Y Myfyriwr Ymchwil
Cyfrol 2, Rhif 1, Medi 2012, 33–43
Prifysgol Cymru
Y Drindod Dewi Sant
The Student Researcher
Vol. 2, No. 1, September 2012, 33–43
University of Wales
Trinity Saint David
How Far were the Commercial Arrangements for Maritime
Loans in Fourth Century BC Athens Dictated by the Legal
Framework Available?
Stuart Rawson
Level 5, BA in Greek and Classical Studies
Crynodeb
Roedd benthyciadau môr (bottomry) yn ffurf arbennig ar fenthyciadau a ddefnyddiwyd
gan fasnachwyr yn Athen yn y bedwaredd ganrif, sef yr unig le yng Ngroeg yr Henfyd
y ceir tystiolaeth sylweddol. Gwelir y dystiolaeth hon ar ffurf pedair araith yng ngwaith
Demosthenes (32, 34, 45, a 56). Codwyd llog uchel ar y benthyciadau, a defnyddiwyd y
llwyth neu’r llong i’w gwarantu, ond dim ond pe bai’r llong yn cyrraedd pen ei thaith yn
llwyddiannus yr oedd angen eu had-dalu. Ymdrinnid ag achosion a ddeilliai ohonynt mewn
llysoedd môr arbennig. Er bod y benthyciadau a’r llysoedd wedi cael sylw ysgolheigaidd,
nid yw hyn wedi canolbwyntio gan amlaf ar y gwahaniaeth rhwng yr hyn a nodwyd yn
y cyfreithiau a’r hyn oedd yn arfer masnachol yn unig. Yn yr astudiaeth hon ymchwilir i
awdurdodaeth uwchgenedlaethol y llysoedd môr, amseru’r llysoedd, y rheithor, defnyddio
contractau ysgrifenedig, cwmpas y dike emporikai, y gyfraith ynghylch benthyciadau
môr a mewnforion grawn a defnyddio gweithdrefn paragraphe. I gloi, bydd y papur hwn
yn gwahaniaethu rhwng y rôl a chwaraeai’r cyfreithiau a’r llysoedd, gan bwyso a mesur y
cyfraniad a wnaed ganddynt i fasnach Athenaidd yn ystod y cyfnod hwn.
Geiriau allweddol: Clasuron, economeg, masnach, cyfraith, Groeg yr Henfyd
Abstract
Maritime, or bottomry, loans were a special kind of loan used by merchants in fourthcentury Athens, the only place and period for which we have substantial evidence from
ancient Greece; the evidence is mainly in the shape of four speeches from the Demosthenic
corpus (32, 34, 45, and 56). The loans, usually secured on the cargo or the ship, were at high
interest, but only repayable if the voyage completed successfully; cases arising from them
were dealt with in special maritime courts. Although both the loans and the courts have
been the subject of scholarly investigation, this has not usually focused on the distinction
between what was laid down in the laws and what was merely commercial practice. This
study examines the supranational jurisdiction of the maritime courts, the timing of the
courts, the jurors, the use of written contracts, the scope of the dike emporikai, the law
on maritime loans and grain imports and the use of the paragraphe procedure. Finally,
this paper will distinguish the role played by the laws and the courts and evaluate the
contribution they made to Athenian trade at this period.
Key words: Classics, economics, trade, law, Ancient Greece
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Introduction
The purpose of this enquiry is to look at the legal framework for maritime loans
in fourth century Athens, both the actual laws and the judicial system, in order to
determine what effect this had on the commercial arrangements of the traders. After
describing what maritime loans were and what sources we have for them, and looking
at an actual example, I shall go on to consider this under the following headings: the
supranational jurisdiction of the maritime courts, the timing of the courts, the jurors,
the use of written contracts, the scope of the dikai emporikai, the law on maritime
loans and grain imports, the scope of the law again and the use of the paragraphe
procedure.
Maritime loans were probably in general use throughout the ancient world
wherever there was a sufficient volume of sea trade,1 but our main evidence comes
from fourth century Athens. The basic principle is summarised by Millett: “In order
to pay for the cargo being taken on board ship, the merchant (emporos) or shipowner
(naukleros) borrowed money for the duration of the trading voyage, which could be
either one-way (heteroplous) or a return trip (amphoteroplous). The loan and interest
were repaid out of the proceeds of the sale of the cargo, but only on condition that the
ship arrived safely at its destination.”2
The last point is key, as if the ship was lost or the cargo stolen, there was no
obligation to repay the loan, which thus took on some of the functions of insurance.
