Trent Boultinghouse
IV Seminário Discente da Pós-Graduação
Instituto de Relações Internacionais
Universidade de São Paulo
Brazilian Strategic Narrative and the Bolsa Família
Abstract: This project argues that the purpose, gains, and existence of the Bolsa Família provide
the strongest opportunity for a Brazilian national narrative of a human rights champion and
pragmatic poverty reductionist. It uses Laura Roselle, et. al’s idea of strategic narrative to
examine the Bolsa Família as a tool designed to increase Brazilian influence abroad by way of
Joseph Nye’s idea of soft power.
PART I.
Introduction
On March 17, 2015, the Fundação Getulio Vargas hosted a discussion entitled, “Desafios
da política externa brasileira em 2015.” Led by Dr. Guilherme Casarões, the event drew
comparisons between the foreign policies of Brazil’s current President Dilma Rousseff (2010present), and her fellow Partido Trabalhador (PT) predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (20032010). The discussion focused largely on a comparison of the Lula and Dilma administrations in
their dealings with the international community.
The Rousseff administration inherited a Brazilian presidency that had been most recently
transformed Brazilian power and increasing the country’s involvement with world affairs. In
many ways, this transformation occurred most strikingly under Lula. Almost immediately upon
taking office, Lula redirected Brazil’s diplomatic energy to its global Southern partners,
especially in Africa, netting Brasília unprecedented political, economic, and commercial support
that buoyed the Brazilian president in his revival of a long-running Brazil measure for a more
democratic global political economy. Among the international initiative championed by Lula
were further calls for Brazilian permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council
and the creation of the G20 WTO trade negotiation coalition.1 If the limitations of previous
visions Brazilian power were beginning to dissipate internationally, they were also beginning to
change within the country’s borders.
1
Sean Burges, “Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?” International Affairs 89, No. 3 (2013): 581.
Domestically, Lula crystallized the Brazilian presidency to operate around the auspices of
a central Brazilian tenet: that the State’s investments were best served directed towards its most
marginalized citizens. With the consolidation of previous social programs into the so-called
Bolsa Família, a conditional cash-transfer program that lifted 13 million Brazilians out of
poverty, Lula’s administration expanded the buying power of previously poverty-stricken
Brazilian citizens. The Bolsa Família has become entrenched as a staple in the Brazilian political
system. It acts as a conditional cash transfer “safety net” for over 12 million families (payable to
women only) who receive meager monthly cash payments in return for meeting incentives such
as ensuring children attend school and pass medical checkups. While Lula’s predecessor,
Henrique Luis Cardoso initially laid the framework for what would become the Bolsa Famiília,
it was Lula who consolidated the program, thus leading to unprecedented reductions in the
amount of poverty in the Brazilian social hierarchy and expanding the amount of families
entering the middle class.2 The program has allowed families to spend on average an extra R$23
for food, R$2.65 for education, and R$1.34 on children’s clothing, leading to other consequences
such as increased school attendance, greater attrition rates, and at least some anecdotal evidence
in safer health practices in rural areas.3
Upon leaving office, his program had helped to reduce poverty by more than 24 percent. 4
Such accomplishments did not go unnoticed by envious Brazilian partners. Taken together, the
“idea” of Brazil grew beyond its borders during the decade to involve previously marginalized
countries interested in tethering their fortunes to an ascendant Brazil. The “idea” of Brazil for
previously wary Latin American and African partners was that the country not only found a way
to increase the quality of life for many of its marginalized citizens, but strengthened its foothold
as an interlocutor between the suddenly empowered South and the perceived outdated vestiges of
Northern rule.
When Rousseff took office in 2011, her administration’s official motto, País Rico e País
Sem Pobreza all but assured that the Bolsa Família and poverty reduction would be the vehicle
in which to continue spreading the Brazilian image. However, the Rousseff administration has
2
Timothy J. Power, “Brazilian Democracy as a Late Bloomer: Reevaluating the Regime in the Cardoso-Lula Era,”
Latin American Research Review 45 (2010): 229.
3
Fábio Veras Soares, Rafael Perez Ribas, and Rafael Guerreiro Osório, “Evaluating the Impact of Brazil’s Bolsa
Família: Cash Transfer Programs in Comparative Perspective,” Latin American Research Review 45, No. 2
(2010): 183.
