Trustees of Princeton University
Hypotheses on Misperception
Author(s): Robert Jervis
Source: World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 454-479
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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HYPOTHESES
I
ON MISPERCEPTION
By ROBERT JERVIS*
N determining
how he will behave,an actormusttryto predict
hisvalues.The
willaffect
howothers
willactandhowtheiractions
andoftheirintentions.
developan imageofothers
actormusttherefore
one; theactor
turnouttobe an inaccurate
Thisimagemay,however,
andtheir
bothothers'
actions
misperceive
ofreasons,
may,fora number
noteI wishto discussthetypesofmisperIn thisresearch
intentions.
whichstatestendto make.The
ceptionsof otherstates'intentions
it to combutherewe can consider
is complex,
conceptof intention
prisethewaysin whichthestatefeelsit will actin a widerangeof
and
Thesewaysofactingusuallyarenotspecific
future
contingencies.
actor
plans.For manyreasonsa nationalor individual
well-developed
but this
may not knowhow he will act undergivenconditions,
cannotbe dealtwithhere.
problem
I. PREVious TREATMENTS OF PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
in their
havediscussed
misperception
historians
diplomatic
Although
have
relations
of international
students
events,
of specific
treatments
haveapplied
twosetsofscholars
thistopic.However,
ignored
generally
thatflowedwithinand between
contentanalysisto thedocuments
WorldWar I. But thedata
in thesixweekspreceding
governments
formin a waythatdoesnotproduce
havebeenputintoquantitative
and intentions
and thatmakesit
accuratemeasuresof perceptions
on
useful
evidence
to
misperception.1
impossible gather
whohaveexplicitly
dealtwithgeneral
The secondgroupoftheorists
in
of those,
consists
international
relations
ofmisperception
questions
Kenneth
likeCharlesOsgood,AmitaiEtzioni,and,to a lesserextent,
have
analyzedthe cold war in
Bouldingand J.David Singer,who
* I am grateful
Affairs
forresearchsupport.
to theHarvardCenterforInternational
Studies
An earlierversionof this researchnote was presentedat the International
Associationpanel of the New England PoliticalScience Associationin April i967.
fromcommentsby RobertArt,AlexanderGeorge,Paul Kecskemeti,
I have benefited
Paul Leary, Thomas Schelling,JamesSchlesinger,Morton Schwartz,and Aaron
Wildavskv.
1 See, forexample,Ole Holsti,RobertNorth,and RichardBrody,"Perception
and
Politics
International
Actionin the I9I4 Crisis,"in J. David Singer,ed., Quantitative
(New York i968). For a fullerdiscussionof theStanfordcontentanalysisstudiesand
Studyof
see my "The Costsof theQuantitative
thegeneralproblemsof quantification,
ApRelations,"in Klaus Knorrand JamesN. Rosenau,eds., Contending
International
Politics(forthcoming).
proachesto International
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
455
termsof a spiralof misperception.2
This approachgrowspartlyout of
themathematical
theoriesof L. F. Richardson3
and partlyout of findings of social and cognitivepsychology,
many of which will be discussedin thisresearchnote.
These authorsstatetheircase in general,if not universal,terms,but
do not providemanyhistoricalcases thatare satisfactorily
explained
by theirtheories.Furthermore,
they do not deal with any of the
numerousinstancesthatcontradicttheirnotionof the self-defeating
aspectsof the use of power.They ignorethe factthatstatesare not
individualsand that the findingsof psychologycan be applied to
organizations
theirtheoretical
onlywith greatcare. Most important,
analysisis forthemostpartofreducedvaluebecauseit seemslargelyto
be a productof theirassumptionthatthe SovietUnion is a basically
behavioris a productof
status-quo
powerwhoseapparently
aggressive
fearof theWest.Yet theysupplylittleor no evidenceto supportthis
of opinionbetween
view. Indeed,the explanationforthe differences
and theproponents
thespiraltheorists
ofdeterrence
liesnotin differing
generalviewsof international
valuesand morality,4
relations,
differing
or differing
methodsof analysis,5
but in differing
of Soviet
perceptions
intentions.
II. THEORIES-NECESSARY
AND DANGEROUS
of theirapproach,thesewritershave touched
Despitethelimitations
on a vitalproblemthathas not been given systematic
treatment
by
ofinternational
theorists
relations.The evidencefrombothpsychology
and history
overwhelmingly
supportstheview (which maybe labeled
tend to fitincominginformation
Hypothesis i) thatdecision-makers
into theirexistingtheoriesand images. Indeed, theirtheoriesand
imagesplay a large part in determining
what theynotice.In other
words,actorstend to perceivewhat theyexpect.Furthermore(Hypothesisia), a theorywill have greaterimpacton an actor'sinterpretationof data (a) the greaterthe ambiguityof the data and (b) the
2See, for example,Osgood,An Alternative
to War or Surrender(Urbana i962);
Etzioni,The Hard Wayto Peace (New York i962); Boulding,"NationalImagesand
International
Systems,"
Journalof ConflictResolution,iii (June I959), I20-3I; and
Singer,Deterrence,
ArmsControl,and Disarmament(Columbusi962).
3 Statistics
of Deadly Quarrels(Pittsburgh
i960) and Armsand Insecurity
(Chicago
For nonmathematicians
i960).
a finesummaryof Richardson's
workis AnatolRapoport's"L. F. Richardson's
Mathematical
Theoryof War," journal of ConflictResolution,I (SeptemberI957), 249-99.
4 See PhilipGreen,Deadly Logic (Columbusi966); Green,"Methodand Substance
in theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics,xvi (Julyi964), 642-67;and RobertA. Levine,
"Fact and Moralsin theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics,xiv (Januaryi962), 239-58.
5 See AnatolRapoport,
and Conscience(New York i964).
Strategy
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456
WORLD POLITICS
thedegreeofconfidence
higher
withwhichtheactorholdsthetheory.6
Formanypurposes
we canusetheconcept
ofdiffering
levelsofperceptualthresholds
to deal withthefactthatit takesmore,and more
unambiguous,
information
foran actorto recognizean unexpected
phenomenon
thanan expectedone. An experiment
by Brunerand
Postmandetermined
"thattherecognition
threshold
for. . . incongruousplayingcards(thosewithsuitsand colorreversed)is significantly
higherthanthethreshold
fornormalcards."7
Not onlyare
peopleable to identify
normal(and therefore
expected)cardsmore
quicklyandeasilythanincongruous
(and therefore
unexpected)
ones,
butalsotheymayat first
takeincongruous
cardsfornormalones.
we shouldnotassume,
However,
as thespiraltheorists
oftendo,that
it is necessarily
irrational
foractorsto adjustincoming
information
to
fitmorecloselytheirexisting
beliefsand images.("Irrational"
here
describes
actingunderpressures
thatthe actorwouldnot admitas
ifhewereconscious
ofthem.)AbelsonandRosenberg
legitimate
label
as "psycho-logic"
thepressure
to createa "balanced"cognitive
structure-i.e.,onein which"all relations
among'goodelements'
[in one's
attitude
are positive(or null), all relationsamong'bad
structure]
elements'
are positive(or null), and all relations
betweengood and
bad elements
are negative(or null)." Theycorrectly
showthatthe
"reasoning
[thisinvolves]
wouldmortify
a logician."'Butthosewho
havetriedto applythisand similarcognitive
theories
to international
relations
haveusuallyoverlooked
thefactthatin manycasesthereare
and theprocesses
important
logicallinksbetweentheelements
they
describe
whichcannotbe called"psycho-logic."
(I am hereusingthe
term"logical"not in thenarrowsenseof drawingonlythoseconclusionsthatfollownecessarily
butratherin the
fromthepremises,
senseofconforming
to generally
of
rulesforthetreating
agreed-upon
For example,
is displayed
evidence.)
Osgoodclaimsthatpsycho-logic
whentheSovietspraisea manor a proposaland peoplein theWest
reactbydistrusting
theobjectof thispraise.'Butif a personbelieves
thattheRussiansareaggressive,
it is logicalforhimto be suspicious
oftheirmoves.Whenwe saythata decision-maker
"dislikes"
another
6
Floyd Allport,Theoriesof Perceptionand the Conceptof Structure(New York
1955), 382; Ole Holsti, "CognitiveDynamicsand Images of the Enemy,"in David
Finlay,Ole Holsti,and RichardFagen,Enemiesin Politics(Chicago i967), 70.
7 Jerome
A Paradigm,"
ofIncongruity:
Brunerand Leo Postman,"On thePerceptions
(Durham,N.C.,
in JeromeBrunerand David Krech,eds.,Perceptionand Personality
I949),
2IO.
8 RobertAbelsonand MiltonRosenberg,
BehavioralScience,
"SymbolicPsycho-logic,"
iII
(JanuaryI958), 4-5.
9 P. 27.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
457
statethisusually
thatthatotherstatehaspolicies
meansthathebelieves
conflicting
withthoseofhisnation.Reasoning
andexperience
indicate
tothedecision-maker
thatthe"disliked"
stateis apttoharmhisstate's
Thus in thesecases thereis no need to invoke"psychointerests.
logic,"andit cannotbe claimedthatthecasesdemonstrate
thesubstitution
of"emotional
forrational
consistency
consistency.'"10
The question
oftherelations
beliefs
amongparticular
andcognitions
canoften
beseenas partofthegeneral
topicoftherelation
ofincoming
bitsof information
to thereceivers'
alreadyestablished
images.The
needtofitdataintoa widerframework
ofbeliefs,
evenifdoingso does
notseemtodo justicetoindividual
is not,or at leastis notonly,
facts,
a psychological
drivethatdecreases
ofourperceptions
theaccuracy
of
to thelogicofinquiry."1
theworld,butis "essential
Factscan be inand indeedidentified,
terpreted,
onlywiththeaid ofhypotheses
and
is impossible,
Pureempiricism
theories.
and it wouldbe unwiseto
in thelightof everybitof information
revisetheories
thatdoesnot
tothem.12
No hypothesis
canbe expected
easilyconform
toaccount
for
andifa prevailing
all theevidence,
viewis supported
bymanytheories
andbya largepoolof findings
it shouldnotbe quicklyaltered.
