UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(ENACTING THE POWERS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS)
NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE 2020
CJCMUN 2013
Director: – Karan Dev
Assistant director: - Simran Khanna
Agenda :-
The situation in 2020:
Assessing the international nuclear security
Framework
Dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism
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CONTENTS
S.NO
TOPIC
PAGE NO
1.
Messages from the executive
board
4-5
2.
6
3.
Introduction to the history of
nuclear warfare
History of the committee
7-8
4.
Introduction
8
5.
International safeguards system
9-12
6.
Existing nuclear weapon states
12-19
7.
Challenges to the international
safeguards system
19-24
a.
Nuclear terrorism
19-21
b.
Terrorist organizations
21-22
c.
Protection of Nuclear Material
22-24
d.
Cyber warfare
24
8.
Some important resolutions
24-25
9.
Text of the treaty
26-31
10.
Points to consider
31
11.
Bibliography
32
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Message from the director:
Delegates, it is with great joy that I welcome you to the General Assembly enacting the
powers of the UNODA. As you may deduce from the above, our job encompasses
numerous factors ranging from assessing existing nuclear programs to ensuring global
nuclear and cyber security. It is in this light that I request you to research every aspect
of this guide and both agendas. It must be noted that this guide must be read in its
entirety and treated as only the starting point of your research. There are currently
about 31,000 nuclear warheads deployed or in reserve in the stockpiles of eight
countries: China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Of these about 13,000 are deployed and 4,600 of these are on high alert,
i.e. ready to be launched within minutes notice. The combined explosive yield of these
weapons is approximately 5,000 megatons, which is about 200,000 times the explosive
yield of the bomb used on Hiroshima.
Hence, our task is vast and highly demanding.
A timeline of events from 2013- 2020 will be provided to you a week or so before the
conference. With that being said, this topic guide will supplement the timeline of events
as it gives you a clear picture of the scenario in 2013.
In conclusion, Arundhati Roy once said, ―The nuclear bomb is the most antidemocratic, anti-national, anti-human, outright evil thing that man has ever made‖. If
you are religious, then remember that this bomb is Man's challenge to God. It's worded
quite simply: We have the power to destroy everything that you have created. If you're
not (religious), then look at it this way this world of ours is four thousand, six hundred
million years oldIt could end in an afternoon.
Regards,
Karan Dev.
Message from the assistant director:
Hello delegates, it is indeed an honour to be a part of this committee. I have been a part
of the Bangalore MUN-ning circuit for the past 4 years and I am at present studying
under the social science pre university programme in Christ junior college. To be honest
I started MUN-ning on a lark, but I ended up falling in love with it and its intricacies. I
hope that as part of the executive board this year we are able to provide you a
memorable experience that will help you fall in love with MUN-ning too.
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This committee promises to combine creativity with reality. Hosted in the year 2020, it
gives us a glimpse of the world seven years from now if we keep with the current pace.
The issues to be dealt with are not far from reality, be it the Iran-Israeli conflict, the
question of the Syrian Arab Republic or even that of the Korean peninsula. Abusing this
technology can promise world annihilation. Therefore by simulating this forum we give
you an opportunity to observe, live and handle the events even before they occur.
Delegates brace yourselves and imagine the impossible, get creative, because this
committee will allow you the opportunity to use both your prior research and creativity to
solve the impossible!
Please bear in mind that this topic guide provides you a very brief understanding of the
complexities of the agenda to be discussed. This will serve only as the base point of
your research. It is strongly advised that your research not be limited to this topic guide
and that you keep updating your knowledge about both the agendas with the help
recent developments that surround the issues discussed above.
Regards,
Simran Khanna.
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History of nuclear warfare
Hiroshima and Nagasaki exposed the world to a new weapon of unparalleled
destructive power. August, 1945 marks the only time in the history of warfare that
atomic weapons were brought into the picture. In an instant, the atomic bomb nicknamed
―Little Boy‖, managed to obliterate an entire city and indiscriminately take thousands of
lives. The radiation generated by this atomic warfare continues to bear a mark on the
subsequent generations of people residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is interesting to
note that unlike today, the use of this new form of weaponry was not scrutinized or
questioned twice. In fact it was used like any other form of weaponry without due
consideration. In the face of World War 2 this weapon of mass destruction effectively
brought an end to the years of warfare that had taken already place. Hence, it is only in
retrospect that we view this act on the part of the U.S.A as a heinous crime against
humanity.
However, at that point of time atomic energy also served as a groundbreaking discovery
in the field of nuclear physics that if tapped into would provide a limitless source of
cheap energy. The main obstacle to regulation of atomic energy was that the resources,
technologies, and activities that could be used for nuclear power might just as easily be
used for nuclear weapons. This dual use phenomenon continues to haunt us even
today.
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History of the committee
To explore the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy that had the power to bring about
radical changes in our standard of living, in 1957 subsequent upon a proposal put forth
by Dwight D. Eisenhower called ―Atoms for Peace,” the United Nations established
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for both the
promotion and the oversight of nuclear technology. The NPT opened for signature in
1968, and entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended
indefinitely fulfilling the first provision built into its original text. This provision provided
the international community with the choice of placing it into effect indefinitely, or to
extend it for a shorter period of time.
