231). Who gets to
define what this conscious raising looks like? On what academic, religious, or social
realities is the requirement of conscious raising based? Empowerment refers to the
development of a sense of collective influence over the social conditions of one’s life
(Young, 1994). For this empowerment to occur, individuals must engage with others who
26
are similarly situated and act collectively to change matters (Lloyd 2013, 123). Power as
capacity can manifest itself in women’s roles as mothers (Mansbridge, 1998 136). This
concept of motherist power is important for understanding women within African
contexts. Power as capacity recognizes women as active participants in their own world
(Radtke and Stam, 1997). Even these early theories of power failed to recognize that
power to can also mean power over, in some circumstances women have power over
others including some men (Miller 2008).
Michel Foucault disagrees with both liberal and materialist/radical feminist thoughts
on power. He is the foundation of feminist theory, power as productive. For Foucault,
power is neither given, exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised and only exists in
action (Foucault 1980, 208). Power as productive emphasizes that power is dynamic but
also localized. Power is everywhere but nowhere at the same time. For Foucault, societies
exist in a constant state of struggle with power manifesting as “manifold of relations of
power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body, and these relations of
power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of discourse” (Foucault 1980,
211). Because we are subjected to the production of truth through power, power cannot
be exercised without truth (Foucault 1980, 211). Because in a power as productive
analysis, power is never “localized here or there. It is never in anybody’s hands never
appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth”. Both liberal and Marxist conceptions
of power are misguided. More specifically, Foucault argues that grand theories of
everything tend to misrepresent and ignore other realities. Power as productive is focused
27
on the local, the cultural and historic realities, and the interactions with others and
institutions. Essentially, “Power is employed and exercised through net like
organizations. Individuals circulate through those threads but are always in the position
of simultaneously undergoing and exercising that power. Individuals are vehicles of
power not its application” (Foucault 1980, 212). Human beings are both an effect of
power and an element of its articulation (Foucault 1980, 212). Power as productive refers to its ability to generate identities, subject positions, forms
of life, and behavioral habits in accordance with particular norms. Susan Bordo studies
the body and the ways in which disciplines such as exercise, diet and makeup reproduce
particular norms of femininity. Bordo argues that women are willing participants in the
cultural practices that objectify and sexualize them (Bordo 1993, 28). According to
Lloyd, submitting to power is the means by which power is subordinated, but it is also the
way we are produced as subjects with a particular meaning (Lloyd 2013, 126). Those
who criticize this perception of power argue that Foucault believes that there is no space
for political agency. Foucauldian feminism is trans-historical, ubiquitous, and tied to
relations of domination and subordination. Power is both relational and productive in the
same sense (Cooper 1994, 452). For Davina Cooper, viewing power as both relational
and productive provides space. This space provides opportunities for agency. Power is
not inherently negative but rather reacts in progressive or reactionary ways depending on
the form, the terrain on which it operates, and on the nature of those exercising power
(Cooper 1994, 452).
28
Davina’s perception of power leaves room for the implication of resources. For her,
resource is a tool of power, impacting upon social processes outcomes and decisions
(Cooper 1994, 448). By applying Cooper's definition of Foucauldian power to Nigeria, I
assess the relationship between the historical, the institutional, the individual, and the
resources. My interviews depict young women and men who disagree strongly with
western conceptions of political power, young women who participate claim authority
through their femininity and motherist capabilities, institutional socialization of power as
tradition, and women’s active participation in their own “subordination”. These themes
understood in relation to militarization, colonialism and patron-clientelism explain the
realities of young women’s social position in Nigeria. Pre-colonial Nigeria Among the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa In order to better understand the contemporary state of women’s formal
leadership in Nigeria, we must first uncover the historical roots of gender relations.
Women in pre-colonial Nigeria exerted a high amount of political authority (Uchendu
1993, X). In researching pre-colonial Nigeria, historians noticed differences between precolonial Nigeria and colonial Nigeria. Colonialism in Nigeria was imperialist rule by
Great Britain. Colonialism had an array of effects on Nigerians. Theorists have started the
process of analyzing the effects of colonialism on gender in Nigeria. Researching the
effects of colonialism on gender relations in Nigeria, requires focus on the three main
ethnic groups Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba. Among these three societies, women once had a
great deal of political power. Colonialism shifted and changed the nature of women's
original political authority(Van-Allen 1972, Okonjo 1976, Sudarkasa 1986,). 29
During the pre-colonial period, the question of women’s participation in politics
was irrelevant because it was the norm (Uchendu 1993, X). In the book the Role of
Nigerian Women Past and Present, P.K Uchendu sets out to “understand Nigerian
women’s former role in politics both in pre-colonial and colonial years” (Uchendu 1993,
X). In all three ethnic groups, roles were assigned based on sex and both sexes
participated in politics through a dual sex structure (Uchendu 1993, vii). Within Nigeria,
politics was considered a role that brought prestige and power, but in European culture,
men believed they had all of the qualities necessary for power and thus left European
women out of their political structure. When the English began to rule Nigeria, they
brought with them their gender structures and societal organization. The third largest ethnic group, the Igbos, are located in Southeast Nigeria. Igbo
people as generally tolerant, ultra democratic, and extremely individualistic, with a strong
commercial sense and an unromantic view of life (Uchendu 1993,5-6). According to
Uchendu (1993, 10), those who studied Igbo communities “have noted the segregation of
men and women in both religion and politics”. Women were both important and
invisible. A mark of the Igbo structure was the title system; Igbo men and women had the
ability to earn titles. The more titles men and women earned the higher their status
(Uchendu 1993, 11). There was a clear division of labor between the sexes. More
importantly, one group’s roles were not valued over another. Igbo women participated in powerful women’s groups such as Umuada, which
translates to the gathering of wives and mothers of the community. Many of these local
women’s groups still exist today. Unfortunately, the formal political and social prestige
30
they once held has dissipated. To these women, political representation was a right and an
honor rather than a privilege (Uchendu 1993, 24-25). Socially, “women trained to be
obedient to their parents and their husbands. Marriage was the most important goal”
(Uchendu 1993, 11). Though women had much more political freedom within precolonial Nigeria, one must not mistake its structures as egalitarian. Economically, Igbo
women did not participate in crafts but rather livestock and trading. For most Igbo
women, once they achieved an economic position they aspired for a political one.
