Land Warfare Conference 2000
Melbourne October 2000
Running the Gauntlet – Force Protection for Tactical
Penetration in MOUT
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight
Headquarters Training Command - Army
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that well protected AFV, the ability to impose and operate within
obscuration and automation of some existing combat functions might synergistically reduce the
risks of operating in complex terrain and enable a manouverist capability. These means offer
capability that is potentially decisive at lower to mid threat levels and still potent in higher
intensity combat.
Complex terrain offers opportunities to the defender, the guerilla and the local whilst reducing
many of the technical advantages enjoyed by sophisticated forces. There are many historical
examples of complex terrain being exploited to inflict reverses on apparently superior
opponents. To project forces into the uncertainties of complex terrain, particularly urban areas,
has either required time and substantial forces to clear thoroughly and systematically or an
acceptance of higher risk. AS can accept neither, airmobile options are not the answer, yet we
must be able to operate there.
There is ample evidence of the value of armour in complex terrain, despite the risks if it is
mishandled. Current armour technologies offer the ability to protect AFV against the shoulder
fired weapons that are the main threat there. Perversely, only recently have we seen this
protection applied to IFV rather than tanks, yet this offers projection into complex terrain at
acceptable risk.
Smoke has been used to screen manouvre since ancient times. TI technology has reached a
maturity where it is possible to equip a force so that it can see within a smoke screen. Various
low-lethality delivery methods can be used to impose and maintain local obscuration.
Together these capabilities provide a force with psychological and tactical advantage that
applies across the spectrum of conflict.
Land Warfare Conference 2000
Melbourne October 2000
We are getting tantalising glimpses of entirely new tactics that unmanned technologies will
soon offer us. Right now however, ‘robotic’ methods already proven in ordnance disposal,
enhanced by artificial intelligence could allow us to automate vital high risk key activities such
as reconnaissance and search, casevac and resupply as well as enhance the survivability of
dismounted troops.
Land Warfare Conference 2000
1. Introduction
The future Regional battlefield is likely
to be on complex terrain. An arc
describing Australian strategic interest
sweeps across jungle, mountain or
swamps. In most areas, it is simply
impossible to find scope for effective
manouvre over land that is not complex.
Much of the cultivated land is farmed in
small plots and relatively densely
populated. The recent trends in conflict
involve warring civil populations and
therefore cities and towns.
Future
combat is complex and the most
complex part is Military Operations in
Urban Terrain (MOUT).
This paper will describe the need for
reach into urban terrain considering
risks,
opportunities
and
the
contradictions the Australian Army
faces. It will then proceed to explain
three concepts which applied together
appear to offer a way forwards.
2. The Need for Reach
Melbourne October 2000
dislodge.
In 1945, Japanese naval forces
defending Manila imposed 6,000
casualties and a months delay on the
attacking Americans, despite the lack of
training of the defenders and the
resultant static character of the
defences.
In the Eastern European theatre, the
turning point of the war was at
Stalingrad when the German Army was
drawn into an attritional battle. Urban
terrain negated Wehrmacht manouverist
operational
capability,
allowing
qualitatively inferior forces to be
concentrated to impose a devastating
strategic defeat. Subsequently, as the
Germans were increasingly on the
defensive, it was when on complex
terrain that they were able to defend
most effectively..
The list of reverses and checks imposed
on the Allies in the West is a list of
towns, cities and forests, places such as
Cherbourg, Cassino, Ortona, Arnhem
and the Ardennes. On the Eastern front,
complex terrain was often the basis of
tactical defence,.
1.1 Urban Terrain as Risk
Urban terrain tends to assist the
defender, particularly if he seeks to
engage in an aggressive attritional
battle. It offers an obstacle, cover and
concealment and channels the attacker.
Often the defender gains advantages of
interior lines of communication and an
outnumbered and outgunned force may
need quite disproportionate effort to
The same patterns of terrain offsetting
inferiority are repeated since WW2.
The highest Israeli casualties of the
1967 War were inflicted in their
recapture of Jerusalem. At Hue in 1968
Tet offensive, an infantry force of the
North Vietnamese Army and the
Vietcong were able to hold parts of the
seized city for three weeks against
intensive US and South Vietnamese
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attempts to retake it. At Khorramshahr
in 1980, irregular Iranian forces offered
prolonged resistance to the Iraqis, at a
cost that served to halt the latter’s wider
offensive.