It propagates three fundamental pillars – non proliferation, disarmament and the
universal right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT recognizes under article
IX, Section 3, all states which have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967, namely China, France, the
former Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States as
nuclear weapon states. The NPT represents the only binding commitment, within the
frame of a multilateral treaty, dedicated to the goal of disarmament by the nuclearweapon States.
The NPT as of 2013 has 189 signatories, with Israel, India, Pakistan and DPRK outside
its purview. DPRK is the only nation that has utilized the option to withdraw from its
commitment to the NPT provided under article X of the treaty, to the growing
consternation of the international community.
The NPT has a second provision built into its original text that allows for updation and
subsequent strengthening of the treaty; in order to formulate a final document that would
successfully implement the objectives enshrined within the treaty. This provision refers to
the NPT review conferences to be held every five years. Many significant decisions and
commitments are made at these Review Conferences.
2000 NPT Review Conference bore fruit in the form of the 13 practical steps for the
systematic and progressive disarmament of the world's nuclear arsenal.
2010 NPT Review Conference proved to be a successful deliberation in light of the
failure of the review conference held in the year 2005. A 64 point action plan was
formulated in order to make significant progress in the field of global disarmament.
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The NPT is the foundation of the global initiative towards non proliferation of nuclear
weapons and disarmament of the existing arsenals. Like every building, the foundation
needs to be strong to overcome adversity in order to preserve it. This strengthening
process is termed as the NPT Review conference.
The United Nations office for disarmament affairs takes the responsibility of conducting
the NPT Review conferences and their preparatory conferences as well. The decisions
to strengthen the disarmament and nonproliferation initiative are taken by the UNODA
and implemented by the IAEA. We believe that the problems to be tackled at the NPT
review conference in the year 2020 will require active participation of all the signatories
of the NPT. Hence we have empowered the United Nations General Assembly with the
powers of the UNODA.
Introduction
While looking at nuclear security the concerns related to it would be three fold. The first
would encompass the threat of non compliance with the IAEA safeguards by the
member states that are signatories to the NPT. This would lead to the subsequent non
conformity with the principles enshrined in the NPT. Hence, it is the prerogative of all
member states to comply with their obligations to the IAEA and international community
in order to pursue the option of nuclear energy.
The second concern would relate to the problem of the limited reach of the NPT as a
whole and that of the effectiveness of the safeguards. The NPT has yet to achieve the
status of universality. Nations such as Israel, India and Pakistan never entered the
sphere of influence of the NPT. Furthermore, the IAEA safeguards are limited in their
ability to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes in order to
create or update an existing nuclear arsenal.
The final concern that threatens to disrupt international peace and prosperity is that of
nuclear terrorism. It is a common occurrence for terrorist organizations, to update their
weaponry in order to cope with the developments in the arsenals of the nation state they
terrorize. It is not farfetched to assume that they would want to acquire nuclear war
heads. The possession of any weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist organization
would ascertain them a leverage or bargaining chip. This in turn could be utilized to black
mail nation states to give into their demands.
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International safeguards system
―The future evolution of nuclear safeguards lies in the realization by the international community
that this form of verification is a security bargain that deserves openness, hard-headed scrutiny,
commitment, finances and resources commensurate with its significance for international
security.‖
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has always had the contradictory
responsibility of promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy while simultaneously trying
to ensure, via safeguards, that this use doesn‘t have any military dimension attached to
it. The IAEA safeguards have received the sanction of the NPT. Article III of the NPT
makes it obligatory for the non nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to embrace the
Comprehensive safeguard agreement. As defined by the IAEA, safeguards “are
activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international
commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.”
Hence, the purpose of the safeguards system of the IAEA is to provide credible
assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items
are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. To that end the IAEA has three types of
safeguards agreements that it has concluded with member states signatories to the NPT.
1. Comprehensive safeguards agreement
The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements ( CSA) refer to the application of
safeguards to all sources or special fissionable material employed in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its
control anywhere. The scope of the CSA is not limited to declared nuclear material but
also nuclear material or resources that are required to be declared by the state under its
obligation to the IAEA. The CSA are limited in their nature to detect undeclared nuclear
activities.
This limitation found expression when a clandestine nuclear weapons programme was
discovered in Iraq in 1991. Iraq was a signatory to the NPT and had implemented the
CSA. Despite the application of the CSA, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq
was able to employ 36.3 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in its research reactor
fuel, a quantity suitable for one gun-type or two implosion-type nuclear devices.
Furthermore, in 1993 the IAEA officials faced difficulties in verifying the DPRK‟s
compliance with the NPT due to the limitations imposed by the safeguards on the
probing ability of the IAEA.