According to Uchendu, among the Igbo women “political power rested on their
association, and whoever was selected to be the leader of the association became
accepted and respected leaders in the entire community” (Uchendu 1993,14). As a group,
Igbo women were politically important but had limited authority on an individual level
(Uchendu 1993, 15). Today, women’s claims of authority are very much rooted in their
individual identity as mothers and wives and less in their collective identity. The
emphasis on individual authority is representative of modernity. Beginning with the
colonial enterprise, Modernity emphasizes the individual over the community. Originally, Yoruba women contributed politically as individuals and as group
members in the administration of their towns. There were female Obas (rulers) (Uchendu
1993,19). Before colonialism, in Yoruba tradition a woman’s place was determined by
her business skills (Uchendu 1993,19). Yoruba women occupied important positions and
created organizations of women in order to execute their power (Uchendu 1993, 25). For
example, the Iya Oba was the king’s mother and she had widespread influence over her
people. In On The Invention of Women, Oyewumi argues that gender has become
31
important to Yoruba life because Yoruba life past and present has been translated into
English to fit the western ideology (Oyewumi 1996, 30). Though Oyewumi would argue
that gender was not an ordering principle at all, I believe that gender was not the sole
form of hierarchy but one of many. Within western society, gender is omnipresent, male
is the norm, and female is the exception (Oyewumi 1996, 30). Because of the emphasis
on male-female interactions and roles, colonialism altered the Yoruba traditional society. Lastly, the Hausa, the largest society in Nigeria, had a highly centralized political
system in pre-colonial Nigeria. Before the 1804 Jihad, women held public office and
experienced divisions of labor based on sex (Uchendu 2003, 21). In 1804, the Usman
Dan Fodio, declared Jihad because he believed Allah’s laws were not being implemented
properly. Essentially, the Jihad created radicalized Islam in the North. There exist records
showing women who retained political power before the Jihad. These women were
referred to as Iya, Magajiya, or Mardanni (Uchendu 2003, 30). Due to the North’s more
orthodox practice of Islam after the Jihad, Northern women’s political influence would
begin to wane even before the expansion of Western colonialism.
Colonialism, Gender, and Women’s Political Authority
As a structural institution over Nigeria, colonialism altered gender interactions, and
social and political institutions (Van-Allen 1972, Okonjo 1976, Sudarkasa 1986,
Oyewumi 1997). According to Oyewumi, woman was not a category in pre-colonial
Nigerian communities. She believes the first achievement of the colonial masters was the
“creation of woman as a category because in pre-colonial societies, male and female had
multiple identities that were not based on autonomy” (Oyewumi 1997, 124). For her,
32
patriarchy did not exist within Yoruba tradition or Nigeria as a whole. In a study done by
Abidogun on the effect of western education on Igbo culture and tradition, he found that
postcolonial Nigerian youth had lost some pre-colonial Igbo perceptions of gender and
had adopted a more Western lens (Abidogun 2007, 30). Abidogun’s research affirms
Uchendu’s (1993, 40) argument that gendered constructions replaced indigenous
knowledge of men’s and women’s rights and legal processes. Using a more nuanced
definition of the effect of colonialism on gender relations, I understand that gender roles
in the traditional setting were controlled by the worldview of the people (Kalu 1998,
228). Traditional structures did not disappear in their society just because the worldview
was interrupted by colonialism and Western ideology (Kalu 1998,229). But rather, the
competing value systems worked in tandem to affect the lives of people within the
country. The colonial officials dismantled the dual sex-political system and interrupt the
existing paradigm, by systematically appointing male leaders as district warrant chiefs in
southern Nigeria (Uchendu 1993,40). Abidogun’s findings show shifting religious
conceptions from male deities to female deities and eventually to one God, his son and
the Holy Spirit (Abidogun 2007, 36). These students no longer recognized the validity of
past practices. Because of their lack of knowledge about pre-colonial nigeria, both young
men and women believed they had separate and distinct roles. These new roles and
understandings legitimized male power in society. Politically, socially, and religiously
men became the dominant force within society, relegating women to the background.
