From ‘New World’ to ‘New Labour’:
Neil Kinnock and the Reagan administration 1984-1987
Dr James Cooper
Senior Lecturer in History, Oxford Brookes University, UK
2012-13 Fulbright Robertson Visiting Professor of British History, Westminster
College, Fulton MO, USA
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
If Europe once ruled the „old world‟, the importance of good relations with the
leaders of the „new world‟ has, for many Europeans, taken precedence in international
relations since 1945. In 1984 and 1987 Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party,
met with President Ronald Reagan. Such meetings are typical diplomatic procedures.
Kinnock sought to enhance his political profile and establish his credentials as a prime
minister-in-waiting by undertaking visits to the United States. The meetings between
the two men were inevitably complicated by the „special relationship‟ between
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Nevertheless, Kinnock‟s intentions for the visits,
how he was received by the Reagan administration, and how the meetings were
reported, serve as an important case study about the significance attached to a visit to
the United States by the British leader of the opposition. Kinnock‟s meetings with the
Reagan administration also demonstrate the potential significance of a convergence
between domestic politics and foreign affairs.
1
Key words
Anglo-American relations; leader of the opposition; Kinnock; Reagan; Thatcher.
Introduction
In the 1987 UK general election, Neil Kinnock‟s Labour Party experienced a
crushing defeat by the Conservative Party. Kinnock could have been forgiven for
thinking that everything was against him; despite arguably winning the campaign
battle, he lost the electoral war to Margaret Thatcher. Moreover, in addition to the
difficult period of trying to establish a credible domestic alternative to Thatcherism,
Kinnock was victim to unprecedented public opposition by Ronald Reagan.
Following his meeting with Kinnock in 1987, the US president wrote in his diary:
„British Labor party leader Neil Kinnock along with former Defense Minister Healey
& the Eng. Ambassador came by. It was a short meeting but I managed to get in a
lick or two about how counter-productive “Labors” [sic] defense policy was in our
dealings with the Soviets.‟1 The meeting between a British opposition leader and
American president is, or at least should be, a relatively standard diplomatic courtesy
call, but this particular meeting proved to be controversial. This was due to three
factors: Kinnock‟s ambitions for his meeting with Reagan; the response of the
president despite the advice of his aides; and, Labour‟s attempt at news management
following the negative press reports. Thus, there are three overlapping and key
narratives that warrant examination: what Kinnock is trying to do in these visits;
1
Douglas Brinkley (ed.), Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries (New York, 2007), Friday 27 March
1987, 486.
2
what Reagan ostensibly wants to do in meeting the Labour leader; and, what the
British press decides to do in the ensuing events. This article is therefore a case study
into the nature of US presidential power and freedom to act, and the relationship
between politicians and the press.2 The 1980s were a period of hostile treatment by
much of the British press towards the Labour party and this case study is an example
of that.3 While Kinnock‟s supporters in a resurgently partisan press were
outnumbered by those celebrating the Thatcher government,4 that Reagan got
involved is certainly in contrast to his largely popular and historiography image. As
Richard E, Neustadt argues, President Reagan had „less intellectual curiosity, less
interest in detail, than any President at least since Calvin Coolidge‟. 5 Similarly,
Michael Schaller observes: „Even his closest aides found Reagan exceptionally
2
For presidential power, see, for instance: Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern
Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
For the relationship between presidents and their staff, see, for instance: James P. Pfiffner, „The
President‟s Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 23:1 (Winter, 1993), 77102. There is a vast literature about relationship between the media and politics. See, for instance:
Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (Shocken Books: New
York, 1988); Colin Seymour-Ure, „The Media in Postwar British Politics,‟ Parliamentary Affairs, 47:4
(1994), 530-48; Ana Inés Langer, „A Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the
Print Media: The British Prime Minister (1945-1999),‟ Parliamentary Affairs, 60:3 (2007), 371-387;
and, Kees Brants, Claes de Vreese, Judith Möller, and Philip van Praag, „The Real Spiral of Cynicism?
Symbiosis and Mistrust between Politicians and Journalists,‟ The International Journal of
Press/Politics, 15:25 (2010), 25-40.
3
See, for instance: James Thomas, Popular Newspapers, the Labour Party and British Politics
(Abington: Routledge, 2005).
4
Seymour-Ure, „The Media in Postwar British Politics,‟ 540-541.
5
Neustadt, Presidential Power, 270.
3
detached from details and often had to guess at what he wanted them to do.‟6 Indeed,
the president‟s reliance on his advisers stemmed from his interest „only in outcomes‟
and not wishing „to be bothered with the details‟. 7
Jimmy Carter consciously reached out to Margaret Thatcher upon the election
of a Conservative government in May 1979, despite his rapport with James
Callaghan.8 In contrast, the Reagan administration was suspicious of the Labour
Party. Two years prior to Kinnock‟s leadership. A State Department briefing in
advance of Thatcher‟s first White House meeting with Reagan in 1981 stated that the
policies „being expounded are at odds with the US interest in a strong British
contribution to Alliance security‟ and their „positions on security issues are causing
misgivings here‟.9 Thatcher was seen to be vital to the consolidation of policies
favourable to the Reagan administration. Victory for Thatcher in Britain in 1983
(concurrent with Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democrats in West Germany)
ensured that Reagan continued to have allies in Europe. Reagan‟s allies guaranteed
Western support for the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe and American policies towards the Soviet Union, and broader philosophical
6
Michael Schaller, Ronald Reagan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 39.
7
Pfiffner, „The President‟s Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned,‟ 85.
8
John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 101-102.
9
Department of State Briefing Paper, The Labour Party and Security Issues, February 17, 1981,
Department of State Briefing Book re: The Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher, 02/25/1981 –
02/28/1981 (3 of 3), Box 91434 (RAC Box 1), Executive Secretariat, NSC VIP Visits, Ronald Reagan
Library.
4
agreement on trade policy, lower taxation and slower growth in the public sector.10 In
short, the Reagan administration feared that the election of a Labour government in
1987 would undermine their foreign policy objectives. Thus, as Geoffrey Smith
observes, the Reagan administration „was clearly intent on cutting the ground from
under Kinnock‟.11
Unlike international summits between heads of government, meetings between
opposition leaders and foreign governments are normally relatively brief courtesy
visits, not intended for substantial policy discussions. 12 As will be discussed below,
10
See: David S. Broder, „A Conservative Tide?‟ The Washington Post, Wednesday 8 June 1983, Final
Edition, A25; David K. Willis, „Thatcher's renewed strength helps Reagan in Europe,‟ Christian
Science Monitor (Boston, MA), Monday 28 February 1983, Midwestern Edition, 3.
11
Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: The Bodley Head, 1990), 228. Reagan and
Thatcher promoted the belief of their shared mission in power in speeches, editorials and memoirs.
See, for instance: Ronald Reagan, „Margaret Thatcher and the Revival of the West,‟ National Review,
May 19, 1989, 21-22; and, Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), 156-7. The
Reagan-Thatcher „special relationship‟ is also perpetuated by examples of „higher journalism‟ that,
aside from acknowledging occasional disagreements, do not challenge this particular interpretation.
