Religion, Ethnic Minorities, and Human Rights
in The Republic of Macedonia*
Edward L. Queen
Social and Historical Background
The question of religious affairs within the Republic of Macedonia cannot be separated
from the historical development of the region and from the ethnic make-up of the
country’s population—the latter fact is even more complicated given that the very nature
of individual identity is itself an essentially contested question within the region
encompassing the Republic of Macedonia.
The best estimates at present is that the Republic of Macedonia—a country of about 2
million individuals—is comprised of: **
Macedonians–50% to 66%. This group speaks Macedonian and is
overwhelmingly associated with the Macedonian Orthodox Church, at
least culturally. Ethnic Macedonians dominate the military and the police
and much of the government bureaucracy as well as higher education.
Albanians—officially 23-25%. This number is greatly disputed. 30%-33% is
probably closer to reality although some disinterested third parties claim
closer to 37% and the Albanian elite argue for closer to 40%. The
overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim, although there are Orthodox
Albanian villages in the south and Roman Catholic Albanians around
Skopje viz Mother Theresa.
Ethnic Turks--4%. Located primarily around Tetovo, Muslim in religion.
Roma--2.2%. This may be a serious undercount. Despite the fact that the Roma
historical have found themselves better treated in Macedonia than other
places, they still suffer from significant discrimination. As a result many
may have represented themselves as something other than Roma to the
census. They are predominantly Muslim but also Catholic and Orthodox.
Torbeshi/Pomaks–2% Muslims of Slavic descent
Serbs--2%
Vlachs–0.4% Transhumant pastoralists, Orthodox in religion but speaking Vlach
not Macedonian
Bulgarians–0.1%
Other groups
Bosniac speaking Muslims—mostly refugees from the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Gorans–Upland Muslims whose language is a combination of Macedonian,
Serbo-Croatian, and Arabic.
Jews–A small community currently re-establishing itself and its presence.
*The use of the name “ Republic of Macedonia” should not be taken to imply any political or ideological
stance. Although in international undertakings the official name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the official name in the country and the one preferred by Macedonians is the Republic of
Macedonia. For that reason and for the sake of convenience, Republic of Macedonia (RoM) or simply
Macedonia will be used through this paper.
Greeks—very few
Historical Background
As an independent country the Republic of Macedonia has been in existence for
less than 10 years. As a separate and identifiable political entity, it has been in existence
for less than 60 years, first as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav
Federation now as the Republic of Macedonia, recognized as the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia in the international arena. The current Macedonian alphabet was
accepted in May 1945 with an official orthography following the next month. In 1946
the first primer in Macedonian was published and the first Macedonian language
department established at the University of Skopje. A grammar of the literary language
did not appear until 1952.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was committed to the creation and
maintenance of a separate Macedonia republic within the federation and expended
considerable resources in trying to create a separate Macedonia consciousness and
identity. This attempt, albeit relatively successful, faced notable resistance even granting
that the Macedonians are a separate nation. To a great extent this difficulty lay within the
history of the region and is intimately linked with questions of religion, ethnicity, and
culture.
Like most of the countries which comprise the Balkans , indeed most of southern, eastern
and central Europe, modern Macedonia has a long history of successive conquests and
different rulers—the background of whom remains essentially unknown and contested.
th
To a great extent one must take the history of Macedonia back to the 4 Century
BCE to begin to understand the roots of some of the troubling questions that confront the
contemporary republic. At that time, Philip of Macedon emerged as a powerful ruler who
would soon dominate the Greek city-states and Macedon—following the succession of
Philip’s son, Alexander—would become the leading power from the Alps to India.
The extent to which Philip and Alexander and their Macedonian subjects were
Greek is, like so much else regarding the history of Macedonia an exceedingly
controverted question. The Athenian politician Demosthenes regarded them as nothing
more than barbarians. They not only were not Greek but did not even descend from a
distinguished foreign lineage. Most of the historical evidence suggests, however, that at
least the court of Philip and Alexander were Hellenized and had adopted the Greek
language as well as Greek culture. Following Alexander’s death and the division of the
empire, Macedonia steadily weakened as a power—with the resulting rise of Carthage
and, more importantly the Roman Empire. Macedonia became a Roman province and
th
with the division of the Empire in the 4 century became connected with the eastern or
Greek-speaking half.
During this period of transition, the area of modern-day Macedonia experienced
by numerous invasions and migrations, including those of the Huns and the Goths. The
most important of these, however, was that of the Slavs and the Bulgars beginning around
th
the 6 century. This eventually led to the establishment of the first Bulgarian state in
681.
Perhaps the most important event during this time was the work of Sts. Cyril and
Methodius who established the first written version of the Slavic language and whose
work eventually led to the Christianization of the Slavs, including the mass conversion of
the ancestors of the modern-day Macedonians in 864.*
The establishment of major center of Slavic religious learning in Ohrid (in
modern day Macedonia) under Sveti Kliment (St. Clement) helped to solidify and
maintain a distinct and separate Slav identity. It also has led to a continuing debate over
whether Cyril and Methodius were Greek, Bulgarian, or Macedonian, with all the parties
claiming them as part of their cultural heritage. Similarly the work by Kliment, who
continued the work of Cyril and Methodius and established the first Slavic seminary in
Ohrid (located in the modern Republic of Macedonia), is fought over by both Bulgarians
and Macedonians. This cultural argument is exacerbated by the rise of a “Bulgarian”
empire under Simeon the Great who wrested much territory from the Byzantines,
eventually receiving the title of Tsar, making him the “equal” of the Byzantine
emperor.**
This empire’s fortunes rose and fell and it eventually re-emerged as a major
power under Samuil whose rule was centered in Macedonia around Ohrid. This is
pointed to by contemporary Macedonian historians who assert that it signifies the
existence of an identifiable and separable Macedonia identity and as an illustration of the
glorious past of the Macedonia people. The Bulgarians reject this and claim Samuil as
one of theirs. The rise of this kingdom came to a crashing halt in 1014 when the army of
the Byzantine emperor Basil II (known as the Bulgar Killer) soundly defeated Samuil’s
army.**
The fortunes of this successors to this kingdom ebbed and flowed under different
rulers with different backgrounds, including the rise under the Asenids whom many
consider to have been Vlachs (see above). They conquered Macedonia in 1210 but were
later driven from power by the Byzantines and the area of Macedonia divided into three
parts by the Serbs, the Greeks of Epirus, and the Greeks of Nicea. They in turn were
superceded in southern Macedonia by a Latin kingdom under the Normans which ended
in 1261, to be followed by Serbian control under Milutin. The Serbian empire reached its
apogee under Stefan Dušan, who, with his capital in Skopje ruled the area from the
Danube to central Greece and from the Drina to western Thrace. This empire declined
quickly after 1389, when the Ottoman victory at Kosovo Polje opened the way for
Ottoman domination of the region. Ottoman control was solidified through their defeat
of Byzantium in 1453.