Through the new system of male warrant chiefs, women’s sociopolitical institutions such
33
as age-grade societies that helped foster checks and balances, and maintain equilibrium
were weakened or systematically removed (Chuku 2009, 88). Essentially, the British
indirect rule system was governed through male authorities and formalized male
institutions while ignoring women. Theorists such as Oyewumi and Abidogun argue that
colonialism laid the foreground for the current state of women’s rights and authority in
Nigeria (Abidogun, 2007; Oyewumi, 1997). Moreover, “colonialism undermined the solidarity of the women by introducing new
divisions based on education, wealth, and religious affiliation (Mba 1992, 291),
weakening their collective understanding of their authority. By undermining the
solidarity amongst women, their ability to mobilize and find common ground was
challenged and those challenges still exist today. These divisions are a marker of
modernity and account for the shift from the collective to the individualist ideologies.
Uchendu’s historiographical study attempts to discover the reasons why women’s interest
in politics in Nigeria has dwindled in comparison to the pre-colonial time period. Similar
to Abidogun, Uchendu links women’s declining interest to colonialism, attributing the
modern day barriers faced by women to the colonial ideology (Uchendu 1993, XIV).
Though these are undeniable effects of colonialism, a broader lens under which to view
women’s underrepresentation in politics is power. Feminist theories of power view the
trans historical as the building blocks of power. The pre-colonial and colonial legacies
inform current day construction of power in Nigeria. Nigeria’s political structure, age of population, and colonial history can be found in
other surrounding nations. If we relied solely on colonial legacies and religion as a means
34
of understanding women’s representation we would not be getting the full story. As a
country, Nigeria seems to find itself lagging behind other West African countries. Is it
really possible to argue that colonialism is the true cause of the state of women’s role in
Nigerian politics or to assume that it is still defining women’s interests today? If
culturally and politically Nigeria is not that different from other conservative African
countries, why does it lag so far behind in women’s political representation? Women’s Political Representation and Participation: 1960-1999 (1ST to the 3rd
Republic) Militarization and patron-clientele are definitive characteristics of the political
arena from Nigeria’s independence in 1960 to 1999. Dominated by men, the first republic
began in 1960 and ended in 1966. In 1960 Nigeria inherited the British parliamentary
system of government (Mba 1989, 70). Though Nigeria was one country, the electoral
system worked differently in the North and the South (Mba 1989, 71). Northern Nigeria
was controlled by the NPC, a party that believed politics was for men. NPC politicians
were Muslim men who either followed the policy of seclusion or believed women
belonged in the domestic sphere. Seclusion implied that women lost the economic
independence they had as farmers and traders and were instead excluded from political
office (Mba 1982,300). Not all women were economically dependent; some had hidden
trades in crafts and food processing. Seclusion was effective in its suppression of
organized associations of married women, thus Muslim women did not develop the
solidarity of southern women (Mba 1982,300). 35
In 1959 when the first federal elections occurred, the only women who could vote
or run for elections were women in the south. In Southern Nigeria, there were very few
women who actually contested elections and none of them won in the House of
Representatives. At the time, one woman was appointed, not elected to the senate and a
second was appointed in 1964. Two parties dominated the southern electoral system, both
of which had women’s wings. However, no women ever held top positions within the
parties. As Nigeria was forming as a new nation, with the hope of an independent
political identity, the National Council of Women’s Societies emerged. Organizations
such as the NCWS, are a means of “activating pre existing identities and consciousness:
creating consciousness in the process” (Mba 1982, 174). NCWS’s, goal was to promote
the welfare, status, and education of women in Nigeria. As a self-proclaimed apolitical
organization, NCWS had close ties to the government and its leaders were mostly elite
women. Because of their close political ties and their elitist bend, NCWS failed to gain
the traction for a collective movement. During this time of independence, women’s
organizations emerged across the country. Each organization worked for the
empowerment and interest of the women they represented. By the end of 1965, the newly independent Nigeria experienced the breakdown of
the political system (Mba 1989, 71). A civil war erupted in the Western region and the
federal government lost control of the state. Heightened ethnic conflicts polarized the
political system, as politicians used their positions to promote their kinsmen (Mba 1989,
71). The act of promoting kinsmen marked the beginnings of the patron-clientele system.
While patronage is the process or system of giving out political position in exchange for
36
votes, clientelism is the act of handing out all forms of goods and resources in exchange
for support or cooperation. Patronage is a subset of clientelism, and the Nigerian political
arena is a manifestation of all forms of clientelism. Due to exacerbated ethnic differences
rooted in British divide and rule policies, Nigeria officially transitioned from a republic to
a military state. Under Major General Ironosi, all civilians were excluded from
government. According to Mba, “This action did not deprive women of any power
because they had none in the first republic” (Mba 1989, 72). Ironosi’s military
government would end in 1966 but would set the pattern of a military government that
included the exclusion of women. “ From 1965 to 1979, Nigeria was under Military rule
and all political organizations and activities were banned. Therefore, there was no
specifically political activity by women in this period” (Mba 1982, 302). Ironosi begins
the process pushing women out of mainstream politics. Because military rule is instituted
by suppressing freedoms such as speech and activism. Those women’s organizations that
emerged in the immediate aftermath of colonialism were systematically silenced.
Because of their close ties to the political elite, the only organization with the permission
to function as a women’s interest group was the NCWS. As we now know, NCWS was
very much a political machine connected to the interests of the ruling class. In 1966 a second coup occurred. When the government centralized under LL.