See: Smith, Reagan and Thatcher; John O‟Sullivan, The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister
(Washington D.C., 2006); and Nicholas Wapshott, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A
Political Marriage (London, 2007). For a reassessment of the Reagan-Thatcher relationship, including
its tensions in foreign affaoirs and differences domestic policy, see, respectively: Richard Aldous,
Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (London: Hutchinson, 2012), and James Cooper,
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
12
For summitry, see, for instance: David H. Dunn (ed.), Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The
Evolution of International Summitry (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Jonathan Colman, A ‘special
relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations ‘at the Summit’,
5
the Reagan White House was aware of this situation. Obviously, the connection
between domestic politics and foreign policy „is hardly a new phenomenon‟. 13
Nevertheless, if such visits are reported in the opposition‟s home country they are
potentially vital political exercises, representing a unique type of internationalization
of domestic politics. 14 For instance, Thatcher‟s visits to the US and meetings with
prominent political figures such as Presidents Ford and Carter were crucial to
establishing herself as leader of the Conservative Party and a potential prime minister.
Thatcher‟s North American tours in 1975 and 1977 were largely unprecedented: no
previous leader of the opposition had undertaken such expeditions in terms of scale
and ambition. Yet Thatcher‟s visits were not without their pitfalls. In 1975, James
Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, accused her of breaking the unwritten rule that MPs
should not criticize or undermine Britain whilst abroad. Indeed, Thatcher used her
1975 visit to argue that only the Conservative Party under her leadership could
reverse British economic decline and save the country from socialism. 15 Kinnock‟s
1964-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); and, Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the
G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
13
James M. McCormick ,„Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy‟, in James
M. McCormick (ed.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlechild Publishers, Inc., 2012), 1.
14
In recent times, American presidential candidates such as Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (both
challenging an incumbent party, akin to Kinnock) have sought to establish themselves as statesmen by
undertaking visits abroad and meeting with significant political figures. Likewise, British politicians
have sought to use meetings with senior American leaders, particularly the president of the United
States, to similar gain, albeit to varying degrees of success. For instance Tony Blair, as leader of the
opposition, received a prime ministerial welcome from President Bill Clinton.
15
See: James Cooper, „The Foreign Politics of Opposition: Margaret Thatcher and the Transatlantic
Relationship before Power‟, Contemporary British History, 24:1 (2010), 23-42.
6
determination to undertake high profile visits to the United States for political
purposes is therefore understandable, but it would not be unique if his foreign travels
involved domestic political concerns. But do foreign politicians (or meetings with
them) really matter in the fortunes of domestic politicians and politics? This case
study of Kinnock‟s transatlantic expeditions in 1984 and 1987 offers some evidence
to support a possible answer to this question.
Kinnock’s visit to the United States in 1984
The increasing personalisation of politics certainly empowers leaders who are
popular or enjoy the support of the press. However, personalisation also means that
leaders are vulnerable to press coverage.16 The latter was the case for Kinnock‟s first
foray into transatlantic diplomacy. On 8 February 1984, Kinnock departed for a sixday tour of the United States. Kinnock‟s purpose was to raise his profile in America,
and to be seen having successful meetings with key political players in Washington
D.C. A major objective of these meetings was to explain his policies about foreign
affairs and defence to a slightly bemused Reagan administration. According to
Martin Westlake, judged against these criteria „the tour was a success‟.17 Similarly,
Peter Osnos, writing in The Washington Post, noted the importance of the visit for
Kinnock as an opportunity to establish his credibility in foreign affairs and explain to
the Reagan administration that a Kinnock government would not threaten AngloAmerican relations. According to Osnos,
16
Langer, „A Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the Print Media,‟ 372, 384.
17
Martin Westlake, Kinnock: The Biography (London: Little, Brown, and Company, 2001), 372.
7
Kinnock‟s predecessor, Michael Foot, never visited the United States as party
leader – a fact which, when disclosed, undermined his credibility on foreign
policy issues during last spring‟s general election. Kinnock‟s intention on this
trip is to show that despite his criticism, he is not fundamentally antiAmerican. Nonetheless, he is committed, should he become prime minister, to
making this country less “obligated” to American interests, as he put it
recently. 18
Kinnock‟s views on domestic and international affairs were well known as
divergent to those espoused by the Reagan-Thatcher axis. As leader of the
opposition, he advocated a nuclear-free Europe both on moral grounds and with
reference to the limitations of Britain‟s finances and realistic status as a world power.
In short, Kinnock argued that Britain‟s economic position and medium-power status
indicated that the country could not afford to maintain a nuclear deterrent and should
instead focus on conventional weapons. Despite America‟s position as Britain‟s
closest ally and the guarantor of Western defence in the Cold War, Kinnock
maintained that America was an imperialist power. He criticised its intervention in
Grenada in 1983, its support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and its advocacy of
the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars). Furthermore, in Kinnock‟s openly stated
view, the nuclear weapons and the arms race between the United States and Soviet
Union was a threat to world peace. Kinnock‟s views were to compound his lack of
endearment to the Reagan administration, particularly as any Kinnock government
18
Peter Osnos, „British Labor Chief Is Strongly Antinuclear,‟ The Washington Post, Monday 13
February 1984, A16.
8
would undermine the policies that Reagan pursued with Thatcher‟s support.19 As will
be demonstrated, the Reagan administration‟s scepticism about Kinnock was matched
by the hostility and embarrassment extended to Kinnock by the right-wing British
press.
Kinnock enjoyed extensive coverage on American television and radio, and
his visit was well documented with reports in the New York Times, Washington Post,
and Wall Street Journal. Amongst others, the Labour Leader met Senator Edward
Kennedy, „Tip‟ O‟Neill (the Speaker of the House of Representatives), and Javier
Perez de Cuellar (the UN Secretary General). Westlake remarks that: „Despite their
different outlooks, Kinnock had amiable meetings with the US Defence Secretary,
Caspar Weinberger, and with President Reagan‟. 20 The Reagan Library record of
Kinnock‟s meeting with Reagan is largely redacted. Apart from diplomatic
pleasantries, Kinnock‟s expressions of respect for Reagan and that they both agreed
the dangers of a nuclear winter, most of the conversation is unavailable. 21 Kinnock‟s
letter of thanks to Reagan was typically in tune with diplomatic protocols. However,
it did point to a divergent worldviews and disagreement on policy issues between the
two men. Writing to Reagan, Kinnock explained,
19
Westlake, Kinnock, 370-72. See also: Tim Lister and Bruce George, „Labour and Mr Reagan: A
World Apart,‟ Small Wars & Insurgencies, 1:1 (April 1990), 15-22.
20
Westlake, Kinnock, 372.
21
Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock,
February 22, 1984, NSA, ASST to the President For: records Chron. File, Box 2, 8401336, Ronald
Reagan Library.