For this reason interest rates were high, probably from 12.5% to 30%.3 Unlike nonmaritime interest-paying loans interest was not time-limited, but for the duration of
the voyage as agreed.4 As a safeguard to the lender against fraud the cargo, or indeed
the ship, could be pledged as security.5
The main sources for maritime loans are four speeches in the Demosthenic corpus
(32, 34, 35, 56) alleging fraud by the borrower.6 It is not relevant to my purpose to
distinguish between those speeches genuinely by Demosthenes and those by others
that have been collected under his name. There are also references elsewhere in the
orators (Dem. 27, 33, 52, Isoc. 27, Lysias 32, Hyperides, Against Demosthenes)
and scattered allusions in Theophrastus, Diogenes Laertius, Diphilus, Eupolis and
Xenophon.7
It will be useful to look at an actual loan agreement, the one preserved in Dem.
35.10–13. Although documents preserved in the transmitted text of Demosthenes
may be spurious insertions concocted from details elsewhere in the speech by a later
hand,8 this agreement contains details not in the speech (e.g. the choice of initial port,
the variable rate of interest) and has been generally accepted as genuine.9
The loan, of 3,000 drachmae, is made by an Athenian and an Euboean to two
Pamphylians, immediately indicating that the jurisdiction of the law covered nonAthenians. They are to sail from Athens to the Chalcidice (the precise port is left
up to them), buy 3,000 jars of wine, and proceed to the Bosphorus, or if they wish
a certain distance into the Black Sea, again giving them some discretion, sell it and
return to Athens with a new cargo. The interest is 22.5%, increasing to 30% if they
are still in the Black Sea after the rising of Arcturus when winter is approaching and
conditions would be more dangerous. The security is the cargo of wine, on which
no other loans could be made (in modern terms, it is hypothecated). Repayment is
due 20 days after return, and the return cargo is security until then. The security
is the property of the lenders if it is saved when the ship is lost, or if the borrowers
do not pay up. Deductions are allowed for jettison agreed to by the passengers and
payments to enemies. The lenders are clearly sharing the risks of the voyage. The
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interest will not be affected if the ship returns in the new legal year, so the interest is
not time-limited.
I will begin the examination of the legal framework for these loans by looking at
the operation of the courts, before going on to look at the scope and provisions of the
laws.
The Supranational Jurisdiction of the Maritime Courts
At some time in the fourth century special maritime courts were set up in Athens
to deal with commercial cases, or dikai emporikai, apparently replacing an earlier
system of nautodikai.10 The unusual and important feature of the courts’ jurisdiction
is that foreigners participated on the same basis as Athenian citizens:11 “Do not the
same laws stand written for us all? And have we not all the same rights in regard
to mercantile suits?” (Dem. 35.45). Zenothemis in Dem. 32 is presumably from
Massilia, Apaturius in Dem. 33 is a Byzantine, Lacritus in Dem. 35 is a Phaselite. In
Dem. 34 both Phormio and his opponent Chrysippus appear to be metics (resident
aliens),12 and in Dem. 56 the parties in dispute appear to be metics and non-resident
aliens.13 International trade at Athens was largely in the hands of foreigners,14 so this
was crucial in ensuring the effectiveness of the courts.15
Status was also not a bar to participation. As well as metics, it is possible that
slaves could be involved, at least as witnesses: Lampis in Dem. 34 is described as by
words meaning slave, oiketes (34.5) and pais (34.10).16 The evidence is dubious, as
this might possibly refer to a freed slave, and it is not indeed certain that he actually
testified.17
Timing of the Maritime Courts
The cases heard in the courts were emmenoi, or “monthly” (Dem. 33.23), as were a
number of other types of cases (Arist. Ath. Pol. 52.2). This was formerly interpreted
as meaning that the case had to be heard within thirty days.18 Cohen has argued
convincingly that the natural meaning of ‘monthly’ is that the cases were introduced
at monthly intervals.19 He still, however, believes that the cases were normally heard
within thirty days,20 so the practical effect of the reinterpretation is limited. The key
point is that the monthly cases dispensed with the often time-consuming arbitration
procedure,21 and as cases in Athenian courts were normally heard in a single day,22
there was no reason for them not to be dealt with rapidly.
