Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
1
※Brief Analysis of Important Issues※
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in PostColor Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
Wei-fang Wang
(MTAC Counselor)
Abstract
Through two approaches of the US economic assistance to Central Asia
and anti-terrorism security strategies, this paper defines Mongolia as a part of
the US strategic deployment in Central Asia, and aims to explore the possibility
of Mongolia becoming a model of democracy for Central Asia in the aspects of
democracy and security and providing an auxiliary role to the US in terms of
regional security in Central Asia in the post-Color Revolution era. The
September 11 Incident has made Central Asia the common target between the
US, Russia, and China, and the Color Revolution has made the three countries
fighting over Mongolia. Central Asia is similar to Mongolia in that both are
geographically located between superpowers China and Russia. The pattern
through which Mongolia consolidates its cooperative relationship with the US, its
“Third Neighbor,” might provide a useful reference for Central Asia in
reconstructing strategies in dealing with the US, Russia, and China.
Key Words ： Color Revolution, the US and Mongolia, Central Asia and
Mongolia, the US and Central Asia
Ⅰ. Introduction
Color Revolution refers to Rose Revolution, Orange Revolution, and Tulip Revolution
that broke out in three republics in former Soviet Union by the names of Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan in January 2004, December 2004, and March 2005 respectively. It was
basically about the opposition in these countries taking to the streets and securing ruling
power from the ruling class through election. Western countries expected Color
Revolution to begin a new wave of democratization following the third wave
democratization in certain post-communist countries. However, there were scholars who
viewed Color Revolution as merely a product of the third wave democratization and as
1
such could not be expected to achieve much. Certain Chinese scholars even dubbed
1
Wu Yu-shan, “The Promises and Limitations of Color Revolutions,” Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No,2 (June 2007),
pp.67-112.
1
2 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
2
Color Revolution a form of street politic. No matter how Color Revolution was perceived,
one fact remained that the US had seen its military influence in Central Asia waning.
After the September 11 Incident, the US managed to build military bases in Manas,
Kyrgyzstan and in Khanabad, Uzbekistan. However, following a Shanghai Cooperation
Organization meeting in July 2005, the US only had one military base left in Central Asia:
3
the one in Kyrgyzstan. After the Cold War, the US, Russia, and China began to compete
for more influence over Central Asia. While the September 11 Incident was a major
4
turning point allowing the US to extend its influence over Central Asia, Color Revolution
might be seen as the beginning of waning US influence over Central Asia. It would be
natural for the US to rethink its Central Asia policies to deal with post-Color Revolution
situation, and any policy adjustment made by the US would naturally have some sort of
impact on China and Russia. As there are plenty of discussions on this subject, this paper
would like to focus on an often ignored neighbor of Central Asia—Mongolia, rather than
on China and Russia.
Geopolitically speaking, Mongolia and the five Central Asian countries are all
located between superpower neighbors China and Russia. A generalized definition of
5
Central Asia by UNESCO included Mongolia as part of Central Asia. However, after the
Cold War, practical considerations over international politics pushed Mongolia closer to
6
countries in northeast Asia, while the five Central Asian countries joined the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed after the dissolution of Soviet Union.
The area between northern China and southern Russia, including the territories of
Mongolia and the five Central Asian countries, was the site of US-Mongolia and ChinaRussia military exercises in recent years. These events included “Khan Quest 2007”
7
military exercise held by the US and Mongolia from July 26 to August 15, 2007 and
“The Peace Mission-2007” anti-terrorism exercise held by the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization led by Russia and China in Chelyabinsk, Russia and Urumqi, Xinjiang from
8
August 9 to 17, 2007. It seemed that Mongolia and the five Central Asian countries were
2
3
Ed. Liu Ming, Street Politics & Color Revolution (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, 2006).
“SCO: Shoring up The Post-Soviet Status Quo,”July 9, 2005, Eurasianet,
〈http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp070905.shtml〉
4
Wei-fang Wang, “Competitions between the US, Russia, and China in Central Asia: A Comparison of the Situation before and
after September 11 Incident,” 2005 Contemporary Mongolia and Asia Geopolitical Relationships—Democracy, Economy, and
Security Academic Forum (Taipei: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2003), pp. 183-223.
5
According to the earliest definitions given by UNESCO, Central Asia included the territories of northern Afghanistan, China
(Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu Hexi Corridor, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia), northwestern India, northern Iran, Mongolia,
northern Pakistan, and the five Central Asian countries. See L. I. MIROSHNIKOV, “Definition of Central Asia,” History of
Civilization of Central Asia, Vol.1 (Beijing: China Translation and Publishing Corporation, 2002), pp. 366-368.
6
Migeddorj Batchimeg,“East Asian Integration and Mongolia’s Participation,”Regional Security Issues and Mongolia, No.25:
U.S.-Mongolian Relations and Their Perspective Roles in Asia（ Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005）, P.25.
7
Around a thousand people from the US, Mongolia, and at least five countries of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, South Korea,
and Sri Lanka participated in the field training. “The US was launching wave after wave of military exercises around China, to
what end?” China Review News, July 25, 2007, ＜http://www.chinareviewnews.com＞.
8
The event involved six member states of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia sent 4700
2
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
3
seeing more and more military exercises launched by three superpowers the US, Russia,
and China. And the military exercises were much like competitions between the free or
partly free democratic country camp led by the US and the non-democratic country camp
9
led by China and Russia. It was this new and unusual development that inspired the
author of this paper to look into the role Mongolia might play in the US strategies in
Central Asia.
This paper centers on the situation after Color Revolution because the event marked
the beginning of a decrease in US influence in Central Asia, which had been growing
since the September 11 Incident. The major reason behind the decrease was that the
Central Asian countries blamed the US for secretly sparking Color Revolution. It was
Color Revolution that caused Kyrgyzstan to replace its long-serving political leader, who
had been in charge since dissolution of the Soviet Union. Alarmed by the example of
Kyrgyzstan, political leaders in Central Asia came to view the growing US influence with
suspicion, a development that had not been anticipated by the US, which had been trying
to advance democracy in these post-communist countries that had once belonged to the
Soviet Union. Mongolia, another post-communist country that played a more minor role
in the US global strategies, was able to enjoy a more stable democracy compared to postcommunist countries in Central Asia.
This paper focuses on changes in US strategies for Central Asia after Color
Revolution and demonstrates that advancing democracy and anti-terrorism were two of
the top priorities in US strategies for Central Asia. Assuming that the US was looking for
Central Asian allies who shared its belief in democracy and anti-terrorism, this paper
explored how the US wielded control in Central Asia through the means of economic
assistance and anti-terrorism deployment, while making informed guesses at what kind of
role Mongolia might play in US strategies for Central Asia. The US was not pleased with
most Central Asian countries’ attitude toward democracy and anti-terrorism. This paper
attempts to answer the question of whether the US, which had seen its influence waning
in Central Asia, can rely on Mongolia as a democratic ally against terrorism to reenter
Central Asia.
