Cambridge University Press
International Organization Foundation
Thomas Hobbes's "Highway to Peace"
Author(s): Donald W. Hanson
Source: International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 329-354
Published by: The MIT Press
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Thomas Hobbes's "highway to peace"
Donald W. Hanson
Among a good many studentsof politics,and especiallythose whose interests
lie primarilyin internationalpolitics, Thomas Hobbes has been remembered
chiefly as the theorist of a natural condition of humankind afflictedby an
insecurityso profound that it results in the logic, and all too often the fact,
of a war of each against all and, therefore,of a ceaseless and self-interested
quest for power that ends only in death. In this strugglethe ideas of right
and wrong,just and unjust, have no place. Certainlyit is for these famous
(or infamous) views that he is so often celebrated (or denounced) as the
quintessentialrealist.Indeed,the only seriousrivalfor that title is Thucydides,
whose great history of the Peloponnesianwar Hobbes translatedand from
which, without doubt, he learned a great deal.
At the level of domestic politics, Hobbes'sanalysishas found few admirers
recently, since the argument is designed to show that citizens owe to the
sovereign their entire and "inviolable"obedience.' His impact on thinking
about interstaterelations, however, has been both durableand substantial.
Indeed, two recent commentators, Michael Walzerand CharlesBeitz, have
representedHobbes's work as the paradigmaticcase for the realistdoctrines
in internationalpoliticaltheory that they wish to persuadeus to reject,while
a third, Stanley Hoffmann, has argued that Hobbes's version of realism is
at any rate the most radical formulation of that view, one that requires
I wishto thankStanleyHoffmann,JudithShklar,RobertKeohane,the editorsof International
Organization,and the anonymousreviewersof this articlefor a good many helpfulcomments,
criticisms,and suggestions.I have not respondedto all of them, but I am neverthelessmost
gratefulfor them.
1. Leviathan,"Reviewand Conclusion,"p. 511 (EW, 3: 713). The initialpage referencesare
to Leviathan,ed. MichaelOakeshott(New York:Collier, 1962). Chapterreferencesare given
for Leviathanin order to make the use of other editions feasible.In some cases I also supply
referencesto SirWilliamMolesworth'seditions,TheEnglish Worksof ThomasHobbes(London:
John Bohn, 1839-45), and ThomaeHobbesMalmesburiensis,OperaPhilosophicaquaeLatine
Scripsit(London:John Bohn, 1839-45): hereafter,EW and LW, followedby volume number
and page.
InternationalOrganization38, 2, Spring 1984 0020-8183/84/020329-25 $1.50
? 1984 by the MassachusettsInstituteof Technologyand the World Peace Foundation
330
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substantialmodificationratherthan rejectiontout court.2 Even Hedley Bull,
who insists, with good reason, that it ought to be better recognized that
Hobbes was a "true philosopher of peace," nevertheless concludes that
Hobbes's theory does not offer any reason to hope for alteration in the
essential logic of the state of war among nations.3
Walzer and Beitz principallyobject that Hobbes depicts the international
state of war as the realm of necessity, a characterizationthat excludes not
only the possibility of any ameliorationin the logic of insecurityand competition but also the meaningfulnessof moral judgment in international
politics. Hobbes and realists generally,Walzer writes, "claim to have discovered an awful truth: what we conventionally call inhumanity is simply
humanityunderpressure."On Walzer'sview, Hobbes found this conviction
expressedin "Thucydides'History of the Peloponnesian Warand then generalized its argument in his own Leviathan."In this "realm of necessity,"
moral discourse is mere cant.4Hoffmann'sview, though sharingin this assessment, is more complex, since his criticismof Hobbes is directedagainst
both the empiricaladequacyof the notion of unrelievedrivalryamong states
and the narrowness and rigidity of its normative dimension. "Not at all
times are states in a situationof war of all againstall; it is not true throughout
history,it is not truein spaceat any one moment."Moreover,"the Hobbesian
view predeterminesthe goal of political action by saying that it must be
securityand survival and nothing else, and by reducingall choices to techniques."' Beitz, too, offers reasons for denying the empirical adequacy of
the model of interstate relations implied by Hobbes's account of the state
of nature. That model, he maintains, must rely, incorrectly,on the suppositions that states of approximatelyequal power are the only actors in international relations, and that in these relations the states are in a position to
control their internalaffairsindependentlybut not in a position to anticipate
"reciprocalcompliance" with any "rules of cooperation."6
There is good textual support for these analyses, and, indeed, it seems to
2. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 4; Charles R.
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979),
pp. vii, 8, 27-28, 32, 65; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse
University Press, 1981), pp. 11, 14.
3. Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," Social Research 48 (Winter 1981),
pp. 725, 728, 729, 738.
4. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 4. For a full-scale account of Thucydides exactly along
Walzer's lines, see Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 139-50. Pouncey's appendix (pp. 151-57)
discusses "the affinity between Thucydides and Hobbes," one that is undeniably there. Nevertheless I distinguish Hobbes from his great predecessor, and not just because Hobbes generalized
while Thucydides dwelt on particularities (although that is anything but unimportant). For an
especially illuminating discussion, see Raymond Aron, "Thucydides and the Historical Narrative,"
in Politicsand History:SelectedEssays by RaymondAron,trans.and ed. by MiriamBernheim
Conant (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 20-46.
5. Hoffmann,Duties beyondBorders,p. 14.
6. Beitz, Political Theoryand InternationalRelations,p. 36.
Hobbes's highwayto peace
331
me that they are in some sense right-as far as they go. There is, however,
more to the story than the logic of the state of nature,enough, indeed, that
the usual view of Hobbes presents us with a diminished figure.To borrow
a point Hobbes makes himself, it is the whole design that needs to be taken
into account, and not just the "barewords" or "singletexts."7In particular,
there are good reasons for saying that Hobbes posed the problem of war to
himself in terms of an identifiable set of assumptions-and aspirationsthat are not fully captured by the inclination to concentrate, sometimes
exclusively, on the implications of the idea of the state of nature (as, for
example, would seem to be the case in Kenneth Waltz'sMan, the State, and
War),or on the spare logical design that provides the scaffolding,but only
the scaffolding,for Leviathan.8
This is not to claim that a wider frame will find Hobbes's work providing
anything like a successful theory of internationalpolitics. On the contrary,
Hobbes conceived of his task in such a way as to result, on the one hand,
in a serious misunderstandingof the fundamental problems involved in
achieving peace, and, on the other, in a very substantialunderestimationof
its difficulty.But the flaws that produce these results can be made understandable. Furthermore,the theoretical missteps lie at a deeper level of
Hobbesianpoliticaltheory and, I shall suggest,have had broaderintellectual
consequences than are accounted for on the usual view.
There is, in any case, a recognizable"Hobbesiantradition"in the study
of internationalrelations,whetherit has been faithfulto Hobbes or not, and
it tends to conform to the characterizationsjust discussed.9Yet in all this
one finds a distressinglylarge amount of irony and paradox.First, the most
obvious difficulty,of course, is that Hobbes has comparativelylittle to say,
at least directly, about the competition of states. It is true that he expressly
licenses the translationof his analysisof the state of war among individuals
to the level of internationalrivalry.Yet preciselywhat his readeris to make
of the analogy is, to put it mildly, not entirely clear. Thanks largelyto the
critical efforts of Montesquieu and Rousseau, Hobbes's analogy must now
seem problematicalat best, and, at worst, misleading.'0Yet Hobbes's sponsorshipof this outlook is not simply inadvertenceor shortsightednesson his
part nor, for that matter, an inexplicable failure to notice the difference
7. Leviathan,chap. 43, p. 436 (EW 3: 602).
8. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), pp. 85, 165-66. Waltz does not undertake an analysis of Hobbes in the otherwise
comprehensive development of his three images of the causes of war; indeed, the book contains
no reference at all to Hobbes's text or even a bibliographical entry. Beitz, Political Theory and
International Relations, p. 35, fn. 49, suggests that Hobbes's account conforms to Waltz's third
image. Beitz says Waltz illustrates his third image by Spinoza and Rousseau. Actually, Waltz
(pp. 161-62) employs Spinoza as an example of his first image, and by way of contrast with
Kant (for the second image) and Rousseau.
9. Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," p. 717.
10. Especially helpful is Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War (New York: Praeger, 1965),
pp. 56-67.
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between internaland externalwar. On the contrary,his analogyis essential
to his understandingof his task.
Second,Hobbesconceivedof his own achievementas a general,systematic,
and logically rigorouscivil or moral science. Yet the readingof Hobbes as
the supremerealistof (at least)internationalpoliticaltheoryrestson a handful
of his most strikingphrases arbitrarilylifted out of a very carefullycrafted
and interdependentwhole. To be sure, his own estimate of the logical rigor
of his scheme can be questioned, but this does not justify inattention to
elements of the argumentother than the famous languageof chapterthirteen
of Leviathan. Hobbes, it must be admitted, is himself partly responsible,
not only becausehe invites the analogybetween his accountof the individual
state of war and interstaterivalrybut also becauseit is exactly in his account
of the state of nature as the state of war that he rose to the highest level of
his very considerableliterarypower. Nevertheless, we mistreathim and, it
may be, mislead ourselves by approachinghis work in this remarkablyselective way. For to the extent that interpretationrests chiefly on the wellknown utterancesof the thirteenthchapter of his masterpiece,his analysis
is at least obscured and at most simply lost.
Third, just where his philosophy appears to have had one of its lasting
effects-in a fundamentalconceptionof the natureof the competitionamong
states-his argument as a whole has been least fully considered. Detailed
studieshave been devoted to a sizablenumberof interestingand problematical
featuresof Hobbes's work. Its relationto social and ideologicalcontext has
been much debated;" there have been close examinations of his ideas on
method, obligation, representation,religion, language,logic, and physics;'2
11. C. B. Macpherson,The Political Theoryof PossessiveIndividualism(Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 1962), pp. 9-106; Keith Thomas, "The Social Originsof Hobbes'sPolitical
Thought," in Keith C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,
1965), pp. 185-236; QuentinSkinner,"The IdeologicalContextof Hobbes'sPoliticalThought,"
HistoricalJournal 9, 3 (1966), pp. 286-317.