9
It was encouraging to find out that, despite our different perspectives, we were
able to move so rapidly to a full discussion of the most serious issues which
confront humanity today, and to find a common understanding that, in your
own words, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought … As I
indicated to you during our discussions, the different views we take of many
issues should not and do not in any way lessen my commitment, and that of
my colleagues, to the Alliance between our two countries and the values
which I attach to developing an even closer bond of understanding and
friendship between us. For that reason I welcomed the opportunity of our
discussion and the comprehension which can grow from such exchanges. 22
When interviewed for this research, Lord Kinnock recalled that he discussed with
Reagan the value and limitations of deterrence in what had been a constructive and
friendly meeting. Reagan argued that the United States was able to use the Bomb
against Japan to end the Second World War only because the United States possessed
the capability to do so. Kinnock argued that if the Nazi or Japanese regimes had the
Bomb, they would have used it by the very nature of their regimes. Although
Kinnock accepted that the United States would not wish to use the Bomb again, and
argued that the Soviet Union would also adhere to the principle of deterrence, the
problem would lie with regimes that were desperate, paranoid and psychotic.
Kinnock and Reagan agreed to differ but resolved to work for their mutual and
ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament.23 In contrast to the political fallout that
22
Letter, Kinnock to Reagan, 24 February 1984, United Kingdom-1984-02/21/1984-03/05/1984, Box
90549, Peter R. Sommer File, Ronald Reagan Library.
23
Interview with Lord Kinnock.
10
followed Kinnock‟s later meeting with Reagan in 1987, the 1984 meeting was
reported as a diplomatic and cordial affair. For instance, Michael Getler, writing for
The Washington Post, explained that, „U.S. officials said that they were “pleasantly
surprised” that the Oval Office meeting went well. Both men immediately expressed
their differences, “but without rancor,” one official said, in a conversation that quickly
turned philosophical over the question of nuclear deterrence‟. 24 Nevertheless,
Kinnock would not have endeared himself to supporters of Reagan or Thatcher, nor
would he have wanted to. In a thinly veiled criticism of the two leaders in a speech to
America‟s National Press Club, Kinnock had pointed to their support for trade unions
as long as their action was in Poland and not Britain or America. 25
In Britain, reports of Kinnock‟s visit to America were dominated by his
meeting with George Shultz, the US Secretary of State. Westlake describes the
meeting as „candid and spirited, but not exceptional. What gave notoriety to the
meeting were Kinnock‟s comments to waiting journalists‟. 26 Kinnock recalled that
the meeting was very polite and successful in regards to him clarifying his opposition
to the Soviet Union and Communism, although this atmosphere changed during the
discussion about American policy in Nicaragua in support of the Contras.27
24
Michael Getler, „Labor Party Leader Tangles With Shultz Over U.S. Policies,‟ The Washington Post,
Wednesday 15 February 1984, A21.
25
Nicholas Ashford, „Kinnock upsets Shultz calm,‟ The Times, Wednesday 15 February 1984, 1. This
is a reference to the Polish Trade Union „Solidarity‟, or the Independent Self-governing Trade Union,
which led the opposing anti-communist coalition after 1980. See, for instance, Timothy Garton, The
Polish Revolution: Solidarity (London, 1999).
26
Westlake, Kinnock, 373.
27
Interview with Lord Kinnock, House of Lords, 9 November 2010.
11
Kinnock‟s criticism of the Reagan administration‟s policy towards Central America
was much to Shultz‟s frustration and puzzlement. Shultz told Kinnock: „We think
you are misguided and perhaps not well-informed in your comments on Latin
America and bases in Europe. I wanted to say that … Nothing you say changes my
mind‟. 28 Afterwards, Kinnock infamously described Shultz as having „got out of his
pram‟ in reaction to his position; a phrase which, Kinnock claimed, was a Welsh
expression. The British right-wing press jumped on this remark as evidence of
Kinnock‟s lack of qualifications to become prime minister. The Daily Express argued
that whilst „we in Britain‟ were reconciled to the „appalling prospect‟ of Kinnock as
„a potential Prime Minister and a potential leader of America‟s closest ally‟, it was
only after Kinnock had „blundered his way around Washington‟ that Americans could
„grasp the implications of Kinnock in Downing Street‟. The Express sympathised
with Shultz – „known and respected around the world for his achievements‟ – who
described Kinnock‟s views on Central America as „misinformed and misguided‟ (yet
according to the Labour leader had „got out of his pram‟ during their discussion).
Commenting on Shultz‟s description of Kinnock‟s understanding of Central America,
the Express gleefully claimed that „No Opposition Leader visiting the United States
has ever provoked such humiliating comment‟ and that Kinnock clearly had „much to
learn‟.29
28
Notes of a meeting between Rt Hon Neil Kinnock MP and Secretary George Schulz (sic.), Monday
13 February 1984, Neil Kinnock Papers, KNNK 19/2/4, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College,
Cambridge.
29
Express Opinion, „Kinnock in Blunderland,‟ The Daily Express, Wednesday 15 February 1984, 8.
12
The Daily Telegraph exploited the incident with Shultz to portray Kinnock as
a dangerous political amateur and a liability in international affairs. The Telegraph‟s
tones were much more sedate than those of the Daily Express, observing that,
Mr Kinnock is right to argue that allies should discuss their differences
frankly. He presents his case, too, with engaging charms. But he exudes a
breezing self-confidence on matters like Central America, where he is still a
beginner. This, coupled with his Left radicalism, has apparently alarmed even
those American leaders who have liked him personally.
Furthermore, the Telegraph‟s editorial comment preferred to focus on the Americans‟
pragmatic perspective that Kinnock had „little prospect for office‟.30 In contrast,
reports in The Guardian unsurprisingly sought to defend Kinnock and detract
attention from his public spat with Shultz. According to Alex Brummer, Kinnock
explained the phrase „got out of his pram‟ as being a „departure from normally calm
diplomatic expression‟ following his professed concern for American policy in
Nicaragua. 31 However, even The Guardian could not help but be mischievous. In
another Guardian report, John Ezard actually contacted the Welsh Language
Department at University College Cardiff (UCC) about the phrase, to find that
academics at UCC argued that the phrase was not Welsh and therefore it could only
30
Editorial comment, The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 15 February 1984, 20. See also: Nicholas
Comfort, „Shultz is “out of his pram” says Kinnock, The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 15 February
1984, 4.
31
Alex Brummer, „Kinnock sympathetic to US nuclear build-down plan,‟ The Guardian, Wednesday
15 February 1984, 6.
13
be attributed to an eccentricity of Kinnock‟s own vocabulary. 32 It was clear even in
Kinnock‟s first full year as leader of the opposition that much of the British press
were determined to avoid discussing the substance of Kinnock‟s transatlantic
expeditions, preferring to focus on incidents and issues which developed a narrative
that he was simply not a credible candidate for prime minister. On this occasion, it
was Kinnock‟s meeting with Shultz that provided a case in a point.
