Multiculturalism and Australian National Identity
Dr Anthony Moran
Sociology, La Trobe University, Bundoora
Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity,
focusing on the Australian context. It argues that national identity and multiculturalism
are not diametrically opposed, but instead that an open, inclusive national identity can
accommodate and support multiculturalism. Such a national identity can serve as an
important source of cohesion and unity in ethnically and culturally diverse societies,
including Australia. However, a combative approach to national identity, as prevailed
during the Howard government, and as was evident in the strong rhetoric on Australian
values and maintaining traditional Australian identity accompanying the introduction of
the citizenship test, threatens multicultural values. The paper nevertheless concludes that
it is necessary for supporters of multiculturalism to engage in ongoing debates about what
it means to be Australian, rather than to simply vacate the field of national identity.
„National identity‟ is a notoriously difficult subject and attempts to characterise the exact
nature of any particular national identity are controversial and contested (Watson 2000).
Nevertheless, the issue of national identity is very much alive in multicultural debates.
Critics of multiculturalism, in Australia (Blainey 1984, 1991) and elsewhere (Schlesinger
Jr 1992; Huntington 2004), see in multiculturalism a dangerous dividing of loyalties,
undermining national identity. On the other hand, many proponents of multiculturalism
(or supporters of pluralism) have been suspicious of national identity, seeing it as a
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homogenising force that threatens cultural diversity (see Modood 2007: 147-48). This
paper argues that national identity is not necessarily in conflict with multiculturalism, that
multiculturalism is not necessarily divisive, and that national identity is not necessarily
homogenising and threatening to cultural diversity. However, this means conceiving
national identity as involving an open and ongoing dialogue about national traditions,
rather than as something simply handed down from the past. It means understanding
national identity as post-ethnic (Hollinger 1995), and accepting that different individuals
and groups in multicultural Australia have different ways of being Australian, and of
engaging with Australian national identity.
Unlike the older terms „nation‟, „national character‟ and „nationalism‟, the
concept of national identity, like identity itself, is a relative newcomer to the social
sciences, with many dating its entry to psychoanalyst Erik Erikson‟s use of the term in
the 1950s (Gleason 1983; Poole 1999: 44-45; see also Inglis 1991: 14-16). In Eriksen‟s
account, as with other psychoanalytic accounts, identity involves a deep intermeshing of
individual and group or social identities through complex processes of identification.
Eriksen‟s notions of maturation and crisis have often permeated the discussion of national
identity since then. This was especially so in Australia in the 1990s, but has also been a
feature of earlier debates and discussions since the 1960s (Curran and Ward 2010: 1718).
One prominent school of thought, dominated by historians, argues that until the
collapse of the British Empire after the Second World War, Australian identity (although
it was not previously called that) was securely moored by British ethnic and civic culture
(Meaney 2001; Ward 2001; Curran 2006). But after that, Australian identity became less
secure, resulting in a series of floundering government efforts at re-definition (Curran and
Ward 2010).
Arguing from the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism pioneered by Anthony
D. Smith (1986; 1991), McGregor (2006) argues that Britishness was the necessary
foundation for Australian nationalism because it was the only viable myth that could
unite Australians as a people in the federation period, and to give the nation the sense of
time-depth that all nations require. All nationalisms combine ethnic and civic elements,
sometimes in tension, and Australian nationalism was no exception. Australian
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nationalism combined „Britannic‟ ethnic symbols, myths and memories with
„civic/territorial components centring on the distinctive entitlements and obligations of
the Australian citizen and commitment to an Australian homeland‟, but the ethnic
principle was predominant (McGregor 2006: 499 for quote; on the dominance of the
ethnic component, see pp. 503-54). In contemporary Australia, Britishness had been „deaccentuated‟ rather than expunged from Australian national identity, and „Australian
nationalism has shifted away from an ethnic toward a civic/territorial emphasis‟. In
explaining this shift, McGregor recognizes the importance of factors including the
decline of the British Empire and Britain‟s turn to Europe, Australia‟s need to engage
with Asia and the growing need to include Aborigines in the nation. But he claims that no
single causal factor was more important in the de-emphasising of the ethnic, Britannic
component of Australian nationalism than the „substantial intake of non-British
immigrants‟ after World War Two. By the 1970s, „the myth of British origins began
giving way, albeit contentiously, to a myth of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural origins of
the Australian nation‟ (McGregor 2006: 508). McGregor does not elaborate, however, on
whether the latter myth is capable of serving the same purpose for contemporary
Australian identity that the former myth did for historical British Australian nationalism.
