Draft
–
Subject
to
changes
Please
do
not
quote
w/o
authorization
Democratization
and
the
Quality
of
Democracy:
theoretical
reflections
with
a
practical
application
to
Central
America
Jorge
Vargas‐Cullellδ
[email protected]
Paper
submitted
to
the
International
Political
Science
Association
Congress
Santiago,
Chile,
July
2009
Comments
welcomed
δ
Ph.D,
University
of
Notre
Dame;
Deputy
Director
of
the
State
of
the
Nation
Centre
(Costa
Rica).
Introduction
A
slowly
growing
body
of
literature
on
the
quality
of
democracy
has
emerged
in
the
past
two
decades1.
The
seminal
works
of
Beetham
and
colleagues
in
the
United
Kingdom
(Beetham
1994;
Beetham
&
Weir,
1995;
Klug
et.
al,
1998)
opened
the
way
to
a
spate
of
works
quite
disparate
in
terms
of
their
conceptual
and
empirical
approaches
and
outreach
(PEN
2001;
IDEA,
2001;
Altman
&
Pérez‐Liñán;
2002;
UNDP,
2004;
see
works
on
the
edited
volume
by
Morlino
and
Diamond,
2005).
In
the
present
decade
there
have
been
attempts
to
lay
out
the
theoretical
and
methodological
underpinnings
of
the
quality
of
democracy
perspective
as
a
theory,
concept
and
program
for
empirical
research,
cfr:
O’Donnell
(2006,
2004),
Vargas‐
Cullell
(2004;
2008),
Diamond
and
Morlino
(2005),
Morlino
(2007).
However,
if
the
quality
of
democracy
approach
holds
any
promise,
much
work
remains
to
be
done.
The
conceptual
links
between
democracy
and
quality
of
democracy,
as
well
as
between
the
latter
and
democratization,
need
to
be
carefully
specified.
If
not,
the
quality
of
democracy
perspective
will
lack
of
a
sound
theoretical
grounding
and
can
dissolve
into
thin
air
as
an
indeterminate,
purely
normative
afterthought.
One
must
be
able
to
compare
the
quality
(or
qualities)
of
democratic
polities
according
to
a
set
of
parameters
firmly
anchored
on
comparative
theories
of
democracy.
This
paper
sketches
some
groundwork
for
such
an
enterprise.
It
builds
upon
the
attempt
by
the
author
to
make
sense
of
his
experience
conducting
empirical
research
on
quality
of
democracy
issues
during
the
past
decade
‐‐departing
point:
the
Citizen
Audit
of
the
Quality
of
Democracy
in
Costa
Rica
(1998‐2001).
I
argue
that,
as
a
derivative
concept,
the
quality
of
democracy
needs
to
be
tightly
woven
to
a
concept
of
democracy.
In
turn,
the
consideration
of
the
quality
of
democracy
requires
revisiting
our
understanding
of
democracy,
broadening
it
to
include
issues
beyond
the
procedural
understanding
of
democracy
as
a
political
regime.
The
paper
flows
as
follows.
In
the
first
part
I
present
my
understanding
of
the
concepts
of
democracy,
quality
of
democracy
and
democratization.
In
the
second
part,
I
present
a
brief
excursus
mapping
out
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America.
The
aim
is
to
show
that
the
analytical
framework
can
be
subject
to
comparative
empirical
study.
However,
the
scope
of
the
excursus
is
deliberately
limited:
beyond
describing
the
state
of
affairs,
I
do
not
engage
in
theory‐building.
1
Quality
of
democracy
is
an
oft
used
expression
in
countless
books
and
articles.
However,
it
is
seldom
specified.
In
this
paper
I
am
interested
in
pieces
aiming
at
systematically
reflecting
on
and/or
assessing
the
quality
of
democracy.
2
Conceptual
discussion
Beetham
and
colleagues’
innovative
initiative
to
audit
democracy
in
the
United
Kingdom
made
two
important
contributions.
First,
they
introduced
a
set
of
empirically
appraisable
democratic
standards,
thus
highlighting
the
evaluative
nature
of
the
quality
of
democracy
perspective.
Secondly,
they
broadened
the
scope
of
this
perspective
by
going
beyond
a
narrow
understanding
of
democracy
as
a
regime
(Beetham
1994;
Beetham
&
Weir,
1995;
Klug
et.
al,
1998).
The
Costa
Rican
Citizen
Audit
experiment
further
elaborated
the
idea
of
auditing
democracy.
It
implemented
participatory
methods
to
set
up
and
assess
democracy
standards,
and
applied
an
evaluative
method
based
on
the
ISO
experience
(PEN,
2001).
In
addition,
borrowing
from
O’Donnell’s
theoretical
works,
it
relied
upon
a
broad
concept
of
democracy,
one
which
includes
some
aspects
of
the
state
as
constitutive
elements.
Quality
of
Democracy
was
defined
“as
the
extent
to
which
political
life
and
institutional
performance
in
a
country
with
a
democratic
regime
meets
the
democratic
aspirations
of
its
citizens”
(Vargas‐Cullell,
2004:
96).
IDEA
2001’s
Democracy
Report
(2001)
and
Diamond
&
Morlino
(2005)
have
been
so
far
the
most
ambitious
efforts
to
study
the
quality
of
democracy
from
a
comparative
perspective.
IDEA
applied
Beetham’s
democratic
principles
and
set
of
requirements
to
the
study
of
eight
polities.
Morlino
&
Diamond
took
a
different
stance:
for
them,
quality
of
democracy
refers
to
a
good
democracy.
They
go
on
to
distinguish
three
meanings
of
quality
for
the
evaluation
of
quality
of
democratic
life
(results,
processes
and
contents).
Analytically,
eight
rather
overlapping
dimensions
are
proposed,
five
of
them
procedural
(Morlino
&
Diamond,
2005;
Morlino,
2007).
In
an
incipient
field
such
as
that
of
the
Quality
of
Democracy,
all
these
efforts
have
opened
interesting
theoretical
and/or
methodological
possibilities.
However,
we
still
lack
of
some
basic
agreed
upon
understandings.
In
a
sense,
one
is
confronted
with
a
series
of
monologues
waiting
for
a
spark
capable
of
eliciting
a
good
conversation.
I
would
point
out,
though,
that
most
works
have
avoided
the
temptation
to
devise
summary
measures
of
the
quality
of
democracy
‐‐like
the
ones
proposed
by
Altman
&
Pérez‐Liñan
(2002)‐‐
due
to
the
many
unknowns
once
one
goes
beyond
the
realm
of
measuring
polyarchy.
In
the
rest
of
the
first
section
I
outline
how
I
nowadays
understand
the
concept
of
quality
of
democracy.
My
thoughts
reflect
critically
on
a
body
of
works
on
this
topic
including
others
I
have
not
mentioned
yet
(Hagopian
2006;
Putnam,
1993;
IDEA,
2001;
Lijphart,
1999).
I
take
stock
with
some
of
my
previous
work,
and
try
to
come
up
with
a
tighter,
more
parsimonious,
approach.
I
aim
at
solving
the
weakest
point
of
my
original
framework:
the
link
between
the
quality
of
democracy
and
the
core
concept
of
democracy.
In
doing
so,
I
hope
I
can
contribute
to
a
fruitful
dialogue
with
other
approaches.
3
Given
that
the
quality
of
democracy
is
a
derivative
concept
(Morlino,
2007;
Diamond
&
Morlino
2006;
Vargas‐Cullell,
2004),
the
departing
point
of
my
theoretical
framework
is
the
definition
of
democracy,
the
substantive
object
it
qualifies.
I
understand
democracy
as
a
system
to
organize
societal
power
relationships
based
on
the
premise
of
the
citizen
as
an
agent
(O’Donnell,
2006,
2004;
Vargas‐Cullell,
2008)2.
In
turn,
I
undertand
democratization
as
the
open‐
ended
process
through
which
a
democratic
organization
of
power
relations
disseminates
in
a
society
(Whitehead,
2002).
As
such,
democratization
is
a
vector
and
implies
examining
historical
trajectories.
When
studying
democratization
one
focus
on
change,
how
a
society
goes
from
point
A
to
point
B,
for
instance,
from
an
authoritarian
system
to
a
democratic
one3.
Quality
of
democracy
evaluates
the
outcomes
of
democratization
at
a
given
point
in
time.