Ⅱ. Introduction to US Strategy for Central Asia after Color Revolution
After dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US strategies for Central Asia experienced
four stages of development as described by Chinese scholars. In the first stage which
people, China sent 1600, Kazakhstan sent more than 100, Kyrgyzstan sent more than 30, and Tajikistan sent 100. Uzbekistan
did not participate in field exercise. “China did not send Chengdu J-10 to SCO military training,” United Daily News, August 7,
2007, p. A15. “Xinjiang Riot the Scenario in China-Russia Military Exercise,” United Daily News, August 8, 2007, p. A15.
9
Of the countries involved in US-Mongolia military exercise, Cambodia (five points on civil liberties and six points on political
rights) was rated not-free, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were rated partly free (four points on civil liberties and four points on
political rights), Indonesia and Korea were rated free (three points and two points on civil liberties respectively and two points
and one point on political rights respectively) by Freedom House. Freedom House（ 2007）,
＜http://www.freedomhouse.org＞. Of the five Central Asian countries, only Kyrgyzstan was rated partly free. All the other four
were rated not free. See section two of this paper.
3
4 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
lasted from 1991 to 1996, the US supported Central Asian countries’ cause for
independence and denuclearization and started to work with these countries in various
fields. In the second stage which lasted from 1997 to 2000, the US interfered with almost
all aspects of Central Asia affairs. In the third stage which lasted from 2001 to 2004, the
US viewed Central Asia as a strategic base after the September 11 Incident. The fourth
10
stage began after the failed Color Revolution in 2005. The focus of the first stage was
pointed out by US Deputy Secretary of State S. Talbott in his speech at Johns Hopkins
University. President Bill Clinton’s Central Asia policies focused primarily on advancing
democracy, building free market economy, supporting peace and cooperation within the
11
region, and encouraging integration between Central Asia and the international society.
The second stage began when the US-led NATO conducted military exercises in Central
Asia in 1997, and when the five Central Asian countries secured NATO Partnership for
12
Peace membership in the same year. US strategies for Central Asia in this period
focused on advancing democracy, market-oriented reforms, introduction of western-style
13
political and military systems, and anti-terrorism and anti-drug smuggling. The pursuit
for democracy and free economy was the common objective in these two stages. While
the US did not elaborate on the need for Central Asia to participate in international affairs
in the first stage, it did stress the importance of anti-terrorism and getting along with
western societies for Central Asia in the second stage. In the third stage, the US clearly
made anti-terrorism its top priority following the September 11 Incident. The second
important objectives in this stage were economic and political reformed for Central Asia,
followed by the least important objective of security and development of Caspian Sea
14
energies. For the sake of anti-terrorism, the US managed to station troops in Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan and used Dushanbe Airport of Tajikistan for fuel supply. Kazakhstan
permitted emergency landing of US military aircrafts. The US increased assistance toward
Central Asian countries (See Table One, the amount of assistance in 2002 was the highest
15
since the September 11 Incident). At this point, advancing democracy and economic
10
Zheng Yu, “Changes of American Policy in Central Asia since Dissolution of the USSR (1991-2006),” Russian, Central Asian
& East European Studies, Issue 4, 2007, pp.54-66.
11
S. Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,“A Farewell to
Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,”July 21, 1997,
＜http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html＞
12
Tajikistan secured “Partnership for Peace” membership in 2002, while the other four Central Asian countries had secured the
membership in as early as 1997.
13
Cited form IB93108: Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, May 18, 2001.
14
On December 13, 2001, US Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones noted these three objectives while addressing the
US House Committee of Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus in a hearing. A. Elizabeth
Jones, “ U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation, ” Testimony to the Subcommittee, U.S. Senate, December 13, 2001, ＜
http:/www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm＞
15
The US provided assistance to Central Asia through the State Department, Freedom Support Act, USAID under the State
Department, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy. For the sake of comparison, only USAID assistance data
were cited here.
Jim Nichol,
4
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
5
reform for Central Asia was considered less important than anti-terrorism by the US. The
fourth stage occurred during the second term of US President George W. Bush, and
16
advancing democracy in Central Asia was reinstated as top priority, which gave rise to
Color Revolution and forced the US to adjust its strategies for Central Asia to focus on
17
security, energy, and political and economic reforms following the waning of its military
influence in Central Asia. Advancing democracy was considered the third priority at this
stage.
Table One: US State Department Financial Assistance to Central Asia since
1992
1992-2002
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Total
886
634
508
490
218
2736
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
90
95
219.8
141.5
18.1
564.4
92
56.6
86.1
49
11.1
294.8
74.2
50.8
50.6
50.7
10.4
186.1
53.2
50.4
91.6
59.9
16.3
271.4
50.43
38.02
20.02
30.87
7.65
146.99
(Million USD)
2006 compared
to 2005
-5.21%
-24.57%
-77.95%
-48.47%
-53.07%
-45.84%
Source: Fact Sheet 2006, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
＜http://www.state.gov＞. Fact Sheet 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, ＜http://www.state.gov＞
It should be concluded that the focus of Central Asia affairs for the US at various
stages included anti-terrorism and security, advancing democracy, and securing a share of
local energy. The priorities were subject to change based on the change in demand. After
Color Revolution, anti-terrorism once again became the top priority for the US, and
advancing democracy became the least important as the US did not want to sour its
relationship with Central Asian countries further in the aftermath of Color Revolution.
16
In his second inauguration speech, US President George W. Bush remarked that the US intended to advance and build
democracy in other countries. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address at the U.S. Capital, February 2, 2005,
＜http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2005/index.html＞
17
US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher confirmed this in a US House
Committee of Foreign Affairs hearing. U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities （Part II）, Richard A. Boucher,
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Statement to the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, April 26, 2006,
＜http:/www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/65292/htm＞
5
6 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Another important aspect is that the US made certain adjustments regarding
jurisdiction over Central Asia affairs. In the past Washington had regarded Central Asia
as a region closely related to Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States, and
therefore had put Central Asia affairs in the charge of Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs under the State Department. Yet by the end of 2005, around the time US troops
withdrew from Uzbekistan, the US government had heeded the “Great Central Asia”
strategy proposed by Professor S. Frederick Starr of Johns Hopkins University in the
summer of 2005, which was about designating Central Asia and Afghanistan the “Great
Central Asia” and using economic complementarity between Central Asia and South Asia
18
to combine the two regions into one. It was in line with this thinking that US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice, when speaking about the new Central Asia strategy adopted
by the US during a visit to Central Asia, stated for the first time in public that the US
should consider the issues of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia together. Later
the US State Department defined Central Asia as a new region and changed the “Great
Central Asia” strategy into the “Greater South Asia Project,” treating Central Asia,
19
Pakistan, and India as strategically part of the “Great South Asia. ” On February 16, 2006,
the US State Department appointed Richard Boucher as the new Assistant Secretary of
20
State in charge of Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. The positive side of this
project was that it could stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, create an extra channel for
transporting energy (energy from Central Asia could be carried from Afghanistan through
21
Pakistan to India), and reduce Central Asia’s dependency on Russia and China.