The Ottomans and their immediate successors were to be the nominal if not actual
rulers of the region until 1913. With their arrival a new twist was thrown into the mix,
not only Islam as the religion of a significant portion of the population—including most
Albanians, as well as Pomaks, Torbeshi, and Bosniacs–but the presence of ethnic Turks
in the region as well.
* The conversions included numerous peoples whom many writers simply describe as “proto-Bulgarians.”
*The terms Tsar, Czar, Kaiser all are derived from the Lain word Caesar.
**The extremity of this defeat is illustrated by the fact that 15,000 of Samuil’s soldiers were captured by
the Byzantines who blinded the soldiers, leaving one soldier out of 100 with one eye so he could lead the
others back. Legend has it that Samuil was so devastated by this defeat that he died shortly afterward, but
not before sending his remaining soldiers out to collect all the eyes which he then had placed in a golden
casket and buried in Lake Ohrid, giving the lake its shimmering surface.
The controverted history of the region was complicated even more by the violent
struggle for Macedonian independence from the Ottomans* a struggle carried on within
Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece and dominated for years by the VMRO (Internal
Macedonia Revolutionary Organization). This struggle helped to create the present
situation where the very existence of Macedonia, Macedonian as a language, and
Macedonians as a people is challenged and even rejected. All issues related to religion,
ethnic origin, and language, therefore, often are seen as involving ultimate issues of
survival among all the communities.
World War I began with what is contemporary Macedonia divided among Serbia,
Greece, and Bulgaria. This settlement had been reached at the end of the Second Balkan
War in August 1913. The next several years saw numerous instances of what would
today be known as ethnic cleansing as Greeks killed and drove out Slavs, Serbs expelled
Bulgarians, and everyone abused the Albanians. This process continued throughout the
First World War and into the interwar period with these three ruling powers trying to
control their respective parts of Macedonia through force, expulsion, and policies of
coercive homogenization. This was complicated even further by the creation of the new
state of Albania, which, while less inclined to forced assimilation than its neighbors,
provided a refuge for numerous armed bands with revanchist tendencies that regularly
staged cross border attacks. This situation was exacerbated by the rise of Mussolini and
the cooperation of certain Albanian and Macedonian paramilitaries with the emerging
fascist power in Italy and the anti-Yugoslav Croatian nationalist party of Ante Pavlecic
(Ustase) in Croatia.
The entire region was riven by conflicts, Bulgaria was forced to live with VMRO
as a veritable state within a state. This led to numerous conflicts with its neighbors since
the majority party within VMRO had strong pro-Bulgarian policies and constantly
engaged in cross-border attacks on the Serbian held regions of Macedonia. The growing
violence of VMRO finally forced a response of from the Bulgarian state which through a
process of military attacks severely weakened its hold on power, an attempt which was
aided greatly by the local population’s increasing annoyance with VMRO given its
devolution into little more than an armed gang engaged in extortion, rapine, and pillage.
The conclusion of World War I left Bulgaria unhappy with the meagre portion of
Macedonia which it controlled and its revanchist and irredentist attitude led it to side with
the Axis powers during World War II..
Only the insistence of Marshall Tito as part of the policy of the Yugoslav
Communist Party and the Anti-fascist League that Macedonia would be considered a
separate and identifiable “state” within the confines of a united, federal Yugoslavia. This
came about, finally, with the defeat of the Axis powers and the victory of Tito’s partisans
in the Yugoslav civil war.
Following this victory, Macedonia emerged as one of the constituent republics of
the Federated Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. This resulted in the regularization of the
Macedonian language (see above) and the implementation of an educational program
designed to promote a Macedonian identity. Historical appeals were particularly
significant in this regard. All of this was undertaken, however, amidst a fairly complex
reality. First, Macedonia itself was identified as the state of the Macedonian people and
*This statement poses numerous difficulties given the pro-Bulgarian position of the majority within VMRO
during this early period.
those nationalities which lived within its borders. Linked with this was the identity of
those nationalities themselves—who was identified as in and who was out. This was
important because it determined the possibility of establishing linguistic or cultural
programs and education.
A problem emerged because Macedonia undertook these activities not only in a
period of nation building but also while the neighboring countries of Greece and Bulgaria
were implementing policies designed to extinguish or deny the idea of a separate and
distinct Macedonian people. Immediately following World War II, Greece undertook a
significant process of hellenizing or transferring the Macedonian speaking population of
Greek (or Aegean) Macedonia. Currently there continue to exist significant numbers of
these people and their descendants who are unable to return to Greece, even temporarily
to visit family or cemeteries.
A similar, although smaller-scale, undertaking occurred in Bulgaria. Both of
these continue to have effects today in the current Republic of Macedonia. Relations
with the Greeks, although much improved, still remain somewhat strained and until
recently laws remained prohibiting the importation of Bulgarian language books into
Macedonia. Bulgarian Orthodox Priests are not allowed to minister to the
Bulgarian-speaking population, and the pro-Bulgarian remnant of VMRO, the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, complains
constantly about discrimination against the Bulgarian speaking minority.
Macedonia after Yugoslavia
Although the separation of Macedonia from the Yugoslav Federation was the
most peaceful, it was not (and still has not yet) been accomplished without several
difficulties. One of the first resulted from the lingering conflicts with Greece over the
very basis of Macedonian identity. Greece vehemently opposed the adoption of the name
Republic of Macedonia by the newly independent state, imposing for a period of time a
blockade at the Republic=s border with it. This hurt the country’s economy especially
give the international blockade against Serbia.
Although the dispute with Greece has yet to be officially settled completely and
its lingering effects are seen in the fact that the official, international name of the country
is The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the relationship with Greece
has improved markedly and Greece has become the largest source of investment in the
country. (Again, this is not without its own issues since there are those who see a Greek
plot to buy up the country cheaply and undermine Macedonia nationhood.) Rumours
current in Skopje during summer 2000 suggested that Greece may soon accede to the
formal use of the name everywhere but Greece. The Republic of Macedonia will be the
official name everywhere but Greece which will use the Republic of Macedonia-Skopje.