4
Julia E. Sweig, “Brazil’s Far-Flung Agenda,” Foreign Affairs 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010): 174.
not invested the same energy and vigor as Lula in fortifying Brazilian power abroad. Dilma has
been distracted by domestic scandals, perhaps most evident with the State’s role in spending for
the 2014 World Cup. In 2009, the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol estimated a $1.1 billion
cost to refurbish 12 stadiums for the 2014 World Cup, in which Brazil would play host.5 But
such refurbishment quickly doubled, tripled, and quadrupled the budget and led many Brazilians
to question such massive state spending for projects that provided minimal public benefit.
(Manaus’s new stadium, constructed at a cost of $325 million, hosted four games. Unable to
attract any event of such magnitude in its isolated corner of the Amazon, it has most recently
served as a parking lot for busses.)6 In 2013, as the Brazilian public grappled with perceived
misguided priorities on State spending, unprecedented nationwide protests loosely organized
around increased public transportation fares and faulty social infrastructure surprised the
Rousseff administration. 7 The problems have amplified. The Brazilian government has
incorporated austerity measures (leaving many pre-Cup projects unfinished or abandoned), and a
slow-dripping corruption scandal nicknamed “Operação Lava Jato”8 continues to indict dozens
of prominent businessmen and politicians for their involvement with kickbacks at Petrobras, the
state-owned oil company.
With these domestic distractions, Rousseff has struggled to maintain the legacies of
Lula’s administration and the subsequent projection of Brazilian power in the international arena.
It is this author’s view that the poverty reductions implemented by the Bolsa Família are the
singular most visible foreign policy “sell” Brazil has been able to make in the years since the
program’s implementation. For example, some five years after Lula left office, the World Bank
continues to tout Brazil as an example of poverty reduction in the world, with one author on its
5
Andrew Zimbalist, “Get Ready for a Massive World Cup Hangover, Brazil,” Time, June 27, 2014, accessed July
27, 2015, http://time.com/2930699/world-cup-brazil-spending/.
6
Zimbalist, “Get Ready,”; Camila Leonel, Denir Simplício, and Leanderson Lima, “Copa do Mundo, um ano
depois: Arena se firma como ‘elefante branco’ depois do Mundial,” Acritica, June 12, 2015, accessed July
27, 2015, http://acritica.uol.com.br/craque/Especial-pos-Copa-Arena-elefanteMundial_0_1374462570.html.
7
Taylor Barnes, “Greasing the Path to Dilma’s Downfall,” Foreign Policy, March 16, 2015, accessed July 27, 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/16/greasing-the-path-to-dilma-rousseff-downfall-brazil-protestspetrobras/
8
In English, “Operation Car Wash.”
website even suggesting that poverty reduction can fight for a foothold amongst the gatekeepers
of the country’s international reputation: soccer and novellas.9
Yet, a disconnect in narrative ensues at home. Protesters in March’s panelaço 10
repeatedly protested against the Bolsa Família on grounds of unchecked government spending,
even though claims of extravagant state spending are unfounded. 11 The complaint, as the
scholars Walquiria Leão Rego and Alessandro Pinzani highlight, is one made by those unfamiliar
with the rigor of the program, of which includes tightly bound rigors of operation for
beneficiaries. The program’s minimal monthly stipend allows coverage for families with a
maximum of three children, all of whom must meet medical and scholarly thresholds in order to
receive money from the State.12
In the FGV event, Dr. Casarões raised a worry elucidated by the former Brazilian
Defense Minister Celso Amorim (2011-2014): the country was at risk of squandering its socalled “soft power” built up by the Lula administration’s “innovative activism” of Brazilian
influence on the international stage. The current administration’s reduced, “immobile” foreign
policy coupled with the Petrobras scandal threatened to undermine Brazilian credibility in the
international arena.13 The success of the Lula administration in amplifying Brazil’s presence on
the international stage can be explained by means of a well-defined strategic narrative, known
colloquially as, “soft power in the 21st century.”14 In part from the continued success of the
Bolsa Família, the Rousseff administration still has the resources needed to rebuild the lukewarm
Brazilian strategic narrative of itself to continue generating a greater Brazilian footprint in
international policy, especially in Latin America and Africa.
The Origins of Strategic Narrative in Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power”
“Soft power” is a term that increases with relevance as hegemonic military policy falls
out of favor with many advanced nations. Joseph Nye coined the expression in the context of a
9
Projeto Second Bolsa Família, The World Bank, accessed July 27, 2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P101504/second-bolsa-fam%C3%ADlia?lang=pt.
10
A type of protest made by drowning out one’s speech by banging pots and pans together.
11
Barnes, “Greasing the Path”
12
Walquiria Leão Rego and Alessandro Pinzani, Vozes do Bolsa Família: Autonomia, dinheiro, e cidadania (São
Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2014), 233-234.