Colonel Gowon, the military and the bureaucracy formed a symbiotic relationship. As a
result, these bureaucrats supported military rule. Within the branches of government,
there were no women. When Eastern Nigeria succeeded in 1967 under the name Biafra,
women were more involved in the Biafra wartime administration. These women were
37
“recruited into the civil militia and promoted to officer cadres. Though women would
benefit from their contracts and roles, after the civil war they would still be boxed out of
civil service. By the end of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria experienced an increase in
income from oil. Their revenues went up from 26% to 82%. According to Mba,
“converted the military political decision makers and their bureaucratic aids into a new
property owning, rentier class working in close and direct collaboration with foreign
business interests”(Mba 1989, 73). This represents the birth of the dynamic system of
patron-clientele politics in Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer, making the
resource a central aspect of its functions. Because Nigeria was already participating in
patron-clientele politics, the sole economic focus on oil cemented the makeup of the
political arena. Referred to as cash madams, a few women were able to join the new
commercial capitalism based class due to their relationships with top politicians. Though
women held little authority in the formal political arena, few entered the political through
the economic because of their role in the new emerging market. All in all, women
experienced diminishing levels of authority. During the 3rd coup in 1975, you could find a
few more women in the top echelons of government. Even with these limited
developments, the situation for women in politics scarcely changed during military rule
from 1965 to 1979. The professional and educational achievements of Nigerian women
increased but these new attainments did not translate into formal political power (Mba
1982, 303). During the second republic, there were more women participating in politics and
represented in formal political office, far more than both the first republic and military
38
rule (Mba 1989, 82). From 1979 to 1983, the conditions of both men and women suffered
under the new Shagari government worsened. The government was full of blatantly
corrupt politicians. In 1983 the military intervened in order to save the country from
mismanagement, abuses, and disorder. As such, Nigeria would go back into a state of
military rule. According to Mba, “by 1984, the highest ranking women in the army was a
colonel, in 1986 there was only one female assistant inspector general of the police”
(Mba 1989, 83). No women were elected into the federal executive council but Buhari
insisted that each state have one female commissioner. Under Buhari the military state
was more oppressive than ever before and relied heavily on the national security
organization, which had no women in top positions (Mba 1989, 83). A second coup occurred in 1985 under Major General Babangida, the same structures
existed and women were still excluded from government. Later, Babingida would adopt
more liberal positions toward women. He declared that 1 in 4 local government
counselors should be women and one woman should be on every board and council (Mba
1989, 84). During this time women’s activism was heightened, NCWS organized a
symposium to speak out against tokenism and demand that 30 to 40 percent of the
government be female (Mba 1989, 84). NCWS faced a lot of criticism from other
women’s organizations. The council of Muslim women criticized NCWS of not being
inclusive of other women with different ethnic and religious ideas. Women in Nigeria
(WIN) criticized NCWS for being an elitist organization focused on the mobilization of a
specific class. Mba argues that the “diversity and depth of women’s political ideas, show
the greater maturity and political consciousness of Nigerian women”. During this time,
39
Nigerian women’s organizations struggled to bridge gaps between elite, formally
educated, middle class women, and the rural woman. These gaps existed due to
capitalism’s inherent divisiveness. The third republic began in 1993 and lasted for a little
less than a year. Nigeria would return back to a military state within the same year and in
1999 the 4th republic began. The period between independence and the 4th republic was
responsible for the systematic removal of women from political office and the silencing
of their voices. Methodology: The Trouble with Gender Research In Africa In order to truly understand power in Nigeria and the social location of women, I
adopted the narrative analysis approach. Narrative analysis is an approach in qualitative
research methodology that explicitly recognizes the researcher-subject- participant
dynamics (chin 1998,stern 2005; Wibben 2011). During my research I interviewed 30
young Nigerians between the ages of 18 and 31. Ten of these voluntary participants were
men and 20 were women. Though my research is explicitly concerned with the location
of women in Nigeria, I understand that truly nuanced research conceptualizes gender as
not just women but also men. By interviewing men, I was able to extract a sense of how
some young Nigerian men perceive politics and how they may or may not be similar to
women. The bulk of my sample was selected from two women’s organizations, the Nigerian
Women’s Trust Fund (NTWF) and Women Advocates Research and Documentation
Center (WARDC). Around ten people within my sample were selected through their
connection to NYSC Lagos. These ten people were unaffiliated with any women’s
40
organization or political organization. Using the snowball method, I relied on my
respondents to direct me to other respondents. My research was based in both Lagos and
Abuja, Nigeria. Lagos has consistently elected a woman to office since 1999, the
beginning of the democratic republic. Abuja is the center of politics in Nigeria. It is the
nation's capitol. Both Lagos and Abuja are very heterogeneous states, and as such, they
have a representative sample of most ethnic groups in Nigeria. As an American researcher interested in Africa, I wanted to ensure that my work did
not carry with it the preconceived notions of the western public. As a student researcher
who is fairly aware of the trouble and critiques of gender research within the continent, it
was my number one responsibility to be very aware of my positionality. Firstly I am a
black, Nigerian-Liberian woman raised in the United States. My socialization is very
much a product of American ideologies and cultures. Though I was raised in the United
States, my socialization was interrupted by my parent’s immigrant cultures. I was very
much raised in an African home, aware of much of the food, practices, cultures, and
traditions of my father and mother. I experienced what some researchers refer to as
bicultural socialization, meaning I am socialized by both the dominant culture and my
home’s culture (Kim 2014, 582).