Currently, according to well-placed sources, even the protests of the Greek diplomatic
community have become mostly pro-forma, with them beginning their objections to the
use of the term by any of the IGOs, etc. with the equivalent of saying, “Look, we know
this is dumb, but . . .”
The name may not only be an issue to the Greeks, however. There are those who
see the name, especially when combined with the fact that the Macedonian constitution
structures the state on the basis of national identity rather than civic identity. For many
this is seen as challenging the very right of those other than Macedonians to an equal
place in the state.
This problem is presented at the beginning by the preamble to the Constitution of
the Republic of Macedonia, the official English version of which reads as follows:
Taking as the point of departure the historical, cultural, spiritual and
statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over
centuries for national and social freedom as well as for the creation of
their own state, and particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of
the Krushevo Republic* and the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist
Assembly of the People’s Liberation of Macedonia, together with the
constitutional and legal continuity of the Macedonian state as a sovereign
republic within the Federal Yugoslavia and the freely manifested will of
the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in the referendum of September
th
8 , 1991, as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a
national state of the Macedonian people, in which the full equality for
citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is
provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities
living within the Republic of Macedonia . . ..***
This provision of the Constitution is particularly disturbing to the Albanian
population since it deprives them of their status as a constituent nationality which they
had under the old Communist constitution. (Although it must be acknowledged that any
expression of Albanian national sentiment was severely repressed by the central
government.) This comes amidst the complex debate over the construction of the
Macedonian national identity. To a great extent that construction is built upon a myth of
the longstanding struggles of the Macedonian people seen as the inheritors of the mantles
of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great and as the sources of Slavic-Orthodox
culture. It is inherently seen as being expressed in the symbols of Slavic Orthodoxy and
forged in the flames of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire.
In this national story the plot has no room for the glories produced by the
Ottoman Empire in the region nor, by extension, those people whose existence is
occasioned to a great extent by the Ottomans, namely all Muslims. They are viewed to a
great extent as interlopers. Indeed I was told as much by the president of the
government’s Commission on Religious Affairs. He was appalled by the idea that some
people wish to construe Macedonia as a bi-religious state—Orthodox and Islamic (forget
that maybe it should be secular or even religiously neutral). He claimed that Macedonia
was an Orthodox country, that Islam was a religion of the country=s past under the
Ottomans, and that Orthodoxy was the only religion that was native to Macedonia. (I
*The Khruschevo Republic was a short-lived (10 days) independent Macedonian state, proclaimed
in 1903. Its leader was a national hero of the Macedonian people Gotse Delcev who along with Dame
Gruev reconstituted VMRO and led the fight against Ottoman rule. (As one can see even attempting to
discuss this in a non-normative way is difficult. While Delcev may have been a hero of the Macedonian
nation, he may not be viewed that way by all Macedonian citizens, especially Albanians and Turks.)
**Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Preamble. Official English translation. Beyond the
privileging of Macedonians, the constitution also makes a statement regarding even those who are named
and those who are not. It expressly fails to mention the Serbs and the Bulgarians who refuse to recognize
the independence of the Autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church, for example, even though the Serbs
constitute a population larger than that of the Vlachs.
forbore asking him where he thought Christianity came from.) The implication of his
entire comments was that all other religious bodies exist here simply on sufferance.
Additionally, the Macedonian Orthodox Church is the only religious body
expressly mentioned in the constitution. In these mentions it appears under the same
rubrics as the Macedonian nationality in the preamble, “the Macedonian Orthodox
Church and all other religious communities . . .” This has significance because of the
history of the region. Given the role of the Orthodox Church in constructing Slavic
language, culture, and literature, the Ottoman millet system which organized identity in
the empire according to religion and gave different communities control over their
internal affairs based on religious law but also led to the structuring of conflicts along
religious lines (although this is an overdrawn claim, numerous Christians sided with and
worked for the empire and numerous local Muslims struggled against the centralizing
activities of it). For a certain type of Macedonian nationalist, the church functions as the
bearer of Macedonian national identity. This point is increasingly made by the Church
itself and has some support within the political establishment. This can be seen by noting
the cultural monuments that are highlighted by the state and by the names of streets
throughout the country. While some mosques receive notice in the tourist information,
almost all the cultural monuments given prominence by the state are Christian, namely
churches and monasteries. The street names fall mostly into three categories—religious
figures from the founding period of Slavic Orthodoxy, “heroes” of the fight against the
Ottoman Empire, and events and individuals related to “the great anti-fascist struggle.”*
Similarly there has been a fair amount of annoyance with the fact that the 50 denari note
is decorated with religious art from Christian churches and the new 1 deni coin has an
Orthodox cross on its reverse. Additionally, the official art which decorates Macedonian
diplomatic offices throughout the world consists of pictures of the Macedonian landscape
and historically significant Orthodox churches and monasteries. One might be inclined to
accept the explanation that these simply reflect Macedonia’s cultural heritage if any
Muslim edifices were included, the Mustapha Pasha Mosque in Skopje for example.
Even more significant questions about Macedonia as a unified state emerge when the
national museum, in one of the few translated exhibit areas, speaks of the “ centuries long
struggle against Ottoman slavery.”
Many might be inclined to dismiss some of this as petty. To do so would be to err
greatly. The entire struggle in the Balkans is grounded on the question of identity, of
who belongs and who doesn’t. This can on occasion lead to fairly complex situations as
groups try to place themselves in a place first. While the Macedonians see their identity
as formed by Slavic culture they cannot rest on that because the Albanians see themselves
as descendants of the Illyrians who were there before the Slavs, so they must make their
claim back to Philip of Macedon but have to affirm vocally that he and his empire were
not Greek, but a completely separate people. To do otherwise would be to fall into the
trap of Greek propaganda that there are no Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia, simply
slavophone Greeks. Given this situation one can see why the construction of a state on a
national basis presents numerous difficulties.
*Of all the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia retains the most positive response to
Tito and the antifascist struggle (not, however, to Communism per se). One of the main planks of Tito=s
Communist and the Anti-fascist assembly was the creation of a separate and distinct Macedonia and it was
only under Tito that Macedonia achieved its existence as an identifiable entity in centuries.
Given the history of the millet system and the role the religious communities have
played in both constructing and carrying national identity and culture it should not be
surprising that religion=s role in the new state is inherently problematic. This is only
compounded by the history of the communist period and the predominant mind set on
human activities and freedom.