Kinnock visits the United States in 1987
The purpose of Kinnock‟s visit to the United States in 1987 was much like
that of the 1984 visit. The major difference was that in 1984 Kinnock was in his first
year as leader of the opposition, but on this occasion he was aiming to win the
imminent general election and become prime minister. Kinnock hoped that meeting
Reagan prior to the anticipated 1987 general election would allow him to be seen as a
credible leader and a statesman both at home on the world stage. The Reagan
administration understood how important the meeting was to Kinnock. Briefing the
president, Shultz explained that Kinnock had met with members of Congress towards
the end of 1986, but enjoyed almost no support for his defence policies – even
amongst liberal Democrats. Since then, Kinnock had revised his position on the
stationing of US cruise missiles in Britain: that they could remain on the condition of
INF negotiations with the Soviet Union. 33 To that end, the administration understood
32
John Ezard, „Kinnock pushes pram too far for words,‟ The Guardian, Wednesday 15 February 1984,
1.
33
Memorandum, George P. Shultz to Ronald Reagan, March 24, 1987, 467199, C0167, WHORM:
Subject Files, Ronald Reagan Library.
14
that Kinnock wanted to be viewed as a „serious figure in international affairs‟ who
would be „a good ally and a participant in the arms control process‟. It was noted that
Kinnock was keen to demonstrate that even Reagan shared his „abhorrence of nuclear
weapons‟ and that Labour policies were therefore „not that far‟ from those advocated
in the White House.34 However, the visits would not have the desired impact on the
polls. Following the 1986 visit, Labour‟s private polling shows that public opinion
had turned against the party‟s message that a strong defence could be concurrent to
unilateral nuclear disarmament. Reagan‟s behaviour in March 1987 would help
ensure that the issue remained at the forefront of British political debate. 35
Charles Clarke, who served as Kinnock‟s Chief-of-Staff, recalled that the
purposes of the visit were: to establish a dialogue and demonstrate Labour‟s ability to
work with the Reagan administration and other senior political figures; to look at
actual policy frameworks (for instance nuclear disarmament), and to emphasise the
positives, for instance by beginning his visit in Atlanta, Georgia, where Kinnock and
his team could examine how effectively the Americans had addressed „race issues‟. 36
In anticipation of Kinnock‟s meeting with Reagan in March 1987, Michael Cassell,
political correspondent for the Financial Times, commented that Kinnock sought „to
spell out the details of Labour‟s controversial non-nuclear defence policy and to
34
Ibid.
35
David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin‟s
Press, 1988), 69. Aside from „rogue‟ polls, the Conservatives enjoyed a healthy lead during the 1987
general election campaign and defence continued to be a serious problem for Labour‟s claims to be a
credible alternative government. See: Butler and Kavanagh, General Election, 124-138.
36
Interview with Mr Charles Clarke, 6 December 2011.
15
underline the party‟s commitment to NATO‟.37 Kinnock‟s visit to Washington was
set to coincide with Thatcher‟s meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.
Cassell expected that the two meetings would be viewed „as attempts by the two party
leaders to enhance their international standing‟ in anticipation of a general election. 38
Kinnock recalled that he and his advisers knew that the visit could prove problematic,
due to the close relationship between the Conservative Party and the Republicans in
the White House, and that there was a risk that he could be „set up‟. However,
Kinnock opted to visit the White House, in view of the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev
(as the reforming General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and
the 1986 Reykjavik Summit (where the Super Powers discussed arms control). If
Kinnock did not visit the United States he feared being misrepresented as not
supporting the diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union to ease Cold War tensions
and, similarly, that he would be viewed as not being serious about developing a
positive relationship with the United States – regardless of the political affiliation of
the White House.39
Kinnock was not just Thatcher‟s electoral opponent: the Labour leader
fundamentally disagreed with US foreign policy and Reagan‟s wider philosophy. In
anticipation of Reagan‟s meeting with Kinnock, Frank C. Carlucci, the National
Security Adviser, briefed the President. 40 The purpose of the briefing was to
37
Michael Cassell, „Kinnock To Spell Out Non-Nuclear Defence Strategy To Reagan,‟ Financial
Times, Wednesday 25 February 1987.
38
Ibid.
39
Interview with Lord Kinnock. (The 1986 Reykjavik Summit led to the 1987 INF Treaty.)
40
Memorandum, Frank C. Carlucci to Ronald Reagan, March 26, 1987, 464657, C0167, WHORM:
Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library.
16
emphasize the administration‟s opposition to Labour‟s anti-nuclear policies and to
emphasise that those policies could undermine the „special relationship with the UK‟.
Carlucci noted that Kinnock‟s visit coincided with „a time of intense political interest
in the UK‟ due to speculation that a general election would be called. Hence,
Kinnock had deliberately arranged to meet Reagan while Thatcher was visiting the
USSR. Kinnock hoped that a successful meeting with Reagan would demonstrate that
he could match Thatcher‟s importance on the international stage. In an attempt to
reassure the president, and reflecting on the potential unease on Reagan‟s part in
meeting Thatcher‟s principal opponent, Carlucci wrote: „You often meet with major
opposition leaders and Charlie Price [the US Ambassador to Britain] strongly urged
this meeting, so there is nothing extraordinary about your seeing Kinnock‟.
Moreover, Carlucci acknowledged the sensitive diplomatic situation while suggesting
that Reagan avoid doing anything to assist Kinnock politically. Carlucci briefed,
Kinnock will want to accentuate the positive, our objectives are different: we
want to make it clear that Labor‟s defense policies would adversely affect our
common security interests and severely strain US-UK relations. This needs to
be done firmly, but delicately, as it would strengthen Kinnock if we appeared
to be intervening in the UK domestic policies.41
Shultz reinforced this delicate warning to the president. He advised the president that
the objective of the meeting would be to „show an even-handed approach to the leader
of a major British party and deflect charges of favoritism and interference in the
41
Ibid.
17
approaching British election‟. 42 Furthermore, that the administration should:
„Demonstrate publicly our respect for the democratic process in the UK while
understanding our disagreement with a specific policy.‟43 The Reagan administration
was therefore clearly aware of the diplomatic protocols and political sensitivities, well
in advance of Kinnock‟s meeting with the president.
Despite the political situation, the White House did express their distrust of
key Labour foreign policies. Therefore, unfortunately for Kinnock, his meeting with
Reagan led to public disagreement with the president over defence policy, which in
turn was viewed as an endorsement for Thatcher‟s re-election. Geoffrey Smith
observed,
The venture was probably doomed from the beginning. There was little
chance of persuading American opinion in the spring of 1987 of the credibility
of Labour defence policy. Nor was there the slightest prospect of the
President allowing Margaret Thatcher‟s principal opponent to derive a little
favourable publicity from a visit to the White House with a British general
election in the offing.44
Martin Westlake agrees, arguing, „the love affair between Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher was at its height and it was inconceivable that the American
42
Memorandum, George P. Shultz to Ronald Reagan, March 24, 1987, 467199, C0167, WHORM:
Subject Files, Ronald Reagan Library.