12.J. W. N. Watkins,Hobbes'sSystemof Ideas(NewYork:Barnes& Noble, 1968),concentrates
on Hobbes's ideas on method; HowardWarrender,The Political Philosophyof Hobbes:His
Theoryof Obligation(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1957);RalphRoss, HerbertW. Schneider,
and TheodoreWaldman,eds., ThomasHobbesin His Time (Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1974), providesessays on diversetopics,as do BernardH. Baumrin,ed., Hobbes's
Leviathan:Interpretationand Criticsm(Belmont,Calif.:Wadsworth,1969), MauriceCranston
and RichardS. Peters,eds., Hobbesand Rousseau(GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), and
Brown,HobbesStudies.F. C. Hood, TheDivinePoliticsof ThomasHobbes(Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1964), arguesthat Hobbes is to be interpretedas a traditionalChristianmoralist;Hanna
Pitkin, "Hobbes's Concept of Representation,"Part I, AmericanPolitical Science Review58
(June 1964), pp. 328-40, and Part II, ibid. (December 1964), pp. 902-18; M. M. Goldsmith,
Hobbes'sScience of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), presentsa very
carefulgeneralaccount;David P. Gauthier,The Logic of Leviathan(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1969), systematicallydevelops a distinctionbetweenthe formal,generaldefinitionalaspectsof
Hobbes'smoral and politicaltheoryand its substantivecontent;F. S. McNeilly, TheAnatomy
of Leviathan(New York: St Martin's, 1968), arguesthat there are importantdevelopmental
asDectsin Hobbes's Doliticalwritingsthat are too often overlooked.
Hobbes's highway to peace 333
his intellectualdebts have provokedsome exploration;13and we have studies
of the hostilityhe provokedin his own day and, fortunately,of contemporary
enthusiasmfor his workas well.'4 But sustainedexaminationof his argument
on the subject of war has not been plentiful.
Finally, and above all, it is too often and too easily forgottenthat, by his
own account, the overridingpurposeof his politicaltheory was to "show us
the highway to peace."'"It is possible to take the view that he must mean
peace only in domestic political life, but, while that judgment can certainly
be defended, it may not be entirely adequate or fair. Hobbes concentrated
his analyticand prescriptiveefforton the problem of civil war, but this fact
does not quite remove the possibilitythat his ultimateaims were wider than
the quest for English domestic tranquillityor even a general resolution to
the problem of civil war. At the very least, his languagesometimes suggests
completegeneralityin connectionwith the achievementof peace. Ultimately,
Hobbes holds, it is the errorsof moral philosophersthat have bred sedition
and war. If, however, we were to achieve a moral philosophy adequate to
its immense practicalimportance, the author of that philosophy, he says,
"surely... will not only show us the highway to peace, but will also teach
us how to avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-paths of faction and
sedition; than which I know not what can be thought more profitable."Of
course, Hobbes thought he had done exactly that in the presentationsof his
own civil science.'6And the languagethat frames that presentation,in De
Civeat least, is altogetherunqualifiedin connectionwith the subjectof peace:
were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of
quantityin geometricalfigures,the strengthof avarice and ambition,
which is sustained by the erroneousopinions of the vulgar as touching
the nature of right and wrong,would presentlyfaint and languish;and
mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for
13. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1952), esp. pp. 30-43, emphasizes Aristotelean elements; Thomas A. Spragens Jr., The Politics
of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (London: Croom Helm, 1973), explores Hobbes's
debts to Aristotle in detail.
14. John Bowle, Hobbes and His Critics: A Study of Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1952); Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan:
Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1962). On enthusiasm see Skinner, "Ideological Context
of Hobbes."
15. The principal exception is Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy." The phrase is
from De Cive, "The Author's Preface," p. 98 (EW, 2: xiv). Initial page references are to Hobbes's
own English version, as printed in Man and Citizen, ed. by Bernard Gert (Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor Books, 1972).
16. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, ed. by Ferdinand Tonnies, 2d ed. (New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1969), "The Epistle Dedicatory." All references to this work will be to this
edition, and will be given as Elements. See also De Cive, pp. 93, 275 (E W, 2: vii, 186); Leviathan,
chap. 30, p. 248 (EW, 3: 325); chap. 31, p. 270 (EW, 3: 357-58); "Review," pp. 509-10 (EW,
3: 710-711); EW, 1: ix and 7: 471.
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habitation,on supposition that the earth should grow too narrowfor
her inhabitants,there would hardly be left any pretence for war.'7
It was preciselysuch mathematicalexactitudethat Hobbesconsideredhimself
to have attained. Needless to say, this language,although it is surely very
striking,is farfromconclusive,especiallysince Hobbesso often eitherbrackets
the problem of external violence, while discussingan everlastingdomestic
peace, or reiterateshis well-known general view that sovereign entities are
in the state of nature, which is the state of war. Nevertheless, the vision
expressed in this passage is intriguingenough to invite a reconsiderationof
Hobbes's view on the problem of war.
The logic of virtually complete obedience to constituted authority is, at
least formally, as close to a guaranteeof domestic peace as human affairs
can afford. But there is a great deal more to Hobbes's argumentthan this
formalsolution. Indeed,while this point is undoubtedlywhat he most wishes
us to see, it is only an ellipticalor summary expressionof the overall result
of his analysis, not a substitutefor it.'8 The sort of polity that emergesfrom
all of Hobbes's political works is in his own view-and he is surely rightsomething new in the political universe. And the label "absolutism"rather
poorly expresses this novelty. This is not to say that the label is inaccurate,
but that it is inadequate,that it does not begin to do justice to Hobbes'saim
or to his achievement.
If the Hobbesian state is in certain respects novel, and if that novelty is
not adequatelyconveyed by its formal attributes-inviolable obedience and
Hobbes's conception of sovereignty-is it possible that the nature of that
state has some bearingon the prospectsfor peace in internationalrelations?
In response there would appearto be several alternatives:one, that Hobbes
accepted the condition of perpetualwar among states preciselybecause the
very achievement of Leviathan, an assured peace at home, would remove
the motive of fear that creates the commonwealth;but, by inference, two,
that if conditionswere to become sufficientlygrim, a global Leviathanmight
reasonablybe expected to result;or three, that states designedin the manner
of Leviathan might themselves be, at the least, consistent with the general
peace of mankindand, at the most, provide some hope of securingit. There
is textual support for the first alternative, and the second would seem a
reasonableenough extension of some of Hobbes's ideas. However, neither
affords much considerationto some of the most distinctive featuresof his
general argumentor to the specific ways in which he undertakesto amend
the prevailingconceptionof the polityinheritedfromGreco-Romanantiquity.
It may, then, be fruitfulto adopt the thirdalternativeas a kindof interrogative
hypothesis,bearingin mind the observationof MichaelOakeshottthat "every
interpretationof Hobbes's moraltheoryleaves somethingthat Hobbeswrote
17. De Cive, p. 91 (EW, 2: iv).
18. On his wishes see Leviathan, "Review," p. 511 (EW, 3: 713).
Hobbes's highwayto peace 335
imperfectlyaccounted for."'9This interrogativehypothesis yields a richer,
more complex, and perhaps even a more instructive reading of Hobbes's
views on war and on interstate rivalry in general. Even so, however, his
treatment more nearly representsan evasion of the problem of war than it
does a solution.
1. The classical legacy
Hobbes not only chose to concentrateon the conditions of domestic peace,
he was quite literallyobsessedwith sedition,faction,and civil war.An obvious
initial question, therefore,is why he chose to proceed in what appearsto be
so remarkablysingle-minded a way. There is an equally obvious answer,
too, which Hobbes himself supplies:impendingcivil war in his own country.20
Given the contentiousnessof Englishpolitics even well before the outbreak
of civil war, this is understandable.However, the immediate circumstances
of Englishpolitics provide only for the occasion and emphasisof his analysis;
they do not help much in accountingfor either its substanceor its originality.
Such originalityis always utterly individual, and yet simultaneouslyit is in
part the result of an ingenious weaving together of threads of thought that
were deeply opposed in origin and by tradition. Much of what Hobbes has
to say, nearlyalways without express acknowledgment,is quite carefullyand
selectivelydrawnchieflyfrom those same authorsof classicalantiquitywhom
he never tired of criticizing:Thucydides, Plato, the Sophists, Aristotle, and
Epicurus,to mention only some of the clearest connections in relation to
the present subject.
On the interrogativehypothesis I have suggested,Hobbes's concentration
on civil war is, in one sense, made rather more puzzling. For if, in fact, he
supposed that his prescriptionswould have some bearingon the problem
of interstatewar, it would seem that he should have said a great deal more
about the dynamics of internationalrivalry than he does. It is a familiar
observation,of course,that the sortof systematicreflectionon politicsinitiated
by the Greeks has always been overwhelminglydirected to the concerns of
domestic politics. And yet that very focus was from the beginninga response,
in large part, to external violence as well as to internal strife. As Sir Moses
Finley has observed, "the dividing line between politics and sedition (stasis
the Greeks called it) was a thin one in classical Greece, and often enough
stasis grewinto ruthlesscivil war." It was internalviolence that seemed both
most frequentand most bitter,thoughit was forever"complicatedby external
affairs,by war and imperial ambitions."2'
19. MichaelOakeshott,"The MoralLife in the Writingsof Thomas Hobbes,"in Rationalism
in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 283.
20. De Cive, p. 103 (EW, 2: xx); Leviathan, "Review," p. 511 (EW, 3: 713); EW, 4: 414-15
and 7: 335, 344.
21. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks(New York:Viking, 1964), pp. 42, 43.
