The Round Table (2002), 365 (375–390)
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND
STATES DEMOCRACIES?
DAG ANCKAR
Empirical findings in the democracy literature suggest that small-sized and
insular units hold democracy in high esteem. Utilizing Freedom House data on a
comparative basis, this study verifies the existence of a strong link between small
size and insulari ty on the one hand and dem ocracy on t he other hand.
Modernization theory is unable to explain this association between small size
and democracy, and the same is true of the literacy and education aspect of
modernization. Furthermore, an analysis of the impact of colonial heritage
indicates that this factor does not challenge the explanatory power inherent in
smallness alone. The usual determinants of democracy thus performing less well,
contesting assumptions are called for, and a set of propositions is put forward
that may prove helpful in future attempts to understand why small size is such a
fertile soil for democratic standards.
Key words: democracy; micro-states; modernization; small island states.
S
OME YEARS AGO THE SWEDISH SCHOLAR Axel Hadenius published
a large-scale empirical study on Democracy and Development. It was the
aim of the study to establish the level of democracy in 132 Third W orld
countries and to explain variations in this respect between countries. The level
of democracy was defined on a scale running from 0 to 10 points, a high
score identifying a high degree of democracy, and the data for this crosssectional study were from the end of the year 1988. The dependent variable, ie
democracy, was operationalized in terms of two dimensions, the one capturing
the nature of elections and observing a number of attributes relating to the
franchise and the validity of elections, and the other capturing the extent and
use in the various countries of political liberties and freedom s (Hadenius,
1992). A variety of factors served as independent variables, including socioeconomic, demographic and cultural conditions as well as several institutional
conditions.
Dag Anckar is Professor of Political Science at Åbo Akademi University.
Correspondence address: Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Biskopsgatan
15, 20500 Åbo 50, Finland. E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 0035-8533 print/1474-029X online/2002/030375-16 © 2002 The Round Table Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/003585302200001034 4
375
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
The charting of democracy levels produced some highly interesting results
from the point of view of island studies (Hadenius, 1992). Of the 132 countries,
only seven scored a full 10 points. These countries were, in alphabetical order:
Barbados, Cyprus, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tuvalu. One country scored a close to
perfect 9.9 points; this country was Kiribati. A group of five countries were
only a handbreadth behind, scoring 9.8 points. These countries w ere, in
alphabetical order: Belize, Costa Rica, St Kitts–Nevis, St Lucia, and Trinidad
and Tobago. Indeed, among the 13 leading Third World countries almost all
were micro-states, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago being the sole exceptions. Furthermore, of the 13 countries all but two were small island states,
Belize and Costa Rica being the exceptions. Among a group of seven countries
that scored a still very satisfying 9.6 points were another five small island
states, namely Antigua–Barbuda, Grenada, Mauritius, Nauru and Solomon
Islands.
Of course, all small island states are not knights of democracy. Hadenius’s
listings indicate a less than satisfying score of 5.4 points for Tonga, a poor score
of 2.7 points for Comoros and 2.0 points for the Seychelles, a likewise poor
score of 1.3 points for Bahrain, and a devastating score of 0.0 points for Sao
Tomé and Príncipe. Still, the piling up of small island cases at the top of the list
is impressive and certainly awakes curiosity as well as calls for attempts at
explanation. Also, one needs to recognize that developments since 1988 convey
a still brighter picture of the performances of the small island states. For
instance, Comoros, Seychelles and Sao Tomé and Príncipe have in the early
1990s turned from one-party states to multiparty democracies (Anckar and
Anckar, 1995); later developments in the Comoros, however, are grave enough
to raise questions concerning the country’s continued existence (Meyers, 1999).
Were Hadenius’s study to be repeated today, there is every reason to believe
that several small island states that were not ranked as democracies in 1988
would now earn much higher and indeed very satisfying ratings. Furthermore,
there is little if any reason to believe that for other small island states the high
scores of yesterday would today have to be adjusted downwards. There are
exceptions to this rule, like the unfortunate case of Antigua–Barbuda, but they
are few.
To inquire further into the link between small size and insularity on the one
hand and democracy on the other hand, systematic use is made in the following
of democracy ratings, provided by the Freedom House organization. Based on
surveys provided by regional experts, consultants and human rights specialists,
as well as on fact-finding missions and public sources, Freedom House has
monitored the progress and decline of political rights and civil liberties in all
the nations of the world and in related territories since 1972. Since 1978 these
efforts have been published in a yearbook called Freedom in the World. In
essence, the units are rated on seven-category scales for political rights and
civil liberties, and then, on the basis of these ratings, placed into one of the
categories of ‘Free’ (F), ‘Partly Free’ (PF) and ‘Not Free’ (NF). On each scale,
the value 1 represents the most free and the value 7 the least free, and the
placing of units in categories is dependent on the combined ratings. Generally,
countries whose ratings average 1–2.5 are considered ‘Free’, whereas countries
376
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
whose ratings average 3–5.5 are considered ‘Partly Free’ and countries whose
ratings average 5.5–7 are considered ‘Not Free’ (Freedom House, 1998).
