strategic asia 2006–07
trade,
interdependence,
and security
Edited by
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills
Country Studies
Rising China: The Search for Power and Plenty
Michael R. Chambers
restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the
use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of
use, please contact <[email protected]>. To purchase
the print volume in which this chapter appears please visit
<http://www.nbr.org> or contact <[email protected]>.
1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300
Seattle, Washington 98105 USA
206-632-7370
© the national bureau of asian research
executive summary
This chapter analyzes the growth of China’s trade and economic
interdependence with both its Asian neighbors and the United States and
assesses the impact these developments will have on China’s security and
the security of the Asia-Pacific region.
main argument:
China currently is engaged in a process of strategic economic development
that will enhance the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) comprehensive
national power. The purpose of this development is to enhance national
wealth, creating a reasonably prosperous China by 2020 and providing
the economic basis for China’s emergence as a regional and global great
power. Toward these ends, China has sought to develop webs of economic
interdependence with its regional neighbors. These connections are both
supporting the PRC’s economic development and linking these neighbors
to China in friendly and cooperative relations. China is also exhibiting
restraint and greater cooperation with its neighbors—behavior explained by
economic interdependence as well as Beijing’s own foreign policy strategy.
policy implications:
• The webs of interdependence, coupled with Beijing’s desire for regional
peace and stability, likely will constrain militaristic adventurism by the
Chinese around their periphery over the next five to ten years.
• Given the growth of economic interdependence between China and its
Asia-Pacific neighbors, several of these countries would be reluctant
to jeopardize the benefits of trade with the PRC in the event of SinoU.S. conflict over Taiwan. This reluctance will complicate U.S. military
operations in the event of such conflict.
• The U.S. and the international community should continue to encourage
China’s active participation in the global economy and multilateral
international institutions. Once China’s rise to great power status is
achieved, China’s interests may change from basic acceptance of the
international status quo to more revisionist goals. Engagement and
socialization today are the best hedge against a future revisionist China.
China
Rising China:
The Search for Power and Plenty
Michael R. Chambers
This chapter seeks to outline the current and future impact of China’s
growing trade and economic interdependence on the security both of China
and of the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter will seek to answer two basic
questions. First, how do growing trade and interdependence relate to and
impact China’s grand strategy as it is rising to great power status? Second,
will China’s increasing involvement with and integration into global trade
help to constrain China from military adventurism?
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is currently engaged in strategic
economic growth with the goal of becoming a moderately well-off society by
the year 2020 and providing the economic basis for China’s drive to become
a great power. Beijing sees not a mutually exclusive choice between wealth
and power but a close interrelationship between economic development and
security, with each dependent on the other. The key themes and arguments
of this chapter are threefold: First, China’s goal to become a great power is
based on the development of “comprehensive national power” that is rooted
in a strong and prosperous economy. Beijing is using foreign trade and
investment as key drivers for the development of its economy.
Second, China seeks to develop webs of interdependence with its
regional neighbors in order to link them to the PRC as well as to create a
buffer zone to help Beijing resist any hostile pressure from the United States.
China’s efforts to build interdependence also are intended to dampen Asian
Michael R. Chambers, Associate Professor of Political Science at Indiana State Univesity, is an editor of
Asian Security. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.
The author wishes to thank Brandy Jolliff, Shyam Kulkarni, Peter Mattis, and Evan Morrisey for research
assistance.
66 • Strategic Asia 2006–07
anxieties about the “China threat” as the PRC rises. These efforts appear to
be generally successful.
Finally, economic interdependence appears to be constraining China in
cooperative relations with its neighbors. Also at work, however, is Chinese
self-restraint—based on Beijing’s strategic desire for a peaceful and stable
regional security environment in which to pursue economic development.
Based on the analysis presented below, three main policy implications
both for the United States and for the international community become
evident. First, the webs of interdependence, coupled with Beijing’s desire for
regional peace and stability, will likely constrain militaristic adventurism by
the Chinese around their periphery over the next five to ten years.
Second, given the growth of economic interdependence between
China and its Asia-Pacific neighbors, several of these countries would be
reluctant to jeopardize the benefits of trade with the PRC in the event of
Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan. This reluctance will complicate U.S. military
operations in the event of such conflict.
Finally, the United States and the international community should
continue to encourage China’s active participation in the global economy
and multilateral international institutions. Once China’s rise to great power
status is achieved, the PRC’s interests may change from basic acceptance
of the international status quo to more revisionist goals. Engagement and
socialization today are the best hedge against a future revisionist China.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section reviews the grand
strategy guiding China’s rise and examines the importance of international
trade and foreign investment for China’s economic development. The
section that follows examines the extent of economic interdependence
in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors and major trade partners. A
third section considers security implications of this interdependence, and a
conclusion offers policy implications.
Grand Strategy, Trade, and Economic Interdependence
Ever since Chairman Mao Zedong’s announcement on October 1, 1949
that the Chinese people had finally “stood up,” the Chinese leadership has
sought to return China to its position of traditional international and regional
status. During the Maoist era (1949–76), China made some progress toward
this goal (e.g., the development of nuclear weapons). Nevertheless, many
of the radical political and economic policies of Mao thwarted Beijing’s
efforts. Not until the late 1970s, with the rise of pragmatic reformers under
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, did the PRC finally set the country on the
path to sustained economic modernization and development. Averaging
Chambers – China • 67
9% annual economic growth since the reforms of 1978, China has set the
stage for its rise to great power status. Deng and the pragmatic reformers
understood that economic modernization and development would need to
be the basis for growth of China’s comprehensive national power and that
the PRC would need to open up to the international economy—including
international trade and foreign investment—in order to help spur continued
economic development.
Grand Strategy with “Chinese Characteristics”
China’s long-term strategic goal—to become a great power in the AsiaPacific region and beyond—is guiding China’s overall foreign policy. To
achieve this goal, the PRC needs to develop its “comprehensive national
power” or “overall national strength,” which includes economic, political,
and military components. This is a long-term plan that will require a few
decades to achieve, based as it is on the modernization and development
of China’s economy. Beijing is also adopting a gradual approach so as not
to unduly antagonize other great powers, especially the United States; the
Chinese recognize the current international structure of U.S. unipolarity
and do not want to provoke counterbalancing actions to China’s, rise either
by the United States or by any Asian neighbors.
Emphasizing China’s goal of rising to great power status is not to deny
the importance of the more basic priorities of maintaining regime security
and preserving the territorial integrity of the PRC. These remain critical
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, and Beijing perceives
that the longer-term goal of great powerdom cannot be achieved without
There is some debate among analysts of Chinese foreign relations as to the existence of a Chinese
grand strategy. Thomas Christensen has argued that China lacks a unified grand strategic plan to
bind together the PRC’s economic, security, and foreign policy objectives, while Avery Goldstein,
Michael Swaine, and Ashley Tellis admit the lack of an explicit strategy but see a de facto grand
strategy both accepted by the Chinese leadership and guiding their policies. There is also some
debate over the relative weighting of the Communist Party leadership’s emphasis on maintaining
regime security, domestic stability, and national unity versus the CCP’s drive for influence and
great power status at the regional and global levels. See Thomas J. Christensen, “China,” in Strategic
Asia 2001–2002: Power and Purpose, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 27–69; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s
Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Michael
D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa
Monica: Project Air Force and RAND, 2000).
For a discussion of this Chinese wariness, see Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, especially pages
130–35, and chapter 7; and Wang Jisi, “China’s Changing Role in Asia” (occasional paper of the
Atlantic Council of the U.S., January 2004).