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On this subject, obviously, Thucydides'painstakingaccount of the interdependence and mutual escalation of internal and external war supplied a
treasurehouse of material, but it was not helpful as a matter of theoretical
graspto the same degree, since his inclinationto settle ultimatelyfor general
reference to human nature overexplains, as it were: it lacks the power of
differentiation.This does not necessarily, much less automatically, make
him wrong. But it does frustratea quite differentintellectualimpulse:to find
more specific and, more importantly, remediable explanations. Thus, the
materialprovidedby Thucydidescould easily be construed,on the one hand,
as having shown as a matter of substance that civil strugglewas the most
likely, bitter, and dangerousform of armed violence, but on the other hand,
as having posed, ratherthan resolved, the theoreticalproblemsof causation
and of the relation between civil and external war. This double aspect of
Thucydides' history is very clearly marked. No doubt each reader of The
Peloponnesian Warhas a particularcandidatefor the role of most absorbing
or most revealing episode. But there can be little doubt that it is in the
account of the civil war in Corcyrathat Thucydides employs the language
of extremity most strikingly."There was death," he says, "in every shape
and form. And, as usually happens in such situations, people went to every
extreme and beyond it." As civil war developed "in city after city," he
continues, "knowledgeof what had happenedpreviously ... caused still new
extravagancesof revolutionaryzeal, expressedby an elaborationin the methods of seizing power and by unheard-of atrocities in revenge." Ever the
moralist, Thucydides concludes that "as a result of these revolutions, there
was a generaldeteriorationof characterthroughoutthe Greek world." In all
this chaotic collapse of civilized standards, he holds, "human nature
... showed itself proudly in its true colours, as somethingincapableof controllingpassion...."22 Lateron, he has the Syracusanleader, Hermocrates,
express the substantive theoretical point that is of primary interest here.
"We should realize that internal strife is the main reason for the decline of
cities." And again, in the eighth book, as the denouement of a generation
of war becomes clear, Thucydides remarks, in his own person, that it is
internal struggleabove all that the Athenians needed to avoid.23
In this connection, it is worth recalling that the exposition of the best
attainable form of the polis in Plato's Laws is explicitly framed in terms of
the problem of war. In response to an initiatingquestion by the Athenian
Stranger,concerningthe military practicesembodied in the much admired
constitution of Crete, Clinias says that their lawgiver meant thereby "to
reprove the folly of mankind, who refuse to understand that they are all
engagedin a continuous lifelong warfareagainstall cities whatsoever.... In
fact, the peace of which most men talk-so he held-is no more than a
22. The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 3: 81-84.
23. Ibid., 4: 61 and 8: 48.
Hobbes's highwayto peace 337
name; in real fact, the normal attitude of a city to all other cities is one of
undeclaredwarfare."Clinias'comments culminatein the generalobservation
that "humanity is in a condition of public war of every man against every
man, and private war of each man with himself."24Without much exaggeration,one mightsay that the firstclausein this statementfoundits supreme
modem analystin Hobbes,the latterin Rousseau.2' At all events,the Athenian
Strangerrefines Clinias'point. There are, he says, two forms of war. "There
is what all mankind call faction, and it is, of course, the most dangerous
kind of war.... [T]he other, and much milder form, as I imagine we shall
all agree, is that waged when we are at variance with external aliens." Ultimately, Plato finds the solution to the dual problem of war in the rightly
ordered and isolated polis. The good city, in sum, lives a life free of both
internal and external war.26
In the Politics, Aristotle takes this frameworkfor granted but advances
objections to Plato's reliance on isolation, which he clearly regardsas insufficientlyrealisticsince it neglects the needs of trade and the exigenciesof
foreign policy.27 Nevertheless, insofar as there is a solution to the problem,
it is to be found in properinternalorganization.But Aristotle does shift the
grounds of discussion in a number of important ways. Neither Plato nor
Aristotleis inclined to accept Thucydides'generalizationsabout the ultimate
sources of war in human nature-showing "itself proudlyin its true colours,
as something incapable of controlling passion... ." Quite the contrary, in
both Plato and Aristotle, psychology rests on a differentiationof human
types, and in some of these reason is capable of controllingthe passions.
Plato contended, of course, that the properly ordered polis must rest on
uniformityof belief; in other words, on the abolition of all the diversity that
is referredto by the word "politics." And it was just that insistence upon
uniformitywhich Aristotle so resolutely (and famously) rejected. Such uniformity, he rightly insisted, amounts to the annihilation of the polis, of
anythingthat is recognizablypolitical.28Aristotle'sunderstandingof the fundamental nature of civil strife is utterly unlike Thucydides' inclination to
resignhimselfto the worst manifestationsof human nature,or Plato'sabiding
impulse to abolish politics. Rather, he found the source of civil strugglein
the idea of the polis, as such. For the very idea of a shared way of life-a
constitution(politeia) in the Greeksense-must breedthe desirefor equality.
And it is this "passion for equality which is thus at the root of sedition."29
24. Laws, trans. A. E. Taylor, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton
and HuntingtonCairns(New York:BollingenFoundation/PantheonBooks, 1964), 625e-626a
and 626d.
25. This is not to suggestthat Rousseau did not have a great deal to say about the former
but only that his central concern was with internalreconciliation,as broughtout so well in
JudithN. Shklar,Men and Citizens(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1969).
26. Laws, 629d (see also 744d, 856b-c), and 829a.
27. Politics, II: 1265a, 1267a; IV: 1291a; VII: 1327a-b.
28. Ibid., II: 1261a-b.
29. Ibid., V: 1301b.
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The great difficulty,of course, was that democraticand oligarchicalparties
embraced contradictoryconceptions of equality, and so Aristotle's task, as
he understoodit, was to producea constitutionin which both could coexist
without generatinga sense on either side that the arrangementwas unjust.
He thought he had found such a balance in the form he chose to call a
polity.30
The experienceof Rome, as recountedby her greatesthistoriansand moralists, could only reinforcethe Greek intellectuallegacyin this as in so many
other ways. St. Augustine is, after all, very much on the mark when he
concludes from a long recitalof Roman internaldisastersthat "these bloody
civil wars [were] more distressing, by the avowal of their own historians,
than any foreign wars.... What fury of foreign nations," he asks, "what
barbarianferocity, can compare with this victory of citizens over citizens?"
Elsewhere,he concludes that the earthlycity can never be free from the fear
of insurrectionand civil wars.3'In fact, these judgments of Augustine'sare
easily confirmedin the Roman sources to which he expresslyappealed,and
such evidence can be multiplied almost endlessly. Let Cicero's assessment
stand for a great many others: he tells his son that "discord and partisan
violence"are "thegravestof all the dangersthat can threatena republic.... "32
This classical legacy works as a generalintellectualbackdropto Hobbes's
own way of addressingthe dual problem of war. It is not so much that only
the problems of domestic political struggleare under considerationor that
only they are susceptible of treatment, but that certain presumptionsrun
concerning the ultimate causes of war and, therefore, about its essential
nature. It is simply assumed that the ultimate causes of war are to be found
in the characteror dispositionsof individualsratherthan in durabledifferences
in the interestsand aims of states. And it is taken for grantedthat the original
and naturalarenafor the displayof the worstformsof characteris in excessive
ambitions in domestic politics, with the consequentrisk of sedition, faction,
and civil war. Internalstrife representsnot simply the bitterest,most likely,
and most dangerous but the essential form of war. The danger of such civil
strugglepresents itself in a triple aspect: domestic ambitions are apt to be
expressedin imperialistventures,or a weakenedpolitymay finditselfexposed
to foreigninterventioneither because it is invited by the partiesto domestic
rivalry or because it presents an irresistibletemptation to the expansionist
aims of outsiders.
30. Ibid., 1293b-1298a.
31. The City of God, trans.by MarcusDods (New York:ModernLibrary,1950), 3: 30, 3:29,
and 19: 5.
32. Abundant evidence is presented in F. R. Cowell, The Revolutionsof Ancient Rome
(London:Thames & Hudson, 1962), and Lidia StoroniMazzolani,Empire withoutEnd (New
York: HarcourtBraceJovanovich, 1976);Cicero,De Officiis,1: xxv, 85 (see also De Legibus,
3: xviii).
Hobbes's highway to peace 339
2. The turn to psychology
Even granting all this, however, it is tempting to suppose that Hobbes's
treatment of war amounts essentially to a generalizationof the views he
found expressed in Thucydides. But the temptation should be resisted, for,
while the resemblancesare surely marked and undeniablyimportant, they
areat best only partial.Hobbes'srelianceon Thucydidesfor the threeprincipal
causes of "quarrels"- mistrust, competition for gain, and the pursuit of
glory-is perfectlyclear.33More importantly,Hobbes shareswith Thucydides
a generalizedaccount at the level of psychology,as againstthe psychologies
of differencesembraced by both Plato and Aristotle. These resemblances
are without doubt striking. But the differences are at least equally great.
Hobbes's psychology differs from that of Thucydides in two profoundly
importantways: it is perfectlyabstract,ratherthan an affairof specifictraits,
and the human mind or character, on Hobbes's account, is indefinitely
malleable.
The linchpin of Hobbes's political theory surely lies in its psychology,in
his account of human nature.Indeed, the entire scheme rests on a prodigious
leap of the speculative imagination, one that has had an immense impact
on post-Hobbesianpoliticalthought.For Hobbesassumes-indeed his system
presupposes-that beneathall the seeminglyintractabledifferencesmanifested
in endless contention,sedition,and wartherelies a common human nature.34
All is doubt and controversy, contention and war, and yet all this is quite
needless provided that we come to see matters aright.35As Judith Shklar
has pointed out, this spectacularleap is one of those truly grand intellectual
"myths" whose function is to supply us with a means of dealing with the
most obvious but deeply unwelcome facts of human experience.36I am not,
of course,suggestingthat Hobbes'sview is utterlynovel or withoutsubstantial
precedent. Something of the sort was clearly in the air, forming one line of
response to an atmosphere of shattered authorities,doubt, and protracted
war.37Machiavellihad held long before that there are constant elements in
33. Leviathan,chap. 13, p. 99 (EW, 3: 112). Cf. PeloponnesianWar, 1: 75. Hobbes'sown
translationof this passage may be found in EW, 8: 81, where the Athenians say that their
empire was expanded"chieflyfor fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit."
34. Elements, pp. 1, 75; Leviathan,"Author'sIntroduction,"p. 20 (EW, 3: xi-xii); EW, 1,
"The Author's Epistle,"and pp. 1, 72; EW, 4: 275-76; Behemothor The Long Parliament,
ed. FerdinandTonnies (London:Simpkin, Marshall, 1889), p. 29. All referencesto this last
work will be to this edition, and will be given as Behemoth.
