METAPHYSICS
PARTICULARS – BARE SUBSTRATA
LECTURE
PROFESSOR JULIE YOO
Arguments for Bare Substrata
Argument from Individuation
Argument from Identity Through Change
Argument from Reification
Allaire’s Argument
An Issue With Predication
Challenges to the Idea of Bare Substrata
Objection from Inconsistency
Objection from Unknowability
Objection from Absurdity
Objection from Modal Insensitivity
Objection from Improper Relationality
Spatiotemporal Points – A Better Substratum?
Spatiotemporal Points As Substrata
Argument from Motion
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ARGUMENTS FOR BARE SUBSTRATA
Argument from Individuation
The kind of properties we are dealing with in this argument are universals – things that are selfidentical across distinct instantiations.
1. It is possible for two particulars to have all of their properties in
common.
2. If (1), then there is something that individuates the two particulars.
3. Relations cannot individuate particulars.
4. If (3), then there are substrata.
5. Therefore, there are substrata.
The kind of relations that are relevant here are relations to spatio-temporal points, as well as relations
to observers. This argument, however, presupposes a false dilemma in (4), because it assumes that
only bare substrata can perform the job of individuating. But this has not been demonstrated; for all
we know, the Bundle Theory and its appeal to compresence can account of individuation.
Argument from Identity Through Change
This argument is addressing situations where an individual goes from having an intrinsic property to
losing it (or gaining another property incompatible with the first). We are dealing, in other words,
with genuine change, not Cambridge change.
1. There is genuine change only if it is possible for objects to survive
change.
2. Objects survive change only if there are bare substrata.
3. There is genuine change.
4. Therefore, there are bare substrata.
The postulation of a substratum s certainly gives us a way to account for how something a can have a
property F at one time and lose it at another, and still remain numerically the same individual a,
because s is the thing that maintains a’s existential integrity over change. As long as s is still there, a
is in existence. Now, we have to recognize that certain of a’s properties are going to have greater
significance than others – being a piece of fruit, for instance, is more significant than being red, as far
as the existence of the apple is concerned. We will deal with this when we get to the “Objection from
Modal Insensitivity.”
Argument from Reification
This argument is targeted against the Bundle Theory, which treats properties as “constituents” of the
individuals, as so many sticks in a bundle, or sheep in a herd, or lumps of clay shaped into a figure.
1. If there are no bare substrata, then we will have to treat the
properties of an individual as parts of the individual.
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2. We cannot treat the properties of an individual as parts of the
individual.
3. Therefore, there are bare substrata.
This argument makes a principled distinction between the idea of being a feature of an object and
being a part of an object. An apple’s being red, and the bottom half of an apple are two ontologically
distinct things. Specifically, being red cannot exist in its own right. It requires the existence of
something which can take on a shade of color – a substratum. The bottom have of an apple, on the
other hand, can have such independent existence. We therefore cannot treat colors as if they were
objects like the bottom half of an apple; that would be a category mistake.
The question, though, is whether (1) is true. Often, Bundle Theorists talk in this way. They say that
what distinguishes BT from the Substratum Theory is that, under BT, properties are not instantiated;
rather, they are mereological fusions of its properties (see Sider: 387). And this is a strange way of
talking, for properties are not “objects” or “things” the way constituents are, but rather qualities of
objects or things. It seems open to the Bundle Theorist to argue that properties are not literally
constituents; properties only need to be compresently instantiated, where none of this implies that
they are anything like constituents.
Allaire’s Argument
Allaire takes on the BT directly in his argument for substrata. He is clearly assuming that we only
have two choices: BT and Substratum theory. Premise (1) of the argument below reflects this. It
clearly disregards a third option, namely, Aristotle’s primary substances. But we will put this issue
aside for now.
1. If BT is not adequate, then there are bare substrata.
2. BT is not adequate.
3. There are bare substrata.
Premise (2) is what requires support. The properties of a bundle can be construed either as a bundle of
universals or as a bundle of tropes. Tropes are by nature particularized. Universals are multiply
instantiable. This difference gives rise to very different accounts of the nature of a bundle, and for that
reason, fall prey to different problems.
2a. BT is adequate only if it can account for difference and
identity.
2b. BT cannot account for difference and identity.
2c. BT is not adequate.
In this argument, it is Premise (2b) that requires support. Allaire asks us to consider two exactly
similar discs, a and b. Regarding difference, Allaire means their numeric difference. Regarding
identity, Allaire means the qualitative sameness of their features. What we need, though, is an
argument for Premise (3b). It appears that the following what Allaire has to offer us:
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2b i.
BT can be only formulated using only universals or only
tropes.
2b ii. Formulated in terms of universals, BT cannot account for
(numeric) difference.
2b iii. Formulated in terms of tropes, BT cannot account for
(qualitative) sameness.
2b iv. BT cannot account for difference and identity.