Reflecting the potential doubt and threat of the shift away from its British origins
and myths, official statements on multiculturalism in Australia, from the 1970s onward,
construed it as part of a nation-building exercise (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977;
Ethnic Affairs Taskforce of the Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs
1982; Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989; National Multicultural Advisory Council
1999). The Hawke government‟s key policy statement on multiculturalism, the National
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, claimed that Australia‟s „British heritage‟ „helps to
define us as Australian‟ and that it was „a potent source of unity and loyalty‟ (Office of
Multicultural Affairs 1989: 50-51). However, the conception of this British heritage deemphasised the ethnic elements while emphasising its civic and institutional elements. To
qualify McGregor‟s (2006) argument about the British ethnic component of early
Australian nationalism, though Britishness was associated with race from the nineteenth
century (i.e. Anglo-Saxon race myths), it also had strong, historically rooted civic beliefs
concerning liberty, free political institutions, and the rule of law, dating back to the
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Horsman 1981: 1-24; Gossett 1997: Ch. XIII).
These could be decoupled from race and ethnicity in new understandings of Britishness
in Australia. This has also occurred in Britain, where „post-ethnic‟ British identity has
been championed by some as a way of accommodating multicultural diversity while at
the same time promoting a common national identity and sense of commitment and
belonging among both immigrant and non-immigrant citizens (Modood 2007;
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000).
The nation-building emphasis of Australian multiculturalism has contributed to its
success, and to its approval (in certain respects) by the general public (Goot and Watson
2005). Christian Joppke (2004), when surveying the retreat of multiculturalism among
liberal states, points out that multiculturalism has sunk deeper roots in settler societies
like Australia and Canada, because of the way that it is bound up with national identity
there; and thus the retreat of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s was less
pronounced in settler societies than in Europe.
The dilemmas of post-British Australian identity have nevertheless been reflected
in the tensions surrounding the relationship between Australia‟s ethno-cultural diversity
and its national identity (Dixson 1999). Does a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society still
have a national identity? If it does not have one, does it need one and should its political
leaders and intellectuals, its schools and so on attempt to cultivate one? There have been
different and competing answers to these questions.
Some dismiss the relevance of national identity in a globalising world where
populations are increasingly ethnically mixed (Day and Thompson 2004: 161, Ch. 9).
Castles et al (1988) famously argued that Australian national identity had become
meaningless and redundant, and offered „transnational‟ identity in its place. Meaney
(2001, 2003) has argued that it did not matter that Australia could not find a new form of
national identity after the collapse of the British Empire, because national identity had
outlived its purpose of unification, and that other forms of post-national unity and new
forms of loyalty were already developing in its place.
Many supporters of multiculturalism see the nation in conflict with, and
nationalism as the enemy of, multiculturalism; for nations and nationalism (as explained
by one of its major theorists Ernest Gellner 1983), seem to rely on a level of cultural
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homogeneity that would undermine the claims of multiculturalists to the peaceful coexistence, within the one state, of a plurality of cultures. When politicians and others
emphasise national culture and national identity, the fear is that this will inevitably result
in the desire and effort to squash multicultural difference; that it will inevitably draw
attention to the supposed destabilising influence of difference, especially among
immigrants.
This fear is legitimate. However, if political leaders and intellectuals completely
vacate the scene by refusing to discuss national identity and issues of national unity and
cohesion, another pressing danger is that more extreme forms of nationalism will take
their place. Left-wing supporters of multiculturalism who deny the relevance of national
identity and love of country threaten to undermine multiculturalism‟s legitimacy among
populations, like Australia‟s, that are patriotic and proud of their national identity (see
Pakulski and Tranter 2000; Goot and Watson 2005).
Like Craig Calhoun (2007), in this paper I argue for the continuing relevance and
importance of national identity, even in the context of multi-cultural or multi-ethnic
societies. It is mistaken to narrowly conceive nationalism as „bad‟, aggressive and
frequently violent ethno-nationalism, for it can also be far more benign, inclusive and
progressive. Calhoun (2002) has argued that nations and nationalism are still important
sources of solidarity in the world, and can also bring about solidarity with others outside
one‟s own nation. He also argues that a thicker vision of national culture, beyond the thin
notion of proceduralist, „political culture‟ admired and adopted by post-nationalists,
including Jurgen Habermas (1992) with his concept of „constitutional patriotism‟, is also
defendable. Calhoun argues that the „republicanism and democracy‟ advocated by postnationalists, cosmopolitans and constitutional patriots, „depend on more than narrowly
political culture – they depend on richer ways of constituting life together‟ (Calhoun
2002).