Too
canbe as bad as toomuch.13
littlerigidity
Thisis as truein thebuildingofsocialand physical
scienceas it is
10ibid., 26.
11I haveborrowedthisphrasefromAbrahamKaplan,who uses it in a different
but
relatedcontextin The Conductof Inquiry(San Franciscoi964), 86.
12 The spiraltheorists
are not theonlyonesto ignorethelimitsof empiricism.
Roger
Hilsmanfoundthatmostconsumers
and producers
of intelligence
feltthatintelligence
shouldnot deal withhypotheses,
but shouldonlyprovidethe policy-makers
with "all
the facts"(StrategicIntelligenceand National Decisions [Glencoe I956], 46). The
closeinterdependence
betweenhypotheses
and factsis overlookedpartlybecauseof the
with "policypreferences."
tendency
to identify
"hypotheses"
13 Karl Deutschinterestingly
discussesa relatedquestionwhenhe argues,"Autonomy
. requiresbothintakefromthe presentand recallfrommemory,and selfhoodcan
be seenin just thiscontinuous
balancingof a limitedpresentand a limitedpast....
is possibleif eitheropennessor memoryis lost.. . . To
self-determination
No further
ceaseto be able to takein new information],
theextentthat[systems
theyapproachthe
behaviorof a bulletor torpedo:theirfutureactionbecomesalmostcompletely
dean organization
termined
by theirpast.On theotherhand,a personwithoutmemory,
withoutvaluesor policy. . . -all theseno longersteer,but drift:theirbehaviordepends littleon theirpast and almostwhollyon theirpresent.Driftwoodand the
. . ." (Nationalbulletare thuseach theepitomeof anotherkindof loss of self-control
ism and Social Communication
[Cambridge,
Mass., I954], i67-68). Also see Deutsch's
makes a
The Nervesof Government
(New York i963), 98-I09, 200-256. A physicist
similarargument:"It is clearthatif one is too attachedto one's preconceived
model,
one will miss all radicaldiscoveries.It is amazing to what degreeone may fail to
whichdoes notfittheinitialimage.... On theother
an observation
register
mentally
and pursueseveryhithertounknownphenomenon,
hand,if one is too open-minded
one is almostcertainto lose oneselfin trivia" (MartinDeutsch,"Evidenceand Inferencein NuclearResearch,"in Daniel Lerner,ed., Evidenceand Inference[Glencoe
I958], I02).
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458
WORLD POLITICS
inpolicy-making.14
Whileitis terribly
difficult
toknowwhena finding
throws
seriousdoubton accepted
theories
and shouldbe followed
up
and wheninsteadit was causedby experimental
mistakes
or minor
in thetheory,
errors
it is clearthatscientists
wouldmakeno progress
iftheyfollowed
ThomasHuxley'sinjunction
to "sitdownbeforefact
as a merechild,be preparedto giveup everypreconceived
notion,
followhumbly
natureleads,oryouwilllearnnothing."1
wherever
As MichaelPolanyiexplains,
"Itistrueenoughthatthescientist
must
be prepared
to submitat anymoment
to theadverseverdict
of observationalevidence.
Butnotblindly.... Thereis alwaysthepossibility
that,as in [thecasesoftheperiodic
system
and thequanofelements
tumtheory
oflight],a deviation
maynotaffect
theessential
correctness
of a proposition....The processof explaining
awaydeviations
is in
factquiteindispensable
to thedailyroutine
ofresearch,"
eventhough
thismaylead to themissingof a greatdiscovery.16
For example,in
i795, theastronomer
Lalandedidnotfollowup observations
thatcontradicted
theprevailing
andcouldhaveledhimto discover
hypotheses
theplanetNeptune."7
Yet we shouldnot be too quick to condemnsuchbehavior.As
ThomasKuhnhasnoted,"Thereis no suchthingas research
without
counter-instances."'8
If a setofbasictheories-what
Kuhncallsa paradigm-hasbeenable to accountfora massof data,it shouldnotbe
trifled
with.As Kuhnputsit: "Lifelong
lightly
resistance,
particularly
fromthosewhoseproductive
careers
havecommitted
themtoan older
tradition
ofnormalscience[i.e.,science
within
theaccepted
paradigm],
is nota violation
ofscientific
standards
butan indexto thenatureof
scientific
research
itself.
The sourceofresistance
is theassurance
that
theolderparadigm
willultimately
solveall itsproblems,
thatnature
14 Raymond
Bauer,"Problemsof Perception
and theRelationsBetweenthe U.S. and
theSovietUnion,"Journalof ConflictResolution,
v (Septemberi96i), 223-29.
15 Quotedin W. L. B. Beveridge,
The ArtofScientific
Investigation,
3rd ed. (London
1957), 50.
16 Science,Faith,and Society(Chicago i964), 31. For a further
discussionof this
problem,see ibid., i6, 26-41,90-94; Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London 1958), 8-I5,
30, 143-68, 269-98, 3Io-II; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution
(Chicago i964); Kuhn, "The Functionof Dogma in Scientific
Research,"in A. C.
Crombie,ed., Scientific
Change (New York 1963), 344-69;the commentson Kuhn's
paperby Hall, Polanyi,and Toulmin,and Kuhn's reply,ibid.,370-95.For a related
discussionof thesepointsfroma different
see NormanStorer,The Social
perspective,
Systemof Science(New York i960), ii6-22.
17 "He foundthattheposition
of one starrelativeto others. . . had shifted.
Lalande
was a good astronomer
and knew thatsucha shiftwas unreasonable.
He crossedout
his firstobservation,
put a questionmarknextto the secondobservation,
and let the
mattergo" (JeromeBruner,JacquelineGoodnow,and George Austin,A Study of
Thinking[New York i962], o05).
18 The Structure
of Scientific
Revolution,
79.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
459
canbe shovedintotheboxtheparadigm
at times
provides.
Inevitably,
thatassurance
andpig-headed
as indeed
ofrevolution,
seemsstubborn
itsometimes
becomes.
Butitis alsosomething
more.Thatsameassuranceiswhatmakesnormalscience
orpuzzle-solving
science
possible."1
Thusitis important
toseethatthedilemmaofhow"open"tobe to
newinformation
is onethatinevitably
at underplaguesanyattempt
in whichevidence
in anyfield.Instances
standing
seemstobe ignored
or twistedto fittheexisting
theorycan oftenbe explainedby this
dilemmainsteadofby illogicalor nonlogical
psychological
pressures
trueofdecision-makers'
toward
Thisis especially
consistency.
attempts
toestimate
theintentions
ofotherstates,
sincetheymustconstantly
take
account
ofthedangerthattheotherstateis trying
to deceivethem.
discussedthusfar,together
The theoretical
framework
with an
examination
of manycases,suggests
and de2: scholars
Hypothesis
cision-makers
areapttoerrbybeingtooweddedtotheestablished
view
andtooclosedtonewinformation,
as opposedto beingtoowillingto
altertheirtheories.20
Another
wayofmakingthispointis toarguethat
andexpectations
actorstendtoestablish
theirtheories
In
prematurely.
politics,
thisis often
ofcourse,
necessary
becauseoftheneedforaction.
Butexperimental
thatthesametendency
indicates
evidence
alsooccurs
ontheunconscious
andPostman
level.Bruner
foundthat"perhaps
the
ofincongruous
greatest
singlebarrier
to therecognition
stimuli
is the
tofixate
tendency
forperceptual
hypotheses
a minimum
after
receiving
ofconfirmation....
there
had
occurred
in
Once
thesecasesa partial
confirmation
ofthehypothesis
... itseemedthatnothing
couldchange
thesubject's
report."21
9lIbid.,150-5I.
Requirements
of effective
politicalleadershipmay lead decision-makers
to voice
fewerdoubtsthantheyhave aboutexistingpoliciesand images,but thisconstraint
can
Similarcalculationsof politicalstrategy
onlypartiallyexplainthisphenomenon.
may
contribute
to severalof the hypotheses
discussedbelow.
21 P. 221. Similarly,
in experiments
dealingwith his subjects'perceptionof other
people,CharlesDailey foundthat "premature
judgmentappearsto make new data
harderto assimilatethan when the observerwithholdsjudgmentuntil all data are
seen.It seemsprobable. . . thatthe observermistakeshis own inferences
for facts"
of PrematureConclusionUpon the Acquisitionof Understanding
of a
("The Effects
Person,"Journalof Psychology,
xxx [January1952], I49-50). For othertheoryand
evidenceon thispoint,see Bruner,"On PerceptualReadiness,"Psychological
Review,
LXIV (March I957),
123-52;
Gerald Davidson, "The NegativeEffectsof Early Exxxxii (Junei964), 278posureto SuboptimalVisual Stimuli,"Journalof Personality,
95; AlbertMyers,"An ExperimentalAnalysisof a Tactical Blunder,"Journalof
LXIX (Novemberi964), 493-98;and Dale Wyattand
Abnormaland SocialPsychology,
Journalof Abnormal
or Hypothesis,"
Donald Campbell,"On theLiabilityof Stereotype
XLIV (October 1950),
and Social Psychology,
496-500. It should be noted that this
more likely(David Braybrookeand
tendencymakes "incremental"
decision-making
CharlesLindblom,A Strategyof Decision [New York i963]), but the resultsof this
fromhis goals.
processmaylead theactorfurther
20
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460
WORLD POLITICS
However,when we apply theseand otherfindingsto politicsand
discusskindsof misperception,
we shouldnot quicklyapplythe label
of cognitivedistortion.