35. Elements, "EpistleDedicatory,"and pp. 1-2; De Cive, pp. 91-93, 95-98, 103-4 (EW,
2: iv-vii, x-xiv, xxi); Leviathan,chap. 29, pp. 237-38 (EW, 3: 308-9); chap. 30, pp. 247-49
(EW, 3: 322-26); chap. 31, p. 270 (EW, 3: 357-58); "Review,"pp. 503, 510-11 (EW, 3: 702,
713); EW, 4: 232-33.
36. Judith N. Shklar,"Facing Up to IntellectualPluralism,"in David Spitz, ed., Political
Theoryand Social Change(New York:AthertonPress, 1967), pp. 280-84.
37. A fineaccountof explodedauthoritiesis given in Paul Hazard,TheEuropeanMind (New
York: Meridian, 1963), Part 1.
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human nature and conduct which are unaffectedby alterationof time and
place.38But however shrewd one might find some of Machiavelli'sobservations on the generallylamentable inclinationsof our kind, his views are
neithergeneralizednor systematic.More importantly,his work does not rest
on a psychologicalfoundation, much less shift the very basis of inquiry in
that direction. To the contrary,he supposed that the principaltask was to
extract lessons in political success from the exemplaryachievements of republican Rome.39Again, Montaigne,that prince of skeptics in an age much
given to skepticism,appearsto have concluded,as Donald Framehas pointed
out, that despite bewilderingdiversity there are common human traitsafter
all.40But Montaigne's style is something like the opposite of systematic.
Much more to the point, Descartes had relied on the idea of a common
human capabilityto know. At this epistemologicallevel, at least, our natural
endowments are similar enough to invite the expectation of an unlimited,
if gradual,accumulationof indubitablescientificknowledge.4'But while Descartes took a perfectlygeneralview, he did not undertaketo apply it to the
problems of moral philosophy. His idea amounts to a bold and ingeniously
defended epistemologicalact of faith, but not to a general psychology.
It is in Hobbes that we find the assumption of a common, underlying
human nature at work in politics everywhereand always, and with it he is
able to accomplish the crucial double task that is central to his purpose of
showingus the highwayto peace.Formally,Hobbes'spsychologyis completely
abstract.Human natureper se is a compound productof bodily constitution,
sense experience,reason, and the passions.42He uses the idea of individual
variationsin our bodily constitutionsand in our experienceto help to account
for the variety in the objects of our desiresand aversions;but he uses neither
source of individuation in any pointed or specific way.43Instead, virtually
all his attention is concentratedon reason and the passions, and here the
theoreticalaccount is given entirely in terms of general capacities,and not
at all in terms of particulartraits, whether virtues or vices. To be sure,
Hobbes embracesthe commonplace that people seek their self-preservation
above all. But, as in the case of most of his substantiveobservationsabout
38. Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, ed. by Bernard Crick (New York: Penguin,
1974), 1, Preface,chaps. 3, 9, 11, 39; 2, Preface;3, chaps. 9, 31, 43.
39. Ibid., 1, Preface,chaps. 1, 6, 10, 30; 2, Preface,chaps. 2, 4, 6, 16, 17, 23, 30; 3, chaps.
1, 25, 31, 49.
40. TheCompleteEssays ofMontaigne,trans.by DonaldM. Frame(Stanford,Calif.:Stanford
University Press, 1965), p. xiii.
41. The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1931). On capability,1: 81-82, 88, 98, 106-8, 121,
171-79, 197; on accumulation,1: 82, 91, 121, 125-26.
42. Elements, p. 70; De Cive, p. 109 (EW, 2: 1).
43. Elements, p. 29; De Cive, p. 150 (EW, 2: 47); Leviathan, "Introduction," p. 20 (EW, 3:
xi); chap. 4, p. 40 (EW, 3: 28); chap. 6, p. 48 (EW, 3: 40-41); chap. 8, p. 62 (EW, 3: 61);
chap. 15, p. 123 (EW, 3: 140).
Hobbes's highwayto peace 341
human conduct, he recognizes that there are exceptions." Moreover, he
holds that human desires are insatiable, and that our actions are regularly
taken with a view to self-interest.45Presumably,this is what he is referring
to when he says that he has based his philosophy on "the known, natural
inclinations of mankind."46And certainly he has introduced, in this way,
substantivelyimportantclaims.Yet he has not therebysacrificedthe generality
of his psychology, since neither the notion of unlimited desire nor that of
self-interestednesshas any particularcontent. In principle,at least, the whole
realm of actions remains entirely open, completely unspecified.Indeed, at
this level of analysis, Hobbes holds that humankindcannot be diffentiated
from the rest of the animals.47This is why he is always at pains to rebuke
Aristotle for, as Hobbes sees it, blurringthe vital distinction between the
political and the non- or prepolitical.48
Thus farwe have only a worldof unlimitedand endlesslyvariousstrivings.
This is quite enough to produce catastrophe.Substantively,Hobbes's point
is that human nature manifests itself in unlimiteddesire (as Aristotlewould
agree), and that the objects of our desire are hopelessly diverse.49Indeed,
our several strivings are utterly idiosyncratic:scarcely any two people call
the same thing good.50Hobbes thus begins with a dramatic intensification
of the essentialproblem.But this depressingclaim suits his purposeperfectly,
which is to induce the realizationthat our situation, as it stands, can only
mean permanentcompetition;it is an affairof actual or incipient chaos. It
is just this that has somehow to be overcome, of course, but he begins, in
44. Elements, pp. 39, 86; De Cive, pp. 90, 99, 115, 142 (EW, 2: ii, xv, 8, 38); Leviathan,
chap. 15, p. 119 (E W, 3: 140).
45. On insatiabilitysee Elements,pp. 30, 47-48; Leviathan,chap. 6, p. 55 (EW, 3: 51); chap.
8, p. 62 (EW, 3: 61-62); chap. 11, p. 80 (EW, 3: 85-86); De Homine, p. 54 (LW, 2: 103).
Initialpage referencesto this last work will be to the translationof CharlesT. Wood, T. S. K.
Scott-Craig,and BernardGert as printedin Gert, Man and Citizen,followedby citationof the
Molesworthedition. On self-interestsee Leviathan,chap. 14, p. 105 (EW, 3: 120); chap. 15,
pp. 114, 118, 121-22 (EW, 3: 133, 138, 143);chap. 18, p. 141 (EW, 3: 170);chap. 19, p. 145
(EW, 3: 176-77).
46. Leviathan,"Review,"p. 509 (EW, 3: 710).
47. Elements, pp. 18-19, 45; Leviathan,chap. 2, p. 27 (EW, 3: 11);chap. 3, p. 31 (EW, 3:
16);chap. 4, p. 33 (EW, 3: 18).
48. Elements, pp. 102-3; De Cive, pp. 167-69 (EW, 2: 66-68); Leviathan,chap. 17, pp.
131-32 (EW, 3: 156-57). Hobbes could not resist the temptation to rebuke Aristotle, for
elsewherehe makes it clear that he understoodthat Aristotlewas not confusedon the point:
"WhenAristotlecalls them [bees] politicalor social creatures,he did not intend it reallythat
they lived a civil life, but accordingto an analogy,because they do such things by instinctas
trulypoliticalcreaturesdo out of judgment"(EW, 5: 89). Presumably,the passageHobbes has
in mind is Politics, I, 1253a 7-18.
49. Aristotle,Politics,II, 1267a. For Hobbes on diversitysee Elements,pp. 23, 29; De Cive,
pp. 92, 122, 141, 150-51, 178, 282-83, 351 (EW, 2: v, 15, 36, 47-48, 77, 196, 277); Leviathan,
chap. 4, p. 40 (EW, 3: 28); chap. 6, pp. 48, 50, 53 (EW, 3: 40-41, 43, 47-48); chap. 11, p. 80
(EW, 3: 85); chap. 15, pp. 118, 123 (EW, 3: 139, 146);chap. 26, p. 214 (EW, 3: 274-75); De
Homine, pp. 47, 68 (LW, 2: 96, 116).
50. De Cive,pp. 282-83 (EW, 2: 196);Leviathan,chap. 6, pp. 48-49 (EW, 3: 40-41); chap.
15, p. 123 (EW, 3: 146); chap. 26, p. 214 (EW, 3: 274-75).
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effect, by making diversity virtually infinite. As things are, we cannot get
what we want-the satisfactionof our desires-either in fact or in principle.
But these desireshave no necessaryor particularcontent. Rightlyunderstood
and arranged,the infinityof human strivingcan be turnednot only to good
purpose but to a solution to the problem of perpetualwar.
The key to the solution lies in an accurateunderstandingof just what it
is that comprisesthe differencebetweenhumanbeingsand the otheranimals,
and how that differenceworks. And it is here that one finds the confluence
of severaldistinctstreamsof classicalthought.To beginwith, Hobbes insists,
with Aristotle, that it is our ability to speak that makes all the difference.5'
Given his quarrelswith Aristotle on the issue of what is and what is not
properlycalled political, Hobbes seems to take the view that Aristotlefailed
to recognizethe implicationsof his own point. At all events, Hobbes holds
that it is the fact that we are languageanimals that accounts for all our nonnaturalwoes and, at the same time, all of our possibilities.52But this general
point is supplementedby the introductionof a radicalconventionalismquite
unlikeanythingheardsince the "sophisticmovement"of 5th-centuryAthens.
More particularly,Hobbes has here embraced the views of "the first and
greatest of the Sophists," Protagoras.s3Despite his very considerableadmirationfor Plato,Hobbeshas thus revivedthe centralplankin the theoretical
platform of Plato's principalintellectualantagonists.54No doubt Hobbes's
conventionalism is not so radicalas that of, say, Wittgenstein,for Hobbes
did not question the objective reliability of our sense experience, or the
possibility of valid referenceto that experienceby our words, or the status
of logic.55But it is perfectly adequate to his needs. For he believes he can
claim that all standardswhatsoever derive from human institutions:from
51. Politics, I, 1253a 10-12; Leviathan,chap. 3, p. 31 (EW, 3: 16);chap. 4, pp. 33, 36 (EW,
3: 18, 22-23).
