Common values?
Perspectives on the Jordan – EU political dialogue
Ann-Kristin Jonasson
Ph D Political Science
Centre for European Research, University of Gothenburg
Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University
Sweden
We must admit ... that in the past we did not always live up to our own values,
instead pursuing the interests of regional stability...
EU‘s President Van Rompuy1
EU relates to the countries around the Mediterranean within the framework of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In this context, ―EU values Jordan as a very important partner
… and is committed to further developing a close, constructive and mutually beneficial
partnership‖. 2 EU has ―acknowledged the efforts of Jordan to move forward with ambitious
political and economic reforms‖. 3 As a result, deeper and broader EU-Jordan relations, as well
as an intensified political dialogue, are envisaged as part of the new Action Plan (2010). An
important element in these relations is the dialogue on human rights and democracy.
The intensified political dialogue is based on a request from the Jordanian government in
2008 for a closer political relation with the EU.4 In November 2009, EU welcomed and
endorsed the prospects for reinforced relations with Jordan, a so called ―advanced status‖.5
Importantly, EU underlines that an ―‗enhanced status‘ will be based on the core values the EU
and Jordan share, i.e. democratic principles‖.6 On 26 October 2010, Jordan was granted an
advanced status by the EU.7
But what are foundations on which Jordan is granted such an advanced status? To what extent
can the Jordan-EU relations be said to rest on shared core values and democratic principles?
In this chapter, perspectives from different actors on the Jordanian and the EU-side on the
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democratisation agenda of the ENP are analysed, in particular regarding the ―common
values‖.
The European Neighbourhood Policy: importance of common values
The ENP was developed after EU‘s 2004 enlargement with the objective to avoid new
dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, aiming instead at strengthening
the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned.8 The Lisbon Treaty further commits the
EU to developing a special relationship with its neighbouring countries, with the objective of
establishing an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, based on the values of the
Union.9 In order to reach this objective, EU offers its neighbours – within the framework of
the ENP – ―a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values
(democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and
sustainable development)‖.10 The basic idea is that ―(t)he ambition and the pace of
development of the EU‘s relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of
commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed
priorities‖.11 EU offers the partner country political association as well as deeper economic
integration.12 However,‖(t)he level of the EU‘s ambition in developing links with each partner
through the ENP will take into account the extent to which common values are effectively
shared‖.13 The ENP is thus characterized by a positive conditionality – EU‘s partner countries
are offered benefits to the extent that common values are effectively shared.
Common values challenged
ENP‘s focus on common values has been much discussed among scholars. Leino and Petrov
for instance refer to the common values as essentially abstract, stating that ―such values can
be both ‗common‘, ‗shared‘ and ‗universal‘ only if they are in fact abstract in nature‖. 14 The
European Commission takes advantage of this abstraction, according to Leino and Petrov, and
appoints itself as the interpreter of those values, effectively deciding their meaning in the
implementation of the ENP Action Plans.15 Thus, Leino and Petrov state that ENP is a policy
―that formally promotes jointly shared values but which, in practice, amounts to the EU‘s own
reading of them‖.16 Therefore, within the ENP framework, there is no issue of shared values
in any real sense. Instead, ‖the neighbouring countries are expected to follow the EU‘s
example in order to achieve closer rapprochement with the EU‖. 17 EU‘s interpretation of the
―common values‖, not shared values in any real sense, is thus what lies at the foundation of
the ENP, according to this perspective.
2
Also Bosse takes on the ―values dimension‖ of the ENP. Bosse concludes that member states‘
interests, particularly of geopolitical or economic kind, are what mainly motivates EU‘s
policies towards it neighbourhood – not values. Bosse exemplifies by referring to that
Southern member states prefer to support regime stability in the Mediterranean, instead of
supporting a clear emphasis on political reforms.18 Hence, the ENP‘s values dimension is
tainted by several deficiencies, according to Bosse, including ―lack of a coherent and
consistent discourse on political values, the lack of a wider EU-level agreement on the
contents and significance of these values as well as the limited degree of institutionalization
of values‖. 19 From this perspective, EU‘s values-based approach thus leaves a lot to be
wanted. In particular, the values dimension is essentially contested within the EU itself.