In
particular,
I
define
quality
of
democracy
as
the
extent
to
which
a
polity
meets
certain
parameters
previously
defined
as
constitutive
of
the
concept
of
democracy.
When
studying
quality
of
democracy,
I
gauge
the
gulf
between
real
outcomes
and
democratic
parameters.
Outcomes
may
vary
a
lot
from
place
to
place,
and,
as
we
shall
see,
within
a
given
polity.
This
is
a
non‐normative
way
of
defining
quality
of
democracy:
although
values
and
principles
are
woven
into
the
fabric
of
democratic
rules
and
practices,
I
do
not
conflate
the
quality
of
democracy
with
a
good,
virtuous
system
or
citizenry.
My
focus
is
on
assessing
democratic
parameters.
To
clarify
the
links
between
democracy,
democratization
and
the
quality
of
democracy
I
need
to
further
elaborate
on
the
concept
of
democracy
I
have
just
outlined.
At
the
heart
of
democratic
power
relationships
there
is
an
act
of
delegation.
The
citizen,
the
source
of
legitimacy,
delegates
power
to
public
authorities
to
govern
in
their
name.
However,
this
delegation
is
partial:
the
citizen‐
agent
retains
a
substantial
amount
of
power
because
she
does
not
forfeit
her
rights.
She
always
retains
the
ability
to
mobilize
her
rights
as
she
see
fit,
within
certain
restrictions.
Power
‐–delegated
and
non‐delegated
one
as
well‐‐
is
exerted
according
to
two
sets
of
rules.
The
first
one
deals
with
the
question
of
who
can
exert
power,
that
is,
who
has
access
to
power
and
how.
The
second
set
of
rules
norm
the
exercise
of
2
An
agent
is
someone
capable
of
adopting
decisions
and
act
in
consequence.
Dahl’s
moral
autonomy
assumption
states
that
all
individuals
are
the
best
judges
of
their
own
interests
and
that
differences
do
not
justify
guardianship
(Dahl,
1989).
Thus,
civil
and
political
equality
ensues.
In
sum,
democracy
is
not
consistent
with
any
kind
of
legal
definition
of
citizenship,
only
with
those
based
on
the
explicit
recognition
of
individuals
as
political
and
moral
agents.
3
Please
note
that
I
do
not
conflate
democratization
with
“transition
to
democracy”.
Democratization
is
a
broader
concept
and
can
very
well
unfold
in
democratic
regimes,
what
Parry
and
Moran
term
as
“democratization
within
democracy”
(1994)
–for
the
record,
Costa
Rica
after
the
1980s
is
a
interesting
case
of
this
type
of
democratization.
For
me,
transitions
are
a
special
case
of
democratization,
one
concerning
the
change
from
non‐democratic
regimes
to
a
democratic
ones.
4
power,
how
power
can
be
exerted
by
those
who
wield
it4.
The
interaction
between
the
terms
of
power
delegation
and
the
rules
to
exert
it
leads
us
to
four
quadrants
or
dimensions
(Figure
1).
The
first
quadrant
refers
to
the
rules
that
norm
the
access
to
delegated
power,
the
one
vested
in
public
authorities,
as
well
as
the
rules
that
specify
the
means
through
which
those
who
have
been
invested
with
authority
relinquish
it.
In
a
democracy
these
regulations
basically
correspond
to
the
electoral
system,
which
in
turn
is
grounded
on
constitutional
rules
that
define
the
extent
and
limits
of
delegated
power.
The
second
quadrant
refers
to
the
rules
that
norm
the
access
to
non‐
delegated
power,
the
one
which
citizens
do
not
forfeit.
This
refers
to
the
question
of
who
enjoy
the
rights
to
have
a
say
on
issues
of
public
interest,
to
elect
those
who
will
govern
the
polity
or
to
be
elected
in
government.
In
short,
these
rules
specify
who
has
been
enfranchised
as
a
citizen,
a
legal
status
which
in
modern
democracies
is
supposed
to
be
quasi‐universal,
and
what
rights
such
as
status
implies.
The
third
quadrant
refers
to
the
rules
norming
the
exercise
of
delegated
power,
the
one
vested
in
public
authorities.
It
deals
with
the
carefully
crafted
and
complex
set
of
rules
that
define
the
lawful
uses
of
power
by
those
invested
with
public
authority,
the
unlawful
exercise
of
it,
and
the
sanctions
for
trasgressing
these
norms.
Please
note
that
the
brunt
of
these
rules
apply
to
non‐electoral
periods,
the
time
in
which
democratically
elected
goverments
are
supposed
to
govern
democratically.
This
is
what
O’Donnell
calls
a
“Estado
de
derecho”
which
in
a
democracy
is
a
democratic
Estado
de
derecho
(O’Donnell
2006,
2004).
In
absence
of
a
good
english
translation,
hereinafter
I
will
term
it
as
the
“Rule
of
Law
and
Accountability”.
Finally,
the
fourth
quadrant
refers
to
the
exercise
of
non
delegated
power
by
citizens,
which
leads
us
to
the
question
of
how
people
engage
in
public
life
and
mobilize
their
rights.
As
we
know,
people
can
choose
to
exert
rights
and
liberties
–or
not
to
do
so‐‐,
or
(unfortunately)
to
exert
them
in
ways
that
are
inimical
to
democracy.
Citizen
engagement,
of
course,
means
involvement
on
issues
related
to
the
access
to
power
(participation
in
electoral
politics)
and
to
the
exercise
of
power
(participation
in
governance
and
public
policy
making).
In
sum,
my
definition
of
democracy
leads
me,
from
an
analytical
viewpoint,
to
four
quadrants
or
dimensions,
and
,theoretically,
to
a
controversial
proposition
which
I
do
not
have
time
to
elaborate
upon:
democracy
goes
beyond
a
political
regime,
it
surely
contains
a
regime,
but
transcends
it
(O’Donnell,
2004,
2006).
4
This
distinction
between
access
and
exercise
I
borrow
from
Sebastian
Mazzuca
(1999)
although
I
draw
a
diametrically
different
conclusion
from
this
useful
distinction.
5
Figure
1:
Four
Dimensions
of
Democracy
The
problem
of
course
is
whether
one
can
set
out
clear
standards
or
benchmarks
that
to
assess
how
far
democratization
has
gone
in
a
given
dimension.
I
think
that
the
literature
has
set
agreed
upon
standards
in
two
of
these
dimensions:
the
electoral
dimension,
where
elections
should
be
fair,
free,
decisive,
competitive
and
periodical,
and
the
citizenship
dimension,
where
universal
enfranchisement
is
a
requirement
(Table
1).
Less
clear
and
researched
are
the
standards
for
the
two
other
dimensions.
Regarding
the
state,
I
think
that
the
“democratic
estado
de
derecho”
concept
posits
a
set
of
empirically
appraisable
conditions:
(a)
the
recognition,
enactment
and
effective
enforcement
of
rights
by
the
state;
and
(b)
the
subordination
of
public
authorities
to
the
law.
In
turn
these
conditions
imply
horizontal
accountability
(legal,
political
and
administrative)
to
ensure
that
authorities
remain
within
the
law,
and
institutional
openess
to
vertical
accountability,
to
ensure
that
authorities
and
public
officials
remain
responsive
to
citizens’
needs
and
demands.
Finally,
the
murkier
and
softer
dimension
is
the
exercise
of
non
delegated
power
by
citizens.
Here,
I
posit
a
still
ill
defined
and
temptative
outcome:
civic
engagement
in
public
life.
I
well
know
that
it
is
impossible
to
specify
an
optimum
6
level
of
participation:
while
democracy
would
collapse
if
all
citizens
op
out
(novelist
Saramago’s
scenario
in
the
“Ensayo
de
la
Lucidez”),
democracies
can
survive
with
fairly
low
levels
of
citizen
involvement
in
public
affairs.
Nonetheless,
in
principle,
more
and
diverse
engagement
is
better
than
less,
with
an
important
caveat:
that
those
participatory
citizens
do
not
mobilize
their
rights
and
liberties
to
back
up
forces
striving
to
replace
democracy.
Widespread
citizen
support
for
democracy
is,
thus,
a
parameter
of
the
quality
of
democracy.
In
addition,
enough
participation
in
the
electoral
front
is
needed
as
to
render
elections
legitimate
in
the
eyes
of
the
citizenry.