Dem. 33.23 states that cases involving merchants are heard in the winter months,
from Boedromion to Mounichion, so that they might sail off straight after they were
decided. As they would not be able to sail during the winter, it has been proposed
that the months have been reversed in the transmitted text, and the courts actually sat
during the summer.23 In support of the emendation, it is argued that the merchants
were mostly foreigners, and so not in Athens in the winter, and that there would be
plenty of time to fit a court case in the summer as well as a trip to the Bosphorus.24
Against; foreign merchants did stay in Athens over the winter arranging their affairs:
Dem. 33.23 simply means they would be able to sail straight off in the summer as
the court case would be over.25 The question is undecidable, but as there is a credible
explanation for the transmitted text the presumption should be with it. In any case,
the key point is that the timing of the courts, like the speed of their operation, was
arranged to benefit the merchants.
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Jurors in the Maritime Courts
Cohen has argued that the dicasts in dikai emporikai were specially chosen from those
with commercial experience.26 He bases this on Dem. 35.43, where it is implied that
it is difficult to deceive “you who sit to decide cases of mercantile contracts” (and on
Dem. 35.46 which is less specific); this might mean they have specialist knowledge,
or might just be a general compliment to their acuteness. He could also have added
Dem. 32.10–11, which suggests that the jury would be familiar with characters of
low repute in the Peiraeus. It is difficult to see how this would work. The jury would
be chosen by lot like all Athenian juries, and Cohen himself has demonstrated that
there could be no definable commercial class at Athens from which the choice might
be made.27 In Dem. 34.50 the jurors have previously condemned someone to death,28
which suggests to me this is not a specialist commercial jury.
It is not the case that the ordinary Athenian juror would be unfamiliar with the
concept of a maritime loan. Eupolis, for example, makes a passing reference to one in
his comedy Marikas of 421, which he would not have done unless his audience knew
what it meant.29 Xenophon in the mid fourth century suggests a revenue measure with
a 20% yield, “like a nautical loan” (Xen. Poroi 3.9), the casual reference again implying
that his readers would be familiar with the concept.30 In another contemporary work
aimed at a general audience, Theophrastus has his braggart boast of his maritime
loans, ‘as he has much money out at sea’ (Characters 23.2). If the concept was familiar,
the technical complexities would hardly be greater than the Athenian juror was
accustomed to cope with in cases involving property or inheritance, for example.
The Use of Written Contracts
The cases dealing with maritime loans make frequent references to written contracts.31
The existence of a written agreement is referred to right at the start of Dem. 35 and
Dem. 56, and in Dem. 34 the speaker’s opponent has apparently conceded that a
written contract (34.6) was indeed made (34.3). In Dem. 35 the agreement is read
out (35.10–13), it is gone through clause by clause (35.14–37), and then it is read
out again (35.38).32 It has been calculated that 105 of the 113 instances of syngraphe/
syngraphomai (written contract/make a written contract) in the Demosthenic corpus
occur in speeches concerned with maritime loans.33 This contrasts with the fairly
limited role of written contracts in non-maritime cases.34 They were deposited with a
banker for safe-keeping: ‘with Kittos the banker’ (Dem. 34.6), similarly Dem. 35.14.
There is no doubt that the use of written contracts was standard commercial practice
for maritime loans.35 The question of whether this was simply a matter of trading
practice or whether it was prescribed by the law will be considered in the next
section.
The Scope of the Dikai Emporikai
The exact scope of the dikai emporikai has been subject to debate, and it will be
necessary to quote the main evidence in full (in my translation).
Dem. 32.1: “The laws prescribe that the cases shall be about agreements of
shipowners and merchants to and from Athens, and about which there are
written contracts. If anyone brings a case outside this, the case shall not be
admissible.”
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This specifies two conditions for agreements: they should be for trade with Athens
and/or they should be written. It has been debated whether the two conditions
are alternatives (the disjunctive interpretation) or whether both are necessary (the
conjunctive interpretation). Gernet favours the disjunctive: “les deux membres
de phrase ... se rapportent à deux espèces différentes.”36 It is obviously absurd
to suppose that the law might apply to any agreement made by merchants on
whatever topic, but a limitation to something like concerning maritime loans might
easily have been supposed by the speaker to be implied by the context. Gernet
thinks the conjunctive interpretation not grammatically possible;37 the phrasing,
however, is that of an advocate, not a legal draftsman, and it seems unwise to
depend too much on the precise wording. Before considering the alternative,
we should look at two other passages. Dem. 34.4: “The laws, however, do not say
so, but allow paragraphe appeals if there is no contract at all at Athens nor for the
Athenian market.”