While multicultural Australia is primarily a political community, a sense of
belonging and commitment to Australia is not only a commitment and loyalty to a
political culture and to a set of political institutions. Though the national culture is
diverse and open, it does have a history, and people feel different levels of attachment to
the meanings that have accrued over its history. Australian national identity includes both
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„nativists‟ and „civic nationalists‟, for example, who attach relative importance to
different things in terms of the national identity and „being Australian‟ (Pakulski and
Tranter 2000; Jones 2000). For others, „diversity‟ and even multiculturalism are key
features of the national identity, sitting alongside other features like egalitarianism,
freedom, democracy and so on. Though the notion of and commitment to the „fair go‟ is
not unique to Australia, at the same time it has a particular national history in Australia,
and is deeply embedded in the culture (Hirst 1988; Thompson 1994). Similarly, the
commitment to civility in everyday life (though obviously also contravened through
incivility, including racism) is an Australian value and tradition reflected in the low level
of political violence and the generally orderly nature of the society (Hirst 2002). National
identity, considered as a relatively open and ongoing dialogue over national traditions
within a community imagining itself as unified and national, remains an important source
for that unity and for the successful operation of democracy.
One of Britain‟s pre-eminent theorists of multiculturalism, Tariq Modood (2007),
has argued that it is nonsensical to argue for the importance of multicultural identities and
traditions while denigrating or ignoring the importance of national identity and tradition.
He foresees the possibility of a flourishing multiculturalism beneath the protective
umbrella of an inclusive British identity upon which people from different backgrounds
can make their distinctive claims. In order for multiculturalism‟s emphasis on difference
to make sense, it needs to be counterbalanced by discourses and narratives of unity that,
he argues, national identity is still able to supply. I argue here that an inclusive Australian
identity can serve the same purpose, and contribute to the success of multiculturalism.
Discussing Australia, Levey (2008) is strongly critical of the post-nationalist
discourse that summarily dismisses the relevance of national identity for social cohesion
and unity. Unlike many multiculturalists, and also against those liberal nationalists who,
he argues, operate with too thin a concept of culture as part of national identity, Levey
argues for a thicker cultural conception of national identity. He argues that liberal
nationalists have too quickly jettisoned the concept of national character. Levey would
reinstate the term, though critically, understanding that it can too often serve the bellicose
aims of states, and lead to an uncritical glorification of one‟s own nation and denigration
of others. But, he argues, there is also truth in national cultural differences that allow one
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to speak of different national characters with „distinctive habits of mind, emotion and
behaving, instantly noticeable to most outsiders‟ (Levey 2008: 263). This does not mean
that everyone within a nation exhibits the same national character, and nor does it mean
that national character is formed at one time in history and forever remains the same. But,
there is a national character and a national culture, and this is too important to simply
dismiss and ignore. National character will find expression through distinctive ways of
doing things, and in the political institutions and processes of a country. However, it is
not the legitimate role of government to seek to impose this character on its citizens, nor
should it try to present its own definitive version of the national character, for this will
inevitably caricature and reify it, when national character is constantly evolving. It needs
to be „left to its own devices‟ (Levey 2008: 264), but politicians and other policy makers
ignore it at their peril. In the same edited volume, John Kane also argues for the need for
a thicker conception of national culture than liberal nationalists allow, while adding the
point that it would be absurd for multiculturalists to call for the recognition and
preservation of ethnic cultures, while dismissing or wishing to expunge this culturalnational identity (Kane 2008: 79).
Levey argues that a more full-blooded understanding of national identity allows one
to stipulate the legitimate domains in which its different aspects operate and the
legitimate role and limits of those agencies involved in its reproduction and development.
Governments have a legitimate role to play in „the inculcation and transmission of a
national language, the teaching of the nation‟s history, and the establishment of national
institutions, holidays, and memorials‟. But there are other aspects that belong to the
domain of civil society, in which government has no role to play, „such as how people
dress, call themselves, or spend their leisure, what languages they speak to each other,
and even in what accent they speak their English‟. And it is in this latter realm that the
national character truly evolves, shaped by myriad social interactions, and influenced
subtly by everyday interactions between the dominant Anglo culture and the cultures of
other groups entering the society through mass immigration (Levey 2008: 266).
Levey‟s point about it not being the job of governments to deliberately shape
important aspects of the national character is pertinent when considering the relationship
between the Howard government, national identity and multiculturalism. The Howard
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government sailed perilously close to dictating to immigrant Australians how they should
behave and think about themselves as Australians, especially when it pushed the case for
the adoption of „Australian values‟ and when introducing the citizenship test in 2007.