A
similar
criterion
can
be
used
with
citizen
engagement
during
non‐
electoral
times:
enough
participation
is
needed
to
check
any
attempts
by
those
in
power
to
eschew
accountability
and
to
ensure
responsiveness
by
public
officials
to
people’s
needs
and
demands5.
Please
note
that
some
dimensions
involve
non‐regime
aspects,
for
example:
horizontal
accountability
and/or
citizen
engagement
in
non‐electoral
times,
what
is
known
as
societal
accountability
(Smulovitz
and
Peruzzotti,
2000).
Evaluation
of
non‐regime
dimensions
of
democracy
can
be
done
following
,
by
analogy,
the
procedures
through
which
scholars
regularly
evaluate
whether
elections
in
a
given
country
have
been
free
and
fair6.
In
sum,
a
concept
of
democracy
that
goes
beyond
a
polyarchical
understanding
of
democracy
was
disaggregated
into
four
dimensions
or
quadrants
and
ten
standards
for
the
quality
of
democracy
were
attached
to
them.
In
addition,
it
has
allowed
me
to
sketch
a
richer,
more
textured
concept
of
democratization
and
to
draw
a
distinction
between
democratization
as
a
process
or
trajectory,
and
quality
of
democracy
as
an
evaluative
concept
measuring
the
gap
between
real
outcomes
and
democratic
parameters
at
a
given
point
in
time.
Finally,
it
helped
my
to
derive
the
quality
of
democracy
standards
not
from
an
abstract
set
of
values
and
principles,
but
from
constitutive
aspects
of
democracy.
5
I
readiy
accept
that
“enough”
is
an
ill‐defined
standard.
In
time,
I
hope
I
can
come
up
with
a
better
specification.
6
Based
on
the
four
dimensional
concept
of
democracy
one
could
distinguish
different
types
of
democratization,
because
progress
on
one
quadrant
does
not
imply
progress
on
the
rest.
Just
to
point
some
of
them:
(a)
Democratization
only
along
the
first
quadrant
would
amount
to
liberalization
within
an
authoritarian
political
system.
(b)
Democratization
along
the
electoral
system
and
citizen
enfranchisement
quadrants
(but
not
along
the
others,
or
very
little)
has
been
the
focus
of
the
transition
literature
that
O’Donnell,
Schmitter
and
Whitehead
inaugurated
more
than
twenty
years
ago.
Here
a
democratized
regime
coexists
with
a
State
with
strong
authoritarian
legacies.
I
suspect
this
is
the
case
in
many
fledgling
democracies
in
Latin
America
and
elsewhere.
(c)
Democratization
along
the
four
quadrants
involves
deep
penetration
of
democracy
in
the
organization
and
functioning
of
the
state
during
non
electoral
periods,
and
basically
implies
an
extra
polyarchical
outreach.
I
suspect
that
most
advanced
democracies
could
fit
into
this
category.
7
Table
1.
Democracy
Dimensions,
Democratization
Outcomes
and
Standards
for
Assessing
the
Quality
of
Democracy
The
Quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America
In
the
second
part
of
my
paper
my
goal
is
to
apply
the
conceptual
framework
I
briefly
sketched
to
an
–admittedly—
general
analysis
of
democratization
and
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America.
My
main
goal
is
to
show
that
a
broader
concept
of
democracy,
if
attached
to
empirically
assessable
quality
of
democracy
standards,
renders
new
insights
regarding
the
breadth
and
scope
of
democratization
in
this
region.
Before
starting,
though,
I
will
place
democratization
within
the
context
of
a
multifaceted
and
complex
process
of
societal
change
Central
America
has
gone
through
recently.
Background
Democratization
in
Central
America
is
part
of
broader
processes
of
dynamic
societal
change.
In
the
past
twenty
years,
the
region
has
gone
through
five
simultaneous
and
intertwined
transitional
processes.
In
spite
of
this
dynamism,
the
region
hosts
some
of
the
hemisphere’s
more
developmentally
backward
and
unequal
societies.
The
first
transition
was
from
war
to
peace.
Twenty
years
ago,
three
countries
were
experiencing
civil
wars
(Guatemala,
El
Salvador
and
Nicaragua)
and
one
was
militarily
invaded
by
the
US
(Panama).
In
the
1990s,
conflicts
were
put
to
rest
by
peace
agreements
between
goverments
and
rebels
–except
for
Panama—within
a
8
regional
framework
for
political
negotiations
called
“Esquipulas
2”.
The
main
outcome
was
the
advent
of
civilian
governments
and
the
loss
of
clout
by
the
military,
the
most
powerful
political
actor
since
independence
in
the
first
part
of
the
XIXth
century
in
all
countries
but
Costa
Rica7.
The
second
transition
was
from
authoritarianism
to
democracy
–the
focus
of
this
paper.
Twenty
years
ago
all
countries
but
Costa
Rica
were
dictatorships;
none
today.
Nowadays,
all
have
electoral
democracies,
though
some
of
them
are
deeply
flawed:
Freedom
House
ranks
four
of
the
seven
Central
American
countries
as
“partially
free”
(Freedom
House,
2008),
and
others
characterize
them
as
semidemocracies
(Mainwaring,
Brinks
and
Pérez
Liñán,
2004).
We
shall
return
to
this
but
for
now
it
is
worth
noting
that
nowadays,
in
Central
America,
elections
are
the
unconstested
means
for
accessing
political
power
and
political
debate
is
quite
lively
and
open.
Since
the
early
nineties
several
rounds
of
national
and
local
elections
have
been
conducted
everywhere,
and
,
except
for
once
(Nicaragua’s
2008
local
elections),
losers
have
accepted
‐‐however
grudginly‐‐
the
outcome.
The
third
transition
has
been
developmental.
All
countries
evolved
from
semi‐closed
economies
that
combined
agroexports
(coffee,
bananas,
sugarcane
and
meat)
and
import
substitution
industrial
policies,
to
open
economies,
deeply
tied
to
the
international
system.
The
degree
of
openess
varies
markedly
from
country
to
country
as
measured
by
the
Openness
Coefficient
(See
Table
2):
Guatemala
has
the
less
open
economy
(0.51)
and
Panama,
Honduras
and
Costa
Rica
have
very
open
ones
(more
than
1).
Countries
implemented
significantly
different
strategies
to
insept
themselves
in
the
global
economy:
Panama
is
building
a
world‐class
hub
center
around
the
Canal;
Costa
Rica
has
created
a
cluster
of
high‐tech
export
firms,
while
the
rest
of
countries
rely
on
non‐traditional
agroexports
(shrimp,
fruits),
low‐
tech
textile
industry,
and
“exporting”
people
(migration).
However,
none
depends
upon
the
raw
agricultural
commodities
they
use
to
export
some
decades
ago.
Central
American
countries
are
no
longer
rural
societies.
All
are
experiencing
intense
urbanization.
Currently,
more
than
half
of
its
42
million
inhabitants
live
in
urban
centers,
from
a
low
of
47%
in
Honduras
and
Guatemala,
were
there
peasantry
is
still
extended,
to
more
than
60%
in
the
more
developed
southern
area
of
the
isthmus
‐‐Panama
and
Costa
Rica
(Table
2).
Most
metropolitan
areas
concentrate
between
25%
‐
50%
of
the
country’s
population
–except
for
Honduras
where
there
is
no
such
urban
primacy.
Finally,
the
fifth
transition
is
demographic
in
nature.
All
countries
are
going
through
processes
of
demographic
transition.
In
the
next
decades,
the
population
7
The
specific
outcome
varied
significantly
from
country
to
country:
in
Panama,
the
military
was
abolished
(thus
creating
with
neighboring
Costa
Rica
the
first
binational
space
without
armed
forces);
in
Nicaragua,
El
Salvador
and,
to
a
lesser
extent,
firm
civilian
control
over
the
military
was
established.
However,
in
Guatemala,
the
army
remains
as
a
powerful
and
independent
political
actor,
with
extended
reserved
domains.
9
will
age
rapidly
and
the
largest
cohorts
in
history
of
young
people
will
flood
the
labor
markets.
The
transition
is
far
more
advanced
in
Costa
Rica
and
Panama,
countries
in
which
forty
years
from
more
than
25%
of
the
population
will
be
65
years
and
older.
However,
change
has
begun
already
even
in
the
developmental
backwater
known
as
the
Central
American
“Northern
Triangle”
(Guatemala,
Honduras,
and
El
Salvador)
which
has
experienced
declining
fertility
and
mortality
rates
since
the
1990s.
