Supreme Court of Georgia
Jane Hansen, Public Information Officer
244 Washington Street, Suite 572
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
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[email protected]
SUMMARIES OF OPINIONS
Published Monday, January 6, 2014
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Public Information Office for the general
public and news media. Summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but
only for those cases considered of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be
considered as official opinions of the Court. The full opinions are available on the Supreme
Court website at www.gasupreme.us .
HUMPHREY, WARDEN V. WALKER (S13A1472)
WALKER V. HUMPHREY, WARDEN (S13X1473)
The Supreme Court of Georgia has thrown out the conviction and death sentence of a
man convicted in Macon County of the murder of a bank vice president.
In today’s unanimous decision, Justice Keith Blackwell writes that the evidence
supports a lower court’s conclusion that Artemus Rick Walker was incompetent due to mental
illness when he was tried and convicted of the 1999 murder of Lynwood Ray Gresham.
This is the second time the case has been before the high court. When Walker’s case first
came up for appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld his death sentence and murder
.conviction.
According to the evidence at his trial in Macon County, Walker devised a plan to rob
Gresham, who was vice president of the bank located next door to the service station Walker
owned. Several days before the crimes, Walker hired Gary Lee Griffin to work at his service
station. He asked Griffin if he would help him “rob and kill” a “rich” man. On May 12, 1999,
Walker borrowed an automobile and drove with Griffin to his hotel where they picked up
Griffin's bicycle before driving to Walker's apartment. Walker gave Griffin black pants, a knife,
and a stun gun. Both men changed into black clothing, then loaded their bicycles into the
automobile.
Walker drove to a place near Gresham's house where they parked, then rode their
bicycles to Gresham's house. Griffin waited at the side of the house as Walker went to the door
and engaged Gresham in a conversation in the front yard. When Walker and Gresham began
struggling, Walker told Griffin to use the stun gun on Gresham, but Griffin refused. Griffin also
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refused when Walker told him to stab Gresham with the knife. Griffin then gave the knife to
Walker, who stabbed Gresham 12 times in the chest and back. Walker told Griffin to pick up
things that had fallen during the struggle, which included Gresham's keys and wallet. Walker
dragged Gresham, who was still alive, to the side of the house and hid him in some bushes,
where he was later found dead. Walker then told Griffin he had “one more to kill” and asked
Griffin for Gresham's keys. Walker tried to unlock the door to Gresham's house, but Gresham's
wife, Roberta Gresham, locked a chain lock and foot lock on the door and called police. Her
daughter yelled to Walker that she had a gun. Walker and Griffin then rode away on their
bicycles. Griffin was arrested nearby after he crashed his bicycle. Walker was arrested a few
hours later after he was discovered in the woods nearby. The victim's blood was on Walker's
clothes, and he had the victim's keys.
In 2002, a Macon County jury convicted Walker of malice murder, felony murder, armed
robbery, aggravated assault, attempted burglary and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
He was sentenced to death plus a life term and 35 years in prison. In 2007, when the case came
up for direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously upheld Walker’s convictions and
sentence. In August 2009, Walker’s attorney filed a petition for a “Writ of Habeas Corpus.”
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding that allows already convicted prisoners to challenge their
convictions on constitutional grounds in the county where they’re incarcerated. They generally
file the action against the prison warden, who in this case was Carl Humphrey. Following a
hearing, the habeas court in Butts County, where death row is located, ruled in Walker’s favor
and granted him a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Walker was denied his constitutional right
to due process by being tried while incompetent, rendering him unable to assist in his own
defense. It also concluded that Walker’s trial counsel had been ineffective in violation of
Walker’s constitutional right to effective counsel for failing to pursue the issue of his
competence and failing to present mitigating evidence regarding his mental health. The State
appealed the habeas court’s decision to the Georgia Supreme Court while in a cross-appeal,
Walker appealed the habeas court’s denial of his other claims for relief.
“Given the standard of review, we cannot say that the habeas court clearly erred when it
found that Walker was incompetent at the time of his trial,” today’s opinion says. “For this
reason, we must affirm the grant of the writ and the vacating of Walker’s convictions and
sentences. The State may, of course, retry Walker, but only if he is competent at the time of
retrial.” (While Walker’s convictions and sentence have been thrown out, the charges against
him remain intact.)
In today’s 41-page opinion, the high court points out that a claim that an accused is
incompetent must be brought up when the case first goes to trial. If it is not raised early in the
court process, it is considered barred and cannot be brought up for the first time in habeas
proceedings.
“The habeas court acknowledged that Walker never asserted in the court of conviction
that he was incompetent to stand trial, but it found adequate cause and prejudice to overcome the
procedural default,” the opinion says. In this case, the habeas court found that Walker’s attorneys
for both his trial and direct appeal rendered “ineffective assistance of counsel,” meaning their
performance was deficient and had it not been for their deficiencies, there is “a reasonable
probability” that the trial would have had a different outcome. The habeas court found that
Walker’s attorneys were ineffective because they “unreasonably failed to more thoroughly
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investigate his mental health, and a more thorough investigation, the habeas court found, would
have supplied evidence that Walker was not competent to stand trial,” the opinion says. The
habeas judge found, through testimony and other evidence, that Walker’s attorneys were
concerned about his mental health and procured funds and made arrangements for Walker to be
examined by Dr. Donald Meck, a psychologist. But when Walker refused to be examined, the
attorneys abandoned their efforts to have his mental health evaluated without consulting with the
psychologist about possible alternatives to a personal examination.