Religion and International Human Rights Law
Although acknowledged as an important human right in the major international
conventions, the freedom to worship freely or not at all, has not received the separate
protection one might think it deserves given the historical hostility and resistance
presented primarily by the former and current communist countries and the Islamic
world. That said, the major international human rights conventions expressly
acknowledge the importance of religious freedom and require its protection. The
Republic of Macedonia either by its own adoption or as a successor state the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a party to all of the relevant international human rights
conventions
Among the relevant citations are:
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
Art. 2
1.
Each State Party to the present Convention undertakes to respect and top
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as . . . religion . . . .
Art. 18
1
2.
3.
4.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for
the liberty of parents and when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their
own convictions.
Art. 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
Art 5. Realization of rights regardless of race colour, or national or ethnic origin,
including
(d)
(vii) The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
(viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression;
Along with those sections which expressly touch on religion there are at least two
others in the ICCPR which can be interpreted to incorporate protections for religion.
These are:
Art. 19
1.
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
forms of art or through any other media of his choice.
Art.21
1.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others…
Since these articles are content neutral (again bearing in mind that they can be
limited for can be limited to protect peace, security, health and morals) there is no reason
that they cannot be extended to protect religious opinions and expressions as well as the
right to associate for religious purposes.
Regional Human Rights and Security Arrangements
Along with being a party to the major international human rights conventions, the
Republic of Macedonia is a party to several regional human rights and security regimes.
Although the establishment of the first independent Macedonian state in modern
history took place peacefully amidst the general chaos of the break-up of the Yugoslav
Republic, international concerns for the continued peacefulness of the state, however,
especially given the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and the fear that any
outbreak of violence in Macedonia could not be contained given the historical interests of
Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia in the region led to a strong international presence
in the RoM. Militarily this was seen in the creation of the UNPREDEP (United Nations
Preventive Deployment Force) in the RoM.
Politically it is apparent in the role of the international community—through the
IGOs, INGOs, and the diplomatic community—in pushing the RoM to recognize and
realize at least a minimum of international human rights standards and a relatively
legitimate democracy.
This push has taken several forms and has manifested itself in various ways. The
most formal of which has been the Royaumont Process as it has been formalized in the
“Stability Pact” which details the actions that must be undertaken by the states of the
former Yugoslavia if they are to be admitted into the Council of Europe (CE).
The Stability Pact although focusing on regional security and trade arrangements,
also has a strong human rights and democratization focus. Among these components are
an affirmation of “commitment to the principles and norms enshrined in the UN Charter,
the Helsinki Final Act, . . . and OSCE Documents . . .
7. We affirm that we are accountable to out citizens and responsible for
one another for the respect of OSCE norms and principles and for the
implementation of our commitments. We also reaffirm that with
commitment with respect to the human dimension undertaken through our
membership in the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to
all States participating in the Stability Pact an do no belong exclusively to
the internal affairs of the State concerned. Respect for these commitments
constitutes one of the foundations of international order, to which we
intend to make a substantial commitment.
10. . . . we pledge to cooperate towards”
.. . .
•
•
bringing about mature democratic political processes based on free and
fair elections, grounded in the rule of law and full respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities, the right to free and independent media, legislative
branches accountable to their constituents, independent judiciaries,
combating corruption, deepening and strengthening civil society.
preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries in the
region and protecting minorities
Thee Stability Pact’s “Working Table on democratisation human rights addresses:
i. democratisation and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities, free and independent, media, civil society building, rule of
law and law enforcement, institution building, efficient administration and good
governance, . . . other related questions of interest to the participants.
The international community also played a powerful role, both directly and
indirectly, in the creation of the basic laws of RoM. This came about due to the fact that
the majority of the population of the RoM, seriously want the country to be viewed as a
Western European country and to obtain all of the seeming privileges and amenities that
seem to accompany such a status. Recognizing that such a status will only come by
acknowledging certain political norms, the successive governments of the RoM have
been willing to a great extent to accede to the demands of the international community
regarding adjustment of legal structures. There have, however, been limits and these
often are many of the most troubling issues.
The most visible expression of the influence of the international community,
especially the human rights, emphasis is the Constitution of the RoM itself. Reading that
document gives one the impression that it was written with the major humans rights
documents in one hand and a pen in the other.
The authority of the international community in this regard can be seen in the fact
that several sections of the Constitution (unfortunately not including the preamble) were
rewritten in line with recommendations of a special EU commission. These
recommendations were designed to bring the fundamental laws into line with European
norms and with the model laws of the EU.
Finally, the IGOs and the diplomatic community have a markedly high profile in
Macedonia. The offices of the OSCE and the EU, as well as the Council of Europe are
very visible and plainly marked in the center of the capital city of Skopje, just a block
from the sobranje (parliament). Their staffs as well as those of the western embassies
have easy and free contact with governmental officers and they have shown a marked
ability to accomplish a great deal under the conditions, particularly in bringing
government policy in line with its own laws and in lobbying against the introduction of
undemocratic laws.
One western embassy in particular, for example, (The US embassy) played a
major role in smoothing the application process for numerous religious groups and
instituted a series of informal dinners with the commission and the various religious
leaders in the country. The diplomatic community as a whole also brought a notable
amount of pressure to bear on the government to force it to bring its restrictive refugee
policy during the Kosovo crisis into line with recognized international norms. This was a
notable achievement given that the Macedonian people manifested visible Serb
sympathies. The opposition to NATO intervention reached a high-point with the “attack”
on the US Embassy in April of 1999.∗ Since that time tensions have eased and the
resettlement of the refugees has proceeded smoothly.
Additionally, Macedonia is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights.
That document’s sections pertaining to religion, both directly and indirectly, mirror
closely the international conventions.
Article 9–Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10–Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
∗ Too much should not be made of this “attack” and the resultant burning of the some
sections of the Embassy. The demonstration was relatively peaceful, however, the failure of the
police to set clear limits led to line after line being crossed until the demonstrators, much to their own
surprise according to eyewitnesses, found themselves on the Embassy grounds and then inside the
entryway. Damage was minimal and the staff continues to work out the same building.
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Article 1–Freedom of assembly and association
1.
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.
2.
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights
by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of
the State.
Article 14–Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Domestic Law
Both the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and the Law on Religious
Associations formally control the status of religion and the activities of the religious
organizations in the Republic of Macedonia. Many of the provisions of the religious
associations law have been overturned by the Constitutional Court due to cases brought
by the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia and currently
there exists some confusion as to which sections of the law remain in force. Additionally
pressures by the international community in different forms had been successful in
ensuring a relatively fair implementation of the law. Currently, although the religious
affairs commission continues to accept applications for registration, general enforcement
of the law seems to be in abeyance. The government does not seem to seek out people to
prosecute but does respond to complaints when made. Additionally, minority religious
groups continue to suffer from harassment of both a legal and social kind and a functional
discrimination in the application of building laws etc. hinders their activities. The
Jehovah’s Witnesses have been particularly victimized by the current military
conscription law which has no civilian alternative to military service.
