State Resilience in Tanzania – Draft Analytical Narrative
Stephan Lindemann and James Putzel
I
The puzzle: Tanzania’s political stability despite the odds
Post-colonial Tanzania has remained an enduring “oasis of peace”1 in an East African region
characterised by extreme levels of instability and violence.2 The country is comprised of the
former Tanganyika and the two Zanzibar islands, together inhabited by 34.6 million people
(of which just fewer than 1 million live on the island of Zanzibar).3 Mainland Tanzania was
initially a German protectorate (1885-1920) and then became a British-administered territory
under a League of Nations mandate (1920-1961). Following the emergence of a strong
nationalist movement under the leadership of the Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU), its transition to independence was relatively peaceful and untroubled, except for the
army mutiny of 1964 that was suppressed with the help of the British. The four decades since
independence have been characterised by remarkable levels of peace and stability. While the
socialist policies in the wake of the “Arusha declaration” (1967) involved the use of
considerable state force (most notably against the owners of cash-crop producing land), largescale violence remained absent. Significantly, political stability was also maintained during
the severe economic crisis of the 1980s, some cases of violence against “economic saboteurs”
and a failed coup d’Etat being rather minor exceptions. While subsequent economic and
political liberalisation has been accompanied by increasing political and socioeconomic
tensions, they have largely remained non-violent. Despite the “violence of everyday life”4 and
the what some might call the “structural violence” 5 of enduring poverty, mainland Tanzania
remains light-years away from the violent excesses experienced by many of its neighbouring
countries and continues to provide a significant degree of security to its citizens – the “social
protection” that Karl Polanyi said is so crucial to human aspirations everywhere.6
Altogether, Tanzania is an amazing case not only of state survival, in a sense, against the odds,
but also of a society and polity, which have enjoyed relative peace and stability for more than
four decades since independence. This remarkable stability should not – and was not – taken
for granted. When, in the mid-1970s, ten years after independence, President Nyerere was
asked by a journalist, “what was your greatest success?”, he replied, “That we have survived”.
1
Hofmeier 1997, 151
This is especially true for Mainland Tanzania, to which we explicitly limit our analysis. On the Zanzibar
islands (Unguja and Pemba), by contrast, political stability has been more volatile. Both the pre-colonial Oman
Sultanate and the British Protectorate (1890-1963) were characterised by severe racial tensions between the
ruling Arab/British minority and the black majority. Only one month after independence (1963) these tensions
culminated in the Zanzibar Revolution, which established the leadership of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and
caused several thousand (mainly Arab) deaths (Hofmeier 1997, 153). After Tanganyika and Zanzibar united
(1964) and the ASP and TANU merged to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (1977), the situation
improved gradually throughout the 1970s and 1980s. With the introduction of multi-party politics (1992),
however, the old tensions started to resurface and culminated in violent clashes around the 1995 and 2000
elections (Kaya 2004, 126ff.). Despite this recurrent and largely unresolved conflict, even Zanzibar remains far
from the large-scale violence observed in many other (East) African countries (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda,
DRC).
3
EIU 2007, 16
4
On the violence of everyday life see Heald 2002.
5
Some might argue that the extreme poverty experienced by Tanzanian people is a form of “structural violence”,
in the manner in which Peter Uvin (1998) discussed this in relation to Rwanda. However, we would argue
against conflating the effects of poverty with the effects of the physical violence that accompanies civil war or
the free reign of local warlords or armed gangs.
6
Polanyi 1944, 26. See also Putzel 2002.
2
1
When asked the same question by the same journalist in 1983, he said, “I think I would still
give the same answer”.7 The puzzle that therefore requires explanation in Tanzania is how the
state survived and presided over a generally peaceful management of conflict despite not only
profound economic crisis, but also surrounded by states experiencing insurgency and civil war.
Our main proposition is that Tanzania’s political stability can be explained by the ruling
party’s ability to forge and maintain a centralised and inclusive political coalition. This form
of political organisation can theoretically be termed an “inclusive elite bargain”.8
Tanzania can be characterised as part of a large set “neopatrimonial states” but what is
specific about the organisation of patronage in Tanzania is that it is “centralised” as opposed
to framed within our literature review. It is inclusive of all significant sources of political,
military, economic and social power within the territory of the Tanzanian state. This type of
centralised and inclusive bargain is what accounts for state resilience (also termed “political
stability” also termed “peaceful management of conflict”). This form of political organisation
has been able to establish the hegemony of state institutions (rules) over and above other
potentially rivalling institutions whether emanating from traditional, religious, regional or
ethnic institutional frameworks. In this sense the Tanzanian state has significantly reduced the
negative consequences of “institutional multiplicity”. We suggest that this form of political
organisation is responsible for the state’s ability to endure repeated episodes of economic
crisis, persistent poverty, destabilising pressures of structural adjustment and potentially
destabilising security challenges (wars in, and refugee flows from, neighbouring countries).
By focusing on the elite bargain, we do not by any means imply that what is happening in
society as a whole, or in non-elite circles, is unimportant. Elites by definition are part of
society as a whole and they need to maintain their legitimacy through coercion and persuasion
within society. They are only “elites” because they command authority in society so our
exploration of evolution of the elite bargain involves necessarily an analysis of social
evolution over time.
We test this proposition by examining the process of state formation in Tanzania over time
and the manner in which the state managed economic, socio-political and security crises
during each historical period.
2
Pre-colonial and colonial legacy
The parameters of the post-independence Tanzanian state were clearly drawn during the
relatively short period of colonial history, roughly 30 years of German rule followed by forty
years under British authority. While the legacy of colonial rule was relatively “favourable” in
that segregation between indigenous groups remained low, the nationalist movement skilfully
built upon this situation by rallying the main social forces in Tanganyikan society and thereby
laying the basis for the “inclusive elite bargain”.
The pre-colonial legacy
Political arrangements in the territory of pre-colonial Tanganyika varied widely related to the
patterns of geography, production and trade, where forms of organisation included anything
7
8
Cited by Shivji (1990), referring to Africa Now, vol.32 (December 1983), p.101.
Cf. Putzel 2007, DiJohn 2008, Lindemann 2008.
2
from the acephalous to highly structured hierarchical chiefdoms. 9 While most political
systems were composed of small, autonomous communities of crop cultivators or pastoralists
organised at the clan or kin-group level, there were also several more centralised forms of
political organisation with strong rulers presiding over larger communities (e.g. the Chagga,
Hehe, Ngoni, Gweno, Nayamwezi, or Sangu).10 On the whole, most pre-colonial societies
were not based on clearly defined tribes but rather characterised by enduring processes of
inward migration and colonisation whereby social and language groups “merged
imperceptibly” into one another. 11 Ethnic consciousness was therefore relatively
un(der)developed and chiefs were mostly not very dominant or powerful.
The territory that would become known through European colonial rule as Tanganyika
contains a total of about 120 of these fluid ethnic groups (cf. map 1). However, no one group
has a dominating position in the population (e.g. as the Buganda in Uganda). The largest
ethnic groups include the Sukuma (13%), Makonde (4%), Chagga (3,7%), Haya (3,5%) and
Nyamwezi (3,4%).12 This diverse, yet no segregated nature of Tanzania’s ethnic composition
has arguably facilitated – yet by no means predetermined13 – the achievement of unity during
both the anti-colonial movement the post-independence administration (see below).
German colonial rule (1985-1920)
As German interests began to establish their authority over Tanganyika from 1895, they
created a colonial order that would severely weaken the political, economic and military
structures of pre-colonial societies. At the same time, and this is key to our argument, the new
order did not entail significant imbalances between the multiple ethnic groups. While the
colonial administration heavily discriminated against Africans in favour of European interests
and Asian traders, it did not create systematic socio-economic segregation among African
groups.14
Politically, the territory was divided into 22 administrative districts with considerable power
left in the hands of district officers backed up with military force.15 Even though the colonial
state never had full control over the territory of Tanganyika, the power of traditonal
authorities was further weakened by a mixture of “semi-indirect” and (mostly) “direct” rule.16
Under “semi-indirect” rule, the Germans made use of chiefs but stripped off much of their
traditional powers, even changing their traditional names. “Direct” rule, by contrast, was
applied where there were no strong traditional rulers. Initially, the colonial administration
simply took over the Sultan of Zanzibar’s officials: liwalis in the main towns, akidas under
them, and jumbes responsible for tax collection at the local level.17 Later on, the Germans
replaced the liwalis with German officials and appointed younger African graduates as akidas
9
Iliffe (1979, 21) is careful to point out that what he calls “stateless” communities were generally not “less
advanced” than the chiefdoms – many of the “most cultured peoples were stateless”.
10
Mpangala 1999: 9. With the exception of the small kingdoms of Buhaya, Tanzanian societies had therefore not
developed highly centralised states like those of the Interlacustrine Region (e.g. the Buganda or Bunyoro).
11
Iliffe 1979, 8f.
12
Hofmeier 1993, 180
13
Some scholars have argued that high degrees of ethnic fractionalisation necessitate coalition-building and
therefore constitute – by themselves – a source of safety for the most heterogeneous countries (Elbadawi &
Sambanis 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2002). However, we argue that ethnic cleavages are always contingent on
inclusive vs. exclusionary political organisation. This is why the trajectories of highly heterogeneous countries
range from enduring political stability (e.g. Tanzania) to recurrent civil war (e.g. Chad).
14
Klugman et al. 1999, 77f.
15
Iliffe 1979, 118f.
16
Mpangala 1999, 13 ff.
17
Coulson 1982, 41f.
3
and jumbes. Significantly, African civil servants at the middle- and lower level were recruited
from various ethnic groups. Also, since the Germans used the Sultan’s bureaucracy, the also
used his language in district administration, Swahili – a decision that would later be endorsed
by the British18. They thus introduced a national language that would facilitate inter-ethnic
dialogue and greatly contribute to the formation of a Tanzanian national identity.19
Map 1: Tanzania’s ethnic groups20
Economically, German colonisation – combined with the devastating impact of several
epidemic diseases – transformed earlier patterns (where Zanzibar interests had controlled
trade) effectively putting “an end to the prosperity of indigenous colonial economies”. 21
While investment in the manufacturing sector remained limited, the Germans opted for a
mixture of settler and plantation agriculture on the one hand, and a cash-crop oriented peasant
18
Iliffe 1979, 208ff., 529; Coulson 1982, 42.
Swahili does not belong to any particular ethnic group that could use it for dominance (Omari 1995, 28).
20
Martin 1988: 21.
21
Hyden 1980, 41. Cf. also Iliffe 1979, chapter 5.
19
4
agriculture on the other. Although land alienation never reached the same extent as in Kenya,
colonial policy generally sought to establish a settler and plantation agriculture where African
labour was used to extract revenue from cash crops (sisal, rubber, cotton, coffee).22 Beyond
these plantation and settler enclaves, the colonialists promoted a “pre-capitalist peasant mode
of production”, in which the incorporation of rural producers into the wider cash-crop
oriented national economy was an essential element.23 Taxation measures (essentially a hut
tax) were introduced in 1897 only to force people into the money economy, delivering
surpluses to market and seeking wage employment. 24 While plantations and export-import
companies were mostly owned by the Germans or other Europeans, Asian traders were
actively encouraged to capture large parts of domestic commerce.25
The structure of the colonial economy had two important consequences. First, it contributed to
the weakening of traditional authorities, not least of those who had been relatively strong in
pre-colonial times. The fact that Germans made use of stronger chiefs in tax collection
(“semi-indirect” rule as outlined above) not only meant a loss of income for the chiefs (who
had received tribute before) but also undermined their own standing in their communities.26
Second, and probably more importantly, the lack of alternatives to independent peasant
production or wage labour on plantations strengthened the socio-economic homogeneity of
the African population.27 While regional imbalances therefore remained far less pronounced
than in other colonies (e.g. in Uganda), colonial rule nonetheless lad the foundation for a
certain degree of uneven development. Infrastructure was mainly develop to support exportcrop production along the Central Line (sisal) and in the northern areas (cotton, coffee),
whereas the other regions were treated as areas of labour supply.28
Finally, German colonial rule also significantly undermined the military capacities of
indigenous societies. The armed movement that left the greatest legacy in this respect was the
Maji Maji rebellion that lasted from 1905 to 1907 – the last major effort of pre-colonial
authorities to resist the colonisation process. The rebellion was rooted in stateless societies of
the south and self-consciously opposed the people’s incorporation into the colonial economy
(in particular the compulsory cotton scheme). It was brutally suppressed by the German
authorities (with about 75000 deaths) and was followed by three years famine.29 The Maji
Maji revolt had two lasting effects. First, it transformed the political landscape of the south
and virtually eliminated Ngoni military society, 30 which might have served as a base for
future armed opposition to colonial authority. But, even more importantly, the devastating
impact of the rebellion created lasting memories among traditional leaders who were loath to
turn to armed resistance later during the British colonial period. In a sense, the scale of defeat,
underpinned thinking about non-violent routes to independence in the 1950s.
British colonial rule (1920-1961)
22
In 1913, there were 5336 Europeans in the country, more than in Kenya at that time (Coulson 1982, 40). The
settler population had achieved significant power in the colony and were arguably well on the way to making it
another Rhodesia.
23
Hyden, 1980, 42f. The integration into the capitalist economy was however marginal in that the pre-colonial
modes of production were replaced by a new pre-capitalist mode based on independent peasant production
(combing both cash-crop and subsistence oriented agriculture).
24
Iliffe 1979, 133.
25
Coulson 1982, 39f. Cf. also Iliffe 1979, chapter 5.
26
Iliffe 1979, 133; Coulson 1982, 35.
27
Klugman et al. 1999, 77.
28
Harnevik et al. 1988, 12.
29
Coulson 1982, 31.
30
Iliffe 1979, chapter 6.
5
The British take-over after the First World War reinforced the existing political and economic
structures in Tanganyika. Despite introduction of “indirect rule”, traditional authorities
remained weak, while British economic policy continued to prevent – at least until the mid1950s – the emergence of major socio-economic segregation among Africans.