At the habeas hearing, substantial evidence was presented that showed Walker was
mentally incompetent at the time of trial. According to a number of witnesses, including his
mother, brother and sister, in his late teens, Walker slipped into increasingly psychotic-like
behavior. He became obsessed with religion, would fast for 40 days at a time, slipping notes
under the door to signal when he needed honey, milk or water, which is all he consumed. His
brother said Walker had grand plans for founding his own “big ministry” named “King of
Kings,” and he began wearing a robe to church and carrying a tall wooden staff. One woman
who went to his church said Walker grew from being “kind of like the golden child” into an
angry, threatening, strange man who stalked her and told her she had been appointed by God to
be his wife. A church pastor, who had been Walker’s childhood friend, described him as a once
“dynamic” youth preacher when he was 16 or 17 who changed over time and began to give
sermons people “just didn’t understand.” His decline into mental illness in his late teens was
confirmed by testimony of the bishop of Walker’s church who said that one night during a
service, Walker asked the organist to stop playing so he could address the congregation.
“Artemus then announced that he learned, directly from God, that I was a false pro[phet] and that
my wife was the Witch of Hindu,” the bishop testified. “He went on to say that God told him that
he was supposed to take over control of my church. Artemus’ behavior was very bizarre and we
escorted him out….” Other witnesses provided information about Walker’s mental state shortly
before the murder.
Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the habeas hearing, Dr. Meck gave his
opinion that Walker had been essentially free of mental illness until he was 18 or 19, then began
suffering from delusional kinds of psychotic behavior. Meck concluded Walker likely had not
been competent to stand trial.
“Dr. Meck acknowledged…that he was unable to determine, without conducting a
clinical interview with Walker, how Walker’s mental condition might have related directly to his
crimes,” today’s opinion says. “But Dr. Meck was clear that Walker’s mental condition affected
his ability to participate meaningfully in his defense.”
“If Dr. Meck had so testified at a competence trial, we can find no error in the conclusion
of the habeas court that a reasonable probability exists that Walker would have been found
incompetent to stand trial,” the opinion says. “Accordingly, Walker has carried his heavy burden
to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel with respect to competence, and
by carrying that burden, he has shown sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural
default of his claim that he was tried while he was incompetent.”
In affirming Walker’s writ of habeas corpus, the high court finds “the cross appeal is
moot and we dismiss it.”
Attorney for Appellant (Walker): Brian Kammer
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Attorneys for Appellee (Humphrey-State): Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Beth Burton,
Dep. A.G., Sabrina Graham, Sr. A.G., Dana Weinberger, Asst. A.G.
IN THE MATTER OF: DENISE L. MAJETTE (S13Y1860)
The Supreme Court of Georgia has disbarred former U.S. Rep. Denise Majette, who
served nine years as a state court judge in DeKalb County before running for Congress.
In today’s 4-to-2 decision, the majority concludes that Majette “committed multiple
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by submitting wholly unsupported and materially
misleading time sheets and invoices to her client and misrepresenting her hours and fees to a
court.” In addition, “Majette has failed to express any remorse.”
Today’s opinion points out that Majette, who was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia in
1983, “had a distinguished career.” But in 2008, while working part-time as a lawyer and real
estate agent, she began experiencing financial difficulties and asked a number of lawyers for
loans. One attorney whom she asked declined to give her a loan but offered to put her on a team
of lawyers involved in a trust case in which the clients were the beneficiaries. Majette accepted
the offer, and she and the attorney, who was lead lawyer in the case, agreed that each would
charge the client at the rate of $200 per hour for work on the estate case. The lead lawyer right
away wrote her a check for $2,000 as a retainer on Sept. 2, 2009. She received additional
payments totaling $22,500 through March 2010. Majette did not keep time records but
reconstructed her time sheets and invoices from memory and from notes she kept on her calendar
and computer. In March and April 2010, Majette, the lead lawyer and another attorney
participated in hearings regarding the trust case. After the judge said both parties could seek
attorney’s fees, Majette prepared a motion seeking legal costs on behalf of the clients. Without
running it by the lead lawyer first, Majette stated in the motion that her billing rate was $500 per
hour and she had spent 260 hours on the case, resulting in a request for $130,000 in attorney’s
fees. The motion stated the lead lawyer’s hourly rate was $300 and he had spent 140.9 hours on
the case. He said that when he eventually saw the motion, he was “stunned” and had it
withdrawn. Majette then began claiming the lead lawyer owed her $38,000, but she did not
present a bill or time sheet, and he told her she would have to seek payment from the clients. She
then demanded $39,400 from one of the clients, saying she needed the money right away. The
client asked for a copy of the bill and in the meantime wired Majette $15,000. Nearly a month
later, Majette sent an incomplete bill for her services. The client disputed the bill and eventually
filed a grievance against Majette with the state Bar. Majette denied she had been paid a $24,500
retainer, claiming the first $2,000 payment was for a personal matter and the remaining $22,500
was for earned fees.