43
Ibid.
44
Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, 228.
18
President would want to do anything to boost Kinnock‟s General Election chances‟. 45
According to Labour‟s minutes of the meeting, Reagan made clear his concerns about
Labour‟s policies at the beginning of the meeting, although he stressed that he would
not want to interfere with the British political process:
I have to tell you that there is a lot of concern here at the prospect of a Labour
Party victory at the next election in Britain, and worry about what they would
mean for NATO and for our defences …I want to make it clear that I don‟t
want to interfere in internal political matters in your country. But I do believe
that the progress that has been made is based upon our realism and strength.46
A Reagan administration memorandum for Marlin Fitzwater, the White House
spokesman, stated that discussions between Kinnock and Reagan „though brief, were
friendly and useful‟. Reagan had „made clear to Mr. Kinnock the very serious
concern with which the United States views the Labor Party‟s proposals for unilateral
nuclear disarmament‟.47 However, it was stressed that: „The meeting represents the
continuing desire of the administration to discuss these differences, as well as the
broad range of issues on which the United Sates and Britain have important mutual
interests with British political leaders‟. 48 In his press briefing, Fitzwater echoed the
mantra that the meeting had been „polite and businesslike‟, and added that Reagan
45
Westlake, Kinnock, 382.
46
Notes of meeting between President Reagan and Neil Kinnock, March 27 1987, KNNK 19/2/43.
47
Memo for Marlin Fitzwater, „Kinnock call on the President: Schedule and Press Queries‟, 27 March
1987, Neil Kinnock – British Labor Leader (1 of 2) 03/27/1987, Box 90912, Coordination Office,
NSC: Records, Reagan Library.
48
Ibid.
19
had „made it clear that he had no intention of intervening in Britain‟s domestic affairs,
but he said we disagree with Labour‟s defence policy‟. 49 In contrast, Kinnock
described the meeting as being „very friendly … useful and constructive.‟ 50
The meeting proved to be a public relations disaster and the Labour Party was
furious with both Reagan‟s attitude and how the meeting was presented by his
administration. It is here that the principle narrative strands converge: what Kinnock
sought to achieve in his visit and how the White House received him, compared to the
British press‟ response – albeit prompted by Fitzwater (a discussion of his briefing is
below alongside Clarke‟s rebuttal). Reagan‟s independence of action – which was
pro-Thatcher and inappropriate – was in contrast to the impartiality urged by his
advisers. George Gordon reported in the Daily Mail that the White House‟s statement
„flatly denied Labour‟s convivial and cosy version of the meeting in the Oval
Office‟. 51 Writing for the Daily Express, Robert Gibson argued that Kinnock was „on
the receiving end of the fiercest dressing down Ronald Reagan has ever given a
leading politician from a friendly power‟. 52 The Daily Telegraph reported that
Reagan had explained to Kinnock that Labour‟s defence policy would undercut the
American position at the upcoming Geneva arms control talks. 53 The Guardian was
sympathetic to Kinnock. In his report, Michael White suggested that Kinnock had
49
Washington Staff, „Kinnock given US warning,‟ The Daily Telegraph, Saturday 28 March 1987, 1.
50
Ibid.
51
George Gordon, „Reagan takes his revenge on Kinnock,‟ Daily Mail, Saturday 28 March 1987, 2.
52
Robert Gibson, „Angry Reagan flays Kinnock,‟ Daily Express, Saturday 28 March 1987, 1.
53
Washington Staff, „Kinnock given US warning,‟ The Daily Telegraph, Saturday 28 March 1987, 1.
20
enjoyed a polite hearing.54 However, White did note that despite requests for access
to the Oval Office from major opposition politicians in allied countries normally
being granted, „there was apparently some official discussion of the pros and cons of
turning Mr Kinnock down before yesterday‟s meeting‟. 55
Labour claimed that the Reagan administration had deliberately sought to
embarrass Kinnock in an attempt to support Thatcher in the forthcoming general
election. In doing so, what Shultz and Carlucci had wanted to avoid actually
happened. According to Philip Webster, The Times’ Chief Political Correspondent,
Denis Healey accused Reagan‟s advisers „of acting to help Mrs Thatcher‟s election
chances by their behaviour after the encounter‟ between Kinnock and Reagan. 56
Likewise, writing for The Sunday Telegraph, David Blundy reported that sources
within the Reagan administration had said that Kinnock had walked into a trap:
„President Reagan is deeply concerned about Labour‟s defence policy and he is a
close friend and supporter of Mrs Thatcher. With an election looming I know that he
would do all that he could to support Mrs Thatcher‟. 57 Whilst such a sympathetic – or
pitying – comment towards Kinnock‟s fate is unexpected from The Sunday
Telegraph, the claim that Reagan was so determined to assist Thatcher would be most
welcome to its typically Tory readership. Webster noted that Healey and Denzil
54
Michael White, „Kinnock‟s defence message gets polite hearing at the White House,‟ The Guardian,
Saturday 28 March 1987, 1.
55
Michael White, „Polite hearing for the Kinnock message,‟ The Guardian, Saturday 28 March 1987,
30.
56
Philip Webster, „Kinnock fights back as US split deepens,‟ The Times, Monday 30 March 1987.
57
David Blundy, „Kinnock walked into a White House trap,‟ The Sunday Telegraph, Sunday 29 March
1987, 6.
21
Davies, Labour‟s Defence spokesman, had subsequently „stepped up the personal
attacks‟ on Reagan in an effort to „repair the damage‟ caused by Reagan‟s „rejection
of Labour‟s non-nuclear policy as a threat to the unity of NATO‟.58 Simon Hoggart,
writing in The Observer, summarised the concerns that the Labour delegation had
been deliberately undermined by the Reagan-Thatcher partnership:
Neil Kinnock and Denis Healey arrived back in London yesterday morning,
resentful, if resigned, over what they believe was a joint attempt by Mrs
Thatcher and President Reagan to wreck their visit to Washington.
They weren‟t whingeing about it. They‟d have been crazy to expect anything
else. The two men attended a meeting with President Reagan on Friday which
may have been the first encounter in the Oval Office ever designed entirely for
British consumption – at least since the Brits burned the place down in the
War of 1812.59
There was therefore a real sense that the entire meeting had been staged and
orchestrated in an attempt for the British press to harm Kinnock‟s electoral chances.
Hoggart continued, noting the White House‟s dilemma about the meeting:
When first asked last year, the White House even pondered briefly whether to
refuse a meeting – though that would have been tremendously offensive.
However, there was no way in which Reagan was going to help Kinnock‟s
chances against his friend and soul-mate Margaret Thatcher. And the Labour
58
Webster, „Kinnock fights back as US split deepens.‟
59
Simon Hoggart, „Charade in the White House,‟ The Observer, Sunday 29 March 1987, 11.