According to those analyses and others, prospects for ENP‘s values dimension, including its
focus on democratization, are bleak. EU is portrayed as a self-serving actor, using the concept
of common values as a cloak of legitimacy to hide underlying, interest-based motives. Values
are emphasized as long as it is beneficial for the EU and as long as they do not compromise
EU‘s interests.
Most analyses of ENP‘s values dimension are carried out on the basis of formal documents,
like the ENP Action Plans, which form the basis of the cooperation in the ENP. But how is
the ENP, with its democratization agenda and its focus on common values, perceived by the
actors involved, both in the partner country – here Jordan – and in the EU? To what extent do
these actors perceive that there are ―common values‖ between the two partners in practice?
This is what is analysed here. Such an analysis is particularly important as EU now
reconsiders its approach to the Middle East, after the Arab Spring of popular uprisings against
entrenched authoritarian regimes, and reinforces its emphasis on positive conditionality.20 By
analysing these perceptions, new facets can be added to the analysis of ENP‘s values
dimension, with direct bearing on the Jordanian case.
This analysis is based on in-depth interviews with centrally placed people, representing
different perspectives, both on the Jordanian and the EU-side. If common values are to be
shared between the EU and a partner country like Jordan, they should be shared by different
segments of the society in the partner country. To capture discourses both at the governmental
level and in various societal segments, representatives from the government, the Islamist
opposition, the civil society and independent analysts have been interviewed on the Jordanian
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side.21 To capture discourses in the EU institutions, representatives from different EU bodies
– the EU Delegation in Amman, the EU Council, the EU Commission and the European
Parliament – have been interviewed. 22
Comparing perspectives on the European Neighbourhood Policy
In comparing Jordanian and EU perspectives on the democratisation agenda and the common
values in the ENP, we look into what is considered to motivate EU‘s focus on democracy and
common values, to what extent there is an orientation to the common values on the Jordanian
side and EU‘s stance in this regard, and to what extent there is a shared orientation to – and
definition of – common values between Jordan and EU, particularly regarding democracy.
EU’s motivation for focusing democracy and common values in Jordan
On the Jordanian side, there is a unanimous perception of EU‘s work to promote democracy
as being motivated by self-interest. The ENP is seen as something that the EU has developed
to ensure stability in an otherwise volatile area. Instead of being regarded as in anyway
contradictory, this is regarded as something natural – the EU pursues its self-interest to work
for stability, also through its efforts to promote democracy. In this perspective, ―democracy‖
is used by the EU as a device to achieve this goal.
This perception is largely shared by the EU-representatives, who point out that stability is the
main objective of democracy promotion in Jordan arguing that only democracy can breed true
stability, even if there also is a moral objective of promoting democracy as a good in itself.
The Delegation representative states that EU works for a democratic change in the political
system in Jordan, but not of the political system as such.
EU is thus perceived as working for more democracy in Jordan. In doing so, it does however
not tackle the political system, which by most interviewees is described as having severe
democratic shortcomings. Indeed, interviewees on both sides agree that democracy is not
primarily promoted for its own sake by the EU, but because it is believed to breed stability.
Even if the EU-representatives do seem convinced that democracy breeds stability, it is
stability that is the end-goal, and democracy is a way to get there.
Such a position is problematic in different ways, Jordanian analysts point out, stating that if
democratisation is perceived as being interested-driven, rather than promoted for its own sake,
there is a risk of delegitimation. If democracy works against the interests of the EU and
stability proves to be better furthered in other ways, democratisation will no longer be
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supported by the EU and the reputation of democracy will be undermined in society at large.