The IAEA required the leeway to verify not only whether the state declaration of nuclear
material is „correct‟ and but also „complete‟. The CSA didn‘t provide them with that
required leeway. Hence, in order to strengthen the safeguards system, the Agency
launched the „93+2‟ Program‟ in December 1993. In addition to new measures under
existing CSAs, this also expanded the IAEA‘s legal mandate by the adoption in May
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1997 of a model Additional Protocol (AP), designed to allow more intrusive inspections
and give greater assurance against the presence of clandestine nuclear weapon
programmes.
Member states with little or no nuclear activities taking place within its territories are
obligated to implement the ―Small Quantities Protocol” (SQP) with the IAEA.
2. Item-Specific Safeguards Agreements
Application of safeguards to nuclear material, non-nuclear material such as heavy
water and zirconium tubes, nuclear facilities, heavy water production plants and
nuclear material processing -related equipment etc takes place under the ItemSpecific Safeguards Agreements. The IAEA currently implements such agreements in
India, Pakistan and Israel as a means of monitoring some of their nuclear activities,
since they are not party to the NPT and are thus not required to comply with IAEA
Safeguards.
3. Voluntary Offer Agreements
The NPT recognizes 5 states as nuclear weapon states. These states namely- U.S.A,
the Russian Federation, and the People‘s Republic of China, the U.K and France are not
obligated under the NPT to implement the CSA. However, all five states have offered
nuclear material and/ facilities excluding those that pose significant national security
concerns. The agreements that are concluded by the IAEA with the above mentioned
nations are referred to as the Voluntary Safeguards Agreements.
Many member states have not yet signed and implemented the CSAs. Furthermore,
there is an urgent need to conclude and bring into force APs. The IAEA also faces
logistical concerns. Over the years due to spread of nuclear technology, the number of
nations that pursue the option of nuclear energy has increased. However, the
simultaneous increase in the work force and working budget of the IAEA has not taken
place. There are limits on the number and frequency of inspections, which can only take
place at agreed key points in declared facilities. Over 70 percent of IAEA safeguards
effort has taken place in Canada, Germany and Japan, which are arguably of less
proliferation concern. The use of material accountancy is particularly problematic in
facilities handling bulk quantities of nuclear materials, such as enrichment, reprocessing
and fuel fabrication plants.
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The Islamic republic of Iran – A case study
"Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn ... We envision producing, as
soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants," the Iranian Shah
had stated. Consequently, Iran profusely banks upon its sovereign right to a civil nuclear
program.
Iran‘s nuclear program started in the 1960s with the assistance of the United States of
America, when the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was in power. After the 1979 Islamic
revolution, the Shah was overthrown and Iran‘s ties with the USA and the western world
were severed.
In 1970 Iran ratified the NPT, and signed the Additional Protocols for international
inspection in 2003. However it hasn‘t ratified the Additional Protocol. Hence, Iran as a
member state of the UN that is a signatory to the NPT as Non nuclear Weapon State has
an inalienable right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 2005, the IAEA
found Iran to be guilty of non-compliance with the NPT. They believed that Iran failed to
divulge all the requisite details about its nuclear program. Iran continues to hold on to
their inalienable right to domestically enrich uranium for their civil nuclear program. Their
neighbors and many critics in the international community counter this belief by saying
that the non compliance of the NPT is to be borne first in mind, rather than the rights
granted to the member nations that are a part of the NPT. Furthermore, they believe that
the lack of transparency in the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding their
nuclear program and their overzealous need to enrich Highly Enriched Uranium are
precursors to a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
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Some critics also argue that there is a double standard in the treatment of Iran, which
was reported to the Security Council for undeclared enrichment and reprocessing
activities, and South Korea, which had failed to report enrichment and reprocessing
experiments but was not found in non-compliance. Subsequent sanctions were levied on
Iran by the UNSC and unilaterally by suspicious countries like U.S.A and U.K. The
rampant political tension in the Middle East facilitated by the nation states of Iran and
Israel further make such a situation murky.
For the first time ever in November 2011 the IAEA released a 14-page report outlining
the potential military applications of Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran‘s nuclear facilities at
Fordow and Natanz continue to induce the suspicion of the international community.
Iran as of 2013 is a shining example of the limitation of the IAEA safeguards and
emphasizes the need for the universal signature and ratification of the additional protocol
in order to provide a better evaluation of the nuclear program of a state as a whole and
it‘s possible military dimensions. We see a shift in the stance of Iran with the transfer of
power from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Hassan Rouhani who promises to be more
agreeable in the negotiations with the international community in light of the previously
unsuccessful six party talks.