As it normally does in disciplinary cases, the state Supreme Court appointed a “special
master” to oversee Majette’s case. A special master is an attorney appointed to conduct hearings
and recommend a course of action to the state Bar, which in turn recommends any discipline of
an attorney to the state Supreme Court for its final decision. According to today’s opinion, in
Majette’s case, the “special master found that by submitting wholly unsupported and materially
misleading time sheets and invoices to her client, misrepresenting her hours and fees to the court,
and misrepresenting in the disciplinary process the payments received, Majette committed
several violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” He recommended Majette be disbarred.
She then requested a hearing by the Bar’s Review Panel, which determined that the special
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master’s conclusions were sound and supported by the evidence. It also found that Majette had
committed additional violations. While the Review Panel decided that disbarment was “certainly
justified,” it recommended a three-year suspension with conditions for reinstatement as this was
Majette’s only disciplinary proceeding “in an otherwise distinguished career.”
Today’s majority opinion, however, rejects the Review Panel’s recommended discipline.
Rather, “we conclude that the special master’s recommendation of disbarment, reached after
careful and thorough consideration of live testimony and documentary evidence, is the proper
sanction in this matter,” the opinion says. “Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the name of
Denise L. Majette be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of
Georgia.”
In a dissent, Justice Harold Melton writes that Majette’s “over thirty years of
distinguished service to the bench and bar with no disciplinary problems whatsoever should
serve as a significant mitigating factor with respect to the punishment imposed here.”
“While I agree that the conduct involved in this case merits a severe punishment, I
believe that a prolonged suspension with conditions for reinstatement, rather than disbarment,
would be a more appropriate sanction.” The dissent is joined by Chief Justice Hugh Thompson.
Disciplinary decisions are “per curiam,” meaning they are written by the court as a
whole. The Justices joining in the majority are Presiding Justice P. Harris Hines, and Justices
Carol Hunstein, David Nahmias and Keith Blackwell. Justice Robert Benham did not participate
in the case.
Attorney for Majette: Denise Majette
Attorneys for State Bar: Paula Frederick, General Counsel, Jonathan Hewett, Asst. G.C.
DANFORTH V. APPLE INC. (SA13A1650)
The Supreme Court of Georgia has partially upheld an injunction against a woman with a
history of mental illness, who was ordered by a Cobb County judge to stay away from Apple
stores for stalking and harassing former fellow employees.
In today’s unanimous decision, however, Justice David Nahmias writes that the high
court has found the injunction is “overbroad,” and it is sending the case back to the lower court
to refashion the injunction so it is consistent with Georgia law.
In August 2011, Apple Inc. hired Catherine E. Danforth to work at its Lenox Square
Store in Atlanta. Danforth has been diagnosed at different times in her life with various mental
disorders, including depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, bipolar disorder, and borderline
personality disorder. She has been hospitalized for mental illness several times. In 2009,
Danforth was indicted for aggravated stalking and ordered as part of a plea bargain to stay away
from Dr. John Horton and not to go on the premises of Emory Hospital for a year. A year after
Danforth began working at Apple, the company fired her following what it considered an
increasing number of Danforth’s inappropriate verbal outbursts at work and displays of extreme
emotion in the store when engaging with supervisors and peers in front of customers. During the
outbursts, Danforth cried, raised her voice, yelled at employees and supervisors, shook visibly
from anger, and once hit a desk and threw a pen. She told a co-worker she had had suicidal
thoughts in the past and again was thinking about suicide.
Following Danforth’s termination, she began frequently contacting former coworkers,
despite their requests that she stop. She sent long, rambling emails, incessantly phoned
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coworkers and supervisors, left disturbing voicemails, sent frequent text messages, left
handwritten notes at the store, and showed up at both the Lenox Square Store and the employees’
parking lot despite being asked to stop. Senior manager Jacob Campbell, who had asked
Danforth to stop emailing and texting him day and night, found her looking at him through the
side mirror of her car when he parked in his usual space in the Lenox Square parking lot. While
on vacation with his family, another manager, Eugene Heggan, received 17 emotional voicemails
from Danforth, in which she was often crying and which he described as “very concerning.” In a
voicemail she left for former coworker Adam Lane, she was crying heavily and stated, “I don’t
really know why I called…you will find out soon enough.” Around the same time, Apple noticed
that her Facebook profile picture showed her looking through the sights of a hunting rifle. Due to
the continuing behavior, Apple hired Fulton County Sheriff’s Department officers as private
security. On Nov. 13, 2012, Apple emailed Danforth and told her not to come back to the Lenox
store as the company viewed her behavior as “highly disruptive and harassing.” Despite the
email, Danforth placed orders for pickup at the store, which Apple cancelled.