At the political level, the onset of British rule was soon followed by a shift to “indirect rule”.
The former Governor of Nigeria, Sir Donald Cameron, was appointed to head the colonial
government in Tanganyika in 1924, whereby the British opted to adopt outright the system
they had established in Nigeria. Indirect rule meant the integration of “indigenous political
systems” into the colonial administration through the establishment of a “native authority”,
which was some combination of a chief and a council, native courts and a native treasury.31
As a consequence “Tanganyika experienced a vast social reorganisation in which Europeans
and Africans combined to create a new political order based on mythical history”.32 Where
German colonial rule had exercised direct control, the British “invented” traditional chiefs and
gave them indirect rule powers and authority.33 In situations where Germany had relied on
“semi-indirect” rule, by contrast, the British provided the traditional chiefs with more power
and restored their traditional names of chiefly authority. After the Second World War, an
attempt was made to further develop “indirect rule” by introducing a system where smaller
chiefdoms were placed under “paramount chiefs”.34 Altogether, the invention of new tribal
identities was the result of both British officials and Africans wanting more effective units of
action and was widely perceived as a route to stability.
While the introduction of “indirect rule” seems to imply a revitalisation of indigenous
political authorities, the available evidence indicates that the system of “ruling through the
chiefs” remained largely ineffective.35 First, the search by the British administrators for the
“legitimate” chief was often fruitless. While northern Nigeria or in Buganda exhibited the
existence of highly centralised and powerful chiefdoms, in Tanganyika the same degree of
centralisation had either never been achieved or been weakened by German rule (cf. above).
Second, the amount of real power held by the chiefs was never great as the Provincial
Commissioners and District Commissioners were always at their side. In this sense, indirect
sense “was a transparent attempt to disguise the reality of foreign rule”.36 Third, and certainly
not least, indirect rule was thwarted by the development of a colonial economy that reduced
the real power of chiefs (see below).
Economically, Tanganyika was “at the bottom of the imperial pecking order”. 37 Its
protectorate status implied a time-constrained period of colonial rule and this meant that a
significant transformation of the country’s economic systems was even less a priority for the
colonial state compared to other colonies. 38 Even though the British would eventually
31
Iliffe 1979, 319f. This stood in contrast to both the former German system, where native authorities appointed
underneath district officers needed to have no status in their communities and with the model of a “native state”
like that which existed in Buganda, “where relations between European and African rulers were fixed by treaty”.
32
Iliffe 1979, 324.
33
Mpangala 1999, 15.
34
Mpangala 1999, 17f. The Chagga, for instance, originally constituted a number of smaller chiefdoms around
the Kilimanjaro Mountain and were now united under one Chief or Mangi, the Mangi Mareale.
35
Coulson 1982, 96
36
Coulson 1982, 97
37
Iliffe 1979, 302
38
“During the 1930s Britain was a net importer of capital and migrants. Of course, even Britain’s waning
economic vigour could have transformed Tanganyika had the territory possessed any economic attraction, but it
offered nothing to compare with South African gold, Middle Eastern oil, or Malayan tin and rubber. Continuing
poverty was British Tanganyika’s leading characteristic.” (Iliffe 1979, 261)
6
implement rudiments of an import substitution oriented industrial polity after the Second
World War, there was initially a conscious decision “not to industrialise”39 and investments in
infrastructure remained limited.40 With respect to agriculture, the British generally maintained
the balance between peasants, settlers, and plantations inherited from the Germans.41 While
small-holder agriculture was consolidated and received little challenge from large-scale settler
agriculture, 42 the introduction of new commercial crops (coffee, tobacco) led to a limited
process of agricultural diversification. 43 From the mid-1930s, the colonial government
considered that an increasing use of force was necessary to make small peasants change their
agricultural techniques.44 It therefore used the Native Authorities to implement compulsory
agricultural development schemes for the cultivation of export commodities and to impose
monopoly marketing arrangements. While the increasing commercialisation of agriculture
gave rise to “cooperatives” representing the emerging African capitalist agriculture (the
“Kilimanjaro Native Planters’ Association” was founded as the first cooperative in 1925), the
latter were for at long time contained by a coalition of settlers, chiefs and the administration.45
It was only in the early 1950 that the British finally began to promote African commercial
farming by allowing African cooperatives to develop and concentrating resources on large
farmers (“kulaks”) – a move that was largely motivated by the desired to strengthen social
control and bolster the colonial mode of production.46
Economic developments under British colonial rule had two important consequences. First,
the implementation of coercive agricultural development schemes through the Native
Authorities again discredited the chiefs and unmasked them as the stooges of the British.47 As
agricultural policies grew increasingly unpopular, the position of the traditional authorities
deteriorated. Moreover, the commercialisation of agriculture led to the development of new
forms of organisation among Africans eventually further marginalizing traditional authorities.
While chiefs were initially were initially able to contain or control African cooperatives with
the help the colonialists, this changed from the 1950s when the new elite used the cooperative
to take the leadership from the traditional aristocrats. Second, British policies ensured that
socio-economic segregation among the Africans developed only towards the end of colonial
rule when the rise of the cooperatives “led to regional imbalances and increased inequality
among Africans”.48 But even though capitalist African agriculture had taken root, this group,
consisting only of a few hundred farmers had very little political clout.49
In the security realm, finally, the British did not recruit along ethnic lines, pitting those who
collaborated against those who resisted their authority, as was the common practice in many
other colonies. Omari speculates that this was because the Germans had already pacified the
39
Coulson 1982, 71. The British feared that industry would bring ruin to the tribal society that “indirect rule”
was trying to retain - “detribalised” African workers in the towns were perceived as “dangerous”.
40
The British period saw very little investment in the kind of infrastructure necessary for development. Between
1938 and 1960, road mileage increased from 15,000 to 20,464, (only 27%) with main roads being extended from
2,700 miles to only 3,770. The construction of railways was even less significant with mileage increasing from
1,370 to only 1,760 miles (only 22%) (Stephens XXX, 82). To be added to the bibliography.
41
Iliffe 1979, 201ff., Coulson 1982, 45
42
Settler farms received limited state support and expropriation of land remained relatively low, especially when
compared to neighbouring Kenya.
43
Iliffe 1979, 286ff.
44
Coulson 1982, 52
45
Coulson 1982, 60ff.
46
Coulson 1982, 55ff.
47
Coulson 1982, 52
48
Klugman et al. 1999, 79.
49
Khan & Gray 2006, 36
7
colony and there was no need for the British authorities to do so.50 While the armed forces
created by Britain were ethnically unbalanced, with members drawn from only seven ethnic
groups (5% of all ethnicities of the time), there was no one ethnic or regional group
dominating the military. The British stationed units of the King’s African Rifles in
Tanganyika under the command of British officers, just as in Uganda.
The nationalist movement
Colonial rule in Tanganyika left a relatively “favourable” legacy in that fragmentation
between indigenous groups remained low, not least when compared with neighbouring
countries (DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda). Nonetheless, one can hardly overemphasise the
achievements of the nationalist movement that skilfully rallied the main social forces in
Tanganyikan society and thereby achieved a comparatively high degree of unity upon
independence.
The nationalist movement in Tanganyika had three main pillars.51 The first pillar was the
Tanganyika African Association (TAA) established in 1929 to rally all Africans against
colonial domination. It was initially an urban-based movement of civil servants and teachers
that had grown out of the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association (1922).
While the TAA was in a rather weak position in the late 1930s, it was revitalised by the entry
of young intellectuals in the early 1950s, most notably Julius Nyerere who was elected
president in 1953. From then on, the TAA took the lead in the anti-colonial struggle,
especially after being transformed into a nationalist political party in 1954 – the Tanganyika
African National Union (TANU). The second pillar was the trade-union movement that
originally developed in opposition to the allegedly elitist stance of the TAA, led by a former
leader of the African Welfare and Commercial Association. Union-based protest against
British rule increased throughout the colonial period and manifested itself in the dock strikes
of 1937-39, the general strike of 1947 and the major riot of 1950. While the latter incident led
to the temporary ban of the union movement, it was allowed to reorganise under the
Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in 1955. Union membership increased from 13.000
in 1956 to about 200.000 in 1961. 52 The third pillar was the cooperative movement that
gained momentum in the rural areas from the early 1950s (see above) and demonstrated
African ability in business.53 Between 1952 and 1952, the number of cooperatives rose from
188 to 617, while their membership increased from 153.000 to 325.000.
From the late 1940s and early 1950s, the TAA started to assume an integrating role in the
nationalist struggle. As it began to develop ideas of struggling towards national independence,
it had to transform its character of an urban elite movement and find ways to sink its roots
more deeply into Tanganyikan society. This was done by simultaneously tapping into
movements for tribal reorganisation and bringing together the incipient nationalist movement
found in cooperatives and trade unions. Tribal reorganisation began during the 1940s and
1950s as struggles of a number of ethnic groups against the cash-crop oriented colonial
policies. 54 While these “proto-nationalist organizations” could have developed into ethnic
political parties (as in other colonies), the TAA managed to co-opt them into the nationalist
50
Omari 2002, 92f.
Coulson 1982, 102 ff.; Klugman et al. 1999, 79f.
52
Harnevik 1993, 32. By 1961, 42% of the country’s workers were unionised compared with 12% in Uganda
and only 8% in Kenya.
53
Cooperatives were especially popular among the African population because they ended the long-resented
Asian monopoly on the trading circuits.
54
Iliffe 1979, 495 f.; Mpangala 1999, 19 f. Examples include the Sukuma Union formed in 1945, the Pare Union
in 1946, the Chagga Kilimanjaro Union in the late 1940s, and the Meru Union in 1951.
51
8
movement (whereby they became branches of TAA). As tribal improvement societies failed
to make real gains for their communities, the TAA won young tribal activists to the nationalist
movement, often at the expense of the already discredited traditional authorities (see above).55
This process incrementally expanded the legitimacy of the nationalist movement to a wide
cross section of the population. Nyerere’s own origin as a son of a chief from a small ethnic
group, the Zanaki, played a crucial role in this context. When Nyerere advocated unity, other
ethnic leaders did not see him as an immediate threat to their own position.56
The role of the TAA was further strengthened when it was re-launched as TANU in 1954,
inspired by the models of the British Labour Party and the Ghanaian Convention People’s
Party. This reinvented organisation had three key attributes: 57 (1) the organisation was
explicitly committed to the goal of independence and proclaimed its opposition to tribalism as
well as its commitment to elections, education, trade unions and cooperatives and wider goals
of African liberation; (2) unions and associations (whether based on tribe or occupation) could
join TANU and pay a “political levy”, but TANU had its own branches of youth and women’s
organisations, which Nyerere saw as central to the organisation’s work; and (3) an annual
delegates conference would elect the national executive committee, giving significant
representation to the base, but day to day activities would be carried out by elected officers
and a central committee appointed by the TANU president, which allowed Nyerere the space
to co-opt in notables and build wider unity.
Altogether, TANU managed to forge a highly inclusive coalition of elites that transcended
ethnic, racial, religious and occupational boundaries. First, it implemented its outright
multiethnic approach and skilfully incorporated key figures from various ethnic groups into
the movement. 58 Second, the party rejected any form of racialism and actively welcomed
whites and people Asian origin. Third, and in contrast to division in Uganda, the
independence movement in Tanganyika was built on religious tolerance. It was “led by Julius
Nyerere, a Catholic, Rashidi Kawawa, a Muslim, and Oscar Kambona, an Anglican”.59 Fourth,
TANU also managed to secure the support from leaders of trade and cooperative unions, even
though there was no open cooperation until 1957 (as unions and cooperatives were watched
over by the colonial government). 60 Beyond this inclusive coalition of elites, TANU also
developed into a powerful mass-based political party that rallied thousands of peasants,
workers and traders. 61 Between 1954 and 1960, TANU membership grew from 15.000
(mostly transferred from TAA) to about 1.000.000, or one in five adults.62
The colonial administration made an attempt to divide the nationalist movement by
supporting the creation of a rival party in 1956, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP),
55
Often the TAA was able to bring national and even international attention to local struggles over land rights.
Omari 1995, 27. Nyerere was outstanding in using every opportunity to incorporate factions into the
nationalist movement. It is doubtful whether without Nyerere’s skill and creativity, TAA/ TANU would have
remained so relatively free of internal disunity.
57
Iliffe 1979, 507ff..
58
Omari 1995, 26. Key ethnic leaders that joined TANU included Chief Fundikira of the Wanyamwezi, Chief
Anna Gwassa of Kasulu, Chief Therea Ntare of Heru Kasulu, and Chief Kasusura of Rusubi-Biharamulo.
59
Kaya 2004, 164. Christian and Muslim proselytisation had continued apace throughout the British period,
when by the late 1950s, Muslims constituted some 31% of the population, Christians were up from 2% in 1914
to 10% in 1938 and 25% by 1957 (17% Catholic and 8% Protestant). Due to attitudes of the colonial authorities,
Muslims were more uniformly pro-TANU and Christians more divided between support for the colonial
government, often allied to traditional authorities, and support for TANU.
60
Coulson 1982, 107
61
The role of traders was particularly important as they carried TANU’s messages to distant communities in
Swahili and they were able to link up local grievances with nationalist demands for independence.
62
Coulson 1982, 115; Iliffe 1979, 536.
56
9
essentially composed of disgruntled chiefs and white settlers.63 Also, a split from the TANU
leadership led to the creation of the African National Congress (ANC) that represented
Africans only and thereby challenged TANU’s ideology of unity and equality.64 Both parties
were however severely defeated in the elections of 1958 and 1960 when TANU secured
sweeping victories. While TANU therefore led the country to independence in a position of
political power, it had not developed a military orientation, partly as a result of earlier defeats
and partly because of the influence of Ghandi’s philosophy of non-violent resistance. 65
Security matters can therefore be regarded as TANU’s “weakest link” – a weakness was soon
to be confirmed by the post-independence mutiny of the armed forces (see below).