Although it is certainly true that the Freedom House data do not discriminate
between degrees of freedom and non-freedom (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000),
the data are still widely used by social scientists and political scientists and they
have been found to possess a high degree of validity and reliability (Bollen,
1993). They have also been found to correlate significantly w ith oth er
prominent measures of the level of democracy in various countries, including
the Hadenius formula (Anckar, 1997).
The latest available ratings are from 1999 (Karatnycky, 2000), and they are
applied in Table 1 to three groups of states. First, the micro-states of the world,
totalling 43, are compared with all other states of the world, totalling 149.
The concept of ‘micro-state’ is applied here to states that have one million
inhabitants or fewer. This is the usual method for defining micro-states, and
although contested at times (Ogashiwa, 1991), this ceiling is widely accepted in
the literature and will be used throughout this article. Second, the island states
of the world, totalling 48, are compared with all other states of the world,
totalling 144. ‘Island’ is defined here as a sub-continental land area surrounde d
by water (Glassner, 1990), and ‘island states’ are defined as states that are
islands or parts of an island or consist of islands and parts of islands (Anckar,
1996). Third, the small island states of the world are compared with all other
states of the world. The concept of ‘small island states’ covers micro-states that
are island states, and by this definition there are 29 small island states in the
world. 1
From the table three main conclusions come to the fore. First, size definitively makes a difference: micro-states are more democratic than larger states.
A lm ost three-quarters of the m icro-states are in the Free category, the
remaining states being scattered over the Partly Free and Not Free categories.
Concerning other states, the picture is quite different. All three Freedom House
categories are about equally well represented, each category comprising
Table 1. Freedom House ratin gs o f m icr o-sta tes, island states and sm all island states
com p ar ed with other sta tes: a sum m ar y v iew
Free States
Partly Free States
Not Free States
Micr o-states (N )
Micr o-states (%)
Other sta tes (N)
Other sta tes (%)
31
72
52
35
5
12
55
37
7
16
42
28
Islan d states (N )
Islan d states (%)
Other sta tes (N)
Other sta tes (%)
34
71
51
35
10
21
49
34
4
8
44
31
Sm a ll islan d states (N )
Sm a ll islan d states (%)
Other sta tes (N)
Other sta tes (%)
23
80
62
38
4
13
54
33
2
7
47
29
377
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
roughly one-third of the states. The emergence through waves of decolonization
since the 1960s and 1970s of a large number of micro-states has been said to
reflect diffusion patterns—emerging and successful small new members of the
international community setting examples for followers—but also to reflect a
more understanding and supportive attitude on the part of the international
community. Indeed, Barry Bartmann has introduced the slogan of ‘a world
made safe for small states’ (Bartmann, 1991). While this observation certainly
carries much validity, it should perhaps be supplemented by an inverted
observation, as, in terms of global democratization, the small states appear to be
givers as well as takers, contributing to as well as benefiting from a more widespread democratic spirit and culture. It is perhaps not too daring to introduce the
slogan of ‘a world made democratic by small states’.
Second, insularity appears to contribute something to the difference between
small and large. The proportions between groups of states based on insularity
are very similar to the ones produced by differences in size. Again, whereas
more than 70 per cent of the island states are democratic, of other states,
slightly more than one-third are in this category. Of course, the similarities
between the size and insularity profiles are to a great extent explained by the
fact that most island states are small. Introducing a volume on the political
economy of small tropical islands, David Lowenthal has maintained that the
stereotype of islands connoting smallness holds some truth: ‘most islands are
relatively small. Islands and island groups make up the great majority of the
world’s small states, and all but a few inhabited islands have fewer than a
million people, most under 100,000’ (Lowenthal, 1992). In fact, the number of
other than small-sized island states is so low that meaningful quantitative
comparisons cannot be made. Such comparisons, then, would confront island
states and other states while controlling for size. A reasonable conclusion is
perhaps that size makes a difference and that insularity adds to this difference,
although not much. Finally, of the small island states an impressive 80 per cent
are in the category of ‘free’ states. Of the remaining 163 independent states of
the globe, 38 per cent are in the same ‘free’ category, whereas the remaining 62
per cent are scattered over the ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ categories. Again,
therefore, small island states stand out as a distinctive group.
In the following an attempt is made to understand why small island states
hold this distinctive democratic feature. The paper has five sections in all.
Following this introduction, the second section aims at finding out to what
degree modernization theory, which is perhaps the leading body of assumptions
about democracy emergence, may explain the association between small size
and democracy. The finding is, however, that the association survives this
attempt at falsification. The third section repeats this exercise, now in regard to
one particular aspect of modernization, namely literacy and education. Thereafter, the fourth section takes a look at the impact of colonial heritage, the result
being, once more, that this factor does not challenge the explanatory power
inherent in sm allness alone. The usual determ inants of dem ocracy thus
perform ing less w ell, contesting assum ptions are called for, and in the
concluding fifth section a set of propositions is put forward, that may prove
helpful in future attempts to understand why small size is such a fertile soil for
democratic standard and performance.