On Nov. 15, Danforth, representing herself “pro se,” sued Apple in federal court for
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging Apple had failed to
accommodate her mental disability. On Nov. 21, 2012, Apple filed a petition in Fulton County
Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order and an injunction against Danforth. (The
petition was subsequently transferred to Cobb County Superior Court after Apple learned that
Danforth lived in Marietta, which is in Cobb County, rather than in Atlanta.) Apple alleged in its
petition that since she had been fired, Danforth “engaged in an escalating scheme of threatening
and harassing stalking primarily directed at three Lenox store management employees” –
Campbell, Heggan and Lane – which caused them “to be gravely concerned for their safety.”
The same day Apple filed its petition, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Danforth from contacting or harassing Apple employees.
Despite the restraining order, Danforth continued to contact Apple’s employees by
copying them on emails she sent to Apple’s attorneys. In one she wrote, “I want to let you know
that you do your client no favors by intentionally antagonizing me and trying to make me angry.”
At a hearing on the injunction in January 2013, Danforth was very emotional, cried and at one
point rambled on about guns. Following the hearing, the trial judge issued an injunction under
Official Code of Georgia § 34-1-7, which allows employers to protect their employees in the
workplace by seeking an injunction when an employee “has suffered unlawful violence or a
credible threat of violence from any individual.” The injunction prohibited Danforth for three
years from: (1) entering any Apple store; (2) knowingly being within 500 feet of any Apple
employee from the Lenox Square Store; and (3) contacting any Apple employee by any means,
including social media. The trial judge concluded there was “clear and convincing evidence” that
Danforth “had exhibited a course of conduct over the past several months that would give a
reasonable person fear of receiving immediate violence.” Furthermore the judge expressed he
was “worried based on the testimony in this case,” and found that Apple employees “have every
reason to be concerned, to be afraid.” Danforth then appealed to the state Supreme Court,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the injunction and that the injunction was
overbroad.
In today’s opinion, the high court finds “the evidence presented at the injunction hearing
…was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find by clear and convincing evidence that
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Danforth engaged in ‘unlawful violence’ against Apple employees by stalking them, which can
reasonably be construed to have been carried out at the employee[s’] workplace.’” Therefore,
“the trial court was authorized to grant Apple an injunction under Official Code of Georgia § 341-7 (e) prohibiting Danforth from engaging in further unlawful violence against Apple’s
employees at the workplace or while acting within the course and scope of their employment.”
However, injunctions authorized by the statute are limited to “prohibiting further
unlawful violence or threats of violence at the employee’s workplace or while the employee is
acting within the course and scope of employment with the employer.”
The main problem with the injunction against Danforth, today’s opinion says, is the third
restriction, which prohibits her from “contacting any Apple employee, directly or indirectly, by
any means of communication including social media….” Under this restriction, “Danforth could
violate the injunction merely by communicating through social media with a person anywhere in
the world who happens to be an Apple employee, even if Danforth is unaware of that person’s
connection to Apple and the communication has nothing to do with Apple or her unhappy
relationship with Apple,” the opinion says.
“Accordingly, we affirm the injunction order to the extent that the trial court ruled that
the evidence supports an injunction under § 34-1-7, but we must vacate the injunction and
remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a new injunction that is fully consistent with §
34-1-7 (e).” Today’s opinion marks the first time the state Supreme Court has interpreted this
statute.
Attorney for Appellant (Danforth): Regan Keebaugh
Attorneys for Appellee (Apple): L. Traywick Duffie, Christine Tenley, Nicolette Lee
SCOTT V. THE STATE (S13G1042)
The Supreme Court of Georgia has unanimously reversed a Georgia Court of Appeals
decision involving a man’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine. At issue in this case is whether
the statute in effect at the time of the offense required proof that the defendant knew the quantity
of cocaine he possessed to convict him of drug trafficking.
With today’s unanimous decision, the high court has ruled that under the former statute,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the man knew the cocaine he
possessed weighed 28 grams or more.
“Simply, former Official Code of Georgia § 16-13-31 (a) (1), applicable to this case,
required proof that the defendant had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine,” Presiding
Justice P. Harris Hines writes for the Court. “Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for consideration consistent with this
opinion.”
According to the facts of the case, in September 2009, police executed a search warrant at
a home rented by Kenneth Scott in Vidalia, GA, where they found a line of individually wrapped
crack cocaine that stretched from the front door to the middle of the room. They also found a
large slab of crack cocaine weighing 72.65 grams with a purity of 72.6 percent of cocaine. The
search further uncovered 37 individually wrapped packages of powdered cocaine, marijuana, a
mirror and a cutting tool, and guns. Scott was charged with several offenses, including
trafficking in cocaine. In March 2010, he was tried in Toombs County with three co-defendants
and convicted of all counts. He was sentenced as a repeat offender to life in prison with no
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possibility of parole. On appeal, Scott argued he could not be convicted for trafficking cocaine
because the State did not present evidence that he knew the cocaine weighed more than 28
grams. At the time of the crimes and his trial, Official Code of Georgia §16-13-31 (a) (1) said:
“Any person…who is knowingly in possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture
with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine,…commits the felony offense of trafficking in
cocaine.” Scott argued that the term “knowingly” required that the State prove he knew that the
cocaine weighed more than 28 grams and that knowledge of the quantity of the drug was an
element of the offense. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled against him and
upheld his convictions. Citing its own precedent, the Court of Appeals ruled that “proof of the
knowledge of the quantity of cocaine is not an element of the offense.”
