The role Kenya’s civil society can play in ensuring a mutually
beneficial Sino-Kenya engagement
Kristina Møller
Abstract:
This article sets out to ask whether Chinese motives and interests in Kenya, are compatible
with Kenya’s development goal of becoming a middle-income country by the year 2030. To
understand how the Sino-Kenya partnership raises new challenges and opportunities for
Kenya’s development, we must first look at two things. We must understand the nature of
Chinese engagement with Africa as a whole; and we must understand the nature of Kenya’s
political economy, in so far as how it hinders their development. This article argues that due
to exploitative elements of China’s engagement, and due to the limitations of Kenya’s
democratic governance, Kenya’s civil society must play an active role in monitoring and
influencing this partnership to ensure that it is mutually beneficial. This article argues, that
Kenya’s civil society must step up and demand accountability from both their government
and China, if this partnership is to truly benefit Kenya.
Keywords: Kenya, China, civil society, natural resources, aid.
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Introduction
The aim of this article is to investigate whether China‘s interests in Kenya, are compatible
with Kenya‘s Vision 2030 development goals. This research question is grounded in the
notion that China has truly ‗arrived‘ in Africa (Large 2009: 371) and that they are here to stay
(Alden et al. 2009: 6). Testament to this can be seen in the rise of Chinese trade, aid, and
business ventures in Africa. China has become Africa‘s second biggest trading partner (AlJazeera 2010); trading over US$106.8 billion since 2006 (Naidu 2010: 34). China also has an
extensive aid program for all African nations that recognize Taiwan as under Chinese
jurisdiction (Taylor 2009: 18-30). Their aid programs may include anything from loans,
infrastructure, agriculture/medical/education assistance, cultural exchanges, and military
support (Christensen 2010: 1-25). Chinese businesses and traders now number in their
thousands on the African continent (Alden 2007: 14). Many Chinese are involved in selling
cheap every day goods, while other Chinese businesses have gotten involved with the
exploration and extraction of natural resources (Christensen 2010: 1-25). This flurry of
activity has been hard to ignore and has sparked heated debate over the nature of this
partnership and what China‘s motives are (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010: 256-265). This article
will be focusing on the case study of Chinese engagement with Kenya, to see whether the
impact of Chinese activities will hinder or support Kenya‘s development goals.
China is offering its experience in rapid industrialization and poverty alleviation, as an
alternative to the West‘s development model (Mbaye 2010: 39-53). However, many are
sceptical as to how to whether China can deliver on their rhetoric of creating a ―mutually
beneficial‖ partnership (Brautigam 2009: 3-7). Many fear that China‘s engagement with
Africa will be exploitative and ultimately hurt Africa‘s development (Naidu 2010: 25). There
are trepidations that China‘s disregard for human rights and illiberal values will have a
devastating impact on Africa‘s fight against corruption and struggle towards democratic
governance (Alden 2007: 20). There are also concerns over the terms/conditions of Chinese
trade and their ―no strings attached‖ aid with Africa. Not to mention, China‘s interests in
African‘s natural resources (Guardian 2010).
This article will be taking a closer look at these allegations and exploring whether they are
legitimate concerns, or if they have been blown out of proportion. This article will
contextualize these issues by focusing on the case study of Chinese engagement with Kenya.
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Kenya is an interesting case study as it does not conform to the typically resource rich
country China is heavily involved with. By focusing on an atypical Sino-African partnership
(China-Kenya), we are given a unique insight into China‘s perhaps more subtle motives.
Additionally, this unique case study raises noteworthy questions over China‘s evolving role
in Africa.
Thus, the aim of this article is to focus on China‘s engagement with Kenya, to assess whether
China‘s interests and actions are compatible with Kenya‘s own development goals. We will
question whether China‘s actions in Kenya are in line with their rhetoric of a ―win-win‖
scenario, and ―mutually beneficial‖ partnership based on ―South-South solidarity‖ (Qiang
2010: 62). We will look at the nature of the Chinese engagement with Kenya, and the
motivations behind this partnership to assess whether China will hinder or support Kenya‘s
goal of becoming a middle-income country by the year 2030 (GOK 2008). This article will
attempt to evaluate whether China can help Kenya fulfil their Vision 2030 ambitions, by
looking at the impact of Chinese engagement on Kenya‘s economy, natural resources
(including land) and political governance.
This article will follow a logical framework of outlining who China is: what they are doing in
Africa and why. Who Kenya is: what does their political economy look like and why. What
factors of Kenya‘s political economy will support or hinder their development aspirations?
Subsequently, the article will look at the case study of China‘s engagement with Kenya.
Questioning China‘s interests in the nation, and how their motives could support or hinder
Kenya‘s Vision 2030 development initiative. The conclusion will focus on the role that
ordinary Kenyan‘s can play in influencing this engagement so that it is mutually beneficial.
Section two will also define China‘s Africa policy. This segment looks at the historical and
socio-economic factors that have shaped China‘s foreign policy. It looks at the contemporary
issues China‘s economy faces and how this has motivated their courting of Africa. It argues
that the new Sino-Africa partnership is rooted in the need for China to continue their rapid
economic development at home. Africa offers China much needed natural resources to fuel
their booming economy. Africa provides new market partners for Chinese exports and
businesses. In addition, Africa is also a strategic diplomatic ally in light of Western critique
and scepticism (Alden 2007: 8-36; Taylor 2009: 1-36).
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It shall also explain that although China‘s ties to Africa are not new, the nature of their
engagement has evolved dramatically in recent years (Alden 2007: 120-136; Alden et al.
2009: 6). This section outlines how China‘s Africa policy has adapted and responded to the
dominant ideology of the time (Buckley et al. 2010: 81-118). It will describe the diversity of
Chinese activities on the continent, including: grants/loans, technical assistance, diplomatic
relations, infrastructure construction, trade, manufacturing, and resource extraction
(Christensen 2010: 1-25). A broad understanding of Chinese activities and interests in Africa,
will serve as a reference point to the case study of Chinese actions in Kenya. This knowledge
will help inform the debate as to whether China‘s relationship with Kenya is an outlier or
consistent with their broader objectives for the continent.
After defining which China we are dealing with, and what the nature of their engagement is
with Africa, we can now define Kenya. The third section defines Kenya‘s current political
economy by focusing on three interrelated categories: Kenya‘s economic performance, their
natural resources (including land), and their political profile. (This framework will be used
later in the article to evaluate China‘s influence on Kenya, using these three spheres as
guidelines.) This section will touch on issues that hinder Kenya‘s development such as
corruption, land disputes, tribalism, lack of infrastructure, and a culture of impunity. At the
same time it highlights the factors that are counteracting these issues, such as Kenya‘s strong
and thriving civil society and critical free press (BBC(b) 2011). Analysing Kenya‘s political
economy is important to understanding the appeal of a Chinese partnership and how this
raises both challenges and opportunities for Kenya‘s development.
Section five critically examines Chinese activities and motives in their engagement with
Kenya. This section asks whether the Sino-Kenya case study is an outlier and example of
China‘s changing role on the continent, or more of the same? And more importantly what
will the lasting implications of this engagement be for Kenya‘s economic development and
governance? The issues raised in this section will contextualize the debates as to whether
China‘s partnership is mutually beneficial or inherently corrupt. It outlines the limitations of
this partnership and argues that if these issues are to be genuinely addressed, then Kenya‘s
civil society must play a pivotal role in influencing this engagement.
The concluding section will contextualize all the topics covered so far. It summarizes China‘s
evolving relations with Africa. It argues that China‘s engagement with Africa shows no sign
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of slowing down; therefore the question is not whether China should be engaging with
Africa, but how this engagement can be adapted so that it is mutually beneficial (Naidu 2010:
25-29). Although one should be wary of the limitations of ―China bashing‖ (Alden et al.
2009: 2), China‘s engagement does raise some serious issues of governance and exploitation.
One of the biggest risks of China‘s engagement with Africa is that the benefits of this
partnership will not be felt beyond the periphery of elites from both sides (Large 2009: 375).
However, Kenya is host to a thriving civil society who will have an important role in
ensuring that ordinary Kenyans feel the returns of this engagement. Kenya‘s civil society
must step up to demand transparency and accountability from both Chinese businesses and
African governments, if this partnership is to be mutually beneficial (Harneit-Sievers et al.
2010: 258).