13
Dr. Guilherme Casarões, “Desafios da política externa brasileira em 2015,” Lecture, Fundação Getulio Vargas,
São Paulo, SP, March 17, 2015.
14
Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft
power,” Media, War, & Conflict 7 (2014): 71.
post-Cold War bipolar power struggle between the United States and the former Soviet Union,
looking for ways in which Washington could influence the international environment outside of
military power. Nye envisioned this early-1990s outlook of Washington’s power as, “the power
of attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of debate
in a way that shapes others’ preferences.”15
The international system has changed since the decline of the Soviet Union. The
functionality of the United States as a leader in the global system has lasted for decades in part
because of the global public good that the Washington provides with its security capabilities.
However, led primarily by emerging economies such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia, the idea
of the U.S. as one of the few stakeholders to shape this governance is increasingly unsettling,
having been exacerbated by the “unipolar moment” of the United States during the invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan during the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush.16 The
current global system is in the midst of a power shift that allows emerging powers such as Brazil
to challenge the preponderance of Western dominance in the liberal international system by
leading coalitions and forging transnational links with previously overlooked partners to fill the
vacuum held by the global West.17 Nye’s argument is that the extent to which Brazil is able to
augment the efficacy of such a strategy depends in part on its “soft power.”
Today’s international system has berthed the idea of “whose story wins” as a way for a
nation to achieve its goals. And this in itself is the central tenet of Nye’s theory in the age of
instantaneous information and rampant globalization: that a country’s conditioned, crafted
narrative is often more powerful than traditional instruments of power, such as military and
economic might.18 It is an idea that has exploded in the 21st century. The Chinese scholars Young
Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, for example, describe China’s concerted effort to develop a soft
power strategy to increase its foreign policy aims, tracing the concept from its origins in the
upper echelons of Chinese academia to a preponderant sampling of books, magazines, and other
mediums of popular culture widely available throughout the country. In the era of ex-Chinese
president Hu Jintao (2008-2013), the Chinese government was so preoccupied with soft power
15
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 166.
G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,”
Perspectives on Politics 7, vol. 1 (March 2009): 81.
17
Leslie Elliott Armijo and Cynthia Roberts, “The Emerging Powers and Global Governance: Why the BRICS
Matter,” In Robert Looney, ed. Handbook of Emerging Economies. New York: Routledge (2014): 503.
18
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 616 (Mar., 2008): 99-101.
16
that it formed an official foreign policy of framing China’s growth as a “peaceful rise” in an
attempt to alleviate skeptical international community members of Beijing’s intentions.19 In the
21st century, soft power strategies have become bedrocks of states’ foreign policy visions,
especially when taken together with traditional “hard power” capabilities to produce what Nye
has also termed “smart power,” an effective blend between so-called “hard” and “soft”
capabilities.20
Measuring “Soft Power”: Fruitful and Misguided
As Nye’s article enters the third decade since its publication, many scholars,
professionals, and governments still struggle to determine what constitutes a state’s soft power,
much less (and more importantly) explaining how it is projected. Instead, most studies of the
phenomenon have opted for a “sophisticated counting of tools or resources,” in the words of one
author.21 That is not to say that such “counting” has not borne fruitful attempts to explain what
these capabilities look like within a state’s arsenal of diplomatic tools. Indeed, the UK-based
Institute for Government has attempted to quantify the soft power from each nation, dividing the
concept across five categories (Business/Innovation, Culture, Government, Diplomacy, and
Education). Each category contains a plethora of metrics. For example, the number of
international patents distributed amongst a country accounts for a percentage of a nation’s score
in the Business/Innovation category, the number of foreign correspondents for Culture, the
presence of think-tanks in society for Government, the number of visa-free countries available
for travel in Diplomacy, and the amount of students studying abroad for Education. In 2012,
Brazil sat at 17th place, with a score of 4.675 out of 10, behind Spain and in front of Austria.22
Another attempt to measure soft power comes from the accounting firm Ernst and Young,
which uses the categories of global integrity, global integration, and global image to rank
nations’ soft power. Some metrics are predictable, such as voter turnout for global integrity and
English fluency for global integration, but the study differs most greatly from the UK’s in its
19
Young Nam Cho and John Ho Jeong, “Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects,” Asian Survey 48, No.
3 (May/June 2008): 460-461, 467.
20
Roselle, et al., 71.
21
Roselle, et al., 72.