378
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
On modernization
It is an oft-quoted thesis in research on democracy that ‘the more well-to-do a
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1959). In
fact, this thesis frames the prominent and much-debated school of thought that
is known as the modernization theory of democracy. As evident from many
reviews of modernization ideas (Vanhanen, 1989; Diamond, 1992; Hadenius,
1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Karvonen, 1997), several inter-related
m ech anism s serve to link econo m ic dev elo pm ent to the em erg en ce of
democracy. These mechanisms include, among other things, an increased level
of education, the development of a more tolerant and equality-oriented political
culture, the establishment of a broad and politically moderate middle-class, the
weakening of political extremism, the appearance of a competent and rational
government bureaucracy, and the appearance also of intermediate organizations
that are helpful in increasing the overall level of interest and participation
in politics. The modernization concept has m et with much criticism and
suggestions for revision over the years; on the whole, however, it has survived
as a guiding framework as economic development has consistently proved to be
a major force behind the rise and stability of democracy. A first step towards an
understanding of the democratic standard of small island states must therefore
examine the relevance of modernization theory in this context.
Indeed, as evident from the figures in Table 2, there is much to be said in
favour of modernization assumptions. In this table, separately for small island
states (N=29) and other states (N=163), economy-type figures are run against
democracy figures. The economy-type figures are from the excellent survey
Political Systems of the World by Denis and Ian Derbyshire (1999), and the
classification in this source of countries in ‘high’, ‘middle’ and ‘low’ income
countries is m ade full use of. The dem ocracy figures are again from the
Freedom House classification of countries as Free, Partly Free and Not Free. It
would seem that wealth and democracy go hand in hand. There are 43 highincome countries in the world, and of these no less than 36 are democracies!
The exceptions to the rule that combines wealth and democracy are above all to
be found in the oil-rich Arab world, which still remains resistant to the spread
of democracy and civil liberties (Karvonen, 1997; Karatnycky, 2000). The
proportion of states that are characterized by high income as well as democracy
Table 2. Wealth an d democra cy : sm all isla nd sta tes com pa red with other states
Democracy standard
Income
Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Sm a ll islan d states
High
Middle
Low
5
11
6
–
3
1
2
–
1
Other sta tes
High
Middle
Low
31
26
7
2
18
34
3
14
28
379
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
is an impressive 84 per cent of all high-income states; high income, then, is
close to meriting being a necessary condition for democracy. On the other hand,
however, high income is by no means a sufficient condition. Wealth spells
democracy, but poverty does not necessarily entail non-democracy. There are in
all 72 middle-income countries in the world; of these a bare majority, 37 as
against 35, are still dem ocracies. A t the level of low-incom e countries,
however, democracy tends to disappear as a frequent political system. In total,
there are 77 low-income countries and, of these, only 13, equalling 17 per cent,
are democratic. The overall picture, therefore, serves to verify in systematic
fashion the expectations of the modernization theory. Of rich countries, an overwhelming majority are democracies, of poor countries, an overwhelming
majority are non-democracies, of countries that are neither rich nor poor, about
half are democracies and about half are non-democracies.
This pattern, however, is quite different when the group of small island
states is taken out from the total population to form a sub-population of its own.
True, the link between richness and democracy is present in the small island
population also. Out of seven rich small island countries, five are democratic,
the Arab islands of Bahrain and Brunei being the two aberrants. However, as
one moves down the income scale, no corresponding decrease can be detected
in the proportion of democratic states. There are 14 small island states in the
middle-income category; of these the vast majority, namely 11, are still democratic! Furthermore, no fewer than six out of eight low-income countries are
democratic! These proportions are very different when compared with the
group of other states, in which fewer than half (26 out of 58) of the middleincome countries retain a democratic status, a small handful only of the lowincome countries (7 out of 69) being in the democracy category. The obvious
implication of this difference is that the relation between wealth and democracy
is heavily influenced by differences in size: what is true of larger states is not
necessarily true of small states. The observation is verified also in a recent
study of the Pacific small island states, which are shown predominantly to be
democracies although, because of less than satisfying income ratings, they
should really not be in this category (Anckar, 2002). These observations
certainly serve to emphasize the important but much neglected rôle in political
science of physical size as an intervening variable (Anckar, 1998).