Helimobile forces are an obvious
tactical option for urban penetration, yet
for warfighting may be extremely
vulnerable. The risk is to both the
aircraft and the inserted force. During
the 1987 Indian peacekeeping operation
in Sri Lanka, the Indians attempted a
‘coup de main’ seizure of the ‘Tamil
Tiger’ HQ at the University of Jaffna by
insertion of a company of troops using
Mi-8 helicopters. The three aircraft
escaped from the ambush that the Tamil
guerillas had set on the landing site, but
the entire force was wiped outi. During
the UN operations in Somalia in 1993,
the US Delta Force and Rangers
conducted an operation in Mogadishu to
arrest and recover a warlord. Two
helicopters were brought down by RPG7 fire and subsequently the inserted
American ground force found itself
fighting desperately to survive and
extricate itself.ii During the Chechnya
campaign of 1995, and again in 1999,
the Russians learned to keep even their
well armoured Hind helicopters clear of
urban areas.
In warfighting, there will probably still
be opportunities to exploit surprise and
weakness and employ helimobile
forces. However, Australia has few
aircraft or crews and cannot afford the
level of risk involved if helicopter
insertion is our only method of urban
reach. The risk is then high because of
the predictability of the helicopter
option, and the lack of alternative
backup if an aviation insertion sustains
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a reverse. Another option is essential
for urban reach.
1.2 Urban Terrain as Opportunity
The potential for complex terrain
assisting the defence as described so far
is well understood. What is less well
appreciated is the penalty paid by the
defender for a defence on urban terrain
that does not prevail.
In the 1980’s Rowland at the Defence
Operational Analysis Establishment
(DOAE) in the UK conducted an
analysis of urban combat that led to
'counter-intuitive' findings that in many
respects favoured the attacker. In the 73
urban battles studied, the defender, for
all his advantages, lost three to four
times as many casualties as the attacker.
iii An interesting further finding was
that where the attacker had armour
(tanks) and the defender had few or
none, the urban casualty exchange ratio
could shift as far as 25:1.
Land Warfare Conference 2000
This might be explained by the
observation that urban attacker will
generally seek to isolate first the urban
area itself, then parts of the area, then
individual buildings. Concurrently the
defender will tend to fight from known
prepared positions rather than accept the
exposure
and
uncertainty
of
redeployment. The isolating effect is
enhanced by the ability of armour to
move to positions that impose isolation.
The consequence is that defenders are
separated and killed or captured
piecemeal. The implication is that
urban terrain might be a battle ground
of advantage, if existing vulnerabilities
are overcome.
1.3 Contradictions for Australia
1.3.1
Current MOUT
Current US concepts for MOUT
warfighting call for systematic clearing
and securing of ground travelled. For
an urban area of any size, this will
inevitably be slow. As an illustration, a
US Army After Next wargame
postulated the thorough clearance of a
section of the South Korean capital,
Seoul. Allowing for 10 seconds to clear
a room and with the assets of a division,
clearance was calculated at many
months before even considering enemy
action.
Combat of this nature is
attritional, requires sheer numbers and
is slow.
1.3.2
AS Imperatives
In contradiction to the traditional
MOUT
concepts,
Australian
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circumstances demand results with low
numbers,
quickly
and
minimal
casualties.
The Australian Ready
Deployment Force is able to project
forces of the order of an Infantry
Brigade, therefore two battalions of
infantry is a realistic force for urban
tasks. This is probably sufficient only
to clear in detail and secure either a
small town or a single axis a few
kilometers long across a large city. The
detailed combat clearance of large
urban areas using a WW2 approach is
unachievable by standing Australian
forces on numbers grounds alone. In
likely offshore scenarios, without
National survival at stake, heavy or
regular casualties are likely to be
politically unendurable and there will be
an increasing pressure for swift results
once warfighting commences.
1.3.3
Risks
The contradiction between MOUT
realities and Australian constraints is
stark and evident to the thoughtful
observer. It is highly likely that any
adversary would seek to exploit this and
draw Australians into urban terrain,
where the benefits of technological
advantage are reduced and firepower is
inhibited.
1.3.4
Conclusion – no no-go
Whilst we cannot mount a large detailed
clearance, we cannot afford to allow
urban areas to be 'no go', and must have
the means to reach into them to
selectively strike, secure key points or
recover elements. These imperatives
and the tiny size of the Army demand
manouverist solutions. Manouvre by air
and sea offer operational options but at
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the tactical level, manouverist capability
on complex terrain is essential.
This paper suggests three concepts to
achieve urban reach: fighting protected
by armoured vehicles, fighting obscured
by smoke and fighting by proxy using
robotics.
2. Fight Protected
2.1.1
Armour as an Enabler
Evidence of the value of armour on
urban terrain comes from a range of
sources. Mirroring some of the findings
of the work of Rowland at DOAE in the
UK, described above, McLaurin et al in
their analysis of 22 modern urban
battles iv found that 'tanks and
armoured personnel carriers have
(also) proven vital to the attacker inside
the city, as long as they were protected
by infantry". An earlier study by
Campbellv of the task organisation used
in 18 WW2 battles hypothesized a
proper relationship of infantry, armour
engineers and artillery. In this work, he
demonstrates the emerging recognition
of the need for an all arms team.