22
Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders III: A 2012 Global Ranking of Soft Power. London: Institute of
Government: 2012: 17-23,
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuaders%20II
I_0.pdf
global image category. Here, factors such as the number of gold medals won by a country in the
last two Olympics as well as the number of individuals listed on the TIME magazine list of the
100 most influential people in the world allow for variation between the study conducted by the
Institute for Government. Ranging from 2005-2010, Brazil begins with a paltry score of 5.9/100,
but peaks in 2010 with 13.8/100, good enough for the nation with the 10th strongest soft power,
behind Russia and in front of Turkey.23
Power as Influence
These two studies align with a traditional pattern of soft power studies in international
relations. Authors stress the need for countries to maintain and develop soft power capabilities,
but often ignore how these tools can generate impacts in practice. Ample literature exists on
identifying potential soft power capabilities, yet little on a projection’s role in generating similar,
country-specific behavior with other actors. As such, scholars are “mesmerized by concreteness,”
working to identify and quantify soft power in nations, but without an incentive to trace its
effects beyond their borders. The limitations of the original incarnation of soft power studies is
apparent, especially when one takes into account metrics such as Olympic gold medals to
determine a country’s soft power; the very idea of soft power is that it is to be channeled
strategically through targeted communication by a government to influence others. To continue
with the example of the Olympic medal metric, while it is true that the exposure from a World
Cup win or a high-profile Olympic sport gold medal can be a boon for a country, “[these
capabilities] must be cajoled into working towards national objectives.”24
The two analyses affirm there is no consensus on identifying soft power resources. Even
with the existence of an agreed-upon metric of those capabilities, the problem still remains on
how these metrics translate into soft power, and more importantly, how they affect foreign
policy. Without the traditional hard power outlets available to traditional Western powers, there
is a necessity to identify Brazil’s use of strategic narrative, especially in regards to one of its
strongest metrics of power, the Bolsa Família.
The Concept of Strategic Narrative
23
Rapid-growth markets soft power index. London: Ernst and Young: 2012. http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2012/05/TBF-606-Emerging-markets-soft-power-index-2012_LR.pdf
24
Roselle, et. al, 73.
As its name implies, strategic narrative is the tracing of an idea in the international
system through the various stages of its lifecycle, most commonly with its formation, projection,
diffusion, and reception across the international arena. It operates within the realm of both hard
and soft power concepts (using Nye’s “smart” power) to better understand the impact of soft
power in an international system of governance that is as chaotic as it is instantaneous. Whereas
the concepts of hard and soft power are subject to blur easily, it is helpful to elaborate that
strategic narrative’s treatment of soft power is based on deployment. Cultural exhibitions, films,
and other productions are designed to be shown and disseminated to a target audience, whereas
hard power outlets like economic coercion and military power can only be used sparingly and in
reserve for influence. 25 (For an example of a tangible soft power strategy in action, it would
behoove the reader to examine the United States’s public diplomacy strategy in the Middle East,
by ways of radio programs, television broadcasts, and information campaigns. However, the
effect has had minimal success; most Muslim nations are recalcitrant in their receptivity.)26
Given the ubiquitous inclusion of strategic narratives to a nation’s soft power, it is helpful to
determine the following three types of levels at set forth by Roselle, et al., before exploring
which applies to the Brazilian case of Bosla Família.
A. International System Narratives
The international system narrative frames the global order in terms of its primary actors,
how those actors interact with each other, and which prevailing themes stand out to explain the
hierarchy. George W. Bush’s administration’s War on Terror is a much-cited example, as is the
current United States-led campaign against the Islamic State in a war on radical Islam. These
narratives are examples of an attempt to describe the world order based on security goals,
labeling and defining actors based on their participation in this structure. International system
narratives can also exist in less bellicose terms: other examples include the belief in the rise of
China and the opinion that the United States is in decline. These narratives run the risk of
backfire by limiting actors’ participation with others based on a perceived conflict of interest
with the international narrative. For example, countries considered to be sponsors of terrorism
risk challenges in their dealings with international commerce, diplomacy, and reputation.
25
26
Roselle, et. al, 71-72.
Wantanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell, eds, Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of
Japan and the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 185.