The belief is w idespread that smallness and insularity spell economic
inadequacy and even poverty. However, the figures from Table 2 do not
substantiate this view. In fact, it is evident from Table 2 that the small states
manage no worse in economic terms than large states. About equal portions of
the small island states on the one hand and the other states on the other hand are
in the highest income category; in this respect, then, no difference exists
between small and large. However, in regard to the lowest income category a
difference is discernible which is advantageous to the small states. Only onequarter of the small islands occupy this category, as against a good 40 per cent
of other states. These findings are in agreement with the result from an earlier
study, indicating that in 1997 some 13 per cent of the world’s small states were
in the lowest income group compared with 37 per cent of the larger states,
whereas 23 per cent of the micro-states were in the highest per capita income
bracket, compared with only 17 per cent of the larger states (Armstrong et al,
380
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
1998). It would indeed appear, as suggested by Godfrey Baldacchino, that small
states have several com parative advantages and that they have an in-built
capacity for resourcefulness, structural openness and rapid policy development
that fosters economic strength and sustainability (Baldacchino, 2000).
On literacy and education
As was already indicated, modernization is not about levels of income and
wealth only. It is also, and perhaps even more so, about the way income and
wealth are used and distributed. Modernization is really an umbrella concept
that covers a great variety of interrelated factors and determinants. In his abovementioned study of democracy in Third W orld countries, Axel Hadenius
performs a factor analysis that detects two socioeconomic dimensions. The one
is about general economic development and the other is about the level of
popular education and mass communication. Furthermore, when analysing in
depth the impact of this second dimension, Hadenius finds an almost linear
association of literacy and the level of democracy. From Hadenius’s research it
would also appear that the association between other socioeconomic attributes
and democracy is largely a reflection of the influence of literacy. The more the
other attributes are internally correlated with literacy, the stronger is their
individual connection with democracy. About literacy Hadenius therefore
concludes that ‘with reference to the development of democracy, this seems to
be the central factor in the modernization process’ (Hadenius, 1992). This is
very much in line with the more general conclusion by Larry Diamond that
economic development is conducive to democracy to the extent that it leads to
higher levels of human well-being. It is also in line with Tatu Vanhanen’s
important studies of democracy determinants, which indicate a correlation
between the proportions of students and literates in various countries and the
democratic standards of these countries as measured by Vanhanen’s Index of
Democracy (Vanhanen, 1984, 1990; Diamond, 1992). A closer look at the
literacy factor is therefore very much called for. This is done in Table 3.
In this table literacy rates are again from the survey by the Derbyshire
brothers, a rate exceeding 90 per cent being classified as ‘high’, a rate of less
than 70 per cent being classified as ‘low’, and figures between these two
extremes being regarded as ‘medium ’. On the democracy dimension, the
demarcation line in this table is between ‘democracies’ and ‘others’, democTable 3. Literacy a nd democra cy : sm all isla nd states com p ar ed with other
sta tes
Literacy rate
Democracies
Others
Sm a ll islan d states
High
Medium
Low
14
4
4
2
3
2
Other states
High
Medium
Low
50
5
9
17
26
56
381
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
racies being those states that are classified in the 1999 Freedom House rankings
as Free. The pattern that emerges certainly verifies the belief that literacy and
democracy are associated. Of the high-literacy states, an impressive 77 per cent
are democracies. Of medium literacy states, a dramatically smaller portion
(24 per cent) is formed by democracies. And finally, of low literacy states,
democracies compose a still smaller part (18 per cent). Again, however, size
and insularity factors appear to make a difference; in fact, the distribution
closely resembles the pattern that came to the fore in the earlier analysis of
modernization in general. On the one hand, concerning the tendency of high
literacy states to cultivate democratic standards, small island states and other
states perform about equally well. However, when it comes to medium and low
literacy states, a majority of the small island states remains in the democracy
category, whereas the vast majority of other states are non-democracies. Again,
therefore, size performs as an intervening variable that distorts the otherwise
distinct and linear-like association between modernization and democracy.
Of the small island states more than half, namely 55 per cent, are highliteracy states; of the other states a smaller portion, ie 41 per cent, are high
literacy states. The finding is consistent with results from the comparison of the
sm all Pacific island states with several groups of other states that w as
mentioned before (Anckar, 2002), and serves to indicate, once more, that small
states do no worse than big states. In fact, small states appear to be better
equipped in terms of literacy. Furthermore, for the micro-states and the small
island states the future looks bright in this respect. This is evident from Table 4,
which summarizes the information concerning net primary school enrolment
and attendance in various countries and regions during the 1990s that is
provided by UNESCO within the framework of ‘The Progress of Nations 2000’
project. The figures are from the set of statistical tables that are included in the
project report (UNESCO, 2000), and they are derived from net primary school
enrolment rates as reported by UNESCO and from national household survey
reports of attendance at primary school. As the figures for regions are averages
they hide huge differences between individual countries in some cases; also, in
several cases, data are missing. The table complies with the method for dividing
the globe into regions that is used by UNESCO and, rather than being compared
with one huge category of ‘other states’, micro-states in this table are compared
with regionally defined groups of states that do not, however, comprise the
micro-states of the region in question.