With independence and the expansion of the franchise in many former colonies in Africa,
democratic forms of government opened the way for factionalism and the politics of regional
ethnic and language groups. John Iliffe concluded that there were three reasons why this did
not have the disintegrating influence in Tanzania that it had elsewhere. First there was no
ethnic group large enough in Tanzania to think seriously about separation. Secondly, the
Swahili language bridged the divide between ethnic groups. But thirdly, and what seems most
importantly, TANU had built a strong party machine throughout the territory before the
franchise was expanded.66 When TANU faced a much expanded electorate after the 1962
Constitution was adopted, it won an even greater margin of victory than in 1958 under a
limited franchise.
III
Independence to Arusha Declaration (1961-1967)
The unity of the nationalist movement notwithstanding, it soon became clear that the
country’s political stability remained fragile. As everywhere across the continent,
independence created enormous expectations among peasants, workers and civil servants who
longed for social services, employment opportunities and higher incomes. Failure by the postcolonial government to immediately meet these demands was bound to create disunity and
unrest. Accordingly, the early 1960s saw mounting confrontations with radicalised trade
union leaders who mobilised as series of strikes for wage increases and rapid Africanisation.
More importantly, the fragility of political stability was underlined by the violent overthrow
of the government of Zanzibar in early 1964, almost immediately followed by the mutiny of
the Tanganyikan armed forces that shook the country in its foundations and was suppressed
only with the help of British troops.67 Interpretations on how much of a threat the military
mutiny represented to the TANU-led government vary considerably. Bienen emphasises that
the mutineers never came close to seizing power.68 According to him, the rebels repeatedly
emphasised that they did not want a coup, but only Africanisation and improved wages. The
Minister of Defence, Oscar Kambona, was instrumental in negotiating with the mutineers and
63
Klugman et al. 1999, 80; Coulson 1982, 115
The ANC had been founded by an Assistant Secretary General of TANU, Zuberi Mtemru, which broke from
TANU over participation in the racially segregated colonial election of 1958 (Baregu 1994, XXX).
65
Lupogo 2001.
66
Iliffe 1979, 570.
67
On 19 January 1964, led by a non-commissioned officer, the first battalion left its barracks and took key
installations in Dar es Salaam: radio station, police stations, the airport and State House. They arrested British
officers from their homes and barracks. Initially, the mutineers demanded the expulsion of British officers and
higher pay in negotiations with TANU ministers (both the President and Vice-President went into hiding). The
second battalion, based in Tabora, joined the mutiny two days later. In Dar es Salaam, looting broke out almost
immediately after the mutiny began, especially as the police decided not to intervene. Some soldiers were
involved in the looting and mainly Asians and Europeans were targeted.
68
Bienen 1978, chapter 7. To be added to the bibliography.
64
10
the President treated the mutiny almost like a labour dispute, consciously playing down its
implications. TANU ranks remained united and the civilian posts it controlled continued to
function throughout. Civil servants did not join in, nor was the mutiny endorsed by key
traditional leaders. It was the strength of the TANU organisation that prevented the mutiny
from turning into a full blown coup d’etat. Bienen’s emphasis on TANU’s strength is at least
questionable. Swai, for instance, claims that the mutiny underlined weakness and fragility of
the political system.69 It was organised by a “handful local rank and file who were poorly
trained and armed and yet managed to force the whole government machinery to a standstill
for several days”. Despite its organisational strength, TANU was unable to organise any local
resistance and was rescued by “only a handful of British marines”.
Not matter how severe the threat posed by the mutiny, it is clear that Tanganyika’s first years
of independence were altogether relatively peaceful and untroubled, especially when
compared with the violent excesses in neighbouring Congo or Rwanda. This relative political
stability between 1961 and 1967 can in part be explained by the pattern of colonial rule and
the achievements of the nationalist movement. More important, however, was the fact that
TANU and its leader, Joseph Nyerere, took a series of decisive steps to consolidate the
“inclusive elite bargain”. TANU was further developed into a centralised and inclusive
political organisation that imposed its hegemony over Tanganyikan society and introduced
beginnings of rent-sharing policies. Perhaps even more importantly, it used the occasion of
the army mutiny to completely reorganise the security sector. The combination of these
actions proved crucial to the state building effort and would have a lasting impact on the
shape of Tanzanian state.
POLITICS
One, if not the major achievement during the first years of independence was TANU’s
consolidation into a powerful ruling party that would become coterminous with the Tanzanian
nation state. Significantly, the party’s dominant position hinged on a skilful combination of
both centralised authority and inclusive cooptation. In the words of Dashwood & Pratt, it
developed an “original set of political institutions” that were “sufficiently participatory and
democratic as to limit the risk of the regime’s becoming severely authoritarian and corrupt,
but not to open as to threaten Tanzania’s still fragile unity or weaken prematurely the
integrating and energising capabilities of the nationalist movement”.70
TANU’s centralised authority was first established at the expense of rival institutions thereby
further minimising “institutional multiplicity”. Most importantly, “two fundamental
institutions of indirect rule” were abolished in 1962. 71 While the Native Authorities were
disbanded and replaced by elected District Councils, the chiefs – already weakened during the
pre-independence period – now lost all official power that was transferred to politically
appointed Regional and Area Commissioners.72 At the same time, their status was further
undermined by the government’s decision to nationalise all land (see below). Even though
TANU faced resistance in some regions where its party organisation was still weak, most
69
Swai 1991, 95.
The ruling party also maintained a hard line towards other organisations that would not submit to its authority.
Religious organisations were tolerated if they did not challenge the political status quo. However when they did,
they were banned, as happened to the East African Muslim Welfare Society in the late 1960s (Kaya 2004, 150).
While some argued this tight control was evidence of authoritarian rule, it could as well be interpreted as a key
measure that avoided the radicalisation of Islam in Tanzania (Chris Peter, interview).
71
Coulson 1982, 136
72
While tribal authorities were removed, customary law was maintained though adjudicated through the normal
courts (Chris Peter, interview).
70
11
traditional authorities tried to ensure their position by joining the organisation. But this led to
serious conflict at times. In one district commoners were elected as TANU representatives
and one of their first actions was to reduce onerous levels of bridewealth and ban the use of
cattle in paying bridewealth or as collateral for loans. This challenged the position of tribal
elders and brought the district to the “fringe of civil tribal fighting”.73
Furthermore, TANU sought to assert its hegemony vis-à-vis the trade unions and the
cooperative movement – the other two main pillars of the nationalist movement (see above).74
With 200.000 members by 1961, the trade unions had grown into a powerful social force.75
While moderate union leaders had been co-opted as cabinet ministers, the new (more radical)
leaders mobilised as series of strikes for wage increases and rapid Africanisation. As a
consequence, four acts were passed in 1962 that limited the right to strict, introduced
prevention detention76, prevented civil servants from joining unions and gave TFL greater
power over its constituent unions. This conflict culminated into the 1964 decision to replace
with the National Union of Tanganyika (NUTA) that was subordinated to TANU and
involved compulsory membership for workers. 77 Gaining control over the cooperative
movement, by contrast, proved to be more difficult. The number of cooperatives increased
from 857 in 1961 to 1533 in 1966.78 While the government controlled their registration and
intervened in their operations in many ways, the movement managed to preserve a certain
degree of autonomy throughout the 1960s79 – a situation that motivated TANU’s efforts for
further control during the 1970s (see below).
TANU’s power was also asserted over other organs of the state. The ruling party was
centralised and highly structured with party organs at all levels of society from village cells of
10 households up to the National Executive Committee (NEC). The “party structure itself was
transformed into a bureaucracy, and integrated with other bureaucracies such as the hierarchy
of regional and district commissioners” thereby constituting a prime example of what Allen
describes as “centralised-bureaucratic politics”.80 Given this unusual degree of organisational
cohesiveness, TANU by far overshadowed other state institutions. The National Assembly,
for instance, was clearly subordinate to the ruling party: Decisions were typically prepared
and taken by TANU and then “rubber-stamped” in Parliament. 81 In 1965, Tanzania was
formally transformed into a one-party state, thereby further consolidating TANU’s now
virtually uncontested position on the political playing field. From now on, all political
competition would take place within the realms of the ruling party.82
But TANU’s dominant political position did not simply rest on centralised authority. Instead,
it also involved a significant degree of inclusiveness. To begin with, the one-party state was
“democratic” in that it allowed for inner-party electoral competition. According to the 1965
constitution, (1) TANU membership was open to anyone willing to accept its objectives; (2)
any TANU member could be nominated for election to the national assembly and party
73
Iliffe 1979, 570.
Dashwood & Pratt 1999: 249f.
75
Coulson 1982, 137ff.
76
The “Preventive Detention Act” (1962) was repeatedly used against trade-unionists and underscored TANU’s
“authoritarian face”. Christopher Tumbo, the leader of the railway union, was detained without trial for four
years (Coulson 1982, 140).
77
Bienen 1967, 271f. To be added to the bibliography.
78
Coulson 1982, 149
79
Harnevik et al. 1988, 57.
80
Allen 1995, 305f
81
Harnevik et al. 1988, 95
82
Kaya 2004, 152.
74
12
organs; (3) in each constituency, the annual district conference selected two nominees among
the candidates (that were screened but normally accepted by the NEC); and (4) local
candidates were not allowed to spend money on campaigning or to use tribal, racial or
religious language.83
Moreover, TANU built on its achievements during the nationalist struggle and maintained an
inclusive elite coalition. The first Nyerere Cabinet included intellectuals, rural activists from
the cooperative movement, urban labour, chiefs 84 , “accommodating immigrants” (i.e.,
Europeans) and TANU professionals. Also, having to pursue an Africanisation programme
upon independence since representation of Africans in the civil service or among university
students was appallingly low,85 TANU resisted any form of ethnic or racial favouritism.86 As
a consequence, the Tanzanian elites remained largely representative of ethnic, regional and
religious divisions.87 With respect to ethnicity, 37% of all ethnic groups were represented in
the leadership, while neither one single nor any of the large groups enjoyed serious
overrepresentation. As for regional representativeness, every region was represented in the
leadership, even though the northern regions (Kilimanjaro, Tanga, and West Lake) as well as
Zanzibar-Pemba benefited from overrepresentation. Religious divisions, by contrast, were less
equally reflected in the Tanzanian leadership. While traditional religions were not represented,
Christians enjoyed overrepresentation relative to the Muslims.
Beyond this balanced distribution of leadership positions, TANU adopted a series of further
measures to rule out the exploitation of ethnic, religious, or regional identities. Not only did
the government ensure that civil servants would serve in districts other than the one they
hailed from, but it took the radical policy of ensuring that at least half of those attending
secondary school would do so in a different district than the one in which they grew up.88
Also, the government greatly expanded policies begun under the German and British
authorities to promote Swahili as the language of instruction among the different ethnic
groups found in Tanzania and Swahili was also used as the language of government.89
ECONOMY
Upon independence, the Tanganyikan economy was largely agricultural, with the sector
representing about 45% of reported output and manufacturing industry no more than 7%.90
83
Dashwood & Pratt 1999: 241f. Cf. also Pratt 1976, 201ff.
While TANU had stripped the chiefs of all official power, it nonetheless continued to work hard to ensure that
notables had a major place in its organisation. Most notably, Chief Fundikira had a role in the TANU leadership
and spoke on behalf of traditional authorities. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the nationalists were
often themselves descendents of traditional authorities. When Nyerere argued for the elimination of tribal
authority, he did so as the son of a chief and his actions meant his own brother would not assume the leadership
role that would have been coming to him (Chris Peter, interview).
85
At independence no African held the position of provincial commissioner; only 2 of 57 district commissioners
were Africans; Africans had only 1,170 of 4,452 senior civil service posts. In the professions, only 16 of the 154
doctors in the territory were Africans; 1 of 84 civil engineers and only 2 of 57 lawyers (Iliffe 1979, 573).
86
In a debate in the National Assembly on citizenship in 1961, Nyerere defended a notion of “political
citizenship” regardless of racial origin and called his racialist opponents, “little Hitlers” (cited in Iliffe 1979,
572). A law passed in 1965 allowed non-citizens to vote if have they have 5 years residence in the country
(Mukandala interview).
87
McGowan & Wacirah 1974, 192 ff. The findings are based on sample of 705 elites covering the period from
1963 to 1968.
88
Mukandala, interview; Kaya 2004, 165.
89
Chris Peter, interview.
90
Bienen 1967, 268f. Some 40% of money income was derived from exports and 80% of these represented
agricultural crops and livestock, with only about 13% earned from minerals. Three cash crops – coffee, cotton
84
13
Significantly, the means of production remained mostly in foreign hands since the process of
transferring political power had not been accompanied by a corresponding process of
transferring economic power. Also, and in sharp contrast to later periods, the public sector
constituted only a limited reservoir of patronage. Even though TANU did distribute well-paid
positions in government or party organs to maintain its inclusive coalition, Britain “set clear
limitations on the speed of Africanisation of national institutions” and continued to dominate
the major share of senior positions in the administration. 91 As a consequence, the postcolonial government felt the urgent need to devise ways to create an economic base for the
state, not least since this would also provide the material underpinnings for alimenting the
“inclusive elite bargain”.
The imperative of economic reform was most obvious in the agricultural sector – the mainstay
of the economy that was based on plantations, settlers and expanding (albeit still small) class
of African capitalist farmers.92 Nyerere strongly disliked this agricultural structure as settler
farms were mostly owned by foreigners93 and the trend towards African capitalist farming
increased inequalities – a situation that clashed with his Socialist ideals and constituted a
potential threat to TANU’s power base among rural peasants. There was thus urgent need for
a new agricultural policy, not least since many settlers virtually abandoned large parts of the
country upon independence. TANU opted for a policy designed to minimise socio-economic
differentiation and inequalities94 – or in the words of Goran Hyden “small was strengthened at
the expense of the large”.95
In 1962, the government decided “to nationalise all land in order to make the state the
ultimate trustee of all land and rule out individual freeholding”.96 Even though the overall
redistribution of land remained limited, small peasant producers were to be strengthened at
the expense of large landowners, namely capitalist farmers (kulaks) and chiefs.97 This basic
orientation was implemented through an agricultural policy based on two (somewhat
contradictory) pillars. First, the government followed a “transformation approach” (based on
recommendations in a World Bank report) that sought to modify peasant agriculture through
the creation of settlement schemes.98 Theses schemes, which provided farmers (mainly TANU
Youth) with land on condition that the followed pre-established rules were relatively few in
number and mostly failed due to the use of inadequate technology. Second, and more
importantly, the government adopted an “improvement approach” that was meant to enhance
and especially sisal – made up more than half of all export revenues. Subsistence activities were said to represent
between one-third and two-fifths of GDP.