We shouldproceedcautiouslyfortwo related
reasons.The firstis that the evidenceavailable to decision-makers
almostalwayspermitsseveralinterpretations.
It shouldbe notedthat
thereare casesof visualperceptionin whichdifferent
stimulican produce exactlythe same patternon an observer'sretina.Thus, for an
observer
usingoneeyethesamepatternwouldbe producedby a sphere
thesize of a golfball whichwas quite closeto theobserver,
by a baseball-sizedspherethatwas further
away,or by a basketball-sized
sphere
stillfurtheraway. Withoutotherclues,the observercannotpossibly
determinewhichof thesestimulihe is presentedwith,and we would
notwantto call his incorrect
perceptions
examplesof distortion.
Such
cases,relatively
rarein visualperception,
are frequentin international
relations.The evidenceavailableto decision-makers
is almostalways
veryambiguoussinceaccuratecluesto others'intentions
are surrounded bynoise22
and deception.In mostcases,no matterhow long,deeply,
and "objectively"
the evidenceis analyzed,people can differin their
interpretations,
and there are no general rules to indicatewho is
correct.
is that
The secondreasonto avoid the label of cognitivedistortion
the distinction
betweenperceptionand judgment,obscureenoughin
individualpsychology,
is almostabsentin the makingof inferences
in
international
politics.Decision-makerswho reject informationthat
contradicts
theirviews-or who developcomplexinterpretations
ofitoftendo so consciouslyand explicitly.Since the evidenceavailable
containscontradictory
to make any inferencesrequires
information,
thatmuch information
be ignoredor given interpretations
thatwill
seemtortuousto thosewho hold a different
position.
Indeed,ifwe consideronlytheevidenceavailableto a decision-maker
at the timeof decision,the view laterprovedincorrectmay be supportedby as much evidenceas the correctone-or even by more.
Scholarshave oftenbeen too unsympathetic
withthepeoplewho were
it is frequently
difficult
to point
provedwrong.On closerexamination,
todifferences
betweenthosewho wererightand thosewho werewrong
and willingnessto
withrespectto theiropennessto new information
modifytheirviews.WinstonChurchill,for example,did not openmindedlyvieweach Nazi actionto see if theexplanations
providedby
theappeasersaccountedforthedatabetterthanhis ownbeliefs.Instead,
22 For a use of this conceptin politicalcommunication,
see RobertaWohlstetter,
Pearl Harbor (Stanfordi962).
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
461
intohis
information
he fitted
eachbitofambiguous
likeChamberlain,
the
shouldnotleadus tooverlook
Thathewascorrect
ownhypotheses.
toproducecognitive
anduseoftheory
ofanalysis
factthathismethods
fromthoseoftheappeasers.23
differ
didnotbasically
consistency
in influencing
of expectations
A consideration
of the importance
of
beliefin theprevalence
thatthewidespread
alsoindicates
perception
or at leastmaybe basedon inthinking"
maybe incorrect,
"wishful
between
on theinteraction
literature
adequatedata.The psychological
is immenseand cannotbe treatedhere,butit
and perception
affect
strong
wereconsidered
thatat first
shouldbe notedthatphenomena
oftencan be better
on perception
evidencefortheimpactof affect
Thus, in
of expectations.24
the influence
treatedas demonstrating
ofthe
casesliketheUnitedStates'misestimation
relations,
international
glance
in CubainAprili96i, whichmayseemat first
climate
political
mayinsteadbe moreadethinking,
ofwishful
tohavebeeninstances
(e.g.,
heldby thedecision-makers
quatelyexplainedby thetheories
Of course,
desires
mayhave
areunpopular).
Communist
governments
butsinceso many
expectations,
byinfluencing
an impactonperception
of
thenetinfluence desiresmaynot
affect
expectations,
otherfactors
begreat.
andinternational
relations
Thereis evidence
frombothpsychology25
seemtobe more
clash,expectations
anddesires
thatwhenexpectations
TheUnitedStateswouldliketobelievethatNorthVietnam
important.
or thattheUSSR is readyto giveup whatthe
is aboutto negotiate
butambiguous
is itsgoalofworlddomination,
UnitedStatesbelieves
23 Similarly,
RobertCoulondre,theFrenchambassadorto Berlinin 1939, was one of
thefewdiplomatsto appreciatetheNazi threat.Partlybecauseof his earlierservicein
He
agreement.
sensitiveto thethreatof a Berlin-Moscow
theUSSR, "he was painfully
thatHitlerhad not attackedRussia in his Reichstagaddress
notedwithforeboding
of April28.... So it wentall springand summer,the ambassadorrelayingeach new
evidenceof the impendingdiplomaticrevolutionand adding to his admonitionshis
(FranklinFord and Carl Schorske,"The Voice in the
pleasfordecisivecounteraction"
Wilderness:RobertCoulondre,"in GordonCraig and Felix Gilbert,eds., The Diplobut it is difficult
werecorrect,
mats,Vol. III [New York i963] 573-74).His hypotheses
betweenthe way he and thoseambassadorswho were incorrect,
to detectdifferences
However,to the
information.
notedand interpreted
likeNevilleHenderson,selectively
of Hitler'sintentions,
the appeasers'perceptions
extentthatthefearof war influenced
thatwas not presentin their
theappeasers'viewsdid have an elementof psycho-logic
opponents' position.
Error on the Part of Human
24See, for example,Donald Campbell,"Systematic
and Control,i (1958), 346-50; and
Information
Systems,"
Links in Communications
in
Analysisof MotivationalFactorsin Perception,"
Leo Postman,"The Experimental
JudsonS. Brown,ed., CurrentTheoryand Researchin Motivation(Lincoln,Neb.,
I953),
59-I08.
Bias as Relatedto
25Dale Wyattand Donald Campbell,"A Studyof Interviewer
Journalof Opinionand
and Own Opinions,"International
Expectations
Interviewer's
AttitudeResearch,iv (SpringI950), 77-83.
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462
WORLD
POLITICS
evidenceis seento confirm
theoppositeconclusion,
whichconforms
totheUnitedStates'expectations.
sensiActorsareapttobe especially
tiveto evidence
ofgravedangeriftheythinktheycan takeactionto
protect
themselves
againstthemenaceonceithasbeendetected.
III. SAFEGUARDS
Can anything
thenbe said to scholarsand decision-makers
other
than"Avoidbeingeither
tooopenortooclosed,
butbe especially
aware
ofthelatterdanger"?Although
decision-makers
willalwaysbe faced
and
withambiguous confusing
evidenceand will be forcedto make
inferences
aboutotherswhichwill oftenbe inaccurate,
a numberof
safeguards
maybe suggested
whichcouldenablethemto minimize
theirerrors.
First,andmostobvious,
decision-makers
shouldbe aware
thattheydo notmake"unbiased"
interpretations
of eachnewbitof
incoming
information,
butrather
areinevitably
heavilyinfluenced
by
thetheories
theyexpectto be verified.
Theyshouldknowthatwhat
often
andunambiguous
inference
mayappeartothemas a self-evident
seemsso onlybecauseoftheirpreexisting
To someonewitha
beliefs.
different
thesamedata mayappearto be unimportant
or to
theory
Thus manyeventsprovideless indesupportanotherexplanation.
forthedecision-makers'
pendent
support
imagesthantheymayat first
realize.Knowledgeof thisshouldlead decision-makers
to examine
thatothers
morecloselyevidence
theirviews.
believecontradicts
containconSecond,decision-makers
shouldsee if theirattitudes
sistent
orsupporting
thatarenotlogically
beliefs
linked.Thesemaybe
oftruepsycho-logic.
nor
Whileit is notlogically
examples
surprising
is itevidence
ofpsychological
pressures
tofindthatpeoplewhobelieve
thatRussiais aggressive
areverysuspicious
ofanySovietmove,other
kindsofconsistency
aremoresuspect.
For example,
mostpeoplewho
feelthatitisimportant
fortheUnitedStatestowinthewarinVietnam
alsofeelthata meaningful
is possible.
victory
And mostpeoplewho
feeldefeatwouldneither
U.S.
national
endanger
norbe costly
security
in termsofothervaluesalsofeelthatwe cannotwin.Although
there
areimportant
thetwopartsofeachofthese
logicallinkages
between
views(especially
theories
of guerrilla
through
warfare),
theydo not
seemstrong
enoughto explainthedegreeto whichtheopinionsare
in Finlandin thewinterof 1939,thosewhofelt
correlated.
Similarly,
thatgraveconsequences
wouldfollowFinnishagreement
togiveRussia
a military
base also believedthatthe Sovietswouldwithdraw
their
demandif Finlandstoodfirm.And thosewho feltthatconcessions
wouldnotleadtolossofmajorvaluesalsobelievedthatRussiawould
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HYPOTHESES
ON MISPERCEPTION
463
ifneedbe.26In thiscountry,
fight
thosewhofavored
a nucleartestban
tendedto arguethatfalloutwas veryharmful,
thatonlylimitedimprovements
in technology
wouldflowfromfurther
testing,
andthata
testbanwouldincrease
thechancesforpeaceandsecurity.
Thosewho
opposedthetestbanwereapttodisagree
on all threepoints.
Thisdoes
notmean,of course,thatthepeopleholdingsuchsetsof supporting
viewswerenecessarily
wrongin anyone element.The Finnswho
wantedtomakeconcessions
totheUSSR wereprobably
inboth
correct
partsof theirargument.
Butdecision-makers
if
shouldbe suspicious
theyholda position
in whichelements
thatarenotlogically
connected
support
thesameconclusion.
This condition
is psychologically
comandmakesdecisions
fortable
easiertoreach(sincecompeting
valuesdo
nothavetobe balancedoffagainsteachother).The chancesarethus
considerable
thatatleastpartofthereasonwhya personholdssomeof
theseviewsis relatedto psychology
and notto thesubstance
of the
evidence.