Examples note the German change at
Stalingrad from previous doctrine of not
bringing tanks into urban areas.
Similarly, the Soviets reaching the same
doctrinal conclusions that are only
reinforced when deviations occur. At
the battle for Poznan in 1945, the
Soviets had to regroup after the first
assault without armour failed.
In the Cold War period, the American,
German and Soviet armies’ doctrine
echoed their WW2 experience, they
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prescribed a combined arms force for
urban tasks. The Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982 provides a more recent
validation of that approach. The PLO
defenders were only lightly equipped
and had limited tactical ability, however
they were fighting on familiar and
prepared urban terrain. As already
discussed, this very situation has
frequently imposed serious reverses on
superior attacking forces.
The Israelis first isolated towns, then
advanced tanks, armoured engineers
and infantry on key axes.
Any
resistance was met with air strikes and
direct fire from self propelled guns and
tanks before the infantry and bulldozers
moved forwards to clear, screened by
the dust and smoke of the
bombardment. Whilst the reluctance of
the Israelis to advance into Beirut city
itself indicates limitations, their tactics
were extremely successful in avoiding
casualties. In their attack on the city of
Sidon, they suffered no fatalities.
From this, we can conclude that armour
is vital to offensive operations in
complex terrain generally and urban
areas in particular, but must be
protected against infantry anti-armour
weapons. In most of the world the
emphasis has been on protection by
infantry and fire support. Interestingly,
those who have recent experience of
urban combat, the Russians and the
Israelis, are looking to the vehicles
themselves for greater protection.
2.2 Armour for Manouvre
Another aspect of the urban battle less
well recognised is the benefits of the
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apparently high-risk tactic of mounted
armoured assault. The Commonwealth
and US approach to urban attack has
generally been to conduct a methodical
and thorough clearance on one or more
axes, securing all ground moved over
and accepting of the time penalty
involved.
In contrast, the Soviets during WW2
identified the possible benefits of
assaulting a disorganised urban defence
with tanks alone. This was put into
practice by 'forward detachments'
during the advance from the Vistula to
the Oder. During the Cold War period,
an endorsed Soviet tacticvi was a thrust
by mechanised columns to ‘bounce’
urban objectives directly. In the West
these tactics were (and in many cases
still are) viewed as inherently suicidal.
In 1985, as part of the research
mentioned above, the British Army in
Berlin ran a series of interactive
instrumented urban field trials. These
were known as the 'Kings Ride' trials
and involved opposing laser-simulatorequipped forces with infantry, APC's
and armour conducting a series of
attacks and defences employing both
UK and Soviet doctrine. One of the
unexpected findings of the trial was that
the then current British deliberate attack
tactics sometimes failed, whereas more
rapid, Soviet tactics did not seem to.
Casualty levels were similar for both
tactics. In the words of the trial officer
Maj Lynham;
"This came as a surprise to all. It had
been generally held that a British
approach, employing slow methodical
methods involving (outwardly) less risk,
would lead to success in slower time but
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with fewer casualties. In the event,
however, conducting staff and observers
noted that it tended to lead to failure to
maintain the momentum and cohesion
of the attack."vii
2.3 Risks To Armour
There are many historical examples of
armoured forces sustaining heavy
casualties in urban areas. In the Soviet
final thrust on Berlin, the 2nd Guards
Tank Army attacked in massed
formations in contravention of doctrine
and lost 64% of its vehicles to the
German defenders Panzerfaust.viii
In Suez city in 1973 an Egyptian force
of about two battalions ambushed the
Israeli 217th Armoured Brigade in the
streets, who had attempted a mounted
assault without regrouping for an allarms operation. The Israelis lost 28
vehicles and 88 killed.
In Grozny in 1995, the Russian 131st
Malikop Bde drove into the central city,
not grouped for combat, nor in radio
communication nor prepared for heavy
resistance.
They also mistakenly
thought that paratroops had secured the
tops of buildings along the route. The
subsequent
Chechen
ambushes
destroyed 100 out of 120 BMP’s and 20
of 26 tanks. From this kind of example,
the conclusion that is often drawn is that
armour is inherently and unacceptably
vulnerable in urban areas.
A slightly different perspective might
be that most armour is inherently
vulnerable to unsuppressed infantry anti
armour weapons, and an all arms force
is required to achieve supression.