52. Elements, pp. 19, 22, 64-65, 68; De Cive, pp. 344-45, 367-68, 374 (EW, 2: 268-69,
295-96, 304); Leviathan,chap. 4, pp. 34, 36-37 (EW, 3: 20, 23-24); chap. 5, pp. 43-44 (EW,
3: 32-35); De Homine, pp. 39-41 (LW, 2: 90-92); EW, 1: 36; EW, 7: 78.
53. G. B. Kerferd,TheSophisticMovement(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981);
the quotationis from W. K. C. Guthrie,TheSophists(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1971), p. 63. Leviathan,chap. 2, p. 23 (EW, 3: 4) echoes the single most celebrateddoctrine
of Protagoras:"Man is the measureof all things, of the things that are that they are, and of
the thingsthat are not that they are not." See Plato, Cratylus,386a; Theaetetus,152a;Aristotle,
Metaphysics,XI, 6, 1062b.
54. On Plato see De Cive, p. 374 (EW, 2: 304); Leviathan,chap. 31, p. 270 (EW, 3: 357);
chap. 46, p. 481 (EW, 3: 668); EW, 7: 346.
55. See David Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein(New York:Viking, 1970), esp. pp. 179-98, for
a discussionof what Pears calls Wittgenstein'santhropocentrism.Wittgensteinseems to have
been preparedto draw logic itself into question. See, for example, Wittgenstein,Philosophical
Investigations,trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford:Blackwell,1958), 1, ss. 81, 89, 90-101,
107-111, 115-116, 118-119, 122-133, 158, 198-199,201-202,217,219,241-243,327,330,
337, 339, 341, 355, 373, 377. Some of the questions raisedare discussedin George Pitcher,
ed., Wittgenstein:The PhilosophicalInvestigations(GardenCity, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966),
pp. 420-96.
Hobbes's highwayto peace 343
arbitrarylinguisticimpositions, agreements,and customs.56This step in the
developmentof his theoryis not only indispensablebut profoundlyingenious.
It is preciselythe conventional natureof our standardsand institutionsthat
makesit possiblefor us to knowthem with certaintyand that makes,therefore,
a generalcivil science possible."7Moreover, this makes them teachableand
so bringsthem within our power to control, if we will do so."8Furthermore,
Hobbes can now arguethat all the specificcontent of our desiresand, indeed,
even of reasonitself is acquiredratherthan natural,conventionalratherthan
innate.59Becausewe speak, we are the only animals capableof reason, able,
in principle,to see rightthroughto the essentiallogic of our situation.Hence,
nothing bars us-again, in principle-from living "securely, happily, and
elegantly;we can so live, I insist, if we so will."60But at the same time, our
ability to speak also means that we are the sole species who can not only
practicedeceit-"the only creatureever made who fakes,"as Auden bluntly
put it-but who can deceive themselves.6' Thus, the fact that the "tongue
of man is a trumpetof warand sedition"is both tragicallytrueand completely
avoidable.62Hobbes himself provides a summary of much of the foregoing
argument:
All the calamities which human industrycan avoid arise from war, especially from civil war.... But the cause of these things is not that humans want them; for there is no will except for the good, at least for
what appears so; and it is not that they do not know that these things
are evils....
Therefore, the cause of civil war is that people are igno-
rant of the cause of wars and peace and that there are very few who
56. Elements, pp. 16-18; De Cive, pp. 345, 367-68, 373-74 (EW, 2: 269, 295-96, 302-4);
Leviathan, chap. 3, p. 31 (EW, 3: 16); chap. 4, p. 35 (EW, 3: 21-22); chap. 5, p. 41 (EW, 3:
30); chap. 31, p. 269 (EW, 3: 355); chap. 32, p. 271 (EW, 3: 359); chap. 34, p. 286 (EW, 3:
380); chap. 46, p. 484 (EW, 3: 673); De Homine, pp. 37-39 (LW, 2: 88-90); EW, 1: 14, 16,
36-37, 55-56, 388, 531; EW, 7: 183-84.
57. Elements, pp. 24-26; De Cive, pp. 367-68, 373-75 (EW, 2: 295-97, 303-5); Leviathan,
chap. 4, pp. 35-40 (EW, 3: 21-29); chap. 5, pp. 45-46 (EW, 3: 35-38); chap. 8, p. 62 (EW,
3: 61); chap. 15, pp. 122-24 (EW, 3: 144-47); chap. 20, pp. 157-58 (EW, 3: 195); chap. 25,
p. 195 (EW, 3: 246-47); chap. 30, pp. 247-49 (EW, 3: 322-25); chap. 46, pp. 478-79 (EW,
3: 664-65); De Homine, pp. 41-43 (LW, 2: 92-94).
58. Elements, pp. 51, 92, 183-84; De Cive, pp. 262-63 (E W, 2: 171-72); Leviathan, chap.
3, p. 31 (EW, 3: 16); chap. 4, pp. 33, 37 (EW, 3: 18, 24-25); chap. 15, pp. 122-24 (EW, 3:
144-47); chap. 18, pp. 137-38 (EW, 3: 164-65); chap. 19, pp. 143, 145-46 (EW, 3: 173,
176-77); chap. 30, p. 249 (EW, 3: 325-26); chap. 31, p. 270 (EW, 3: 357-58); chap. 43, pp.
427-28 (EW, 3: 589-90); "Review," pp. 503, 510-511 (EW, 3: 702, 712-14); Behemoth, pp.
39-40, 62, 64, 160.
59. Leviathan, chap. 3, p. 31 (EW, 3: 16).
60. Elements, p. 94; De Cive, p. 229 (EW, 2: 135); Leviathan, chap. 17, p. 129 (EW, 3:
153). The quotation is from De Homine, p. 40 (LW, 2: 91).
61. Elements, p. 22; De Cive, pp. 168-69 (EW, 2: 67); Leviathan, chap. 4, p. 34 (EW, 3:
20); chap. 5, p. 43 (EW, 3: 32-33); chap. 6, p. 55 (EW, 3: 50); chap. 7, p. 57 (EW, 3: 53);
chap. 8, pp. 67-68 (EW, 3: 69-70); chap. 11, p. 83 (EW, 3: 90); De Homine, pp. 40-41 (LW,
2: 91-92); E W, 1: 36. W. H. Auden, "'The Truest Poetry is the most Feigning,'" in Collected
Shorter Poems, 1927-1957 (New York: Vintage, 1975), p. 317.
62. De Cive, pp. 168-69 (EW, 2: 67).
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have learned their responsibilities,by which peace flourishesand is preserved, that is, the true rule of living. But moral philosophy is knowledge of this rule.63
And, of course, Hobbes's moral science provides the requisiteknowledge.
Hobbes is fully aware of the novelty of the theory he has developed, and
of the stunninglyparadoxicalcharacterof the view that the manifoldtragedies
of human history have been largely needless. But if this is the case, it is
plainlynecessarythat he give us an accountof how it can be so, both because
the evidence is so overwhelmingly adverse and because, as he wishes to
claim, accuratediagnosishas gone undiscoveredacrosscenturiesof experience
and thought. He is preparedwith a twofold response to this challenge. He
arguesthat experienceproves nothing againsthim, both because experience
is always inconclusive as argument and because all improvements are a
function of "time and industry."64Second, all moral philosophy, till the
appearance of his own work, has been doubly and systematicallywrong:
"wholly estranged,"he says, "from the moral law," and the general proof
is continuouscontentionand war.65Indeed, Hobbes explicitlymaintainsthat
moral philosophersare ultimatelyresponsiblefor the condition of perpetual
war.66 But, more specifically,moral philosophy has misled us, both because
it lackedthe correctmethod and becauseit was assumedthat such knowledge
is something we possess or acquire naturally,merely by what he derisively
calls "mother wit."67But this is a complete mistake; all such ideas derive
from human agreementsor customs, not from the philosopher'snative gifts.
This does not, however, mean that all one need do is record or generalize
about customary linguistic meanings. On the contrary, that is one of the
generalcriticismsHobbes bringsagainstthe ancientphilosophers:they merely
transcribedthe practices of their own social orders.68Apart from its fatal
lack of universality,this fails to deal with the ambiguitiesand equivocations
that collect around our usages. Such work is not simply fruitless,it is deeply
dangerous,since it feeds the disagreementthat leads to contentionand war.69
Hence, the philosopher'stask is something like the opposite of complacent
acceptanceof whatever happens to pass for currentpoliticalor moral usage.
Such usages, Hobbes insists, can never supply the foundation of any true
63. This translationfrom Part I of De Corporeis taken from Thomas Hobbes, Computatio
Sive Logica/Logic,trans. by Aloysius Martinich,ed. by Isabel C. Hungerlandand George R.
Vick (New York:Abaris Books, 1981), p. 185. Cf. EW, 1: 8.
64. On inconclusiveexperiencesee Elements, p. 16; Leviathan,chap. 20, p. 158 (EW, 3:
195); EW, 7: 398. On improvementssee Leviathan,chap. 30, p. 248 (EW, 3: 324).
65. De Cive, p. 151 (E W, 2: 49).
66. Ibid., p. 98 (EW, 2: xiii); see also p. 344 (EW, 2: 268); EW, 1: x; EW, 7: 76 expresses
a more moderate view: moral philosophy "has been a great hindranceto the peace of the
westernworld...."