22
group believes they suffered from several small but cumulative dirty tricks –
ending with a White House misrepresentation of the meeting. 60
Labour Party officials and Fitzwater offered differing accounts of the meeting
between Kinnock and Reagan. Labour noted that Fitzwater was not even at the
meeting, and, in contrast to his report, argued that Kinnock „did not … raise the issue
of his unilateral nuclear disarmament policy, that the President did not state Labour‟s
policy would undercut the American position at the Geneva arms talks‟ and Mr
Fitzwater „had underestimated by almost a third the duration of the meeting when he
said that it had taken 20 minutes‟.61 Webster repeated the claim Healey had made in a
BBC interview that Reagan had mistaken him for British Ambassador Sir Antony
Acland and had used cue cards for his discussions with Kinnock.62 Davies reportedly
suggested that „perhaps half an hour was too long for Reagan from what Dennis
Healey was saying‟. 63 A Guardian leader expressed the wider difficulties that
Kinnock faced. The divergent political views of Kinnock and Reagan, alongside the
relationship between Reagan and Thatcher, poor opinion polls, the determination of
some newspapers to criticise him, and Thatcher‟s visit to Moscow, all ensured that
Kinnock had „a rotten hand to play‟. 64
Charles Clarke, Kinnock‟s Chief-of-Staff, still believes that the Reagan
administration distorted the president‟s meeting with Kinnock in order to portray the
60
Ibid.
61
Webster, „Kinnock fights back as US split deepens.‟
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Leader, „Kinnock wins some tricks with a bad hand,‟ The Guardian, Monday 30 March 1987, 16.
23
Labour leader in a negative light. Just as Reagan‟s aides had wished to prevent
accusations of partiality and political skulduggery, Kinnock‟s advisers sought to
defend the Labour leader. Clarke wrote a formal letter to the Reagan administration
„following Mr Kinnock‟s meeting with the President last Friday, to express our
concern at the way in which this meeting was briefed by the White House Press
Officer. I will not need to tell you the harm done by the misrepresentation of the
meeting or of our disappointment and resentment at the misreporting‟. 65 That Clarke
reviewed the White House‟s official statement line-by-line demonstrates how
seriously the Labour Party had taken the events. Clarke argued that the official White
House statement was inaccurate in describing the meeting as lasting „approximately
twenty minutes‟. He explained that „20 minutes‟ was „of interest in relation to
previous anonymous briefings to the British Press attributed to the White House‟ and
crucially „contrasts with our earlier expectations of at least half an hour, and with the
fact – which was that the meeting lasted a couple of minutes less than half an hour‟.
Clarke agreed that the meeting was „polite and businesslike‟ but added the caveat that
if „this is White House code for “chilly”, as some newspapers have reported, then that
would not represent the true nature of the discussions‟. It was agreed that both
Kinnock and Reagan „emphasised a long and friendly relationship between the United
States and Great Britain‟. However, it was „untrue‟ that the Labour leader „raised
Labour‟s proposal for unilateral nuclear disarmament‟ and that Kinnock was only
responding to Reagan‟s comments about disarmament and that „unilateral‟ was never
mentioned in the discussion. Similarly, Kinnock only raised the importance of
building up conventional forces in response to Reagan. Clarke agreed that Reagan
65
Letter, Charles Clarke to Ray (surname unknown), March 31 1987, KNNK 19/2/38. (Subsquent
quotations are taken from this source.)
24
„made clear that he had no intention of intervening in Britain‟s domestic affairs‟, but
that he never disagreed with Labour‟s policy for defence. According to Clarke,
Reagan „did state that there was “concern” at the defence implications of Labour‟s
policy, but the most that could be said was that the disagreement – which is of course
common knowledge – was implied. It was never stated.‟ Likewise, Clarke stressed
that although Reagan did express „concern‟ about Labour‟s defence policy, he never
explicitly claimed that „Kinnock‟s proposal would have a strong effect on NATO‟, or
that it would have an impact „on East-West relations‟ or „would undercut our
negotiating position in Geneva‟. According to Clarke, the closest Reagan actually
„got to anything which could be interpreted in that way was his statement that any
“lack of resolve” in NATO would hinder progress towards arms reductions. He never
stated, or even implied, that Labour‟s policies represented that kind of “lack of
resolve”‟. In fact, „Kinnock said that he agreed that any real or apparent “lack of
resolve” would be weakening, and went on to say that he considered that the public
demonstration of that resolve must be clearly related to the conventional effectiveness
of our defences‟. Clarke notes that Reagan did opine „that firmness and solidarity in
NATO is important‟ and „that he believed strongly in the Strategic Defence Initiative‟
as it „moved the Soviets to the bargaining table and strengthens our hand on INF‟, and
agreed that Kinnock „said that he is hopeful on INF talks‟. But Clarke stresses the
importance of context. According to the White House, Reagan‟s concluding remarks
were that „We must be prepared, unlike we were before World War Two. We cannot
let that happen again‟. Clarke argues that while this „reported speech is inaccurate …
it does not unfairly reflect the President‟s closing remarks.‟ For Clarke,
25
In fact the President‟s remarks immediately followed his assertion –
unreported in the White House briefing – that it was necessary to seek the total
elimination of all nuclear weapons, since they were “immoral and
uncivilised”, and the discussion which followed that assertion upon the need
to close the conventional gap with the Soviets. That was the context of the
President‟s remarks about World War Two not – as reported – the need for
stronger nuclear forces.
Commenting on these „inaccuracies‟, Clarke believes that they „took on
importance because of the way in which the Press chose to report them, but also
because of various allegations about the guidance that the White House had
apparently given to selected correspondents both before and after the meeting‟.
Clarke reminded the Reagan administration that Kinnock had given his own press
conference an hour after meeting Reagan and his statement, and answers to questions,
were based on Clarke‟s detailed notes from the meeting. Interestingly, Clarke used
Kinnock‟s press conference as a means to further critique the White House‟s account
of the meeting:
Of course, if the President had decided to take the opportunity to make a direct
and open attack upon Labour‟s defence policy Mr Kinnock would have
responded in the same tone and our own press briefing would have reflected
that. And though the subsequent reports would, necessarily, have been of
major disagreement, no one could or would have been accused of duplicity.
26
In his letter, Clarke suggests that arrangements for the meeting had been haphazard.
Given that both teams had been „well aware of the possible pitfalls of the meeting
between President Reagan and Mr Kinnock‟, the Labour team met with Rozanne
Ridgeway (Assistant Secretary of State), whom they believed to be an authorised
representative of the administration, in advance to discuss „some of these procedural
matters‟. However, it soon emerged from conservation with other administration
staff, namely Peter Summer,66 that Ridgeway was not authorised to guarantee any
plans for the meeting.