China offer‘s Kenya a unique opportunity to fulfil their development goals (Harneit-Sievers
et al. 2010: 257). China offers the world‘s most impressive example of rapid development to
date (Raine 2009: 54). They have both the technical expertise, experience in poverty
reduction interventions and funds necessary (Dubosse 2010: 72) for Kenya to meet their
goals. However this article concludes that this will only be a reality if Kenya‘s civil society
actively monitors, oversees‘ and influences this engagement.
China’s Engagement with Africa
China‘s trade with Africa has risen dramatically in recent years. Since 2006, China has traded
an astonishing US$106.8 billion with the continent (Naidu 2010: 34). This makes China,
Africa‘s second biggest trading partner after the United States (Al-Jazeera 2010; Taylor
2009: 1). There are over 800 Chinese companies working in 49 African countries, 480 of
these are joint ventures with African firms (Alden 2007: 14). China‘s activities on the
continent are very diverse and include everything from aid, cultural exchange projects,
natural resource exploration and extraction, trade, manufacturing, and infrastructure projects
(Christensen 2010: 1-25). The aim of this section is to explain the unique economic and
political conditions that have shaped China‘s engagement with Africa, to become what we
know today. We will examine the changing nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and how these political changes have reflected in China‘s foreign policy. This section will
examine how China carries out their foreign policy with Africa. This insight will be useful in
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the coming sections that look at the new set of opportunities and threats China‘s engagement
poses for Africa‘s (and namely, Kenya‘s) development.
This article will draw on Rotberg‘s framework of categorizing China‘s engagement with
Africa into three distinct stages (Rotberg 2000: 1-20). China‘s first contact with the continent
was under the Ming dynasty. Between 1418 and 1433, the Chinese emperor ordered several
fleet of ships to Africa in search of medical compounds, possibly to fight the many epidemics
China was facing at the time (Brautigam 2009: 23). Evidence of these expeditions can be
seen in a number of Chinese artefacts found at the ruins of Ancient African civilizations such
as Timbuktu and Great Zimbabwe (Obiorah 2007: 35).
According to Rotberg, China‘s second stage of engagement with the continent began under
Mao Zedong‘s rule (Rotberg 2000: 1-20). During this period, China was attempting to
promote their socialist ideology to African states who were either fighting for national
liberation or were newly independent. This period was also marked by the Cold War. Both
the US, USSR and China attempted to project their ideological claims on the African
continent (Snow 2009: xiv). China was particularly active in influencing socialist reform in
Tanzania and Zambia. During this time, China also set up trading posts across the continent
and began their first aid projects (the great Tanzam railway, built in Tanzania starting in Dar
es Salaam to Lusaka in Zambia which is probably the most famous remnant from this period)
(Brautigam 2009: 40; Qiang 2010: 57).
In return for China‘s support for Africa‘s national liberation struggles, Africa gave China
unwavering support on the international arena. This backing saw China win its first seat at
the UN. As Mao Zedong said: ―We are carried into the UN by African friends‖ (Qiang 2010:
58). However, Chairman Zedong was soon forced to end his outward venture and shift his
focus back to China‘s internal issues in the light of the post Cultural Revolution era. This
marked the end of China‘s second stage of engagement with Africa (Qiang 2010: 58).
China‘s started its last stage of engagement in the early 1990s‘, which is on going today
(Rotberg 2000: 1-20). This latest era reflects China‘s new foreign policy and their search for
raw materials to fuel their industry heavy economy (Qiang 2010: 26), and new markets to
expand their trade (Alden 2007: 14).
There were several unique instances in both China and Africa that served as preconditions for
China‘s third stage of engagement. One could argue that China‘s reaction to the Tiananmen
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Square massacre was possibly a key event in shaping their foreign policy towards the
developing world (Taylor 2009: 13-14). On June 4th 1989, the Chinese government sent
troops to end a mass protest where thousands of civilians were calling for democratic reform
in China. The army‘s response was brutal; tanks rolled over protestors while soldiers‘
sprayed bullets into the crowds. The massacre was caught on video and was broadcast around
the world (BBC 2010). The United States and European Union condemned the killings and
heavily criticized the repressive authoritarian rule of the government. China felt completely
isolated by the Western World and made a decision never to allow themselves to be caught in
such a vulnerable position again. They realized that they desperately needed a dependable
ally. Many believe that this incident made China re-evaluate their foreign policy; putting the
developing world at the cornerstone for their policies (Taylor 2011: 14).
In direct response to these events, China started courting Africa. China relied on their
reformed political rhetoric to ease this procedure. They used their guidelines for foreign
policy to show their good intentions. Their five guidelines are: (1) mutual respect for
territorial boundaries, (2) nonaggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international affairs,
(4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) peaceful coexistence (Taylor 2009: 14-15). Aside from
these guidelines, China‘s foreign policy states that they will only collaborate with countries
that recognized the ‗One China‘ policy: Recognizing China‘s jurisdiction over Taiwan and
therefore ceasing all economic or political affiliations with the country (Brautigam 2009: 6768). With these guidelines in place, China promoted the merit of a ‗South-South‘ partnership
in light of disillusionment with the West. China emphasized their common bond with
developing countries (Marks 2007: 7) and promised a new dawn for Africa with ‗mutual
respect and support‘ for a ‗win-win‘ outcome (Qiang 2010: 62).
Supported by their new foreign policy, China started their ‗going out policy‘ in 1991.
Chinese companies were encouraged to seek out international markets to start businesses and
maximize profits. 17% of Chinese growth is generated from exports, but China found that the
markets that they were exporting their goods to were becoming increasingly saturated They
needed new markets to export their cheap everyday goods to, and Africa, a continent with
800 million consumers was what China was searching for (Taylor 2009: 179). At the time,
Africa was beginning to mirror China‘s ―going out policy‖ by liberalizing their markets and
creating favourable trade conditions. These economic reforms encouraged China to invest in
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Africa (Taylor 2006: 1-35). China has now overtaken the United Kingdom to become
Africa‘s second biggest trading partner (Al-Jazeera 2010; Taylor 2009: 1).1
The CCP also saw Africa‘s partnership as a necessity for their political stability. With
China‘s economic reform, the CCP‘s focus was shifted from class struggle to one
emphasizing political stability and order. This is based on the premise that if a government is
unable to provide economic opportunities for their citizens, this will led to civil unrest. ―For
[China], the goal is to present an image of continuity, emphasizing the legitimacy and
stability of the CCP and its system as the Party embarks on its seventh decade in power […]‖
(Raine 2009: 233). It is important for the CCP to give the impression that they are in charge
of their rapid development and that the economy shows no signs of slowing down if they
wish to avoid protest and civil unrest.
Aside from the economic incentives, Africa had something else that China desperately
needed-- raw materials and natural resources to fuel their heavy industrial economy (Marks
2007: 7; Mbaye 2010: 49; Naidu 2010: 26). China is the world‘s second largest importer of
oil but has lost out on the Middle East‘s oil supply (Taylor 2011: 18-19). China is desperately
searching for a reliable source of oil (Assogbavi 2010: 194). Not wanting to be dependent on
and vulnerable to the international oil market, China turned to Africa for dependable, longterm oil deals (Taylor 2011: 19). However, oil is not the only natural resource China is
interested in. They are also actively searching out and extracting Africa‘s timber, cobalt,
copper, iron, uranium and manganese, to sustain their own economic growth (Christensen
2010: 1).
As China‘s objectives for Africa are long-term, it is in their interest to establish and foster
stable solid alliances with African governments. This is often achieved through aid donations.
China grants development aid to every African country that recognizes their ‗One China‘
policy (Alden 2007: 21). The terms and conditions of Chinese aid projects are negotiated
directly with host governments. Chinese aid may include loans, infrastructure projects,
military support, technical assistance for health/agriculture/academia disciplines, scholarships
and cultural exchange programs (Onjala 2008: 35). Aid is either given symbolically – as a
gesture of ‗South solidarity‘ and ‗mutual support‘ (Mbaye 2010: 40), or granted in exchange
for natural resources (Chen et al. 2008: 6-7). Chinese aid is appealing as there are no political
1
See Appendix I, p.32 : Graph: Trade Between China and Africa.
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conditions involved, however aid is often tied to Chinese goods or services (i.e. a road will be
built by a Chinese construction firm) (Christensen 2010: 6).
Chinese business ventures in Africa are also negotiated directly with African governments.
These deals are often ‗lubricated‘ with bribes in the form of ‗aid donations‘. Corruption is a
taken-for-granted fact in business transactions between China and Africa (Mbaye 2010: 46).