The competing cultures that have informed my
ideologies played a role in my research and motivated me to take on this research in the
first place. 41
Quantitative Analysis: Gender (Table 2a): Men 7
24.14%
Women 22
77.86%
Total
29
100%
Religious Affiliation (Table 2b):
Christian 25
84%
Muslim 4
16%
Total:
29
100%
Ethnic Group (Table 2c): Igbo 13
44.82%
Yoruba 7
22.14%
Bura 1
3.44%
Ebira
1
3.44 %
Ibirra 1
3.44%
Babur
1
3.44 %
Ham 1
3.44%
42
Ibibio
1
3.44%
Okobo
1
3.44 %
Duma 1
3.44 %
Angas
1
3.44 %
Total 29
100%
Table’s 2a, 2b, and 2c show the demographic makeup of my sample on the basis of
age, gender, and religion. According to the CIA factbook, Nigeria is 50% Muslim, 40%
Christian, and 10% of people practice an indigenous belief. Though my sample is skewed
toward those who practice Christianity, based on my interviews it is fair to argue that
both Christian women and Muslim women experience the same general beliefs
surrounding their gender identity. Though there are differences between ethnic groups, all
Nigerians have the same basic worldview on gender relations (Kalu 1998, 229). Details
may differ while the basic structure stays the same (Kalu 1998, 229). Nigerian views on
gender relations are an amalgamation of both Eurocentric norms (colonial constructions)
and traditional (pre-colonial) conceptualizations. Because my research relied heavily on the women connected to advocacy groups, my
sample is representative of the organization's sample. In Nigeria today 29% of people are
Hausa and Fulani, 21% are Yoruba, and 18% are Igbo. My sample is representative of
the 2 major ethnic groups in Nigeria as well as a number of northern ethnic minorities.
Most importantly, my sample is made up of young people between the ages of 18 to 31.
43
These young women and men identify as middle class and University educated.
According to Samson Itodo, Nigeria has one of the largest youth populations in the
world. By focusing on young Nigerian women, I am uncovering the future of women’s
leadership in Nigeria.
Discussion: Cooper’s (1994), theory on Foucauldian power places resources as inadvertently
connected to power. From my interviews with both Nigerian women and men, I
discovered that an aspect of power in Nigeria is inadvertently connected to access to
resources. Access to resources is not the existing structure but rather a characteristic of
the form of power in existence in Nigeria. The government’s failure to address issues
such as education and poverty are directly connected to the historical mismanagement of
funds as a result of rampant political corruption induced by the centralization of oil under
the state. In the case of Nigeria, formal power is held and occupied by the “Big Men”.
Because the political sphere does not actively address the needs of the people, politics in
Nigeria is not viewed as a social good. Because political power is not defined as a social
good, both men and women find difficulty understanding why any woman would want to
enter the space. Women are perceived as being to moral, but men are perceived as having
the ability to handle immorality. Moreover, the negative nature of politics in Nigeria
ensures that both young men and women are forcibly denied access. In a Nigerian context, formal power is very much about resources and access to
resources. These resources come in the form of money, godfathers, or oil. Jacob, a 30
year old middle class Yoruba man, residing in Ikeja, Lagos and working at WARDC, a
44
women’s advocacy group, believes “it is not about paying attention to the root of the
country's political system it is bad already,… it is not a gender thing it is more of a too
many old people thing. Younger people should be given opportunities they should be
given a chance”. Gerald, a 23-year-old middle class Igbo man residing in Festac who has
no affiliation to any women’s advocacy group, said that “the same old people that are
ruling don’t want to give the chance to the youth”. Gerald goes on to say that “Nigerian
politics is all about money to win the hearts of the people they promise the same things
every election and we know they will not do anything so the people that are even running
and pushing the career for them they are after the money it's all about the money”. Young
people, both men and women, are very much disenchanted with the system in Nigeria.
This line of reasoning is a direct challenge to materialist and radical feminist perceptions
of power.
The hegemonic “big Man” power entity in Nigeria disenfranchises both men and
women. And as such, their theory does not recognize the dynamic nature of
marginalization in Nigeria. Because women are not the only people being left out of
formal power, young men find difficulty understanding the purpose of gender equality.
Who is fighting for the young unemployed Nigerian man? Gerald believes “there are
more important things Nigeria is facing, I don’t think gender equality is one of our
problems right now”. For Gerald and so many of my other interviewee’s, unemployment,
poverty, and education are all issues burdening both men and women. Challenging Gerald’s understanding of the opportunities, Modicious concurs that
“those men out there, they are not ready to make space for the young ones” but “men will
45
always find their way, but we women, we have to appease them and persuade them, we
have to work much harder”. Modicious is a 28-year-old Yoruba woman in Lagos Nigeria.