B. National Narratives
Arguably the most common in foreign policy, states uses national narratives to lay out the
visions of themselves in the world arena. National narratives “explain” a state by means of its
historical experience as well as its future ambitions, such as the United States’s vision of itself as
a democratic peacekeeper in the arena (or the converse of “world bully,” as Roselle, et al.
mention). Perhaps one of the strongest contemporary powers using a national narrative as a
means to amplify its soft power is Russia, long caught between embracing modern Western
values and fashioning a more protectionist vision of itself. The Russian scholar Tatiana
Shakleina repeatedly references “legacy,” “tradition,” and “history” in explaining Russia’s
foreign policy; her writing gives great importance to, “the historical experience and the tradition
and culture of exerting a decisive or visible influence on world politics and to determine or very
actively participate in the formation of the world order,” closing with a recognition of a “great
power tradition” as one of the strongest Russian capabilities.27 Just as the United States justifies
its military excursions under the auspices of spreading democratic values, other countries such as
Russia cast their versions of themselves based on the strengths of their country (in Russia’s case,
its past).
C. Issue Narratives
Actors use issue narratives to generate support for a specific policy or issue. One of the
most topical examples is the recently proposed P5+1 nuclear weapons agreement with Iran that
assembles various enrichment limits, creates opportunities for third-party inspections, and
develops set limits on the amount of research and development Iran can be allowed to invest in
its nuclear program.28 The Iran Deal is one example of how an issue narrative is a strong
capability. When deployed strategically it can help explain, “what the conflict or issue is, and
how a particular course of action will resolve the underlying issue.”29
27
Tatiana Shakleina, “Russia in the New Distrubtion of Power,” in Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective:
The Political and Economic Rise of BRIC Countries, Vidya Nadkarni and Norma C. Noonan, eds. (New
York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 178.
28
“The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, accessed July
26, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal.
29
Roselle, et. al, 76.
Separating the different narratives from each other is not necessarily a facile exercise; there is no
“hard and fast” rule to determining one type of narrative between the other. However, for any
type of narrative to be effective it must be promulgated with clear and strategic placement. In an
age of multiple actors that expand beyond the range of traditional states and governments,
narratives are subject to a litany of factors. These factors include the differences in perception
between different media outlets in delivering messages, the participants involved with shaping
the message (and the exclusion of those who are not included), and the consequences that are at
play in realizing a successful narrative.
PART II.
The Bolsa Família as a National Narrative
The opportunity exists for the Bolsa Família to provide the strongest opportunity for
Brazil to leverage its strategic narrative as a human rights champion and pragmatic poverty
reductionist. The Lula administration crystallized this narrative in an unprecedented manner
during its years of power, but the Rousseff administration has so far squandered the chance to
build further on the narrative. In the spirit of national narrative studies, this project will look at
the projection of the Brazil as a poverty reductionist narrative during the Lula years and evaluate
its opportunities for greater expansion during the Dilma administration, relying on reactions from
the international community as well as the Brazilian media’s reporting of the gains of Bolsa
Família.
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution is a seminal document in the country’s history not only
for its establishment of various rights granted to the Brazilian citizenry, but also for the end of
authoritarian military rule and a return to democracy. Article 3 is especially noteworthy for its
language on poverty reduction and deserves to be reprinted in full:
Article 3 – Constitutes fundamental objectives of the Federal Republic of Brazil
I.
Construct a free, just, and united society
II.
Guarantee national development
III.
Eradicate poverty and marginalization and reduce social and regional inequality
IV.
Promote the well-being of all citizens, without discrimination of origin, race, sex,
color, age, or any other forms of discrimination30
In national narrative studies, articles like the 1988 Constitution are important for
constructing a nation’s foreign policy because of a concept known as representational force.
Representational force, also known as coercive attraction, is Nye’s idea that the traditionally
“soft” act of persuasion is greater than force, and can also possess “hard” qualities of desired
behavior when deployed strategically, as in with a conditioned narrative. In the case of poverty
reduction––one of the strengths of domestic Brazilin policy in the last decade–– “[such values]
may attract others because they address individual and collective desires and needs.”31 The Bolsa
Família is not immune to abuses and imperfections in its operations, but it serves as a tangible
policy that has directly addressed Article 3 of the Constitution. It exists as a function, to extend
Nye’s idea, as a way for a country to “live up” to its political ideas and values. 32 A successful
Bolsa Família embodies a commitment to the country’s democratic Constitution (itself a medium
of strategic narrative) and, combined with a semblance of transparency, a powerful tool in the
arsenal of Brazilian statecraft. The use of Bolsa Família to guide the Brazilian national narrative
is appropriate given the program’s, “beginning as the most basic of Brazilian prerogatives,
because it directly addresses the most basic right, the right to life,” in the words of two experts
on the program.33
Early in his first term, President Lula gave a speech on the inauguration day of the Bolsa
Família. Not only did Lula connect the program’s implementation to the fundamental idea of
Brazilian well-being, but gave an optimistic nod to increasing Brazilian power in the
international arena. Lula relied on a calculated strategic narrative projection, that is, presenting
the Brazilian experience in terms of what Roselle et al. describe as “attractive, appealing,
welcoming [and] worth emulating”34:
And we the people of Brazil, we have to be certain that if we do this here and obtain this
success that I imagine we will have, there isn’t a doubt in my mind that we can’t help
other countries in the world eliminate hunger. Moreover, other countries, even ones
30
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, accessed June 26, 2015,
http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortalIO/download/pdf/Constituicoes_declaracao.pdf
31
Roselle, et. al, 72.