Further, analysts also suspect that the EU only promotes democracy and democratic values if
these coincide with Western interpretations of democracy; questions are raised as to whether
EU would accept interpretations of democracy influenced by Islam. Thus, analysts suspect
that democracy will only be promoted when it serves EU‘s interests and not in its own right.
Despite the perceptions of EU democracy promotion as basically self-serving, almost all
Jordanian interviewees regard EU‘s policies in their country in a positive light; they are
positive to the engagement as such, not least because it furthers Jordan‘s economic situation.
This favourable view of EU‘s work in the country is however not overly enthusiastic, but
embraced in a matter-of-fact manner. Still, EU is definitely viewed in a more positive light
than the US, as it is considered to have more affinities with the region. Importantly, EU is
generally not seen as a neo-colonial power coming to impose policies on Jordan. The common
contention is that policies are not imposed on Jordan that easily.
Orientation to democracy and common values in Jordan – and EU’s stance in this regard
All Jordanian interviewees outside the government agree that the government is not serious in
its claims to promote democratic reform, stating that while the government supports
democracy rhetorically, it counteracts it in practise. On the basis of these accounts, a genuine
orientation to EU democratisation policies by the government can thus be questioned, even if
the government makes claims to the opposite. Interestingly, also the government
representatives concede that there are democratic shortcomings in Jordan, not on
governmental but on societal level, referring to the lack of democratic convictions – not least
in relation to women – in society at large.
In different ways, all Jordanian interviewees thus agree that there are obstacles to democracy
in Jordan. All also agree that the government is reluctant to relinquish power and give power
to the people. However, the reasons for this reluctance differ markedly. The government
representatives emphasise that the people have to be educated and that social conditions must
be improved before power can be turned over to them. Representatives outside government
point to the self-serving ambition of the government to keep power to itself.
The government representatives however claim to be seriously committed to reform. This is
also vouched for by the EU-representatives, who all perceive the government to be oriented
towards the policies agreed with the EU, including those on democratisation.
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Yet, even if EU and government representatives agree on Jordan‘s commitment to democratic
reform, they differ on how it is to be achieved. While the government argues that a profound
developmental approach must be taken to democratisation, EU primarily focuses political
issues like elections, not least emphasising the importance of a fair electoral system. The
Delegation representative stresses that the opinion of the people should not be feared,
regardless of their views. However, the government representatives argue that before focusing
on elections, the social conditions must change and democratic values become engrained so
that the people become democratically mature, making for genuine democratisation. Until
then, substantial electoral reforms should be postponed.
These perspectives indicate that the Jordanian allegiance to democracy is far from
straightforward, giving a dim picture of the commitment to democracy as stipulated in the
ENP to advance relations with the EU.
In this context, it should be noted that also the assumption that EU actually aims at promoting
democracy through the ENP has been questioned. Jordanian analysts claim that EU‘s prime
aim is to support the Jordanian government which provides stability, under the guise of a joint
commitment to common values. They argue that even if the EU would like to work for
democracy, the government does not and it is the government that has the final call.
Shared orientation to common values?
Jordanian interviewees emphasise that Jordan subscribes to universal – and in that sense
common – values, referring to general values like peace, security, human rights and
democracy. They also emphasise that Europe is in a better position to understand the local
context in Jordan than the US, because of the affinity. When scratching the surface somewhat,
the Jordanian interviewees however acknowledge that there are differences between Jordan
and the EU regarding values. In order to come to terms with the differences, Jordanian
interviewees emphasise that the common values need to be contextualised in the local society.
However, both the Jordanian analysts and the EU-representatives contend that the definition
of ―common values‖ is not discussed between the partners. While the Jordanian side
emphasise that the differences in values must be acknowledged and addressed, and that the
values must be adapted to the particular context, the EU-representatives do not stress local
contextualisation of the values. Instead, at a formal level, EU-representatives state that
commitment to common values is assumed if the partner country has signed international
declarations to that effect, as Jordan largely has, even if they do recognise that there indeed
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are substantial differences between values in practice. On the EU-side, ―common values‖ are
unanimously seen as those values laid down in universal – particularly UN – agreements that
both partners have committed to.