During the 1973 War, Israeli armour
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without infantry or artillery support
counter-attacked Egyptian infantry, who
had crossed the Suez canal and dug in
on open ground. The resulting first
major defeat of the Israeli armoured
corps was widely ascribed to the Sagger
missile system, overlooking the role of
shorter-range systems, especially the
RPG-7. The point is that armour is also
technically vulnerable on open terrain,
but that complex terrain concentrates
this vulnerability in time and space.
The primary warfighting threat to
armour on complex terrain has, since
1942, been hand held infantry anti
armour weapons with hollow-charge
warheads.
The RPG-7 family of
weapons has been by far the most
widely used system. The secondary
threat has been anti tank mines, which
can be efficiently deployed on
constricted
routes,
although
concealment is more difficult in paved
urban areas. There is no indication that
the
threat
will
soon
change
substantially, although weapons with
more advanced warheads might be
quickly deployed. Off route mines
conceled beside roads and which launch
a warhead or explosively formed
fragment will present an increasing
detection problem.
2.4 Unsuitability of AFV
Protection for MOUT
Most armoured vehicles are designed
with manouvre and open spaces in
mind. They are not suitably protected
for combat in close terrain against the
weapons they will face there.
When the first tanks appeared in WW1,
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they were all intended to protect against
small arms fire and shell splinters. As
anti-armour weapons were fielded,
designers began the search for balance
between
the
competing
design
requirements of mobility, firepower and
protection that continues to this day.
Until well into WW2, defeat of the
increasing armoured protection was by
ballistic means (or hand placed
charges). The physics of firing high
velocity projectiles to achieve this
dictated that an effective infantry anti
armour weapon was a crew served gun
of increasing size and decreasing
mobility. Well-concealed guns could
wreak havoc on attacking armour in
urban areas, but their siting was
constrained
The advent of the hollow charge
warhead changed this. An infantryman
armed with a Panzerfaust, PIAT or
Bazooka could, at close range, defeat
any tank. The cover of urban terrain
provided the opportunity to get close to
do so. The Germans fielded tanks with
additional stand off armour plates to
reduce the threat, and experimented
with very heavy tanks, but the near
impunity of the tank to dismounted
infantry fire was over for many years.
The early development of infantry
carrying armoured vehicles took a path
that would reduce their protection and
therefore utility for urban operations. In
WW , personnel carrying variants of
tanks (Mk V** and Mk IX tanks) were
developed, but between the wars the
notion of equivalent protective mobility
vanished.
During WW2, with the exception of the
Anglo-Canadian Kangaroo or turretless
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Melbourne October 2000
Sherman tank, armoured personnel
carriers were brought into service as
lightly armoured battle taxis, not assault
vehicles. This trend continued after the
war with the M113 series as well as the
BTR wheeled AFV in the USSR,
although the Soviets planned a more
aggressive employment under massive
artillery superiority. The BMP series of
infantry fighting vehicles, designed for
the nuclear battlefield was similarly
lightly armoured.
Its Western
equivalents, the Marder and the Bradley
are
better protected, but still not
sufficient to protect against the threat.
This vulnerability was demonstrated
during Operation Desert Storm on 27th
Feb 91 when an RPG-7 round
penetrated a Bradley.
experience of a series of wars has taken
a different approach to armoured
vehicle
development,
placing
a
premium on the preservation of the lives
of its soldiers. The indigenous Merkava
main battle tank has an unconventional
front-engined layout, low silhouette and
advanced armour design for increased
survivability.
This has been
demonstrated
on
the
Lebanese
battlefield with one vehicle sustaining
20 warhead strikes without penetration
of the crew compartmentix.
The
Merkava has other survivability features
such as a 60mm mortar and the ability
to carry and dismount through a rear
door, a small squad of infantry. It has
been described as a Combined Arms
Tank.
The irony is that whilst better protected
tanks can at least theoretically stand off
outside of the anti armour range to
engage, the infantry, whose role is to
close with the enemy, have the less
protected vehicles.
The vulnerability of the M113 was
made clear during the 1973 war at Buq’
atta when most of the vehicles of the
Israeli 7th Recon Company attempting
to assault a Syrian commando position
were knocked out. The lesson was
driven home during the 1982 invasion
of Lebanon when the lesser protection
levels of the infantry and engineers
mounted in M113 compared to the tanks
became evident. A major development
programme took two strands. One was
to improve the protection levels of the
large fleet of M113’s in service; the
other was to convert tanks into
personnel carriers.
2.5 New Developments
A challenge to the supremacy of the
RPG-7 was heralded with the British
development of Chobham armour, a
heavy complex armour for their
Challenger tank. The Americans and
Europeans followed suit, yet still only
for tanks. Outside of Israel, the only
APC with close country levels of
protection was the British Warrior APC
in its hastily uparmoured Bosnia/Gulf
War guise.