African governments find doing business very appealing as China offers cheaper, and fast
deals with little dogma or conditionality (Raine 2009: 131). China is not interested in the
countries internal issues of political legitimacy, human rights violations, or corruption. This is
a refreshing change from Western scrutiny, critique, and economic sanctions (Alden 2007:
20; Taylor 2009: 24).
However, State control of Chinese businesses working abroad is weakening. Along with the
opening up of Chinese markets, their ‗going out policy‘ also lead to the proliferation of
private traders and businesses (Alden 2007: 29; Dickson 2003: 4-5). Thus, when China
turned to Africa for business ventures, a hoard of private Chinese businesses followed.
Although large state supported Chinese firms are closely monitored, it has become
increasingly difficult to keep track and monitor a growing number of private companies and
traders and their various undertakings. This has led to claims that China‘s economic
liberalization and increased privatization have undermined their communist rule. ―Weak rule
of law, endemic corruption, and bureaucratic tendencies at every level of government means
that the central leadership is in a perpetual and losing struggle to keep up with a surging
economy, whether domestic or when it is projected overseas‖ (Taylor 2009: 179). However,
it is unlikely that the CCP would admit to this, as their priority is to project an image of
absolute control (Dickson 2003: 3-4).
The main issue with the proliferation of Chinese actors is that it can lead to competing or
incompatible motives/incentives. China‘s going out policy was founded on the premise that
Chinese actors share the CCP‘s goal of maximizing profits and thereby strengthening the
Chinese economy. Yet private entrepreneurs hoping to maximize their profits may undermine
this objective. For example, the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SOASAC) own or have shares in State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and it is
therefore in their interest to encourage SOE to maximize profits despite the cost it may have
for the Chinese state‘s diplomatic relations (Taylor 2009: 6). This lack of cohesion means
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that there is a discrepancy between Chinese foreign policy and actions. This can lead to a
situation where the conduct of private actors are at odds with China‘s overall diplomatic or
political ambitions (Alden 2007: 30; Christiansen & Rai 1996: 176).
However, China is becoming more and more aware of the importance of maintaining a good
‗image‘ to secure long-term positive relations and further investment with African countries
(Brautigam 2009: 309; Kabemba 2010: 150; Raine 2009: 131). This will hopefully make the
CCP take decisive action to oversee and control the actions of private Chinese companies and
traders.
China‘s partnership is certainly offering Africa a unique opportunity to boost their
development capacity. China has only recently undergone a process of rapid poverty
reduction and impressive infrastructure upgrade to become the world‘s second largest
economy (Raine 2009: 54). China can offer Africa a chance to learn from their own
development experience, as well as provide the technical assistance and vast credit necessary
to see this through (Dubosse 2010: 72). In addition, China‘s rhetoric of ‗South South‘
solidarity is very appealing for Africa in light of recent Western apathy or scorn (Alden 2009:
20). However, whether a ‗win-win‘ engagement will be a reality, will depend on the ability of
both China and African leaders to tightly regulate and monitor the situation (Kabemba 2010:
152; Ong‘ayo 2010: 224-253).
Kenya’s Political Economy
This section will explain the historical and cultural factors that have shaped Kenya‘s political
economy. This section will focus on Kenya‘s political economy in regards to three
interlinked categories: their political governance, their economic performance, and their
natural resources (focusing here on land). We will refer back to these three categories in the
next section when we analyse the impact of China‘s engagement with Kenya. The aim of this
section is to provide a theoretical background to the contemporary obstacles that impede
Kenya‘s development. This will provide a background to understanding how the Sino-Kenya
relationship raises new challenges or opportunities for Kenya‘s development. We will begin
by outlining what Kenya‘s development aspirations are, and then go on to discuss how
certain aspects of their political economy might undermine or support these goals. This
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section will begin by providing a brief history of Kenyan politics; discussing the issues of
tribalism, nepotism, Kenya‘s culture of impunity and how land has been used as a political
tool. We will then look at Kenya‘s economic performance, focusing on the factors that pose a
challenge to their economic growth.
The government of Kenya (GOK) launched their Vision 2030 development plan in 2008. The
aim is for Kenya to meet all their Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015, and then
become a middle-income country by 2030. Vision 2030 calls for reform in Kenya‘s political,
economic and social spheres so that it can reach its goal of becoming a newly industrialized
country with a high standard of living (GOK 2008). The following segments of this section
will discuss issues of Kenya‘s political economy that may compromise this vision.
We will begin by looking at Kenya‘s past, thus providing an important context to
understanding Kenya‘s current political state. This section will briefly outline Kenya‘s
political history and how it created a legacy of tribalism, corruption, and a culture of
impunity. This section will explain how practices of bad governance are inherited from one
regime to the next. We will begin with the injustices Kenya experienced under British
colonial rule (from 1920-1963) (Branch 2009; Elkins 2005; Oyugi 1998: 290).
Britain‘s colonization of Kenya was based on both ideological and economic grounds. Under
imperialism, Britain sought out to expand their empire by claiming new (foreign) territories
(Meredith 2005: 11). Britain saw it‘s African colonies as an ideologically driven ―civilizing
mission‖ (Elkins 2005: 88). Kenya was not nearly as resource rich as some of Britain‘s other
colonies (i.e. India, Zambia) but what Kenya did have was pristine and fertile land. At the
height of colonial rule, the British controlled 25% of Kenya‘s best land (Oyugi 1998: 290).
This fertile land was taken from the central province, home of the pastoral Maasai tribe and
Kenya‘s biggest tribe - the Kikuyu (Elkins 2005: 12). The Kikuyu had no choice but to
become squatters on what used to be their homeland (Meredith 2005: 82).
The other big change that the British brought to Kenya was the emergence of a money
economy with taxes and wages (Elkins 2005: 7). In a sense, this development ―created‖
poverty. The British tended to hire Kenyans who were proficient in English, creating a tribal
hierarchy. Kenya has 42 tribes but the missionaries had only set up education programs in
certain ethnic territories thus excluding many minority or nomadic tribes. The British
increased ethnic divisions by relying on tribal stereotypes for certain job allocations. For
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example, ―warrior tribes‖ like the Kamba or Kalenjin were hired in the army/police force and
the Luo were hired in State corporations for their alleged hardworking and honest nature
(Oyugi 1998: 291).
By the late 1940s, mass urbanization, high unemployment, and resentment over colonial
preferential tribal treatment meant that tensions were running high. This was the setting that
led the landless Kikuyu to mobilize support for a mission to take back their ancestral land; it
was called the Mau Mau movement (Meredith 2005: 82). Up to 90% of the entire 1.5 million
Kikuyu population took the secretive Mau Mau oath, committing them to fight the settlers for
their land (Elkins 2005: 27).
In reaction to the rebellion, the British declared a state of emergency in 1952 and started a
ruthless counter attack. They rounded up all the Kikuyu, and sent them to ―holding pens‖ for
interrogation. This almost always involved torture methods such as burning suspects, rape, or
mutilating their genitals. Many people died during the process. If a Kikuyu was cleared of all
charges, they were sent to crowded ―reserves‖ where many died of malnutrition, starvation
and disease. If the Settlers were not satisfied with the interrogation, the suspect was sent to
camps where they were put to work on Colonial development projects (Elkins 2005: 62-153).
It is estimated that over 100,000 Kikuyu were detained without a trial (BBC(a) 2011). The
official death toll of Kenyans who died under Mau Mau is 13,500, but it is thought that the
‗real‘ figure could be much higher (Meredith 2005: 86).
After several years of the brutal Mau Mau war, the British leaders took a new direction in
their colonial rule and were open to the idea of national self-determination and independence.
Blueprints were created for Kenya‘s independence at the Lancaster House Conference in
1962, and Kenya was awarded independence the following year (Meredith 2005: 80-92).
Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya‘s first president and ―father of the nation‖ (Cheeseman 2009:
97). The British had seen Kenyatta as the leader of the Mau Mau and he had been imprisoned
in the UK for seven years (Meredith 2005: 80), yet once he became president, he was not
interested in bringing the settlers to justice. Instead, he preached a message of ―forgive and
forget‖, stressing that the most important thing was to move on (Branch 2011: 17). This
shocked many Kikuyu who could not forget the atrocities they had experienced (Asingo
2003: 20).