The legal status of religion and religious organizations in the Republic of Macedonia
The various provisions of the Constitution which touch on religious matters,
broadly understood, are the following.
Article 9
Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are equal in their freedoms
and rights, regardless of sex, race, colour of skin, national and social
origin, political and religious beliefs, property and social origins.
Article 16
The freedom of personal conviction, conscience, thought and
public expression of thought is (sic) guaranteed.
Article 19
The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed.
The right to express one’s faith freely and publicly individually or
with others is guaranteed.
The Macedonia Orthodox Church and other religious communities
and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law.
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious
communities and groups are free to establish schools and other
social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated
by law.
Article 20
Citizens are guaranteed freedom of association to protect their
political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and convictions.
Citizens may freely establish associations of citizens . . . join them
or resign from them.
The programmes and activities of political parties and other
associations of citizens may not be directed at the violent
destruction of the constitutional order of the republic, or at
encouragement or incitement to military aggression or ethnic,
racial or religious hatred or intolerance.
Article 48
Members of nationalities have a right freely to express, foster and
develop their identity and national attributes.
The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities.
Members of the nationalities have the right to establish institutions
for culture and art, as well as scholarly and other associations for
the expression, fostering and development of their identity.
Article 54
...
The restrictions of freedoms and rights cannot discriminate on
grounds of sex, race, colour of skin, language, religion, national
origin, property or social status.
The restrictions of freedom and rights cannot be applied to . . . the
freedom of personal conviction, conscience, thought and religious
confession.
Article 56
All the . . . objects and buildings of particular cultural and
historical value determined by law, are amenities of common interest for
the Republic and enjoy particular protection.
The Republic guarantees the protection, promotion and
enhancement of the historical and artistic heritage of the
Macedonian people and of the nationalities and treasures of which
it is composed, regardless of their legal status.
Besides these constitutional provisions the activities of religious organizations in
the Republic of Macedonia are also governed by Law on Religious Communities and
Religious Groups adopted in 1997. The law distinguishes between the “Religious
Communities” of the Republic of Macedonia and “Religious Groups”. The Religious
Communities are: the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and
the Islamic Community. All other religious organizations are “Religious Groups”. The
current law has been challenged several times by the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights of the Republic of Macedonia and the Constitutional Court has set aside portions
of it. The result is that there currently exists a significant lack of clarity about what
portions of the law remain in effect.
There are those, including members of the Helsinki Committee, who fear that
when Parliament adopts a new law it might be even more restrictive than the one
previously in effect and may even attempt to give a formal legal status to the Macedonian
Orthodox Church as the state church. This appears to be the policy of the Macedonian
Orthodox Church and it uses its position within the country to push for such recognition
on a de facto basis and seems to be trying to ensure itself such a position in law. This
was apparent in the passage of the law requiring the offering of prayers on the first day of
school and in the Church’s push for formal religious education in the schools.
Under the present system beyond the three religious communities, fifteen other
religious organizations are registered as religious groups.
These groups are:
Evrejska Zenica (Jewish Community)
Evangelsko-metodisticka crkva (Evangelical Methodist Church)
Hristijanska adventitia crkva (Christian Adventist Church
Baptisticka crkva (Baptist Church)
Hristijanska zaed na ehvini svedoci (Christian Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses)
Hristova crkva-Braqa-Bitola (Christ Church–Brothers-Bitola)
Evangelska Crkva (Evangelical Church)
Pentakosna crkva (Pentecostal Church)
Kongresanska crkva (Congregational Church)
Nova Apostolska Crkva-Casa-Vales (New Apostolic Church of Casa-Veles
Prahristijanska crkva (Pra-Christian Church)
Tarikatsca islamska Zenica (Tarikat Islamic Community)
Bekteska islamska Zenica (Bekteshi Sufi order)
Najdanovski Katja Univerzalen Zivot
Additionally, 13-14 other religious communities are known to have been
functioning as of Spring 2000 and others are suspected to exist.
Treatment under the law
Despite the statement of the U.S. State Department in its 1999 Human Rights
Report on the Republic of Macedonia, there does exist a legal difference between the
Religious Communities and the Religious Groups. The Religious Communities have a
special status and their registration with the government was, if not automatic, at least pro
forma, while all other groups were (and are) required to submit formal applications which
could be and have been denied or unduly delayed. Additionally, they tend to be affected
by the application of the law in ways the religious communities are not.
The Law on Religious Associations
The law placed explicit restrictions on religious practice. It allowed citizens only
to organize religious groups and religious rituals and practices were to be carried out only
by individuals registered with the Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
(This latter provision was one several struck down by the Constitutional Court in
1998/1999.) The law also required prior approval by the Ministry of the Interior (a
permit) for religious gatherings outside of established religious facilities or in public.
Such gatherings could be held only by those groups registered with the Commission. The
permit requirement still stands and regardless of whether the limitation to the issuance of
the permits only to registered groups has survived earlier court rulings, a de facto
limitation continues, given the ability of the Interior Ministry to withhold permits from
groups they consider “unacceptable” or “illegitimate”.
The registration of applicants between 1998 and 1999 was a process that lacked
both transparency and rationality. Similar problems affected enforcement of the law.
Legal pressures from organizations like the Helsinki Committee as well as diplomatic
pressures from OSCE, EU, and the American Embassy among others led to a somewhat
smoother and more regularized process. Changes in staff, the lack of clarity about the
existing state of the law, and the question of what the draft law will look like has left
everything in a situation of limbo.
Although the legal situation as it now stands is somewhat unclear, formal denial
of the right to religious freedom seems to be minimal, although the refusal of the
Commission to register religious organizations with names similar to existing religious
organizations and requirements for minimum membership, time of existence, and other
technical issues continue to hinder the registration process. On a deeper and somewhat
more disturbing level, the functional violations on the right to religious freedom and
practice continue. These violations are linked to the general weakness of democratic
attitudes in the country, the continuing conflict over the state’s identity, and the weak
human rights situation in general. Additionally, some of the other problems involve
ethnic issues much less, but go to the heart of what it means to be a democratic state with
a viable civil society at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Review of the Current application of the law
The current law requires that religious organizations be registered with the
government in order to operate. There currently are eighteen registered religious
communities and groups but at least thirteen others are known to have some presence in
the country. Religious services are to be conducted “at churches, mosques, and other
temples, and in gardens that are parts of those facilities, at cemeteries, and at other
facilities of the religious group.” The law also allows for the holding of religious services
in private homes. If services are to be held in any other locales, a permit must be
obtained fifteen days in advance.