91
Harnevik 1993, 38.
92
Coulson 1982, 145ff.
93
“At independence, African ownership of the sisal plantations, a crop which constituted 50 per cent of exports,
was 0.6 per cent, whereas Europeans held 75.3 per cent and Asians 24.1 per cent” (Klugman et al. 1999, 98).
94
This policy followed from TANU’s stance during the independence struggle. While the nationalist movement
in Kenya fought for freehold rights, TANU – with its power base among rural peasants – resisted such policy as
it “would have hastened rural differentiation and led to the emergence of a stratum of richer peasantry that the
nationalist movement saw as unacceptable. Within the structure of the economy at that time, the number of
richer African farmers who could have benefited from this law was extremely limited and it was perceived that
the only group who would benefit from a capitalist land market were the European and Asian farmers at the
expense of the non-capitalist peasants” (Khan & Gray 2006, 57 f.).
95
Hyden 1980, 82ff.
96
Hyden 1980, 70
97
In the Bukoba District, for instance, chiefs enjoyed traditional property rights over a portion of the land in their
chiefdoms (through a semi-feudal land tenure system called “nyarubanja”). With the land reform of 1962, the
“nyarubanja” was abolished and landlords lost their land to independent peasant producers (Hyden 1980, 82ff.).
98
Hyden 1980, 71ff.; Coulson 1982, 145ff.
14
the existing mode of peasant production.99 In order to increase the control of the economy by
indigenous people, the cooperative movement was expanded in all parts of the country,
including those previously untouched (central and coastal parts, Mtwara and Ruvuma in the
south, and the western areas). Accordingly, the number of registered marketing cooperatives
(for both export and food crops) increased from 857 in 1961 to 1533 in 1966. The expansion
was based on “compulsory marketing order” whereby cooperatives became the only legal
purchasers of crops. The agricultural extensive service was improved and channelled a large
array of resources (inputs, credit, technology, training, education) to the cooperatives.
This agricultural policy favoured political stability in that the expansion of commercial
agriculture in all parts of the country helped to reduce inequalities between ethnic groups and/
or regions.100 As the control over cooperatives provided local elites across the country with
access to state resources, the expansion of the cooperative movement can be interpreted as a
rent-sharing policy. At the same time, however, the government policy increased socioeconomic differentiation in the countryside. Even though it explicitly sought to reduce
inequalities between commercial farmers and peasant producers, there is strong evidence that
the expansion of the cooperative movement and the improvement of the agricultural extension
service benefited mainly the large farmers – a situation that “allowed the strong to get
stronger”.101 Altogether, agricultural policy during the early post-independence years mainly
contributed to minimising “horizontal inequalities”, that is, inter-group inequalities that are
arguably more conducive to large-scale violent conflict than interpersonal (or “vertical)
inequalities.102 This “horizontal” inclusiveness was achieved “at a relatively low cost in terms
of rent distribution” because “factional competition within the party structure was relatively
limited compared to other developing countries”.103
In the industrial sector, the Tanganyikan government built on the late colonial policy of
import-substitution.104 While there had been only very limited industrialisation under colonial
role (cf. above), the country witnessed a relatively rapid process of import-substitution in light
manufacturing between 1955 and 1965 (e.g. textile, sisal-spinning, chemical, plastic and
rubber products, pre-cast concrete articles, cement, oil). This sudden “boom” became possible
because Asians – whose traditional trading activities had been taken over by the cooperative
movement – started investing in manufacturing, and because a number of companies
established in Kenya (both Asian and multinational) decided to set up branches in Tanganyika
(not least because Kenya became unstable after the Mau-Mau rebellion). In sharp contrast to
the agricultural sector, however, the nascent industries remained overwhelmingly foreignowned – a situation would change only in the wake of the Arusha Declaration (see below).
SECURITY
Maybe more than any other single event, the military mutiny that occurred in 1964 and the
response to it by the young TANU government had far reaching effects on long-term stability.
The related mutiny in Uganda’s African Rifles, the mutiny by the Force Publique in Congo
99
Coulson 1982, 145ff. This “improvement approach” was not least motivated by the fact that TANU was
anxious to take unpopular measures that could endanger its power base among rural producers. Rural tax
collection, for instance, remained highly incomplete throughout the 1960s (Hyden 1980, 76ff.).
100
Harnevik 1993, 38.
101
Coulson 1982, 145ff.
102
For the distinction between „horizontal“ and „vertical“ inequalities and their varying impact on large-scale
violent conflict cf. Stewart (2000).
103
Khan & Gray 2006, 40
104
Coulson 1982, 168ff.
15
and the different response to them may go a long way in demonstrating the distinct
trajectories of state building in these countries.
At independence the units of the King’s Armed Rifles formed the core of the new country’s
armed forces and they were under the command of British officers. The army was composed
of 2,000 soldiers with only three African officers.105 Africanisation of the officer corps was
proceeding slowly and soldiers faced persistent discrimination at the hands of British officers
and developed grievances over low pay. Training was British oriented and did little to
improve the skills of recruits. No universal conscription had yet been introduced. There was
almost no contact between the political authorities of Tanganyika and the armed forces.106 As
a consequence, the military “had no machinery of making its grievances known to the
Government”.107 While TANU took care to accommodate other sectorial interests (e.g. the
civil service or the trade unions), the army was ignored in the struggle for sharing the “fruits
of independence”. This neglect of the armed forces can arguably explained by TANU’s
confidence that it could keep “the army apolitical” and make it serve the civilian
government.108
The outbreak of the military mutiny in 1964 shoed that TANU’s confidence was unfounded
and shook the ruling party to its foundations. In a sense, since the mutiny lasted longer in
Tanzania than in Uganda and involved almost the entire army, TANU felt more threatened by
it than did Ugandan political authorities. As a result they decided to abolish the old army and
construct an entirely new force. The new army, established in September 1964 and named the
Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) was subordinated to the ruling party and initially
drew on the base of the TANU youth wing.109 While the number of recruited TANU youths
remained too small and it soon became necessary to recall former members of the Tanganyika
Rifles, TANU membership was required as a prerequisite to join the armed forces. Soldiers
were recruited from all tribal origins110 and different walks of life with promotions based on
performance rather than affinity. The President retained the power to make appointments from
the chief of the TPDF down to battalion commanders. Political commissars were introduced
into the army in order to ensure “a new, correctly politicised military establishment”, and
senior officers were awarded prominent party positions.111 Some 25% of training time was
reserved for political study, which stressed the history of the national struggle and the
ideology of the party. TANU and Nyerere consciously worked to create an idea of the TPDF
as a “people’s army”. In 1965 national service was introduced, eventually becoming voluntary
for primary school leavers, but obligatory for secondary leavers for two years. In order to
ensure that the politicisation and popularisation of the army would not undermine its
professionalism, a national military academy was set up and sources of training diversified.112
105
In fact, the British had introduced the first African political officer in 1955 (Iliffe 1979, 573).
Lupogo 2001.
107
Swai 1991, 94f.
108
Omari 2002, 93. When asked whether the military mutiny in Congo could be repeated in Tanganyika after
independence, Nyerere even overconfidently replied that “[t]hese things cannot happen here. We have a strong
organisation, TANU. The Congo did not have that kind of organisation. And further there is not the slightest
chance that forces of law and order in Tanganyika will mutiny” (cited after: ibid.).
109
Omari 2002, 94.
110
Zirker (1992, 112) reports that a “strict formula” of balanced ethnic recruitment and promotion was
introduced after 1964. See also Lupogo 2001.
111
Zirker 1992, 112.
112
Omari 2002, 94. Israel, Nigeria, Canada, China, India and North Korea. Israel, however, concentrated on the
National Service.
106
16
In 1968 Nyerere understood just how important the mutiny had been to state-making in the
country:
“The mutiny was a strike of the army people, and it went out of control. It shocked the
country. But every cloud has a silver lining, as the British say. It enabled us to build an
army almost from scratch. Many institutions we have inherited, but the army is
something we built ourselves."113
The complete reconstitution of the armed forces in Tanzania and the fact that they were
integrated into TANU and made subservient to political authority was crucial to the state’s
stability in years of crisis ahead. This move probably consolidated the resolve to maintain
TANU as a single party, since such political control could not be achieved over the armed
forces in a multiparty arrangement.114
IV
Ujamaa and nationalisations (1967-1981)
By the mid-1960s, the Tanzanian state started to face a credibility crisis. Annual GDP growth
rate of 6% during the early post-independence years notwithstanding, Nyerere himself
evaluated the country’s economic performance as “growth without development”, largely
insufficient to bring about the impatiently expected improvements in material welfare. 115
Control over the national economy still remained limited thereby constraining the capacity to
implement redistributive policies. Moreover, “there were manifestations of a growing divide
between the TANU leaders and the bureaucracy on the one hand and the social base of the
nationalist movement, poor peasants and workers on the other”.116 While the social profile of
post-colonial policies had been neglected, socio-economic differentiation was on the rise with
elites struggling for “status, income, and personal power”. The overall situation was further
complicated by the inability to realise sufficient foreign aid, which was mainly due to a
diplomatic fallout with Britain, the United States and West Germany.
The Arusha Declaration (1967) has to be understood as a response to these mounting
contradictions within the post-colonial state. The declaration spelled out Nyerere’s visions of
a socialist society, emphasising public ownership, self-reliance as well as the importance of
agriculture and rural development. It was followed by radical transformative policies – most
notably large-scale nationalisation and villagisation – that were (unsurprisingly) accompanied
by social tensions and incidences of minor-scale violence. In 1969, for instance, a group of
army officers and disgruntled politicians, whose property had been nationalised, launched an
unsuccessful coup attempt. 117 Also, the compulsory villagisation scheme during the 1970s
often involved a significant use of state force, most notably against the owners of cash-crop
producing land.118 Altogether, however, the Tanzanian state showed remarkable resilience and
again remained free of large-scale violent conflict. In what follows, we argue that this
enduring political stability can be explained by the ruling party’s ability to maintain and even
extend its centralised and inclusive authority in both the civilian and military sphere. Even
more importantly, the Arusha policies provided the post-colonial government with tight
control over the economy and thereby established the material basis of the “elite bargain”.
113
Lupogo 2001.
Omari 2002, 94.
115
Nyerere 1968, cited after Harnevik et al. 1988, 95
116
Harnevik 1993, 40f.
117
Lupogo 2001.
118
A few examples for this state-sponsored violence are documented in Coulson 1982, 250ff.
114
17
POLITICS
Between 1967 and 1981, TANU undertook further measures to consolidate its centralised
authority whereby it came to enjoy an even tighter grip over both the Tanzanian elite and the
broader population.
The TANU leadership code (1967) was a key measure to gain control over elites and contain
private enrichment and corruption. It required all state elites to undergo political training by
the ruling party and banned them from owning more than one real property, investing in
business and receiving a salary outside their state employment. According to Costello, the
code was not least an attempt to better incorporate civil servants into the party-state.119 As
elite cohesion had suffered from persistent competition and disagreements between party and
administration throughout the 1960s, TANU sought to make bureaucrats more dependent on
the state and ensure “compliance with party politics”. In a similar vein, the TANU Guidelines
(Mwongozo) in 1971 were supposed to impose party control by creating party branches in all
national institutions, including the proliferating parastatals. 120 Hyden claims that this was
mainly “to ensure greater control of a faction of the petty-bourgeoisie” that benefited from
their position in the parastatals and had proved disloyal to political leaders in other African
countries. Altogether, no leader “could any longer claim autonomy from the party control”
whereby the cohesion of the “elite bargain” had been improved.
Party control was also imposed at the regional and local level where elites had been able to
preserve a considerable degree of autonomy throughout the 1960s (see above). 121 In a first
step, TANU initiated a decentralisation programme (1972) that was rather a “centralisation”
in that it replaced the elected and self-reliant District Councils with centrally appointed Area
und Regional Commissioners. 122 As the District Councils had long been perceived as
instruments of local notables, their suppression allowed TANU to restrict the potential for
independent political mobilisation at the local level.123 Furthermore, the decentralisation of
the government administration anchored planning and implementation at the regional and
district levels and increased the state’s control over rural areas. At the same time, TANU
underwent a similar reorganisation. As salaried officials were strengthened at the expense of
elected ones, there was for the first time a “strong, well-paid party bureaucracy at regional,
district, divisional, and ward level”. 124 The ruling party thereby became the de facto
instrument of local government. In a second step, TANU decided to abolish the cooperative
unions in 1976. The cooperatives were typically controlled by larger farmers (kulaks) who
had a local power base, controlled a large share of the exchanges but were not fully integrated
into the ruling party.125 Similar to the elected District Councils, they therefore constituted
fairly autonomous structures that TANU found recurrently difficult to control. As a
consequence, the cooperatives were replaced by parastatal companies (“Corp Authorities”)
that were now dealing directly with the sale and purchase of the crops. Once local elites had
been severely weakened, bureaucrats and party cadres were able to develop centralised
“patronage relations” with villages. A key instrument in this regard was the regional
development funds that were introduced in 1976 and exclusively devoted to the villages.
These funds enabled bureaucrats or party cadres to better compete with local elites who had
119
Costello 1996, 124ff.
Hyden 1980, 159ff.
121
Hyden 1980, 107
122
Coulson 1982, 254
123
Hyden 1980, 134ff.
124
Coulson 1982, 254
125
Hyden 1980, 132ff.
120
18
previously controlled patronage – the party patron was strengthened at the expense of the
local patron. Altogether, the state became more directly anchored at the grassroots and
thereby extended its control over rural areas.