Table 4. Micro -sta tes com pa red with other states: net
prima ry schoo l enrolm ent/atten dan ce 1990–99
Micro-states
Sub -S ah ar an A frica
Mid dle East an d North Africa
Centra l Asia
Sou th east Asia a nd the Pacific
Am erica s
Europ e
Source : UN ESCO (2000).
382
92%
62%
85%
83%
84%
87%
95%
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
One obvious implication from the figures is that the prospects for the small
states being also in the future good representatives of democratic ideas are
apparently good. Schooling today spells literacy tomorrow. Because of their
smallness, the small states may not be expected ever to achieve very much in
the field of higher education. But in terms of obtaining the basic knowledge that
is a precondition for the emergence and maintenance of a democratic spirit and
a democratic order they manage with credit. In so doing, they reap the fruits of
two favourable conditions. One is the rather strict social control that is
embedded in the intimacy of small societies. The other is the early and also
recent impact of religion and missionary work in the islands. A wanderer may
on walkabouts in the small islands observe a common phenomenon. Groups of
schoolchildren, often dressed in uniform s, are on their w ay to or from
schools and schoolyards that are furnished with signs informing one that these
institutions belong to or are maintained by one or the other church or religious
com munity. The yards and houses are small, and classes are often given
outdoors in the shade of palm trees. However, these plain settings notwithstanding, the activity appears enriching and functional. Our wanderer in fact
observes one mechanism that brings the small states close to the modernization
theory whose requirements otherwise remain distant to them.
On colonial heritage
Democratization is not only a consequence of factors that are characteristic of
the units that are being democratized. Clearly, democratization has international
aspects as well, manifested in patterns of diffusion and in ‘waves’ of democratization (Markoff, 1996). Within this school of thought, the hypothesis that the
small islands are democratic mainly because of colonization lies near at hand
and is only natural. Of course, differences between metropolitan powers and
their colonial policies may affect the extent to which democratization patterns
emerge.
Britain and France are often given in the literature as examples of metropolitan powers that have pursued quite different strategies as colonial rulers
(Smith, 1978). Generally speaking, the difference between Britain and France is
evident in that Britain applied a more reformist strategy, introduced an administrative and judicial system in the colonies, and gradually familiarized the
territories with parliamentary and pluralistic forms of government. In contrast,
France displayed a more rigid attitude, applied a centralized administrative
system, did not involve the colonial people in the exercise of authority to the
sam e extent and resisted the idea of independence for its colonies. This
difference between Britain and France has even been introduced in comparative
research as an explanatory factor for differences in terms of democracy between
nations with a colonial past (Hadenius, 1992), and the investigation of these and
related questions has produced several and even contradictory findings.
These suggest, to mention a few, that the fact that some former British
colonies have a better democratic record than other former British colonies is
the result of a longer British presence in the first case (Huntington, 1984), that it
in fact makes little difference which metropolitan power was the colonial
master as long as the power in question was a democracy (Hadenius, 1992), and
383
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
that the characteristics of insularity and colonial heritage are relevant prerequisites of democracy only when they coincide to establish islands with a
colonial past under British or US rule (Anckar, 1997). In the context of this
paper, however, the issue of size is the crucial one, and any effort to unmask the
impact of this factor of course requires that small former colonies be compared
with large former colonies while controlling for the metropolitan power factor.
If the analysis implies that there are about equal shares of democratic states in
both groups, the size differences may obviously be ignored. On the other hand,
if a difference can be detected between the groups, a case can obviously be
made for the impact of size.
Indeed, such a case can be made. This is evident from Table 5, which for
former British colonies gives a cross-tabulation of size and democracy. All 48
British colonies which have gained independence since 1950 are included
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1999), and micro-states (N=24) as well as small
island states (N=20) have been isolated to form categories of their ow n.
Democracy levels are once again determined on the basis of the 1999 Freedom
House ratings, Free nations being classified as dem ocracies and all other
nations being classified as non-democracies. Again, a definite pattern in favour
of smallness emerges. Of the 24 small territories, a vast majority of 17 are
dem o cracies, inclu din g 1 5 sm all island states. W here larger states are
concerned, the proportion is dramatically different. Out of 24 states in this
group, only four are democracies, whereas all others are non-democracies. In
the light of these figures, the British background does not in itself count for
much: of 48 former colonies 21 are now democracies whereas 27 are not. Once
again, it is therefore size that matters. Small former colonies are democracies,
and large former colonies are not.
Against these findings the objection may of course be raised that they are
challenged by the presence of other factors that are unrelated to size but still
produce patterns that are similar to those that follow from differences in size. In
this respect, Samuel Huntington’s thesis concerning the impact of the length of
the colonial period immediately comes to mind. According to this idea, then,
the fact that some former British colonies like, for instance, the West-Indian
micro-states, are more democratic than other former British colonies like, for
instance, the nations in Africa, is not a consequence of differences in size.