32
Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 98.
33
Rego and Pinzani, Vozes, 176.
34
Roselle, et. al, 72.
without hunger, those which are developed and those that are rich, can help us
financially…so that we can in countries even poorer countries than, help to combat this
35
affliction...
From its inception, Lula defined the Bolsa Família as a national narrative, directly tethering its
domestic success to the international clout Brazil was set to gain (reinforced by the presence of
then-World Bank president James Wolfensohn at the inauguration ceremony).36
As authors such as Andrew Hurrell and Sean Burges have shown, Brazil has long defined
its foreign policy in terms of its desire to join the Westphalian “victor’s club” of Western nations
who currently possess the greatest shares of responsibility in multilateral bodies. Brazilian
diplomats advocate for greater inclusion and democratic participation in the United Nations
Security Council and for greater responsibility within the World Trade Organization. The
Brazilian foreign policy export is one of coalition-building (especially with the global South) and
of diplomacy. It works to reform multilateral bodies by generating greater authority to its
demands based on the inclusion of more actors it represents. It works as a “bridge builder” from
its status as the conduit and lead representative of developing nations (many of which are
represented by the G-77) and the powerful Western overseers of the liberal order, such as its
hemispheric counterweight, the United States. The more transnational links and international
recognition it can obtain within other nations, the greater credibility Brazilian power has on the
world stage.37 Brazil’s current incarnation of power, based in part on its lack of “hard power”
military resources in comparison with many of the other countries it is commonly associated
with as “emerging” –– China, India, and Russia –– relies on recognition, status, and credibility.38
The Bolsa Família as a Strategic Narrative Incarnate
Strategic narrative studies routinely fall between formation (a historical approach based
on process tracing), projection (studying how narratives are disseminated to target audiences),
and reception (relying on Q-methodology and psychological literature on human reception).
35
“Leia a íntegra do discurso de Lula no lançamento do Programa Bolsa-Família,” Folha de São Paulo, October 20,
2013, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u54596.shtml
36
“Leia a íntegra,” Folha De São Paulo
37
Andrew Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State in What Kind of Institutional Order?” in Rising States, Rising
Institutions: Challenges for Global Goverannce, Alan Alexandroff and Andrew W. Cooper, eds.
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2010), 135-137.
38
Flávia de Campos Mello, O Brasil e o Multilateralismo Contemporâneo (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada, June 2011), 26.
Strategic narrative studies expand beyond traditional soft power studies in that they directly
factor in how leaders attempt to project countries’ influences using controlled actions.39 Lula’s
national narrative of Brazil as a poverty reductionist already proved to be generating expected
support in 2005. Then-World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz heaped praise upon the Brazilian
program for the attention it was generating internationally: “Countries around the world are
drawing lessons from Brazil’s experience and are trying to produce the same results for their
own people,” the president said in a World Bank press release. Pamela Cox, World Bank Vice
President for Latin America and the Caribbean, was even more effusive in her praise, calling the
Brazilian program an example of, “clear leadership in the global fight against poverty and
hunger.”40 Given the World Bank’s reputation as one of the Western-dominated institutions in
which Brazil has historically sought greater clout, the results of such international laudation
buoyed Brazil in its international credibility.
As Lula solidified the Brazilian poverty-reduction experiment within national borders, he
also began an unprecedented international presence for a Brazilian head of state, conducting 81
international visits during his first mandate (2003-2005). Of those visits, 39 were to Latin
American or African countries, reinforcing the narrative of Brazil as a leader of emerging
countries and representative stakeholder of the developing world for greater inclusion in
international bodies. After winning re-election in 2006 (based in part of the success of Bolsa
Família41), Lula continued to expand the Brazilian diplomatic presence abroad, conducting a
record 124 trips abroad between 2007-2009. During this time, the international influence of
Bolsa Família appeared to grow based on the following cases, themselves direct projections of
Lula’s national narrative of Brazil as a poverty reductionist and leader in social programs for the
global South.