Having established control over virtually all parts of the polity, TANU formally entrenched its
supremacy in the Interim Constitution of 1975 that declared it the supreme organ of the
state.126 The 1977 Constitution made the Party, not the Cabinet, the main organ for advising
the President, even though the Cabinet continued to exercise a key advisory function because
of its superior technical know-how. Also, the ruling party’s machinery was further
strengthened when TANU decided to merge with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar in
1977. This saw the birth of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – or “Revolutionary Party” –
which has remained the ruling party ever since.
Beyond the consolidation of centralised authority, TANU also took great care to maintain an
inclusive elite coalition. With respect to the staffing of his Cabinet, Nyerere repeatedly made
gestures in “the direction of regional and religious balancing”.127 While the distribution of
public employment was overall fairly balanced, there was – as in the early post-independence
period – evidence for regional and religious imbalances. As public employment required
educational qualification, the North benefited more than the less educated South and the better
educated Christians outnumbered Muslims.
ECONOMY
The Arusha declaration involved the nationalisation of large parts of the Tanzanian economy
and the proliferation of parastatals in almost every sector. This increased share of the state in
the economy marked “an important turning point in the nature of rent creation by the state and
the associated rent seeking”.128 According to Coulson, the parastatal was to perform three
fundamental roles, namely (1) reducing the transfer of profits out of the country, (2)
expanding investment in productive sectors, and (3) strengthening infrastructure. 129
Altogether, the number of parastatals rose from 64 in 1967 to 380 in 1981. 130 In the
manufacturing sector, the state’s share rose from 14% in 1967 to 57% in 1982.131 Furthermore,
“extensive administrative resource allocation and price controls, import quotas and foreign
exchange rationing system were introduced”.132
The motivations underlying the Arusha policies were at least twofold. To begin with, its
socialist rhetoric of minimising inequalities and re-establishing unity in society should not
simply be discarded as done by some leftist critiques.133 In this sense, Harnevik is maybe right
126
Harnevik et al. 1988, 101.
Kelsall 2002, 608f.
128
Khan & Gray 2006, 41.
129
Coulson 1982, 274ff. Key financial parastatals included the Bank of Tanzania, the National Bank of
Commerce, the National Insurance Corporation and the State Trading Corporation, whereas manufacturing
parastatals comprised investment banks (e.g. the Tanzania Rural Development Bank), holding companies
(mainly the National Development Corporation) as well as parastatals directly involved in production. Key
infrastructure parastatals, finally, involved railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications.
130
Harnevik 1993, 50. When compared with other African countries, this number highlights the exceptional
degree of state involvement achieved in Tanzania. By the 1980s, only Mozambique had a larger number of
parastatals with over 1000. Senegal had 188, Ethiopia 180, Ghana 130, Guinea 181, and the majority including
Kenya, Uganda and Zambia had fewer than 100 (Temu & Due 2000, 693).
131
Klugman et al. 1999, 84.
132
Khan & Gray 2006, 41.
133
E.g. Shivji 1976 who tends to reduce the goal of the declaration to providing the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”
with an economic basis.
127
19
to argue that the “primary aim was to change the direction of societal development so that the
TANU leadership, the bureaucrats and the social base of the nationalist movement would
grow closer together”. 134 From this perspective, the goal was to achieve rapid economic
growth “without the unequalising pressures of capitalist development” that would have
mainly benefited Asian and European business interests as well as the small class of African
capitalist farmers.135 Nonetheless, and this is equally important, the extremely high degree of
state intervention in the economy was also motivated by the perceived need to create a
material base for Tanzania’s “inclusive elite bargain”. The expanded parastatal sector brought
an end to the predominance of European and Asian interests and created – together with the
steadily increasing employment in government and party organs – a huge reservoir of wellpaid employment that made it relatively easy to satisfy the country’s educated elite and
accommodate ethnic, regional and religious cleavages. These far-reaching rent-sharing
policies created a high degree of elite unity and thereby contributed to political stability.
The agricultural sector, the backbone of Nyerere’s Tanzanian socialism, was subject to
particularly transformative forms of state intervention. The government launched the concept
of ujamma (literally: familyhood), aiming at the “creation of communal village production
units”.136 This policy was explicitly directed against the large farmers and sought so achieve a
more equitable distribution of wealth – a goal that had not been achieved in the early postindependence period (see above). From 1970/71, TANU started to assume an active role in
village creation, which involved explicit campaigns against capitalist farming. As the number
of villages grew from 1956 in 1970 to 5631 in 1973 (sheltering around 2 million people),
European capitalist farmers (notably in Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions) began to leave the
country and most of capitalist farming came to an end. While half of the sisal plantations were
nationalised, the coffee estates in Kilimanjaro as the last capitalist enterprises were handed
over to local cooperatives in 1974. Between 1973 and 1976, the government intensified its
efforts to contain the emerging African capitalism. The compulsory villagisation policy was
the “largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa” with about five millions rural
Tanzanians being resettled. 137 By 1977, there were 7684 villages involving a total of 13
million people.138 This radical resettlement effort, which involved an element of land reform,
combined with the subsequent dissolution of the cooperative unions in 1976 (see above) were
decisive measures to promote a more equitable distribution of public goods while increasing
state control over economic activity. Their combined effect further undermined the power of
the richer peasants.
While the political impact of these policies remains difficult to evaluate, there is reason to
argue that the established agricultural order was rather conducive to political stability. First,
large-scale villagisation combined with the introduction of state marketing structures provided
the ruling coalition with tight control over the agricultural surplus – the main source of wealth
in the country – and thereby represented a cornerstone of its hegemony. The transfer of
financial surplus from the peasantry to the state was considerable throughout the 1970s
amounting to an estimated average tax of 26.6% on peasant crop income. 139 Second, the
villages were created in all parts of the country whereby all regions and ethnic groups
benefited from access to state resources. Also, and in contradiction with the anti-elite bias of
agricultural policies, there is evidence that local elites typically benefited disproportionately
134
Harnevik 1993, 43.
Khan & Gray 2006, 41
136
Hyden 1980, 96ff.
137
Hyden 1980, 129ff.
138
Coulson 1982, 242.
139
Ellis 1983, cited after Harnevik 1993, 48.
135
20
from villagisation policies140 whereby they had little incentive to mobilise opposition. Third,
although regional inequities continued to be obvious or maybe even increased141, they were
“compensated” as a result of a deliberate policy to extend the social infrastructure primarily to
the more backward parts of the country”. 142 These service delivery programmes were an
integral part of ujamma policies, the argument being that people had to live in villages in
order for the government to reach them. Progress in providing basic education and health
services was immense and improved the social status of the broader population – a situation
that secured the government “wide-based political support”. 143 TANU “established very
successful universal primary education and adult education programmes and opened health
centres throughout the country rather than large hospitals accessible only by a few. During
1971-74, education was the single largest item (16 per cent) in total government spending. As
a result, literacy increased from 10 per cent in 1960 to 30 per cent in 1970 and 70 per cent by
the end of the 1970s. Life expectancy rose and child mortality fell substantially.”144
Some people have even argued that relocations through villagisation “may have weakened
tribal connections“thereby exercising a positive impact on national integration.145 While this
seems plausible at first sight, empirical evidence does not support such argument. While
millions of Tanzanians were relocated (see above), the newly created villages were on
average no more than 5km away from the original dwellings thereby minimising the potential
for ethnic blending.146 Also, Hyden reports that in some instances even “fighting broke out
between members of the Nyaturu and the Barabaig tribes over land rights that were upset in
conjunction with the enforced movement of people into villages”.147
SECURITY
A series of events in the late 1960s and early 1970s strengthened TANU’s resolve to further
incorporate the army into the ruling party. First, the failed coup plot of 1969 (see above)
illustrated that the military still represented a reasonable threat to civilian rule. Also, the
Portuguese invasion of Guinea in 1971 showed just how vulnerable African states could be to
outside interference.148 Even more importantly, the fall of Milton Obote’s government to Idi
Amin’s coup d’etat in Uganda, sent warning signals throughout the TANU leadership. Finally,
on Zanzibar, Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume was assassinated in 1972 and some thought it was
at the hands of military officers.
As a consequence, the 1971 Party Guidelines also redefined the relationship between the
ruling party and the armed forces. While all soldiers had been required to join TANU from
1964 (see above), it was not until after 1971 that a party structure was introduced into the
army.149 This party structure in the military – operated from 1971 and approved by the TANU
National Executive Committee (NEC) in 1978 – was modelled after the overall structure of
140
Coulson 1982, 246.
There is some evidence for widening differences in per-capita income between regions. The cash income of
smallholders in the rich regions (Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Arusha) hardly fell between 1969 and 1975, but middleincome regions (Kigoma, Mtwara, Lindi, Mwanza, Ruvuma, Coast, and Dodoma) lost nearly 20 per cent of their
cash income, while the poor regions lost nearly half (Coulson 1982, 197).
142
Hyden 1980, 122.
143
Klugman et al. 1999, 85.
144
Klugman et al. 1999, 85.
145
Klugman et al. 1999, 80.
146
Martin 1988, 111.
147
Hyden 1980, 151.
148
Omari 2002, 96ff.
149
Swai 1991, 100f.; Omari 2002, 100ff.
141
21
the ruling party and introduced a “kind of democratic centralism” in the army”. While the
army party hierarchy remained subordinate to the national party organ (that is, the NEC), it
nonetheless gave the military an opportunity to participate in the formulation of Party Policy.
This had considerable politicisation and identification effects and ultimately eased civilmilitary relations.
Beyond this “bureaucratisation of the military”, measures were taken to further the integration
of the army into the civil service.150 From 1971, military personnel were increasingly co-opted
into civilian sphere (as managers, directors and to party and government posts). Moreover,
civil servants and military officers were allowed to run for political office in 1972 without
having to give up their jobs. In case of election, they were granted an unpaid leave and could
return to their original position upon completion of their service. This progressive
“militarization of the bureaucracy” gained pace throughout the 1970s and especially the 1980s
(see below).
The increasing integration between the ruling party and the army was from the early 1970s
complemented by the creation and training of a militia, drawing on traditions of village selfdefence. The recruitment of the militia was done by the Party (but recruits were not limited to
TANU members only), while the army carried out the training. 151 Upon complete of the
training recruits became part of a “reserve army” whose command was directly under the
Party rather than the military. This “militarization of society” did not only build confidence
between the broader population and the army (that had been perceived as an alien and
oppressive force since colonial rule) but also provided TANU with a counterbalance to the
TPDF, which no longer monopolised the use of force.
The war with Uganda at the end of the 1970s had an ambiguous impact on civil-military
relations. On the one hand, it demonstrated Tanzania’s achievements in building state
resilience over the past twenty years. As Uganda’s armed forces (under Amin) invaded
Tanzania’s Kagera Region in northwest in November 1978, the Nyerere government
immediately mobilised for a counter-attack calling on and apparently receiving popular
support to fight the Amin dictatorship. 152 According to Lupogo, in just a few weeks, the
armed forces were expanded from 40,000 to 100,000 fighters, by drawing on the police,
prison services and militias. The speed and potency of the response was unprecedented and
led to a sweeping victory by April 1979. On the other hand, however, the size of the campaign
and the impact it had on the armed forces generated new problems. As Tanzanian forces
returned victorious there were no immediate efforts to downsize the army, which had grown
enormously due to the war effort. The military was virtually given a free reign to establish
these units at home with little regard to the costs this would incur on the state budget or the
economy, particularly given the context of economic crisis in the country. Militias, expanded
for the war effort, got involved with robbery and other criminal activities. 153 As a
consequence, TANU had to devise further measures to ensure the subordination of the
military throughout the 1980s (see below).
V
Economic crisis and liberalisation (1981-1991)
150
Omari 2002, 101ff.
Swai 1991, 96
152
Lupogo 2001.
153
Shivji 1990, p.144. To be added to the bibliography.
151
22
In the early 1980s, Tanzania was hit by economic crisis that was dramatic even by African
standards.154 It is now widely agreed that the downturn was the result of both internal and
external factors, including currency overvaluation, low producer prices, parastatal
mismanagement, declining terms of trade, the oil crises of 1974 and 1978, the droughts of the
mid-1970s, the break-up of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 and the war with
Uganda between 1977 and 1979. As a result of these factors, GDP per capita declined by an
average of 1.67% between 1980 and 1986 (thereby falling to a level even lower than in
1966), 155 while inflation reached around 30% throughout the 1980s. The budget deficit
deteriorated considerably, averaging 10.09% between 1980 and 1986. All critical export crops,
except coffee and tea, suffered from disastrous decreases.156 The ensuing acute balance-ofpayments crisis resulted in a growing debt crisis (the estimated debt service ration climbing to
staggering 66% by the mid 1980s) and extreme scarcities of foreign exchange. As funds for
the funds for the importation of capital goods, spare parts, and raw materials became scarce,
industrial production plummeted by 11.3% between 1980 and 1985 (industrial capacity use of
about 20%). Also, the availability of consumer goods and the provision of social services and
infrastructure were very negatively affected. Economic stagnation saw the expansion of an
“informal economy”, which came to be of far greater dimensions than the formal economy.157
This “worst of all worlds”158 was of course not free of political and socio-economic tensions.
From 1983, for instance, the country witnessed an increasing degree of state repression
against alleged “economic saboteurs”. In 1986, thousands of workers demonstrated because
they had not been paid. Instead of paying the workers, the management called in the Field
Force unit – a paramilitary force that opened fire on the unarmed worked, killing four and
injuring many others. 159 Also, there was once more a failed coup d’Etat in 1982-83 that
involved about 20 army officers and a few civilians, largely organised by Tanzanians living
abroad.160 These incidences notwithstanding, the country once again avoided extremer forms
of large-scale violent conflict. This political stability against the odds can be explained by
CCM’s ability to reconfigure itself in times of crisis without endangering its integrity, while
preserving both the material basis of the elite bargain and control over the armed forces.