Rather, the differences in democratic status follow from the first group of
colonies having experienced a longer British presence. Table 6 addresses this
question; on the basis of the distributions reported in the table it would appear,
however, that the impact of the length of the colonial period is insignificant
when compared with the impact of size. All 54 former British colonies that
Table 5. Dem ocr atic sta nda rd of form er British colon ies
Democracies
Others
All colo nies
21
27
Micr o-sta tes
Sm a ll isla nd sta tes
Others
17
15
4
7
5
20
384
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
Table 6. Form er British colonies: sm a ll islan d states com p ar ed with oth er sta tes in
term s of British presen ce
Democracies
Others
Long British presen ce
Sm all isla nd s
Oth ers
All
9
4
13
Sm a ll islan ds
Others
All
3
7
10
Sh ort British presen ce
Sm all isla nd s
Oth ers
All
8
3
11
Sm a ll islan ds
Others
All
2
18
20
have been independent since W orld W ar II are classified in the table in
terms of two dichotomized dimensions: whether or not they are democracies
and whether or not as colonies they experienced a long British presence.
Freedom House ratings are again used as democracy criteria: Free nations are
democracies, whereas others are not. Regarding the length of the colonial
period, states that at independence had experienced a century-long or longer
British presence are placed in one category (‘long’ British presence) whereas all
other states are in another category (‘short’ British presence). A major finding is
that time does indeed matter. Of 31 short-time colonies 11 are democracies and
20 are not; however, of 23 long-time colonies 13 are democracies and 10 are
not. Clearly, there is much validity to Huntington’s idea.
However, when size is introduced as an explanatory factor, the pattern once
again changes. For another important finding is that size matters more than
the length of the colonial period. Within the group of small island states no
differences appear between short-time colonies and long-time colonies, both
sub-groups reporting huge majorities of democracies and tiny minorities of nondemocracies. Within the group of larger states short-time colonies as well
as long-time colonies have definite majorities of non-democracies, and this
disproportion in favour of non-democracy is especially distorted in the first subgroup. This warpedness is probably the factor that tips the overall balance in
favour of the Huntington hypothesis. In conclusion, then: smallness produces
democracy regardless of the length of the colonial period, and larger size
produces non-democracy regardless of the length of the colonial period.
It may be noted, in passing, that the thesis concerning British supremacy does
not hold in the small island context. There are no clear differences between
islands that have been freed from British rule and islands that have been freed
from other rules. Overlooking the case of Tonga, where the colonial background
is disputable (Campbell, 1992) and disregarding also the cases of Nauru (Ogan,
1999) and Vanuatu (van Trease, 1995), the colonial background of which is
indistinct, the result is that 13 former British colonies are democracies today,
whereas five former colonies are not. In itself the proportion bears witness to the
blessings of British rule. Still, the same is also true of other colonial powers. Out
of eight former colonies, seven are democracies, including cases like Belau,
Cape Verde, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Sao Tomé and Príncipe. Although
the cases are few, the conclusion that the smallness that is common to these
cases outweighs their differing colonial backgrounds is persuasive.
385
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
Smallness, insularity and democracy
Why, then, do small island states hold democracy in such high esteem? Why is
it the case that they stand out as a group of countries that embrace democratic
norms and procedures to such a great extent? Although democracy is indeed a
contested concept (Kimber, 1989), few would argue that the criteria used by
Hadenius and also Freedom House, namely honest and open elections and
unrestricted political freedoms, are not at the core of the concept. It is the
argument of this paper that such devices are promoted by the existence of a
tolerant, considerate, understanding and moderate political climate, which is
foreign to despotism, dictates and zero-sum solutions. The view is also taken
here that in small island states, for a variety of reasons, such a climate is likely
to emerge and prevail. To expand and explain this view, four general propositions (Anckar and Anckar, 1995) are given below:
Proposition no 1
More than other units, remote and small units are likely to promote feelings of
fellowship and a sense of community. When people live at a distance from the
outside world, they share a feeling that they are, so to speak, alone in the world
and thrown upon their own resources. Remote units are often therefore cohesive
units. One particular mechanism at work here has to do with problems and
problem solving. Remote and small units must come to terms with problems
that are outcomes of remoteness and smallness and therefore are, to some extent
at least, special in nature. Special problems call for special solutions; these
problems and solutions, then, become a part of the daily life of the inhabitants
of remote and small units. They are, as members of communities with special
characteristics, subjected to the consequences of these characteristics as well as
accustomed to dealing with the consequences. Remoteness and smallness
become unifying factors. They establish a frame of reference that is shared by
every member of the community.