“But such holding is in error,” today’s opinion says. “The plain language of former
Official Code of Georgia §16-13-31 (a) (1) at issue dictates the conclusion that knowledge of the
quantity of the drug was an element of the crime. It contains express scienter requirements, that
is, knowledge of the nature and amount of the drug and of being in possession of it. And,
certainly where ‘knowledge’ is made part of an offense, the State has the burden to prove the
defendant’s guilty knowledge.”
The General Assembly has since deleted the word “knowingly” from the trafficking
statute, effective July 1, 2013. That change “is consistent with legislative confirmation that proof
of a defendant’s knowledge of each element of the trafficking statute, including weight of the
drug, was required in former versions of the statute, but that the General Assembly no longer
intends that it be so,” today’s opinion says. This is reinforced by passage of another statute,
Official Code of Georgia §16-13-54.1, also effective July 1, 2013, which states that “the
defendant’s knowledge of such weight or quantity shall not be an essential element of the
offense, and the state shall not have the burden of proving that a defendant knew the weight or
quantity of the controlled substance or marijuana in order to be convicted of an offense.”
Furthermore, the enacting legislation states that any offense occurring prior to July 1, 2013 is to
be governed by the statute in effect at the time.
With today’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court has overruled the Court of Appeals’
1995 decision in Cleveland v. State, as well as three other cases “to the extent that they hold that
knowledge of the quantity or weight of the cocaine is not an essential element of the offense of
trafficking in cocaine as set forth in former Official Code of Georgia §16-13-31 (a) (1).”
Attorney for Appellant (Scott): Robert Persse
Attorneys for Appellee (State): Hayward Altman, District Attorney, Rizza Palmares, Asst.
D.A.
CRAWFORD V. THE STATE (S13A1875)
In this high-profile Gwinnett County murder, the Supreme Court of Georgia has
unanimously upheld the conviction and life prison sentence given to Demarcus Crawford for his
role with three others in the 2008 killing of 51-year-old Tedla Lemma during a break-in and
burglary at his Lilburn home.
In the 1990s, Lemma, an Ethiopian native, and his three brothers sought asylum in the
United States. He lived in a quiet neighborhood with one of his brothers who had built up a
successful business before Tedla became a victim of three violent crimes.
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Lorna Araya, who was also Ethiopian, later testified for the State as part of a plea bargain
that in late 2007 and early 2008, she masterminded several burglaries in which she targeted
members of Gwinnett County’s Ethiopian community whom she suspected stored money or
other valuables in their homes. Quincy Jackson and Marshae Brooks, two of her co-indictees,
helped execute the earlier robberies. At some point, Araya met Demarcus Crawford, known as
“Money Marc,” at a party where Jackson and she discussed in front of Crawford possible plans
for a future burglary. In early March 2008, Araya and Jackson decided to target the Lemma
house on Kenion Forest Drive where Tedla lived with his brother Sirak Lemma. According to
briefs filed in the case, the brothers had arrived in this country with nothing, but after working
many jobs and saving money, Sirak was able to buy his own convenience store. Several years
earlier, Tedla had been working as a cashier when the store was robbed and he was shot, leaving
him partially paralyzed.
Araya said she chose the Lemmas to rob because her parents had dealings with the
Lemmas and she was familiar with the operation of the store and when the most cash would be
around. The first time they robbed the house, in November 2007, Araya drove her car to the
Lemma house with Jackson and another man as passengers. While she waited, the other two,
armed with guns and duct tape, went into the house for about 15 minutes, before they ran back
out with a plastic bag of money. The men told her they had taken the money from Sirak’s safe
after they hit him in the head with a gun and he gave them the combination. They tied up both
Lemmas with the duct tape before leaving. Back at Araya’s house, they split the proceeds, each
getting $15,000 to $18,000.
In the ensuing months, they broke into two other homes whose owners Araya knew from
which they stole money, credit cards, video games, and computers. In March 2008, Araya and
Jackson began making plans to burglarize the Lemmas a second time. This time, they would go
during the day, assuming no one would be home. On March 25, 2008, Crawford joined Brooks
and Jackson and drove to Araya’s house. When Araya asked why Crawford was with them,
Jackson replied that Crawford “needed money.” Again, Araya drove and let the three men out at
the Lemmas’ house while she waited up the street. Jackson called her a few minutes later and
had her back into the garage so they could load a television and electronics into her car.