Existing nuclear weapon states
United States Of America
United States‘ nuclear tests were conducted on an intermittent basis between 1946 and
1958. During this period, nuclear tests were conducted in groups known as
"operations" or "test series". Each series was a distinct operation that was organized
and carried out independently of other operations. The United States was the first nation
to develop nuclear weapons. This development of nuclear weapons began during the
Second World War, initially to counter German nuclear research, and later to counter
perceived Soviet aggression. This initial program code named the Manhattan Project
(officially known as the Manhattan Engineer District), was conducted from 1942 to 1946
and cost the nation over $2 billion dollars ($23.4 billion 2010 USD). Over 90% of the
cost was for building plants and producing the fissionable materials, and less than 10%
for development and production of the weapons. The United States successfully tested
a nuclear bomb on July 16, 1945 in the New Mexico desert. The test, code named
„Trinity‟, was of a plutonium implosion device, which was later converted into an air
deliverable nuclear bomb called “Fatman”. A second atomic bomb developed during
the Manhattan Project, called “Little Boy”, was a uranium gun-type weapon. These
weapons were subsequently used against Japan, killing an estimated 200,000 people
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and effectively ending World War II. This was the only use of nuclear weapons in
combat to this day. Nuclear tests were organized into separate operations. Depending
on weapons objectives, these operations had specific weapons development goals and
effects studies. These nuclear tests proof tested warheads for entry into the U.S.
Stockpile. The United States built over 70,000 nuclear weapons since 1945. The peak
number of weapons stockpiled was in 1967 with approximately 32,500 warheads in
existence. The United States conducted the largest number of nuclear tests of any
nation. Between 1945 and 1992, 1,125 nuclear devices were detonated by the United
States; the majority of these were weapons development and effects tests.
The Russian Federation
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left the Russian Federation in
possession of the vast majority of the USSR's weapons of mass destruction complex.
The Soviet nuclear weapons program began during World War II and culminated in a
successful nuclear test in 1949. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a
nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. By 1991, the Soviet Union had approximately
35,000 weapons in its stockpile, down from a peak in 1986 of approximately 45,000.
Russia has one of the most robust and advanced missile programs in the world, and
maintains the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-propelled
missiles of all ranges.
Like the U. S., the Russia engaged in a massive deployment of nuclear weaponry
though it lagged the U.S. by several years in achieving both qualitative and quantitative
milestones. ). Soviet nuclear warheads have been fined on over 75 different types of
weapons, from atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) to intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), with yields from under one kiloton to tens of megatons. Estimating the current
size and composition of the former Soviet nuclear stockpile remains difficult. The current
Russian stockpile has about 12,000 operational warheads, with an equal number in
reserve or awaiting dismantlement. Over a 46-year period the Soviet Union has
produced about 55,000 warheads, including approximately 1,000 used in 715 tests. The
size and composition of its future nuclear arsenal are less clear than the U.S.
The United Kingdom
The British were the first nation to seriously explore the possibilities of building an
atomic bomb in the year 1940. The formal decision to actually build an atomic bomb
was made by a small committee of Ministers, operating in total secrecy.
The current British stockpile has about 300 warheads of three types with a cumulative
yield of approximately 45 megatons. Britain has the smallest operational stockpile of the
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five declared weapons states. Over a 43-year period Britain has produced about 950
warheads of ten types, including 45 for the nuclear test program. The weapon stockpile
remained fairly steady in the 300 to 350 range from the 1960s through the late 1980s. In
the early 1990s, the British government· withdrew some naval weapons and air force
bombs, reducing the stockpile to around 200 weapons. During the Cold War Britain had
a supplementary stockpile of American nuclear weapons that at times has exceeded its
own.' British forces planned to use these Americannuclear warheads and weapon
systems to accomplish a variety of NATO missions, thus freeing themselves from
developing or producing certain weapons of their own. The "special relationship" with
the United States has fundamentally shaped British nuclear practices and policies. This
relationship has been perhaps the single most important factor in determining the kinds
of nuclear programs the British have pursued and the numbers of warheads they have
built.
France
The manner in which France decided to actually create its nuclear arsenal was not the
result of a single decision, nor was it the result of a clear-cut long-range policy rationally
planned and executed. The decision was taken without any public knowledge or
Parliamentary debate. As in the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, a small group
of scientists, in collaboration with military and government officials, brought the bomb
program to fruition. The first French nuclear test took place on February 13, 1960 in
Algeria. The development of tactical warheads began in 1965.
The current French stockpile has about 480 warheads of four types with a cumulative
yield of approximately 100 megatons. France has produced about 1,250 warheads of
ten different types, including over 200 for the nuclear test program over a 35-year
period.
China
The Chinese decision to develop an atomic bomb was made on January 15, 1955 on
the basis of political and military factors. A Chinese nuclear arsenal would vault China to
major power status and also stop the "nuclear bullying" by the U.S. The Korean War,
events in Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait crisis all demonstrated China's insecurity in
the face of U.S. nuclear weapons and threats. Despite much talk of self-reliance, China
undertook its nuclear weapons program with tremendous assistance from the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union basically designed and built the fledgling nuclear industry in
China until 1960, when the USSR abruptly ceased all nuclear cooperation and the two
nations engaged in a Cold War of their own.
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China maintains an arsenal of about 425 weapons of two basic categories, with a
cumulative yield of approximately 400 megatons and 650 warheads.
India
―I regard the employment of the atom bomb for the wholesale destruction of men, women
and children as the most diabolical use of science.‖ M.K Gandhi.