2.5.1
The
Israel
Israeli
army,
with
its
bitter
Work in hand led to a passive armour
suite for M113 known as Toga, which
provided greatly improved ballistic
protection.
Subsequently a light
reactive armour system was developed
which will protect against RPG-7 type
threats from the front and sides.
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The first tank based personnel carrier
known as the Nakpadon was derived
from the Centurion. The turret was
removed, the fighting compartment
extended upwards and advanced armour
installed, very noticeably on the track
skirts where the thickness of the
protection is evident. The result is a 55
tonne vehicle that is protected to heavy
tank levels and which appears to have
been refined to develop the Puma
armoured engineer vehicle.
The other tank based personnel carrier
is the Achzarit. This uses an obsolete
T55 tank from which the turret is
removed and the old engine replaced
with a more compact one, offset to the
left. This allows the installation of a
rear access passageway and back hatch
to the right of the engine. 14 tonnes of
advanced composite armour is then
added to the hull, giving an all up
weight of 44 tonnes for a vehicle that
can carry 10 troops with near immunity
from the weapons of enemy infantry. It
is a true close assault vehicle.
2.5.2
Russia
In response to the losses of BMP
vehicles in Chechnya in 1995 the
Russians have also developed a close
assault vehicle, the BTR-T. This, like
the Achzarit, is based on the T55 tank,
in this case with the turret removed and
a 30mm cannon installed.
Troop
capacity is five men, who must
dismount from roof hatches.
2.6 Description of Concept – Close
Assault Vehicle
Well protected armoured vehicles that
have a good chance of withstanding the
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main urban threats may provide one
means of enabling reach into urban
areas. Total invulnerability is neither
possible nor sought. What is necessary
is a level of close terrain survivability,
equivalent to that of existing vehicles on
open terrain. For this to be assured it
must be achieved through physical
protection means. Such a vehicle will
have increased close range survivability
generally, which will be valuable for all
complex terrain. It will be a close
assault vehicle, able to deliver troops
through the zone of enemy infantry and
artillery fire. Few armoured vehicles
and none in Australian service qualify.
The primary warfighting purpose of the
close assault vehicle is to move troops
rapidly across unsecured terrain to a
location where they deliver effects
dismounted.
Depending on the
situation, this might be a rapid move of
many kilometres or merely across a
street. Occupants should be able to
fight mounted, preferably from under
armour. Characteristics that meet this
requirement will exceed those required
for peace support operations.
All recent MOUT experience and the
inventories of the armed forces of the
region suggest that the RPG-7 will
continue to be the greatest threat to
armoured vehicles operating on close
terrain.
The requirement is therefore firstly
protection against penetration by
shoulder fired anti armour weapons,
specifically and secondly, occupant
survivability from track attack anti
armour mines. Protection must extend
around both sides and the front and up
or down for at least 30%. Ideally it
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should extend over the upper surfaces
and rear of the vehicle. The necessary
level of hollow charge warhead defeat is
likely to provide a significant level of
ballistic protection also.
(Further details of the defeat of hollow
charge warheads are at Annex A.)
It is desirable that the vehicle have
provision for rear debussing, however
for MOUT warfighting purposes
alternative protected exit may be
possible, using sheilds to dismount off
vehicle hulls sideways into buildings, or
conceivably through a front hatch
screened behind a dozer blade. The
vehicle should ideally be capable of
fitment with at least a simple dozer
blade and must be reinforced to
withstand deliberate breaching collision
with light buildings.
Ideally close
protection weapons should be fitted that
can be fired from under armour.
Further refinements for a close assault
vehicle for urban terrain would be
means of delivering troops into upper
levels and an extendable boom with
CCTV.
The requirement for this vehicle is to redeploy any dismounted soldiers for
specific tasks in a high threat
environment. This can be met by a
relatively small fleet of vehicles that
provide support to all units of a
formation rather than permanent
assignment to the lifted unit.
2.7 Options
A simple method of achieving the
necessary levels of survivability would
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appear to be to fit active protection
devices to the upgraded M113. These
fire disruptive charges at incoming
warheads.
Little is known about
performance of these new systems,
which are principally being developed
in Russia. Given the unfortunate track
record of Russian automatic radar
controlled self defence systems such as
the ‘Shilka’ anti aircraft system, it
seems unlikely that active systems
would give acceptable assurance of
protection without unacceptable risks to
crew and non-combatants.
An equally simple, but mid to long term
solution would be to procure a
specialised vehicle such as the Achzarit.
This seems unlikely to occur unless the
vehicle was also to meet a wider
requirement such as replacement of the
Armoured Engineer/Recovery Vehicle.