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In retrospect, it is clear that Kenyatta‘s rhetoric had strategic implications. Kenyatta was
interested in getting his ancestral Kikuyu back from the settlers, making it of utmost
importance that he fostered and maintained good relations with them. By holding them
accountable, Kenyatta risked alienating them, thus, jeopardizing his access to the land. The
land was sold to the State to redistribute. Kenyatta‘s family and close friends awarded
themselves large tracks of prime land (Asingo 2003: 20) and the rest was sold on a ‗willing
buyer‘ basis (Branch 2011: 10-11). This outcome left the Mau Mau fighters feeling deeply
betrayed. The atrocities the Kikuyu‘s had experienced went unacknowledged and they had no
funds to buy the land they had been promised. The wealthy Kikuyu minority and their richer
neighbouring tribes bought up the remaining land. The vast majority of Kikuyu were once
again forced to become squatters. Sentiments of this betrayal stayed with the Kikuyu for
decades (Oucho 2002: 66).
Kenyatta had come to power under the political party Kenya African National Union
(KANU), made up of Kenya‘s three biggest tribes the Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo The
opposition party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), consisted of minority tribes.
KANU deliberately undermined KADU‘s authority by depriving their constituencies of State
funds (Oyugi 1998: 295). KANU was instrumental in establishing patronage politics in
Kenya with their harambee movement. The principle behind harambees is that the
community comes together to fundraise for a development project. They invite along their
MP who is expected to make a substantial contribution that in turn rallies the community to
also give generously. Harambee is therefore based on two principles, namely, that political
patrons owe their communities the benefits of their privileged position, and that patronage
should be extended to those who are working hard to assist themselves (Cheeseman 2003:
97). ―Absolutism reigns and power is maintained through patrimony, by means of the illegal
commandeering of State resources. Corruption, not hegemonic rule, is the cement that keeps
the system together, yoking the patrons to their predatory ruling class‖ (Taylor 2009: 11).
Kenyatta used ―harambees” as an instrumental way to compensate the ethnic minorities
(KADU members) who were not receiving state funding (Cheeseman 2003: 103).2
KADU, the opposition party was disbanded in 1961 (Oyugi 1998: 295) and Kenya became a
one party state. This empowered Kenyatta by consolidating his power as the political head
2
See Appendix II, p.33: Diagram of Patron-Client Networks.
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and giving him sole access to State funding. Kenyatta was using patronage politics to cater
for his own Kikuyu constituencies and he targeted those who threatened this trend. Prominent
political figures who were calling for political reform and transparency (Pio Pinto, Tom
Mboya, J.M. Kariuki) were all killed under mysterious circumstances (Cheeseman 2003: 96103). Tom Mboya had been a key Luo figure in KANU. He was outspoken against
Kenyatta‘s preferential treatment for his own tribe. Mboya was seen as a threat to the
Kikuyu‘s power in KANU and he was assassinated. His death sparked a violent backlash
from his fellow Luo tribesmen (Oyugi 1998: 296-297).
Kenyatta died in 1978 and Daniel Arap Moi took over KANU rule. The general consensus is
that Moi‘s rule was more authoritarian and violent than Kenyatta‘s (LeBas 2011: 99-108) but
it is misleading to present his regime as radically different from his predecessors‘. Moi‘s
willingness to use ‗divide and rule‘ politics, centralize power and use ethnic violence as a
political tool, are all reactions to the greater challenges he faced. Moi had none of Kenyatta‘s
public appeal, nor the vast resources or large ethnic base to help his political career. He also
came to power in a time of increased economic constraints with the oil price shocks of 1973
and 1979. In addition, the institutions he inherited were filled with Kikuyu members loyal to
his predecessor (Cheeseman 2003: 97).
Moi used four main strategies to secure his power. As a Kalenjin, and minority tribe in
KANU, his first priority was to secure his position by appointing many Kalenjin and loyal
friends to top government positions (Oyugi 1998: 299). Second, he followed in Kenyatta‘s
footsteps by targeting anyone who threatened his power. Opposition parties were banned and
critics were either expelled, or detained and tortured (LeBas 2011: 99-108). Third, he used a
‗divide and rule‘ approach to consolidate power. Moi flamed ethnic tensions and sponsored
ethnic violence to cater to certain political interests, particularly around election times
(Cheeseman 2003: 97).
Lastly, Moi continued Kenyatta‘s legacy of ‗looking out for your own‘ by distributing state
resources to his close supports. Because of the unstable economic climate and the reduced
donations in light of the end of the Cold War, Moi did not have the same resources to cater to
his patronage networks, and therefore cash rewards were often compensated with land
allotments (Cheeseman 2003: 97). Yet economic vulnerability did not stop Moi‘s closest
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family and friends from ‗pocketing‘ state funds. It is estimated that they received $2 billion
(Vaughan 2011: 5).
Moi‘s violent rule did not deter opponents from challenging his power. It was during the
1980s‘ that Kenya‘s civil society groups, in cooperation with an increasing number of
disillusioned university graduates, came together to challenge KANU. The rigged election of
1992 and 1997, with ballot stuffing and ‗queue voting‘ undermined the legitimacy of KANU
rule and was a catalyst for the mobilization of political opponents (Cheeseman 2003: 97-98;
LeBas 2011: 166-169).
Internal disputes within KANU put an end to Moi‘s 24-year regime. In the run up to the 2002
elections, Moi handpicked a KANU candidate who proved very controversial. The candidate,
Uhura Kenyatta (Jomo Kenyatta‘s son), was seen as a weak, inexperienced leader and a
political ‗puppet‘ for Moi. KANU began to splinter around the issue of Kenyatta (Cheeseman
2003: 98). Kenyatta ran against Mwai Kibaki of the multi-ethnic, multi party National
Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party. To ensure that NARC avoided the internal
strife which had plagued Kenya‘s opposition parties, Kibaki made a deal with another
prominent political figure in NARC, Raila Odinga (a Luo). If Odinga supported Kibaki‘s
candidacy (instead of running against him), he would be elected prime minister when Kibaki
won (USIP 2008; Wrong 2009: 73). KANU had no chance against a united opposition and
Kibaki won by a landslide.
Kibaki‘s win was believed to be a turning point for the country and Kenyan‘s were very
optimistic about the future. Kibaki promised to break old forms of patronage (Cheeseman
2003: 105), investigate and rectify historic land grievances (Branch 2011: 17), fight
corruption, and improve Kenya‘s development indicators (Wallis & Manson 2011: 1).
However, disillusionment grew as the GOK‘s initiation enthusiasm for reforms began to
diminish (Branch 2011: 251-260).
After Moi‘s rule, the economy was in ruins so Kibaki first initiative was to focus on bringing
up the economy. From 2003 to 2007 Kenya experienced the longest period of sustained
economic growth in its history. Kibaki kick-started Kenya‘s retail trade, and manufacturing
sectors. This period also attracted many foreign investors (like China) wanting to take
advantage of this promising economy. Kibaki made significant headway in improving
Kenya‘s development indicators too. Poverty levels declined, literacy levels went up and HIV
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rates fell to 6% by the end of 2004 (Chege 2007: 26). However in recent years, this growth
has slowed, due to the global fiscal crisis, falling stock market and political violence has
deterred foreign investment (Wallis & Manson 2011: 1).
Kenyans were also encouraged when Kibaki set up a strong anti-corruption team, headed by
former-journalist John Githongo. Yet, when Githongo handed in his reports, they went
unacknowledged and then Githongo started receiving death threats (Brach 2011: 253-254). It
became clear that he was simply there for ―show‖. It seems that Kibaki had elected Githongo
on the premise that as a close family friend and Kikuyu member, he would understand that
his job entailed covering up the GOK‘s scandals (Wrong 2010: 63-182).
Despite Kibaki‘s original promise to start an equitable land distribution process, he soon
joined his predecessors‘ tendency to use land as an instrumental political tool (Branch 2011:
17). Kibaki allocated land to select groups that were in line with his political interests
(Cheeseman 2003: 105), proving that ―the more things change, the more they stay the same‖
(Cheeseman 2003: 95). At the same time, the GOK did little when government institutions
(Nairobi City Council and City Commission) were exposed for illegal land grabbing
(Vaughan 2011: 5).
Kibaki also promised to put an end to the legacy of patronage politics. A testament to this is
how he made it illegal for MP‘s to be involved with harambee activities, thus undermining
their ability to use their power to benefit their own supporters. NARC also started the
Constituency Development Fund (CDF), which would in theory replace harambee
development projects. The CDF was meant to undermine the link between local patrons and
their political elite representatives. The appeal of the CDF was that State resources were
distributed equitably among Kenya‘s 235 constituencies, and that there would be more
transparency. Although this development was a positive step towards democracy, the CDF
was undermined by MPs who effectively controlled the distribution of credit to their
constituencies (Cheeseman 2003: 105).