Proposition no 2
A spirit of fellowship and community is further promoted by the citizens being
able to orient themselves towards political life and the political apparatus. This
ability is no matter of course. The costs in time, inconvenience, energy, money,
embarrassment, anxiety, fear, and so on, of gaining information and knowledge
about politics and social affairs may prove too high for many members of a
society (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). However, members of small units possess
unique possibilities to form structured sets of preferences. Because they
are small, the units are less complex and more lucid than bigger units. One
manifestation of this is that big units are likely to develop a greater number of
organizations and organizational sub-units that are difficult to detect, identify
and understand (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). In this respect and in others, small units
appear more simple, elementary and easy of access. The implication of this is
not only that members of small units are well informed about and have a good
understanding of their society. As Giovanni Sartori has pointed out, information
is not knowledge: at a minimum, knowledge implies a grasp of and a mental
control over the information that is not contained in the information itself
386
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
(Sartori, 1987). The implication is that members of small units may develop
such a mental control. They are more likely than members of big units to understand the way means relate to ends and they are more likely to understand the
consequences that different lines of action may carry.
Proposition no 3
The emergence of feelings of tolerance and understanding is facilitated if and
when open channels of communication exist between those who govern and
those who are governed. In this respect, it is important to note that the lucidity
of small units not only promotes the insight of unit members. It also promotes
the ability of leaders to survey what is going on in their societies. The leaders of
small units are thus more likely than leaders of big units to acquire knowledge
of general dispositions. Factors that are related to smallness clearly contribute
to this state of affairs. For instance, the relative sim plicity of articulation
structures and the limited extent of specialization make the incoming information about preferences more genuine and comprehensible, as it is filtered
through relatively few intervening structures and agents. The remoteness of
island units and the unifying sense of community that comes out of remoteness
merits attention in this respect also: the distance between those who govern
and those who are governed is lessened as the two segments share a frame of
reference which has emerged from shared problems and problem conceptions.
Also, in small-scale societies ordinary citizens can deal more directly with top
leaders (Dahl and Tufte, 1973), and this offers preconditions for effective
citizen control.
Proposition no 4
It is comm only assumed that small units are more hom ogeneous than big
units (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). However, this is only partly true. In terms of
categorical homogeneity no differences appear between small and big units; on
the other hand, small units do represent attitudinal homogeneity to a higher
extent than big units (Anckar, 1999). Attitudinal homogeneity carries important
implications. One implication is that small units, more than big units, are likely
to develop open and flexible political processes that offer the participants
opportunities to know and understand each other. The attitudinal homogeneity
of small units thus promotes knowledge, consideration and anticipation. In a by
now classic paper Willmoore Kendall and George Carey explain why this is the
case (Kendall and Carey, 1968). First, in societies that share interests and values
an individual may acquire an estimate of the reactions of others simply by
observing his or her own reactions. Second, if an attitudinally homogeneous
society has in its bosom groupings that are differently affected by policy
decisions, society members, because of the overriding homogeneity of the
society, still have greater opportunities to comprehend the composition and
the structure of the society and thereby to foresee the potentially conflicting
interests. Finally, in homogeneous societies one may expect from the society
members a high degree of sympathetic identification with each other, implying
a willingness to understand beforehand the probable effects of action and a
greater effort to anticipate others’ feelings.
From these general propositions could be derived several hypotheses for
387
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
verification. One hypothesis that may follow is that small democratic entities
tend towards consensus democracy rather than majority democracy. There is in
fact in the small states literature pieces of empirical evidence to support this
hypothesis (Anckar, 2001). On the whole, however, the set of propositions
remains under-researched, and this sad state of affairs well reflects the absentminded and incidental interest that political science has hitherto taken in the
political life of micro-states and small states (Anckar, 1998). This neglect is
advanced by two unfortunate conditions. One is the still prevailing ethnocentrism of political science, researchers taking a dominating interest in their
own countries and political systems. As the small states do not have their own
research cadres, they are unable to profit from this thriving ethno-centrism. The
second is the belief that small islands are remote and unimportant political
actors and therefore do not merit attention. Such a criterion should of course be
alien to scientific thought and discourse which ought, instead, to start from an
ambition to identify and fill up lacunae in scientific theories. The study of small
states and small island states is certainly helpful precisely in this respect, as it
may by introducing the size variable modulate the frontiers of knowledge.
Small states not only contribute to the democratization of the globe, but may
also, as objects of study, enrich and cultivate the democratic theory that is the
core of political science. The neglect of the small states is therefore unfortunate
and demands constructive contributions. In fact, the task of thoroughly investigating the validity of the various propositions above forms an inviting as well
as an ambitious and important research programme in its own right.
Note
1
They are, in alphabetical order: Antigua–Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados,
Belau (Palau), Brunei, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus, Dominica, Federated States
of Micronesia, Fiji, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, St Kitts–Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tomé
and Príncipe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
References
Anckar, C. (1997) Size and democracy. Some empirical findings, in D. Anckar and
L. Nilsson (eds), Politics and G eography, pp 22–29, Sun dsvall: M id-Sweden
University Press.
Anckar, D. (1996) Noncontiguity and political architecture: the parliaments of small
island states, Political Geography, p 702, Vol 15, No 8.