Initially, between the years 1948 to the mid 1960‘s India‘s behavior corresponded to its
nonproliferation and disarmament posture. However, owing to the growing regional
instability India grew out of her aversion to nuclear weapons. The strained relations with
both Pakistan and the defeat India faced in the 1962 border conflict with China proved
its military unpreparedness. ―We do not wish to see India blown apart by Pakistan or
China because we did not possess the deterrent nuclear power.‖ stated Mr. Atal Bihari
Vajpayee.
A strong supporter of the civil use of nuclear technology India had developed a complete
nuclear fuel cycle which allowed it to easily acquire the technical capability to build
nuclear weapons. Hence, India's conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974,
described by the Indian government as a ―peaceful nuclear explosion. However, due to
the ambivalent reactions of the international community to this, further tests were called
off. The weapons program was resumed after Indira Gandhi, the country‘s first female
prime minister returned to power in 1980.
India has not signed the NPT and has reiterated that it does not intend on doing so
citing reasons of national security. The former Defence Minister Of India, George
Fernandes justified India‟s nuclear arsenal stating, “Why should the five nations
that have nuclear weapons tell us how to behave and what weapons we should
have?
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Pakistan
Since their independence in 1947, India and Pakistan fought three wars. Their foreign
policies are a consequence of these conflicts. Many of the actions taken by Pakistan are
complimentary to those taken by India and vice-versa. Hence, the development of
nuclear weapons by Pakistan was spurred on by India‘s nuclear test conducted in May of
1974. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist from Europe, made significant
contributions to the development of a nuclear weapon program in Pakistan. He is known
as the father of the nuclear weapons program possessed by Pakistan. At present
Pakistan possesses the world's fastest-growing nuclear weapon stockpile.
Pakistan continues to be outside the purview of both the NPT and the CTBT. Pakistan
concedes to come under the umbrella of the NPT recognized as a nuclear weapon
state. Furthermore, they cast the blame for their reliance on nuclear weapons on nations
such as the U.S.A for destabilizing the secure environment in South Asia and thus
forcing nations like Pakistan to increase their dependence on nuclear weapons.
Democratic people‟s republic of Korea
DPR Korea started its research on nuclear energy in 1960s when it established a large
atomic research institution in Yongbyon with the assistance of the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR). DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, after facing international
pressure to do so. They signed the safeguards agreement in 1992. The first report
submitted to the IAEA under the obligation of the said safeguards revealed some
inconsistencies with the discoveries of the IAEA inspections conducted. Hence, the IAEA
requested to inspect the two nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that had been previously
concealed by them. However, their request was denied by DPRK. Furthermore, the
DPRK government announced its intention t withdraw from the NPT in 1993.
Following the passage of a Security Council resolution, DPRK allowed IAEA inspections
to take place in their nuclear facilities and reconsidered their decision to opt out of the
NPT. However, the information made available to the IAEA officials via the inspections
was very limited and the DPRK continued to hinder comprehensive investigations on the
part of the IAEA. With the adoption of the agreed framework with the U.S.A, a ray of
hope was seen in solving the first nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula. However, the
uncooperative behaviour that DPRK is known to display on occasion, found expression
in 2002 once again. In early 2003, DPRK once again entertained the idea of withdrawing
from the NPT, following up on the previous statement made by their head of state which
propounded that DPRK would make good on the option to develop a nuclear arsenal
should its sovereignty be threatened. After a series of unsuccessful six party talks the
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DPRK in 2009 officially declared that it was no longer under the purview of the NPT. The
withdrawal became effective April 10, 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to
withdraw from the treaty. Most supporters of DPRK believe that their actions are
justified by the threat posed by the B2 stealth bombers and F22 fighters sponsored by
the USA
The possession of nuclear weaponry by the DPR Korea threatens the stability of the
Korean peninsula and adds to the strain in the relations of the North and South Korea,
even though North Korea withdrew from the NPT on the premise of protecting and
preserving their sovereignty. The relations of North- South Korea have suffered to such
an extent that their only act of co-operation has been severed by the disallowance of
the South Korean workers at the plutonium producing reactor at Yongbyon in North
Korea. This situation highlights the failure of the six party talks, the sunshine policy and
also emphasizes the need for a peace treaty between the two Koreas. The situation in
the Korean peninsula has escalated out of hand to such an extent that many nations are
preparing for the occurrence of nuclear warfare as DPRK had declared a state of war
with ROK and had also threatened to nuke the American mainland and the military bases
of Guam and Hawaii. However, a shift in the trend of negotiations on part of the DPRK
has been witnessed recently when they called for bilateral talks with the U.S.A in June
2013.
The Article X of the NPT provides member states an option to free one‘s nation from the
obligations of the non proliferation regime under circumstances which jeopardize the
supreme interests of their nation. The DPRK portrays how the clauses under NPT are
prone to manipulations and still possess a few loop holes which can be exploited to
one‘s advantage.
Israel
Israel has not signed the NPT. Israel's current arsenal size is unknown, with estimates
ranging between 75-80 warheads on the low end, to upwards of 400 on the high end with
the ability to deliver them via intercontinental ballistic missiles, aircrafts, and submarines.