Demographics
exert
pressures
for
dynamic
labor
markets
as
well
as
for
rapid
increases
in
productivity;
however,
in
the
past
few
years
that
has
not
happened.
While
the
image
of
Central
America
as
comprising
dormant
–stagnant‐‐
societies
is
misguided,
the
region
continue
to
be
mired
by
deep
social
and
economic
problems.
In
spite
of
a
recent
spurt
of
economic
growth,
almost
half
of
the
population
remains
poor
(46%
in
2006)
–and
that
was
before
the
current
economic
crisis.
30
millions
of
the
42
millions
inhabiting
the
region
do
not
have
access
to
social
security,
and
10
millions
do
not
have
access
to
any
kind
of
health
services
(public,
private
or
charity).
Income
inequality
as
measured
by
the
Gini
Coefficient
is
among
the
highest
in
Latin
America,
and
it
is
rising
in
Costa
Rica,
the
second
less
unequal
country
after
Uruguay.
One
out
of
ten
Central
Americans
has
emigrated,
the
majority
to
the
US.
In
El
Salvador,
Guatemala,
and
Honduras,
remittances
amount
between
10%
to
20%
of
their
GDPs.
State
capabilities
to
promote
social
progress
are
weak:
everywhere
tax
collection
is
low,
and
except
for
Panama
and
Costa
Rica,
social
expenditures
are
among
the
lowest
in
Latin
America
(PEN,
2008;
ECLAC,
2008).
In
addition,
there
are
growing
assymetries
within
the
region.
In
1965,
the
ratio
of
per
capita
GDP
in
Costa
Rica
and
Panama,
the
more
economically
advanced
countries,
to
Nicaragua
and
Honduras,
the
most
backward,
was
2:1.
Today
the
gap
has
widened
to
4:1.
80%
of
the
regional
population
lives
in
countries
that
experience
economic
long
term
stagnation,
and/or
are
just
painfully
recovering
pre‐
civil
war
GDP
per
capita
levels
(PEN
2008).
In
sum,
in
the
past
two
decades
democratization
has
unfolded
in
Central
America,
as
part
of
a
multifaceted
process
of
societal
change.
It
went
from
being
an
exception
(Costa
Rica)
to
a
regional
trend.
Democracy,
however,
has
rooted
on
the
unfriendly
soil
of
developmentally
backward
societies.
10
Table
2.
Central
America:
societies
in
multiple
transitions,
1980­2009
Transition
BZ
GUA
ELS
HON
NIC
CRI
Rural
to
urban
1/
Pyramidal
to
rhomboidal
demographic
structure
2/
(Year
transition
ends)
ISI
to
open
export‐led
economy
3/
War
to
peace:
peace
agreement
(Invasion)
Authoritarianism
to
electoral
democracy
4/
From
colony
to
independence
Democratization
within
democracy
5/
Number
of
Transitions
≤50%
≤50%
50%>x<60%
≤50%
50%>x<60%
PAN
>60%
>60%
58%
(2035)
50%
(2050)
59%
(2035)
54%
(2040)
56%
(2040)
64%
(2015)
60%
(2015)
ND
0.51
0.79
1.18
0,57
1.02
1,38
1996
1992
1989
1990s
1994
1985
1990
1981
Mid
1980s
3∗
5
5
4
4
5
1989
(US
invasion
replaces
regime)
1994
3∗
1/
%
urban
population
in
2007
2/
%
of
the
population
between
15
and
65
yrs.
3/
Openness
coefficient:
(Exports
+Imports)/GDP.
All
figures
are
for
2006.
4/
Year
of
first
democratic
election
5/
The
term
is
borrowed
from
Parry
and
Moran
(1994).
Date
indicates
the
period
in
which
Congress
approves
constitutional
reforms
and/or
ordinary
laws
significatively
broadening
and
strengthening
the
institutions
of
the
Rule
of
Law
and
accountability.
Source:
For
notes
1,
2,
3,
and
4:
PEN
2008.
For
note
5,
PEN,
2001.
Electoral
democracy
In
assessing
the
quality
of
democracy
of
Central
American
polities,
I
shall
start
with
regime
democratization,
or
more
accurately,
the
establishment
of
electoral
democracy:
how
far
has
Central
America
gone?
This
is
the
arena
where
political
change
has
been
more
dramatic.
In
most
countries
we
have
functioning
electoral
democracies.
More
than
30
elections
(national
and
local)
have
been
held
in
this
decade
alone.
Voters
not
only
elect
representatives
to
the
Executive
and
Legislative
bodies,
but
all
of
their
relevant
local
authorities.
In
all
countries,
legally
independent
electoral
bodies
organize
electoral
processes
and
have
the
authority
to
declare
the
winners.
The
region
also
hosts
the
oldest
and
stablest
Latin
American
democracy
(Costa
Rica).
However,
in
terms
of
the
existence
of
free,
fair,
decisive
and
competitive
elections,
electoral
democracies
in
Central
America
confront
unsettling
unfinished
business.
In
most
countries,
a
key
democratic
guarantee
is
missing:
the
bodies
responsible
for
organizing
elections
are
politicized
and
partisan.
The
worst
situation
11
is
Nicaragua’s,
where
electoral
authorities
are
handpicked
by
congress
on
strictly
partisan
ways
(the
ruling
FSLN
controls
the
Electoral
Tribunal)8.
However,
five
other
countries
have
their
share
of
politicization
(Table
3)
–in
El
Salvador,
though,
main
parties
have
representatives
to
the
electoral
body
thus
creating
some
checks
(as
Mexico
did
in
2007).
Political
finance
is
a
second
problematic
area.
All
countries
have
weak
or
inexistent
regulation
for
private
funding
of
political
parties
and
no
caps
for
electoral
expenditures
(Casas
Zamora,
2007,
2002).In
four
countries
the
law
is
silent
on
this
issue.
This
has
not
only
created
blatant
imbalances
between
political
parties
–some
of
them
directly
controlled
by
powerful
economic
actors.
In
contexts
of
weak
institutions,
this
loophole
has
opened
the
door
forthe
penetration
of
the
political
system
by
illegal
actors
–as
it
has
happened
in
Guatemala,
where
representatives
with
criminal
records
and
publicly
known
ties
to
organized
crime
have
been
elected.
Regarding
public
subsidies,
all
countries
but
Costa
Rica
have
weak
or
inexistent
accountability
(oversight)
over
how
parties
use
public
monies.
Table
3.
Central
America:
Type
of
electoral
authorities
and
fairness
of
last
election
Selection
Integration
Non
partisan
Mixed
Partisan
(2)
(1)
Non
political
Costa
Rica
(3)
(1)
Last
election
2007
(referendum):
free
and
fair
Polítical
Guatemala,
Honduras
El
Salvador
(1)
(0)
Panama
(2)
Last
election
GUA:
2007
(national):
2009
(01‐legislative;
03‐
violence,
irregularities
presidential):
free
and
HON:
2005
(national):
fair
minor
irregularities
PAN:
2009
(national):
free
and
fair
(0)
Nicaragua
(0)
2008
(local):
fraud
Note:
Numbers
within
parentheses
indicate
scores
according
to
the
assurances
for
electoral
fairness
by
type
of
electoral
authority,
in
an
ordinal
scale.
Range:
(0)
minimum
score,
(4)
maximum
score.
Fuente:
PEN,
2008
based
in
Artiga
2007
8
Partisan
control
over
the
electoral
authority
has
allowed
the
FSLN
–ruling
party‐‐
to
use
the
law
as
a
weapon
for
political
advantage:
in
2008
the
Tribunal
cancelled
two
opposition
parties
on
bogus
charges;
it
has
not
published
the
complete
results
of
the
2005
national
elections
and
2008
elections;
also,
it
has
authorized
sudden
redistricting
to
prevent
popular
opposition
candidates
to
run
for
mayor
of
Nicaragua’s
capital
city.
12
The
perverse
combination
of
politicized
electoral
authorities
and
non‐
regulated
political
finance
is
a
threat
to
political
stability
and,
in
the
case
of
Nicaragua,
has
enabled
a
democratic
reversion.
Here,
the
2008
municipal
election
was
blatantly
fraudulent,
the
first
fraudulent
electoral
process
in
Central
America
since
authoritarianism
was
vanquished
in
the
region.
As
a
result,
the
European
Union
and
the
US
have
cut
social
and
economical
aid
programs
to
this
country.
