African
Perspectives
REPORTS
The French Intervention in Mali
Madi Ibrahim Kanti
Political Science Researcher- Mali
Upon the UN resolution No. 2085 on Mali, the ECWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, including 15 countries,
had joined the Malian army, under an intense cover from France.
Then, the French Prime minister said that the intervention in Mali
aims at realizing three goals: halting the advancement of terrorist
groups towards the south, preserving the existence and the territorial integrity of the Malian state, and preparing for the deployment of the African Intervention Force which was established by
virtue of a Security Council resolution. Despite the fact that such
political targets are geographically limited inside the Malian soil,
yet this is not the truth, especially that terrorism is a trans-border
phenomenon. The strategic aim for the intervention in Mali is the
protection of the French interests (security and economically).
Fighting in Mali is a protection for Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritius. In this respect, France has understood the domino effect of the terrorist
groups in Mali; if they took control over Mali, other countries will fall in
their hands sooner or later. Thereupon, its intervention aims at imposing a
reverse domino effect that would totally face the terrorist groups in the region and prevent any similar aggression on the fragile neighboring countries
(lie under French influence). Undoubtedly, the stability of the terrorist
groups along the shore for a long period of time (Mali, Niger, Mauritania)
constitutes a security obsession for France.
The French military intervention in Mali has raised various questions and
dimensions, the matter that made it appear as if Paris had hastily taken the
decision of war, especially with the creeping of the fighters of the Qaedalinked Tawhid and Jihad Movement in West Africa and Harakat Ansar elDin (Movement of Religious Supporters) in the South towards the Capital
Bamako, and their repercussions on various pivots, salient of which are the
French and Western interest in Mali; the oil and mineral-rich country, and
in Mali’s neighboring countries such as Niger, Mauritius, Algeria and Cote
d’ivoire.
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The main target behind the
French intervention in Mali is the
protection of the financial, political
and security interests. In this vein,
various francophone countries in
West Africa began orienting towards the US as regards the educational system and towards China
and Iran as regards the trade relations. Furthermore, France, as a
previous colonial power, did not accept to lose its previous spheres of
influence in favor of other powers
such as China and Iran, thus,
France regarded it a ripe time for an
intervention that would save its interests.
The expedient French decision
came as a result of the new givings
which the Islamist movements tried
to impose through crippling to the
South towards Bamako; the matter
which means a full domination over
Mali; or rather on all the west African states as was mentioned in Ansar el-Din statements as follows; “we
neither need independence nor do
we need secession, we rather want to
apply Islamic Shariaa (law) over the
whole Malian state, or rather on all
the west African states” the matter
which threatens the French interests
in the region.
The French Interests in Mali and
West Africa
1. Economic Interests
In Mali, French investments in the
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mining sector is huge, not to mention
the French companies that work in
various fields either inside Mali or in
its neighboring countries, especially
as regards the huge investments in
Algeria in the field of oil and the
French investments in Niger and
Mauritania. Thus the domination of
the extremist Islamic movements
which fight the Western states by all
means in North Mali will lead to a
state of instability in the region; thus
hampering the French interests in
Mali and in the whole region.
Mali is the third biggest gold producer in Africa after South Africa
and China. It is noteworthy to mention that an Italian company had
discovered petroleum, uranium and
phosphate in north Mali in 2010, the
matter behind France’s attempts to
find a place for herself in the African coast especially upon the discovery of huge oil reserves in that place.
Such attempts aim at compensating
any deficiency that might happen
upon Iran’s closure to the strategic
Strait of Hormuz which the Gulf
petroleum is exported to the rest of
the world.
Undoubtedly, France has huge strategic and economic interests in Mali.