According to Clarke, the outcome of these confused discussions was a „whole
sequence of events‟ that „has been extremely damaging as it obviously gives rise to
the charge that, in the handling of this meeting, the White House was less concerned
about building reasonable working relations between democratic parties within
NATO than in promoting political support for its close ideological friends‟. 67 Clarke
was clearly expressing his frustration in the most diplomatic language possible. But
he was much more direct as to the consequences of the White House press statement
for Kinnock:
These inaccuracies took on importance because of the way in which the press
chose to report them, but also because of various allegations about the
guidance that the White House had given to selected correspondence [sic] both
before and after the meeting …The immediate consequences of these differing
accounts was that the main news story was of total conflict and bad feeling.
66
(Presumably Peter Sommer, a member of Reagan‟s team, as referenced below.)
67
Ibid.
27
Indeed certain British journalists came to the conclusion that Mr. Kinnock had
been deliberately misleading – which I am sure you will agree is a very
damaging charge.68
Similarly, he was far more accusatory in terms of the White House‟s behaviour and
the over-ruling of Ridgeway‟s involvement in the preparation of the meeting:
She … had no role in relation to the questions we had discussed earlier in the
week, but that they were matters for the White House.
This history of events inevitably gives rise to the suspicion that the White
House has totally overridden the State Department and your Embassy in
London on these matters.69
Labour believed that Kinnock had been victim to a political plot involving the
Conservative Party, the White House, and the Conservative supporting press.
Whether the management of the White House would have been effectively organised
to embark on such a venture is open to debate. For instance, Reagan‟s second term
was defined by the Iran-Contra scandal. The second term difficulties were arguably
due to the incompetency of Donald T. Regan, who succeeded the highly effective
James Baker as Chief-of-Staff, and Kinnock‟s 1987 visit was shortly after Regan‟s
resignation. 70
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Pfiffner, „The President‟s Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned,‟ 87.
28
Kinnock still strongly suspects that sources at Conservative Central Office
were responsible for the incident and that antagonistic journalists in the British press
were inevitably enthusiastic to report that the meeting had been a disaster for him
personally. According to Kinnock, the Reagan administration had nothing to gain
from deliberately undermining an Opposition Leader who was six to seven points
behind in the polls at the time and, moreover, the meeting had not been unfriendly but
constructive. He believes that Conservative Party aides had essentially set up the
White House statement in advance. 71 Clarke agrees with Kinnock that they had been
victims of Reagan‟s decision to engage in „political theatre‟ out of loyalty to
Thatcher. He recalled that Alastair Campbell, then working as a political reporter for
the Daily Mirror, told him that Downing Street political operatives had been involved
– although Clarke obviously could not be certain of this. 72 Other interviewees raised
points that further confuse the story. Lord Powell, who served as Thatcher‟s private
secretary, recalls that the government reacted „with pleasure‟ to Kinnock‟s
embarrassment at the White House. Yet Powell notes that Tory political forces could
not have been involved, as they did not participate in foreign policy. He explained
that the only person who could have made any such political request to the White
House was himself and, despite discussing Kinnock‟s meeting in advance with the US
Ambassador, it was simply unnecessary as Reagan would not have wanted the
meeting to be a success or substantial. Powell added that it would have been an
achievement by the US State Department to have even secured a meeting for Kinnock
with the president.73 Similarly, Sir Bernard Ingham, who served as Thatcher‟s press
71
Interview with Lord Kinnock.
72
Interview with Mr Charles Clarke.
73
Interview with Lord Powell, 20 June 2012.
29
secretary, would have been „surprised if Reagan got involved‟ as it was an iron rule
that governments should not interfere with other countries‟ elections, plus it would
have risked severely damaging the reputation of anyone involved in doing so.
Instead, Ingham attributes the political fallout from Kinnock‟s meeting with Reagan
to poor preparation on the part of his team. 74 Lord Hurd, Home Secretary in 1987,
concurred with this view: it would have been too politically dangerous if such
political action leaked and that Kinnock must have suffered from poor advice. 75
There is no available evidence as to whether Labour‟s accusations of collusion
between the Conservatives and White House with the Tory press are true. Interviews
for this research are clearly divided along partisan concerns. However, it is clear
from available records of the meeting, and particularly his diary, that Reagan was
determined to criticise Kinnock, regardless of the concerns of his staff that he should
avoid political fallout. Similarly, the Conservative press were enthusiastic for any
opportunity to attack Kinnock. Indeed, a defining aspect of the general election
coverage of 1987 was extensive smearing of individual politicians. 76
The 1987 General Election
The White House certainly considered the potential political pitfalls of Reagan
appearing to intervene in order to ensure, or at least favour, a Conservative victory in
the 1987 general election. Aside from diplomatic protocol, the Reagan administration
74
Interview with Sir Bernard Ingham, 28 May 2012.
75
Interview with Lord Hurd, 20 June 2012.
76
Seymour-Ure, „The Media in Postwar British Politics,‟ 541.
30
was reluctant to add credence to the popular idea that Thatcher was beholden to her
„special relationship‟ with Reagan. Thatcher‟s close relationship with Reagan
attracted criticism and accusations of a one-sided relationship with America, with
Thatcher described as a „poodle‟ for the Reagan administration, a role which allegedly
prevented closer foreign policy relations between Britain and Europe.77 Therefore,
any attempt by Reagan to intervene in domestic affairs on behalf of Thatcher,
particularly during a general election, would have been counterproductive, as well as
inappropriate.
Controversy was first courted in February 1987 when the relationship between
Thatcher and Reagan prompted ITN news to seek a television coup in anticipation of
the 1987 general election. David Nicholas, Editor-in-Chief at ITN, approached
Ambassador Price about the possibility of a „unique broadcast in the event of a
Conservative win‟.78 Nicholas wanted Reagan, from the Oval Office, to congratulate
Thatcher, at 10 Downing Street, on a live national television broadcast following an
election success.79 The prospect of this broadcast concerned members of both the
Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Peter R. Sommer (a member of the National
Security Council staff) informed Grant S. Green (Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council) that members of the Reagan administration and Downing Street
77
For an excellent summary of Thatcher‟ relationship with Reagan in foreign affairs and the criticism,
which she received, see: John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher Volume Two: Iron Lady (London:
Vintage, 2008), 253-300.
78
Letter, David Nicholas (Editor-in-Chief, ITNL) to Mr Charles Price (Ambassador), February 16,
1987, United Kingdom Folder, Memos, Letters (3 of 10), Box 92082, Nelson Ledsky Files, Ronald
Reagan Library.
79
Ibid.
31
„thought this was a bad idea‟. 80 Indeed, the idea „suggested an arrogant presumption
about who would win an election that had not yet been called and, even if she won,
could easily have subjected Mrs. Thatcher to the old cry that she is America‟s
“poodle”.‟ Interestingly, Sommer noted that due to „Price‟s involvement and the
President‟s connection with Mrs. Thatcher, we begged off on grounds that any
decision would be premature, since an election had not been called‟. Sommer was
seemingly concerned that Reagan and Price would support the proposal.
Following the announcement of the general election, Sommer was worried
that the idea had resurfaced. He argued that in addition to „the same pitfalls‟, any
broadcast would conflict with Reagan‟s visits to Venice, Berlin and Bonn on 12 June
1987, which was to be „one of the most hectic days of the Reagan Presidency‟.