Decision-makers
shouldalsobe awarethatactorswhosuddenly
find
themselves
havingan important
sharedinterest
withotheractors
havea
tooverestimate
tendency
thedegreeofcommon
This
interest
involved.
is especially
tendency
strongforthoseactors(e.g.,theUnitedStates,
at leastbeforei950) whosebeliefsaboutinternational
relations
and
morality
implythattheycan cooperate
onlywith"good"statesand
thatwiththosestatestherewillbe no majorconflicts.
On theother
of limitedcooperation
hand,statesthathaveeithera tradition
with
others(e.g.,Britain)or a strongly
heldtheory
thatdifferentiates
occasionalfrompermanent
allies27
(e.g.,theSovietUnion)findit easier
toresist
thistendency
andneednotdevotespecialefforts
tocombating
itsdanger.
A thirdsafeguard
fordecision-makers
wouldbe to maketheirasandthepredictions
thatfollowfromthemas explicit
sumptions,
beliefs,
as possible.
An actorshouldtrytodetermine,
before
events
occur,what
evidence
wouldcountforand againsthistheories.
By knowingwhat
to expecthe wouldknowwhattobe surprised
by,and surprise
could
to thatactorthathisbeliefsneededreevaluation.28
indicate
A fourth
is morecomplex.
The decision-maker
safeguard
shouldtry
The Diplomacyof the WinterWar (Cambridge,Mass., i96i),
26Max Jacobson,
I36-39.
RaymondAron,Peace and War (GardenCityi966), 29.
Cf. Kuhn, The Structureof ScientificRevolution,65. A fairlyhigh degree of
knowledgeis neededbeforeone can statepreciseexpectations.
One indicationof the
lack of international
relationstheoryis thatmostof us are not sure what "naturally"
either"puzzles" to be further
flowsfromour theoriesand what constitutes
explored
withtheparadigmor "anomalies"thatcastdoubton thebasictheories.
27
28
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464
WORLD POLITICS
toprevent
individuals
and organizations
theirmaintask,
fromletting
political
andidentity
future,
andimages
becometiedtospecific
theories
of otheractors.29
If thisoccurs,subgoalsoriginally
soughtfortheir
contribution
to higherendswill takeon value of theirown,and informationindicatingpossiblealternative
routesto the originalgoals will
not be carefully
considered.For example,the U.S. ForestServicewas
unableto carryout itsoriginalpurposeas effectively
when it began to
seeitsdistinctive
competence
notin promoting
thebestuse oflandsand
forests
but ratherin preventing
all typesof forestfires.30
Organizationsthatclaim to be unbiasedmay not realizethe extent
to whichtheirdefinition
oftheirrolehas becomeinvolvedwithcertain
beliefsabouttheworld.Allen Dulles is a victimof thislack of understandingwhenhe says,"I grantthatwe are all creaturesof prejudice,
includingCIA officials,
but by entrusting
to
intelligencecoordination
our centralintelligence
service,whichis excludedfrompolicy-making
and is marriedto no particularmilitaryhardware,we can avoid, to
the greatestpossibleextent,the bending of factsobtainedthrough
to suit a particularoccupationalviewpoint."31
intelligence
This statementoverlooksthe factthatthe CIA has developeda certainview of
international
relationsand of the cold war whichmaximizesthe importanceof its information-gathering,
espionage,and subversive
activities.SincetheCIA would lose itsuniqueplace in thegovernment
if it
were decidedthatthe "back alleys"of worldpoliticswere no longer
vitalto U.S. security,
it is notsurprising
thattheorganization
interprets
information
in a waythatstresses
thecontinuedneedforitstechniques.
should realize the validityand implications
Fifth,decision-makers
of RobertaWohlstetter's
argumentthat "a willingnessto play with
materialfromdifferent
anglesand in thecontextof unpopularas well
as popularhypotheses
is an essentialingredientof a good detective,
whethertheend is thesolutionofa crimeor an intelligence
estimate."32
However,it is oftendifficult,
and politically,for any
psychologically
one personto do this.Since a decision-maker
usuallycannotget "unbiased" treatments
of data, he should insteadseek to structureconflicting
biasesintothedecision-making
process.The decision-maker,
in
otherwords,shouldhave devil'sadvocatesaround.Justas, as Neustadt
pointsout,33
thedecision-maker
will wantto createconflicts
amonghis
See PhilipSelznick,Leadershipin Administration
(EvanstonI957).
AshleySchiff,
Fire and Water:Scientific
Heresyin theForestService(Cambridge,
Mass.,i962). Despiteits title,thisbook is a fascinating
and valuablestudy.
31 The Craftof Intelligence
(New York i963), 53.
32 P. 302. See Beveridge,
93,fora discussionof theidea thatthescientist
shouldkeep
in mind as manyhypotheses
as possiblewhen conductingand analyzingexperiments.
33Presidential
Power (New York i960).
29
30
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
465
in ordertomakeappropriate
subordinates
choices,
so he willalsowant
toensurethatincoming
information
is examined
frommanydifferent
withmanydifferent
in mind.To someextent
perspectives
hypotheses
thiskindof examination
thediwillbe doneautomatically
through
vergence
ofgoals,training,
experience,
and information
thatexistsin
willnotbe
anylargeorganization.
Butin manycasesthisdivergence
sufficient.
The viewsof thoseanalyzingthe data will stillbe too
homogeneous,
and thedecision-maker
willhaveto go outofhisway
notonlytocultivate
buttocreatediffering
viewpoints.
Whileall thatwouldbe neededwouldbe tohavesomepeopleexaminingthedatatrying
it wouldprobtovalidateunpopular
hypotheses,
ablybe moreeffective
iftheyactually
believedandhad a stakein the
views theywere tryingto support.If in I94I someonehad had the
task of provingthe view thatJapanwould attackPearl Harbor,the
government
mighthave been less surprisedby the attack.And onlya
personwho was out to show thatRussiawould take objectively
great
riskswould have been apt to note thatseveralships with especially
largehatchesgoingto Cuba wereridinghigh in thewater,indicating
thepresenceof a bulkybut lightcargothatwas not likelyto be anythingotherthanstrategicmissiles.And manypeople who doubtthe
wisdomof the administration's
Vietnampolicywould be somewhat
reassuredif therewere people in the government
who searchedthe
and actionsof both sidesin an effortto provethatNorth
statements
Vietnamwas willingto negotiateand thattheofficial
of
interpretation
such movesas the Communistactivitiesduringthe Tet truceof i967
was incorrect.
Of courseall thesesafeguardsinvolvecosts.They would divertresourcesfromothertasksand would increaseinternaldissension.Determining
whetherthesecostswouldbe worththegainswould depend
on a detailedanalysisofhow thesuggestedsafeguards
mightbe implemented.Even if theywere adoptedby a government,
of course,they
would not eliminatethe chanceof misperception.
However,the safeguardswouldmakeit morelikelythatnationaldecision-makers
would
makeconsciouschoicesaboutthewaydatawereinterpreted
ratherthan
merelyassumingthattheycan be seenin onlyone way and can mean
only one thing.Statesmenwould thus be remindedof alternative
imagesof othersjust as theyare constantly
remindedof alternative
policies.
These safeguards
are partlybased on Hypothesis3: actorscan more
easilyassimilateintotheirestablishedimageof anotheractorinformation contradicting
thatimage if the information
is transmitted
and
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466
WORLD POLITICS
case,
considered
bitbybitthanif it comesall at once.In theformer
datacanbe copedwithas it arrives
and each
eachpieceofdiscrepant
of theconflicts
withtheprevailing
viewwillbe smallenoughto go
at mosta
or to necessitate
unnoticed,
tobe dismissed
as unimportant,
to the
slightmodification
of theimage(e.g.,additionof exceptions
bein a block,thecontradiction
rule).Whentheinformation
arrives
tweenit and theprevailing
viewis apt to be muchclearerand the
willbe higher.
probability
of majorcognitive
reorganization
IV. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS
thusthe imagesthatamAn actor'sperceptual
thresholds-and
bywhathe has
biguousinformation
is apttoproduce-areinfluenced
andlearned
thatanother
experienced
about.34
Ifoneactoris toperceive
in
he
or
develop,
a
conceptfor
fits a givencategory mustfirst
have,
thatcategory.
threelevelsat whicha
We can usefully
distinguish
conceptcanbe present
or absent.First,theconceptcanbe completely
cormissing.
The actor'scognitive
structure
maynotincludeanything
can
This situation
responding
to thephenomenon
he is encountering.
occurnotonlyin sciencefiction,
butalsoin a worldofrapidchange
orin themeeting
ThusChina'simageofthe
oftwodissimilar
systems.
century,
Western
worldwasextremely
inaccurate
inthemid-nineteenth
herlearning
werewoefully
inadequate.
wasveryslow,andherresponses
The Westwasspareda similar
struggle
onlybecauseithad thepower
to reshapethesystem
it encountered.
Once theactorclearlyseesone
it muchmore
instance
ofthenewphenomenon,
he is apttorecognize
quicklyin thefuture.35
Second,theactorcan knowabouta concept
butnotbelievethatitreflects
ThusCommunist
an actualphenomenon.
andWestern
explanation
decision-makers
areeachawareoftheother's
ofhow his system
butdo notthinkthattheconceptcorfunctions,
argue that thisinfluencealso holds for perceptionof shapes.
34Most psychologists
societiesdifferin respectto theirpredispoFor data showingthatpeoplein different
sitionto experiencecertainopticalillusionsand for a convincingargumentthatthis
which
physicalenvironments,
difference
can be explainedby the societies'different
fromampatternsof drawinginferences
have led theirpeople to developdifferent
biguousvisual cues, see MarshallSegall,Donald Campbell,and MelvilleHerskovits,
The Influence of Culture on Visual Perceptions (Indianapolisi966).