From the perspective on national identity as an open dialogue that I have been advocating
in this paper, Howard‟s combative approach was counter-productive and even destructive
in managing the relationship between national identity and multiculturalism.
Howard at times recognised that diverse immigration had made a valuable
contribution to Australian national identity, including changing it for the better. But his
predominant rhetoric characterised Australian identity as something looming out of the
past, as a settled, permanent entity that people like his predecessors Hawke and Keating
had believed that they could change, and which fellow-travelling intellectuals had
endlessly, and fruitlessly debated. Howard also saw secure national identity as an
important counterpoint to the economic change that he was committed to, giving national
identity a firm footing in his social conservatism, as he explained in his Irving Kristol
lecture, delivered in Washington on 5 of March, 2008:
Economic reform and change – inherent in globalisation – can involve dislocation
for communities and individuals. The anxiety this brings cries aloud for consistency
and reassurance in other aspects of people‟s lives; the sense that not everything is
changing.
From our election in 1996 we pursued reform and further modernisation of our
economy. On the social front we emphasised our nation‟s traditional values, sought
to resurrect greater pride in her history and became assertive about the intrinsic
worth of our national identity. In the process we ended the seemingly endless
seminar about that identity which had been in progress for some years (Howard
2008).
In assigning national identity this conservative, reassuring function, it was difficult, if not
impossible, for Howard to emphasise its dynamism and capacity to change. And as he
began to enrol national identity in the battle against Islamist terrorism (as he and others
like Costello especially did after the London underground bombings of 2005), his
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discomfort with multiculturalism was given new license, so that he could claim that it
was the duty of all western leaders to hold the line against those who would demand
„cultural concessions‟. A strong national identity was now seen as necessary to defend
Australia, and like-minded western and/or democratic countries, against the pernicious
influence of Islamic extremists, who calculate „that it is in the nature of western societies
to grow weary of long struggles and protracted debates‟ and who „produce, over time, a
growing pressure for resolution or accommodation‟ (Howard 2008). Standing firm on,
and being assertive of, national values thus became crucial in that fight for survival:
The particular challenge posed by extremist Islam means therefore that more than
ever before continued cultural self-belief is critical to national strength....In the
protracted struggle against Islamic extremism there will be no stronger weapon than
the maintenance by western liberal democracies of a steadfast belief in the
continuing worth of our national value systems (Howard 2008).
By 2006, stirred up by a perception that some immigrants in Australia rejected
Australian culture and its values – a growing perception shared among senior government
figures including Peter Costello – Howard gave Australian identity a more explicitly
ethnic and religious underpinning (as he noted in his 2006 Australia Day speech,
Australian values were guided by „Judeo-Christian ethics‟, see Howard 2006a). While
there was diversity, there was also a dominant cultural strain (and Howard did not give
the impression that this dominant cultural strain should or could be questioned). In a
radio interview in early 2006, Howard argued against what he called „zealous
multiculturalism‟ that viewed Australia as simply „a federation of cultures‟. Not all
cultures were equal. Australia, Howard claimed then, had an „Anglo-Saxon‟ core culture
and set of distinctive values, which also bore distinctive Australian traits, that migrants,
and all other cultures, had to fit themselves into (Howard 2006b; see also Tate 2009).
During the public debate on the introduction of the citizenship test during 2006
and 2007, the test was defended in cultural nationalist terms by the Howard government
and other supporters, and it was opposed by some, including the Ethnic Communities‟
Council of Victoria (ECCV), on post-nationalist grounds (Ethnic Communities‟ Council
of Victoria 2006). The ECCV was suspicious of any construction of national values,
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arguing that what united Australians in a multicultural society was not common values, or
national culture, but rather a „commitment to democracy, the rule of law and our shared
homeland‟ (Ethnic Communities‟ Council of Victoria 2006: 1). It argued that „Australian
values and claims to an Australian way of life are both nebulous and highly contested‟
(Ethnic Communities‟ Council of Victoria 2006: 4). In dismissing the notions of national
values, national culture or an „Australian way of life‟, the ECCV may have been
provoked by a political climate, stimulated by the Howard government, of intolerance
towards expressions of cultural difference in public, especially by Muslim individuals
and communities. However, in dismissing the existence of national culture, national
values, and an Australian way of life, the ECCV in a sense played into the hands of the
Howard government, that could then accuse it of adopting a form of separatist
multiculturalism that ignored the importance of national solidarity and cohesion; and of
being out of touch with ordinary Australians‟ valuing of their Australian way of life
(Robb 2006).