In
Honduras,
the
narrow
victory
of
the
Liberal
Party
in
the
2005
elections
unleashed
riots,
and
calls
for
the
military
to
step
in,
until
backdoor
negotiations
succeeded
in
convincing
the
loser
party
to
accept
the
outcome.
In
Guatemala,
more
than
100
people
died
of
politically
related
violence
in
the
2008
elections,
and
the
international
community
had
to
step
in
to
shoulder
electoral
authorities
in
the
ballotage.
The
brights
spots
are
El
Salvador,
Panama
and
Costa
Rica.
Despite
a
flawed
institutional
design,
in
El
Salvador
the
electoral
body
was
able
to
aptly
organize
the
hotly
contested
national
elections
in
which,
for
the
first
time
since
the
peace
agreement
of
1992,
the
party
of
the
former
guerrilla
won
(FSLN).
The
outcome
was
duly
accepted
by
the
fiercely
rightst
ruling
party
(ARENA).
In
Panama,
the
recent
elections
were
free
and
fair,
and
in
Costa
Rica,
despite
a
string
of
narrow
elections
(2002
and
2006
presidential,
and
2007
national
referendum),
outcomes
have
also
been
free
and
fair.
Democratic
Rule
of
Law
Even
if
in
most
Central
American
countries
electoral
democracies
are
fragile,
they
are
so
far
the
best
part
of
the
story.
Democratization
weakest
spot
in
the
region
has
been
the
inability
to
show
substantial
progress
in
establishing
the
institutions
of
the
democratic
Rule
of
Law
and
accountability
over
political
powerholders.
Herein,
the
quality
of
democracy
is
low,
an
unfortunate
outcome
that
threatens
progress
at
the
electoral
front.
Democratic
regimes
can
be
easily
encroached
upon
by
states
with
strong
authoritarian
legacies,
in
whose
womb
they
exist
–as
it
has
clearly
happened
in
Nicaragua.
In
sum,
the
standard
of
a
rule
of
law
capable
of
enforcing
rights,
subordinating
political
power
to
the
law
and
creating
robust
networks
of
political
and
legal
accountability
is
not
met
–by
far—in
all
Central
American
countries
but
Costa
Rica.
There
are
several
indicators
regarding
the
weakness
of
institutions
of
the
rule
of
law,
i.e.,
the
meager
budgets
allocated
for
the
judiciary.
The
argument
here
is
not
that
more
resources
necessarily
lead
to
robust
and
efficient
institutions,
but
that
the
lack
of
resources
prevents
institutionalization.
Costa
Rica
and
El
Salvador,
annually
invest
around
US$
20
to
US$
30
in
the
judiciary
(expenditures
per
capita)
but
most
Central
American
countries
are
around
10
dollars
or
less
per
year.
From
a
comparative
perspective,
this
is
extremely
low
(PEN,
2008:
523).
In
contrast,
military
expenditures
are
much
higher.
A
basic
indicator
of
access
to
justice,
such
as
the
number
of
new
cases
filed
to
courts
by
the
population,
also
shows
the
wide
gap
13
between
Costa
Rica
and
the
rest:
in
2006
more
than
12
thousand
per
100
thousand
inhabitants
were
filed
in
the
former,
five
to
twelve
times
more
than
in
the
rest.
Table
3:
Central
America:
Budget
of
the
Judiciary
and
Military
Expenditures
2002,
2006
(in
US
dollars)
Country
Judiciary
Budget
Military
Ratio
Military
New
cases
2006
per
capita
expenditures
to
Judiciary
(per
100
thousand)
2002
Costa
Rica
a/
El
Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panamá
2006
27,0
17,3
4,3
4,8
5,4
11,4
2006
(%
GDP)
29,9
23,7
6,9
8,0
9,2
12,9
‐‐
105
(0,6)
147
(0,3)
68
(0,7)
35
(0,7)
‐‐
‐‐
4,4
21,3
8,5
3,8
‐‐
536.377
(12.185)
162.378
(2.323)
339.114
(2.605)
73.481
(997)
98.796
(1.789)
‐‐
a/
Costa
Rica:
if
budgets
of
the
Prosecutor
and
the
Technical
Police
are
included,
per
capita
budget
should
be:
US$
39,0
(2002),
US$
40,5
(2003),
US$
40,8
(2004),
US$
42,4
(2005)
and
US$
44,6
(2006).
Source:
PEN,
2008,
based
on
Solana,
2007.
SIPRI,
2008
In
Central
America,
legal
operators
are
few
and
overloaded.
In
countries
where
more
than
half
of
the
population
is
poor,
there
are
only
2
or
less
public
defendants
per
100
thousand
inhabitants.
This
indicates
deep
seated
problems
in
access
to
justice
and
the
underlying
fact
that
poor
people
are
also
legally
poor
(O’Donnell,
1999).
In
most
countries
prosecutors
outflank
public
defendants
by
margins
of
3
to
1
or
more,
a
procedural
imbalance
also
biased
against
the
poor.
Table
4.
Central
America:
number
of
judges,
prosecutors
and
public
defendantsa/
2006
(per
100.000
inhabitants)
Country
Costa
Rica
El
Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panamá
Total
31,5
22,4
15,2
18,6
13,5
12,0
Judges
Prosecutors
18,0
9,1
6,1
8,4
7,1
7,8
7,7
9,4
b/
6,8
c/
6,9
4,7
2,3
Public
Prosecutors:
Defendants
Defendants
5,8
3,9
2,3
3,3
1,7
1,9
1,3
2,4
2,8
2,1
2,8
1,2
a/
Includes
Chief
Justices
of
the
Supreme
Courts.
b/
In
2005.
c/
In
2004.
Source:
Solana,
2007.
Finally,
please
take
notice
that
countries
with
the
weakest
judiciary
are
also
those
with
the
weakest
and
more
politicized
General
Comptroller,
a
fundamental
14
institutional
requirement
for
legal
oversight
and
accountability
over
public
resources.
Again,
one
finds
a
perverse
combination
of
meager
budgets,
weak
legal
competences
–i.e.
no
exante
controls
and/or
no
say
over
public
budgets‐‐
and
politicization
(Table
5).
As
a
result,
one
encounters
rampant
corruption,
mismanagement
of
public
resources,
and
the
use
of
the
law
as
a
political
weapon
against
enemies
–Nicaragua
is
a
case
in
point.
Table
5.
Central
America:
Average
Budgets,
Type
of
Oversight
and
Partisanship
of
National
Comptrollers
Country
Costa
Rica
El
Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Average
budget
1998­2005
Higher
(+
US
106)
Higher
(+
US
106)
Low
(US$
56
‐
106)
Very
low
(−
US$
56)
Very
low
(−
US$
56)
Higher
(+
US
106)
Strength
of
Oversight
Power
to
name
Robust
Congress
Weak
Congress
Weak
Congress
Weak
Congress
Weak
Congress
Robust
Executive
Congress
ratifies
Partisanship
Non
partisan
Non
collegiate
Partisan
Non
collegiate
Non
partisan
Non
collegiate
Partisan
Collegiate
Partisan
Collegiate
Partisan
Non
collegiate
Notes:
Robust:
Comptroller
has
a
priori
and
a
posteriori
controls
and
oversight
over
public
expenditures
and
approves
public
budgets
Robust:
Comptroller
has
a
posteriori
controls
and
no
competences
over
approval
of
public
budgets
Source:
PEN
2003,
UNDP
2004.
Effective
Citizen
Enfranchisement
A
third
dimension
for
assessing
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America
is
the
extent
of
citizen
effective
enfrachisement.
Quasi‐universal
citizenship
for
adults9
is
nowadays
a
widely
accepted
liberal‐democratic
standard:
one
person=
one
vote;
one
person
=
bearer
of
legal
rights.
However,
this
basic
standard
is
not
met
in
certain
Central
American
polities.
One
admittedly
formal
and
minimalist
requirement
for
exerting
citizenship
is
having
a
legal
identity
card.
Without
it
a
person
can
not
legally
ascertain
who
she
is,
enter
a
formal
legal
dealing,
and
of
course,
she
can
not
vote
if
wanting
to
do
so.
In
9
Adults
may
be
stripped
of
certain
legal
and
political
rights
under
highly
regulated
circunstances
(i.e.,
insanity).
Also,
not
all
adults
inhabitants
have
the
right
to
vote
only
those
with
citizen
status
in
the
host
country.