Israel prefers to be outside the purview of the NPT because the NPT requires Israel to
reassess their ambiguous nuclear policy. Israel adopts a policy of what is known as
“Nuclear ambiguity” or "nuclear opacity"; it claims that it ―will not be the first country
to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East‖ but refuses to expand, leaving a lot to
the interpretation of various governments and International bodies. Thereby it neither
denies nor accepts the possession of nuclear weapons. Israel is the only Jewish state
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surrounded by a host of Arab neighbours; they claim to face a lot of hostilities from them.
A flip side to this notion is that the Arab nations believe that the Israel‘s undeclared
nuclear arsenal presents the greatest threat to peace in the region.
Israel feels particularly threatened by the Islamic Republic of Iran and professes the
need to keep their options open to effectively deal with the threat posed by the possible
military dimensions of Iran‘s nuclear programme.
Israel‘s ambiguous nuclear policy and its political hostility with Iran is one of the many
factors that hinder the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Israel
does not wish to consider taking part in nuclear weapon-free zone discussions or joining
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty until a lasting peace is achieved with their
neighbours. Furthermore, the possibility of Israel possessing nuclear weapons has
made many neighbouring nations think about adding nuclear weapons to their arsenal
to protect themselves and in order to cope with the developments in the Israeli
armaments.
Due to the sustained habit of Iran that drives it to accumulate highly enriched uranium
for their nuclear program Israel believes that they may be harboring a nuclear weapons
program. This strong belief has driven Israel to make many statements that favor a pre
emptive strike on Iran‘s nuclear facilities if they continue to enrich uranium up to
weapons grade repeating the actions of the Israeli Air Force which bombarded Iraqi and
Syrian construction sites in 1981 and 2007 respectively to prevent the development of
nuclear installations in these countries since "Israel will not tolerate a nuclear Iran‖.
Preparing for the possible need for a military strike on Iran‘s nuclear facilities due to
failure of diplomatic measures to curb Iran‘s clandestine nuclear activities in 2008, the
Israeli Air Force conducted an exercise over the Mediterranean Sea, where Israeli
aircraft practiced aerial refueling and simulated attacks on targets 870 miles off the
Israeli coast. In 2010, a joint air exercise between Israel and Greece took place on
Crete popularly known as ―Minoas 2010" , wherein Israel tested five F-16I Sufa and five
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F-15I fighter jets in strike missions, Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters in pilot
rescue missions, and a Boeing aircraft to practice aerial refueling .
On December 4th 2012, the UN general assembly passed a resolution, which calls on
Israel to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ―without further delay‖ and encourages
it to open its nuclear facilities for inspection by the IAEA. Resolutions adopted by the
193-member general assembly are not legally binding but they do reflect world opinion
and carry moral and political weight.
Challenges to the international safeguards system
Nuclear terrorism
―Nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing.‖
— Mohamed El Baradei, former director general of the IAEA and winner of the 2005
Nobel Peace Prize (February 1, 2009)
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The International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism defines nuclear terrorism as the
threat to use any nuclear or radiological materials in a harmful way. Even illegally
receiving or selling nuclear or radiological materials is considered an act of nuclear
terrorism.
Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. Having only been used in warfare
on one occasion by the U.S.A on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The international community
was alarmed by the devastation it left trailing behind it. Due to the capacity of nuclear
weapons to put the safety of the world community at risk, these weapons possess a
high appeal for terrorists or non state actors.
Many nations have strived for decades to successfully acquire a nuclear weapons
program. However faced with the condemnation of their allies and the international
community as a whole, they have decided against it or subsequently disarmed / curb
the military dimensions of their nuclear programme. However terrorist organizations do
not hold the opinion of the international community in the same regard. Terrorist
organizations like the Al Qaeda, the Boko Haram or even the LRA rely heavily on
violence against civilians as a strategy to get their voices heard or acquire attention
from the host country. Hence a weapon as destructive as a nuclear bomb would give
terrorists enormous physical and political power.
As of January 2013, nuclear energy has spread to 31 countries in the form of 437
nuclear power plant units. This wide spread application of nuclear energy on account of
its diverse applications in fields such as medicine, research etc allows nuclear material
and technology to be accessible to these terrorists thereby increasing the threat of
nuclear terrorism.
―We are not just dealing with the possibility of governments diverting nuclear materials
into clandestine weapons programs. Now we have been alerted to the potential of
terrorists targeting nuclear facilities or using radioactive sources to incite panic,
contaminate property and even cause injury or death among civilian populations.‖
-International Atomic Energy Agency official
The IAEA has taken on the responsibility to monitor the application of nuclear
technology and the subsequent use of nuclear material. However, as mentioned before
we note that the efficiency of the IAEA is tied to the cooperative attitude displayed by
the nation state in question. Terrorist organizations that aim to make use of nuclear
technology as a bargaining chip often host themselves with countries with erratic
governments or in those nations in which the government is slacking or unstable.