She is an active participant in WARDC and an activist at her university. Similar to what
theorists of hegemonic masculinity argue, Modicious is addressing the fact that though
some men don’t benefit from the system, there is still opportunity for them to survive in
the system and that may not be the case for young women. Young women such as Barbie
and Jenifa, 27 and 25 respectively, believe that government is useless. Rather than a
social good used for the implementation of policy and agenda for the people, Barbie and
Jenifa both reiterate that the government does nothing, “we provide everything for
ourselves…. light, heat, education, house…the government does not provide for our
interests”. My interviewees use politics and government interchangeably. There is no
difference between the government and the political because of the patron-clientelism.
The corruption that exists in political spaces is carried over to government spaces,
making both spheres the same. For these women there is no motivation to join the
political arena because the government does nothing. For them, there is no moral or
ethical reason to participate in politics in Nigeria. This clearly defines a definitive reason
why women may not actively attempt to enter the formal political sphere as a means of
accessing power. In agreement with Foucault’s 1980 analysis of power as everywhere but nowhere at
the same time, these respondents depict how the university institution is a tool of power
that produces and is formulated by individuals. Following Foucault’s analysis, power is a
network of relations; the social order is replicated within educational institutions. The
46
social order manifests within institutions because both women and men have accepted the
norms of power. From a young age, experienced an institutional socialization of male
power as legitimate and tradition. All of my interviewees were middle class Nigerians,
who attended either public or private secondary school institutions and Universities. For
Nita, a 26-year-old Eber woman from Kogi state in northern Nigeria, both her secondary
school and university experiences included men wielding more authority. At her school,
she was food prefect and there was a male equivalent. She believed, “the guy prefect felt
that he was above me and people felt he had the last say”. Nita is a part of the women in
leadership initiative at the Nigerian Women’s Trust Fund. While in school, Nita started
an organization to support young girls on her campus and push them into leadership
positions. Nita says, “at my university there are some that say females can't handle this
and I’m like why not but it’s like a standard has been set already there is nothing you
could do about it”.
At many of the institutions my respondents attended, men were always student
presidents of departments, while women held vice president and secretarial roles. This
does not represent a dual sex political system, because the women I interviewed felt
invisible in relation to the men. Even Solomon a respondent from Lagos said, “The
number 2 position was meant for women they could be vice president, treasurers, and
secretary”. For Hadisa, a northern respondent in Abuja, even her predominantly female
“French” department was headed by a male student. Gerald echoes the other responses
and says, “the vice president is female and the president is male Mhmmm the vice
president is a female so the girls if they want to run have that position”. For many of my
47
respondents, there was uncertainty about the legitimacy of these rules. When asked if the
rules that dictated leadership were written institutional rules or a manifestation of
precedent, Most respondents believed it was just “tradition”. Moreover the practice of
legitimate power under men and women as supportive positions, parallels society. This
does not mean that there are not women who strive to challenge the status quo, but rather
that there is more difficulty due to a lack of societal support. Women in Nigeria tend to
work in NGO’s, and act as political support to men both through their roles as wives or
their roles as deputies. Though women may experience specific confines for public work,
as individuals, young Nigerian women describe femininity and mothering as forms of
authority that challenge the existing construction of power. Though many of the women in Nigeria tend to play supportive roles, from my
interviews I discovered that these women felt their supportive roles as mothers, activists,
and assistants are equally as important as the roles men tend to dominate in Nigeria.
Firstly, women tended to associate the corrupt nature of politics as characteristics of
masculine nature. Because they saw masculinity as inherently flawed to some extent,
some women could not comprehend why any other women would want to damage her
virtuous authority for formal power. For them, men have political power not because God
said so or tradition said so, but because men have the ability to be corrupt and money
hungry. From Chinelo, a 30-year-old Igbo woman, “men do not care about anything other
than money”. Because many of the women define the negative nature of politics in
Nigeria as masculinity, they formulated a dichotomy between men and women that
allows them to argue for increased women’s leadership in formal politics. These women
48
believe the natural qualities of femininity are far more effective for addressing issues in
government and politics.
Modicious believes “When a female is heading an organization she treats people
like family. When a female is heading an organization, she treats the staff like family and
when a female see’s something is wrong they will advise the person …..Formally they
will talk and interact….. a woman will not ask you to resign but look for alternative
solutions”. These traits are considered the natural traits women posses that make them
better leaders than men. For these women, Nigerian government will never represent a
social good because they view themselves as the social good. When asked if Nigeria
needed more female representatives, Chinelo said “women naturally are careers so if they
are found in politics... so if they are given leadership roles in government they will care
more they will do more they will do it with passion”. Because women will care more,
they will be better apt for addressing issues such as health, poverty, and education. Many
of these young girls witness women care through women’s roles as market women, as
leaders of NGOS’s, and as mothers in church groups. Women in these groups address the
issues the government fails to address. They provide financial help for their families, they
help poor children, they raise money for the community, and they organize for better
maternal health care and services. Ife Williams echo’s Chinelo’s comments and says,
“if a man takes decision he doesn’t really care about anything his own is to drop
the money and leave the wife to buy the clothes and food and that’s how they
behave in politics. Women they are the one’s who raise children boys and girls
and so they know how to run a family and run a country. A woman is in a position
49
she will know that there should be sanitary pads provided everywhere. A woman
is more compassionate and passionate than a man” Another respondent, Hadiza, believes women’s natural talents and ability to enter
leadership roles are most connected to their roles as mothers, daughters, and wives. “Yes because whether they like it or not they have beautiful ideas, they are
passionate they care about children they are no longer myopic. You have to
communicate with your husband and children and that alone makes us strong
enough. That alone gives us higher advantage because we are not just looking at
short term we are looking at long-term”. Because of their natural talents as women, these ladies have adopted the role of the social
good. This social good exists outside of the formal political sphere.