35Thus when Brunerand Postman'ssubjectsfirstwere presented
withincongruous
playingcards (i.e., cardsin whichsymbolsand colorsof the suitswerenot matching,
producingred spades or black diamonds),long exposuretimeswere necessaryfor
perceivedthe card and added this
But once a subjectcorrectly
correctidentification.
otherincongruous
he was able to identify
of categories,
typeof card to his repertoire
cards much more quickly.For an analogousexample-in this case, changesin the
photographsof an enemy'ssecretweapons-testing
analysisof aerial reconnaissance
unknownobjectmaybe present-see
facilities
producedby thebeliefthata previously
David Irving,The Mare's Nest (Bostoni964), 66-67, 274-75.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
467
toreality.
responds
Communist
elites,
furthermore,
denythatanything
couldcorrespond
to thedemocracies'
description
ofthemselves.
Third,
theactormayholda concept,
butnotbelievethatanother
actorfillsit
at thepresent
moment.
ThustheBritish
and Frenchstatesmen
ofthe
I930's helda concept
ofstates
withunlimited
ambitions.
Theyrealized
thatNapoleons
werepossible,
buttheydidnotthinkHitlerbelonged
in
thatcategory.
Hypothesis
4 distinguishes
thesethreecases:misperceptionismostdifficult
tocorrect
inthecaseofa missing
andleast
concept
difficult
to correct
in thecaseofa recognized
butpresumably
unfilled
concept.
All otherthingsbeingequal (e.g.,thedegreeto whichthe
is centralto theactor'scognitive
concept
structure),
thefirstcaserequiresmorecognitive
reorganization
thandoes thesecond,and the
secondrequires
morereorganization
thanthethird.
However,
thishypothesis
doesnotmeanthatlearning
willnecessarily
be slowestin thefirst
case,forif thephenomena
are totally
newthe
actormaymake suchgrosslyinappropriate
thathe will
responses
quicklyacquireinformation
clearlyindicating
thathe is facedwith
he doesnotunderstand.
something
And thesoonertheactorrealizes
thatthings
arenot-or maynotbe-whattheyseem,thesoonerhe is
apttocorrect
hisimage.36
Threemainsources
contribute
to decision-makers'
concepts
ofinternationalrelations
and of otherstatesand influence
thelevelof their
thresholds
forvariousphenomena.
perceptual
First,an actor'sbeliefs
abouthis owndomestic
politicalsystem
are apt to be important.
In
somecases,likethatoftheUSSR,thedecision-makers'
concepts
aretied
toan ideology
thatexplicitly
a frameofreference
provides
forviewing
affairs.
Evenwherethisisnotthecase,experience
foreign
withhisown
willpartly
determine
system
whattheactoris familiar
withandwhat
he is aptto perceive
in others.
LouisHartzclaims,"It is theabsence
ofsocialrevolution
oftheexperience
whichis attheheartofthewhole
American
dilemma....In a wholeseriesofspecific
waysitenters
into
ofcommunication
ourdifficulty
withtherestoftheworld.We findit
difficult
to understand
Europe's'socialquestion'.. . . We are notfamiliarwiththedeepersocialstruggles
ofAsia and hencetendto inevenreactionary
terpret
as 'democratic.'
regimes
"3 Similarly,
George
Kennanarguesthatin WorldWarI theAlliedpowers,
andespecially
couldnotunderstand
thebitterness
America,
and violenceof others'
internal
conflicts:
". . . The inability
oftheAlliedstatesmen
topicture
tothemselves
thepassions
oftheRussiancivilwar [waspartlycaused
86
Brunerand Postman,220.
37 The LiberalTradition
in America(New
York I955),
306.
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468
WORLD POLITICS
bythefactthat]we represent
in whichthemanifestations
... a society
ofevilhavebeencarefully
buriedandsublimated
in thesocialbehavior
of people,as in theirveryconsciousness.
For thisreason,probably,
despiteour widelytraveledand outwardly
cosmopolitan
lives,the
ofpolitical
mainsprings
in sucha country
behavior
as Russiatendto
remainconcealed
fromourvision."38
Second,concepts
willbe supplied
bytheactor'sprevious
experiences.
An experiment
fromanother
fieldillustrates
this.Dearborn
andSimon
presented
businessexecutives
fromvariousdivisions(e.g., sales,accounting,
production)
withthesamehypothetical
dataandaskedthem
foran analysisand recommendations
fromthe standpoint
of what
wouldbe bestforthecompany
as a whole.The executives'
viewsheavilyreflected
theirdepartmental
perspectives.39
WilliamW. Kaufmann
showshowtheperceptions
ofAmbassador
Joseph
Kennedywereaffectedbyhispast:"As befitted
a former
chairman
of theSecurities
Exchangeand MaritimeCommissions,
his primary
interest
lay in
economic
matters....The revolutionary
character
oftheNazi regime
wasnota phenomenon
thathecouldeasilygrasp.... Itwasfarsimpler,
andmorein accordwithhisownpremises,
toexplainGermanaggresin economic
siveness
The ThirdReichwas dissatisfied,
terms.
authoritarian,and expansive
largelybecauseher economywas unsound.""0
it hasbeenarguedthatChamberlain
Similarly
was slowto recognize
Hitler'sintentions
partly
becauseofthelimiting
natureofhispersonal
background
andbusiness
experiences.41
The impactoftraining
andex38
Russiaand the WestUnderLenin and Stalin (New York i962),
I42-43.
9 DeWittDearbornand HerbertSimon,"SelectivePerception:A Note on the De-
partmental
Identification
of Executives,"Sociometry,
xxi (June I958), 140-44.
40 "Two American
Ambassadors:
Bullittand Kennedy,"in Craigand Gilbert,358-59.
41 Hugh Trevor-Roper
putsthispointwell: "Broughtup as a businessman,successful
in municipalpolitics,[Chamberlain's]outlookwas entirelyparochial.EducatedConservativearistocrats
like Churchill,Eden, and Cranborne,whose familieshad long
been used to politicalresponsibility,
had seen revolutionand revolutionary
leaders
before,in theirown history,
and understoodthemcorrectly;
but the Chamberlains,
who had runfromradicalimperialism
to timidconservatism
in a generation
of lifein
had no such understanding
Birmingham,
of historyor the world: to themthe scope
of humanpoliticswas limitedby theirown parochialhorizons,and NevilleChamberlain couldnot believethatHitlerwas fundamentally
different
fromhimself.If Chamberlainwantedpeace,so mustHitler" ("Munich-Its LessonsTen Years Later," in
Francis Loewenheim,ed., Peace or Appeasement?[Boston i965], 152-53). For a
similarview see A. L. Rowse,Appeasement(New York i963), 117.
But Donald Lammerspointsout thatthe viewsof manyprominent
Britishpublic
figuresin theI930's do notfitthisgeneralization
(ExplainingMunich[Stanfordi966],
13-140). Furthermore,
argumentsthat stressthe importanceof the experiencesand
views of the actors'ancestorsdo not explainthe linksby which theseinfluencethe
read the same history
actorsthemselves.
Churchilland Chamberlain
books
Presumably
in schooland had the same basic information
about Britain'spast role in the world.
is thatin theirhomes aristocrats
Thus what has to be demonstrated
like Churchill
learneddifferent
thingsaboutpoliticsand humannaturethandid middle-class
people
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
469
seemsto be demonstrated
perience
whenthebackground
of theappeasersis compared
to thatoftheiropponents.
One difference
stands
out:"A substantially
higher
oftheanti-appeasers
percentage
(irrespectiveof classorigins)had thekindof knowledge
whichcomesfrom
closeacquaintance,
mainlyprofessional,
withforeign
affairs."42
Since
members
ofthediplomatic
corpsareresponsible
formeeting
threats
to
thenation'ssecurity
before
thesegrowto majorproportions
and since
theyhavelearned
aboutcasesinwhichaggressive
states
werenotrecognizedas suchuntilverylate,theymaybe pronetointerpret
ambiguous
dataas showingthatothersare aggressive.
It shouldbe stressed
that
we cannotsaythattheprofessionals
of the I930'S weremoreapt to
makeaccurate
judgments
ofotherstates.
Rather,
theymayhavebeen
moresensitive
to thechancethatothers
wereaggressive.
Theywould
thenrarely
takean aggressor
fora status-quo
power,butwouldmore
often
maketheopposite
error.43
Thusin theyearsbefore
WorldWarI
the permanent
officials
in the BritishForeignOfficeoverestimated
Germanaggressiveness.44
A paralleldemonstration
in psychology
oftheimpactoftraining
on
perception
is presented
byan experiment
in whichambiguous
pictures
wereshownto bothadvancedand beginning
police-administration
students.
The advanced
groupperceived
moreviolence
in thepictures
thandid thebeginners.
The probableexplanation
is that"thelaw
enforcer
maycometo acceptcrimeas a familiar
personalexperience,
onewhichhe himself
is notsurprised
to encounter.
The acceptance
of
crimeas a familiar
in turnincreases
experience
theability
orreadiness
toperceive
violence
wherecluesto it arepotentially
available."45
This
like Chamberlain
and thattheseexperiences
had a significant
impact.Alternatively,
it
could be argued that the patternsof child-rearing
prevalentamong the aristocracy
influenced
the children'spersonalities
in a way thatmade themmore likelyto see
othersas aggressive.
42lbid.,i5.
43Duringa debateon appeasementin the House of Commons,Harold Nicolson
declared,"I knowthatthoseof us who believein thetraditions
of our policy. . . who
believethatone greatfunction
of thiscountry
is to maintainmoralstandardsin Europe,
to maintaina settledpatternof international
not to makefriendswithpeople
relations,
who are demonstrably
evil . . . -I knowthatthosewho hold suchbeliefsare accused
of possessing
the ForeignOfficemind.I thankGod thatI possessthe ForeignOffice
mind"(quotedin MartinGilbert,The Rootsof Appeasement[New York i966], i87).