15
Nicaragua,
and
especially,
Guatemala,
substantial
segments
of
adults
do
not
have
a
legal
identity
card
(Table
6).
In
the
former,
close
to
a
quarter
of
the
adult
population
does
not
carry
a
card
and
in
the
latter,
around
10%.
In
addition,
this
elementary
pitfall
is
eschewed
against
the
poor.
A
measure
of
social
exclusion
was
developed
to
classify
adults
those
who
do
not
experience
any
type
of
social
exclusion
and
those
suffering
exclusions
across
different
dimensions
(See
Annex
1).
Social
conditions
do
not
matter
in
Honduras
and
Costa
Rica
–two
countries
with
dissimilar
levels
of
social
and
economic
development‐‐
where
all
groups
share
similar
and
almost
universal
access
to
an
identity
card.
However,
in
three
Central
American
countries
–El
Salvador,
Guatemala
and
Nicaragua‐‐
those
suffering
from
dismal
social
conditions
have
less
access
to
a
legal
identity
card
(Robles,
2008).
For
instance,
in
Nicaragua,
access
to
a
card
by
those
experiencing
three
or
more
types
of
social
exclusion
is
close
to
ten
percentage
points
lower
than
those
who
do
not
experience
exclusion
(Table
6).
Table
6.
Central
America:
Percentage
of
political
inclusion
according
to
the
intensity
of
social
exclusion,
2006
%
registered
in
each
GUA
ELS
HON
NIC
CRI
category
of
exclusion
Political
inclusion
with
zero
social
exclusions
N
(%
of
national
sample)
Political
inclusion
with
one
social
exclusion
N
Political
inclusion
with
two
social
exclusions
N
Political
inclusion
with
three
exclusions
N
Total
(N)
X 2
77.6
945
(63,7%)
72.4
96.5
93.7
1,105
987
(63,9%)
(62,4%)
93.7
96.4
89.7
99.5
1,016
1,292
(57,9%)
(86,2%)
86.5
98.0
232
68.7
270
93.0
223
93.6
207
87.8
99
100.0
201
72.1
242
83.0
282
93.3
337
80.6
96.9
104
75.2
1,482
8.93*
112
94.7
1,729
39.08*
89
94.1
1,581
2.61
201
87.9
1,761
13.46*
32
99.4
1,499
7.62
76
*
Sig
<
.05
Notes:
Political
inclusion:
No
identity
card
or
could
not
vote
because
of
lack
of
access
to
polling
station.
See
Annex
1
for
an
explanation
of
how
exclusion
was
defined
and
measured.
Count
of
dimensions
of
social
exclusion
a
person
experiences
(assets,
consumption,
productive).
Source:
Robles,
2008,
based
on
LAPOP‐University
of
Vanderbilt
surveys
for
each
country,
2006.
Exclusion
also
affects
effective
citizen
enfranchisement
in
other
less
blatant
ways.
Engagement
in
politics
systematically
decreases
when
a
person
experiences
social
exclusion.
This
trend
holds
for
all
Central
American
countries
for
which
information
was
analyzed.
Even
if,
on
average,
interest
in
politics
varies
from
16
country
to
country
–is
lower
in
Guatemala
than
in
the
rest‐‐,
people
suffering
simultaneously
from
different
types
of
exclusion
show
levels
of
disinterest
in
politics
between
10
–
25
percentage
points
lower
than
those
not
affected
(Table
7).
Table
7.
Central
America:
percentage
of
people
with
no
interest
in
politics
according
to
the
intensity
of
social
exclusion,
2006
%
no
interest
in
politics
in
GUA
ELS
HON
NIC
CRI
each
category
of
social
exclusion
Not
interested
with
zero
exclusions
(N)
Not
interested
with
one
exclusion
(N)
Not
interested
with
two
exclusions
(N)
Not
interested
with
three
exclusions
(N)
Total
(N)
X 2
44,8
31,6
35,3
34,6
38,2
715
52,8
1.028
37,2
896
40,6
787
37,2
1.242
47,2
352
71,9
296
43,1
281
40,6
312
45,2
127
47,3
235
69,3
260
52,1
278
45,7
398
45,4
93
54,1
163
53,8
1.465
70.49*
142
36,0
1.726
30.41*
129
38,0
1.584
7.73**
262
39,1
1.759
17.96*
37
39,9
1.499
9.64*
*
Sig
(α=.05)
**Sig
(α=.10)
Notes:
Political
inclusion:
No
identity
card
or
could
not
vote
because
of
lack
of
access
to
polling
station.
See
Annex
1
for
the
methodology
and
measurement
of
exclusion
Count
of
dimensions
of
social
exclusion
a
person
experiences
(assets,
consumption,
productive).
Source:
Robles,
2008,
based
on
LAPOP‐University
of
Vanderbilt
surveys
for
each
country,
2006.
What
are
the
prospects
of
change?
The
most
flagrant
ways
of
citizen
disenfranchisement
may
very
well
be
removed
in
the
near
future.
However,
a
root
cause
of
civic
disengament
–social
exclusion‐
will
prove
far
more
resilient.
Except
for
Costa
Rica
and
Panama,
annual
social
expenditures
in
Central
America
are
close
to
US$100
per
capita,
seven
times
less
than
the
Latin
American
average
(Fuentes,
2007;
ECLAC,
2008).
In
addition,
in
some
countries
social
expenditures
are
regressive,
as
measured
by
expenditures
per
capita
by
quintile
of
income:
the
most
affluent
are
the
largest
recipients
of
public
funds.
(PEN,
2008).
In
general
terms,
countries
where
the
quality
of
electoral
and
state
democracy
is
lower
are
those
with
dismal
levels
of
social
expenditures.
Civic
engagement
in
politics
In
spite
of
dismal
levels
of
quality
of
democracy
along
various
dimensions,
in
Central
America
citizens
are
not
walking
away
from
democracy.
These
are
good
news
considering
the
circumstances.
In
terms
of
organized
participation
–
community
level,
local
governance,
electoral
politics‐
citizenries
in
the
region
are
17
not
that
different
from
the
rest
of
Latin
America.
Acoording
to
LAPOP
2004
&
2006
survey
data,
between
one
fifth
(in
Honduras)
and
one
third
(in
Nicaragua
and
Guatemala)
of
adults
are
mostly
disconnected
from
organizaed
social
and
political
life
–they
“do
nothing”
or
only
vote
every
four
or
five
years.
The
hard
core
of
highly
participatory
citizens
is
close
to
10%
of
the
population,
with
some
cross‐country
variations.
UNDP’s
2004
Democracy
Report
based
on
Latinobarometro
data
reports
similar
results
(UNDP,
2004;
Vargas‐Cullell
&
Rosero
Bixby,
2007).
It
is
worth
noting
that
electoral
participation
is
rather
healthy.
Except
in
CRI,
one
does
not
find
a
regional
trend
to
lower
levels
of
participation.
Turnout
in
the
Central
American
countries
has
been
above
Latin
American
average
when
one
pools
all
elections
(Artiga,
2007).
However,
it
most
be
noted
that
everywhere
political
parties
are
in
deep
troubles.
The
worst
case
is
Guatemala,
where
we
see
polarized,
non
structured
multipartism,
a
recipe
for
weak
governance.
In
Nicaragua
one
finds
a
polarized,
non‐structured
bipartism
and
in
El
Salvador,
although
the
party
system
is
more
institutionalized,
it
is
also
polarized.
In
both
cases
the
potential
for
confrontation
and
gridlock
is
high.
Finally,
Costa
Rica
and
Panama
experience
party
systems
in
transition,
and
therefore
face
quite
difficult
and
uncertain
times
(Artiga,
2008).
One
critical
aspect
of
the
quality
of
democracy
is
citizen
support
for
democracy.
If
a
majority
of
citizens
reject
democracy
and,
in
addition,
they
are
highly
participatory
and
organized
under
certain
party
levels,
then
–in
Linzean
terms‐
democratic
stability
would
be
at
risk
(UNDP,
2004;
Vargas‐Cullell
&
Rosero‐
Bixby,
2005).
In
our
terms,
the
quality
of
civic
engament
would
be
low.
However,
this
is
not
the
case
in
Central
America.
Only
a
very
small
fraction
of
the
citizenry
are
bouching
for
regime
replacement:
3%
support
a
non‐elected
leader
with
extraordinary
powers.
Compare
this
with
the
28%
that
want
an
elected
leader
constrained
by
democratic
checks.