The social good position is further supported by the young women’s ideas about
the other ways women impact society. Hadiza, a 21 year old Igbo girl residing in
northern Nigeria, described this as the king vs. the kingmaker. During the interview, she
said “I think I want to be a kingmaker someone who will push and help people”. When I
asked her what was so special about the kingmaker she said “uneasy lies the head that
wears the crown when you are on that throne that is when the king maker is important
people don’t carry as much pressure. You need someone who is constantly reminding you
and telling you things that are more important”. These women have found ways to
empower and be empowered within their society. Jenifa a woman unaffiliated with any
women’s organization said, 50
“it makes me sick when women try to compete with men because we all have a
place in society and I’m not saying that makes us second but it means we have a
role in society….If I am the wife to the governor at the end of the day, he comes
back to me and tells me everything. I play my role in the background …A woman
should be a woman and give support, a woman should be the backbone and a man
should be the head. He will always come to the woman for advice, the man should
protect and provide for the woman”. Firstly, for Jenifa, there should be no competition between women and men because both
men and women have authority but through different means. She finds power in being
the kingmaker. She is the wife, and as a wife she has authority through her children, her
family. Though many of my respondents disagree with the beginning of her argument,
they connect due to the ways in which they believe women’s authority is felt in society. Young women define women’s authority in Nigeria through the role of mother.
Women recognize the active participation of other women in Nigerian society through the
role of mother. Rather than a collective influence over their society, women’s authority is
determined by their individual exercise of capacity through mothering. Due to
modernization, the individual is emphasized over the community. For the women I
interviewed, power as capacity is not the collective action of mothers, but the individual
influence mothers have over their children, and their husbands. Nita, a 26 year old Eber
woman, believes women do not have power but that they do influence society through
their authority as mothers. When asked how women influence society, Nita says, 51
“Through their kids…yeah a woman is very powerful if you see a man who is not
gender friendly check back to how he grew up. Look at his mother. I tell women
we can rule the world from how we train up our kids. It is what the mother puts
into that child, women have enough power on a grassroots level maybe not in
politics but in the community and the social level”. Nita is not alone in her understanding of women’s authority, echoing Nita’s, response
Haunus says, “Women are into business or NGO’s even in the home a woman is a leader
although people say the man is the head of the family, most of the decisions like
what we will eat today are made by the woman, the man is just bringing the
finance …its through the home because they say charity begins at home. Children
spend more time with the mother while the husband is working so she is the one
influencing and growing them”. For these young women, mothering is a site of resistance against the construction of
power. Because they have a space through which they have authority, young Nigerian
women don’t wholly define themselves as oppressed. In fact they deny the language of
power as domination. Because they themselves deny the language of power as
domination, the construction of power has to be understood in dynamic and relational
terms (Cooper, 1994). Though their grasp of mothering is to some extent a production of
power (Foucault, 1980), this does not imply the depressive stance of Foucauldian
feminist. While their motherist roles are produced by power, this production is used as
resistance and subordination. 52
Modernization and its global and economic policies place emphasis on the experiences
and life of the individual. Because of the emphasis placed on ethnic and class differences
in a country like Nigeria, this understanding of differences among groups of women
specifically, was first implemented through colonialism. The act of dividing ethnic
groups and integrating the south into the global economic networks more so than the
north, helped to ensure divisions among women by the end of colonialism. Women acted
as individual groups, with the goal of empowering those that fit their specific
demographic. For example, NCWS was an organization for elitist women from the south
who didn’t address the issues facing poor women in their regions or Muslim women in
the North.
As a result, more groups emerged to address specific constituencies of
women. This divisiveness of Nigerian women is still prominent today. When asked if
women in Nigeria were united, most of my respondents said no. Hadasa believes women
do not have power because they are not united. She says, “When people unite with one
voice there is power. Power is in unity as long as people stand for a cause”. For Ife
Williams, the inherent divisiveness among women brings about competition. She says, “I
know when it comes to something about leadership: women envy each other a lot. Some
people find it hard to just say hello. Men can enter here meet another guy and start talking
like they’ve known each other forever. I think it’s this inferiority complex. That’s what is
delaying our access to leadership”. There are organizations of women who focus on specific aspects of women’s
experiences but don’t have a collective agenda. Since 1999, a woman has consistently run
for president but never receives any votes. In 2015 in Taraba, a Northern woman was
53
elected governor. The incumbent challenged the election. A re-election occurred and she
coincidentally lost. In 2016 when the gender equality bill failed, there was silence from
within the ranks of sitting women’s representatives. Finally, when senator Melaye
threatened to rape, impregnate, and beat Senator Oluremi Tinubu, there were echoes of
discontent toward Melaye (Hassan, 2016). But even more recognizable, were the women
who came out to criticize Oluremi Tinubu. These women felt Tinubu had entered politics
through compromising means, thus denying her inherent mothering characteristics
(Kapital FM). Secondly they argued that a woman was killed in the north and no one said
anything as to why they should fight for Tinubu’s. Nigerian women were divided into
many factions. When a woman does not adhere to the principles of mothering, she immediately
loses support or finds difficulty gaining support. In casual conversation with the young
women and older generation, the consistent observation they made was “women don’t
support women”. In this respect, Foucault is correct. In the same way we produce power,
we are also products of power. The construction of power through the colonial
implementation of male-female gender norms defined women as responsible for the
private. Though women believe they affect the public through the private, when a woman
decides or fails to adhere to the private she is problematized. Barbie says, “we have to be
submissive, our role is to be in the kitchen, taking care of the kids, you have no reason
trying to rule a nation”. Jenifa supports this argument and says, “it makes me sick when a
woman tries to be competitive with a man… whether we like it or not, it is a man's world
God made the man first…. if I am the wife of the governor at the end of the day he comes
54
back home to me and tells me everything. I play my role from the background…. for
god's sake be the neck and not the head”. Finally, Uche says, that politics appeals to men
more because “women don’t really care…. If you ask a woman why she isn’t involved in
politics she will say I’m not interested I want to maintain my family and my husband”.