Assuming adherence to values based on international declarations is however problematic,
according to the Human rights institute representative, who points out that Jordan has a
history of not implementing conventions it is signatory to. In this situation, it would seem
naive for EU to assume that common values are implemented in line with such conventions.
However, EU-representatives point out that it does give EU leverage to constantly press the
issue in hope for eventual, gradual change.23
Shared definitions of democracy?
Even if all interviewees, on both sides, subscribe to democracy as a common value,
perceptions of democracy as a concept differ between them. Government representatives
largely seem to refer to a liberal, Western definition, not least by heavily emphasising the
rights of women. A strong emphasis on individual freedoms and political rights protected by
institutions, framing the democratic principles of contestation and participation, is the
hallmark of the liberal definition of democracy. 24 Along with analysts and NGOrepresentatives, government representatives note that democracy in this sense is not an
ingrained value in Jordan. Indeed, analysts point out, any (rhetorical) support of democracy is
based on the values of the elite, not on popular values. The Islamist however contends that
democracy equals the power of the majority and argues that democracy is to be based on the
prevalent values in the local context. In a Muslim majority country like Jordan, democracy
should therefore be based on Islamic values.
At their end, EU has not explicitly defined the concept of democracy. However, the
Copenhagen political criterion, a requirement for EU-membership, can be used as an
approximate in this regard. The Copenhagen political criterion stipulates that ―(m)embership
requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities‖.25 The
emphasis on rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities indicate a definite liberal
slant in EU‘s democracy definition.
While all interviewees pledge allegiance to democracy, one can thus discuss what kind of
democracy they pledge allegiance to. In the Islamist interpretation, democracy as such is seen
as a concept intrinsically void of values. It is a purely technical term, resting on what values
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the majority holds. In Muslim majority Jordan, Islam therefore defines the limits of
democracy. Here, there is little emphasis on individual rights and freedoms per se, as found in
the Western liberal democracy definition. The degree to which the Islamist definition of
democracy coincides with that of the EU can therefore be questioned.
As noted previously, government representatives largely seem to refer to a liberal definition
of democracy. However, in other respects, like in emphasising the need for special conditions
before power is to be handed over to the people, the government‘s perception goes less well
with EU‘s perception, which instead emphasises the importance of fair elections. In this
context, it can also be remembered that all Jordanian interviewees outside of government
question the government‘s democratic credentials. In different respects, then, perceptions of
democracy differ largely between the actors.
Common values? A concluding discussion
On the basis of this analysis, it can be questioned to what extent and in what sense there are
common values between Jordan and EU. What is actually meant by ―common values‖ in this
context? As the analysis shows, this is essentially vague. Instead, there are rather substantial
differences in perceptions on different sides, both of ―common‖ values in general and of
democracy in particular. However, the issue of common values remains largely
unproblematised from EU‘s side. For different reasons and on the basis of their own
perceptions, EU seems to assume that the definition of common values is indisputable. This
analysis shows that it is not.
This leads to a number of questions. How much leeway is EU willing to give Jordan in
developing its democracy, in order for Jordan to be regarded as acting in line with ENPagreements? What kind of democracy is EU promoting? Democracy as a decision method,
irrespective of what values that emerge or certain (liberal) democratic values? This is not
clear. Indeed, it is not clear to what extent EU aims at promoting democracy at all, if doing so
threatens stability and security.
Whereas the Jordanian government is orientated towards the ENP, the ENP itself is thus not
straightforward in relation to democracy, and the Jordanian orientation towards it is not
necessarily based on democratic commitments or commitments to common values.
Considering the importance of common values and the democratisation agenda in the ENP,
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these uncertainties are deeply troublesome. In fact, the very core of the ENP becomes
ambiguous. What is it that is furthered in the ENP?