POLITICS
Since independence, the ruling party had managed to achieve a fairly high degree of
legitimacy through its nationalist rhetoric, the improvement of social services and the profile
of Nyerere as a credible and committed leader. Against the backdrop of dramatic economic
downturn in the early 1980s, however, CCM started to face a severe crisis of political
legitimacy.161 Unable to provide rapid solutions to economic turmoil and decline, the ruling
party’s ability to fulfil the promises of the Arusha Declaration was brought into question – a
situation that weakened its mobilisation capacity. Mounting unemployment, especially among
urban youth, and a lack of opportunities for income generation constituted an increasing threat
154
The following account of economic crisis is based on Lofchie 1993, 418ff. and Klugman et al. 1999, 87.
Despite a relative recovery from 1987, Tanzania’s GDP per capita in 1999 was “the second lowest in the
world, exceeding only Mozambique, which had been devastated by more than two decades of civil war”
(Lofchie 1993, 418).
156
During the period 1980-84, cotton production fell to 65% of its 1970-72 peak; sisal production – Tanzania’s
key export in the 1960s – to 28% of its 1964-1966 peak, and cashew production – Tanzania’s key export in the
1970s to 30% of its 1972-74 peak (Lofchie 1993: 419).
157
On Tanzania’s informal economy cf. Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1990.
158
Lofchie 1993, 421
159
Campbell 1992, 100
160
Swai 1991, 113f.
161
Baregu 1994, 165ff.
155
23
of political unrest. Economic crisis was therefore not merely an economic problem but also
began to undermine CCM’s political achievements.
CCM’s response to waning political legitimacy was threefold. First, the ruling party adopted a
repressive stance that continued the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the late 1970s.162
While the Economic Sabotage Act (1983) was officially presented as a mere economic action
to combat hoarding, overpricing and others kinds of economic sabotage, Maliyamkono &
Bagacliwa (1990) argue that it was not least “prompted by the perceived need to counter a
threat to state legitimacy”. 163 Under this Act, special tribunals allowed neither for legal
representation nor for bail, all rules of evidence were set aside and police was granted
extensive powers of investigation, search and detention. Moreover, the concomitant Human
Resources Deployment Act (1983) gave the government considerable leeway in addressing
the problem of urban unemployment, e.g. by means of forced relocations. On the one hand,
these acts created the popular impression that not only government but also private actors
were responsible for economic havoc, which may have helped to contain unrest. On the other
hand, they also further undermined the government’s political legitimacy, especially when it
became obvious that the state would not use the acts against higher state elites (see below).
Second, CCM soon engaged in a (albeit limited and controlled) reduction of centralised
authority that it had so carefully built throughout the 1960s and 1970s.164 In 1982, party and
government were separated at the regional and district level, which gave rise to greater
autonomy and influence for local commercial elites. The latter also benefited from the
reintroduction of the cooperative unions that replaced state crop authorities during the same
year.165 However, the cooperative movement was as autonomous as in the 1960s since CCM
took great care to control its organisation at the top. As primary societies were re-registered
and started to operate from 1984, it soon became clear that their organisational structure
extending over several villages – which was economically desirable – constituted a threat to
the Party-dominated village political structure. This clash between economic and political
objectives was resolved by a Party directive in 1987 that limited primary societies to one
village only. This move underlines CCM’s continuing preoccupation with political control at
the expense of economic efficiency.
Third, and clearly most importantly, the ruling coalition proved mature enough to reconfigure
itself in times of crisis without endangering its integrity. Significantly, economic crisis gave
rise to a power shift both within CCM and among the central organs of the state. Throughout
the 1980s, a sharp division developed within Tanzania’s political leadership between those in
favour of economic reform (the “pragmatists”) and those who remained committed to the old
statist system (the “socialists”).166 This division conformed roughly to the division between
the state administration on the one hand, and CCM on the other (even though pragmatists and
socialists were found in both the administration and CCM). As CCM remained the supreme
organ of government, the pragmatists faced the challenge of dislodging the party’s most
prominent socialists from important ministerial positions, while avoiding a destabilising
rupture between the party and the state. According to Costello, when economic crisis
undermined the capacity and legitimacy of the party, bureaucrats – who had never fully been
incorporated into the party (see above) and were now bolstered by their privileged ties to
foreign actors (especially the IMF) – “became an increasingly coherent and dominant force
162
Harnevik 1993, 58
Maliyamkono & Bagacliwa 1990, cited after Costello 1996, 138
164
Harnevik 1993, 61
165
Harnevik et al. 1988, 61ff.
166
Lofchie 1993, 452f.
163
24
within the state”.167 The rising influence of the pragmatists was behind Nyerere’s resignation
as President in 1985 who now dedicated his attention – as chair of the CCM – to
reconstructing the link between the party and the people.168 Ali Hassan Mwinyi's ascension as
the new President brought to power a “career bureaucrat, whose power was based less in the
party than in the government”.169 Mwinyi consistently sought to strengthen the government at
the expense of the ruling party, particularly with respect to policy making. 170 While the
socialist faction no longer controlled the key organs of government within which economic
policies were formulated, CCM nonetheless continued to maintain a “high political profile”
(e.g. in Parliament), which caused uneasy coexistence of a reformist government and a
socialist party.171 This situation was resolved in August 1990 when Mwinyi became chairman
of the CCM as well as President. Leading government and party positions were again
reconciled, but now under the control of the reform-oriented pragmatic faction.172
Altogether, CCM managed to maintain a high degree of centralised authority during economic
crisis, albeit under new leadership and with increased leeway for the state bureaucracy.
Moreover, there is no evidence that economic crisis put an end to the inclusive character of
ruling party. While ethnic and regional favouritism continued to be avoided, President
Mwinyi was “widely perceived to have gone some way to redressing religious imbalance by
promoting Muslims in his government”.173
ECONOMY
The dramatic economic crisis of the 1980s represented an imminent threat to the material base
of Tanzania’s elite bargain. As the crisis-ridden economy generated a sharply declining
supply of rents to bind together and reproduce the ruling political coalition, there was a
clearly perceived need for economic adjustment and reform – not least since even middle and
upper class civil servants were seriously affected by dwindling purchasing power and the
extreme unavailability of even the most basic consumer goods. 174 However, as Stein as
convincingly argued, the debate during ensuing process of economic adjustment was about
changes in policy rather than in elite power and did therefore “not challenge the existing
hegemony of the state”. 175 Instead, Tanzania’s “inclusive elite bargain” remained largely
intact, not least at the expenses of the living standards of the bulk of the population.176
167
Costello 1996, 123
By resigning from the presidency but remaining at the helm of the CCM, Nyerere was able to keep up a
critical stance towards the IMF, which helped to preserve the legitimacy of the CCM and ultimately the political
alliance in control of the state (Stein 1990, 20). To be added to the bibliography.
169
Costello 1996, 138ff.
170
In 1988, for instance, “Mwinyi issued a circular stating that bureaucrats who wished to earn a second income
during their own time could do so, as long as they gave the state the forty hours a week for which they were paid.
In one step, this abrogated the Leadership Code; only in 1990 did the party open this issue for discussion. The
president had presented the CCM with a fait accompli, the Leadership Code was passé, no matter what the party
said. The government's initiation of this change demonstrates the power to define policy was shifting from party
to government” (Costello 1996, 140, original emphasis).
171
Lofchie 1993, 454
172
Costello 1996, 145
173
Kelsall 2002, 610
174
Lofchie 1993, 447
175
Stein 1992, 59f.
176
This closely mirrors patterns of structural adjustment across the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa as described by
Nicholas van de Walle (2001).
168
25
Economic reform in Tanzania was characterised by difficult negotiations with the IMF and
the World Bank. 177 While the initial IMF adjustment package (1981) was – under the
vehement leadership of Nyerere – rejected as incompatible with the Tanzanian development
strategy, the period between 1981 and 1986 was nonetheless used to prepare for and “own” an
accommodation with the international financial institutions, both in political and economic
terms. In late 1981, the government first launched the National Economic Survival Program
(NESP) – a soon abandoned “home grown” reform effort that suffered from unrealistic
(export) targets and failed to mobilise internal resources. The 1982 Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) combined attempts to preserve the parastatal sector and the social profile
with the cautious introduction of liberal reform elements (increased producer prices,
reductions in consumer subsidies and a limited devaluation) – an approach that did not find
the approval of international donors. In the same year, the National Agriculture Policy (NAP)
opened the way for elements of private ownership of land and advocated the liberalisation of
various aspects of agricultural marketing, while still supporting producer subsidies and the use
of existing state-controlled marketing boards. The real liberal shift came however with the
1984/85 budget that foresaw, among others, a significant raise in producer prices, a large
currency devaluation, the removal of subsidies on maize meal and fertilisers and the
introduction of a “own funded import scheme” where no questions were asked about the
source of foreign exchange. In the light of these previous policies, Tanzania finally reached an
agreement with the IMF in August 1986 and was able to present the accord as a logical
extension of its own efforts. Major policies announced in the Economic Recovery Programme
(ERP) included a series of further devaluations; an increase of producer prices by 5% per year,
the further liberalisation of external and internal trade by tightening budget expenditure and
money supply; and improvements in parastatal efficiency and foreign exchange allocation.
Upon expiry of the ERP, a second phase of structural adjustment was initiated covering the
period from 1989-1989. The “Economic and Social Action Programme” (ESAP) mainly
sought to build on previous trade liberalisation targeting the liberalisation of foreign
investment, the financial sector, and agricultural marketing.
Economic adjustment was accompanied by deteriorating living standards for the bulk of the
population. Due to persistently high levels of inflation during the 1980s (see above), real
urban wages declined by 63% between 1981 and 1989, while the removal of maize subsidies
(the urban staple food) caused further hardship.178 The rural population seems to have fared
slightly better at first sight since real producer prices increased by an average of 24% between
1980/81 and 1987/88. If one excludes cashew nuts and robusta coffee (which have outlier
status), however, price increases are reduced to a negligible 3,9%. In some cases, devaluationinduced-inflation and rising input costs even by far outweighed the nominal increases in
producer prices. 179 Furthermore, the state clearly used the devaluations to extract a larger
percentage of the values of the crops. Between, 1986-1983, for example, the peasants’ share
of the value of major export crops dropped from around 80% to 50%.180 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the adjustment process involved grossly deteriorating social services,
especially for the poor. While the share of education in total government spending declined
from 12.55% to 6.45% between 1980 and 1987, the share of health fell from 5.61% to 3.66%
over the same period (see table XXX). As school fees were introduced in 1984, the literacy
rate dropped by 7% among the poor but increased among the better-off between 1983 and
177
The following account of the adjustment process is based on Stein 1992, 65ff. and Harnevik 1993, 287ff.
Stein 1992, 65ff.
179
While the average producer price for cotton increased by 70% between 1985 and 1989, the average prices of
agrochemicals for cotton went up by 475% during the same period. This amounted to real price decrease of
14.6% (Harnevik 1993, 298).
180
Harnevik 1993, 298
178
26
1991.181 Meanwhile, 6% of the better-off had access to secondary school, whereas only 1% of
the poor had this privilege. By the early 1990s, only in two of the 20 regions (Arusha and
Kilimanjaro), did more than 10% of the population above school age have secondary or
higher education. Altogether, “the government’s objective of eliminating regional biases had
become severely constrained by the 1980s”.182
While CCM leadership was asking ordinary people to tighten their belts (with slogans like
hali halisi – life is hard), the higher levels of the ruling elite maintained its conspicuous
consumption patterns. 183 In the 1980s, budget allocations to the public service increased
almost steadily– despite the dramatic economic crisis and a concomitant decrease in the
expenditures for education and health (see table XXX).
Table XXX: Selected government expenditure by purpose (%)184
Public service
Education
Health
1980/81
10.47
12.55
5.61
1981/82
17.95
12.47
5.38
1982/83
17.09
13.09
5.29
1983/84
22.02
11.85
5.46
1984/85
29.93
7.29
4.98
1985/86
26.21
7.61
4.37
1986/87
25.50
6.45
3.66
Structural reform in public administration and the parastatal sector – the bastions of
Tanzania’s elite bargain – remained minimal throughout the 1980s. After a commitment to
reduce the size of the government, the number of cabinet ministers was reduced from 40 to 30
in 1985 but then crept back to 38 by 1990.185 Civil service reforms started as early as 1982 but
did not lead to noticeable results until the mid-1990s. In fact, total government employment
under Mwinyi continued to grow until 1992, when it reached a peak of 355,000 employees.186
Furthermore, the parastatal sector remained largely untouched. In 1988, Tanzania still had 413
public enterprises, of which 339 were commercial, and 56 non-commercial (e.g. higher
learning institutions), plus several holding companies.187 Thus, even after committing to the
liberalization in 1985, the parastatal sector continued to grow and direct subsidies to
parastatals increased to 11% of total government expenditure during the late 1980s.188
This is not to deny that elites were also adversely affected by economic crisis. The purchasing
power of the civil service, for instance, declined by 94% in real terms between 1969 and
1985.189 Yet, various forms of corruption that became rampant from the early 1980s opened
new ways for elite accumulation. As the formal economy declined, civil servants started to
make use of their control over a wide array of licences, taxes, subsidies, quotas, and rationing
181
Klugman et al. 1999, 91
Ibid.
183
Campbell 1992, 97
184
Campbell 1992, 92f.
185
Kiondo 1992, 32f.
186
Kjaer 2004: 399 ff.
187
Temu & Due 2000, 693.
188
Khan & Gray 2006: 64.
189
Stevens 1994, cited after van de Walle 2001, 155.
182
27
mechanisms to derive extra income. 190 Significantly, the highly partial economic reform
adopted since 1985 (see above) has by no means contained these illicit economic activities,
which appear to have continued to grow. It was especially after Tanzania embarked on the
process of partial market liberalisation in the mid-1980s that “the one-party state began to
resemble a racket for the protection of corrupt and acquisitive public officials”.191 Tellingly,
these forms of economic sabotage by middle- and higher level elites were hardly targeted by
the above-mentioned Anti-Economic Sabotage Act (1983). 192 As a result of epidemic of
corruption, land grabbing, and lawlessness, Mwinyi's rule is often “remembered as a period of
ruksa, a Swahili word perhaps best translated as ‘do your own thing”.193
SECURITY
At the beginning of the 1980s, CCM felt an urgent need to further subordinate the military
under civilian control. The war with Uganda left the country with the potentially dangerous
legacy of an oversized and increasingly confident army that became difficult to control. The
failed coup attempt of 1982/83 was a timely warning signal in the respect. Moreover, the
serious economic downturn increased the overall vulnerability of the ruling coalition and
made the military back-up all the more necessary.