67. On method see Elements, p. 1; De Cive, p. 92 (EW, 2: v-vi); Leviathan, chap. 5, pp.
43-44 (EW, 3: 33); EW, 1: 8. The phraseis from De Cive, p. 96 (EW, 2: x)
68. Leviathan,chap. 21, p. 163 (EW, 3: 202).
69. Leviathan,chap. 5, pp. 45-46 (EW, 3: 36-37); chap. 26, p. 209 (EW, 3: 267-68).
Hobbes's highwayto peace 345
ratiocination.70At the same time, however, he does maintain the general
principlethat truth or falsity depends upon common usage. But he assumes
both that linguistic uses, originallyat least, were means of referringto the
mental images produced in sense experience and that they were univocal,
constant in their reference.7'The task of the moral philosopheris to recover
those originalmeanings and thereby establish their empiricalreferenceand
purgethem of their ambiguity.The failureto performboth these operations
accounts for the universal failure of moral or civil philosophy and defines
the wholly "acquiredwit" that Hobbes holds is science;that is, the work of
reason.72
In sum, his claim is that all pre-Hobbesiancivil or moral philosophy has
involved the inculcation of error, and the result is uncertainty,contention,
and war. However, since all human action proceeds from the will, and what
is willed is a function of acquiredbeliefs-of what he calls "opinion"-the
affairsof the world are invariablygoverned by opinion.73The generalform
of the problem, for Hobbes, is that virtually any opinion is susceptible to
beingput at the serviceof politicalmischief,to beingemployed in the pursuit
of ambition and avarice.74What Hobbes does initially, in other words, is
quite literally politicize everything. All opinion has political implications,
and all actions are a function of opinion. As a result, Hobbes's prescription
involves nothing less than the reciprocalof this diagnosis:the abolition of
politics. In effect, he redefinespolitics exclusively in terms of the actions of
the sovereign,and these are the concernof no one else. At this level, Hobbes
presents his readerwith a radicalizedversion of the ethics of Epicurus:each
of us is to be trainedto confine his desires to the satisfactionsof privatelife.
"For there is no reason," he says, "why every man should not naturally
mind his own private, than the public business."75Thus, the intractablediversity he has insisted upon survives, but only through its having been
completely relocated in nonpolitical pursuits. His scheme represents the
apotheosis of diversity but, at the same time, its complete political erasure.
More specifically,however, the root of the difficultyis that all the opinions
we have inheritedlead us either to hopes that cannot be fulfilledor to fears
so excessive that they are incompatiblewith enduringorder and peace.76It
70. Ibid., chap. 4, p. 40 (EW, 3: 29).
71. Elements, pp. 20-21, 31; De Cive, pp. 373-74 (EW, 2: 303-4); Leviathan, chap. 2, p.
24 (EW, 3: 6); chap. 3, p. 28 (EW, 3: 11-12); chap. 4, pp. 36-37, 39 (EW, 3: 23-25, 27-28);
chap. 5, p. 42 (EW, 3: 30-32); chap. 46, p. 482 (EW, 3: 671); EW, 1: 36, 37, 70, 84.
72. Elements, pp. 16-17, 20-21; De Cive, pp. 344, 367-68, 373-74 (EW, 2: 268-69, 295-96,
303-4); EW, 4: 335.
73. Elements, p. 63; De Cive, pp. 163, 165, 179, 365 (EW, 2: 62, 63, 78, 293); Leviathan,
chap. 18, pp. 137, 140 (EW, 3: 164, 168); chap. 21, p. 163 (EW, 3: 202-3); chap. 32, p. 272
(EW, 3: 360); chap. 38, pp. 329-30 (EW, 3: 444); chap. 42, p. 393 (EW, 3: 537); EW, 4: 268,
272-75.
74. De Cive, p. 179 fn. (EW, 2: 78-79 fn).
75. Ibid., p. 232 (EW, 2: 140).
76. Elements, pp. 39-40, 51-53, 169, 175-78; De Cive, pp. 165, 179, 252-54 (EW, 2: 63,
78, 160-63); Leviathan, chap. 6, pp. 50, 53 (EW, 3: 43, 47-48); chap. 8, p. 63 (EW, 3: 62-63);
chap. 13, pp. 98-99 (EW, 3: 111); De Homine, pp. 57-58 (LW, 2: 106); see also EW, 4: 242-45.
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is exactly these misplaced hopes and fears-misplaced because they rest on
ignoranceor falsehood-that supplythe motive powerof politicalcatastrophe.
Virtuallyall opinion is manifestly false because truth, he holds, can never
be inconsistentwith peace.77Hence, the task becomes one of sweepingaway
all inheritedbeliefswhatsoeverand, of course,replacingthem with Hobbes's
civil science.
Formally,then, Hobbes's programrests on the sovereign'sexclusive title
to political activity and the complete privatization of the pursuits of all
nonsovereign persons. Substantively,it rests upon a complete reformation
of education. It is not too much to say that Hobbes sharedAristotle'sconviction that it is educationthat mattersabove all. Only the new content and
aims of Hobbes's educative state can provide the foundationfor a new kind
but completely
of politicalentity.78It is the combinationof a "uniformitarian"
abstractpsychologywith his Protagoreanconventionalismthat supplies the
What stands in the way of peace is not the nastinessof human
framework.79
nature but the joint existence of false belief and the natural condition of
competitive individualismmistakenlybut fatally channeledinto public life.
But he insists that his educational renovation can rectify this catastrophic
misdirectionof our hopes and fears. Indeed, Hobbes managedto persuade
himself that the overhaul of the content of our beliefs through altered educational aims would really not be at all difficult.80He clearly takes an
immensely optimistic, even exalted, view of the possibilities open to us,
though certainlynot of what we have thus far managedto do.8' For not only
does he think us capable of reason but, what is very differentand far more,
he holds that we can be expected to abide by it. Thus, "if the minds of men
wereall of white paper,they wouldalmost equallybe disposedto acknowledge
whatsoevershould be in rightmethod,-andrightratiocinationdeliveredunto
them."82 But, in fact, our minds are white paper, provided that one begins
at a relatively young age. Hobbes supposed that the time of university education was, in general, soon enough. (And normally this was, to be sure,
substantiallyearlierin life than it is today.)The same sortof view is expressed,
even more forcefully, in Leviathan:"The common people's minds, unless
they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbledover with the
opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by
77. Leviathan,chap. 18, p. 137 (EW, 3: 164).
78. Politics, II, 1263b;V, 131Oa.On Hobbes'seducativestate see Elements,pp. 51, 183-84;
De Cive, pp. 262-63 (EW, 2: 171-72); Leviathan,chap. 18, pp. 137, 139-40 (EW, 3: 164-65,
167-68); chap. 30, pp. 247-53 (EW, 3: 322-31); "Review,"p. 503 (EW, 3: 702); Behemoth,
pp. 39-40, 70-71, 160; EW, 4: 438.
79. The word is borrowedfrom CliffordGeertz, The Interpretationof Cultures(New York:
Basic Books, 1973), p. 35.
80. Elements, pp; 183-84; De Cive, pp. 148, 262-63 (EW, 2: 44-45, 171-72); Leviathan,
chap. 15, p. 122 (EW, 3: 144-45); chap. 30, p. 249 (EW, 3: 325-26); Behemoth,pp. 39-40;
De Homine, p. 52 (LW, 2: 102); EW, 4: 439.
81. Leviathan,chap. 29, pp. 237-38 (EW, 3: 308-9); chap. 30, pp. 247-49 (EW, 3: 322-35).
82. Elements, p. 51.
Hobbes's highwayto peace 347
public authorityshall be imprintedin them."83In principle,then, the mind
can be supplied with the appropriatecontent.
In the meantime, however, it is necessary first to launch Leviathanand
then to embark upon the campaignto re-educate,to "root out" the poison
of false doctrines, but by educational,not coercive, means.84The initiation
of the new state requiresreliancechiefly on the motive of fear.85But it is a
mistake to suppose that Hobbes meant his solution to representno more
than this. He is careful to explain that war is likely to resume so soon as
men have forgotten the horror of the last one unless education has been
reformedand, particularly,unless the common people should be better instructedthan before.86Leviathan,therefore,is to rest on true and correctly
cultivatedbelief ratherthan on fear,force,or fraud.AlbertHirschmanseems
to me exactly right to point out that what he has called the "countervailing
passions"-in Hobbes's case fear, the desire for commodious living, and the
hope of obtainingit-need to operateonly once.87If the rulercan be brought
to recognize the requirementsof enduring sovereignty, then the ultimate
causes of war can be removed.
3. Institutional and educational reformation
It is now possible to turn to the question of the relationshipof Leviathan
and the dual problemof internaland externalviolence. Hobbes summarizes
the forms of contention as derivingfrom mistrust,competitionfor gain, and
the pursuitof glory. The structureand the educationalprogramof Leviathan
are expresslydesignedto supply remediesfor all these sourcesof contention.
In general, of course, Hobbes maintains that absolute sovereigntyremoves
the need to resort to violence based upon just suspicion and mutual fear
amongcitizens.In addition,however,he engagesin a studiedeffortto extirpate
any political manifestationof ambition and avarice, to solve the perennial
problem of the overmighty subject. It is just here that Hobbes makes his
much noticed assault on the pretensionsand the exalted social and political
status of the aristocracy.There are three main lines of attack. First, Hobbes
dismisses, as no more than superstition,the traditionalnotion that either
the abilityor the rightto positions of leadershipor counsel in the state attach
to personsas a matterof birth.88Second, he arguesthat correctgovernance,
83. Ibid., pp. 183-84; De Cive, p. 263 (EW, 2: 172); Leviathan, "Review," pp. 510-11 (EW,
3: 713); Behemoth, p. 71. The quotation is from Leviathan, chap. 30, P. 249 (EW, 3: 325).
84. De Cive, pp. 262-63 (EW, 2: 171-72); see also Elements, pp. 183-84.
85. Leviathan, chap. 13, p. 102 (EW, 3: 116); chap. 14, pp. 105, 108, 111 (EW, 3: 119, 124,
128-29); chap. 20, p. 151 (EW, 3: 185); chap. 27, p. 221 (EW, 3: 285).
86. Elements, "Epistle Dedicatory"; Leviathan, chap. 18, pp. 139-40 (EW, 3: 167-68); chap.
30, p. 249 (EW, 3: 325-26); chap. 47, pp. 497-98 (EW, 3: 693-95).
87. Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), p. 31.