Upon winning the 2002 election, Kibaki reneged his promise to make Odinga prime minister
(Branch 2011: 249). This decision would come back to haunt him in the following election
(USIP 2008). Kenya had a referendum surrounding a constitutional shake-up; a disillusioned
Odinga saw this as an opportunity to break free from NARC and rally support for his new
party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). ODM ran against NARC in the 2007
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elections. The disputed election saw both opponents claim victory amid widespread
allegations of vote rigging. Kibaki secured his presidency with a rushed secret swearing in
ceremony (Pambazuka(b) 2009). A US government investigation deduced that Odinga should
have won by a comfortable margin of 6%. After the results were declared, the nation erupted
in violence divided along ethnic lines. This was the worst ethnic violence Kenya had ever
experience, over 1,500 people were killed and 600,000 displaced (Vaughan 2011: 9;
Kantai(b) 2011: 3).
By late 2010, no tribunal had been set up to try the persecutors, not least because many MP‘s
feared that they too would be persecuted. However, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
took on the case, promising to break Kenya‘s cycle of impunity. The ICC used the Waki
Commission investigations (set up the GOK), several independent reports by civil society
groups, and witnesses to name six suspects. Of the six named, five were either part of the
government or involved in government institutions (Branch 2011: 283-284).
Kenya now has a power-sharing government with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime
minister. Although this is certainly not an ideal situation, it probably stopped Kenya from
descending into civil war (Wallis & Manson 2011: 1). Yet again, Kenyans heard their new
government make hollow promises of reform before continuing with their predecessors‘
legacy of corruption, assassinations and ethnic bigotry. Although not nearly on the same scale
as previous regimes, the current government continues to seize land illegally, and have been
facing a corruption scandal involving the embezzlement of funds from the sale of Kenyan
embassies abroad. Political assassinations have also continued with the murders of two civil
society activists who were reporting on illegal extrajudicial murders by the police. No arrests
were made (Branch 2011: 284-286).
However, there are signs that things are changing in Kenya. Their robust civil society and
critical free press have made it clear that political corruption and injustices will be brought to
light and challenged. They are drawing attention to the links between government officials
and electoral violence (Branch 2011: 296). A new constitution has provided the legitimacy
and support the civil society needed to confront the State‘s wrongdoings. For example, last
year Kibaki appointed three of his close associates to the judiciary. The nation was incensed,
and referred to the new constitution that states that all nominees must be democratically
voted in. Kibaki was forced to make an embarrassing retreat (Kantai(a) 2011: 3). The GOK is
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also facing increasing pressure for democratic reform from the vast number of Kenyans in the
diaspora, especially those in Northern Europe and North America (Karanja 2012). A strong
civil society is essential for holding the government accountable for their actions and for
fostering a free and fair democracy. Yet, there is only so much the civil service can do to
pressure the government and raise awareness of their shortcomings and injustices (LeBas
2011: 14-16).
Political stability and economic prosperity go hand in hand. An unstable political
environment disrupts the economy and deters Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Endemic
corruption saps funds that could be used for development projects and social services,
undermines the State‘s legitimacy, discourages FDIs and strains relations with donors
(McMahon 2006). Tribalism and nepotism compound inequality and pose serious obstacles
for those competing for scare employment opportunities (Oyugi 1998: 305-307).
Unfortunately these are not the only obstacles to Kenya‘s economic development. This
section will outline the factors that have affected their recent economic performance.
Kenya is a major economic player in East Africa. It is considered an important transportation
hub for the region and has the largest economy (US State 2012), however Kenya‘s economic
growth has fallen in recent years. The Kenya shilling reached a historic low last year (2011)
when it fell 24% against the dollar (Manson(b) 2011: 2). Inflation is now four times the
government‘s target. The events of the past few years have been very traumatic for Kenya‘s
economy. The 2007 post election violence saw Kenya‘s market drop 41.4%, hurting both FDI
and the tourist industry (Manson(a) 2011: 2). Inflation was made worse by Somali pirates
who forced cargo ships to find alternative sea routes, making trade difficult and driving up
the cost of transport. The threat of abduction from Somali pirates and the terrorist group AlShabaab has played havoc with Kenya‘s (usually booming) tourist industry (Wallis 2011: 3).
The government see‘s these issues as ―spill over‖ problems from Somalia. They decided that
they had no choice but to declare war on Al-Shabaab and invade Somalia. This war will
undoubtedly result in a backlash of terrorist attacks in Kenya (Manson(a) 2011: 2).
Adding to Kenya‘s woes, it experienced one of the worst droughts in recent history. Kenya‘s
reliance on the agricultural sector was severely tested as crops died, the market dropped and
people faced a humanitarian and food crisis made worse by the flood of climate refugees
from Somalia (Wallis & Manson 2011: 1). Kenya‘s main exports are tea, coffee and flowers,
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all of which are susceptible to adverse weather conditions (US State 2012). Erratic rainfall,
and periods of floods and droughts have become much more common in Kenya in recent
years. Global climate change has been compounded by mass deforestation (Maathai 2009).
Despite the current economic climate, Kenya still has one of the most diversified economies
in Sub Saharan Africa and is home to some of Africa‘s most innovative entrepreneurs
(EBSCO 2011). Kenya was the first country to come up with an advanced mobile phone
banking system. Kenya‘s ―M-pesa‖ initiative has revolutionized Kenya‘s economy. M-pesa
allows you to wire money to people in isolated areas, pay school fees, groceries, insurance
etc. through text messages. There is now on-going research into how to adapt the M-pesa
network to address social issues. So far, M-pesa has led to a maternal care hotline and a
system that tells the patient via SMS whether their drugs are genuine or counterfeit by
analysing the bar code on the bottle. Innovative projects like that have the potential to have a
huge impact on Kenya‘s development (Manson(c) 2011: 4).
In conclusion, the main obstacle for Kenya‘s development is the ‗winner takes all‘ mentality
that makes patronage politics a zero-sum game (Cheeseman 2009), and fosters a culture of
impunity that allows for historical injustices to go uncorrected. This ―winner takes all
mentality‖ has corrupted all State institutions, meaning that Kenyans cannot trust the police,
judiciary or politicians to act fairly (Vaughan 2011: 11). So when tribal groups feel that the
government is excluding them or that their needs are being marginalized they see no option
but to take matters into their own hands resulting in violence. Similarly, if a tribal group
(politician) feels that another group threatens their position of power they will fuel ethnic
tensions to crush the threat and to rally support for their own group (Oucho 2002: 1-30).
These sentiments are made worse by historical grievances of land grabbing and State
supported ethnic violence. It is not that these offences have not been investigated and
documented, but that a culture of impunity ensures that these injustices are never corrected.
This sense of hopelessness and despair manifests itself in (ethnically organized) violent
outbursts (Branch 2011: 261-286).
However, there are positive signs that the status quo is now being challenged. Kenyan‘s civil
society, in allegiance with a network of Kenyans living in the diaspora are rising up to
challenge bad governance (Karanja 2012; Wallis & Manson 2011: 1). Kenya‘s impressive
media discipline has also been instrumental in uncovering scandals and calling for political
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reform (Kantai 2011: 3). The civil society will have a crucial role in breaking Kenya‘s
legacy of patronage, culture of impunity and standing up against this.
Now that China has become a major player in Kenya (Chege 2007: 30); there is a risk that
they will entrench and take advantage of Kenya‘s culture of impunity. It is vital that Kenya‘s
civil society steps to ensure that Kenya‘s injustices do not go unpunished. The civil society
has a colossal task ahead of them, having to keep their government and Chinese businesses in
Kenya, in check.
China’s engagement with Kenya (Case Study)
This section will look at the opportunities and challenges that arise with China‘s engagement
with Kenya. This section contextualizes what we have covered so far by asking whether
Chinese interests and activities are compatible with Kenya‘s development goal of becoming a
middle-income country by 2030 (GOK 2008). For the sake of simplicity, this section will
refer to the framework used in section three to analyse China‘s impact on Kenya‘s (1)
Economy, (2) Natural Resources, and (3) Governance. Although this section has divided
China‘s influence into these three categories, it is important to understand that the issues
raised in each section are not unrelated. We must analyse China‘s influence at all levels of
Kenya‘s society to get a holistic understanding of China‘s impact on Kenya‘s development.