Araya later testified the men told her that upon entering the Lemmas’ house, they’d been
startled to find someone at home. Tedla had stayed home the morning of March 25 and was due
to be picked up by a family friend later in the day and taken to his brother’s store. When the
friend was unable to make contact with Tedla, he contacted his brother, who asked him to call
police to make a welfare check, according to the briefs.
A Gwinnett County police officer found Tedla’s body lying face down on the floor of an
upstairs bedroom. He’d been bound with several neckties and a television cable that was still
attached to the TV. His hands and feet were hogtied behind his back and a shoe was missing.
Tedla had suffered multiple injuries to his face, eyes, testicles, head, neck and ribs, and his face
was covered with an adult diaper held in place by a man’s tie. According to the medical
examiner, the cause of death was mechanical obstruction of the nose and mouth, combined with
blunt force trauma. Following a jury trial, Crawford was acquitted of malice murder but
convicted of felony murder, burglary and false imprisonment, and he was sentenced to life in
prison. He then appealed, arguing among other things that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions.
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But in today’s opinion, written by Justice Carol Hunstein, the high court disagrees,
upholding his convictions and sentence. Crawford’s attorney argued that the evidence was
insufficient because it was based alone on the uncorroborated testimony of Araya, who was an
admitted accomplice. Under state law, “in felony cases in which the State relies on the testimony
of an accomplice to the crimes, in order to justify submitting the case for the jury’s
determination, the State must present testimony of at least one other witness or evidence of
corroborating circumstances,” the opinion points out. “The additional evidence that is required
‘may be circumstantial and it may be slight, and it need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a
conviction of the crime charged.’” In this case, in addition to Araya’s testimony, cell phone data
tied Crawford to the crime, showing that “Jackson traveled to Crawford’s home and then to
Araya’s home and that, after the burglary, Jackson traveled back to Crawford’s home,” the
opinion says. There were also multiple calls made the morning of the crime among the four coindictees, including Crawford. “Though we recognize that these records provided only
circumstantial evidence of Crawford’s participation in the crimes, we agree with the trial court’s
finding that this evidence was sufficient to support submission of the case to the jury for its
determination.”
“The evidence was thus sufficient to corroborate Araya’s testimony” under the statute in
effect at the time, the opinion says. “This being the case, the evidence was also sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawford was guilty of
the crimes of which he was convicted.”
Attorney for Appellant (Crawford): Maryann Blend
Attorneys for Appellee (State): Daniel Porter, District Attorney, Drew Unger, Assistant District
Attorney, Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Patricia Burton, Dep. A.G., Paula Smith, Sr. Asst.
A.G.
PEOPLES V. THE STATE (S13A1893)
In a split 4-to-3 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the murder conviction
and life prison sentence given to Kevin Peoples for his involvement in the 2002 shooting death
of J.R. Morrow during a home invasion. A key issue in this Douglas County case is whether the
trial court’s admission of evidence of Peoples’ involvement in a prior robbery was a harmless
error, which would not require the reversal of Peoples’ conviction, or a harmful error, which
would require reversal.
In today’s opinion, Justice David Nahmias writes for the majority that a reversal is not
necessary. “We agree that this evidence was erroneously admitted,” the majority opinion says,
“but we conclude that the error was harmless.”
According to the evidence, 20-year-old J.R. Morrow lived with his father, James
Morrow, and his father’s girlfriend, Judy McClure, at McClure’s home in Douglas County.
Justin Brown, a friend of J.R.’s, had been staying at the house for several days prior to the home
invasion. Brown knew there was a large amount of money in a gun safe because he had seen the
contents when James took out $1,000 to give to J.R. so he could buy a car. Brown told Peoples
and another friend, Giovanni Little, that he was thinking of making some money by robbing
J.R.’s father. The three devised a plan for Peoples and Little to distract the home’s occupants
while Brown slipped in and took the money.
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The night of Oct. 15, 2002, James, J.R. and McClure were at home when Brown called
from a nearby gas station pay phone and asked for J.R. James told the caller his son was not at
home, as he didn’t want to disturb J.R. who was asleep in his basement bedroom. A few minutes
later, Peoples, Brown and Little were driven to the McClure house by Peoples’ younger brother,
Byron Peoples. Byron waited in the car, while his brother and Little climbed the stairs to the
front porch and Brown hid at the side. Hearing noises outside, James Morrow went to the door.
As he opened it, one of the men reached inside and shot him in the shoulder. The men then
rushed the door, knocking James down. Once inside, one of the intruders shot James in the leg
and shot at McClure as she tried to exit her bedroom, firing the gun with his right hand. McClure
was not hit but was ordered by the gunman back into her bedroom while James was moved at
gunpoint to a back bathroom. Trapped in the bathroom, James Morrow heard one of the intruders
say, “I found him, I found him.” He also heard a gunshot from the direction of the basement.
After hearing the intruders run out of the house, James and McClure ran to the basement, where
they found J.R. with a gunshot wound to the chest. J.R. died at the scene. James and McClure
later identified Little as the shooter who forced them into the rooms. James identified Peoples as
the other man who had burst into the house from the front porch.