The law does place a vague but potentially disturbing limit on the right of
religious practice, although this provision seems not to have been applied. It states that
religious activities and services “shall not violate the public peace and order, and shall
not disrespect the religious feelings and other freedoms and rights” of those not members.
This formulation is consistent with a general social ethos discussed below that is terribly
disturbed by the possibility that people should be allowed to make choices regarding the
ways they structure their lives and which views freedom as something acceptable only if
it is used properly. The question of such proper use seems to be left to the state. While
this provision has yet to be invoked against any religious group it does remain as a
potential club with which to coerce or silence those religious groups viewed as abnormal
and personal communications to me from the president of government’s Commission on
Religious Affairs suggest that this is more than mere paranoia.
It is particularly problematic when applied to religion. The biggest limits on
religious liberties in the Republic of Macedonia is the fundamental ability of the state to
determine what is and is not an acceptable religion and that religious association are
treated more strictly than other forms of associations.
On a formal legal basis there has been little overt discrimination or repression of
religious practice or belief. There have been some problems in the registration process
and certain groups found their applications delayed or rejected. Most of the latter were
on purely technical grounds.
The administrative delays, many of which were only solved through the
intervention of international third parties and local human rights NGOs, were due to a
fairly deep-seated and underlying hostility to new religious organizations. They reflected
a deep suspicion within much of the population, particularly the Macedonian Orthodox
Church, of religious organizations, especially Evangelical Protestant ones, which they
consider harmful and destructive sects. This suspicion is manifest in the limits placed on
the religious work of foreigners in Macedonia.
One of the preeminent forms of functional discrimination is between the formal
religious communities and the religious groups. Although there at first glance seems to
be little to distinguish these on a legal basis, such is not the case and an even greater
distinction exists when one considers the extent to which the division of religions into
communities and groups is premised upon a presumption about what religious traditions
actually belong in Macedonia. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, Islam, and Roman
Catholicism have been given the status of “religious communities” given their
longstanding presence in the region of Macedonia. A similar status seems to be currently
being bestowed on the revived Jewish community.
As mentioned above the religious communities do not have to meet the criteria of
membership numbers, etc. for registration. They, therefore, had a legal advantage over
the religious groups and began their work with the RoM with a privileged status both
functionally and legally.
Beyond the difficulties of undertaking the registration process, the smaller and
newer religious groups in the RoM experienced noticeable levels of discrimination from
their fellow citizens and often from local authorities. Jehovah’s Witnesses seem to have
been the greatest target and their building attempts have been hindered by permit delays
and vandalism. Permit delays for many of the smaller religious groups are quite
common. Although many of these delays result from the general inertia of the
bureaucracy and the lack of transparency of many government functions, some them
seem to be attributable to a desire by individuals to hinder the work of those religious
groups.
Interestingly, the most blatant forms of religious discrimination have been
directed primarily against the fellow Orthodox believers. Serbian priests have not been
allowed to enter the country to minister to the Serbian speaking minority, primarily due
to the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church refuses to recognize the autocephalous
nature of the Macedonian Church. Vlachs also appear to have been denied the right to
have services in their language and there exist some claims that the minute
Bulgarian-speaking minority also desires Bulgarian speaking Orthodox priests and cannot
have them. The legal basis of this stems from the Law on Religious Associations which
limits religious communities to one religious association and which prohibits the use of
similar names by religious associations. Functionally, at least in the case of the
Bulgarians and Serbs, it results from a longstanding conflict within the Church over the
independent (autocephalous) status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. This refusal to
allow these minorities access to religious services in their own language seems to place
the RoM in direct violation of Art 18 §§1, 3 and Art. 27 of the ICCPR as well as Article 9
§§ 1, 2 and Article 14 of the ECHR.
Here one clearly sees the fusion of religion, governmental policy, and the question
of national identity. The fact that the government is able to control the nature of religious
services, the existence of religious organizations, and can limit people’s right to access to
religion by controlling its official manifestations is one of the most powerful constraints
on religious liberty. The issue is not whether the state exercises that power as much as
the fact that legal structures exist which enable it to do so. When that is the case, the
state will use it for its own purposes, directing its powers against those who challenge it
whether implicitly or explicitly. This is clearly seen in the case of the Serbs and the
Bulgarians. Where the manifestation of a particular form of religious expression exists as
a challenge, either implicitly or explicitly, to state policy and to national identity, it is
unsurprising that it feels the exercise of state power.
Most disturbing in producing a sense of religious hostility and discrimination in
the RoM is the Macedonian Orthodox Church. It appears that as part of its desire to be
acknowledged not only as the national church and the bearer of national identity,
language, and culture, the Macedonian Orthodox Church also desires to be recognized as
the state church (despite this being forbidden by the Constitution of the RoM). Seeing
itself as the bearer of Macedonia identity, the church gives the impression that failure to
identify oneself as Orthodox or to change one’s religious faith to something other than
Orthodox is tantamount to a assault upon one’s national identity itself and an insult to
one’s ancestors who, allegedly, suffered much on behalf of their faith. The Macedonian
Orthodox Church critically and hostilely speaks of the new religious organizations in
RoM as “ sects” and claims that they are source of many dangers and a threat both to
individuals and society.
The Struggle for Identity and the Nature of the Macedonian State
As discussed above one of the major issues the question of the nature and
composition of the Republic of Macedonia. Practically it is a multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional state. Legally its nature is somewhat confused since the Constitution
speaks of it as both a national state and civil state. In terms of how people lived it is a
divided nation, one that is in the minds of many becoming more divided. Tensions
between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians are remarkably high and there exists little
intercourse between the communities. Each views the other as hostile and aggressive and
as wishing to dominate the state or, in the case of the Macedonian view of the Albanians,
to secede from it.
Most of the source of this division can be laid at the door of Macedonian
nationalists, including a powerful element within the Macedonian Orthodox Church, led
by the Patriarch himself. The position of certain segments of the Albania elite have done
little, however, to ease the conflicts. To a great extent this is reasonable. There have been
many occurrences that have led them to question their position in the state and with
changed circumstances within both the Republic of Albania and Kosovo, the realities of
Macedonia also have been altered drastically.