This section recognizes the unique opportunity China offers for Kenya‘s development goals
(Kabemba 2010: 150) but also notes that there are elements of their partnership that are
exploitative. Moreover, this section argues that Kenya‘s civil society must play a pivotal role
in monitoring and influencing this engagement if it is to deliver on it‘s promise of being
mutually beneficial (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010: 265).
We will begin by looking at China‘s economic interests in Kenya and ask if their economic
activities are compatible with Kenya‘s development goal. It will look at the potential China
offers Kenya‘s economic and social development but also the limitations and challenges it
posses. We will start by looking at the structure of trade between the two countries, and then
discuss the debate that China‘s role in Africa is neo-colonial. We will then ask, to what extent
Chinese actions are encouraging or hindering capacity building.
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As outlined in the previous section, there is a huge trade imbalance between Kenya and
China with China exporting thirty times more goods than they are importing from Kenya
(Guardian 2010). There are also serious allegations that China‘s trade with the continent has
taken a neo-colonial slant with China extracting and exporting their raw materials and
importing (cheap) manufactured goods (Taylor 2009: 63). However there are counter
arguments to these claims. First off, exporting raw materials to China can lead to established
trade relations and contacts and can thereby led to the diversification of exports. Exporting
raw materials can be a starting point for exporting other goods (Raine 2009: 124).
Secondly, although there is a trade imbalance, China has started to take measures to
accommodate an increasing number of African imports. They have removed tariff barriers for
twenty-five of Africa‘s poorest nations (Taylor 2009: 21). When China‘s commerce minister
visited Kenya in 2009, he stated that China is keen to extend their tariff exemption initiative.
This is definitely a step in the right direction to levelling the playing field for Sino-African
trade (Raine 2009: 126). Kenya‘s exports to China continue to grow exponentially and the
compositions of these exports have also started to change. 67% of Kenya‘s exports now
consist of nonfuel materials (recycled metals, soda ash), and more importantly Kenya‘s
manufactured goods are now 15.3% of exports to China (Chege 2007: 28).3
There are worries that China‘s export prowess may make it difficult for Africa‘s attempts to
develop its own manufacturing sector (Raine 2009: 114) however this does not seem to be the
case with Kenya. In fact, Kenya‘s retail trade and manufacturing sector, which had been
reinvigorated under Kibaki‘s rule, continued to grow despite taking in a historic number of
Chinese imports (Chege 2007: 28-30).
China has also been accused of using Africa as a dumping ground for their cheap
manufactured goods, but this must be seen within the context of the local consumer. The
cheap goods China is exporting are tailored to the African market. The Chinese are simply
responding to the demand for affordable everyday goods (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010: 258).
We must recognize that a lot of critique is disguised protectionism (Economist, 2011). Cheap
goods are not intrinsically exploitative, but flooding the market with ‗factory-rejects‘ and
counterfeited goods is exploitation (Raine 2009: 115). The influx of faulty goods will have a
detrimental impact on Kenya‘s economy and it is therefore important that the Kenyan
3
See Appendix III, p.34: Graph of Kenya‘s Exports to China
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government takes this issue seriously. Kenya should take note of how Nigeria responded to
this issue in 2009 by getting China to sign an agreement that their exports would comply by
the terms of the Nigerian Industrial Standards Act (Raine 2009: 124). Getting China to sign
an agreement would be the first step to curtailing the influx of substandard goods but this
would have to be followed up with regular supervision by the government to ensure that
China is observing the agreement.
On a positive note, there seems to be a significant shift in the content of Chinese exports to
Africa. China is trying to move away from light industrial goods and is focusing on the
exports of machinery and technology that will maximize profits (Qiang 2010: 59). ―The
Chinese government wants exports of Chinese machinery and equipment to overtake cheap
consumer goods in the export mix, moving up the value chain‖ (Brautigam 2009: 223). 40%
of Chinese imports to Kenya now consist of machinery, transport equipment for agriculture
and industrial production, and the service sector (Chege 2007: 28). This is a significant
opportunity for Kenya as access to advanced technology and machinery is vital if Kenya is to
meet its economic and social development goals.
One of the main components of China‘s engagement with Kenya is the construction of large
infrastructure projects. However, considering that the quality of other Chinese manufactured
goods, there is the possibility that even these large-scale projects may be substandard. This
was the case in Angola where a newly constructed hospital had to be shut down after a few
months when significant cracks were shown in the walls (Economist 2011). Yet the reason
that Chinese companies are Africa‘s first choice for infrastructure building (Qiang 2010: 60)
is because projects are completed quickly and cheaply with minimal ―red tape‖ and
bureaucracy (Chege 2007: 32). The fear is that what may be a cheap fix in the short term will
prove to be expensive in the long run. Having said that, it is in China‘s interest to ensure their
African consumers are satisfied so as to secure further investments (Raine 2009: 131).
There are estimated to be 44 Chinese construction firms currently working in Kenya (Chege
2007: 31). China has contributed significantly to addressing Kenya‘s infrastructure deficit.
Roads, railways, power grids, ports etc. are being built at a speed never before imagined
(Onjala 2008: 35). These projects not only provide Kenyans with a leading source of
employment, but the construction of infrastructure at an affordable price, also boosts Kenya‘s
economic performance, thus making them a stronger competitor (Chege 2007: 32).
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Infrastructure construction is perhaps the best example of the Chinese promise of a ‗win-win‘
paradigm. Improving Kenya‘s infrastructure capacity is vital for their aspirations of
becoming a newly industrial, middle-income country by the year 2030 (GOK 2008).
Another common accusation is that Chinese investment does little for Africa‘s capacity
building. The issue being that China imports workers instead of hiring locally. They say this
is because Chinese workers have more experience with rapid infrastructure construction and
because there is a language and cultural barrier with local workers. However in recent years,
this too is starting to change, as African governments are less willing to hand out work
permits (Brautigam 2009: 156). Now it is more common to have a small core of Chinese
workers who manage the projects and ―set the pace‖ while the majority of workers are locally
hired (Alden 2007: 46; Brautigam 2009: 229). The Chinese are also becoming more aware
that since their interests in Africa are long-term, it is mutually beneficial to support capacity
building (Raine 2009: 107).
Ultimately it is up to African governments to set up regulations to ensure that their people
receive employment opportunities from this engagement. For example, the Angolan
government has a quota that 70% of all workers must be locally hired. Regulations like these
are vital for capacity building and to ensure that a Sino-Africa partnership is mutually
beneficial. Yet at this point it is fair to consider that even though local civil servicemen
receive training that does not ensure that they will stay with the project. In a country like
Kenya where there is a serious shortage of skilled manpower, a brain drain to international
organizations is very common. A skilled Kenyan civil service worker will receive five times
more pay if he works for an international aid agency. It is also fair to note that Chinese aid
packages also contribute significantly to Africa‘s capacity building through their training
programs, technical assistance in the disciplines of health and agriculture and with their
scholarships and cultural exchange programs (Brautigam 2009: 156-159).
The second category looks at China‘s impact on Kenya‘s natural resources, including land.
As mentioned previously, Kenya is an outlier in the Sino-Africa engagement because it does
not fit the bill of the typical resource rich country that China is heavily involved with. This
section will analyse the threats that China posses to Kenya‘s environmental sustainability and
look at the role that Kenya‘s civil society can play in managing this threat.
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China has a notorious reputation for its disregard of the environment. Their impressive rapid
development has come at a very high price to the environment. It is estimated that each year
China loses 9% of its GDP to environmental degradation. There is grave concern that if
China cannot protect their environment at home, they will not be able to do so abroad;
especially in developing countries with weak environmental legislation and regulation
(Kabemba 2010: 144). In Kenya, it has been widely documented that in instances where
Chinese road projects run close to national parks, there has been a rapid increase in poaching.
In fact, 90% of those caught smuggling ivory at Jomo Kenyatta Airport are Chinese. This is
very worrying not only for Kenya‘s endangered species, but also because increased poaching
may jeopardize Kenya‘s tourism industry (Shoumatoff 2011).
Although Kenya is not known for its wealth of natural resources, this has not deterred China
from signing several deals for the exploration of gas titanium and oil (Economist 2008).