Anckar, D. (1998) M ikrostater som företeelser och forskningsob jekt, Politiikka,
pp 276–277, Vol 40, No 4.
Anckar, D. (1999) Homogeneity and smallness: Dahl and Tufte revisited, Scandinavian
Political Studies, pp 29-44, Vol 22, No 1.
Anckar, D. (2001) Westminster democracy: a comparison of small island states varieties
in the Caribbean and the Pacific, Pacific Studies, Vol 23, Nos 3–4.
Anckar, D. (2002) Democratic standard and performance in twelve Pacific island states,
Pacific Affairs (forthcoming).
Anckar, D. and Anckar, C. (1995) Size, insularity and democracy, Scandinavian
Political Studies, pp 222–227, Vol 4, No 2.
388
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
Armstrong, H. W., De Kervenoeal, R. J., Li, X. and Read, R. (1998) A comparison of
the economic performance of different micro-states and between micro-states and
larger countries, World Development, pp 539–556, Vol 26, No 4.
Baldacchino, G. (2000) The challenge of hypothermia, The Round Table, pp 65–79,
No 353.
Bartmann, B. (1991) A World Made Safe for Small States, Charlottetown: Institute of
Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island.
Bollen, K. A. (1993) Liberal democracy: validity and method factors in cross-national
measures, American Journal of Political Science, pp 1207–1230, Vol 37, No 4.
Burkhart, R. E. and Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1994) Comparative democracy: the economic
development thesis, The American Political Science Review, pp 903–910, Vol 88,
No 4.
Campbell, I. C. (1992) Island Kingdom. Tonga Ancient & Modern. Christchurch:
Canterbury University Press.
Dahl, R. A. and Tufte, E. (1973) Size and Democracy, p 41, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Derbyshire, J. D. and Derbyshire, I. D. (1999) Political Systems of the World. Vols 1 and
2, Oxford: Helicon Publishing.
Diamond, L. (1992) Economic development and democracy reconsidered, in G. Marks
and L. Diamond (eds), Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour
Martin Lipset, pp 93–139, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Foweraker, J. and Krznaric, R. (2000) Measuring liberal democratic performance: an
empirical and conceptual critique, Political Studies, p 767, Vol 48, No 4.
Freedom House (1998) Freedom in the World: 1997–1998, p 597, New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
Glassner, M. I. (1990) Neptune’s Domain: A Political Geography of the Sea, p 47,
London: Unwin Hyman.
Hadenius, A. (1992) Democracy and Development, pp 39–62, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hun tington , S. P. (19 84) W ill more countries be dem ocratic?, Political Science
Quarterly, pp 193–218, Vol 99, No 2.
Karatnycky, A. (2000) A century of progress, Journal of Democracy, pp 192–193, Vol
11, No 1.
Karvonen, L. (1997) Demokratisering, Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Kendall, W. and Carey, G. W. (1968) The ‘intensity’ problem and democratic theory,
The American Political Science Review, p 17, Vol 62, No 1.
Kimber, R. (1989) On democracy, Scandinavian Political Studies, pp 199–219, Vol 12,
No 3.
Lipset, S. M. (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and
political legitimacy, The American Political Science Review, p 75, Vol 53, No 1.
Lowenthal, D. (1992) Small tropical islands: a general overview, in H. M. Hintjens and
M. D. D. Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, pp 18–19,
Exeter: Exeter University Press.
Markoff, J. (1996) Waves of Democracy. Social Movements and Political Chang e,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Meyers, B. D. (1999) Comoros, in D. A. Kaple (ed), World Encyclopedia of Political
Systems and Parties, Vol II, p 233, New York: Facts on File.
Ogan, E. (1999) Nauru, in D. A. Kaple (ed), World Encyclopedia of Political Systems
and Parties, Vol II, p 775, New York: Facts on File.
Ogashiwa, Y. S. (1991) Microstates and Nuclear Issues, pp ix–x, Suva: Institute of
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific.
Sartori, G. (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part One: The Contemporary
389
WHY ARE SMALL ISLAND STATES DEMOCRACIES?
Debate, p 117, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
Smith, A. (1978) A comparative study of French and British decolonization, Comparative Studies in Society and History, pp 70–102, Vol 20, No 2.
UNESCO (2000) The Progress of Nations, 2000—Statistical Tables, at http://www.un.
org/Pubs/whatsnew/e00pon.htm .
Van Trease, H. (1995) Colonial origins of Vanuatu politics, Melanesian Politics. Stael
Blong Vanuatu, pp 3–58, Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies,
University of Canterbury.
Vanhanen, T. (1984) The Emergence of Democracy. A Comparative Study of 119 States,
Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
Vanhanen, T. (1989) The level of democratization related to socio-economic variables in
147 states in 1980–85, Scandinavian Political Studies, pp 95–127, Vol 12, No 2.
Vanhanen, T. (1990) The Process of Democratization. A Comparative Study of 147
States, New York: Crane Russell.
390