But thequalitiesNicolsonmentionsand applaudsmay be relatedto a morebasicattributeof "theForeignOfficemind"-suspiciousness.
44GeorgeMonger,The End ofIsolation(London I963). I am also indebtedto FrederickCollignonforhisunpublished
and severalconversations
manuscript
on thispoint.
45Hans Toch and RichardSchulte,"Readinessto PerceiveViolenceas a Resultof
Police Training,"BritishJournalof Psychology,
LII (Novemberi96i), 392 (original
italicsomitted).It shouldbe stressedthatone cannotsaywhetheror not theadvanced
policestudents
perceivedthepictures"accurately."
The pointis thattheirtrainingpre-
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WORLD POLITICS
470
sensidiplomats'
lendsweightto theviewthattheBritish
experiment
selecofpersonnel
a product
to aggressive
stateswas nottotally
tivity
tionprocedures.
will be themostdiwhichfrequently
A thirdsourceof concepts,
relaof international
relevant
to a decision-maker's
perception
rectly
history.
As HenryKissingerpointsout,one
tions,is international
thethreatposedby
wereso slowto recognize
reasonwhystatesmen
themonlyto
Napoleonwas thatpreviouseventshad accustomed
it.46
notoverthrow
system,
theexisting
actorswhowantedto modify
can
traumas
historical
The othersideofthecoinis evenmorestriking:
a state's
Theycaneitherestablish
future
perceptions.
influence
heavily
imageof theotherstateinvolvedor can be used as analogies.An
bythefactthatforat leastten
caseis provided
exampleoftheformer
felt
War mostof Europe'sstatesmen
yearsaftertheFranco-Prussian
goal
was
to
planswhenin facthismain
had aggressive
thatBismarck
The
thestatusquo. Of coursetheevidencewas ambiguous.
protect
tokeeppeace,
whichweredesigned
maneuvers,
Bismarckian
pOst-187i
designed
tosetthestagefor
maneuvers
lookednotunlikethepre-I871
agwar. But thatthepOst-187I
wereseen as indicating
maneuvers
earlier
totheimpactofBismarck's
attributable
plansis largely
gressive
imageofhim.
actions
on thestatesmen's
witha typeofdangercan
A state'sprevious
unfortunate
experience
ofthatdanger.
Whilethissensitivity
ittootherexamples
may
sensitize
in thepast,itmayalso
itcommitted
leadthestatetoavoidthemistake
situation
is likethepast
to believethatthepresent
lead it mistakenly
around:"Thosewhorememmaximcouldbe turned
one.Santayana's
to maketheopposite
As Paul
mistakes."
berthepastarecondemned
and criticsof the unconditional
Kecskemeti
shows,bothdefenders
in termsoftheconsurrender
planoftheSecondWorldWarthought
Annette
BakerFox foundthattheScandiditionsofWorldWar L"47
inpoliciesin WorldWarII werestrongly
naviancountries'
neutrality
in theprevious
war,eventhoughvital
fluenced
by theirexperiences
Thus "Norway'ssuccess
weredifferent.
aspectsof thetwosituations
though
non-belligerent
[duringtheFirstWorldWar] in remaining
Whetheron balancetheywould
disposedthemto see violencein ambiguoussituations.
For an
make fewerperceptualerrorsand betterdecisionsis veryhard to determine.
experiment
showingthattrainingcan lead peopleto "recognize"an expectedstimulus
even when thatstimulusis in factnot shown,see IsraelGoldiamondand WilliamF.
and RecogBetweenWord-Frequency
Hawkins,"Vexierversuch:
The Log Relationship
nitionObtainedin the Absenceof StimulusWords,"Journalof ExperimentalPsychology, LVI
46,
(December1958),
457-63.
WorldRestored(New York i964),
47Strategic
Surrender
(New Yorki964),
2-3.
215-41.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
471
pro-Alliedgave the Norwegiansconfidencethat theircountrycould
again stayout of war."48And the lessondrawnfromthe unfortunate
factorin Norway'sdecisionto
resultsof thispolicywas an important
join NATO.
The applicationof the Munich analogy to variouscontemporary
eventshas been muchcommentedon, and I do not wish to arguethe
that
pointsat stake.But it seemsclearthattheprobabilities
substantive
any stateis facingan aggressorwho has to be met by forceare not
alteredby thecareerof Hitlerand thehistoryof the 1930's. Similarly
announcinghis plans is not increased
of an aggressor's
theprobability
itis decreased)bythefactthatHitlerwroteMein Kampf.
(if anything,
and thus
are moresensitiveto thesepossibilities,
Yet decision-makers
moreapt to perceiveambiguousevidenceas indicatingtheyapply to
a given case, than theywould have been had therebeen no Nazi
Germany.
Historicalanalogies oftenprecede,ratherthan follow,a careful
analysisof a situation(e.g., Truman'sinitialreactionto the news of
theinvasionof SouthKorea was to thinkof the Japaneseinvasionof
however,does notshowus which
Manchuria).Notingthisprecedence,
mind. Truman
of many analogieswill come to a decision-maker's
Europeanwars thatwere of
couldhave thoughtof nineteenth-century
to the United States.Severalfactorshavingnothingto do
no interest
influence
whatanalogiesa decisionwiththeeventunderconsideration
makeris apt to make.One factoris thenumberof cases similarto the
is familiar.Anotheris theimanalogywithwhichthedecision-maker
the
to
event
politicalsystemofwhichthedecisionportanceofthepast
makeris a part.The moretimessuchan eventoccurredand thegreater
will be sensitiveto
its consequenceswere,the morea decision-maker
the particulardanger involvedand the more he will be apt to see
ambiguousstimulias indicatinganotherinstanceof thiskind of event.
personalinvolveA thirdfactoris the degreeof the decision-maker's
mentin the past case-in time,energy,ego, and position.The lastmentionedvariablewill affectnot onlythe event'simpacton the debut also the way he perceivesthe
cision-maker's
cognitivestructure,
eventand thelessonhe draws.Someonewho was involvedin getting
troopsinto South Korea afterthe attackwill rememberthe Korean
War differently
fromsomeonewho was involvedin consideringthe
possibleuse of nuclearweaponsor in decidingwhat messagesshould
will usuallygive
be sentto theChinese.Greaterpersonalinvolvement
own views
theeventgreaterimpact,especiallyif the decision-maker's
48
The PowerofSmallStates(Chicago 1959), 8i.
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472
WORLD POLITICS
werevalidated
bytheevent.One neednotaccepta totalapplication
of
tonations
learning
theory
tobelievethat"nothing
failslikesuccess."49
It also seemslikelythatif manycriticsarguedat thetimethatthe
decision-maker
waswrong,
hewillbe evenmoreapttoseeothersituationsin termsof theoriginalevent.For example,becauseAnthony
Edenleftthegovernment
on accountofhisviewsandwaslatershown
tohavebeencorrect,
he probably
wasmoreaptto see as Hitlersother
leaderswithwhomhe had conflicts
(e.g.,Nasser).A fourth
factoris
thedegreeto whichtheanalogyis compatible
withtherestof his
A fifth
is theabsenceofalternative
beliefsystem.
and analoconcepts
and statesvaryin theamountof director indirect
gies.Individuals
politicalexperience
theyhavehad whichcan providedifferent
ways
data.Decision-makers
ofinterpreting
who areawareofmultiple
posof
states'
intentions
sibilities
maybe lesslikelyto seizeon an analogy
The perception
of citizensof nationslike the United
prematurely.
littlehistory
ofinternational
Stateswhichhaverelatively
politicsmay
the
be moreaptto be heavilyinfluenced
few
international
by
major
to theircountry.
thathavebeenimportant
events
indicatethatan eventis moreapt to shape
The firstthreefactors
thantheremote
ifit occurred
in therecentrather
present
perceptions
the
statesman
will
then
it
occurred
knowaboutit at
past.If
recently,
in themakingofpolicyat the
handevenifhe was notinvolved
first
areprepared
tofight
thelastwar,diplomats
time.Thusifgenerals
may
to
toavoidthelastwar.PartoftheAnglo-French
reaction
be prepared
the
can
beliefs
that
Hitler be explained
theFirstWorld
by prevailing
and could
War was to a largeextentcausedby misunderstandings
And
and nonbelligerent
havebeenavoidedbyfarsighted
diplomacy.
ofRussiaand Chinacan be explained
partoftheWestern
perception
toHitler.50
wasan inappropriate
bytheviewthatappeasement
response
V. THE EVOKED SET
datais influenced
notonlybytheircogniThe waypeopleperceive
aboutotheractorsbutalsobywhattheyare
andtheories
tivestructure
withat thetimetheyreceivetheinformation.
concerned
Information
49WilliamInge, OutspokenEssays,FirstSeries (London I923), 88.
50 Of course,analogiesthemselves
are not "unmovedmovers."The interpretation
of pasteventsis not automaticand is informed
by generalviewsof international
relaAnd just as beliefsaboutthe pastinfluence
the present,
tionsand complexjudgments.
of history.
It is difficult
to determine
viewsaboutthe presentinfluence
interpretations
of the reasonsit wentto war in
thedegreeto whichtheUnitedStates'interpretation
Americanforeignpolicyin the i920's and i930's and how much the
I9I7 influenced
of the war.
thehistories
of thatperiodinfluenced
isolationism
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
473
thatis
in lightofthesmallpartoftheperson'smemory
is evaluated
of thedarkstreets
active-the"evokedset."Myperceptions
presently
if thefilmI
I passwalkinghomefromthemovieswillbe different
IfI amworking
sawhaddealtwithspiesthanifithadbeena comedy.
system
and I hearsomeonetalkabout
education
on aidinga country's
state,I am aptto thinkhe
in
that
development
need
for
economic
the
whereasif I had beenworkingon,say,
witheducation,
is concerned
I wouldhaveplaced
in thatcountry,
stability
political
toachieve
trying
inthatframework.5'
hisremarks
aresentfroma differThusHypothesis
5 statesthatwhenmessages
thanis possessed
bythe
ofconcerns
and information
entbackground
is likely.PersonA andpersonB willread
misunderstanding
receiver,
ifA has seenseveralrelatedmesthesamemessagequitedifferently
willbe compounded
sagesthatB doesnotknowabout.Thisdifference
thecase,A andB eachassumethattheotherhasthe
if,as isfrequently
can occur
he does.This meansthatmisperception
samebackground
intended
norexpected.