Adding to the complexity of the problem is that, as Patrie – reporting from a European
Parliament delegation to Jordan – points out, ―the expression ‗democracy‘ has taken on a
negative connotation for Jordanians and has become tainted by its use as a slogan justifying
the American war in Iraq‖; indeed, the Prime Minister stressed it is ―not possible to talk about
democracy in the region as it is understood in Europe‖.26 In this situation, it is far from clear
what is meant by ―democracy‖ in the Jordanian context.
These ambiguities emphasise the need for EU and Jordan to actually discuss, and not only
assume, the definition of common values such as democracy. Until there is a genuine debate
on common values and what they mean in the local context, the question is how much can be
accomplished regarding democracy. Only by such a discussion, genuine progress towards
shared values can be made. This is even more evident in the wake of the Arab Spring-events.
Obviously, discussing common values is no easy task, however. Especially not since common
values are essentially debated also within the EU itself. 27
By not discussing the basic foundations of democracy and other common values – and what
those would mean in the particular local context at hand – EU still largely engages in a policy
of ―our size fits all‖ to speak with Bicchi, in an ―unreflexive attempt to promote its own
model‖, despite its declarations on flexibility and local adaptation. 28 Thus, the results of this
analysis are much in line with previous analyses of ENP‘s values dimension, even if it adds
analytical and empirical details. By refraining from defining the fundamental concepts at play,
but assuming them and taking them for granted, EU stays in firm control of the basic
foundations of the partnership.
This analysis shows that there would seem to be major challenges for a closer relationship
between Jordan and EU and an ―enhanced status‖ of Jordan, ―based on the core values the EU
and Jordan share‖ – not least since there is an essential vagueness regarding what these values
consist of. It would have seemed difficult for the EU to motivate an advanced status for
Jordan on the basis of common values, both because it is essentially unclear what the common
values actually are, but also because – judging from the analysis presented here – EU and
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Jordanian values on issues like democracy in fact must be regarded as far from ―common‖,
but instead rather far apart. What common values are thus shared by whom?
At the same time, the analysis – again in line with earlier research – points to that any
decision on an advanced status for Jordan is ultimately political. Representatives on both the
Jordanian and the EU side agree that even if there are moral values underlying ENP‘s focus
on democracy and common values, EU is primarily pragmatically motivated. It should also be
remembered that a focus on stability and security is in line with the core aims of the ENP.
Indeed, stability, security and well-being are the foundational objectives of the ENP.29
The analysis thus suggests that, at the end of the day, emphasis on democracy and common
values has primarily been used by the EU as a means to reach the goal of security and stability
in Jordan. If other means – such as an advanced status of Jordan in the ENP and a strong
regime in place – are regarded as better means to this effect, EU might well support these.
Therefore, an advanced status can be granted by the EU despite an actual lack of the common
values formally required. Thus, it seems as politics have won out yet again and as ―common
values‖ will continue to be used as a playing card by both the EU and the Jordanian
government in their pursuit of their respective interests. In this situation, focus on real
democratisation and real common values remain but spurious, unless real change comes
about. This needs to be taken into account as EU now promises to ―support all steps towards
democratic transformation‖ in the Arab world, through reinforced emphasis on positive
conditionality. 30
Acknowledgements
I thank Helena Rohdén and Andreas Bågenholm for constructive comments on earlier drafts
of this chapter. I also thank the Centre for European Research at the University of Gothenburg
and the Royal Society of Arts and Sciences in Gothenburg for their financial support.
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1
Van Rompuy (2011): ―Two tests for Europe‖, The Malta Independent online, 9 May, 2011
http://www.independent.com.mt/news.asp?newsitemid=124919
2
European Commission (2010): Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009, Progress
Report Jordan, Brussels, 12/05/2010, SEC(2010) 525, p 2.
3
Ibid.
4
―Upgrading of Jordan-EU relations‖, submitted to the November 2008 EU-Jordan Association Council.