Eurasianet pointed out that the US was trying to move closer toward Central Asia and
22
South Asia and make Afghanistan its gateway to Central Asia and South Asia. While the
US made certain adjustments regarding jurisdiction over Central Asia affairs, the focus of
its Central Asia strategies would remain on security, energy, and democracy.
There are still uncertainties over exactly what role Mongolia should play to aid the US
in claiming a share of oil resources in Central Asia. Right now Central Asia is second only
to Persian Gulf on the US list of major oil suppliers. This paper would not focus on energy
issues, but would focus on how the US used economic assistance to get its way and how the
US weighed the importance of anti-terrorism and democracy. The key focus of this paper is
Mongolia’s role in the US strategic deployment in Central Asia. For the purpose of
18
S. Frederick Starr,“A Partnership for Central Asia,”Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.4 （July/August 2005）, pp.164-178.
19
The “Great Central Asia Project” focused more on Central Asia and Afghanistan and less on South Asia, while the “Great South
Asia Project” viewed South Asia and Central Asia as related and covered Afghanistan as well. Atajan IAZMURADOV,
“Greater South Asia-America’s New Regional Approach to Central and South Asia: How It Is Developing and What
Prompted It,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4（40）, 2006, p.84.
20
Atajan IAZMURADOV,“Greater South Asia-America’s New Regional Approach to Central and South Asia: How It Is
Developing and What Prompted It,”pp.79-90.
21
Atajan YAZMURADOV,“The U.S.’s Greater South Asia Project: Interests of the Central Asian Countries and of the Key
Non-regional Actors,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5（41）, 2006, pp.81-94.
22
Joshua Kucera,“Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States toward South Asian Allies,”Eurasianet, April 28, 2006,＜
http://www.eurasianet.org.tw:8080/FCKM/inter/research/report_detail.jsp?report_id=2179＞
6
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
7
comparison, this paper would look at the situation from Mongolia’s perspective and explore
first the issue of democracy, then the economic assistance strategies directed at Central Asia,
and finally anti-terrorism and security issues, as opposed to the Central Asia strategic
priorities (anti-terrorism, energy, and democracy) set by the US.
Ⅲ. Democratic Development: Mongolia as an Example for Democracy for Central Asia
The Freedom House, a US-based non-governmental organization, rated the
performance of Mongolia and five Central Asian countries in the areas of civil liberties
and political rights based on survey reports on a scale of one to seven. A score of 1.0 to
2.5 points are considered "Free"; 3.0 to 5.0, "Partly Free"; and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free." The
results were summarized in Table Two. After the third wave democratization, Mongolia
and the five Central Asian countries which had broken free the Soviet Union had began
the move toward democracy. Mongolia had been classified as a “free” country for five
years. Of the five Central Asian countries, only Kyrgyzstan earned the rating of “partly
free” in 2006 thanks to Color Revolution in 2005. The rest four countries had all been
rated “not free” for five years.
Table Two: Freedom House Ratings for Mongolia and Five Central Asian
Countries
（2003 to 2007）
2003
2004
2005
2006
Ratings Civil
Political Ratings Civil
Political Ratings Civil
Political Ratings Civil
Political Ratings
liberties rights
liberties rights
liberties rights
liberties rights
Free
2
2
Free
2
2
Free
2
2
Free
2
2
Free
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
5
6
5
6
5
6
5
6
free
free
free
free
free
Not
Not
Not
Partly
Partly
5
6
5
6
5
6
4
5
free
free
free
free
free
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
7
free
free
free
free
free
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
5
6
5
6
5
6
5
6
free
free
free
free
free
Not
Not
Not
Not
Not
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
free
free
free
free
free
Source: Freedom House (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007),
＜http://www.freedomhouse.org＞
Michael McFaul, an expert on democratic transition for post-communist countries,
classified 28 post-communist countries into three types based on styles of political power
7
8 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
distribution between old and emerging elite in the period of transition. According to him,
Mongolia had seen an equal distribution of political power between old and emerging
elite and therefore had become a democratic country. Of the five Central Asian countries,
only Tajikistan was deemed to have managed an equal distribution of political power,
while the rest four countries were deemed to have favored political elite of the old
communist regime. McFaul concluded that the five Central Asian countries had become
authoritarian states. His classification of the 28 countries is summarized in Table Three.
Table Three: Political Transition Results for 28 Post-Communist Countries
Authoritarian
Emerging elite claiming a
larger share of political
power
Partly Democratic
Democratic
Croatia
Armenia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Czech Republic
Georgia
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Equal distribution of political Tajikistan
power between old and
emerging elite
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Albania
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Mongolia
Azerbaijan
Old elite of the former
communist regime claiming a
larger share of political
power
Belorussia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Macedonia
Yugoslavia /Serbia
Romania
Source: Michael McFAUL,“The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the
Postcommunist World,”World Politics, No.54 (January 2002), p.227.
As indicated in Tables Two and Three, two ways of evaluation yielded similar
results regarding the situation in Mongolia and the five Central Asian countries. In other
words, Mongolia is widely seen as a democratic country because it has seen several
8
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
9
23
turnovers of ruling elite through regular presidential election. While there might be
periods of political impasse when the government was being assembled, the Mongolians
were always able to come up with a legal solution to conflicts based on their new
democratic Constitution. The Mongolians never allow any political incident or other
factors to affect the timetable of their presidential and parliamentary elections. The five
Central Asian countries, on the other hand, were still governed by the same old group of
24
communist elite or their protégé despite the transition toward democracy. Their
presidents were often able to amend the Constitution to extend their term of office or even
25
grant themselves lifelong tenure.
Mongolia, as a democratic country, was likely to be more stable as an ally than the
five Central Asian countries to the US, and the relationship was less likely to be affected
by breaches of human rights. The five Central Asian countries, despite also facing
political and economic transitions like Mongolia following the third wave
democratization, had a less smooth ride of political transition than Mongolia, which
26
increased the likelihood of instability in their relationship with the US. In October 2005,
US Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld remarked during a visit to Mongolia
that it was important to build Mongolia into an example for democracy for Central Asian
27
countries to follow. What was implied was that Mongolia’s democracy was successful
enough to be an example to Central Asian countries. Democracy is part of criteria the US
considered in decision-making over economic assistance toward Central Asia.