For many of these women, accessing political power does not mean denying your natural
authority. Because of this line of reason some women do not believe it is necessary to
have a female president, more female representatives, or even female governors. The idea
is to support the nation not to rule the nation. One of the most divisive female figures in
Nigerian politics is Uche Ekwunife a former Igbo senator, is disregarded by some women
because she attempts to access power by the same means as men. She plays the “dirty
game” just as well as they do. Because she doesn’t seem to adhere to the mother
authority, her biggest critics are women.
Conclusion:
The perceptions of government ability, mothering as a source of authority,
institutional socialization of power as tradition, and women’s active participation in their
own “subordination” represent themes that emerge due to the dynamic relationships
between colonialism, militarization, and patron-clientele system. In essence, the political
sphere is so delegitimized that young people struggle to understand the importance of
attaining formal leadership. Using their social roles as mothers, daughters, and wives,
young women define their own authority in society. Because women have such a high
moral standing, young women believe they have the ability to change the existing
structure of politics. While this may be true to some extent, the reality is mothering as a
55
sight of authority also aids in diminishing women’s collective authority. By drawing
distinctions among women, mothering acts as a source of authority and a source of
oppression. When young women and current female politicians fail to adhere to the
principles of mothering authority, they are heavily criticized and deemed as other.
Feminist power theories provide a framework by which we may begin to conceive of
the structures in Nigeria, the competing hierarchies, and women’s authority. Through
Davina Cooper’s conception of Foucaudian feminist power, we understand that
patriarchy may manifest itself differently in different places. For Cooper, power is
dynamic and does not exist in one form. In the case of Nigeria male- female power is
only one form of social hierarchy, access to oil resources both material and monetary
determine both men and women’s ability to acquire political power, and mothering is a
legitimate form of authority acting as a sight of resistance. As a means of harnessing the
way young women and men conceive of the construction of power in Nigeria, more
African feminist centered activism and work must depict the ways in which Nigerian men
may benefit from feminism.
For many gender activists, quotas provide an avenue for bypassing structural
barriers to electoral politics. In the case of Nigeria, quota systems are an illegitimate form
of addressing women’s low numbers of representation. The illegitimacy of gender quotas
derives from the fact that most young men and most young women are unable to access
the political space. Rather than help to legitimize female power in formal spaces, gender
quotas could cause increasing backlash against women in the country. By bringing men
into African feminist discussions in Nigeria, women’s organizations both expand their
56
reach and pose a threat to the current system. In my own opinion women’s organizations
have to collectively mobilize as a means of disrupting the current system. Disrupting the
system entails viewing health, domestic abuse, unemployment, leadership, sex
trafficking, education, and lack of housing as intertwined issues rather than singular
projects. Addressing these issues not only benefits women but also men.
Moreover, women’s organizations should emphasize women’s natural authority as
mothers but advocate and support those who resist mothering. By doing so, these
organizations begin to legitimate multiple forms of women’s authority. We must nuance
the idea that having women in politics is good for addressing women’s issues. Though
this may be valid in some respect, having women in formal leadership is positive for
everyone. Nigerian women should not and do not need to be restricted to women’s issues.
Finally, by equating the negative qualities of politics in Nigeria to natural qualities or
characteristics of men, they fail to hold men accountable. Change in Nigeria, hinges on
the ability of people to hold politicians and government officials accountable regardless
of gender. All in all my respondents are resoundingly positive about the future.
Unfortunately, I believe that if women don’t begin to break down the class, ethnic, and
religious barriers separating them, there will never be sustainable change. Seeing each
other, mobilizing together, and advocating for one another is the only way to viably
disrupt the existing system.
Suggestions for further research:
Though my research added qualitative evidence to the already existing body of
literature, my project is limited due to ethnic and religious bias. Future researchers should
57
interview more Hausa and Muslim respondents. My finding may present a middle class
bias; as such more should be done to study urban and rural conceptions of power and
authority. By doing so, the existing body of literature will not generalize the experiences
of Nigerians, but rather enhance and nuance our understanding of the varying social
locations.
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