At first sight this might seem to support the disjunctive interpretation, as it seems
to specify a contract for the Athenian market and a contract made at Athens as
alternatives, thus implying that the contract at Athens might not be for the Athenian
market. Again, however, we cannot rely on the speaker using precise legal wording
in his argument. If both he and the jury knew very well that the law only applied
to trade to and from Athens, he might mean “a contract made at Athens (of course
for the Athenian market), or indeed any contract (made anywhere providing it was)
for the Athenian market”. Dem. 34.42: “The law prescribing that commercial cases
concern agreements at Athens and for the Athenian market, and not only those at
Athens, but also those for a voyage to Athens.”
Here we have another combination of conditions: the Athenian market again,38
and a contract made at Athens. Again, this might be interpreted conjunctively or
disjunctively. The second part effectively repeats 34.4. It is clear, however, by
comparison with Dem. 32.1 that ‘agreements at Athens’ (34.42) is being used as
the equivalent of ‘about which there are written contracts’ (32.1), and this seems to
answer our question in the previous section. Contracts at Athens are the same as
written contracts. The law therefore stipulated written agreements for contracts at
Athens, and thus by implication for any contracts whatsoever. What was normal good
commercial practice was thus given legal status.
Cohen argues for the conjunctive approach to 32.1,39 chiefly on the grounds of the
importance of the grain trade to Athens.40 Before considering this, it will be useful to
look at the legal relation between grain imports and maritime loans.
The Law on Maritime Loans and Grain Imports
Athens had a uniquely large dependence on grain imports, chiefly from the Pontos,
but also from Egypt, Cyprus, Cyrene, South Italy, Sicily and Thrace.41 Among the
measures it took to protect this,42 were various laws restricting the grain trade, for
example forbidding the use of harbours apart from the Piraeus and requiring at least
two thirds of the grain to be unloaded there.43 The law concerning loans is in Dem.
35, and again we need to look at the wording of the relevant part.
Dem. 35.50: (Introduction by speaker) “For you know how harsh the law is, if
any Athenian provides grain to anywhere other than Athens, or lends money for
any other market than the Athenian.”
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Dem. 35.51: “(Law quoted) No Athenian nor metic nor those they have legal
power over shall give out money to any ship that is not to bring grain to Athens,
and the other things written about each of these.”
This passage raises a number of questions. Is the quoted law genuine, or a later
interpolation in the speech? Does the speaker refer to two laws or one? To whom does
the law apply? Does the law forbid outward-only loans? What are the other things
referred to? Is the lending restriction confined to the grain trade?
The genuineness of the law is supported by Calhoun and Cohen.44 After the
passage quoted above, it goes on to specify details of what will happen if the law is
broken (reference to the epimeletai) which are not taken from the body of the speech
and would have no particular point as an invention. It has been argued above45 that
the agreement in this speech at 35.10–13 is genuine, and if so it is likely that the other
quoted citations are also. Bissa’s opinion that it is a spurious Hellenistic insertion
seems to be based on a general suspicion of such quotations rather than any signs of
inauthenticity in this particular law.46 As usual, it is not possible to be certain, but the
balance of probability seems to favour it being the genuine law.
The speaker does appear to be referring to two laws, the first being the law on
transporting grain cited at Dem. 34.37, and the second being the law on lending.47
This law applies to Athenian citizens, metics and their slaves, but not to foreigners.
Foreigners seem to have accounted for most of the traders (the resident alien metics
were more associated with retailing);48 the lenders, however, would have been a
mixture of Athenians and non-Athenians, as in Dem. 35, which mentions loans from
the Athenian Androkles, the speaker (35.10), Nausikrates of Carystus (35.10), Aratos
of Halicarnassus (35.23) and Antipatros of Kition (35.33).49 It is unclear what would
convert a foreigner staying at Athens on business into a metic, perhaps length of stay
or setting up a household,50 but there is no particular reason to suppose these lenders
had that status.51
The law prohibits all loans on ships that are not intending to bring grain to
Athens.52 This would then allow loans on the outward journey only, but only if the
return cargo was intended to include grain. We learn of such an outward loan at Dem.