Should
Australia
follow
the
development path towards a standard
wheeled armoured vehicle, it will still
need a tracked platform for high traction
tasks. Alternatively, should a tracked
standard vehicle be specified, an
optional modular protection version
would be feasible. For combat in
complex terrain a heavy combined arms
tank such as the Merkava would be an
ideal base vehicle.
In the foreseeable future any close
assault vehicle would need to be based
on the existing fleets. This appears to
give two options. Reactive armour
could be procured for part of the M113
fleet. Reactive armour is the only
current means of giving RPG-7
protection within weight limits. Both
Rafael of Israel and SNPE of France
offer ‘bolt on’ solutions that will
achieve this, with the former able to
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provide protection against top attack.
This would involve in excess of 2.2
tonnes of additional weight and is
therefore probably not compatible with
the current upgrade, nor possibly the
fitment of a turret.
The reactive armour fitted vehicle
would be capable of fulfiling the urban
close assault role, retain airportability
(with preparatation), be relatively agile
in narrow streets and narrow enough to
achieve ‘clean’ breaches between
vertical supports when ramming into
light buldings.
Explosive reactive
armour poses some hazard to nearby
dismounted troops if struck by
explosive rounds, and the vehicle would
be vulnerable to repeated strikes.
The alternative solution is to adapt part
of the Leopard tank fleet (or second
hand vehicles bought for the purpose)
along the lines of the Israeli
conversions.
This would involve
removing the turret, developing a crew
compartment, installing machine gun
mounts
and
fitting
passive
supplementary armour. A front hatch
behind a dozer blade is probably
feasible. Such a solution would provide
the basis of both a close assault vehicle
and a combat engineer vehicle.
The tank based vehicle would be very
well protected against the spectrum of
anti armour weapons, giving utility on
all terrain. Durable 360 degree and
partial overhead protection is possible.
This vehicles manouvre would however
be constricted in narrow streets.
The close assault vehicle concept
appears to offer a means of achieving
sufficient mobility at an acceptable risk
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to enable manouverist options. The
obscuration concept would assist.
3. Fight Obscured
3.1 Obscurant Use
Smoke has been used throughout
warfare to screen movement and
disorientate the enemy. In WW1 smoke
was used to screen infantry attacks and
Naval manouvre, particularly during the
battle of Jutland. During WW2 both
allies and axis forces used smoke,
especially to screen against air attacks.
The Germans and Russians fired smoke
onto objectives to screen their assault
from depth and flank positions and the
former developed weapons principally
for this task. During the Cold War
period, the Soviets developed the
combination of artillery and tank
exhaust injector smoke as the chief
means of protecting their armoured
formations against anti tank missiles.
Activity within smoke remained a
confused and disorienting prospect and
this effect is also exploited by the use of
irritant smokes to maintain public order.
3.2 TI and Smoke Developments
In a dual response to a need to fight at
night and to Soviet obscurant tactics the
western armies developed and fielded
thermal vision technology for anti
armour weapons during the 1980’s.
These cooled systems, able to view in
the 9-13 micron band, were able to view
through most smokes. Advances since
have produced uncooled systems small
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and light enough to fit individual
weapons. These systems hold out the
prospect of revolutionizing close
combat. In a battlefield ‘kingdom of the
blind’ obscured by smoke, the ‘one
eyed man will be king!’
3.3 Description of Concept
A technologically superior force that is
able to obscure a selected area of the
battlefield and deploy thermal imagerequipped troops there will gain an local
asymetric advantage. Even if both
forces have access to imaging
equipment, advantage will accrue to the
side with the operational initiative, since
the latter can concentrate capability at
the point of decision.
The concept suits the small well
equipped force and is a counter to the
usual advantage of the unsophisticated
urban enemy as well as being an
effective aid to countering threats
concealed amongst the civil population.
Melbourne October 2000
which may lead to exposure
asphyxiating atmospheres.
or
Conventional indirect and direct fire
methods of smoke delivery are
inapropriate, because of the ballistic
hazards from smoke carrier or base
ejection shells and the fire hazards from
phosphorous ammunition.
The
commonly used hexacloroethane filling
poses an inhalation hazard also.
Fog oil, Polyethelyne Glycol and
Titanium Dioxide are preferred
obscurants for reduced inhalation
hazard and new materials such as micro
fibre and brass flakes are under
development to mask thermal viewers.
New pyrotechnic ammunition might be
designed for obscurant delivery, by
mortars, or simple launchers, using a
light projectile that is fitted with a
safety drogue chute.
This would
dispense many small burning pellets
that are bound by thermal insulation
which would reduce fire hazard.
The effect required is to be able to
rapidly and fully obscure sections of the
urban battlefield, and maintain that
condition until manouvre is completed.