According to Allaire, the trope version cannot “account for the sameness of the [individuals] since the
members of the two collections are all unanalyzable and different from each other.” (115). And the
universals version cannot “account for the difference, since each collection has literally the same
members.” (115)
AN ISSUE WITH PREDICATION
Let’s think about the Substratum Theory as applied to a red apple. When we say that the apple is red,
we mean to predicate “is red” to the apple a. That is, we mean to attribute the property F to a. But on
the Substratum Theory, it is the bare substratum s and only s that literally instantiates F. And surely a
is not identical with s, since s is forms only a “part” of a, so we have to choose. But which do we
choose? If we go with a, then we abandon the Substratum Theory. If we go with s, then we have to
denounce our usual attributive practices, as we must say that the apple is red only “derivatively.” That
is, it is red in virtue of its substratum instantiating redness. But this is an awkward imposition on our
semantics.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST BARE SUBSTRATA
Objection from Inconsistency
Some have objected that the very idea of a bare substratum is inconsistent. For instance, bare substrata
have the property of lacking properties. Or they must at least have the property of being a particular.
This comes down to how permissive we are going to be about what counts as a genuine property. If
Armstrong is right, then negative properties (exclusive negation, not choice-negation), having no
distinctive causal powers, are not properties in any genuine sense. Similar reasoning can be applied to
the idea of being a particular.
Objection from Unknowability
Several philosophers have objected to the idea of bare substrata on the grounds that we have no
knowledge of their existence. We thus have no justification for postulating them, as they are supposed
to be completely devoid of properties, and therefore, of sensible properties – properties whose
instantiations give us perceptual knowledge.
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This objection, though, assumes a rather crude empiricist epistemology, where knowledge can only be
of perceptible things. But we can have knowledge of mathematics, logic, and perhaps other abstraca
like modal truths, and arguably non-empirical things like moral rightness and wrongness.
The argument for postulating substrata is basically an inference the best explanation, and many
arguments given in the science use this type of reasoning. We have, thus, argument for postulating
black holes, even though we have no direct perceptual knowledge of them. Now, black holes certainly
differ from bare substrata – the former have causal powers whereas the latter clearly do not, except in
the very attenuated sense that they have the “power” to have causal powers. But the point is that we
reason by inference to the best explanation all the time and only the demerits of the advanced theory,
and its relative merits compared with its competition, should be relevant for gauging its value.
Objection from Absurdity
Some argue that the idea of a bare substratum leads to the possibility of there existing “bare naked
substrata” – entities in their pure quality-less state, and that such a possibility (or entity) is simply
absurd. One could just reply that it is not absurd, and leave it at that. But a different tack might be to
do some work on one’s theory of possibilia. Armstrong, for instance, is not so permissive about the
possible so that bare naked substrata can occur. In fact, on his view, since the most basic ontological
entities in his account are states of affairs, where a state of affairs is a substratum’s instantiating a
property, there is no room for such things.
Objection from Modal Insensitivity
An apple can cease to be red, but it can’t cease to be a fruit, or a concrete physical object, or a
particular. It’s “sortal” or categorical, kind, properties, are essential to it. However, the bare
substratum view does not have a way of recognizing the modal status of these privileged properties; it
is “modally insensitive.” Unless there is a way to ensure that the substratum for the apple comes and
goes with certain of its essential properties, we can have such oddities as unfruited apples.
Again, one may apply restriction upon one’s theory of possibilia and deal with the problem from that
direction. Or one may just adopt the Substance Theory instead; whether this is a complete
abandonment of the Substratum Theory is difficult to declare in advance. This objection does not seem
to be an assault against the main idea of bare substrata. Instead, it seems to call for addenda to the
Bare Substratum theory. A defender may develop a theory that explains how the modally privileged
properties are packaged with the bare substratum.
Objection from Improper Relationality
This objection makes the most sense when coming from a Nominalist (see Sider 2006). An apple’s
being red is a simple monadic fact. But the Substratum Theory inappropriately renders this fact
relational, because it makes the apple’s being red a matter of some bare particular standing in a
relation – instantiation, exemplification, participation – with a universal. This is, of course, where
Bradley’s regress comes from. But this isn’t exactly the point of the objection. The point is that the
nominalist construes the order of explanation differently from the Substratum Theorist. Consider the
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following bi-conditional, where the LHS expresses a monadic fact while the RHS expresses a
relational fact.
The apple is red IFF the apple has the property of redness.
Both the Nominalist and the Substratum Theory Realist agree that the bi-conditional is true. But they
differ over the explanatory priority of the LHS over the RHS. The Nominalist prefers to explain the
RHS in terms of the LHS, while the Realist prefers to reverse this order.
SPATIOTEMPORAL POINTS – A BETTER SUBSTRATUM?
Spatiotemporal Points As Substrata
Rather than postulating these entities to serve as individuators – bare substrata – why don’t we use
something we already have in our ontology, namely, contiguous spatio-temporal points? It seems that
making spatio-temporal points the bearers of properties can service the job just as well.
Objection from “The Given”
But can it? Spatio-temporal points are completely indifferent to the spatial and temporal boundaries of
individuals. Unless there is a way to specify in advance which points get to bear which properties, we
cannot make use of this suggestion. And it does not seem that we can “prime” the points for their job
without postulating the substrata or something like it that will be just as contentious.
Objection from Motion
A different problem with this suggestion comes from considerations about motion and change (see
Martin). If we adopt the spatiotemporal approach, then there can be no genuine motion or change,
since all that’s going on is different points coming to instantiate and no longer instantiating properties.
This is no more genuine change or motion than the mere appearance of motion generated by a series of
lights flashing in consecutive order.
REFERENCES
Martin, C.B. (1980), “Substance Substantiated,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 58, No. 1:
3 – 10.
Sider, T. (2006), “Bare Particulars,” Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 387 – 397.
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