In 1981, the Mwongozo wa CCM for the first time granted the military formal representation
at the ruling party’s sittings.194 This meant that the armed forces were turned into a “Party
Region” with “districts” and therefore got the right to elect their own representatives to the
National Conference. The military representation was equivalent to three districts – a nonnegligible representation if one considers that the entire Party had no more than 113 in the
country. The “military region” is chaired by the chief of the defence forces who by virtue of
that position becomes a member of the NEC and the National Conference.
Furthermore, military personnel were increasingly co-opted into political leadership positions.
From 1982, five seats of the CCM NEC were set aside to be contested exclusively by the
army.195 Cabinet posts were also open to army officers either through election to parliament or
direct presidential appointment.196 In 1982, more that 30% of all regional party secretaries
were military personnel, while 15% of the district party secretaries and commissioners were
army officers.197 Five years later, 15% of the central committee were senior officers, whereas
24% of the regional party secretaries and 2% of the NEC were former soldiers. By 1992, “the
Tanzanian administration looked like a civilian-military coalition”.198 “By 1992 the Tanzanian
administration looked like a civilian-military coalition.” As a consequence, “the armed forces
did not feel left out of the action (…). They could therefore not point accusing fingers at other
political leaders because they were in it together. The military was part of the government and
the party hierarchy. It could almost be maintained that they did not need a coup d’état.”199
190
Tripp 1997, cited after van de Walle 2001, 154.
Kelsall 2003, 56
192
Stein 1992, 65ff.; Harnevik 1993, 58. Instead, the Act targeted mainly „small fry“ as 92% of the arrested were
private businessmen and the rest low-level officials.
193
Hyden 1999, 143.
194
Swai 1991, 100ff.
195
Swai 1991, 101
196
Swai (1991, 101) reports that Members of Parliament with military background increased from 4 between
1975-1980 to 22 between 1982-1987.
197
Omari 2002, 101
198
Omari 2002, 101
199
Lupogo 2001.
191
28
The critical importance accorded to the military was also reflected in the rising military
budgets, which – according to Zirker – “appear to represent a systematic strategy of
cooptation”.200 Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of the national budget allocated to the
military increased from 4% to 14%, while the budget share for education decreased from 14%
to 4% during the same period.201
Beyond the co-optation of the armed forces, CCM also managed to contain the Sungu Sungu
movement that developed in the most populous regions of the country (Mwanza, Shinyanga
and Tabora) “as a popular peasant army reacting to the cattle rustling and illegal smuggling of
gold and ivory from the rural areas”.202 As the state failed to deliver security to ordinary
citizens, especially in the countryside, the movement started to dispense justice itself through
popular democratic village assemblies – a form of self-organisation that bypassed the courts,
the police and the party structures. Faced with this “institutional multiplicity”, the government
initially “deployed the security organs to infiltrate the movement, but in the face of its
mammoth growth to over 5 million citizens, the party retreated behind the populist traditions
of the past and declared the Sungu Sungu to be the real rural people’s militia”.203 As the
Sungu Sungu were integrated into the village security structure, CCM had successfully coopted this “tremendous burst of popular energy”.204
VI
Transition to multiparty competition (1992-present)
In the early 1990s, Tanzania embarked upon a process of political liberalisation. The latter
involved far-reaching changes in political organisation including (1) the separation of CCM
from the government; (2) the introduction of a multiparty system; (3) the de-linking of the
trade unions and cooperatives from the ruling party; (4) and the granting of both freedom of
press and freedom of association.205 Political liberalisation has also raised fundamental issues
about the relation of the security forces to the civilian state.
Expectedly, the dismantling of the deeply entrenched one-party state was not free of tensions.
On the Tanzania mainland, the unregistered Democratic Party has launched political
propaganda and even attacks on Asian traders who often still “dominate profitable economic
activities”.206 But the by far the most serious source of instability and violent conflict arises
from the always imperfect union between the mainland and Zanzibar where politics has been
increasingly conducted through an idiom of religion. Yet on the whole and once again, the
country managed to maintain a remarkable degree of political stability. This enduring stability
can be explained by CCM’s ability to retain its overwhelming dominance of the political
system. While there is some evidence for reviving ethnic and regional loyalties and changing
patterns of rent deployment, the ruling party still exerts an “immense gravitational pull”207
and maintains centralised control over patronage.
200
Zirker 1992, 114
Zirker 1992, 117
202
Campbell 1992, 101f. Cf. also Heald 2006.
203
Campbell 1992, 101f.
204
Campbell (1992, 102) claims that CCM’s success became evident “in the way the party called on this
traditional army to form the guard of honour for leaders of the state at the Peasants Day in Shinyanga in July
1987”. Chris Peter (interview), by contrast, argues that CCM has tried to institutionalise the Sungu Sungu but
has so far been unable to effectively get rid of this rivalling security system.
205
Tripp 2000, 197
206
Klugman et al. 1999, 96.
207
Kelsall 2003, 62
201
29
POLITICS
Political liberalisation was not driven by a strong popular movement but can better be
described as “top-down democratisation”.208 According to Aili Tripp, democratisation from
above was deemed inevitable for at least three reasons.209 First, the “democratizing winds
sweeping Africa” generally made political reforms hard to avoid. By “jump-starting political
liberalisation”, leaders sought to manage and control the reform process without endangering
their own political power. Second, CCM did not want to compromise its relations with foreign
donors who made continued support conditional on steps towards democratisation. Third, the
ruling party hoped to be able to strengthen its links with the people that had been weakened
throughout the 1980s (see above). A controlled process of political liberalisation was
perceived as a suitable means to “enhance the CCM’s credibility” over the opposition.
In line with these initial calculations, CCM has indeed so far been able to assert its political
hegemony in the era of multiparty politics. In the 1995 elections, the first multiparty elections
in 35 years, CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa was elected President winning 61.8% of the
vote.210 CCM also won a large parliamentary majority with 186 seats equalling about 80% of
the vote. The political opposition was divided into several parties, only four of whom
managed to win parliamentary seats. The strongest opposition party was the Civic United
Front (CUF) that won 24 seats, mainly because of its strength in Zanzibar where it won close
to 50% of the vote. The second largest opposition party was the National Convention for
Constitutional Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), which won 16 seats. The Party for Democracy and
Progress (CHADEMA) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) each won three opposition
seats. CCM’s considerable margin of victory was even increased in subsequent elections, not
least since many of those who initially left the ruling party to set up opposition parties have
returned in the meantime. In 2000, Mkapa was comfortably reelected President, this time
winning 71.7% of the vote. In Parliament, CCM won a total of 206 seats, while the 25
opposition seats were divided between the CUF (16 seats), the CHADEMA (4 seats), the
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) (3 seats) and the UDP (2 seats).211 In 2005, finally, the new
CCM candidate and current President Jakaya Kikwete was elected with 80.3% of the vote.
The elections for the Bunge (Parliament) again resulted in a one-sided victory for CCM that
now secured 206 out of the 232 parliamentary seats. The opposition seats were divided
between the CUF (19 seats), the CHADEMA (5 seats) as well as the TLP and UDP (1 seat
each). In sum, “CCM’s stranglehold on the political system has not been significantly
weakened by multi-party politics” whereby Tanzania’s one-party state has been transformed
into a “dominant party system”.212
CCM’s overwhelming electoral dominance may seem puzzling, given the substantial loss of
credibility that the ruling party had suffered throughout the 1980s. Yet, the ruling party’s
enduring hegemony can be explained by a number of different factors.213 To begin with, as
associational life in Tanzania has been crippled since independence and continues to be
controlled by CCM in the post-1992 period (see below), the opposition parties have clearly
suffered from the “absence of ready-made social bases” on which they could have built.
Moreover, opposition parties have been unable to build a national presence, not least due to
208
Hyden 1999, 154. This democratisation from above challenges the pattern identified by Bratton & van de
Walle (1997) who argue that democratic transitions in Africa tend to originate in society rather than among elites
(cited after ibid.).
209
Tripp 2000, 197f.
210
The following account of recent electoral developments is based on EIU 2007, 6ff.
211
Note that the NCCR-Mageuzi lost all of its 16 seats in the 2000 elections.
212
Kelsall 2003, 58.
213
Kelsall 2003, 59ff.
30
the country’s highly fragmented ethnic structure. In this context, CCM has found it relatively
easy “stigmatise fledgling opposition parties with strong local bases as tribalist, thereby
impeding their expansion into other areas”. 214 Finally, and arguably most importantly, the
CCM is not competing in elections on a level playing field as it still enjoys massive
advantages in terms of party funding and controls access to key campaigning resources (e.g.
stadiums). In the end, CCM’s enduring dominance has largely been driven by the party’s
entrenchment within the state and its tight command over patronage. 215 In the words of one
Tanzanian scholar, “(e)ventually one needs to go to the government to get a contract”.216
While multi-party democracy has not really taken root, there is also evidence that CCM has
equally managed to maintain a tight grip on other elements of the political liberalisation
process. According to Tripp, the government does not display any serious commitment “to
adopt any measures beyond continuing to hold multiparty elections”. 217 Whereas the
executive continues to dominate the judiciary and legislature thereby constraining political
accountability, the ruling party and the state bureaucracy remain de facto closely intertwined.
Furthermore, CCM has so far mostly been able to control the growing associational life in the
country.218 While the number of registered NGOs has increased exponentially from 224 in
1993 to 8.360 in mid-1997 (women’s organisations having particular weight), the
organisations often lack autonomy from the government and the dominant party. The mass
organisations that had previously been tied to CCM experienced particular difficulties in
emancipating themselves. The Organisation of Tanzanian Trade Unions (OTTU), for instance,
was formed in 1991 to replace the party-controlled trade union but still remained under the
tight control of the CCM-led government. Moreover, its leadership has been able to “insinuate
itself” into the competing Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFTU), which therefore
also “remains only semiautonomous from the CCM”. 219 The case of the cooperative
movement is only different at first sight. Even though it was de-linked from CCM through the
Cooperatives Act of 1991, it is weak when compared with the pre-independence momentum
and remains subject to increasing government re-regulation (see below). Many other of the
“new generation organizations” are officially independent of the party and government, but
also face “enormous pressures for cooptation”, e.g. by means of deregistration or stateinitiated umbrella organisations.
Altogether, CCM has clearly managed to maintain a high degree of centralised authority even
in times of “political liberalisation”. The ruling party “is more a state party rather than a
political party” – a “ruling machine designed to maintain a grip on power (…)”.220 At the
same time, it has largely preserved its inclusive character and remains “broadly reflective of
the country at large and manifests many of the same cleavages. The leadership is divided in its
religious, regional, generational and ethnic identifications, and in its ideological
persuasions”.221
214
According to Kelsall (2003, 60), this “happened to NCCR, which the CCM identified as a Chagga party, and
the UDP, which was accused of being a vehicle for Sukuma interests”.
215
Superior access to state resources has made it easy for CCM to undermine opposition parties. As one
informant argued, the “CCM is used to big victories. During the first five years [of the multiparty period] the
government and CCM spent effort and resources to undermine small parties. They used the government to create
disharmony in small parties” (Chris Peter, interview).
216
Muya, interview. Cf. also Hyden 1999, 144.
217
Tripp 2000, 198.
218
Tipp 2000, 199ff.
219
For details cf. Tripp 2000, 202
220
Baregu 2002, 71.
221
Kelsall 2003: 61 f.
31
Despite the maintenance of a centralised and inclusive ruling coalition, some observers have
expressed concern that the introduction of multiparty politics “has revived ethnic and regional
loyalties and heightened tensions around class, religious and other factional differences
(…)”. 222 And there are indeed some (albeit still minority) instances that point into this
direction. Even though the constitutional amendment that legalised the multiparty system in
1992 prohibits political parties from tribal, religious and racial biases in order to protect
national unity, several opposition parties have de facto organised along ethnic, regional or
racial lines. As mentioned above, the NCCR-Mageuzi had their stronghold in the Kilimanjaro
region, while the bulk of UDF’s followers were Sukuma. Also, while in the past TANU and
later the CCM often ran its leading candidates in areas different from the regions of their
ethnic origins,223 there is now a distinct trend for candidates to stand in their local areas.
Religion has also become the basis of an appeal for votes,224 while one campaigner (Mtikila)
beat up masses with the overtly racist slogan “Throw all Indians into the Oceans”. 225
Especially worrying is a new trend that puts into question the strong notion of political
citizenship that Nyerere had earlier fought for. Kaya argued that “currently, there are people
arguing for uzawa (black indigenisation) in the economy.”226 CCM officials in the state have
at times used citizenship to exclude potential potent political opponents.227 Last but not least,
CCM is affected by the emergence of “regional blocs” among MPs.228 The “southern bloc”,
based in the Southern Highlands, claims that northerners continue to hold key positions of
power. The increased visibility of the “southern bloc” has in turn consolidated the emergence
of other “blocs”, e.g. a “northern group” and a group of MPs from the Lake Zone.
Even though these instances remain minority and are unlikely to endanger political stability in
the short- and medium-term, they nonetheless indicate a certain change in the way politics is
conducted. As political discourse and campaigning has increasingly shown signs of appealing
to the electorate on the grounds of ethnicity, regionalism, religion and racialism in marked
contrast to the past, this raises questions about the long-term stability of the Tanzanian state.
ECONOMY
The extreme downturn of the 1980s was followed by macroeconomic recovery and
stabilisation since the mid-1990s.229 Economic growth averaged 4.2% between 1996 and 2000,
then picked up to 6.2% in 2001 and 7.2% in 2002, before moderating to 5.7% in 2003, and
222
Mmuya 2000, 71. Erdmann (2000, 93), by contrast, claims that the “chain of causation is exactly the reverse.