Despite this, Price was apparently „very persistent‟. Sommer wrote, „I defer to you
but you may wish to mention this “bad idea” to Mr. Carlucci and Gen. Powell‟. 81 ITN
clearly wanted to encapsulate the relationship between Thatcher and Reagan with
their exclusive broadcast, yet the Reagan administration sensibly rejected the
opportunity as it might undermine both Reagan‟s and Thatcher‟s positions. As such,
on this occasion, the president was not afforded the opportunity to act independently
from protocol-minded members of his staff. Thus, his advisers did not allow Reagan
to be so publicly impartial and pro-Thatcher on this occasion.
80
Memorandum, Peter R. Sommer to Grant S. Green, May 18, 1987, 514986, C0167, WHORM:
Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library. (General Colin Powell was serving as the National Security
Adviser.)
81
Ibid.
32
Even so, the president‟s advisers were unable to completely control the
situation. Reagan continued to be critical of Kinnock‟s policies and, again in breach
of diplomatic protocol, declared his support for Thatcher during the 1987 general
election. In The New York Times, Francis X. Clines reported how Reagan described
the unilateral nuclear disarmament policies advocated by Kinnock as „grievous
errors.‟82 Kinnock was reported to have even questioned whether the Conservatives
had „sought to mobilize the views of the President‟.83 Thatcher typically refuted the
suggestion as „totally and utterly untrue … We are free to say what we wish. We must
extend the same freedom to other people‟. 84 Karen DeYoung, in The Washington
Post, noted that earlier in the week, Reagan was quoted in The Independent (a British
broadsheet), discussing his admiration for Thatcher but added: „I know that I can't go
beyond that, because I'm not going to again intervene or express an opinion with
regard to your politics‟.85 The American Defence Secretary, Casper W. Weinberger,
was also quoted as claiming that Labour‟s policy „could lead to the unravelling of
NATO‟. 86 He also refused to elaborate on his views following Reagan‟ remarks as he
did not want to interfere in the general election. 87
82
Francis X. Clines, „Reagan Adds Furor to Race in Britain,‟ The New York Times, Friday 29 May
1987, Late City Final Edition, A11.
83
Ibid.
84
Karen DeYoung, „British Campaign Focuses on Reagan,‟ The Washington Post, Friday 29 May
1987, Final Edition, A27.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
33
Reagan‟s comments also garnered the attention of the British press.
According to The Guardian, wishing to avoid further embarrassment for Kinnock,
Reagan „gave only mild support‟ to Thatcher and „avoided any attack on Labour‟s
defence policies‟ during the interview with European correspondents. 88 Reagan was
quoted as assuring the reporters that the special relationship would continue
regardless of the election‟s outcome.89 In contrast to the Guardian‟s coverage, the
Daily Express was much more sensationalist: Paul Potts and Robert Gibson reported
how Reagan „gatecrashed‟ the 1987 general election and had essentially endorsed a
Conservative victory.90 Reagan‟s comments were clearly inappropriate. As Philip
Geyelin, writing in The Washington Post observed, they appeared „to violate accepted
norms of behaviour‟.91 Following Thatcher‟s general election victory in 1987,
journalists asked Reagan whether he was pleased with the result. Reagan replied:
„Now I can say it – Yes.‟92 Given Reagan‟s single-minded support for Thatcher and
opposition to Kinnock, regardless of protocol, it is perhaps understandable why some
members of his staff were reluctant to allow ITN‟s offer to reach the president‟s desk.
Conclusion
88
Alex Brummer and David Fairhall, „Reagan steers clear of British election,‟ The Guardian,
Wednesday 27 May 1987, 1.
89
Ibid.
90
Paul Potts and Robert Gibson, „Kinnock‟s grievous errors,‟ Daily Express, Thursday 28 May 1987,
1.
91
Philip Geyelin, „Everyone Listens to Thatcher,‟ The Washington Post, Sunday 17 May 1987, Final
Edition, C7.
92
News report, „Reagan ends his silence to lead tributes,‟ The Guardian, Saturday 13 June 1987, 4.
34
Although meetings between governments and visiting leaders of the
oppositions are essentially „courtesy calls‟ in accordance with diplomatic protocols,
they are inevitably politicised. They help to establish a party leader‟s domestic
political standing and to foster potential working relations before gaining power.
However, such meetings are further politicised by the broader political circumstances.
In 1984, Kinnock was accused in some quarters of being a national embarrassment,
while in 1987 he was ruthlessly and publicly snubbed by Reagan who clearly
favoured a continued working relationship with Thatcher. Foreign visits by
opposition leaders are therefore a potential instance of the overlapping of, and
connections between, domestic politics and foreign policy.
The actions of Reagan and Fitzwater were a clear sidelining of Carlucci and
Schultz – and diplomatic sensibilities briefly prevailed when Reagan was not afforded
the opportunity to congratulate Thatcher live on ITN news following her third general
election victory. Given the broader political circumstances, Kinnock‟s treatment by
the Reagan White House is therefore hardly surprising. On the other hand, what is
significant is that the coverage of Kinnock‟s visits to the United States in 1984 and, in
particular, 1987, demonstrates the importance that can be attached to such events and
meetings. In 1984, the Conservative supporting press used Kinnock‟s meeting with
Shultz to discredit the Labour leader. But it is in the apparent sabotaging of the 1987
visit, when three narratives intertwine and make what was, essentially, an
insignificant „courtesy call‟ meeting so explosive. Firstly, that Kinnock was trying to
enhance his image as leader of the opposition and potential prime minister. Secondly,
Reagan was placed in the position as a foreign statesman meeting with his principle
ally‟s political opponent and wanted to express his concerns about Labour defence
35
policies and support for Thatcher. Thirdly, how the event unfolded in practice when
the Conservative supporting press were briefed and decided to use the incident to
discredit Kinnock. These narratives revolved around the fact that Reagan was
actually interested in a relatively insignificant meeting with a British political leader
who, by his own admission, was unlikely to become prime minister. But his
independence of action prompted a news management battle between the Labour
Party, the British press and the White House. Both Kinnock and Reagan‟s respective
aides clearly hoped that the meeting would be impartial and not politically
troublesome. Yet Reagan‟s actions ensured that Kinnock had to be defended by his
aides, namely Clarke, and colleagues, such as Healey. The right-wing press‟ fierce
criticisms of Kinnock following his American expeditions were not unique – the
constant attacks on Kinnock and the Labour Party during the Thatcher epoch
undoubtedly contributed to their desire to master the „dark arts‟ of political spin as the
New Labour project unfolded.93 Kinnock‟s disastrous treatment by Reagan in 1987
was just further evidence as to why it was deemed necessary.
Total word count: 7,962 (excluding footnotes)
93
See, for instance: Nicholas Jones, The Control Freaks: how New Labour gets its own way (London:
Politico, 2001).
36