Thus Roberta
is neither
evenwhendeception
partsof theUnitedStates
foundnotonlythatdifferent
Wohlstetter
intentions
ofdataaboutJapan's
had different
perceptions
government
in
and messages
partlybecausetheysaw theincominginformation
in thefieldmisunderstood
butalsothatofficers
contexts,
verydifferent
advisedGeneralShort[in
fromWashington:
"Washington
warnings
PearlHarbor]on November
27 to expect'hostileaction'at anymofromwithpossessions
ment,bywhichit meant'attackon American
"52
thisphraseto mean'sabotage.'
out,'butGeneralShortunderstood
did notrealizetheextentto whichPearlHarborconWashington
and furthermore
it
sideredthe dangerof sabotageto be primary,
theintercepts
of
believedthatGeneralShorthad received
incorrectly
availableinWashington
which
messages
diplomatic
thesecret
Japanese
Another
implithatsurprise
attackwas a distinct
possibility.
indicated
information
is knownto
is thatifimportant
cationofthishypothesis
of
ofstateA andpartofthegovernment
onlypartofthegovernment
be
misunderstood
of
those
parts
by
may
messages
stateB,international
51For some psychological
on this subject,see JeromeBrunerand A.
experiments
and PerceptualOrganization"Journalof
Leigh Minturn,"PerceptualIdentification
LIII (JulyI955), 22-28; SeymourFeshbachand RobertSinger,
GeneralPsychology,
of Fear Upon SocialPerception,"
of Fear Arousaland Suppression
"The Effects
journal
LV (NovemberI957), 283-88;and Elsa Sippoal,
of Abnormaland Social Psychology,
XLVI,
Monographs,
Sets,"Psychology
"A GroupStudyof Some Effectsof Preparatory
of the perceiver's
No. 2IO (1935), 27-28. For a generaldiscussionof the importance
evokedset,see Postman,87.
52 Pp.
73-74.
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474
WORLD POLITICS
thatdo notmatch,in theinformation
thereceiver's
government
they
thatdispatched
themessage.53
have,thepartofthesender's
government
ofthose
canbe drawnfromtheproblems
Two additional
hypotheses
6 statesthatwhenpeoplespenda great
sending
messages.
Hypothesis
dealoftimedrawing
up a planormakinga decision,
theytendtothink
thatthemessageaboutit theywishto conveywillbe clearto thereceiver.54
Sincetheyareawareofwhatis tothemtheimportant
pattern
in theiractions,
theyoftenfeelthatthepattern
willbe equallyobvious
andtheyoverlook
toothers,
thedegreetowhichthemessageis apparenttothemonlybecausetheyknowwhattolookfor.Thosewhohave
not participated
in the endlessmeetings
maynot understand
what
information
thesenderis trying
toconvey.
GeorgeQuesterhas shown
howtheGermanand,to a lesserextent,
theBritish
desireto maintain
in thefirst
targetlimitson bombing
months
ofWorldWar
eighteen
II wasundermined
partly
bythefactthateachsideknewthelimitsit
was seekingand itsownreasonsforanyapparent
"exceptions"
(e.g.,
theGermanattackonRotterdam)
andincorrectly
feltthattheselimits
andreasons
wereequallycleartotheotherside.55
Hypothesis
7 holdsthatactorsoftendo notrealizethatactionsina givenimagemaynothavethedesired
tendedtoproject
effect
because
do notturnoutas planned.Thusevenwithout
theactionsthemselves
structures
and backgrounds,
appreciable
impactof different
cognitive
an unwanted
an actionmayconvey
Forexample,
a country's
message.
and so maygive others
representatives
maynotfollowinstructions
impressions
contrary
tothosethehomegovernment
wishedto convey.
andBerlintosettle
ofWashington
theirdispute
overSamoa
The efforts
in thelatei88o'swerecomplicated
behavior
oftheir
bytheprovocative
theintensity
ofthe
agentson thespot.Theseagentsnotonlyincreased
butled thedecision-makers
to becomemoresuspicious
localconflict,
oftheotherstatebecausetheytendedto assumethattheiragentswere
instructions
andthattheactionsoftheothersiderepresented
obeying
official
policy.In suchcasesbothsideswill believethattheotheris
intoa policyof theirswhichis friendly.
readinghostility
Similarly,
53For example,Roger Hilsman pointsout, "Those who knew of the peripheral
reconnaissance
flightsthatprobedSovietair defensesduringthe Eisenhoweradministration
and theU-2 flights
overtheSovietUnion itself. . . werebetterable to understandsomeof the thingsthe Sovietswere sayingand doing thanpeoplewho did not
know of theseactivities"(To Move a Nation [GardenCity i9671, 66). But it is also
possiblethat thosewho knew about the U-2 flightsat timesmisinterpreted
Soviet
messagesbyincorrectly
believingthatthesenderwas influenced
by,or at leastknewof,
theseflights.
54I am grateful
to ThomasSchellingfordiscussionon thispoint.
5DeterrenceBeforeHiroshima(New York i966), I05-22.
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HYPOTHESES
ON MISPERCEPTION
475
to
to limitbombingreferred
Quester's
studyshowsthattheattempt
sidewasabletobombas accurately
becauseneither
abovefailedpartly
ofits
effects
itcouldandthusdidnotrealizethephysical
as itthought
actions.56
VI. FURTHER
HYPOTHESES
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERCEIVER
seem
severalotherhypotheses
oftheperceiver
Fromtheperspective
fordecision8 is thatthereis an overalltendency
tohold.Hypothesis
Thereseem
makersto seeotherstatesas morehostilethantheyare.57
areplanning
others
incorrectly
believing
tobe morecasesofstatesmen
beinglulledby a
thanof statesmen
majoractsagainsttheirinterest
Thereare manyreasonsforthiswhichare too
potential
aggressor.
feelit
to
be
treated
here(e.g.,somepartsofthebureaucracy
complex
is theirresponsibility
of all otherstates;decisionto be suspicious
itsafe"tobelieveandactas though
feeltheyare"playing
makers
often
cases; and often,when
theotherstatewerehostilein questionable
to
theyfindit difficult
peopledo notfeeltheyare a threatto others,
believethatothers
mayseethemas a threat).It shouldbe noted,howare described
whoseperceptions
by this
ever,thatdecision-makers
to
further
their
own
values
not
would
bytrying
necessarily
hypothesis
The valuesof possibleoutcomes
as well as
forthistendency.
correct
and it maybe thattheprobamustbe considered,
theirprobabilities
arms-tension
cyclearisingout of mispercepbilityof an unnecessary
a
such
mayseemlesstodecisioncycle,
bythecostsof
tions,
multiplied
of incorrectly
believinganotherstateis
makersthantheprobability
multiplied
bythecostsofthiseventuality.
friendly,
of othersas
Hypothesis
9 statesthatactorstendto see thebehavior
andcoordinated
thanitis.Thishypothedisciplined,
morecentralized,
are
toomanycomplex
events
sisholdstrueinrelated
ways.Frequently,
Actorsarehesitant
to admitoreven
pattern.
squeezedintoa perceived
cannotbe explainedby theirtheories.58
see thatparticular
incidents
notcausedbyfactors
thatareimportant
Thoseevents
partsoftheperactorssee
ceiver's
imageareoftenseenas thoughtheywere.Further,
unitedthantheyin factare and generally
othersas moreinternally
a coherent
thedegreetowhichothers
arefollowing
policy.
overestimate
ofinternal
Thedegreetowhichtheotherside'spoliciesaretheproduct
56Ibid.
different
formulation
of thisview,see Holsti,27.
For a slightly
hold an extremeversionof thisview and seemto believe
The Sovietsconsciously
See thediscussionin NathanLeites,A Studyof Bolshevism
thatnothingis accidental.
(GlencoeI953), 67-73.
57
58
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476
WORLD POLITICS
internal
or subordinates'
notfollowbargaining,59
misunderstandings,
inginstructions
isunderestimated.
Thisis thecasepartly
becauseactors
tendtobe unfamiliar
withthedetailsofanother
state'spolicy-making
processes.
Seeingonlythefinished
product,
theyfindit simpler
to try
to construct
a rationalexplanation
forthepolicies,
eventhoughthey
knowthatsuchan analysis
couldnotexplaintheirownpolicies.60
io: becausea stategetsmost
forHypothesis
alsoaccounts
Familiarity
forabouttheotherstate'spoliciesfromtheother's
ofitsinformation
office's
forthestandof
ittendstotaketheforeign
eignoffice,
position
as a whole.In manycasesthisperception
will
theothergovernment
is dividedorwhen
be an accurate
one,butwhentheothergovernment
is actingwithout
office
theotherforeign
specific
authorization,
misperception
mayresult.