From the Howard government‟s perspective, immigrants should be willing to
embrace what it saw as the overarching Australian culture, that it also called „the
Australian way of life‟– and this was reflected in some of the questions in the initial
Citizenship test, along with questions concerned with more culturally neutral, liberal and
democratic values. The booklet accompanying the test, Life in Australia, was also
combative in tone, with some of its statements about Australian values clearly targeted at
Islamic extremists, and making strong demands for putting the commitment to Australia
before all others, which, as Davison points out, would be anathema to people of any
strong religious persuasion, not just Muslims (see Davison 2008). It was difficult to
know, however, what was really expected of immigrants in terms of embracing
„mainstream Australian culture‟ as some of the rhetoric surrounding the test‟s
introduction proclaimed. When pushed on these issues, most of the values suggested were
liberal and democratic ones, and especially the rule of law (in this it was implicitly
targeted at so-called sections of the Muslim community who wanted to operate in
accordance with Sharia law.) And because „diversity‟ was, at the same time, accepted as
an important value and aspect of the Australian national culture, the message was
contradictory; there seemed to be considerable allowance for individuals and their
10
families to go their own way, following their own paths and living out their own
identities. Though around this time the Howard government finally made the decision to
drop the term multiculturalism (for example, changing the name of the Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship), because of its supposedly divisive connotations, its representatives
nevertheless continued to use quintessential multicultural language when describing the
nature of Australian society. For example, in a speech supporting the citizenship test,
parliamentary secretary for multicultural affairs Andrew Robb (2006) both criticised the
ECCV‟s rejection of the idea of a national culture, but also noted that Australia was „a
nation of immigrants‟, „that each wave of new settlers has broadened and deepened our
culture and character, helping to mould new attitudes and traditions‟, that Australia
valued and benefited from its cultural diversity, and even that Australia was „a nation
incorporating many cultures, and as a community we are the stronger for it‟. And the
common values that he listed as part of our shared national identity, and the glue that
united us as a community, were quintessentially „civic‟ and liberal values‟ such as
„respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual‟, commitments „to democracy and
the rule of law‟, and „the equality of men and women and a spirit of egalitarianism that
embraces mutual respect, fair play and compassion for those in need…‟ It was these
values, Robb said, that helped us to define ourselves as Australian. In this respect it
seems, to paraphrase a famous book by Nathan Glazer (1997), that „we are all
multiculturalists now‟, even when we seem to be proclaiming otherwise.
Conclusion
So, where does this leave us when thinking about the connection between
multiculturalism and Australian national identity? Political philosopher Geoffrey Brahm
Levey has one take on this. He argues that „multiculturalism‟ itself cannot serve as the
unifying myth for Australia, because it is a principle of diversity and difference, not
unity. In this way it is different to the American notion of the „melting pot‟, that does
provide such a myth of unity – with diverse immigrants all going into the same pot and
coming out as Americans. While he is strongly supportive of multicultural policies,
which play a powerful integrative role in a diverse Australia, in his view „it makes more
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sense to construe multiculturalism as a set of principles, policies, and programs in the
service of an Australian national identity than as the locus of that identity itself‟ (Levey
2008: 262). Levey has a strong belief that national identity is an important support for
democracy, unity and solidarity. But he sees national identity and national culture as
dynamic, an ongoing conversation, and something belonging to the whole population, not
something that politicians should try to explicitly shape. It emerges and transforms itself
through everyday interactions, including those between the dominant culture and
incoming immigrants.
While Levey‟s argument that multiculturalism cannot in itself be seen as a locus
of unity is convincing, it nevertheless seems to me that multiculturalism - or if you prefer
to call it, cultural or ethnic diversity - is more than just a set of policies and procedures
and programs in the service of an Australian national identity; it has also become an
important feature of the national identity, and at least one point of identification for many
Australians, in particular for those whose histories do not stretch back through many
generations in Australia (see Moran 2005). But multiculturalism as an emphasis is not on
its own enough (see Modood 2007); in addition we need to continually create new stories
of solidarity, new narratives of national identity, explanations of what things hold
Australians together, not simply emphasise difference and diversity as a multicultural
society; a point that Tim Soutphommasane has also made in his recent book Reclaiming
Patriotism (2009). As he puts it, active citizens need to engage in an „ongoing dialogue
about the content of their national identity and must exercise a certain imagination about
the national tradition‟ (Soutphommasane 2009: 80).
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