88. Elements, pp. 87-88; Leviathan, chap. 30, p. 258 (E W, 3: 340); Behemoth, p. 31.
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in any case, depends upon the purely acquired knowledge of civil science
and so has no relationto mere naturalwit, especiallyif that happensto have
been developed on the basis of a classical education, which, of course, it
would have done.89And third, underthe new arrangements,the sovereign's
position is so exalted that everyone will appear equal by comparison and,
for good measure,will be taughtthe correctnessof this estimation.90But he
is no less emphatic that wealth bolsters no more than equally irrelevant
claims to politicalroles in the commonwealth.The richareno betterqualified
than anyone else (which really means everyone else), since they, too, lack
familiaritywith the principlesof civil science. Moreover, they are inclined
to be chronicallymyopic, since theirexperienceis exhaustedby attentiveness
only to their own presentprofit.9'Furthermore,no one-aristocrat or plutocrat-is any longer to be permitted ostentatious display, or to be accorded
any impunity from the consequencesof misdeeds.92
The implicationsof all this with regardto interstatewar are not what one
could call crystal clear. Indeed, what Hobbes does say might be thought to
point in more than one direction. True, he invariablysummarizesthe sovereign'sduty in terms of providingfor internalpeace and externaldefense.
Moreover, the latter is incontestably a matter of vigilance, foresight, and
adequate preparation.93
Furthermore,Hobbes consistently maintainsa distinction between the possibility of attaining a permanent peace when its
internal requirementsare considered in isolation and the fact that it may
So it must
neverthelesssufferdisruptionin the form of externalaggression.94
be conceded that one could quite reasonablyarguethat Hobbes confines his
hope for peace to the domestic sphere, that he resignshimself to the armed
camps of the state of nature in internationalpolitics. Yet these points do
not exhaust what Hobbes has to say in connection with interstatewar. As
alreadysuggested,thereare some indicationsthat his aim may have involved
rather more than the suggestive statements cited at the beginning of this
discussion.
At one level, these indications have to do with the attributes,functions,
89. Elements, p. 66; De Cive, pp. 96, 252 (EW, 2: x-xi, 160); Leviathan, chap. 5, p. 46 (EW,
3: 37-38); chap. 8, pp. 61-62 (EW, 3: 60-62); chap. 15, pp. 123-24 (EW, 3: 146-47); chap.
20, p. 158 (EW, 3: 195-96); chap. 21, pp. 162-63 (EW, 3: 201-3); chap. 25, pp. 192, 195
(EW, 3: 242-43, 246-47); chap. 27, p. 219 (EW, 3: 282); chap. 30, p. 258 (EW, 3: 340); De
Homine, p. 68 (LW, 2: 115-16); Behemoth,pp. 3, 23, 43, 70, 155, 158-60; EW, 7: 399.
90. Leviathan,chap. 18, p. 141 (EW, 3: 169);chap. 30, pp. 250, 254 (EW, 3: 327, 333).
91. Ibid., chap. 19, p. 144 (EW, 3: 174);chap. 30, p. 258 (EW, 3: 340); Behemoth,p. 142.
92. DeCive, p. 267 (EW, 2:178); Leviathan,chap.27, pp. 221,224-26 (EW, 3: 285,290-91);
chap. 30, pp. 253-54 (EW, 3: 332-33); see also chap. 15, pp. 118-19 (EW, 3: 139).
93. On the sovereign'sduty see De Cive,pp. 169, 177, 223 (EW, 2: 68, 76, 128);Leviathan,
chap. 17, p. 132 (EW, 3: 158);chap. 18, pp. 134, 137 (EW, 3: 159, 163-64); chap. 19, p. 143
(EW, 3: 173); chap. 25, p. 195 (EW, 3: 246); chap. 26, p. 200 (EW, 3: 254). On defense see
Elements, p. 184; De Cive, pp. 260-62 (EW, 2: 169-71); Leviathan, chap. 18, pp. 138-39 (EW,
3: 166); chap. 29, p. 244 (EW, 3: 319).
94. Elements, pp. 111, 168; De Cive, p. 177 (EW, 2: 76); Leviathan, chap. 20, pp. 157-58
(EW, 3: 195); chap. 21, p. 167 (EW, 3: 208); chap. 29, p. 237 (EW, 3: 308).
Hobbes's highwayto peace 349
and objectives of the true sovereign. On another but clearly related plane,
they involve Hobbes's effortto transcendthe inherited,Greco-Romanconception of the polity. With respect to the first of these, his aims emerge in
the effort to supply content for the traditionalmaxim he employs so often,
that the good of the people is the supreme law (salus populi suprema lex).
In addition to the measures already mentioned that are designed to make
Leviathan"kingof the proud,"to squelchthe overweeningpoliticalambitions
of great men, which so often result in imperialdesigns or in conspiringwith
foreignpowers, it is also the sovereign'sduty to see to it that materialabundance at home is sufficientto remove the economic impulse to domestic
ambition and to imperialistventures.95More generally,Hobbes's elaborate
analysisof the indispensableelements of sovereigntymay be reduced,as he
pointsout, to completechargeover threematters:militia,money, and mind.96
It is control over education that is crucial.Thus, having delineatedthe elements of sovereignty, Hobbes says "therefore"the sovereign must have
complete control over what is said and taught.97It is plain enough, too, what
must not be taught and why not: both the classics and all forms of theology
must be abandoned. One great vice of the classics is that they exalt the
martial virtues and martial glory.98And, because they are inspired by a
theology that is essentially Roman Catholic in character,the universitiesof
England,Hobbes maintains,"have been to this nation, as the wooden horse
was to the Trojans." In other words, they have been instruments of the
foreign policy of the papacy.99
Again, Hobbes suggests that the true sovereign would recognizethe imprudence of an adventurous foreign policy.'00On this issue, he frequently
refers to the unwarrantedhazard of war or to what he calls the "uncertain
die" of war.'0' On other occasions, he supplies a quite differentreason for
avoiding the attempt to ensure external securityin the Roman or Athenian
manner-by a more or less deliberateand ruthlessimperialism-by arguing
that this sort of expansionismwould be self-defeatingbecauseit would make
real "union" or "sodality"in the commonwealth impossible.'02
95. The phrase is from Leviathan,chap. 28, p. 236 (EW, 3: 307). See also Elements, pp.
180-8 1;De Cive,pp. 266-67 (EW, 2: 176);Leviathan,chap. 24, pp. 185-86 (EW, 3: 232-33).
96. Leviathan,chap. 18, pp. 139-40 (EW, 3: 167-68).
97. Ibid., chap. 18, p. 137 (EW, 3: 164); see also Elements, pp. 183-84; De Cive, p. 263
(EW, 2: 172).
98. Leviathan, chap. 21, pp. 162-63 (EW, 3: 201-3); chap. 29, pp. 241-42 (EW, 3: 314-15);
Behemoth, pp. 3? 23, 43.
99. The quotationis from Behemoth,p. 40. See also ibid., pp. 14, 16-18, 20, 40-41, 148;
see also Leviathan,chap. 29, pp. 237-38 (EW, 3: 309); chap. 30, pp. 252-53 (EW, 3: 331-32);
chap. 46, p. 482 (EW, 3: 670); chap. 47, pp. 497-98 (EW, 3: 693-95); "Review,"pp. 510-11
(EW, 3: 713); EW, 7: 399-400.
100. Elements, p. 184; De Cive, p. 267 (EW, 2: 177);Leviathan,chap. 24, p. 187 (EW, 3:
235-36); chap. 29, p. 245 (EW, 3: 321).
101. Leviathan,chap. 20, p. 155 (EW, 3: 191), and chap. 24, p. 187 (EW, 3: 236); De Cive,
pp. 217, 267 (EW, 2: 121, 177).
102. De Cive, p. 267 (EW, 2: 177);Leviathan,chap. 29, p. 245 (EW, 3: 321).
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In quite anotherway, moreover, Hobbes adds other relevantpoints in his
effortto avoid the flaws he finds in the Greco-Romanidea of the city. These
considerations, insufficientlyappreciated,are surely pertinent and clearly
important in Hobbes's view. One aspect is the point just made: avoiding
the errorof imperialexpansion, which, he says, not only frustratesthe sort
of politicalunion he has in mind but also is more likelyto produce"incurable
wounds" than it is to provide abundance.'03Another is his recognitionof
the fact that the city-whether classical or Machiavellian-is simply not a
viable politicalentity. He addressesthis partof the classicallegacyin several
important and interestingways. First, and most obviously, he makes the
point that the city is too small; as for little commonwealths,he remarks,no
humanwisdom can preservethem.104Second,he plainlyrejectsthe peculiarly
Greek dream of the self-sufficientpolis in emphasizingwhat was to become
the central idea in the postmercantilistconception of internationaltrade:
what is not available in sufficient amounts at home can be obtained by
tradingwhat one has in "superfluous"amounts. Indeed, he attributesthe
Peloponnesianwarto the Athenianfailureto allow for freetrade,as it were.105
Third, and probablymost significantto Hobbes himself, he would have us
abandon classical literaturealtogether,since it struckhim as altogethertoo
much preoccupiedwith soldierlyexploits.106 Finally,and most deeply,Hobbes
does not merely abandon the idea that political vigor and stability derive
from the identificationof people and polity-the sum of all the peculiarly
Greek and Roman associations of politeia and civitas-but inverts the relationship. The citizens of Hobbes's polity are to be completely immersed
in private pursuitsand so not just politicallypassive but inert.
In sum, Hobbes's effort to show us the highwayto peace proceeds along
two avenues. They might be expressedas his attempt to remove the causes,
motives, and temptations to external as well as civil war by working,as it
were, from inside out and outside in. That is, he aims to remove any plausible
temptation to foreign powers both through demonstratedcompetence and
preparationat home and throughthe state'sexhibitionof the kindof solidarity
he calls "union." At the same time, an institutionaland educationalreformation is designed to eliminate the sorts of ambitions in domestic politics
that he thinks lead to adventurismand imperialism.Certainlyhe does not
go so far as to suggest, with Plato, that a rightly ordered polity will surely
be free of both internal and external violence. But neither does he share
Thucydides'resignationto the state of war. Here, he adopts a kind of Aristotelian via media:the correctinternalmeasuresshould ensurethat a foreign
103. Leviathan, chap. 29, p. 245 (EW, 3: 321).
104. Ibid., chap. 25, p. 197 (EW, 3: 250).
105. Elements, pp. 180-81; De Cive, pp. 266-67 (EW, 2: 176-77); Leviathan, chap. 24, p.
185 (EW, 3: 232-33). On Athens' failure see Elements, p. 87.