Ⅳ . A Comparison of US Economic Assistance Strategies toward Central Asia and
Mongolia: Democracy and Security Concerns
In the words of Chinese experts specializing in US foreign assistance, the US is
actually using foreign assistance as a bargaining chip in foreign relations with the ultimate
goal of implementing security strategies, economic strategies, and appearance strategies
(advancing democracy). Security consideration has been the major driving force behind
23
Mongolia enacted a new constitution in 1992 and held its first presidential election in 1993. P. Ochirbat of the opposition
Democratic Coalition won the election. He was previously a member of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (a
communist party). Subsequent presidential elections in 1997, 2001, and 2005 were won by N. Bagabandi and N. Enkhbayar of
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party respectively.
24
Of the presidents of the five Central Asian countries, only Askar Akayev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, was not a member
of the former communist ruling elite. He had been the director of National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic. Wu
Yu-shan, “the Promises and Limitations of Color Revolutions,” pp.83-91.
25
President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, and President Imomali Rahmonov of
Tajikistan all extended their term of office from five years to seven years. Turkmenistan amended its constitution to give
President Saparmurat Niyazov lifelong term. For details regarding political transitions in Mongolia and Central Asia, see Weifang Wang, “A Comparison of Political Transitions in Mongolia and Central Asia,” 5th Taiwan-Central Asia Forum (Chungli,
Taiwan: Ching Yun University Institute of European and Asian Studies), November 23 and 24, 2005.
26
Following the “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, protestors took to the streets in Andijian, Uzbekistan in May
2005. Uzbekistan government was strongly censured by the West for the breach of human rights in sending troops to crash the
protesters, who had been accused of collaborating with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) by Uzbekistan government.
27
Liu qing-cai, Gao Ke et al., A Study on Geopolitics in Northeast Asia and Geopolitical Strategies for China (Tianjin: Tianjin
People’s Press, 2007), p. 309.
9
10 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
the US foreign assistance projects since the end of Cold War. These foreign assistance
28
projects included economic assistance, military assistance, and various loans. In fact, it
is natural for any country in the world to use foreign assistance to fulfill its various intents
and purposes. The US, as a post-Cold War superpower, would certainly design its global
assistance projects based on its foreign policies. The nature of US economic assistance
projects toward Central Asia and Mongolia would change along with the change of its
considerations and needs.
In the US, foreign assistance projects are the responsibilities of the US government,
the US Congress, non-governmental organizations, and certain financial institutions. One
of the major institutions responsible for administering foreign assistance projects is the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It deals with almost all
29
kinds of non-military foreign assistance projects. A comparison between USAID
assistance projects toward Central Asia and Mongolia would be presented in this section
to understand how anti-terrorism considerations affected economic assistance projects.
The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), set up by US President George W. Bush in
2004, is an example of how the US favored Mongolia over Central Asia because of
Mongolia’s democracy.
(1) The United States Agency for International Development
The USAID had been providing economic assistance to the five Central Asian
countries since 1992 to facilitate the development of democratic system, health, and
economic growth. Details of assistance are presented in Table 4.
Table Four: The United States Agency for International Development’s
Assistance toward the Five Central Asian Countries from 1992 to 2006
（million USD）
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan
1992 to
2006
500
360
300
240
73
Source: USAID: Central Asia,＜http://cemtralasia.usaid.gov＞.
Differences in USAID assistance toward the five Central Asian countries before and
after Color Revolution in 2005 are presented in Table Five. In 2004, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, two countries where the US had military bases, received the most assistance
from USAID. However, USAID reduced the amount of assistance for all the five
countries after 2006, with Uzbekistan taking the largest cut (50.3%). This happened
around a time when the US withdrew troops from Uzbekistan in 2005. (As indicated in
Table One, Uzbekistan also suffered the largest cut in US State Department assistance out
28
Ed. Zhou Hong, Foreign Aid and International Relations, (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002), pp. 161-213.
29
Ed. Zhou Hong, Foreign Aid and International Relations, pp. 171-172.
10
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
11
of the five countries in 2005-2006.) US increased its assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2007
because US troops were still paying a large rent to use one of the country’s airports. A
comparison of USAID assistance toward the five Central Asian countries in 2007 would
demonstrate that Uzbekistan suffered the largest cut (a 58.2% decrease from 2004 to 2007)
of the five. This more or less indicated that the withdrawal of US troops from Uzbekistan
was a major blow to US influence in Central Asia and seriously affected US assistance
toward Uzbekistan. The increase in US assistance toward Tajikistan in 2007 was probably
caused by the fact that the US and Tajikistan held their first joint anti-terrorism exercise in
the southwestern part of Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, from January 28 to March 9,
30
2007. Eurasianet reported that the 2008 budgetary estimate released by Bush
administration in 2007 indicated that US assistance toward Central Asia would be cut by
24%. The reason given by the State Department was that Uzbekistan would be taking the
largest cut because the country had been resisting reforms that were part of the conditions
of assistance. Kazakhstan, remarked the State Department, had been rendered very rich by
oil and therefore was not in serious need of assistance. This left Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan taking the largest share of assistance. Martha Brill Olcott, a research
fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pointed out that Bush
administration’s assistance toward Central Asia would serve little purpose, adding that the
US must do something about its waning influence in Central Asia or face greater risks in
31
the region. The Eurasianet report confirmed the fact that the US was in the habit of
making adjustments to its foreign assistance projects based on strategic considerations
regarding anti-terrorism and security. As countries in Central Asia perceived Color
Revolution as a form of democratic reform secretly supported by the US, it was natural
for them to choose to cool down their relationship with the US in order to hold on to their
ruling power. This ended with the result of US troops withdrawing from Uzbekistan
following Color Revolution. A frustrated US then responded by massively cutting its
economic assistance toward Central Asia but extending preferential treatment to partners
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The adjustments were not so much caused by failures to
advance democracy in Central Asia as caused by frustrations over anti-terrorism
deployment. Advancing democracy is merely an excuse used by the US to adjust its
Central Asia strategies. That was why US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed
during a trip to Central Asia in October 2005 that the US should allow Central Asia some
32
time rather than pushing too hard for democratic and economic reforms in the region.
From these words, it was clear that the US would not focus too much on democracy in
Central Asia for the time being so as not to make the situation worse.
30
Roger Madermott, “ U.S. Military Needs Long-term Stay in Manas, ” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 30, 2007, ＜
http://www.jamestown.org＞
31
Joshua Kucera,“US Aid to Central Asia: The Rhetoric and the Numbers Are at Odds with One Another,”Eurasianet,
February, 6, 2007,＜http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020607_pr.shtml＞
32
Jonathan Beale,“Rice’s Soft Tone in Central Asia,”BBC News, October 10, 2005,
＜http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4327560.stm＞.