Forexample,
partofthereasonwhyin i9i8 Allied
"thattheJapanese
to
governments
incorrectly
thought
werepreparing
takeaction[in Siberia],if needbe,withagreement
withtheBritish
and Frenchalone,disregarding
theabsenceof Americanconsent,"6
had talkedmostly
wasthatAlliedambassadors
withForeignMinister
of theJapanesle
Motono,whowas amongtheminority
favoring
this
America'sNATO alliesmayhavegainedan inacpolicy.Similarly,
ofthedegreeto whichtheAmerican
curatepicture
was
government
had
to theMLF becausethey
contactwithparts
committed
greatest
thatstrongly
favored
theMLF. Andstates
ofthegovernment
thattried
aboutNazi foreign
togetinformation
policyfromGermandiplomats
weregenerally
wereoftenmisledbecausetheseofficials
ofor
ignorant
withHitler'splans.The Germansand theJapanese
outofsympathy
misinformed
sometimes
theirownambassadors
purposely
in orderto
deceivetheirenemies
moreeffectively.
thatactorstendto overestimate
ii states
thedegreeto
Hypothesis
to whattheythemselves
areactingin response
whichothers
do when
withtheactor'sdesires;butwhenthe
behavein accordance
theothers
of theotheris undesired,
it is usuallyseenas derivedfrom
behavior
internal
If theefectofanother's
actionis to injureor threaten
forces.
59A. W. MarshallcriticizesWesternexplanationsof Soviet militaryposturefor
failingto take thisinto account.See his "Problemsof EstimatingMilitaryPower,"a
paper presentedat the i966 AnnualMeetingof the AmericanPoliticalScienceAsso-
ciation, i6.
60 It has also been notedthatin labor-management
disputesboth sides may be apt
thatthe otheris controlledfromabove,eitherfromthe interto believeincorrectly
or fromthecompany's
centralheadquarters
nationalunionoffice
(RobertBlake,Herbert
in Industry[Houstoni964],
Shepard,and JaneMouton,ManagingIntergroup
Conflict
It has been further
i82).
notedthatbothDemocraticand Republicanmembersof the
House tend to see the otherpartyas the one that is more disciplinedand united
(CharlesClapp,The Congressman
[Washingtoni9631, I7-I9).
61GeorgeKennan,RussiaLeaves the War (New York i967), 484.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
477
sideis aptto believethatsuchwas theother's
thefirst
side,thefirst
purpose.
An exampleofthefirst
partofthehypothesis
is provided
by
Kennan'saccountof theactivities
of official
and unofficial
American
representatives
who protested
to the new Bolshevikgovernment
ofitsactions.
WhentheSovietschangedtheirposition,
againstseveral
theserepresentatives
feltitwaslargely
becauseoftheirinfluence.62
This
sortofinterpretation
can be explained
notonlyby thefactthatit is
gratifying
to theindividual
makingit,butalso,takingtheotherside
ofthecoinmentioned
inHypothesis
9,bythefactthattheactoris most
familiar
withhis own inputintothe other'sdecisionand has less
knowledge
of otherinfluences.
ii is
The secondpartof Hypothesis
illustrated
bythetendency
ofactorstobelievethatthehostilebehavior
ofothers
is to be explained
bytheotherside'smotives
and notbyits
reaction
to thefirst
side.Thus Chamberlain
did notsee thatHitler's
behavior
was relatedin partto hisbeliefthattheBritish
wereweak.
Morecommon
is thefailure
toseethattheothersideis reacting
outof
fearofthefirst
side,whichcan lead to self-fulfilling
prophecies
and
of
spirals misperception
andhostility.
is oftencompounded
Thisdifficulty
byan implication
ofHypothesis
12: whenactors
thattheydo nottryto concealfrom
haveintentions
others,
theytendto assumethatothersaccurately
perceivetheseintentions.
do theybelievethatothersmaybe reacting
Onlyrarely
to a
muchlessfavorable
imageof themselves
thantheythinktheyare
projecting.63
howstateB perceives
ForstateA to understand
A's policyis often
becausesuchunderstanding
difficult
withA's
mayinvolvea conflict
imageofitself.
Raymond
SontagarguesthatAnglo-German
relations
WorldWar I deteriorated
before
partlybecause"theBritish
did not
to
think
themselves
of
as selfish,
or unwilling
like
to tolerate
'legitiThe Germans
didnotliketothinkofthemmate'German
expansion.
orunwilling
torecognize
selvesas aggressive,
'legitimate'
British
vested
interest."64
62 Ibid., 404, 408,500.
63HerbertButterfield
notesthat theseassumptions
can contribute
to the spiralof
"Hobbesianfear.. . . You yourself
mayvividlyfeelthe terrible
fearthatyou have of
butyoucannotenterintotheotherman'scounter-fear,
theotherparty,
or evenundernervous.For you know thatyou yourself
standwhyhe shouldbe particularly
mean
him no harm,and thatyou want nothingfromhim save guaranteesfor yourown
safety;and it is neverpossibleforyou to realizeor remember
properlythatsincehe
cannotsee the insideof yourmind,he can neverhave the same assuranceof your
thatyou have" (History and Human Conflict [London I95I], 20).
intentions
64European Diplomatic History 187I-1932
(New York I933), I25. It takes great
to realizethatactionswhichseem only the naturalconsequenceof dementaleffort
can look to othersas thoughyou are refusingthemany
fendingyourvitalinterests
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478
WORLD POLITICS
Hypothesisi3 suggeststhatif it is hard foran actorto believethat
theothercan see him as a menace,it is oftenevenharderforhim to
to others.While he
to him are not important
see thatissuesimportant
mayknowthatanotheractoris on an opposingteam,it maybe more
different
difficult
forhimto realizethattheotheris playingan entirely
game.This is especiallytruewhenthegamehe is playingseemsvitalto
him.65
The finalhypothesis,
HypothesisI4, is as follows: actorstend to
withtheirtheoriesmay also
overlookthefactthatevidenceconsistent
be consistent
withotherviews.When choosingbetweentwo theories
we have to pay attention
onlyto data thatcannotbe accountedforby
one of thetheories.But it is commonto findpeople claimingas proof
of theirtheoriesdata thatcould also supportalternativeviews.This
phenomenonis relatedto thepointmade earlierthatany singlebit of
ofhypotheses
can be interpreted
information
onlywithina framework
and theories.And while it is truethat"we maywithouta viciouscircularityacceptsome datumas a factbecauseit conformsto the very
law forwhichit countsas anotherconfirming
instance,and rejectan
allegationoffactbecauseit is alreadyexcludedby law,"66we shouldbe
seemsin manycases
carefullestwe forgetthata piece of information
a
because
we alreadybelievethat
only
to confirm certainhypothesis
to be correctand thatthe information
can with as much
hypothesis
For example,one of thereasons
hypothesis.
validitysupporta different
whytheGermanattackon Norwaytookboththatcountryand England by surprise,
eventhoughtheyhad detectedGermanshipsmoving
towardNorway,was thattheyexpectednot an attackbut an attempt
by the Germansto breakthroughthe Britishblockadeand reachthe
chanceof increasing
theirinfluence.
In rebutting
thefamousCrowe"balanceof power"
memorandumof I907, which justifieda policyof "containing"Germanyon the
groundsthatshe was a threatto Britishnationalsecurity,
Sanderson,a formerpermanentundersecretary
in theForeignOffice,
wrote,"It has sometimes
seemedto me that
to a foreigner
readingour pressthe BritishEmpiremustappearin the lightof some
huge giant sprawlingall over the globe,with goutyfingersand toes stretching
in
everydirection,
whichcannotbe approachedwithoutelicitinga scream"(quoted in
Monger,3I5). But few otherEnglishmencould be convincedthatothersmightsee
themthisway.
65 GeorgeKennan makes clear that in i9i8 this kind of difficulty
was partlyresponsiblefor the inabilityof eitherthe Allies or the new Bolshevikgovernment
to
understandthe motivations
of the otherside: "Thereis . . . nothingin naturemore
egocentricalthan the embattleddemocracy....
It .
.
. tends to attach to its own cause
an absolutevalue whichdistorts
its own visionof everything
else. . . It will readily
intothisframeof mindhave littleunderbe seenthatpeoplewho havegot themselves
standingforthe issuesof any contestotherthanthe one in whichtheyare involved.
The idea of peoplewastingtimeand substanceon any otherissue seemsto thempreposterous"(Russia and the West,II-I2).
66Kaplan, 89.
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
479
The initialcourseoftheshipswasconsistent
witheither
Atlantic.
plan,
buttheBritish
and Norwegians
tookthiscourseto meanthattheir
predictions
werebeingborneout.67
Thisis nottoimplythattheintershould
pretation
madewas foolish,
butonlythatthedecision-makers
withan invasion
havebeenawarethattheevidence
wasalsoconsistent
andshouldhavehada bitlessconfidence
in theirviews.
The longertheshipswouldhaveto travelthesameroutewhether
themoreinfortheyweregoingtooneoranother
oftwodestinations,
theirplans.Takenas a metamationwouldbe neededto determine
Thus
tothetreatment
ofevidence.
phor,thisincident
appliesgenerally
as longas Hitlermadedemands
German
forcontrol
onlyofethnically
thathe
areas,his actionscouldbe explainedeitherby thehypothesis
hadunlimited
ambitions
orbythehypothesis
thathe wantedto unite
(e.g.,thetakeover
all theGermans.
Butactionsagainstnon-Germans
ofCzechoslovakia
forbythe
in Marchi938) couldnotbe accounted
latter
And it was thisactionthatconvinced
theappeasers
hypothesis.
to speculate
on what
thatHitlerhad to be stopped.It is interesting
theBritish
reaction
wouldhavebeenhad HitlerleftCzechoslovakia
alonefora whileand insteadmadedemandson Polandsimilarto
thoseheeventually
madein thesummer
ofI939. The twopathswould
couldhave
thenstillnot have diverged,
and further
misperception
occurred.
67 JohanJorgen
Holst, "Surprise,Signals,and Reaction:The Attackon Norway,"
Cooperation
and Conflict,
No. i (i966), 34. The Germansmade a similarmistakein
November1942 when theyinterpreted
the presenceof an Allied convoyin the Mediterranean
as confirming
theirbeliefthatMalta would be resupplied.They thuswere
takenby surprisewhen landingstook place in NorthAfrica(William Langer,Our
VichyGamble[New York i966], 365).
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