European Commission (2009): Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, Progress Report
Jordan, Brussels, 23/04/09, SEC(2009) 517/2, p 2.
5
Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission to a Parliamentary question, 21 September 2010, E5785/2010.
6
European Commission (2010), p 2.
Council of the European Union (2010): Ninth meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council (Brussels, 26
October 2010). Statement by the European Union. Brussels, 26 October 2010,15539/10. PRESSE 288.
7
8
The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy? http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
Title 1, Article 8, Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 2010/C 83/01,
30.3.2010.
10
The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?
11
European Commission (2004): European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. Communication from the
Commission. Brussels, 12.5.2004. COM(2004) 373 final, p 8.
9
12
The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?
European Commission (2004), p 13.
14
Leino, Päivi and Roman Petrov (2009): ―Between ‗Common Values‘ and Competing Universals—The
Promotion of the EU‘s Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy‖, in European Law
Journal, Vol. 15, No. 5, September 2009, p 654, p 656.
15
Ibid., p 654.
16
Ibid., p 656.
17
Ibid., p 663.
18
Bosse, Giselle (2007): ―Values in the EU‘s Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a
Coheren Policy‖, in European Political Economy Review, no7, summer 2007, p 57.
19
Ibid., p 59.
20
European Commission (2011): A new response to a changing Neighbourhood. Communication from the
Commission. Brussels, 25/05/2011 COM(2011) 303.
21
Government: Senior Foreign Ministry official and Ministry of Planning Official. Islamist opposition:
Member of the Muslim Brotherhood Executive Bureau. Civil society: Women‘s rights NGO representative,
Sisterhood is Global Institute, Human rights institute representative, The National Centre for Human Rights, and
Health institute representative, Al Hussein Society for the rehabilitation/habilitation of the physically challenged.
Independent analysts: Scholar 1, Professor of Political Science, University of Jordan, Scholar 2, Dr,
International Studies Department, University of Jordan, Scholar 3, Guest Researcher, Department of Peace and
Conflict, Uppsala University, Scholar 4, Dr, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Scholar 5, The
Middle East Studies Center in Amman, Economic consultant, House of Audit, and Ex-Minister. All interviews
were carried out in Amman in December 2006. On an academic visit to Jordan in December 2010, it was largely
corroborated that perceptions stated by interviewees in 2006 are still valid.
13
22
Delegation representative, Delegation of the European Commission to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
Amman, Council representative, Swedish EU-Representation, EC Official 1, Desk Officer for Jordan, DG Relex,
European Commission, EC Official 2, Co-desk Jordan, DG Relex, European Commission, Human rights expert,
DG Relex, European Commission, EC Official EuropeAid, European Commission, EP Official. The Amman
interview was carried out in December 2006, the Brussels interviews were carried out in May, 2008.
23
According to an evaluation, ―(t)he dialogue with EC/EU is said to be a major cause of the recent acceleration
in the pace of ratifying and publishing international treaties‖, regarding treaties like the CEDAW (EGEval IIEureval/To-Excel (2007): Evaluation of the European Commission‘s support to the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. Final report. Volume 2. August 2007. Evaluation for the European Commission, p 70).
11
24
Landman, Todd (2007): Developing Democracy: Concepts, Measures, and Empirical Relationships.
Stockholm: International Idea, p 3.
25
Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 1993, 7.A.iii
26
Patrie, Béatrice (2008): 5th EP-Jordan interparliamentary meeting, 25 April-2 May, 2008. Draft report,
Delegation for Relations with the Mashreq Countries. European Parliament, p 11.
27
Cp. for instance the British and Polish Protocol (joined also by the Czech Republic) to the Libon Treaty,
relating to the applicability in those countries of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
28
Bicchi, Federica (2006): ―‘Our size fits all‘: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean‖, Journal of
European Public Policy, 13:2, March 2006, p 286.
29
European Commission (2004), p 3.
30
Van Rompuy (2011).
12