Now, an Anglo-Irish firm has found oil in Northern Kenya (Opio 2012). The US ambassador
to Kenya predicted that if oil was found then China‘s engagement with Kenya would likely
escalate (Guardian 2010). China makes no secret of the fact that it is interested in Africa‘s
natural resources (Raine 2009: 35). Considering that oil has been found in many East African
countries (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia, DRC) this may well be the real
motivation behind China‘s involvement in building infrastructure projects that will connect
these countries (Aron & Okoth 2012). ―Like that of any country, China‘s foreign policy is
intended to serve its domestic interests‖ (Raine 2009: 35). The Lamu Port-South SudanEthiopia Transport corridor (LAPSSET) project, that China is building, will allow China
access to the wider markets of East Africa (Nyabiange 2010) but it may also give China
access to their oil reserves (Aron & Okoth 2012).
The Lamu port initiative also brings up another issue: land. Now, there have been cases of
China buying large tracks of agricultural land in Africa (Brautigam 2009: 233-236; Naidu
2010: 37) but there are no reports of this in Kenya. However that is not to say that this could
be an issue in the future. As outlined in section three, land disputes have been used as a
political tool by each regime that has governed Kenya. Land disputes have still not been
addressed by the current government (Cheeseman 2009: 95), and land remains one of the
underlying causes for ethnic violence (Branch 2011; Cheeseman 2009; Wrong 2010). Only
time will tell if China will be granted land or buy land, but the fact of the matter is that
Chinese construction companies are already aggravating land problems. Many of the Lamu
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locals have expressed anger that they are being displaced to make room for the port
construction. President Kibaki has promised to compensate them with land titles (Moloo
2010) but given the government‘s handling of previous land disputes this seems unlikely
(Branch 2011; Cheeseman 2009; Elkins 2005).
The silver lining is that China is becoming more conscious of the consequences of creating a
negative image of themselves. China knows that it cannot continue with ―business as usual‖
if they do not wish to outstay their welcome. ―China has realized the need for greater
converge between Africa‘s development needs and its own economic interests‖ (HarneitSievers et al. 2010: 263). In the 2006 Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
conference, China promised to work towards protecting Africa‘s environment. The real issue
lies with the proliferation of private Chinese companies abroad. It will be up to host countries
to improve the capacity of their environmental legislation and regulatory institutions to deal
with this challenge (Kabemba 2010: 150-152).
The fact that China needs Africa‘s partnership to sustain its 1.3 bill. population gives African
governments a degree of bargaining power. Africa is the one that will suffer from
environmental degradation by Chinese firms so the recipient host countries must be the ones
to monitor the situation and investigating any allegations (Kabemba 2010: 152). Kenya is
host to a thriving civil society, not to mention the biggest green social movement in Africa
(the Green Belt Movement started by Nobel prize winning Wangari Maathai (Maathai
2009)), and it will be their job to demand accountability of the Kenyan government and
Chinese firms. A strong eco-conscious civil society will help put pressure on the government
to negotiate issues with China (Raine 2009: 137).
Moving on, we will now look at China‘s impact on Kenya‘s political governance. This
section looks at the possible threats and opportunities China posses for Kenya‘s democratic
governance. We will look at how China conducts its engagement with Kenya, how their ―non
interference‖ stance may affect good governance and whether their business style encourages
corruption. This section will explore the role that Kenya‘s civil society can play in
influencing Chinese behaviour in Kenya. Lastly, this section explores the idea that a Chinese
partnership has elevated Kenya‘s political leverage vis-à-vis the West.
There has been much talk that China‘s presence in Africa will undermine efforts to improve
democratic governance and anti-corruption campaigns (Brautigam 2009: 292). The first area
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of concern is that China does business with any government in charge, regardless of how they
gained power or their human rights record. This does not fare well with the West who
actively promote their ideology of democracy and sound macroeconomics (Young 2012: 15).
The worry is that if Kenya can count on China‘s support, then President Kibaki is more likely
to act unlawfully and ignore Western critique, sanctions and threats of aid withdrawal
(Economist, 2011). China conducts business strictly on a government-to-government basis.
This makes the government the only local stakeholder and this becomes an issue when the
government is not representative of its citizen‘s best interests (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010:
265). This may prove a real obstacle for Kenya, considering its history of patronage politics
(Cheeseman 2009).
The fact that China supported Kibaki‘s attempt to deter the ICC from persecuting two
suspects with government affiliations (Samora 2011), suggests China‘s presence could be a
hindrance to Kenya‘s efforts to become more democratic. However we should not
underestimate the power of Kenya‘s civil society to ensure that decisions like these do not go
unchallenged. Kenya boasts one of the best media disciplines in Africa. (BBC(b) 2011;
Wallis & Mason 2011: 1). Kenya‘s media has been very critical of the government and has
reported any attempt of mismanagement and corruption and in highlighting the links between
political elites and the instigation of ethnic violence (Branch 2011: 296). Hopefully this will
mean that Kenya‘s civil society will stand up to an unlawful government leaning on China for
support.
Another barrier to good governance is the lack of transparency in China‘s engagement with
Africa. The deals between China and host government are shrouded in secrecy, and the local
population is kept in the dark about the conditions and costs of these agreements. ―It is not
the sums in themselves that cause concern, rather the precise terms on which they are lent.
The uncertainties surrounding this issue create mistrust‖ (Raine 2009: 129). China‘s
continual opacity on the matter causes suspicion amongst the local population as people fear
that they are being cheated or exploited and it hardly inspires the West to view China as a
conscientious and trustworthy stake-holder (Raine 2009: 129). Africa‘s civil society has been
taken aback by the recent expansion of Chinese influence in their countries, but very little
information is disclosed to them. China is wrong to assume that only political elites from
both sides of the partnership can remain the only players. As Africa‘s civil society grows fed
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up with the lack of transparency in this engagement, their raised voices will become hard to
ignore (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010: xi).
Lack of transparency is a real threat to Kenya‘s fight against corruption. The fact that both
Kenya and China have a tradition of bribery could prove an explosive chemistry (Mbaye
2010: 47). China is notorious for using bribes in their oversees ventures. Transparency
International listed them at number thirty in their 2006 Bribe Payer‘s Index for their oversees
bribes (Brautigam 2009: 294). Nevertheless, it is perhaps fair to note that many Western
banks and oil companies do not disclose the terms/sums of their transactions in corrupt
countries either. In no way does this justify China‘s lack of transparency but it does raise
issues over Western hypocrisy. Fortunately there has been a rise of international ―watch-dog‖
programs (i.e. Transparency International, Oil Watch) that are calling for more transparency
and accountability (Brautigam 2009: 294-297).
Additionally, there are concerns that the large amounts of credit from China will be
embezzled; fortunately this is a common misconception. The money that China wishes to
invest is so tightly tied to goods and services that it is almost impossible for any of it to pass
―sticky hands‖ (Brautigam 2009: 293). Money to be invested in development projects abroad
is kept in escrow accounts in China and are then transferred directly into Chinese company
accounts (Economist 2011).
Another aspect of the Sino-Africa engagement is the political implications it will have for
Africa vis-à-vis external powers (Large 2009: 371). The Chinese stance of non-interference
is in sharp contrast to the West‘s critique and sanctions. Many African nations have felt
patronized by the West and have welcomed China‘s non-intrusive attitude. Where the West
has tended to sideline the State, preferring to use NGOs to fulfil their objectives, Chinese
foreign policy centres on State-to-State relations. Chinese expanding engagement with Africa
has challenged the West‘s view of Africa as welfare dependent and passive actors and has
also made the West reconsider Africa‘s emerging role on the world stage (Tull 2009: 111128).
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Are Chinese interests compatible with Kenya’s development goals?
The on-going debate about China‘s engagement with Africa reflects concern over China‘s
underlying motives; how this partnership will impact Africa‘s development (Naidu 2010: 25)
and how this will translate into Africa‘s influence on the world stage (Large 2009: 371).
Heated debate is framed by China‘s rise as a global power and force to be reckoned with, and
the importance that the benefits of this partnership are felt beyond the elite circles (Large
2009: 375). The extent of Chinese activities, the complexity of Chinese motives, and the
implications of this engagement are only beginning to be understood. This debate has been
taken up by the media, academic circles, international governments and organizations, and
Africa‘s civil society, all of which are contributing to a growing body of research on the
subject (Alden et al. 2009: 1). There are no signs that China‘s engagement with Africa is
easing up (Guardian 2010). The question now is who are the real losers and winners of this
partnership? Does China offer a new dawn for Africa or just more of the same? (Naidu 2010:
25-27)
China‘s contact with Africa is not new but its relationship has taken on a new form.