Obscurants and delivery systems used
should pose little threat to civilians,
own troops and, for warfighting, not
breach chemical warfare conventions.
Dispersing smoke from vehicles or
smoke pots allows good control and
localisation of effects but does not
assure effects forwards or upwind of the
force. Unmanned vehicles probably
provide the simplest supplementation
method.
The wing tank dispenser
technology, developed for fighter
aircraft to simulate poison gas attack
could probably be adapted to lay almost
instant obscurant clouds by flying single
low passes at high speed
The structures of urban areas assist in
defining zones to be obscured and
reduce the effects of ambient winds,
however they can also cause local
dispersion and concentration effects
Operating in smoke will pose
considerable challenges, particularly for
dismounted soldiers. Fields of view are
still much narrower than natural vision
and using a weapon mounted viewer
3.3.1
Effect Requirements
Land Warfare Conference 2000
whilst moving is quite difficult. To
accommodate
this
limitation,
procedures are likely to require soldiers
deployed forwards to be coverd by
another behind who is in radio
communication and can overwatch.
The use of obscurants at night will
heighten psychological advantage and
reduce unintended exposure due to
cloud gaps.
As thermal imaging
eqipment becomes more wideley
available, smoke tactics might evolve to
surround normal smoke with thermal
imager opaque smoke.
Fighting obscured appears to offer an
assymetric advantage. Even a small
group of soldiers could feasibly move
across a hostile
major city if
obscuration could be maintained. The
concept is particularly attractive in
current strategic circumstances where
Australia may require a potent
intervention option. A relatively small
investment
that
equipped
a
company/squadron sized organisation
to fight obscured could only be
countered by much wider investment.
4. Fight by Proxy
4.1 Robots as enablers
The first military use of robotics was
probably by the Germans in WW2. The
Goliath, a small vehicle shaped like an
early British tank, controlled by a 400m
cable and packed with 85Kg of
explosives was used for assault
demolition tasks. In the 1970’s, the
British began using small tracked robots
with actuated devices for bomb disposal
purposes. Similar technology was then
used to produce remote controlled
Melbourne October 2000
mechanical mine clearing vehicles such
as the US Army Panther. This is based
on a M60 tank with the turret removed
that is fitted with mine rollers and is
radio controlled from a safe distance.
4.2 New Developments
Technological advances in processing
power, artificial intelligence and the
decrease in size and cost of electronic
equipment have opened up a whole
new field of military robotics. The US
military in particular are developing a
range of ground and air vehicles of
decreasing
size
and
increasing
capability. There are a number of
programmes specifically focussed on
the MOUT requirements.
The MPRS (man portable robot system)
provides small low cost model tank
sized devices with cameras for
inspection of underground systems.
Teleoperated vehicle control has now
been extended to a wide range of
military vehicles and mounted weapons
systems whilst autonomous systems are
being fielded for recconnaisance
purposes. The REMOTEC ANDROS is
similar to earlier bomb disposal
machines but specifically designed for
hazardous building search and clearance
tasks and is capable of unlocking a
door with a key.
4.3 Description of Concept
There are almost unlimited tasks for
robotic devices in MOUT. Most have
the potential to reduce vulneratbilitiy
and so increase reach. The difficulty is
determining where to invest. It is
logical to seek multiple roles, including
those for other terrain, and address
Land Warfare Conference 2000
Melbourne October 2000
greatest risks first. Historically the
greatest operational or tactical risk has
been from the major ambush. This
suggests that a platform able to prove
routes and threaten ambushing forces
with being cut off or destroyed would
be a high payoff system. Similarly, at
the minor tactical level the the greatest
risk occurs when teams are exposed on
the street outside objectives.
A
platform that carries out tasks requiring
such exposure would also be high
payoff.
smoke. It is desirable for the system
also to be able to inspect through
windows and to manouvre within
buildings.
The procurement of teleoperating
systems for the M113 vehicle and
weapons would appear to offer a robot
with combat power, without the
investment in a new platform. An
added tactical and logistic advantage is
the ability to interchange unmanned and
manned vehicles. This would be a
relatively low cost exercise using
mature technology proven in mine
clearing. The robot M113 vehicle could
be expected to be more durable than
many specialist devices, and with extra
armour on the engine compartment
would probably be very difficult to
diable.
The running costs would
probably be larger than dedicated
systems.
Each of the above concepts: fighting
protected, fighting obscured and
fighting by proxy offers increased
reach. If the concepts are integrated
synergies result.
Armour gains
increased psychological shock effect
within obscuration whilst vehicles and
dismounting
troops
are
further
protected.