34.6, 8, where at least one of the lenders, Lampis, was resident at Athens (34.37);
Lampis was certainly involved in the grain trade (35.36) but among all the speakers’53
allegations of double dealing we cannot tell what was originally intended for the
voyage.54
I have translated the end of 35.51 as “and the other things written about each of
these”, which is literal, but does not explain the sense. It has been taken as referring
to an omission in the quotation55 or to an earlier part of the law not quoted,56 as
blurring over shady dealing by the speaker,57 as referring to other necessities apart from
grain,58 or just ignored.59 It is plausible that it specified other things of strategic value,
such as timber for shipbuilding.60 It follows, therefore, that the lending restriction was
confined to grain together with these additional items.61
The Scope of the Dikai Emporikai (concluded)
Returning to the question of the interpretation of Dem. 32.1, we now have good
evidence that the Athenians were ready to incorporate their concern for the grain
trade in their laws, which therefore supports the conjunctive interpretation. The law
at Dem. 35.51 placed a limitation on commerce to promote the public good, and
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given this priority of the lawmakers it is likely that they meant their laws to apply to
the grain-dominated Athenian trade and not to written contracts for loans relating
to non-Athenian trade.62 The balance of probability must be that the law specified
contracts that were both for trade to and from Athens and were written. This, then,
was a limitation on the traders’ ability to use the law, though in practice trades that
fell outside its scope may have been rare.
On the question of who could bring the cases, Isager and Hansen suppose this
is limited to the naukleroi and emporoi (shipowners and merchants) referred to in
32.1;63 this is surely just the speaker’s assumption that these were the people involved
in maritime loans, not part of the law.64 We do not know if cases could be brought
against third parties who prevented the contract being fulfilled.65
Dem. 34.42 is explicit that the contract need not actually be made at Athens.
Dem. 35.47–8 lists the other Athenian courts and makes it clear that they have no
jurisdiction in such a case. Of course, the case might not be heard in Athens at all, but
in the trading destination, as is suggested in Dem. 32.21, where it is envisaged that
the case might have been tried in Sicily where the cargo was bought.
There were other legal measures to support the commercial infrastructure.66 Dem.
56.10 refers to a law binding naukleroi and epibatai, shipowners and supercargoes,
to sail to the port specified in the agreement. There was also a law (Dem. 58.10)
giving some kind of protection from sycophants (malicious informers) for traders and
shipowners.
The Use of the Paragraphe Procedure
Of the four Demosthenic speeches centred on maritime loans, one (Dem. 56)
is a dike blabes for breach of contract.67 The other three (Dem. 32, 34, 35) are all
paragraphe cases, a claim by the defendant that the action is inadmissible.68 In Dem.
32 Zenothemis has brought an action against Demon, which Demon is trying to have
rejected on the grounds that there was no contract between him and Zenothemis
(32.2).69 Phormion, the defendant in Dem. 34, has argued that the contract has now
expired (34.3), apparently because the ship has sunk;70 his opponent asserts that the
law allows a paragraphe to claim that a contract never existed, but that a claim that it
existed and has been fulfilled should be considered in the main action (34.4). In Dem.
35 Lakritos, the brother of the man with whom the agreement was made, who has
now died, seems to have asked for the suit to be set aside on the grounds that though
he was the heir to his estate he has now rejected his inheritance (35.4).71
The speeches in these cases include a great deal that is not relevant to the paragraphe
but relates to the main action. For example, in Dem. 32 we get a very colourful
account of the fraud allegedly perpetrated by Zenothemis and Hegestratus, with a
graphic description of Hegestratus’ attempt to sink the ship (32.5–6), which is hardly
relevant to the question of whether a contract existed. In Dem. 35 the plaintiff in the
main case is reviled as a Phaselite and sophist, again not relevant to whether he has
inherited his brother’s debts.72 What evidence there is seems to support the view that
the paragraphe was heard in a separate hearing before the main case: ‘the magistrates
should first submit this question to the tribunal’ (Isoc. 18.2), ‘before bringing in the
case’ (Harpocration, s.v. diamarturia kai diamarturein).73 If so, the introduction of so
much matter concerning the main case might suggest that it was at least the same jury.74
That most of the extant cases dealing with maritime loans are paragraphe might
just be due to the chances of survival. There is a more obvious reason, however:
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precisely because the operation of the courts was designed to benefit merchants and
allowed foreigners equal status with Athenians, it might be difficult or impossible
to pursue the case elsewhere if it were not admissible here,75 and so successful use of
the procedure would effectively settle the case. Misuse of the paragraphe was limited
by the loser having to pay one-sixth of the value of the claim, the epobelia (Isoc.