In 2013 when the world is still dealing with the domino effect of the Arab spring, it would
be very feasible for these organizations to get a hold of these nuclear materials/
technology in the midst of the aforementioned turmoil.
With that being said, it would not be easy for any terrorist organization to build
sophisticated nuclear weaponry without arousing the suspicion of the host nation or the
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IAEA for that matter, as they would require a substantial amount of nuclear material
such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and an offhand knowledge about
sensitive nuclear technology that in an ideal scenario should be shared through a ‗black
box‘ approach.
Hence, with that dreary scenario looming over them terrorist organizations usually resort
to acquiring or manufacturing ‗dirty bombs‘. These are nothing but radiological devices
that spreads low-grade radioactive material over a public area hence taking the lives of
many innocent civilians a much smaller number in comparison o nuclear weapons.
Exposure to radiation caused by the dirty bomb could cause tissue damage, radiation
poisoning and even cancer. This radiation could contaminate buildings and food
sources, potentially affecting millions of people. The materials that are a requisite for
production of a dirty bomb can be made from the radioactive materials present in
hospital equipment, present at oil drilling facilities or university laboratories and are
thereby easily available to these organizations.
Terrorist organizations
―A capable and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver and
detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major
city in the world.‖
-May 2004 Report of Harvard University‘s Project on Managing the Atom
Many terrorist organizations have also taken the dreaded step to acquire nuclear
materials from black markets in order to facilitate the production of a nuclear weapon.
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Al Qaeda, one of the most feared terrorist organizations with links in almost all regions
of the world, which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks did as early as 1994 make
attempts to acquire uranium, with an aim to construct a nuclear bomb. The Al Qaeda
leader Osama bin Laden had described the acquisition of a WMD for the defense of
muslims as a ―religious duty‖.
Nuclear research laboratories have claimed to have been infiltrated by terrorist spies
many a times. A good example of such an infiltration would be that of the Russian
nuclear scientists that were hired by Taliban regime, a movement of Islamic
fundamentalists in Afghanistan way back in 1998.
Aum Shrinrikyo is a terrorist group which was responsible for the use of lethal gas
called sarin on the subway commuters in March 1995 tried to obtain nuclear weapons.
Furthermore they had allegedly recruited scientists at two of Russia‘s top nuclear
research facilities and established relationships with top Russian security officials.
The North Caucasus-based separatists also posed a threat to nuclear safety by
displaying an interest in acquiring nuclear weaponry. In 1995, Chechen fighters placed
radiological material in a park as a threat to the Russian government.
Protection of Nuclear Material
―Theft and smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear materials is not a hypothetical
concern, but an ongoing reality: the International Atomic Energy Agency has
documented 18 cases, confirmed by the states involved, of seizures of stolen plutonium
or highly enriched uranium over the past decade.‖
Lacking a global standard for protection of nuclear material, it becomes easy for terrorist
organizations to buy, steal, or construct nuclear weapons. Thereby protection
becomes three fold. Firstly, protection of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Second curbing black market transactions related to buying and selling of nuclear
material and sensitive technology. Lastly, preventing terrorist organizations from
acquiring nuclear materials from the nation state they are hosted at because of
leakages in the state or commercial system. Hence, the UN and individual member
states must to everything possible to prevent the theft and trafficking of nuclear
weapons and materials.
It is important to understand the brunt borne by the IAEA that not only makes it
necessary for them to make sure that all member nations‘ party to the NPT is complying
with their safeguards agreements. The political will of many member states comes
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between their compliance of any international treaty. This makes the work of the IAEA
officials all the more difficult.
The IAEA must also take measures to include the commercial organizations in their fight
against nuclear terrorism as it is in these commercial sectors be it medicine or research
that the nuclear material is easily accessible to the terrorist organizations. The safety
efforts of most corporations and research facilities focus on preventing accidental
exposure to radiation, instead of theft of nuclear materials. Sometimes, when their
equipment becomes obsolete, it is simply discarded, even though the radiological
material is still active. Many radioactive materials, which could be used to create a dirty
bomb, are simply thrown away and discovered later in junk yards. It is important that
efforts are equally diverted to prevent both radioactive fallout and theft of nuclear
material from their facilities. This will further require the cooperation and help of the
nation state in question. In the past, terrorist groups and other criminals have attempted
to steal nuclear materials from government defense warehouses and from nuclear
research facilities. Countries must also prevent their nuclear materials from being
illegally sold by corrupt officials in nuclear black markets.
With the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons carried forward from the cold war era, the
Russian Federation is speculated to have the highest risk of nuclear terrorism due to
its mammoth stockpile ( estimated at 10,000 warheads). Furthermore, almost half of
Russia‘s nuclear weapons facilities do not have modern security systems or dependable
tracking systems. Weapons-grade materials, which can be used to manufacture a
powerful nuclear weapon, have been stolen from Russian warehouses in the past.
REPORTED ILLICIT TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS FROM 1993-2004
IAEA‘s Illicit Trafficking Database recorded 662 incidents of illicit or unauthorized
transportation of nuclear or radioactive materials. They include:




196 incidents involving nuclear materials.