Armoured
vehicles
themselves can be used to generate
smoke and provide a good platform for
thermal viewers. The enemy difficulty
of defeating protected vehilcles is
compounded by using unmanned
teleoperating systems for route proof
The procurement of a version of the
ECHIDNA bomb disposal robot would
have similar commonality and proven
technology advantages. The primary
requirements are to be able to mount a
weapon systems, including the Minimi
LSW and grenade launcher, place
external breaching charges and deploy
A small number of systems of this kind
would add capability on all complex
terrain and act as a force multiplier for
small elements.
5. Conclusion
The acquisition of capabilities as
described would, even if only provided
for a small force, offer the ability to
rapidly reach into a hostile urban
environment with a huge advantage,
rather than the current vulnerability.
Land Warfare Conference 2000
Melbourne October 2000
Appendix A: Explanation of the Hollow Charge
Warhead Mechanism and its Defeat
A.1.
Warhead Description
In a High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT)
or hollow charge warhead the explosive
surrounds an inverted cone of ductile
metal. As the explosive is detonated
from the rear, the huge pressures
generated around the cone deform the
metal and accelerate it in the direction
of least resistance. This forms a long
and thin rod of metal moving out of the
cone, sometimes referred to as a jet.
The tip of the jet travels at up to Mach
25 and the effects on target surfaces are
mainly kinetic.
The enormous
momentum of the metal jet imposes
plastic deformation on metal target
surfaces. Because the tip of the jet
travels faster than the rear, within a few
tens of centimeters the jet becomes
stretched then breaks up. Warhead
design requires detonation at an
optimum stand off and increasing the
distance of the warhead from the target
permits jet break-up and reduces
penetration.
A.2.
Defeat Methods
Defeating HEAT warheads with
homogenous armour is difficult even
exploiting sloping thickness. Warhead
penetration is roughly proportional to
charge diameter and warheads in the 6070mm range will readily penetrate in
the order of 300mm of RHAl: far more
than any practical AFV can carry over
most surfaces. There are four main
approaches to counter HEAT warheads.
Active protection detects an incoming
warhead and fires an explosive charge
in its path to break up or prematurely
detonate it. The remaining methods aim
to break up or degrade the jet. Passive
systems do this by exploiting the
distortions of the jet that occur at the
interface of materials of different
densities and angles. Such systems may
present hazards for crew and third
parties
Lighter passive applique systems seek
to detonate the warhead at increased
stand off distances and place laminates
(which may be angled) in the path of the
jet, in front of and behind the vehicle
armour wall. Typically this does not
defeat the jet but greatly reduces
penetration and behind armour effect.
Heavy passive complex armours such as
Chobham armour or that used on heavy
Israeli
vehicles
use
proprietary
combinations of materials of different
densities and shock transmitting
properties, sometimes including air gaps
and fuel storage. These armours are
capable of completely adsorbing the
attack of specified HEAT jets, will
withstand a series of adjacent attacks
and give good general ballistic
protection. They are however very
heavy and can only be fitted to vehicles
with tank type suspensions. The Israeli
Achzarit, for example, carries 14 tonnes
of additional armour
Explosive reactive armour provides an
array of modules over the armoured
Land Warfare Conference 2000
vehicle. The modules consist of
explosive material sandwiched between
armour material and are sited so that the
armour surfaces will be at an angle to
incoming warheads. When a warhead
detonates against a module, the jet tip
triggers detonation in the explosive
causing the armour to fly apart, moving
across and down the path of the jet and
breaking it up. Reactive armour is
much lighter than passive armour
equivalents. A suite giving frontal and
side protection on an M113 weighs in
the order of two tonnes. The detonation
Melbourne October 2000
of the protective module presents a
greater hazard to exposed crew or
personnel nearby than the warhead
alone does. Once a module has
detonated there is an unprotected area,
and this effect can be exploited by firing
explosive rounds to strip protection
away.
.
Land Warfare Conference 2000
3. References
i Schilling A. and Sims D. CAPTs, The Battle
for Jaffna, Field Artillery, April 1980
ii Task Force Ranger, a Case Study, George
B.Akers, National Security Program Office, Feb
2000
iii Rowland D, The Effect of Degradation on
the Urban Battle,Operational Research Society
1991
iv McLaurin R.D. et al Modern Experience in
City Combat US Army HE Lab 1987
v Campbell J.D. Task Organising for Urban
Combat, USAC&G SC 1976
vi Donnelly C. Soviet Techniques for Combat
in Built up Areas, International Defense Review
Feb1977.
vii Lynham J.M. Kings Ride V Initial
Impressions, Army Training News, April 1986
viii Vigor P.H. FIBUA: A Soviet View Pt 1
RUSI Jan 77
ix Eshel D. LTC, “Armoured Anti-Guerilla
Combat in South Lebanon”, ARMOUR, JulAug 1997, p 29.
Melbourne October 2000