In 2007, Brazilian diplomats met with the Dominican Republic to install a registration
system for a Bolsa Família imitator called Solidaridad. Then-Dominican Republic president
Leonel Fernandez Reyna visited Brazil and cited the country’s own system as an inspiration for
39
Roselle, et. al, 79.
“Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program Celebrates Progress in Lifting Families out of Poverty,” The World Bank,
December 19, 2005,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20702063~pagePK:64257043~pi
PK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html
41
Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, “Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian
Elections of 2006,” Latin American Politics & Society 49, No. 1 (Spring 2007): 24.
40
the Dominican program. 42 The Brazilian model of social programs became increasingly
attractive. Some three years later, ex-New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg initiated
Opportunity NYC, the first conditional-cash-transfer program of its kind in the United States, in
part because of the Brazilian experience. While the program folded in 2013, it still is a
remarkable example of Brazilian policy reaching arguably the gatekeeper of the Westerndominated order.43 When Lula left office in 2010, expectations for Brazilian foreign policy were
stratospheric, described in robust language such as, “breathless excitement,” “the Mac to the
United States’ PC,” and “the envy of the developing world, turning Brazil into a laboratory and
model for globalization with a social conscience.”44
Brazilian heads of state are fortunate to have a powerful platform in the annual United
Nations General Assembly, given that Brazil historically leads off the conference. These
speeches are opportune platforms for countries to expound on their wishes and tout their
accomplishments (and in the case of Lula, further capability structures to advance the Brazilian
national narrative). When Dilma assumed the role of president in 2011, becoming the first
woman to commence a U.N. General Assembly, she continued with the gains of the Lula
administration in her discourse, using the growth of Brazilian power to strongly call on Security
Council reform and also reference the amount of Brazilians who had entered the middle class of
the past decade.45 In some ways, Dilma’s speech at the 66th General Assembly can be seen as the
high point of Brazilian power before subsequent domestic crises detracted from the Brazilian
national narrative that had carefully been constructed in previous years.
Roselle et al. highlight two traits that are applicable in explaining the discrepancy in
Brazilian strategic narrative between the Lula and Rousseff administrations. The first is Nye’s
idea that the communication expertise of the actor is essential in transforming capabilities into
desired outcomes.46 While in office, Lula was a skilled political force, channeling his own
poverty-stricken roots into a personal narrative into a populist leader that resonated well with the
42
Sarah Fernandes, “Bolsa-Família inspira República Dominicana,” Terra Magazine, August 27, 2007,
http://terramagazine.terra.com.br/interna/0,,OI1839172-EI6580,00.html.
43
“How to get children out of jobs and into school,” The Economist, July 29, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16690887.
44
Sweig, “Brazil’s Far-Flung Agenda,” 173-174.
45
“Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, na abertura do Debate Geral da 66 Assembleia Geral das
Nações Unidas,” Portal do Planalto, July 4, 2014, http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-oplanalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-aberturado-debate-geral-da-66a-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-nova-iorque-eua.
46
Roselle, et. al, 73.
underdeveloped Brazilian Northeast. He did not always tether his own political actions to those
of his party, and was able to convince even the opposition parties of the value of his singular
domestic achievement, the Bolsa Família. He was able to deflect corruption charges in the period
leading up to the 2006 presidential elections and won with 61 percent of the vote. If there was to
be an organ to voice the Brazilian narrative, Lula proved to be a competent actor.47 By contrast,
Dilma has repeatedly been mocked on social media and in recent panelaços for perceived
incompetence in public speaking. At a recent visit at the White House in a bilateral meeting with
President Obama, Dilma gave a rambling, incoherent answer regarding the current Petrobras
scandal that provided ample fodder for an already critical Brazilian media.48
Dilma assumed office during the height of the Arab Spring, a manifestation of antigovernment protests across Northern Africa and the Middle East that toppled several entrenched
heads of state. This development immediately complicated the Africa foreign policy strategy that
Lula had cultivated in his term. Moreover, she inherited a Brazilian economy that was already
showing signs of retraction after passing through the initial years of the 2008 global financial
crisis relatively unscathed. By 2012, growth in Brazilian PIB was a stagnant 0.9%. During
Dilma’s first mandate, Brazilian economic growth failed to rise above 4.05%, the average growth
for the entirety of the Lula administration. 49 Additionally, Rouseff was forced to address
revelations that the United States’ National Security Agency engaged in clandestine spying on
Planalto, leading to a vehement Dilma cancelling a proposed state visit to Washington and
distancing Brazil with its hemispheric neighbor. 50 Coupled with the largest protests in the
modern Braziliam democratic era (loosely organized over the discrepancy in state spending for
the 2014 World Cup and poor quality of public services), one understands how a poignant
campaign to continue the Brazilian national narrative of poverty reductionist became muddled.