According to the French Foreign
Minister Laurent Fabius on January
14, 2013 “the main interests of
France, Europe and Africa are at
stake, thus we had to take a quick
action.” On top of such French inter-
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ests is finding Uranium in the African
desert, as around 75% of France’s
needs of electricity comes from nuclear energy. In this respect, international energy estimations indicate
that the north Mali desert and east of
Niger occupy the third rank as of
possessing the uranium reserves
worldwide, not to mention the huge
reserves of crude oil there.
In Niger, the French “AREVA”
company provides more than third
of the nuclear energy stations for
(ODF) company for electricity in
France. Thus, the French economic
interest in Mali was one of the main
targets behind the intervention;
highlighting France’s fear from the
influence of the Islamic groups over
the North which has huge mineral
wealth, especially petroleum, phosphate, Iron and uranium.
2.Political Interests
Not only does France has economic
interests in Mali, but it also has traditional and historic influence in the
region, thus it is trying to re-draw
its influence against the increasing
US and Chinese dominations. In this
respect, the US tried to build a huge
military base so as to monitor the
whole region extending from Somalia to Mauritania; an area double
that of the whole European continent and had chosen north Mali as a
headquarters for its military base
(AFRICOM).
China’s pragmatic policy towards
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Africa is one of the two key actors in
the African policy during the last
decade. In this vein, many calls have
emerged inside various African
countries asking for fostering relations with the new emerging powers
in Asia such as China, India and
Malaysia that do not have any colonial history in Africa.
3- Security and Strategic Interests
France has huge economic interests in Mali and its neighboring
countries that should be protected.
At the same time, France wants to
protect itself and its citizens abroad.
Thus, the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian said that
the threats are related with
“establishing a terrorist state at the
gates of Europe and France” adding
that his country will not leave any
Islamic resistance remains, will
eradicate terrorism along the coast
and will restore Mali’s territorial
integrity. As for the prime minister,
he concentrated upon the European
and international dimensions for the
threat saying that France has interfered in Mali “in order to stop the
terrorist threat” which not only targets the African countries, but also
all the European states.
Another psychological matter that
should be taken into consideration is
the terrorist groups who horrify
France through kidnapping its citizens, thus giving France a good reason for targeting the kidnappers
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themselves and for delivering a message saying that despite the threats
on the lives of the French hostages,
yet France will never hesitate in any
military intervention.
The French military intervention
in Mali has recorded some primitive
successes such as seizure of cities
and saving the weak transitional
government in Bamako from the
attack of the Islamic rebels. However, it is not yet clear whether the
“war in Mali” will end soon or will
extend to long periods. The French
forces – especially the Air Forcecan achieve successes in the operation in Mali as it can confine the
French losses and intensify those of
the armed groups on land.
In order for the peace and security
to stabilize in Mali, such recommendations should be achieved:
• The international society, through
the (ECOWAS) contact groups,
should support the government
and the political elite in Mali in
applying wide-range political reforms in order to create a real
democratic rule in Mali.
• The transitional government in
Mali should be backed to adopt a
comprehensive strategy for reform and rebuilding the army and
the rest of the security bodies.
• The Sahel and Sahara countries
should unite under a strong regional system that can address the
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security challenges in the region,
while concentrating on issues including the exchange of intelligence information, the security of
the borders, fighting the smuggling and the organized crime
which include drugs, human trafficking, weapons, explosives and
fighters.
• The African and Malian forces
should invest in building strong
and amicable relations with the
local citizens in north Mali so as to
deprive the rebel groups from any
kind of support from those citizens. Moreover, while fighting the
Islamists, the French and African
forces should avoid any kind of
human rights violations.
• The French and African forces
should develop a wide-range informative plan or a psychological
strategy to face the Jihadi campaigns who accuse the Malian and
foreign forces of declaring war in
order to “destroy the Islamic emperor in Mali.”
• The (ECOWAS) should support
Mali in developing and implementing an overall strategy for
national conciliation while concentrating on addressing the Malian
issues including the negotiations
for finding solutions for the corruption, injustice and marginalization problems which the Malian
minorities suffer from.
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