When
the
data
is
broken
down
by
country,
one
finds
that
only
in
Guatemala
those
against
democracy
are
a
sizable
group
(around
25%
of
the
population),
comparable
to
the
democrats
(PEN
2007).
A
more
problematic
finding
is
that
many
people
support
an
elected
leader
with
extraordinary
powers
to
cope
with
the
country’s
problems
(See
footnote
4).
This
type
of
President
is
a
thinly
disguised
caudillo
that
once
in
power
can
easily
encroach
upon
the
institutions
of
democracy.
Some
60
percent
of
the
population
in
the
pooled
2006
LAPOP
sample
approves
of
at
least
one
of
the
measures
that
a
caudillo
may
take
against
the
judiciary,
congress
or
opposition
parties.
Unfortunately,
disfunctional
democracies
can
impose
a
perverse
choice
between
effectiveness
and
liberty.
In
short,
support
for
what
O’Donnell
terms
as
delegativism
is
widespread
in
the
region.
The
good
news
are
that
the
minority
who
support
regime
replacement
and
the
majority
who
demands
delegativism
have
not
coalesced
into
a
social
and/or
18
political
group
(no
significant
correlates
were
found).
Also,
they
do
not
seem
to
be
particularly
engaged
in
politics,
or
at
least
more
engaged
than
the
average
citizen.
Table
8.
Central
America:
Citizen
Support
for
a
President
with
Special
Powers
and
for
a
Non
Elected
Political
Leader,
200610
Support
for
Support
for
Pooled
sample
President
with
special
powers
Non
elected
leader
High
Low
None
%
of
all
interviewed
3,3
6,9
3,2
13,4
Electoral
democracy
15,3
43,8
27,6
86,6
%
18,6
50,7
30,8
100,0
Total
2544
6.937
4.215
Pooled
sample
1.835
11.861
13.696
Note:
High
Support
for
a
President
with
special
powers:
support
for
a
strong
leader
in
3
or
more
of
the
five
items
in
the
POP1‐5
questions.
Low
Support:
support
for
a
strong
leader
in
one
or
two
of
the
five
items
in
the
POP1‐5
questions.
No
support:
rejection
of
a
strong
leader
in
all
five
items
of
the
POP1‐5
questions.
Source:
Vargas,
2007,
based
on
LAPOP
‐
University
of
Vanderbilt
2006
LAPOP
surveys
Summary
overview
The
quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America
varies
not
only
between
countries
but
also,
in
a
given
polity,
between
the
four
dimensions
of
democracy.
In
10
Questionnaire
items
for
measuring
support
for
a
President
with
extraordinary
powers:
“Ahora,
yo
le
voy
a
leer
varias
frases.
Teniendo
en
cuenta
la
situación
actual
del
país,
quisiera
que
me
diga
con
cuál
de
las
siguientes
frases
está
más
de
acuerdo?
POP1.
[Leer
alternativas]
1.
Para
el
progreso
del
país,
es
necesario
que
nuestros
presidentes
limiten
la
voz
y
el
voto
de
los
partidos
de
la
oposición,
[o
al
contrario],
2.
Aunque
atrase
el
progreso
del
país,
nuestros
presidentes
no
deben
limitar
la
voz
y
el
voto
de
los
partidos
de
la
oposición.
POP2.
[Leer
alternativas]
1.
La
Asamblea
Legislativa
impide
mucho
la
labor
de
nuestros
presidentes,
y
debería
ser
ignorado,
[o
al
contrario],
2.
Aun
cuando
estorbe
la
labor
del
presidente,
nuestros
presidentes
no
debieran
pasar
por
encima
de
la
Asamblea
Legislativa.
POP3.
[Leer
alternativas]1.
Los
jueces
con
frecuencia
estorban
la
labor
de
nuestros
presidentes,
y
deberían
ser
ignorados,
[o
al
contrario],
2.
Aun
cuando
a
veces
los
jueces
estorban
la
labor
de
nuestros
presidentes,
las
decisiones
de
los
jueces
siempre
tienen
que
ser
obedecidas.
8.
NS/NR
POP4.
[Leer
alternativas]
1.
Nuestros
presidentes
deben
tener
el
poder
necesario
para
que
puedan
actuar
a
favor
del
interés
nacional,
[o
al
contrario],
2.
Se
debe
limitar
el
poder
de
nuestros
presidentes
para
que
nuestras
libertades
no
corran
peligro.
POP5.
[Leer
alternativas]
1.
Nuestros
presidentes
deben
hacer
lo
que
el
pueblo
quiere
aunque
las
leyes
se
lo
impidan,
[o
al
contrario],
2.
Nuestros
presidentes
deben
obedecer
las
leyes
aunque
al
pueblo
no
le
guste.”
Questionnaire
item
for
measuring
support
for
a
non
elected
leader:
“AUT1.
Hay
gente
que
dice
que
necesitamos
un
líder
fuerte
que
no
tenga
que
ser
elegido
a
través
del
voto.
Otros
dicen
que
aunque
las
cosas
no
funcionen,
la
democracia
electoral,
o
sea
el
voto
popular,
es
siempre
lo
mejor.
¿Qué
piensa
Ud?
[Leer]
(1)
Necesitamos
un
líder
fuerte
que
no
tenga
que
ser
elegido
(2)
La
democracia
electoral
es
lo
mejor”
19
general
terms,
the
quality
of
democracy
of
electoral
systems
and
of
civic
engagement
is
higher
than
the
quality
of
effective
enfranchisement
and,
particularly,
of
the
democratic
Rule
of
Law
and
Accountability.
The
latter
is
democratization’s
weakest
spot
in
the
region.
Costa
Rica,
the
oldest
and
stablest
Latin
American
democracy,
has
particular
strengths
along
the
four
dimensions.
Although
its
political
system
shows
signs
of
gridlock
and
lack
of
effectiveness
(Lehoucq,
2006),
from
a
comparative
perspective
it
clearly
outperforms
the
rest.
However,
an
in‐depth
analysis
of
this
democracy
by
the
2001
Citizen
Audit
showed
the
existence
of
areas
of
very
low
quality
of
the
democratic
life11
(PEN,
2001).
In
contrast,
in
Guatemala
and
Nicaragua
the
quality
of
democracy
is
the
lowest
of
all
along
the
four
dimensions
considered.
Therein,
electoral
and
state
democracy
is
weak
and
flawed;
unversal
citizen
enfranchisement
is
pending,
even
though
there
are
no
organized
demands
for
regime
replacement.
These
are
extremely
fragile
semidemocracies,
and,
at
least
in
the
case
of
Nicaragua,
a
case
of
rapid
democratic
deterioration.
Next
in
line
is
Honduras:
in
terms
of
free
and
fair
elections,
its
electoral
system
performs
reasonably
well
–although
upon
shaky
institutional
foundations‐‐,
but
the
quality
of
democracy
of
the
Rule
of
Law
is
dismal,
and
effective
citizen
enfranchisement
is
mired
by
widespread
social
exclusion.
El
Salvador
and
Panama
are
mixed
cases.
In
spite
of
problematic
weaknesses,
their
electoral
systems
have
evolved
positively.
Even
if
the
institutions
of
the
Rule
of
Law
and
accountability
tend
to
be
weak,
the
problems
are
not
as
severe
as
in
Guatemala
and
Nicaragua.
And,
effective
enfranchisement
has
progressed
markedly.
A
New,
Unconventional
Challenge
to
Democracy
So
far,
I
have
been
assessing
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Central
America
on
its
own
merits.
I
have
tried
to
answer
the
question
of
how
far
has
democratization
in
this
region
been
able
to
establish
polities
that
meet
the
requirements
of
democracy.
In
the
final
section,
though,
I
want
to
briefly
comment
on
an
unforeseen
and
highly
unconventional
challenge
to
democratic
Rule
of
Law
and
Civic
Engagement
that
stems
from
“outside”
the
political
system.
In
some
countries
it
has
come
to
threaten
the
ability
of
the
state
to
control
its
territory
and
impose
public
order.
Central
America
is
immersed
in
the
geopolitics
of
drug
trafficking.
The
region
is
located
between
the
main
producer
area
(South
America)
and
the
main
consumer
market
(the
US).
Other
illegal
actors,
not
necessarily
linked
to
drugs,
plague
the
region
as
well
such
as
arm
dealers
and
illegal
traffickers
of
persons.