11
12 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Table Five: The United States Agency for International Development’s
Assistance toward the Five Central Asian Countries from 2004 to 2007
2004
2005
2006
2006
compared
to 2004
2007
2007
compared
to 2004
（thousand USD）
Turkmenistan
5,690
6,505
4,950
Kazakhstan
34,086
26,690
24,750
Kyrgyzstan
36,721
35,126
24,750
Uzbekistan
35,874
31,495
17,820
Tajikistan
31,452
41,261
27,244
-27.4%
-32.6%
-50.3%
-13.4%
-13.0%
19,000
32,000
15,000
35,000
5,000
-44.3%
-12.9%
-58.2%
11.3%
-12.1%
Source: USAID:Budget,＜http://www.usaid.gov＞.
USAID assistance toward Mongolia totaled USD 150 million from 1991 to 2004, but
had been on the decline starting 2004 (down by about 24.6% from 2004 to 2007). While
the total paled in comparison to the amount received by each of the four of the five
Central Asian countries, it still exceeded the amount received by Turkmenistan. In
addition, Mongolia took a less steep cut in assistance compared to Turkmenistan. (See
Table Six) Mongolia had participated in US anti-terrorism campaign immediately after
the September 11 Incident by sending troops to join US peacekeeping forces, sending
troops to join US anti-terrorism alliance against Afghanistan and Iraq, and taking part in
33
US military exercises in Southeast Asia. However, USAID had failed to issue a more
generous reward to Mongolia in the form of economic assistance. This was due to the fact
that Mongolia does not have the same kind of geographical proximity to Afghanistan and
Iraq as Central Asia and therefore was of less value to the US in its anti-terrorism
deployment.
Table Six: The United States Agency for International Development’s
Assistance toward Mongolia from 2004 to 2007
Private
sector
economic
growth
Effective
33
2004
2005
2006
2007
（thousand USD）
Change
7,241
7,220
5,025
5,600
-22.7%
2,700
2,700
2,400
1,900
-29.6%
Wei-fang Wang, “The US-Mongolia Relations under Anti-terrorism,” Issues & Studies, 2005, Vol.44, No.2, pp. 65-101.
12
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
13
governance
Total
9,941
9,920
7,425
7,500
-24.6%
Source: USAID: Mongolia,＜http://www.usaid.gov/mn＞.
(2) Millennium Challenge Account
The Millennium Challenge Account is a fund set up by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) in January 2004 at the request of US President George W. Bush with
the purpose of improving quality of life in developing countries. The MCC selected
countries out of a pool of countries with a GDP of less than USD 1,415 based on criteria
such as “ruling justly,” “encouraging economic freedom,” and “investing in people.”
Mongolia was named a MCA recipient country in as early as 2004, and Mongolia had
34
received more MCA support compared to the five Central Asian countries.
Of the Commonwealth of Independent States including the five Central Asian
countries, only 6 in 2004 were being considered for MCA funding (8 in 2005 and 10 in
2006) (See Table Seven). In the end only Armenia and Georgia were picked as MCA
recipients. Kyrgyzstan qualified for MCA Threshold Program in 2006 because it
outperformed other Central Asian countries in civil society and freedom of press and
35
because it was home to the only remaining US military base in Central Asia. Of the five
Central Asian countries, only Uzbekistan was not considered for MCA funding. Both the
USAID and the MCC excluded Uzbekistan, though their reasons were different. The
MCC attached greater importance to democracy than anti-terrorism and security in
36
choosing MCA recipients, which was why Mongolia was selected. Kyrgyzstan was the
only one of the five Central Asian countries to qualify for MCA Threshold Program.
While this might have something to do with the fact that Kyrgyzstan was rated partly free
by Freedom House in 2006, a more probable reason behind Kyrgyzstan’s qualification
was that the US still had a military base there. It was clear that national interests played a
big part in US considerations over economic assistance.
Table Seven: Millennium Challenge Account Selection Results for the
Commonwealth of Independent States in 2004, 2005, and 2006
2004
Armenia＊
2005
Armenia＊
2006
Armenia＊
34
For more details on the MCA and Mongolia’s MCA funding, see Wei-fang Wang, “Examining the US-Mongolia Relations
from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),” Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation,
Vol.13, No.4, July 2004, pp.17-28.
35
Maks KOBONMAEV, “ The Commonwealth of Independent States on the Millennium Challenge Account Selection
Indicators: Governance Is the Main Challenge,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.2 （38）, 2006, pp.113-114.
36
Democracy was merely one of the criteria of selection. To qualify for MCA funding, countries would have to have a GDP of
less than USD 1,415. According to World Bank’s 2006 data, Mongolia had a GDP of USD 880, Kazakhstan had a GDP of
USD 3790, Kyrgyzstan had a GDP of 490, Uzbekistan had a GDP of 610, Turkmenistan had a GDP of 650 (year 2000 figures),
and Tajikistan had a GDP of USD 390. The World Bank Group, ＜http:devdata.worldbank.org＞(retrieved September 17,
2007).
13
14 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Azerbaijan
Georgia＊
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Azerbaijan
Georgia＊
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Belorussia
Georgia＊
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan★
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
＊Countries selected as MCA recipients ★ Countries qualified for MCA Threshold Program
Source: See Maks KOBONMAEV,“The Commonwealth of Independent States on the Millennium Challenge
Account Selection Indicators: Governance Is the Main Challenge,”Central Asia and the Caucasus,
No.2 (38), 2006, p.110.
Generally speaking, the US attached more importance to anti-terrorism than
democracy in assessing economic assistance toward Central Asia. As for assistance
toward Mongolia, the US sometimes valued democracy and anti-terrorism equally and
sometimes valued democracy over anti-terrorism. The priorities were subject to
change depending on the differences between countries and between regions. While
the US provided most Central Asian countries more assistance than it did Mongolia, it
urged the Central Asian countries to look to Mongolia as an example for democracy.
Mongolia’s value to the US was more obvious only when the US had to change its
anti-terrorism strategies in Central Asia.
Ⅴ. Mongolia’s Supporting Role in US Anti-Terrorism Strategies in Central Asia
After Color Revolution, the US saw the waning of its hard-earned military influence
in Central Asia. This drove the US to cut its assistance toward Central Asia and come up
with a new set of anti-terrorism strategies. Two of the most important developments had
something to do with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and US troops’ strategic
deployment in Mongolia.
(1) Keeping Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Check: Mongolia as a Gateway into
the SCO
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization evolved from the Shanghai Five, an
organization created specifically for settling border disputes. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization was officially created in 2001 with signing statements. Current member
states include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Countries
given observer status include Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Iran. According to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter released in 2002, the primary mission of the
SCO switched to safeguarding the Central Asia and conducting anti-terrorism campaigns.