The number of Albanians within the RoM who desire an immediate unification by
any means of all the predominantly Albanian areas of RoM with Albania and Kosovo are
few (for as bad as things may be in the RoM economically and socially, they are
markedly better than they are in either Albania and Kosovo). That said, it must be
recognized that at least as a metaphysical ideal, many Albanians harbour dreams of a
greater Albania (Ishquipteria, Illirida). It becomes stronger the more that Albanians
perceive themselves as second-class citizens within the RoM. While this ideal may be
linked most directly with issues of Albanian language and culture, it also has an
increasingly religious component. Although both Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism are
represented among Albanians, the overwhelming majority are Muslim, at least nominally.
This Islamic identity, while of marked importance for only a minority of Albanian
Macedonians is still more significant there than in either Kosovo or Albania itself. It
remains, however, a source of identity for many Albanians in Macedonia and, more
importantly, structures to a great extent the manner in which they are perceived by
Orthodox Macedonians.
This is only exacerbated by the manner in which the Macedonian Orthodox
Church and to some extent the government uses Orthodoxy as a basis for constructing
Macedonian identity. By creating the picture of Macedonia as an Orthodox, Slavic
country they increasingly drive the Albanians into the opposing camp. This was not
assisted at all by the war in Kosovo. The tendency of the Serbian government to frame
its conflict with Albanians in terms of Orthodoxy Christianity versus Islam and to insist
on maintaining its hold over Kosovo due to a desire to avenge its loss to the Ottomans
600 years earlier also has helped to increase the perception that differences have a major
religious component but also to make the parties perceive it in that manner.
Finally, the aid provided by many of the Islamic countries—both humanitarian
assistance and covert arms and war materiel—also helped to give the participants the
perception that the conflict was indeed religious.
Given, therefore, that the regional conflicts increasingly have been seen as
religious in nature and that the role of religion in the construction of national identity is
increasing in importance, the status of religious laws and the perception of religious
entities by the state deserves greater attention and concern by local human rights NGOs
and by the international community.
Cultural Monuments
One of the most troubling, if not most overlooked, issues has to do with the
treatment of cultural monuments and the role of the government in privileging certain
religious symbols. There have been, and continue to be, actions by the state at both the
national and the local levels which have led either to the destruction of (Islamic) cultural
monuments or their being given a Christian valorization.
Mosque in Ohrid
In May of 2000 the government of the Republic of Macedonia demolished the
Imaret mosque in the city of Ohrid in order to build a church on the site. Such an
undertaking is a further example of the tendency within large sectors of the government
to privilege the Orthodox Christian narrative. The explanations provided for the
destruction by the Ministry of Culture did little to minimize the suspicion that it was an
express assault against the Islamic community. The ministry stated that the mosque was
of little historical importance since it was less than two centuries old and that its
destruction did little more than right an historical wrong since it had been built on the site
of a church.
Clock tower in Bitola
In several cities of Macedonia, Ottoman era clock towers remain as fairly
significant reminders of their former rule of the region. These towers are important
architectural and cultural monuments deserving of protection and sensitive treatment. In
an example of the way in which the authorities have acted in ways contrary to such
deserved treatment is the fact that in Bitola they placed a cross atop that city’s clock
tower. Needless to say, this raised a great deal of hostility in the Albanian population. It
also raises disturbing questions about the governmental perception of its relationship to
religion. This action not only desecrated an important cultural monument but served to
make a symbolic claim of the precedence of one religion within the country over others.
Funding for Preservation and Maintenance of Sites
A similar problem is created by the perceived and real inequity of the amount of
governmental funding provided for the preservation and maintenance of such
monuments. As one might suspect from the earlier discussion of the cultural monuments
emphasized in governmental activities and propaganda, the overwhelming bulk of monies
used for the maintenance and support of cultural monuments in the country go to those
monuments which highlight the glories of Orthodox Christianity in RoM.
To be fair, given the poverty of the country this does not account for an
overwhelming amount of funding. Additionally, there are reasons to suspect that the
Muslim community has not looked particularly favourably on placing their site in even
partially in the hands of government ministries. These caveats aside, it is clear that the
expenditures of the state are directed toward sites and museums which highlight a
Macedonian nationalist story and ignore the importance and role of other stories and
other events, especially Ottoman rule in the region. An illustration of this is the amount
of monies which have been allocated by the government for events commemorating,
th
indeed one might say celebrating, the 2000 anniversary of Christianity. The celebration
was budgeted at DM 4 million.
Indeed from conversations with him, the President of the Commission on
Religious Affairs seems to consider these events to be one of the high points of the work
of the Commission. During our interview he went on for a long time about what they had
planned and were doing, all of which was to culminate with the placement of a cross with
a banner inscribed with the year 2000 in the Vodno.
This position seemed particularly unnerving given his view that there was only
one legitimate national religion in Macedonia, namely the Macedonian Orthodox Church.
The commission president became particularly incensed when he discussed those who
felt or acted like that Macedonia was a multi-confessional or bi-confessional state. While
immediately dismissive of Protestant “sects,” especially those which were morally
dangerous, he saved his greatest length of discussion at Islam which he derided as a
religion of the past (the Ottoman period) and completely alien to Macedonia.
Other activities:
One example of the types of activities which have been undertaken is the act of
the erecting of a large concrete cross in the Matka (a hilly area outside of Skopje). This
cross apparently was paid for with governmental monies and governmental resources
(including a military helicopter) were used in its erection. Additionally, its location
directly above an Albanian Muslim village was less than sensitive and gave the
impression to many that only a particular way of being Macedonian counted. While
many in the local human rights community viewed this as relatively insignificant, neither
its effects nor the conceptual understandings which lie behind it should be dismissed. It
was regularly mentioned to me by Albanians during discussions with them and members
of the IGO and diplomatic communities discussed it in ways which suggested strongly
that they had heard numerous complaints about it.
th
Also, as part of the country’s general allocation for the celebration of the 2000
anniversary of Christianity there are plans to erect a large (and having seen the plans, I
mean very large) cross in the Vodno, the large mountainous area overlooking Skopje.
While these activities themselves are disturbing in a state, the constitution of
which has strong protections for religious freedom, even more bothersome is the linkage
of state funds with a particular religious viewpoint. Given a state as divided as the RoM
such a practice not only appears to violate the country’s basic law it is inherently unwise.
Ancillary implications
One of the most troubling current issues regarding religion has little to do with
religious practice per se. This is the issue of conscientious objection. The law in
Macedonia, a country with universal male conscription, recognizes that some individuals
are unable for religious reasons to take up arms. Such individuals are allowed to
undertake their military service in the armed forces but in an unarmed capacity. There
exists no alternative or civilian service for conscripts.