400 incidents involving other radioactive materials.
24 incidents involving both nuclear and other radioactive materials.
37 incidents involving materials contaminated by radiation.
In 1987 the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entered into
force. This convention required all parties to the convention to take ―appropriate steps‖
to ensure that nuclear materials are protected from theft and illegal trafficking. The
convention requires that states not export, import or allow the transportation of
dangerous nuclear or radiological materials unless the state can ensure that the
material will be completely protected. If dangerous nuclear or radiological materials are
stolen, states must cooperate with international organizations and with other countries
to recover the materials. The convention even describes the kinds of protection
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dangerous materials will require, such as constant surveillance, trusted guards and
physical barriers
In 1995, the IAEA established the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), a collection of
detailed reports that it distributes to UN member states. The ITDB is not intended to
compile all knowledge of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. It is supposed to build
knowledge about how trafficking occurs, how it is most frequently detected, where
nuclear sources originate and what regions of the world they are trafficked to. The ITDB
relies on the UN member states to submit reports of nuclear trafficking, but as of 31
December 2012, 120 States participate in the ITDB programme
Cyber warfare
Cyber attacks can be carried out by governments, civilians or even members of the
private sector. A good example of a cyber attack in relation to nuclear programmes and
research would be that of the „Stuxnet‟ worm or virus that infiltrated the Iranian
nuclear facility at Natanz causing the breakdown of 17 centrifuges and had apparently
infected more than 60,000 computers not only in Iran but in India, Indonesia, China,
Azerbaijan, South Korea, Malaysia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Finland and Germany. Even though there is still a lot specualtion around the creation of
this infection, some speculate Stuxnet was a cooperative operation conducted by the
U.S.A and Israel, with possible assistance from Germany and Britain in order to take
action against Iran‘s suspected non compliance with the NPT. The use of such tactics
brought the Iranian nuclear programme at Natanz that is clouded with suspicion to a
standstill until the technical problems caused by the virus were sorted out. There are
many types of cyber attacks such as the DDoS attacks, espionage and sabotage to
name a few.
IAEA RESOLUTONS
The IAEA has been the principle body when it comes to dealing with nuclear terrorism
and allied issues. Over the last few years, the agency has strived to combat threats
being faced by Governments by Non-State Actors. The other noteworthy function of the
IAEA has been in its implementation of the NPT. Accordingly, it has imposed checks
upon nations suspected of having embarked on the research and development process
the best example being Iran (GOV/2012/47). Moreover, article 4 of this resolution
throws light on the concrete solutions that the agency offers,‖ Commends the
Secretariat for its intensive efforts, pursuant to GOV/2011/69, to conclude with Iran an
agreement on a structured approach for resolving outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions and stresses that it is essential for Iran to immediately conclude and
implement such an approach, including as a first step providing the access the IAEA
has requested to relevant sites, and decides that Iranian cooperation with IAEA
requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues is essential and urgent in
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order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‘s
nuclear programme.‖
The IAEA stated explicitly in a public statement, ― National measures for protecting
nuclear material and facilities are uneven in their substance and application. There is
wide recognition that the international physical protection regime needs to be
strengthened‖.
At its meetings in March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved in principal an
action plan designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving
nuclear and other radioactive materials. In approving the plan, the Board has
recognized that the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism is the strong physical
protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Accordingly, a mutual fund was set up to
finance this action plan.
The Board of Governors called upon Member States to contribute to the fund as a
matter of urgency. The IAEA develops basic guidelines that have proven to be of
significant importance in the development of national physical protection systems and
international agreements. It has initiated a number of activities, including training,
technology transfer and peer review, to support Member States in improving their
nuclear material accountancy and physical protection systems at State and facility
levels. The Agency also maintains a database of reported incidents.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war
and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to
take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger
of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
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Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic
points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology,
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon
States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for
peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclearweapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute
alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning
nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its
Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national
arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for
armaments of the world‘s human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
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assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards,
as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Agency‘s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of
verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall
be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being
produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such
facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclearweapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of
safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of
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such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such
agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of
initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in,
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to
do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the
world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications
of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research
and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to
obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements,
through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclearweapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after
the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories.
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Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an
amendment
.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a
majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its
instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the
Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this
Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of
the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the
Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective
of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign
the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may
accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments
of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to
this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this
Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
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4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of
their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any
requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of
July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
Points to consider:
1. According to your country, what are the significant existing provisions in the
international framework that aim to combat nuclear weapon proliferation?
2. What are the obstacles that stand in the way of a nuclear weapon free world?
3. According to your country, which nation/s poses a substantial threat to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy/ which contribute to the proliferation concerns?
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4. What is your country‘s contribution to the combating proliferation of nuclear
weapons and nuclear terrorism?
5. How does your country propose to counter proliferation of nuclear weapons and
nuclear terrorism?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml
http://www.un.org/disarmament
http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/sv.html
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/html_index.htm
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