During the investigation, a cousin of J.R.’s told police that Brown had told him he
planned to rob James Morrow and that Peoples planned to participate. Later, in a search of
Peoples’ home, police found a Remington brand ammunition tray and identification that
implicated Peoples in a robbery and shooting by a left-handed gunman that had occurred 12 days
earlier in Buckhead. While police were searching his house, a car that matched the description of
Peoples’ car drove up the street, abruptly stopped and drove away. Peoples’ girlfriend later
admitted to officers that after the shooting, Peoples asked her to provide a false alibi, hid out at
her house with his brother, and later told her from jail not to cooperate with the investigation.
Telephone records showed that multiple calls had been made between Peoples and Little before
and after the home invasion. Three days after J.R.’s murder, Peoples was arrested in Texas where
he and his brother had fled. A firearms expert concluded that the bullets used in the shootings at
the Morrow home and in the Buckhead armed robbery came from the same gun and were .25
caliber Remington brand bullets. Little entered a guilty plea and testified against Peoples at his
trial. Byron Peoples also pleaded guilty, and Brown was convicted following a separate trial.
Following a two-week trial, a jury convicted Peoples, who is left handed, of felony
murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, aggravated battery and burglary, and
he was sentenced to two life terms plus 20 years in prison. He then appealed to the state Supreme
Court, arguing the trial court made several errors.
In today’s opinion, the high court finds it was error for the trial court to let the State
present evidence implicating Peoples in the prior armed robbery without following the
procedures required to admit “similar transaction evidence.” Under Uniform Superior Court
Rules 31.1 and 31.3, the trial court failed to give notice to the defense that it intended to offer the
Buckhead robbery evidence as a “similar transaction.” The trial court also erred by not holding
the hearing and making the findings that are required before similar transaction evidence may be
admitted.
“Not all trial errors require reversal, however,” today’s majority opinion says. “The test
for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error
did not contribute to the verdict.”
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“Considering the trial record as a whole, and weighing the evidence as we believe that
reasonable jurors would, we are convinced that the jury in this case would have found [Peoples]
guilty of the same crimes had the Buckhead robbery evidence not been erroneously admitted,”
the majority opinion says. “Moreover, compared to the overwhelming other evidence of
[Peoples’] guilt, we do not view the Buckhead robbery evidence as particularly compelling or
prejudicial. We therefore conclude that it is highly probable that the trial court’s error in
admitting the independent offense evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict, and a new trial is not
required.” Joining the majority are Presiding Justice P. Harris Hines and Justices Harold Melton
and Keith Blackwell.
In the dissent, Justice Carol Hunstein writes that the majority’s holding that the trial
court’s error was harmless “eviscerates the requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1
and 31.3 and improperly permits the introduction of evidence of independent acts of the accused
without the procedural protections we have insisted are mandatory. As we have recognized,
evidence of an independent act committed by the accused is ‘highly and inherently prejudicial’
because it raises ‘an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is
likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion.’” “This is why we
have held that the trial court must hold a hearing pursuant to Rule 31.3 (B) before any evidence
of independent offenses or acts may be admitted at trial.”
“Given the evidence presented here, I believe it is highly probable that the errors – the
State failing to provide proper notice pursuant to Rules 31.1 and 31.3 (B) and the trial court
failing to conduct a Rule 31.3 (B) hearing and make affirmative findings on the record – did
contribute to the verdict.”
“Once the Buckhead armed robbery was admitted, Peoples’ character was tainted and he
was no longer tried solely for the crimes charged in the indictment,” the dissent says. “I believe
that the proper course in this particular case is to find that the error was not harmless and to
reverse.” Joining the dissent are Chief Justice Hugh Thompson and Justice Robert Benham.
Attorney for Appellant (Peoples): J. Scott Key
Attorneys for Appellee (State): David McDade, District Attorney, Emily Richardson, Asst.
D.A., Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Beth Burton, Dep. A.G., Paula Smith, Sr. Asst. A.G.,
Meghan Hill, Asst. A.G.
FULTON COUNTY ET AL V. CITY OF SANDY SPRINGS ET AL. (S14A0114)
In a 6-to-1 decision, the state Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the City of Sandy
Springs in a dispute with Fulton County over which government entity must pay for two
drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs.
In today’s majority opinion, Justice Harold Melton writes that the County never
transferred ownership of the ponds and dam to the City, and the Fulton County Superior Court
was therefore correct in ruling that the County retains responsibility for their upkeep.
“Under the present circumstances of this case, we find that Fulton County retains current
ownership of and responsibility for the easements it holds over the dam and retention ponds
located in Sandy Springs,” the opinion says. However, the County’s responsibility continues
“only until the easements at issue are legally transferred, terminated or prospectively abandoned.
As a result, to the extent that the trial court’s order may be read to indicate that Fulton County
has to maintain the easements in perpetuity, it must be reversed.”