It is precisely because the authoritarian regime could not provide for social and economic development, and
because social and political integration was threatened, there remained only the attempt at democracy. The
growing social tensions were only covered over by authoritarianism through violence and a clientelist
distributive structure. Without the democratisation, sooner or later these tensions were going to erupt more
violently and in ways that we have seen in other countries”.
223
“Julius Nyerere, Amir Jamal, Omar Muhaji and Oscar Kambona who stood, and won, in constituencies
outside their home areas. Derek Bryceson is a classic example of a white, Cambridge-educated big farmer
standing in a working class area, the numerically largest constituency in the whole country, and still winning
massively” (Kaya 2004, 165).
224
Kaya 2004, 164f.
225
Source?
226
Kaya 2004, 164
227
Oscar Kambona, who was Minister of Industry and Secretary General of TANU went into exile in 1967 in
England after he fell out with Nyerere. When he wanted to return in 1992 to participate in forthcoming elections
he was told he was not a citizen. Declaring people ‘non-citizens’ has also been used to gain access to business
interests. During the debate on “indigenisation” after independence, Nyerere called it “camouflaged apartheid”
(Chris Peter, interview).
228
Kelsall 2002, 606f.
229
The following account of economic performance is based on EIU 2007, 28ff.
32
then recovering to 6.7% in 2004 and 6.8% in 2005. Growth in real GDP per head (at 2000
prices) has been slower, rising from TSh199531 in 1994 to TSh265965 in 2004. The
performance of the agricultural sector, on which the economy remains heavily dependent with
a 45% share in GDP, remains mixed despite an output growth by over 5% in 2004-05. The
manufacturing sector has struggled to grow over the past decade with its contribution to GDP
falling from 9% in 1991 to 6.8% in 2005. Growth in the minding sector, by contrast, has been
extremely rapid, at 27.4% in 1998, 9.1% in 1999, and then averaging 15.3% per year between
2000 and 2005.230 Even though the sector’s overall contribution to GDP remains small with
only 3.8% in 2006, minerals have now replaced agricultural products in terms of export value.
While earnings from traditional commodity exports (coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco, cashew
nuts and cloves) fell from $436 million in 1997 to an average of $243 million between 2000
and 2003, revenues from mineral exports rose from just $26.4 million in 1998 to an estimated
$823.9 million in 2006, dominated by gold, which is now Tanzania’s single largest export
commodity.
Economic stabilisation in the 1990s was accompanied by new rounds of structural adjustment.
Tanzania’s commitment to reform strengthened during Mkapa’s first term and then picked up
considerably during his second term.231 Tanzania even became “a star reformer in the eyes of
many donors” and prompted substantial inflows of foreign aid, which have accounted for
around 40% of the government’s budget. Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the period
between 1981 and 1992, adjustment now involved structural reform in public administration
and the parastatal sector – the bastions of Tanzania’s elite bargain. Between 1992 and 1998,
over 80.000 public servants were laid off (including thousands of ghost workers), whereby the
total number of central government employees declined from 335.000 to 255.000.232 These
initial retrenchments were deemed necessary mainly to maintain aid flows. The pace of public
sector reform has clearly increased under Mkapa, especially since 2000.233 While Tanzania’s
civil service is both smaller and better paid than previously, Mkapa has also cut the number of
ministries in the cabinet.234 In the parastatal sector, structural reform has been even more
pronounced. Out of the 413 public enterprises in the late 1980s (see above), as much as 200
had been privatised by 1998235 – a number that increased to 266 in 2003.236
The significance of these structural reforms should not be exaggerated since both public
administration and the parastatal sector are still of considerable size and thereby continue to
aliment existing patterns of elite accommodation. Nonetheless, Kelsall is certainly right to
point out that the “state has shrunk and so is no longer sufficient to act as a vehicle for
reproducing the elite in toto”.237 This structural change has been combined with the increasing
liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy, which endangers the manifold commercial rents that
had existed in the context of the highly statist economy. As a consequence, rent-seeking
activities are changing (see below). On the one hand, elites are battling to regain control over
imperfectly liberalised markets in order to protect rents. On the other, rent-seeking has at least
partially started to shift away from the state and became increasingly entangled with private
capital, sometimes in a highly localised context. These developments make the “elite bargain”
230
For details on the history and rising importance of Tanzania’s mineral sector cf. Chachage 1995.
EIU 2007, 29
232
Temu & Due 2000, 703f.
233
Kjaer 2004, 399ff.
234
Nonetheless, Kjaer (2004, 401) reports that even Mkapa “must distribute some patronage” through the
creation of independent portfolios.
235
Temu & Due 2000, 694
236
Lockwood 2006, 111
237
Kelsall 2002, 610, original emphasis.
231
33
more difficult to manage and may – at least in the long term – have a centrifugal impact on
the cohesion of the country’s ruling coalition.
The often imperfect liberalisation of markets under structural adjustment provides national
and local elites with manifold opportunities for accumulation. The agricultural sector is a
good case in point. In the early 1990s, the monopoly of state trading companies and
cooperative unions for both export and food crops was broken, fertiliser subsidies were
phased out and markets were opened to private traders. 238 While the liberalisation of the
markets of maize and other grains has been significant and sustained, export crop
liberalisation remained highly imperfect, in particular for coffee, tobacco and cashew.239 In
these cases, the initial liberal surge after 1993-94 was gradually undermined by (1) the reempowerment of export crop boards, which re-emerged as major actors in the marketplace;240
(2) the arbitrary treatment of farmers by local government, most notably through taxation; (3)
the proliferation of sector policies that privilege the state as “initiator rather than facilitator,
especially through foreign aid funded projects; and (4) continued government-guaranteed
bank lending to select cooperative unions, which facilitated their partial recovery. The
rationale underlying this anti-liberal behaviour of the political class and its clients in
cooperatives and crop boards is clearly the preservation and perpetuation of lucrative
agricultural rents.
The example of the coffee sector is illuminating in this respect.241 When the domestic coffee
trade was opened to private traders and processors in 1994-95, foreign companies rapidly
management to capture the Tanzanian coffee market, both domestically (trade and processing)
and export.242 While the market share of cooperative unions fell from 83% in 1994-95 to just
26% in 1999-2000 (with only a few large unions being able to survive), independent local
traders also lost ground – a disempowerment of Tanzanian interests that was accompanied by
widespread popular discontent. Ponte shows that the government adopted a series of measures
to “re-empower” local elite interests including the “manipulating of licensing rules,
encouraging direct selling of coffee at auction by independent co-operatives and farmer
groups, auction haggling, threats of tightening regulation and, above all, the period or remonopolisation of domestic coffee marketing in Kagera”.243 In the latter case, the ruling party
not only rescued cooperatives from bankruptcy (by repaying its large debts and even backing
new loans) but also banned private traders from operating in local markets (most of whom
were agents of foreign companies) – a move that helped it to win the 2000 elections in the
region. Developments in the Kagera region had repercussions at the national level in that the
2002-03 Coffee Act prohibits exporters from holding a domestic trading license. While Ponte
convincingly argues that the Act was meant to reverse the “pattern of foreign ownership” (not
least since private traders were re-allowed to buy domestic coffee), the re-regulation of
238
Cooksey 2003, 69ff. After the Cooperative Societies Act (1991), only economically viable cooperatives
would be registered, membership became voluntary and unions were given more autonomy and began setting
their own prices. As the government stopped guaranteeing loans, banks started to be more cautious in lending
(Ponte 2004, 626).
239
Cooksey (2003, 76) hypothesises that these differences can best be explained by the fact that “the price of
maize – the food staple of the urban poor – is too important politically to be left to the mercies of marketing
board and co-operative lobbyists. This political imperative does not apply to export crops, where national-local
patronage policies and systematic rent-seeking can be more easily accommodated”.
240
Through the state marketing boards, the Minister of Agriculture retains draconian powers over crop
production, marketing and taxation (cf. Cooksey 2003, 77ff.).
241
Another interesting example would be the cashew sector. Chachage & Nyoni (2001, cited after Kelsall 2003,
68) have shown how the cashew board, local government, traders and investors have manipulated markets to
extract rents from cashew farmers.
242
Ponte 2004, 618ff.
243
Ponte 2004, 631
34
agricultural trade can equally be interpreted as a struggle by Tanzanian elites to regain control
over rent deployment.
Another key site of struggles over rents are land issues, which have gained increasing salience
in the recent period. A process of land accumulation by powerful elites began already during
the villagisation period and gained momentum when the National Agricultural Policy (1982)
introduced elements of private ownership of land (see above). According to Khan & Gray, the
“new land laws that were enacted in 1999 were intended to address the competing pressures
generated by the emergence of land markets on one hand and security of tenure for smallscale peasant farmers on the other (…). Far from achieving these ends, the actual
implementation of ‘land reform’ is not occurring under the clear guidance of the state but
rather through the actions of private individuals engaging in illegal non-market transfers”.244
As ultimate land titles remain vested in the state, the government has been able to provide
individuals – mostly foreign investors or Tanzanians of Arab and Asian origin – with large
tracts of land.245 This form of patronage distribution has increasingly given rise to disputes
with local farmers over water and land. Moreover, the recent wave of privatisations has
opened new opportunities for rent deployment since influential politicians or bureaucrats may
use their position to receive kickbacks or become joint partners in the privatised companies.
The privatisation of parastatals has prompted increasing struggles and suspicion among elites,
not least since half of the enterprises have landed in foreign hands.246.
A final, and particularly interesting example of newly emerging rent-seeking activities are the
so-called District Development Trust Funds.247 Trust funds are non-state institutions that are
run by local elites – sometimes retrenched civil servants – and seek to fund local development
projects, most notably education. They finance themselves by taxing local populations and
securing donations from patrons. Typically of ethnic nature, they constitute an important link
between local and national elites. National elites patronise trust funds both to have access to
local resources (e.g. minerals, cash crops, fisheries, tourism) and to ensure local political
support, which has become increasingly important in times of multi-party politics. Local elites
use the trust to finance education for their children, built local prestige or even misappropriate
their revenues. Altogether, “local and national elites are linked, more closely than ever before,
by a skein of reciprocities, the ideology to which is localism”.248
SECURITY
The introduction of multi-party politics brought about important changes in Tanzania’s
civilian-military relationship. While 30 years of civilian-military integration had created a
situation where it was becoming to a certain extent difficult to draw a line between CCM and
the armed forces, the civilian and military spheres now had to be formally de-linked.249 Party
structures in the army were abolished and army personnel are now prohibited from being
involved in politics, that is, they can no longer join political parties.
One of the greatest worries about the political stability implications of the multiparty era is
therefore the fate of the Tanzanian armed forces. But even though the end of the one-party
244
Khan & Gray 2006, 58f.
Kelsall 2003, 67
246
Muya, interview [check data]
247
Kelsall 2002, 611; 2003, 71. For a more detailed discussion cf. Kiondo 1995.
248
Kelsall 2002, 611
249
Omari 2002, 102f.
245
35
state seems to endanger Tanzania’s achievements in subordinating the army under civilian
rule, there is strong evidence that so far “not much as changed”.250 Omari reports that the
habit of co-opting army members into the civilian sphere has continued even after 1992. By
2002, 45% of regional commissioners and 20% of the district commissioners were still of
military background. Also, many trop ranking military officers contested the 1995 elections
under the umbrella of the CCM (even though required to resign their army duties with no
possibility of returning afterwards. Altogether, the available evidence suggests that the
majority of the TPDF still align with the ruling party and that civilian-military relations
remain fairly healthy.251
Nonetheless, there is also evidence that armed forces are slowly becoming “a law unto itself
(…). Recently, questions have been asked about the army’s involvement in gold mining, links
between the Tanzanian military and Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe, evidence of gun
running in the Democratic Republic of Congo, not to mention the purchase of an extremely
expensive military radar system. A dissident MP gave as his opinion on what the first of these
issues suggested about state-military relations: No man wants his wife to go into business
alone. If a man allows his wife to go into business, that suggests to me that he is no longer
able to feed her”. 252 Furthermore, The central question remains whether the military
organisations of the state have become institutionalised to the point that they can serve any
political masters who occupy state offices. In case another political party gains power – no
matter how unlikely this may seem at the moment – it will either have to purge all known
CCM members in the armed forces or prepare to face hostilities.
Finally, there remain security worries related to the lack of capacity of the state’s police
forces to ensure the safety of people in their everyday lives. The rise, and tolerance by the
state, of Sungu Sungu organisations to enforce local law and order (see above) is an indication
of the precariousness of security in the rural areas. At least to date, however, the violent
conflicts that have occurred are related more to criminal activity or local disputes over land or
grazing rights rather than taking on a more general political character.253 Even in urban areas,
there has been a rapid expansion of private security forces. Tanzania still has only one police
station for every 30-40,000 people. While these trends are worrying, by all accounts the police,
while lacking in capacity, remain a centrally organised force with a significant degree of
discipline.
VII
Conclusion
Summary of argument to follow
We will consider our conclusions in light of Khan and Gray:
Khan & Gray 2006, 50f.: “While Tanzania has clearly achieved political stability since
independence, this has not led overall to a higher level of state effectiveness as there is an
important distinction between inclusive politics and strong party politics. The CCM party in
Tanzania has historically been an inclusive organization that has been able to contain factional
competition through its well-developed and inclusive institutional structures in a political
250
Omari 2002, 102f.
Ibid.; Mukandala, interview.
252
Kelsall 2003: 62
253
Source?
251
36
context where political entrepreneurs are not very powerful given the low level of economic
differentiation and development. Further, the low level of social differentiation and weak
economic transition has paradoxically reduced the costs of political competition given the
existence of an inclusive one-party state that is still effectively a one-party state despite the
beginnings of multi-party competition. So far, at least, the ability of different factions in the
business community and within the state to mobilize broader social groups to demand or
protect rents has been very limited. Clientelist political corruption in Tanzania therefore
ensures that the centre remains stable through internal redistribution to diffuse power
networks even though the centre itself lacks the political power to act as a strong state”.
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