18.35,37).76
Conclusion
The evidence for the legal structure governing maritime loans in fourth century Athens
is limited, and sometimes difficult to interpret; any conclusions can therefore only be
tentative. Nevertheless, I think the following has been established with a reasonable
degree of probability:
(i)
Foreigners and metics (but not necessarily slaves) had the same status in the
dikai emporikai as Athenian citizens.
(ii) Cases were heard monthly and, because no arbitration was involved, settled
rapidly.
(iii) Cases were heard during the winter months, when the parties were not at
sea.
(iv) The jurors were not specialists.
(v) Written contracts were not only standard, but required by law.
(vi) The cases were for trade to and from Athens.
(vii) Athenian citizens, metics and their slaves could not lend unless the voyage
involved the import of grain or other strategic materials.
(viii)The contracts did not need to be made at Athens.
(ix) The law required that sailing must be to the port specified in the
agreement.
(x) There was protection against sycophantic prosecutions.
(xi) It was important to establish that a case was admissible as a dike emporike, as
otherwise it might be difficult to pursue.
To finally return to the question I posed at the beginning: what effect did the legal
framework, both the actual laws and the judicial system, for maritime loans have
on the commercial arrangements of the traders? It is clear that in the speed and
timing of the courts, their openness to foreign traders, the adaptation of the laws to
commercial practices such as written contracts and the protection of the stipulations
in the agreements and the precautions against sycophancy the legal system did in fact
prescribe an environment deliberately encouraging to loans for trade. Only in the
provisions concerning grain imports did public policy override this. The prevalence
of paragraphe actions concerning admissibility as dikai emporikai is testimony to their
effectiveness.
Xenophon, writing not long before the system of dikai emporikai was created,
observed (Poroi 3.3): ‘If prizes were offered to the magistrates of the market for just
and prompt settlement of disputes, so that sailings were not delayed, the effect would
be that a far larger number of merchants would trade with us and with much greater
satisfaction.’77 It seems that the Athenians may have taken his advice.
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
de Ste Croix, 1974
Millett, 1991: 189. The functions of emporos and naukleros are distinguished in Finley, 1935
Millett, 1983: 36
Cohen, 1989: 212–18
Millett, 1983: 36; Finley, 1952: 223n7
This account of the sources is based on Millett, 1991: 189–90
Millett, 1991: 190 for details
Todd, 1993: 44–5
Accepted by Blass, Kirchner, Lipsius, Thalheim, Boeckh, Harrison, Cohen and Todd: Paley and
Sandys, 1898 ad loc for a summary of the earlier scholars; Harrison, 1971: 111; Cohen, 1973:106n22
(‘Its validity is beyond doubt’); Cohen, 1992: 106n217; Todd, 1993: 340n26. Not accepted by
Ashburner (quoted in Cohen, 1973: 106n22), who nevertheless believes it is based on a genuine
agreement. For further discussion of the quoted citations in this speech, see the section on maritime
loans and the grain laws below
10 Cohen, 1973: 158–98
11 For the normal situation regarding aliens see McDowell, 1978:75–6
12 Paley and Sandys, 1898: 3; Cohen, 1973: 121
13 Carey and Reid, 1985: 197
14 Reed, 2003: 27–33
15 Cohen, 1973: 59–74
16 Paley and Sandys, 1898 on 34.10
17 Cohen, 1973: 121; Todd, 1993: 193
18 E.g. Harrison, 1971: 134
19 Cohen, 1973: 9–40
20 Cohen, 1973: 39
21 Cohen, 1973: 35–6
22If paragraphe hearings were heard separately this would be at most two days, Cohen, 1973:
147–50
23 Paoli, cited in Cohen, 1973: 43–4
24 Reed, 2003: 90–2
25 Cohen, 1973: 42–59
26 Cohen, 1973: 93; Todd, 1993: 336–7 disagrees