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According to the facts of the case, in the early 1970s, property owners located
downstream from Arlington Memorial Park began complaining about surface flooding. The
cemetery on Mount Vernon Highway is privately owned by Executive Equities, Inc. In response
to the homeowners’ concerns and to avoid litigation, in the mid-1970s, the County acquired from
Executive Equities two easements over the property to construct and maintain two detention
ponds on the property. At the time, the property was located in unincorporated Fulton County.
On Dec. 1, 2005, Sandy Springs came into existence as a separate city created by the Georgia
General Assembly. Official Code of Georgia § 36-31-8 provides for a transition period of no
more than 24 months “for the orderly transition of governmental functions from the county to the
new municipal corporation” after which “[v]arious governmental functions, services, and
responsibilities will be assumed by the new municipal corporation within its territory.” In 2009,
after the transition period had ended, the Sandy Springs city attorney notified the County that
there were continuing problems with the detention ponds and dam, which had fallen into
disrepair, and that because neither of the ponds was road-related, Sandy Springs had not assumed
any ownership interest at the time of its incorporation. When the County did not respond, the
City and two homeowners sued, asking the court to declare that the County retained ownership
of, and responsibility for, the two drainage retention ponds and dam located within Sandy
Springs. Following a bench trial (before the judge with no jury), the judge ruled in the City’s
favor, finding that Fulton County was responsible for the continuing maintenance of the
detention ponds even though they were within Sandy Springs’ city limits. The County then
appealed to the state Supreme Court, arguing that once the City came into existence, it became
automatically responsible for the maintenance of storm water infrastructure within its
boundaries. It further argued that the under a provision of the Georgia Constitution, the County
was prohibited from providing storm water management services within the City without an
intergovernmental agreement.
“Fulton County’s reliance on this constitutional provision is misplaced,” today’s opinion
says. “Fulton County is not being required to provide Sandy Springs with an ongoing ‘storm
water and sewage collection and disposal system’ in the absence of an intergovernmental
contract. As it stands right now, Fulton County continues to own the easements. Until its
easement is legally transferred, terminated, or abandoned, Fulton County is merely being
required to maintain those structures it previously decided to build.”
Although the County argues that its easement to build and maintain the ponds and dam
was automatically terminated by the creation of Sandy Springs, “Fulton County has pointed out
no statute or law which would indicate that an easement over private property automatically
terminates when a city has been created,” the majority opinion says.
In the dissent, Justice Robert Benham writes that the County voluntarily constructed the
two detention ponds and had no contractual duty to maintain the facilities it built on its
easements. “Now that these storm water detention facilities are no longer located within
unincorporated Fulton County, the County is no longer obligated to provide these facilities; in
fact, the County is constitutionally prohibited from maintaining these facilities except by contract
with Sandy Springs or unless otherwise provided by law,” the dissent says. “Despite language to
the contrary, the effect of the majority opinion is to require Fulton County to maintain these
facilities and thereby provide storm water detention services to a territory that is not within
unincorporated Fulton County, which the County is prohibited by law to provide.”
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“I agree that the creation of Sandy Springs did not automatically terminate these
easements and that the easements were not transferred to Sandy Springs upon the City’s
creation,” the dissent says. “But that is not the issue raised by this case. The easements simply
permit Fulton County to enter onto the property owned by another to construct and maintain the
facilities it built. By law, it is no longer permitted to provide the storm water detention services
that these facilities were built to provide.”
“While Sandy Springs currently does not own easements to enter onto the private
property on which the ponds are located, there is nothing to prevent it from obtaining the
necessary easements,” the dissent says. “That is what Fulton County did in order to fulfill its
obligation to provide storm sewer facilities, and now the obligation to provide such services to
territories within its incorporated limits is that of Sandy Springs.”
Attorneys for Appellants (County): Kaye Burwell, Matthew Welch, Laura Lewis
Attorneys for Appellees (City): Wendell Willard, Lawrence Young
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IN OTHER CASES, the Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld murder convictions and life
prison sentences for:
* Anthony Bonner (Bibb Co.)
* Anthony Idris Bostic (Clayton Co.)
* Deanthony Hartsfield (DeKalb Co.)
* Mark Reed (DeKalb Co.)
BONNER V. THE STATE (S14A0034)
BOSTIC V. THE STATE (S13A1344)
HARTSFIELD V. THE STATE (S13A1608)
REED V. THE STATE (S13A1583)
IN OTHER DISCIPLINARY MATTERS, in a split 4-to-3 vote, the Supreme Court has
disbarred the following attorney:
* Edward T. Murray
IN THE MATTER OF: EDWARD T. MURRAY
(S14Y0137, S14Y0138, S14Y0139, S14Y0140)
(Justice Robert Benham has written a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Hugh Thompson and
Justice Harold Melton, and stating that “disbarment is a needlessly harsh sanction.”)
The Court has denied a Certificate of Fitness for Readmission for the following attorney who
was disbarred in 2003:
* William Norman Robbins IN THE MATTER: OF WILLIAM NORMAN ROBBINS
(S12Z0998)
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