Responding to internal reforms and global pressure, the CCP has shifted away from isolation
and moved towards global interdependence. The CCP must continue their economic growth
to legitimize its rule and keep its citizens content. Africa is an essential component for
China‘s success. In Africa, China has found a diplomatic ally, a new business partner and a
wealth of natural resources (Alden et al. 2009: 1-26).
Modern day China is one of the best examples of rapid industrialization and poverty
reduction in history (Raine 2009: 54). This offers Africa a unique opportunity to learn from
China‘s experience. China offers both the technical support and funds necessary for Africa to
undergo the same process (Dubosse 2010: 72). However, a troubling aspect of this model is
that it refutes the notion that good governance and human rights are necessary for
development. China did not follow the Washington Consensus to become the second largest
economy in the world. Unlike the West‘s preconditions for sound macroeconomics and
democratic practices, the Chinese see these as issues that relate to a nation‘s self-governance
and sovereignty. China‘s stance of ‗non interference‘ is unobtrusive and undoubtedly makes
it attractive for some of Africa‘s more despotic regimes (Marks 2007: 6-12). As one
government official in South Sudan put it: ―If a man is thirsty, he needs to drink, no matter
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where the water comes from. China is ready to do things straight away…when the west gives
some small money, they want to handle it very carefully. While they are thinking what to do,
China will come in‖ (Kelly 2012).
As China becomes more conscious of establishing global brands and a positive reputation this
will be a major incentive to turn away from repressive governments and improve their labour
and environmental standards (Marks 2007: 10). China is planning a long-term engagement
with the continent, and therefore it is important that they maintain good relations with their
host countries. China can no longer afford a ‗business as usual‘ approach (Kabemba 2010:
149-150). However, at times, China‘s economic interests and political ambitions are at odds
with one another (Christiansen & Rai 1996). This conundrum is becoming increasingly more
common with the proliferation of independent Chinese companies working abroad to
maximize their profits (Dickson 2003: 1-20). This is where it becomes clear that the issues
raised in this partnership, lies not so much with China but with Africa‘s governance and
regulatory body (Kabemba 2010: 152).
China‘s State-to-State engagement style is grounded in pragmatism; so African governments
must negotiate carefully to ensure the partnership develops in a way that is mutually
beneficial (Taylor 2009: 182). The aim of Chinese foreign policy, like any other countries‘, is
to serve their own best interests (Raine 2009: 35). It is not China‘s job to ‗look out‘ for
Africa. China is no altruist; the responsibility will fall on African leaders to negotiate a
mutually beneficial outcome (Taylor 2009: 182). But what happens when the government
does not reflect the best interests of their citizens?
The worry is that the nature of power relations in Kenya-- the ‗winner-takes-all‘ mentality,
will limit the benefits of this engagement to the elite peripheries. This is where Kenya‘s civil
society will play a critical role in holding their government‘s accountable and in critically
examining the terms and conditions of the deals stuck with China. ―In short, Chinese
involvement in Africa offers a wealth of opportunities for the continent, but only if it
approaches them prudently‖ (Taylor 2009: 183). The two main stakeholders of this
engagement are still the CCP and host governments but the civil society is also starting to
speak out (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010: 265). Kenya has one of the most impressive and
critical media disciplines in East Africa, and a strong civil society who are not afraid to make
their voices heard (Branch 2011: 296; Wallis & Mason 2011: 1). A recent amendment of the
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constitution has empowered Kenya‘s civil society to confront the government‘s shortcomings
and to challenge their inclination for taking unconstitutional liberties (Kantai(a) 2011: 3).
Pressure from Africa‘s civil society will also empower their governments‘ to negotiate harder
with China to fulfil a ‗win win‘ scenario (Raine 2009: 137).
This article chose to focus on Kenya as a case study, specifically because it does not comply
with the typical oil and mineral rich African nation China engages heavily with. We
attempted to examine the deals and activities taking place between the two nations and tried
to understand the complex motives behind these actions. This article explored what
implications Chinese engagement had on Kenya‘s development prospective and asked
whether Chinese interests in Kenya were compatible with Kenya‘s goals of becoming a
middle-income country by 2030 (GOK 2008). This case study raised questions about whether
China was showing a new direction in China‘s Africa policy or whether it is more of the
same.
China‘s rhetoric preaches a new dawn of ‗South South solidarity‘ and a ‗win win‘ alliance
(Taylor 2009: 14-15) but the truth is that the aim of Chinese foreign endeavours, is to serve
their domestic interests (Raine 2009: 35). The bulk of Chinese investment deals in Kenya
have to do with infrastructure construction (Economist 2011). Kenya is in desperate need of
improving their infrastructure capacity if they wish to fulfil their Vision 2030 development
goal (GOK 2008) and China has the experience and skills necessary to address this deficit
(Chen et al. 2008: 5). Chinese firms have little dogma and complete projects quickly and
cheaply, winning them favour with African governments (Raine 2009: 131). China‘s
engagement with most African nations tends to follow the ‗Angola model‘ of doing business,
where development aid (including infrastructure) and loans are often paid back with natural
resources (IRIN 2012). As Kenya is not known for its wealth of resources, many have
speculated as to China‘s interest in Kenya‘s infrastructure.
This article has found that Chinese engagement with Kenya is driven by several motives.
China benefits directly from their tied approach as it guarantees contracts to Chinese
construction companies (Brautigam 2009: 294). The creation of job opportunities is vital for
the stability of the Chinese government. The CCP knows that if its economy slows, then they
will have to face the wrath of millions of disgruntled and repressed citizens. China‘s ‗going
out policy‘ drives them to seek out new markets for investment and trade (Taylor 2009: 14-
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15). By building roads and railways that connect Kenya to their land locked neighbours,
China also get‘s access to the wider markets of East Africa (Onjala 2008: 9). China therefore
has a strategic interest in Kenya as a trading platform (Nyabiange 2010).
Another motive behind this engagement is China‘s need for natural resources. This may not
immediately seem so obvious considering that Kenya‘s limited supply of natural resources.
However the discovery of oil in March 2012, by an Anglo-Irish firm (Opio 2012) may
change this. One substantial aspect of China‘s aid to Africa is that it is a symbolic gesture of
‗South South‘ solidarity. Aid serves a purpose of winning favour with African governments
and consolidating alliances (Alden et al. 2009: 18). China‘s vast development aid is likely to
have helped them win several bids for major oil exploration deals with the Kenyan
government (Onjala 2008: 12). As US ambassador to Kenya predicted, now that oil has been
found, China‘s engagement with Kenya is only likely to escalate (Guardian 2010). Kenya is
but the latest East African nation to discover oil; it joins the ranks of Sudan, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Uganda, DRC. We can therefore assume that oil was also a motive behind China‘s
interest in expanding Kenya‘s infrastructure to connect with the rest of East Africa (Aron &
Okoth 2012).
Kenya is a strategic regional and political powerhouse. Kenya is the major economic partner
in the East African Community as well as holding political influence with its neighbours in
Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan (Wallis & Manson 2011: 1). Kenya provides the main
port access to Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Eastern Congo, Southern Ethiopia and
Southern Somalia (Nyabiage 2011). China‘s involvement with Kenya opens up possibilities
for more Chinese expansion and influence in Eastern Africa (Gettleman 2010; Langfitt 2011).
China‘s investments in Kenya are robust, expanding and entrenched for the long term
(Guardian 2010). This article concludes that it would be difficult for Kenya to accomplish its
development goals for 2030 without China‘s funding infrastructure support and technical
assistance (Moloo 2012). Understandably, there are concerns given China‘s reputation for
practices of exploitation, corruption, secrecy, disregard for human rights and environmental
impact, this coupled with Kenya‘s history of leadership based on cronyism, corruption,
tribalism, lack of transparency and impunity; this partnership has the potential to be a ‗looseloose‘ situation. However with China showing a desire to improve its image and make
changes and with Kenya‘s dynamic civil society and open press there is a possibility for a
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‗win-win‘ situation. It is vital that the Kenyan civil society, emboldened by their new powers
from the constitution, along with the open media and an engaged Kenyan diaspora population
become a vigilant watch dog to ensure that their government and the Chinese firms are held
to account for their decisions and their work. It is only through this dynamic check and
balance process that Kenya‘s development goals can be compatible with Chinese interests
and a fashion a mutually beneficial engagement.
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Appendix I
Trade between China and Africa
(Christensen 2010: 3)
Appendix II
Diagram of Patron-Client Networks
(Cheeseman 2009: 96)
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Appendix III
Kenya’s exports to China have increased over the years
(Onjala 2008: 26)
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