27 Cohen, 1973: 114–16, 123–4
28 See Paley and Sandys, 1898 ad loc
29 Harvey, 1976
30 Millett, 1991: 190
31 See the example in the Introduction
32 Lanni, 2006: 162
33 Carey and Reid, 1985: 200n50
34 Lanni, 2006: 166
35 Cohen, 1973: 129–36; see also Millett, 1991: 259–60n27 on the use of written documents by
traders in general. Plato (Laws 953e) prescribed written contracts for any kind of security, which
may have been based on contemporary commercial practice
36 Quoted in Cohen, 1973: 101
37 Cohen, 1973: 104
38 eis might mean either ‘into’ (imports) or ‘concerning’ (imports and exports); I have translated ‘for’
to try to preserve the ambiguity. Bissa, 2009: 186–7 argues for ‘concerning’ here, but ‘into’ is quite
possible; the speaker might mean ‘either (contracts both made at Athens and for imports into
Athens) or (any contracts for imports into Athens)’. alla kai (‘but also’) is regularly used in cases
where the second possibility includes the first; Denniston, 1954: 3. Again, we are listening to an
advocate, not a legal draftsman
39 So also Isager and Hansen, 1975: 148
40 Cohen, 1973: 100–14
41 Jameson, 1983:11; Garnsey, 1985; Reed, 2003: 16–17
42 Austin and VIdal-Naquet, 1973: 115–16
43 Bissa, 2009: 177–190
44 Calhoun, 1918: 175n10; Cohen, 1973: 104
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42
Stuart Rawson
45 Introduction and note 9
46 Bissa, 2009: 185. We know from epigraphic confirmation that at least some quoted documents in
speeches were genuine: Todd, 1993: 45
47 Bissa, 2009: 185
48 Reed, 2003: 57, 59
49 Cohen has argued that Athenian bankers played a prominent role (Cohen, 1992: 111–89), but
the evidence is not really there to support this; in particular, it is clear that Phormion the trader of
Dem. 34 is not (as argued by Cohen, 1992: 176–8) the same as Phormion the banker of Dem. 45
(Phormion I and Phormion II in Reed’s catalogue: Reed, 2003: 106–7, 113–14)
50 McDowell, 1978: 77
51 But see Bissa, 2009: 187n88 on Antipatros
52 eis in eis ... emporion (‘for the market’) from the speaker would here mean ‘into’, as it certainly does
at 34.37 and may do at 34.42 (see note 38 above). Bissa’s alternative of ‘concerning’ depends on
Athenaze (‘to Athens’) in the quoted law being spurious; Bissa, 2009: 186–7
53 Or speaker’s: Lofberg, 1932
54 Bissa also cites Dem. 35.22 (Bissa, 2009: 187n88), but 35.23, a quoted document again accepted as
genuine, makes it clear the loan is for a return trip
55 Paley and Sandys, 1898 ad loc
56 Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1973: 292
57 Todd, 1993: 321n8, because the speaker has not been importing grain
58 Garnsey, 1988: 139–40
59 Isager and Hansen, 1975: 142; Jameson, 1983: 11; Bissa, 2009: 184
60 Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1973: 117; enumerated by the Old Oligarch (2.11–12)
61 Bissa, 2009: 187, assuming the quoted law is spurious, suggests it is a general import restriction, but
the general emphasis of the laws on protecting the grain trade makes this less plausible
62 Cohen, 1973: 104
63 Isager and Hansen, 1975: 148
64 See Cohen, 1973: 114–16, 123–4 on the difficulty of defining a specific group
65 Isager and Hansen, 1975: 148
66 Hasebroek, 1933: 170–1
67 Carey and Reid, 1985: 199; Harrison, 1971: 79
68 Harrison, 1971: 106–24
69 Harrison, 1971: 113–15; Isager and Hansen, 1975: 148
70 Harrison, 1971: 110
71 Harrison, 1971: 111–12
72 Not relevant to the main case either, unusually in actions in maritime cases, Lanni, 2006: 167–74
73 Cohen, 1973: 147–50
74 Harrison, 1971: 119 discusses the evidence for a different jury, which is inconclusive
75 Cohen, 1973: 157; Dem.35.47–8 lists other courts which could not be used
76 Harrison 1971: 184; Cohen, 1973: 86
77 Marchant’s translation; Hasebroek, 1933: 171–2
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