In
the
past
two
11
For
example,
trade
unions
face
stiff
barriers
to
freely
organize
workers
in
the
private
sector,
a
clear
and
systematic
violation
to
constitutional
rights.
In
poorer
counties,
the
quality
of
local
democracy
tends
to
be
affected
by
widespread
clientelism
and
weaker
accountability
(PEN,
2001).
20
decades,
the
emergence
of
gangs
(the
so‐called
“maras”)
in
Central
America’s
Northern
Triangle
main
urban
centers
has
triggered
exponential
extorsive
and
criminal
activity.
Illegal
actors
have
penetrated
deeply
the
economies
and
polities
of
the
region.
Although
they
have
not
coalesced
into
an
organic
force
and
none
of
them
seem
interested
in
grabbing
political
power,
they
do
pose
a
strategic
challenge
to
democratic
stability
because
they
have
become
powerful
de
facto
players.
In
the
past
few
years,
the
intensified
activity
of
these
actors
in
the
region
has
been
triggered
in
part
by
extra‐regional
events.
The
ongoing
military
onslaught
between
the
Mexican
government
and
the
drug
cartels
has
favored
the
transfer
of
certain
illegal
activities
to
Central
American
territory.
US
policy
of
systematically
expelling
criminals
of
Central
American
background
back
to
the
region
has
been
instrumental
to
the
establishment
of
widespread
networks
of
“mara”
organizations.
Colombia’s
protracted
civil
war
cum
narcoactivity
has
triggered
arm
traffic,
money
laundering,
drug
consumption
and
traffic.
It
is
in
Central
American
“northern”
triangle
(Guatemala,
El
Salvador,
and
Honduras)
where
the
security
situation
most
threatens
democratic
stability.
In
these
countries
one
finds
a
convergence
of
high
social
violence
and
crime
–crime
levels
are
among
the
world’s
highest
for
societies
not
experiencing
civil
wars‐‐,
high
and
widespread
citizen
perception
of
insecurity,
weak
and/or
incipient
institutions
of
the
Rule
of
Law,
and
strong
arm
policies
that
violate
due
process
in
the
name
of
decisive
action,
or
La
Mano
Dura
(PEN,
2008).
Unfortunatey,
then,
the
political
challenge
of
illegal
actors
is
higher
in
countries
where
the
quality
of
democracy
tends
to
be
low.
Therein
the
risks
of
state
failure
do
exist,
particularly
in
Guatemala12.
However,
no
Central
American
country
escapes
from
mounting
public
order
problems
caused
by
the
activity
of
dangerous
illegal
actors.
Table
10.
Central
America:
Current
situation
and
medium­term
scenarios
for
public
insecurity
and
the
rule
of
law
Current
Situation
Medium­Term
Countries
Outcome
1.
High
social
violence
and
crime
2.
Intense
public
insecurity
3.
Weak
or
incipient
rule
of
law
4.
Use
of
“strong
arm”
policies
1.
Low
social
violence
and
crime
(but
rising)
2.
Not
so
intense
public
insecurity
Very
high
probability
of
severe
threats
to
democratic
order
GUA
HON
ELS∗
High
probability
of
severe
NIC
threats
to
democratic
order
PAN∗
12
Nicaragua
is
an
interesting
case
to
study:
it
shares
with
Guatemala
and
Honduras
many
social,
economic
and
institutional
characteristics
such
as
low
economic
development,
widespread
poverty
and
exclusion,
and
weak
institutions.
However,
so
far
its
has
been
able
to
escape
relatively
unscathed
from
high
levels
of
crime
and
social
violence.
21
3.
Weak
or
incipient
rule
of
law
4.
Little
or
no
use
of
“strong
arm”
policies
1.
Low
social
violence
and
crime
(but
rising)
2.
Intense
public
insecurity
3.
Robust
rule
of
law
4.
No
use
of
“strong
arm”
policies
Low
probability
(but
not
CRI
negligible)
of
severe
threats
to
democratic
order
∗
Cases
showing
at
least
one
significant
difference
vis‐à‐vis
other
countries
in
the
same
category
Closing
Remarks
This
paper
has
tried
to
perform
a
delicate
theoretical
balancing
act.
On
the
one
hand,
I
have
woven
the
concept
of
the
quality
of
democracy
to
the
comparative
theory
of
democracy
and
democratization.
By
so
doing,
I
have
disentangled
the
quality
of
democracy
from
the
normative
considerations
of
the
“good”
democracy.
At
the
same
time,
this
theoretical
move
has
led
me
to
reconsider
the
concept
of
democracy,
freeing
it
from
the
cage
of
a
narrow
and
procedural
understanding
of
it
as
a
regime.
In
broadening
the
concept,
I
have
been
cautious,
though:
the
standards
of
the
quality
of
democracy
are
not
a
laundry
list
of
all
I
wish
I
could
see
in
a
democracy,
but
correspond
quite
tightly
to
“objective”
standards
derived
from
the
concept
of
democracy
I
first
posited.
On
the
empirical
side,
I
have
tried
to
show
that
this
theoretical
framework
enables
interesting
insights
when
applied
to
the
empirial
study
of
democratization.
In
this
sense,
I
have
shown
that
Central
American
political
systems
have
been
unexpectedly
resilient
to
deal
with
multiple
and
simultaneos
transitions.
However,
I
have
been
forced
to
admit
that
the
democratization
drive
has
weakened.
In
Guatemala
and
Nicaragua
the
low
quality
of
their
democracies
along
all
dimensions
has
produced
fragile
semidemocracies.
In
Honduras,
a
flegdling
though
better
performing
electoral
democracy
coexists
with
a
thinly‐democratized
state.
Here,
the
future
is
a
open
question.
El
Salvador
seems
to
be
on
a
stronger
footing
given
stronger
efforts
to
develop
a
democratic
state.
In
comparative
perspective,
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Costa
Rica
is
consistently
higher
than
elsewhere
in
the
region.
Central
America
polities
face
complex
threats.
Some
stem
from
“within”,
due
to
the
narrow
scope
of
democratization
and
the
resulting
low
quality
of
the
majority
its
democracies.
Other
challanges
stem
from
“outside”,
particularly
extraregional
geopolitics,
and
are
rapidly
eroding
the
ability
of
the
states
to
maintain
control
over
their
territory.
As
the
first
decade
of
the
XXI
century
closes,
the
region
faces
real
risks
of
democratic
failure,
particularly
in
Nicaragua
and
Guatemala.
Given
that
the
region
is
deeply
interwoven,
as
a
Central
American
I
am
bracing
myself
for
dangerous
times.
22
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Annex
1.
Methodology
for
measuring
social
exclusions
Methodology
for
the
analysis
of
social,
economic
and
political
exclusion
in
Central
America
based
on
LAPOP­University
of
Vanderbilt
2006
Survey
Type
of
exclusion
Consumption
(Consumption
of
household)
Criteria
Proxy:
persons
with
half
or
less
(<
50%)
the
country
median
in
the
Social
Welfare
index
Assets
(Resources
that
can
be
mobilized
in
the
event
of
an
emergency)
Production
(No
or
severed
links
with
labor
market)
Social
Welfare
index
without
toilet
and
potable
water
items
Political
(No
participation
due
to
external
barriers)
Social
(No
involvement
in
social
networks)
Persons
without
any
job
and
no
working
job
for
at
least
5
weeks
in
the
past
12
months.
Persons
in
non
paid
job.
Autoemployed
with
less
than
3
years
of
schooling.
Persons
not
registered
as
voter
1/
Persons
who
could
not
vote
in
last
election
because
lack
of
access
to
polling
station
(transport,
disability)
No
involvement
in
any
comunity,
labor,
environmental,
professional,
sectoral
or
religious
organization.
Observation
Social
Welfare
Index:
list
of
assets
in
household
plus
inhouse
toilet
and
potable
water
Items
weighted
by
the
reciprocal
of
relative
importance
in
the
pooled
sample
(to
allow
comparable
country
measures
of
exclusion)
Additional
criteria:
persons
with
less
7
or
less
schooling
years
(threshold
above
which
exclusion
decreases).
Salaried
and
employers
not
included.
Housewives,
students
and
pensioneers
not
included.
Additional
check:
person
declares
she
has
never
been
active
in
politics
Only
adds
to
exclusion
if
the
person
already
experienced
at
least
one
type
of
exclusion
(assets,
consumption,
etc)
Notes:
1/
Only
Guatemala
has
an
electoral
registration
requirement.
25