14
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
15
China and Kyrgyzstan held their first bilateral joint military exercise at their border on
October 10 and 11, 2002. It was the first time for Chinese troops to conduct a military
37
exercise with foreign troops on foreign land. It was then that the SCO took on the new
responsibility of military peacekeeping. China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Russia assembled a group of more than a thousand military men to conduct their first
multilateral anti-terrorism exercise in the territories of China and Kazakhstan from August
6 to August 12, 2003. It was the first time China opened its doors to foreign troops for the
38
purpose of military exercise. Since then, SCO member states have been holding military
exercises every single year. China and Russia held their first joint military exercise known
as Peace Mission 2005 since the onset of their diplomatic ties from August 18 to August
25, 2005. Some believe that one of the strategic considerations behind this particular
39
military exercise was to counter US predominance in Central Asia. Since Color
Revolution, the SCO under the leadership of China and Russia seemed to be holding joint
military exercises more frequently. China, Russia, and Central Asia all wanted to use the
SCO to curb the spread of Color Revolution.
For a long time, the US had been stressing the importance of security, democracy,
and energy for the Commonwealth of Independent States. The view shared by members
of the Commonwealth was that Color Revolution was a manifestation of the US’s
intention to advance democracy in the Commonwealth. From 1993 to 2003, the US
provided up to USD 9 billions in political appropriation to countries within the
Commonwealth. In the Advance Democracy Act of 2005, the US Congress classified
countries into “completely democratic,” “semi-democratic,” and “non-democratic.” The
Commonwealth of Independent States, including countries of Central Asia, were
classified as “semi-democratic” and in need of assistance toward democratic
transformation because they had “powerful president, small parliament, and weak
40
government. ” In the roundtable conference called by Far East Branch of Russian
Academy of Sciences on May 20, 2005, the consensus was that a certain country had
launched the Color Revolution with the intention of “creating a ‘power belt’ along
southern Russia that stretches from Turkey in the west to Mongolia in the east, a belt that
passed though Iraq, Iran, which the US was contemplating to invade, Afghanistan, and
37
United Daily News, October 12, 2002, p. A13.
38
China National Defense, August 12, 2003, Special Issue on Military Affairs.
39
China-Russia military exercises were directed at increasing US influence in Central Asia, and also at the Taiwan Strait issue
and the Korean Peninsula issue. See Willy Lam, “ Hu’s Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. ‘ Containment
Strategy’,”China Brief, Vol.5, Issue 15, July 5, 2005,＜http://www.jamestown.org＞. For analysis on China-Russia military
exercises, see Wei-fang Wang, “A Brief Analysis of China-Russia-Mongolia Relationship based on China-Russia Military
Exercise,” 2005 Contemporary Mongolia and Asia Geopolitical Relationships—Mongolia-Russia Relationship Academic
Forum (Taipei: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, September 24 and 25, 2005).
40
Wu Da-hui, “The Triple Purposes of US Instigating ‘Color Revolution’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States—China
and Russia’s Priorities in Resisting ‘Color Revolution’ under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Russian Central Asian
& East European Studies, 2006 Issue 2, pp.1-3.
15
16 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Central Asia countries that were SCO members states with whom this particular country
41
was trying to befriend. ” What was implied was that the US had used Color Revolution to
extend its influence to a “belt” in southern Russia that stretched from Turkey to Mongolia.
Before Color Revolution, Russia exercised considerable influence over security affairs in
Central Asia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) under the
Commonwealth of Independent States. After Color Revolution, Russia had high hopes of
using the SCO for political maneuvering and found it necessary to join hands with China
to use the SCO to consolidate their powers in Central Asia to counter the US. Political
leaders of Central Asia, on the other hand, regarded the “democratic transformation”
strategy introduced by the US the greatest threat to their regime. The Central Asia
42
Democracy and Human Rights Bill proposed by the US in February 2006 was another
sign that the US had yet to give up pushing for democratic reform in Central Asia. This
further caused countries in Central Asia to pin their hopes on the SCO as an effective
counterforce against the US.
According to Washington Observer weekly, the SCO’s military exercises were
significant in that they had facilitated military cooperation between China and Russia. The
SCO intended to use the military exercises to counter the West on diplomatic and
strategic fronts. Moscow wanted to show its military muscles to NATO, the EU, and the
43
US, while China wanted to respond to the US’s attempt to expand its influence globally.
As members of the SCO drew closer to each other, an alarmed US was beginning to
monitor the SCO’s future development.
In the beginning, the SCO had attracted little attention from the US. For a long time
since 1996, the US had never uttered any response to SCO’s official statements. Then
after 2005, the US suddenly expressed a wish to become an observer under the SCO. This
unexpected gesture was caused by the fact that after Mongolia became an SCO observer
in 2004, Pakistan, India, and Iran followed suit in 2005, which meant the SCO had
expanded its influence to the whole Central Asia and South Asia. The US’s request was
denied on the ground that it was located in neither Central Asia nor South Asia. The US
then resorted to cozying up to certain SCO members. In a 2006 hearing regarding the
SCO, US officials stressed the importance of exercising a higher degree of influence over
SCO member states that were on friendly terms with the US, such as Kazakhstan and
Mongolia. In fact, the US had put their ideas into practice even before the hearing. An
41
Wu Da-hui, “The Triple Purposes of US Instigating ‘Color Revolution’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States—China
and Russia’s Priorities in Resisting ‘Color Revolution’ under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” pp. 4-5.
42
The bill was proposed by US State Department on February 28, 2006 with the view of advancing democracy in the five Central
Asian countries and providing economic support for democratic and human rights development in Central Asia. Jim Nichol,
“Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,”Congress Research Service, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division, November 16, 2006,
＜http://opencrs,cdt.org＞
43
“China and Russia Held Joint Military Exercise, Central Asia the Center of Global Strategies,” United Daily News, July 3, 2007,
p A.16.
16
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
17
example was that President George W. Bush passed by Mongolia during his visit to East
Asia in November 2005 and made himself the first US President ever to visit Mongolia.
Then in May 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney, during a visit to Europe and Asia, made
Kazakhstan his only stop in Central Asia. The US State Department reorganized in 2006
44
and created the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. These initiatives were all
directed against the SCO.
It was reported that Mongolia was likely to become the SCO’s seventh member state
45
in the near future. The US had been eyeing to cozy up to Mongolia and India. The SCO
held a summit in Bishkek, the capital city of Kyrgyzstan, in August 2007. All SCO
member states and observers, including Iran, said they would participate. Eurasia Daily
Monitor believed that Iran’s participation was a sure sign that an anti-west force was
46
growing in Eurasia. As Iran was branded one of the “Axis of Evil” by the US, it would
be in the interests of the US to exercise influence over the SCO through one of the
members or observers. And Mongolia was the best candidate in this regard.