Conclusion: Opportunities for Refashioning the Narrative
47
Hunter and Power, “Rewarding Lula,” 20-23.
Joint Press Conference by Obama, Brazilian President Rousseff, The White House, June 30, 2015,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/06/20150630316392.html#axzz3hUVL5PUA.
49
João Marcelo Conte Cornetet, “A política externa de Dilma Rousseff: Contenção na continuidade,” Conjuntura
Austral 5, No. 24 (Jun. Jul. 2014): 138.
50
Brazil has long sought to maintain its South American identity while keeping amicable ties with the United States.
It is a delicate “balancing act,” that, in its context helps explain additional rationale for the blemish between the
United States and Brazil during the Edwad Snowden revelations regarding the NSA.
48
Despite the struggle the Rousseff administration has faced in fomenting the Bolsa
Família as a stronger national narrative, the program still generates tangible soft power gains for
Brazil, especially from the Western-backed global order that has dominated global governance.
During the time of this writing, France had just finished a visit with the Brazilian government to
determine how best to incorporate “the Brazilian experience” into the French model of poverty
reduction.51 The attention rose past individual countries to appear in the International Labour
Organization, which promised to tout the program’s groundbreaking accolades within the realms
of health and education. The International Labour Organization also referenced the praise the
program has received from the United Nations in its discussion of the Bolsa Família.52 The
environment is receptive for the Brazilian narrative, but the country must do a better job of
strategically applying it in the second half of the Rousseff administration to repair some of the
diminished expectations brought on by Lula leaving office.
The FGV talk referenced at the beginning of this article concluded by suggesting Brazil
recapture its perceived losses in soft power by a return to a greater international presence,
especially with regards to the then-cold relationship with the United States.53 There are signs that
this could be changing. Dilma met with President Obama in June 2015, and while it is still early
to determine if greater relations with Washington will strengthen the Brazilian narrative, it looks
promising. Brazil is fortunate in that it has a variety of attractive elements to sell internationally
in an effort to augment its own diplomatic weight, yet the Bolsa Família provides the best case to
strengthen the Brazilian national narrative. Based on the values outlined in the 1988 Constitution
and the Brazilian propensity to project itself as a defender of human rights and a poverty
reductionist, further investment in the program allows Planalto occupants to claim that they are
living up to the country’s values, thus increasing Brazilian credibility on the world stage.
Finally, national narratives are often defined as “giving meaning to the future,”
something that the Bolsa Família is fundamentally designed to do for families’ investments in
their children. Anecdotes from Bolsa Família recipients abound, but a striking quote comes from
“Dona Inês,” a 30-year old with a high school education and two children living in Piauí, an
51
Portal Brasil, “Combate às desigualdades no Brasil é exemplo para França,” July 23, 2015,
http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2015/07/combate-as-desigualdades-no-brasil-e-exemplo-parafranca
52
Portal Brasil, “Exemplo internacional de inclusão social, Bolsa Família é apresntado na Suíça,” July 30, 2015,
http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2015/07/exemplo-internacional-de-inclusao-social-bolsafamilia-e-apresentado-na-suica.
53
Casarões, “Desafios da política externa brasileira em 2015.”
impoverished state in Northeastern Brazil: “According to the Constitution, [the Bolsa] is our
right, but it was never respected until now. Now it is here.” 54 Such statements increase the
credibility of the Brazilian government in the eyes of its citizens, but the contemporary challenge
for Brazil is to ensure voices like Inês’s are not lost amidst a raucous political landscape
dominated by the current economic crisis and a current defensive narrative strewn together by an
embattled President Rousseff.
In many ways, the end of the presidential administration of George W. Bush signaled the
greatest leap to a post-unipolar world order. It was here where the United States recognized that
unilateral action proved to be a dangerous alienator of international support, weakening the very
institutions that Washington sought to build in the entirety of the 20th century. The study of
strategic narratives only grows in relevance as unipolar power declines. Every country has a
story, yet it is in determining how that story fits that can, “demand the development of a concept
to explain power and influence that is fit for purpose –– strategic narrative.” 55 Brazil has
experimented with its strategic narrative before; it is up to the state to determine how to reapply
it in future pursuits of Brazilian foreign policy aims.
54
55
Rego and Pinzani, Vozes, 143.
Roselle, et. al, 80-81.
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