106. Leviathan, chap. 29, pp. 241-42 (EW, 3: 314-15).
Hobbes's highwayto peace 351
power would be most unlikely to accept the risks of an attack on such a
polity, nor would such a polity be inclined to externalventuresof its own. '07
However, even if the line of interpretationsuggestedhere were granted,
it would remain the case (unsurprisingly)that Hobbes's treatmentof war is
a compound of the old and the new, recognizablymodern but also distinctly
premodern.It may well be possible to arguethat, on his own terms, Hobbes
did address the problem of interstate war. The entire treatment, after all,
derives from an era in which interstatewar appeared,on the one hand, as
the expression of dynastic or more broadly of familial ambitions and, on
the other, as religiouslyinspiredwarfarethat involved a systematicblurring
of domestic and external interests, commitments, and forces. Hobbes confronted both faces of interstate war. For it is his view that "there are no
wars so sharply waged as between sects of the same religion, and factions
of the same commonweal... ." Moreover,he holds that the "most frequent
pretextof sedition,and civil war, in Christiancommonwealths"is the notion
that legitimatequestions may arise as between the citizen's duty to obey the
commands of God and the commandsof the civil sovereign.108But,of course,
roughly half of Leviathan, and substantial portions of his other political
works, are devoted to the argumentthat this supposed dilemma is not only
completely unreal, it is also sufficientlypernicious for him to insist that
theologycan and should be completelyabandoned.This can be done without
involving the loss of individual salvation, however, since salvation depends
wholly on the single belief that Jesus is the Christ.'09In this connection,
moreover, Hobbes regularlyhas interstaterelations in mind, both because
of interferencefrom abroad and because of sympathizerswithin the commonwealth."0Thus, Hobbes not only provides a partial outline of a new
conception of the polity-the sovereign,territorial,and Erastian(thoughnot
yet secular) state-but quite clearly makes the state a positive element of
hope in the search for peace, ratherthan the primarysource of trouble that
it has since come to seem for so many observers. And again, it might be
suggested that he is among the early theorists of a kind of national consciousness based upon a shared language. For in his concentrationon the
purely conventional foundations of all our standards,he insists that access
to truth itself is based on "the common consent of them who are of the
same languagewith us (as it were, by a certaincontractnecessaryfor human
society)... .""' On the other hand, however, there is, in Hobbes, no anticipation of the nation in arms as the result of secular solidarity,no sense of
107. Politics, VII, 133 la, 1333b-1334a. Cf. Leviathan, chap. 17, pp. 129-30(EW, 3: 154-56);
De Cive, pp. 166-71 (EW, 2: 63-70).
108. De Cive, pp. 114-15 (EW, 2: 7); Leviathan, chap. 43, p. 424 (EW, 3: 584).
109. Elements, p. 164; De Cive, pp. 371, 375-77, 381 (EW, 2: 300, 305-7, 312); Leviathan,
chap. 43, pp. 425, 428-32 (EW, 3: 585, 590-96); Behemoth, p. 63; EW, 4: 345.
110. Leviathan, chap. 12, p. 97 (EW, 3: 108-9); chap. 29, p. 238 (EW, 3: 309); Behemoth,
pp. 18, 40-41, 148; EW, 4: 432; EW, 7: 399-400.
111. De Cive, p. 373 (EW, 2: 303); see also Leviathan, chap. 19, p. 150 (EW, 3: 183-84).
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the consequencesof mobilized peoples. His determinedindividualismplays
him false, for he treats the entire subjectin terms of individualdispositions.
His theory precludesrecognitionof persistent,perhapseven legitimate,but
nonethelessdangerous,differencesof interestand aim between "collectives."
At a deeper level, however, it is the very turn to a psychologicalperspective
bereft of "time, place, and circumstance"that is ultimatelyat issue here."2
4. Hobbes's unrealism
What Hobbes bequeathed to us is not very well characterizedas political
"realism,"whether one understandsthat word to refer primarilyto an unflatteringaccount of the fundamentaltraits of human nature or to the idea
that only power, in the sense of the instrumentsof coercion,counts. Indeed,
even if one understandsby realismthe view thatBeitzhas called"international
skepticism"-the inapplicabilityof any normative standardsin the state of
war- the case of Hobbes may not be quite so clear as it has sometimes been
held to be.' 'I Hobbes's account of human nature is an affairof nonspecific
capacities,on the one hand, and a "situation,"on the other. To be sure, the
combination produces lamentable conduct and consequences. But given
Hobbes's conception of the solution to the problem of perpetual war, he
cannot affordto make the wickednessof conduct the resultof indelibletraits,
since this would defeat his purpose. Nor does he do so. As for the concept
of power in Hobbes's system, it is clear that he means by it any and all
means to the satisfactionof the individual's desires, and that living just is
the constant but infinitely varying pursuit of desires. All this is Hobbes's
way of saying that a person is alive.' '4 But the important point is that all
power whatsoeveris a functionof what people have come to believe or been
trained to believe. "For the power of the mighty hath no foundationbut in
the opinion and belief of the people."'" That is why Leviathan must be
primarilyan educative state.
Admittedly, the third meaning attached to the idea of realism is amply
supportedby Hobbes'stext, and the interrogativehypothesisI have explored
here certainlydoes not resolve all the difficulties.But, to returnto the point
borrowedfrom Oakeshott,Hobbes's text is apt to presentproblemsfor any
single line of interpretation.It is quite possible, after all, that he simply was
not altogether consistent. Generally, of course, he holds that the laws of
1 2. This way of phrasingthe point I have borrowedfrom Geertz,Interpretationof Cultures,
p. 35.
113. Beitz, Political Theoryand InternationalRelations.
114. Leviathan,chap. 6, p. 55 (EW, 3: 51); chap. 8, p. 62 (EW, 3: 61-62). The famous
languageof chap. 11, p. 80 (EW, 3: 85-86), should, I think, be read in this light:"So that in
the first place, I put for a generalinclinationof all mankind,a perpetualand restlessdesireof
power after power, that ceaseth only in death."
115. Behemoth,p. 16.
Hobbes's highwayto peace 353
nature enjoin both individuals and sovereignsto endeavor peace whenever
it can be safely obtained.Preciselywhat this obligationamounts to, however,
is farfrom clear,involving,as it does, the much debatedquestionof Hobbes's
theory of obligation."16To enter into that discussionwould requirea separate
essay, at the least. But perhaps it is possible to consider some portions of
the problem apart from that issue. Hobbes does say, for instance, that the
law of waris the law of honor,which means that crueltyand pointlessrevenge
are excluded, and that the taking of a life can never be justified except by
fear."'7 At all events, however, my aim in this essay has been to suggestthat
Hobbes was at considerablepains to introducesubstantialalterationsin the
nature and purpose of the polity and of education, and the content of these
changes suggeststhat he may have anticipated,or at least hoped, that they
might come to have genuine and salutaryeffects in the internationalstate
of nature. At a minimum, he appearsto have thought that the adoption of
his scheme would eliminate all but defensive wars. And at a maximum,
might it not be possible that he hoped for the proliferationof enlightened
sovereignsand properlynonpoliticalcitizen bodies?In connection with this
suggestion,it is perhapspertinentto recall that, in Hobbes's view, example
is the most effective teacher by far."8
In sum, Hobbes's treatment of his chief concern-peace-is not usefully
summarized by any of the standard uses of the word "realism." On the
contrary,he is among the foundingfathersof a profoundlyunrealisticmode
of thought, unrealisticprecisely because it is systematicallyapolitical;it is
apolitical because it is purposefullytranshistorical.This mode of thought
has been exhibited not only in modern realism in internationalpolitical
theory but also in the liberalidealismthat has so often been set in opposition
to it, as well as in a good many other lines of thought. Hobbes's resort to
radicalprivatizationis sufficientlyplain, and it is withoutdoubt an important
part of the story. Diversity of belief and interestis politics, but, for Hobbes,
this politics is war, and that is why diversity must be confined to the sphere
of private life.
But this is not the heart of the matter. Rather, Hobbes, above all, accomplished a decisive shift of analytic focus in systematic political reflection
from history to psychology, from concern with the often all too ugly and
painful actualitiesof human experienceto the presumptivevalidity of complete generalityin the hidden uniformityof the human psyche. The result
of this remarkablealteration of focus has been a persistent tendency to
116. The principalissues at stake here are convenientlypresentedin Brown,HobbesStudies,
chaps. 2-4.
117. Elements, pp. 100-101; De Cive, p. 149 fn (EW, 2: 45-46 fn); cf. Leviathan,chap. 17,
pp. 129-30 (EW, 3: 154).
118. Leviathan,chap. 27, pp. 226-27 (EW, 3: 292-93); chap. 30, p. 257 (EW, 3: 337-38);
chap. 45, p. 472 (EW, 3:655); Behemoth,p. 54; De Homine, pp. 67-68, 81-82 (LW,2: 115-16,
129); EW, 4: 256, 346. This point is alreadyapparentin Hobbes's first publishedwork, his
translationof Thucydides;see EW, 8: xxii.
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multiplyapproachesto the studyof society,approachesthat, howeverdifferent
otherwise, share the inclinationto ignore or deliberatelyminimize the particularitiesof time, and place, and circumstance.To be sure, Hobbes by no
means established this habit of mind single-handedly.In particular,it remained for Locke to provide a sustainedaccount and defense of the human
mind conceived of as white paper,and of alternativeuses of sensationalism;
Hume would supplythe specificprinciplesof an associationismin psychology
that is only announced in Hobbes; and politicaleconomists would first systematize and then mathematicize the placeless and timeless. Contraryto
Hobbes's own view, this last embalmingprocesswas accomplishedin terms
not of geometry but of simultaneous equations. But it may fairly be said
that with Descartes, Hobbes stands at the head of the tradition.
Hobbes's supposed realism, in short, is much more nearly a headlong
flight from the realitiesof history and human experience.And is it not this
transhistoricalimpulse that lies at the root of the apoliticalapproachto the
political?That is, is this not the principalfeatureof the inclinationto undertake
political analysis without any substantialreferenceto specificcircumstance,
place, and time, deliberately to abstract from specificity in the name of
transhistoricalgenerality?Hobbes's achievementis as undeniablyfascinating
as it is great. But are we well advised to follow his lead?