(2) The US-Mongolia joint military exercise designated Mongolia part of the Northeast
Asian defense network, making Mongolia the US’s foothold in Central Asia.
Mongolia is the model for democracy for countries in Central Asia. Mongolia was
courted by the US who tried to exercise influence over the SCO through Mongolia. After
Color Revolution, the US sensed the need to secure a foothold in Central Asia, which
made Mongolia even more valuable as a potential partner for anti-terrorism for the US.
Since the September 11 Incident, the US and Mongolia have been seeing more and more
military cooperation. The military cooperation was further enhanced by Color Revolution.
Mongolia participated in US military exercises in Asia Pacific, including the annual
US-Japan and US-South Korea military exercises, as well as military exercises jointly
held between the US and Southeast Asia countries under the code names of “Qalat,”
“Cobra Gold,” “Exercise Tiger,” and “Shoulder to Shoulder.” These two types of military
exercises involved about a dozen countries including South Korea, Japan, India, Thailand,
Mongolia, and Australia. Mongolia’s participation more or less indicated its status as one
of the Asian allies of the US. Many even described the group as the Asian equivalent of
47
NATO.
44
“US: China-Russia military exercise was not about anti-terrorism, but about showing off military muscles,” CRI Online, July 4,
2007,
＜http://www.tycool.com/2007/0704/00014.html＞
45
“US: China-Russia military exercise was not about anti-terrorism, but about showing off military muscles,” CRI Online, July 4,
2007,
＜http://www.tycool.com/2007/0704/00014.html＞
46
Erica Marat,“SCO’s International Importance Surges as Iran, Turkmenistan Wish to Join,”Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 29,
2007。
＜http://www.jamestown.org＞
47
“US Intended to Contain China with Intensive Military Exercises,” International Herald Leader, July 28, 2007,
＜http://www.wenweipo.com/news_print.phtml?news_id=WY0707280001＞
17
18 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Since 2003, the US and Mongolia have been holding the “Khan Quest” military
exercise on an annual basis. “Khan Quest” is merely another step taken by Mongolia after
the Cold War toward adjusting its military strategies and extending military cooperation.
Mongolia has always insisted on securing as many as footholds as possible but strike no
alliance when it comes to military and diplomatic affairs. Mongolia practiced the policy
of maintaining balanced relationships with China and Russia. Under its “third neighbor
policy,” Mongolia sought to build relationships with military powerhouses other than the
two superpowers China and Russia in order to keep China and Russia in check. To the US,
“Khan Quest” was more like a “strategic military exercise” and as such carried little
48
substantive significance. What the US really wanted was to make Mongolia a training
base for the Asia Pacific joint peacekeeping force in the Pacific Combat Zone. It was in
line with this thinking that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during a visit
to Mongolia in 2005, pledged on behalf of the US government to provide Mongolia with
more than USD 10 million dollars in funds to build the Tavan Tolgoi (“Five Hills”)
Training Center in Mongolia to be used by the Pacific Combat Zone troops. The center
would become an inland training base in Asia for US troops and would allow the US to
react quickly to unexpected incidents in Central Asia and Northeast Asia. Since the US
had always wanted to make Mongolia part of its ballistic missile defense system, the US
troops were likely to step up their non-combat military operations in the Pacific Combat
49
Zone.
As many as 18 countries featured in the 2006 US-Mongolia military exercise. The
event was evidently a response to the 2005 China-Russia military exercise. With “Khan
Quest” becoming an annual routine, the US succeeded in securing a foothold two or three
50
kilometers away from Beijing. Once the US sets up a military base in Mongolia, it can
make up for the loss in Ukraine and allow the US to keep the China-Russia alliance in
check.
After Color Revolution, US troops completely withdrew from Uzbekistan at the end
of 2005. Now Manas, Kyrgyzstan is their only remaining military base in Central Asia.
After falling out with the US, Uzbekistan improved its relationship with Russia in 2006
51
by joining the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) and CSTO. Before the SCO
48
Rong Zhen-hua, “US-Mongolia Military Exercise Meant to Infiltrate Asia,” News of the World, August 18, 2006, p. 17，＜
http://www,atchinese.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20924&Itemid＞
49
“Seven countries including Mongolia and the US held joint military exercise, and the US troops learned the ropes of fighting on
mountains,” Singtaonet, August 25, 2006,
＜http://www.singtaonet.com:82/glb_military/t20060825_308925.html＞
50
“Hu Jintao Quizzed with Two Military Exercises during Visit to USA,” Central News Agency, March 31, 2006,
＜http://www.grandtrial.org/Chinese/newsdetailp.php?id=3859＞
51
Roger McDermott,“Tashkent Uses‘Democracy Carrot’to Entice West,”Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 18, 2007,＜
http://www.jamestown.org＞ Roger McDermott,“Russia Reclaiming Central Asia as Sphere of Influence,”Eurasia Daily
Monitor, March 13, 2007。
＜http://www.jamestown.org＞
18
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
19
summit was held on August 16, 2007, CSTO Secretary General paid a visit to Kyrgyzstan
in May. Then the President of Kyrgyzstan set up a task force to see whether the existence
of US troops in Manas was in the best interests of Kyrgyzstan. While parliament members
of Kyrgyzstan called for the shutdown of Manas military base, they regarded the presence
of Russian troops in Kent, Kyrgyzstan as a fulfillment of CSTO contract, not a sign of
52
foreign invasion. Apparently the US was close to losing their only military base in
Central Asia.
After Color Revolution, Russia and China used the CSTO and SCO respectively to
53
expand their influence in Central Asia and elbow the US out of their way. While the US
responded with a large-scale US-Mongolia military exercise, US-Mongolia relationship
could only survive in the context of China-US relationship, to quote the words of a
Mongolian expert. China would never endanger its relationship with the US to get
between the US and Mongolia, and the US would never get too close to Mongolia at the
expense of China-US relationship. As such, Mongolia had to sustain a balanced
54
relationship with either of these two superpowers. Yet the post-Cold War climate and
China’s quest for peace all looked favorable to the development of US-Mongolia
relationship. Mongolia could play a supporting role in the US anti-terrorism strategic
deployment in Central Asia.
Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks
The September 11 Incident and the resulting anti-terrorism and security concerns
gave rise to an unprecedented height in cooperation at all levels between the US and
Central Asia. And while geopolitically speaking, Mongolia was of lesser importance
compared to Central Asia in the US anti-terrorism strategic deployment, Mongolia still
managed to forge a strategic partnership with “third neighbor” the US in the war against
terrorism out of a shared belief in democracy. Speaking at a conference on the subject of
US-Mongolia relationship, Mongolian expert Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis argued that an
important condition of US-Mongolia relationship was that Mongolia had to remain a
democratic country. In addition, the US and Mongolia had to share common beliefs in
democracy and be able to work together in economic and cultural affairs in order to
55
remain as partners on the security front. This argument pretty much confirmed
52
53
Erica Marat,“Kyrgyz Officials, Citizens Oppose U.S. Base,”Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 24, 2007。
＜http://www.jamestown.org＞
Roger McDermott,“Russia Using CSTO to Counterbalance NATO,”Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6, 2007。
＜http://www.jamestown.org＞
54
Migeddorj Batchimeg,“Mongolia-China Relations and Its Implications on Mongolia-US Relations,”Regional Security Issues
and Mongolia, No.26, “A Comprehensive U.S.-Mongolia Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities,”Proceedings of the
Bilateral Conference （Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies）, February 28-March 1, 2005, pp46-58.
55
Munkh-Ochir D. khirghis,“U.S.-Mongolian Comprehensive Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges,”Regional Security
Issues and Mongolia, No.26: A Comprehensive U.S.-Mongolia Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities,”Proceedings of
the Bilateral Conference （Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies）, February 28-March 1, 2005, pp31-45.
19
20 Bi-monthly Journal on Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation, Vol.17, No.2
Mongolia’s role in the US strategic deployment in Central Asia. In other words, Mongolia
may be used by the US as a fine example for democracy to be displayed to Central Asia.
In fact, the US often noted Mongolia’s democracy when providing economic assistance to
Central Asia.
After Color Revolution, the SCO started to play a more prominent role between
Central Asia and China and Russia. China and Russia forged more cooperative
relationships in Central Asia than in any other regions of the world because China and
Russia regarded the US selling of democracy in Central Asia a serious threat to their
interests in the region. As many as two thirds of SCO member states are Asian or
European countries, including the world’s largest oil producing country and major oil
consuming countries. The US has made its relationship with SCO the top priority in its
Central Asia affairs. According to Richard Weitz, Senior Advisor at the US Project on
National Security Reform, since China had yet to form a relationship with NATO, the US
may secure more channels for dialogue with China and Russia by making contact with the
SCO and CSTO through NATO. However, NATO members may prefer to deal with SCO
56
members over CSTO members. Many members of SCO have been working closely with
China and Russia since Color Revolution. Mongolia, as an observer under the SCO, is a
better option as the bridge between the US and the SCO compared to other observers such
as India, Pakistan, and Iran. This is one of the roles Mongolia may play in support of the
US anti-terrorism campaign in Central Asia.
As the US sees its influence waning in Central Asia, Mongolia is seeing an increase
in its strategic importance. Some Chinese experts argued that the US supported
democratic reform in Mongolia because it wanted to include Mongolia into its strategic
57
network in Asia. The US wanted Mongolia both as an ally in dealing with military
affairs in Central Asia and as a tool in upsetting the relationship between Central Asia and
China and Russia. In the future the US may even use the Tavan Tolgoi (“Five Hills”)
Training Center as a military base to deal with Central Asia. This is another role
Mongolia may play in support of the US anti-terrorism campaign in Central Asia
In a nutshell, the September 11 Incident had brought the US closer to Central Asia to
the benefit of Mongolia. However, Color Revolution caused the relationship between the
US and Central Asia to cool down and consequently, Mongolia became of greater
importance to the US. As for the future direction of US strategies in Central Asia, the
hawkish members of Washington believed that the SCO had the potential of becoming an
anti-NATO force. Others cited the conflict of security interests between members of the
58
SCO to argue otherwise. No matter how the situation of the SCO would turn out, it
56
Richard Weitz,“Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia,”The Washington Quarterly, Vol.29, No. 3, Summer 2006,
pp.155-167.
57
Liu qing-cai, Gao Ke et al., A Study on Geopolitics in Northeast Asia and Geopolitical Strategies for China, p. 308.
Conflicts between SCO members included the lack of trust between China and Russia, as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
58
20
Mongolia’s Role in US Strategic Deployment in Central Asia in Post-Color Revolution Era: Democracy and Security
21
remained a fact that the US selling of democratic and economic reforms in Central Asia
was less successful than expected, and as a result the US security deployment in Central
Asia was affected. Martha Brill Olcott, a research fellow at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, argued at a hearing of the US House Committee of Foreign Affairs
that the US should continue providing assistance to support civic society and economic
development in Central Asia regardless of Central Asia’s past performance in human
59
rights because when the “sticks” failed, it would be best to switch to the “carrots. ” The
idea of this argument is that the US should not keep its distance from Central Asia just
because of the frustration caused by Color Revolution. While the US may make
adjustments to its Central Asia strategies, its ultimate goal of selling democratic and
economic reforms to Central Asia would remain unchanged. This gives Mongolia room to
exercise its influence. In fact, the Central Asia shares the same predicament with
Mongolia of having to survive between superpowers China and Russia and having to rely
on a third party to keep China and Russia in check. The US has both the intent and the
ability to provide strategic deployment. Now that Mongolia has managed to cooperate
with “third neighbor” the US on the issues of democracy, anti-terrorism, and security to
keep China and Russia in check, political leaders of Central Asia should consider
following suit and working with the US in certain fields to enjoy the same benefits. No
matter what kind of influence the US would command in Central Asia, it remains certain
that Mongolia will still be a strategic partner for the US. The waning of US influence in
Central Asia only raised the possibility for Mongolia to become an anti-terrorism base for
the US. The September 11 Incident may have turned Central Asia into a battlefield
between the US, Russia, and China, and Color Revolution may have caused Mongolia to
become another battlefield between the same three superpowers.
fighting each other to be the leader of Central Asia. Joshua Kucera,“Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summiteers Take
Shots
at
US
Presence
in
Central
Asia,
”
Eurasianet,
August
20,
2007,
＜
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082007a_pr.shtml＞. Forward also reported that as the alliance of
Central Asia was derived from by failed US policies, it was unlikely for the SCO to become a military alliance. The US
branded the SCO anti-US because it wanted to direct attention away from its failed Central Asia policies. M.K. Bhadrakumar,
“Rebel with a Cause: Born of America’s indifference, Eurasian Alliance Comes of Age,”Forward, June 30, 2006.
＜http://www.forward.com/articles/rebel-with-a-cause＞.
59
Martha Brill Olcott, “ U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities, ” Testimony prepared for the Committee on
International Relations, April 26, 2006。
＜http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/ros042606.pdf＞
(This paper was reviewed at the 550th MTAC commissioner meeting and the 1103rd
MTAC administrative meeting on October 8, 2007. Revision was completed on
October 15, 2007.)
21