This law presents a significant problem for Jehovah’s Witnesses (who already
suffer from a fair amount of discrimination and from inequitable applications of the laws)
since they refuse to have anything to do at all with activities that involve killing or the
taking of human life. Several members of the Jehovah=s Witnesses have been arrested
following their refusal to accept induction and have as a result been prosecuted. After
being sentenced and serving their time, these individuals have then received new
induction notices and the situation begins anew.
The statements given by the defendants that their refusal is solely of a religious
nature are usually dismissed by the courts as irrelevant to the case, because the Law on
Defense supposedly provides a remedy in such instances. Even more disturbing is that a
major motive for the pronouncement of sentences on these persons is the expectation that
the sentence will influence the defendant to change his attitude to the military call of
duty, and undertake his army service. This often is coupled with a warning that if he
repeats his refusal—a more severe sentence will be imposed next time. This rationale for
sentencing shows the intention of the state to force the defendant to change his profound
religious beliefs (in case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses). This is contrary to the guaranty of
freedom of religion provided for in the Constitution and the Law on Religious
Communities which provides for legal equality of all religious communities in the
country. The personal integrity of the citizen and his right of religious belief and practice
is sacrificed to the (“higher”) interest of the state—to serve in the army. Factually this
criminal act (mentioned in Art. 341 of the Criminal Code) is transformed into a so-called
continuous criminal act, whereby the possibility is opened for the military conscript who
had been fined or imprisoned to again to be sentenced pursuant to the same Article.
There is no other way out for persons who, on grounds of their deep belief, refuse both
the standard and the so-called alternative form of army service.
Despite the ongoing efforts of the both the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights
of the Republic of Macedonia and external pressures, the law has yet to be changed.
Attempts to address these changes both through the parliament and the legal system
continue.
The Future
Given the current status of the Religious Associations law, there is a general
perception that a new law is required. The shape that such a new law should take is
greatly disagreed upon. The Commission on Religious Affairs which appears to have
primary responsibility for presenting a draft has not yet completed a draft. In my
conversations with the President of the Commission, he stated that the Commission
members currently were examining the laws of various neighboring countries. At the
first meeting several of the Commission members expressed the concern that the laws
being examined were insufficiently representative and requested that they get a greater
variety. Given the countries at whose laws they were looking–Bulgaria, Serbia, Austria–
this struck me as an eminently reasonable concern. The increased list, however, did not
look more promising. This fact and the striking absence of the relevant parts of the
Constitution of the RoM, the operative draft laws of the EU, and the relevant treaties
raised a great deal of suspicion. My visceral suspicion is that the law submitted, although
perhaps not emanating from the Commission, will have a much stronger role for the
Macedonian Orthodox Church and that the law’s supporters will point to Greece, Italy,
and Spain as EU members which have (to some degree) an established church, with
Greece being the most extreme. (See the attached annex of a statement from the
Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences as an example of this).
Simultaneously, there currently has been submitted a draft law to the Ministry of
Justice by the Macedonian Orthodox Church itself. This draft does not yet appear to be
public and the president of the Religious Commission had not seen a copy at the time of
our meeting.
Given the public positions taken by the current Patriarch, the consensus is that this
draft pushes for a formal recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a state
church in some form. There exist good reason for such suspicion. Not only has the
Macedonian Orthodox Church pushed hard for prayers in the public school as well as
religious instruction, but it has aggressively argued the linkage between Macedonian
culture and identity and the Macedonian Orthodox Christianity. This is particularly
troubling given that nationalist rhetoric is the norm for all of the political parties when
they are out of power.
Conclusion
Although large-scale violations of religious freedom have not been present in the
Republic of Macedonia, numerous and on-going limitations have been placed on the
religious practices of unpopular and minority religious groups. Additionally, the legal
regime of the state hinders the development of new religious associations and by
extension places what probably are unnecessary burdens on religious practice, burdens
which under the operative case law interpretations definitely seem to be in violation of
the European Convention of Human Rights and appear to violate the intent of the ICCPR.
More importantly there exists a wider cultural ethos within certain segments of
the government which results in the application of policies which definitely favour one
religion over another. Such an ethos is not only problematic for the long-term stability of
the Republic of Macedonia but often reaches the level where Macedonia is placed in
violation of the both the various international and regional human rights conventions
respecting religion, but also regarding the treatment of ethnic, racial, linguistic, and
religious minorities as well.
To a great extent, the pressures exerted by the international and human rights
communities have played a positive role in maintaining a modicum of social peace and
growing respect for international human rights norms. As tensions ease in Balkans and
attention turns elsewhere, it is questionable whether this attention will continue to a
degree sufficient to help Macedonia turn the corner and develop into a mature democratic
and pluralistic state.
Annex B
Persons Interviewed
Government
Mr.Gyorgy Naumov, President, Commission for Relations with Religious
Communities of the Republic of Macedonia
Experts:
Dr. Mirjana Naj@evska, Director, Center for Human Rights, Institute for
Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Sts. Cyril and Methodius
University, Skopje.
Dr. Teuta Arifi, Department for Albanian Language, Sts Cyril and
Methodius University, Skopje, and Research Fellow, Centre for OSCE
Research, IFSH, Hamburg.
Mr. Ahsim Zekollie, Journalist, Skopje
Mr. Xhabir Derala, Journalist, Skopje
Embassies
Charles Stonecipher, Political Officer, Embassy of the United States of
America,
IGOs:
Ms. Melinda Lord, Human Rights Officer, OSCE Spillover Monitor
Mission to Skopje
Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey (1998), and Sidiropolous
and Others v. Greece (1998)
Mr. Harald Schenker, Mission Member, OSCE Spillover Monitor
Mission to Skopje.
Mr. Vladimir Ristovski, Director, Information Office of the Council
of Europe, Skopje.
Mr. John White, Press and Information Director, European Union,
Delegation of the European Commission
Mr. Antonia Genzano, Head of Mission, European Commission
Monitoring Mission in Macedonia
Ms. Ana Androsik, Program Officer, United Nations Development
Program, Skopje
NGOs:
Mr. Francois Stamm, Head of Delegation (Macedonia),
International Committee of the Red Cross
Dr. Eran Fraenkel, Search for Common Ground – Macedonia,
Skopje.
Dr. Meto Jovanovski, Director, Macedonian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Suad Missini, Executive Director, Civil Society Resource
Center, Skopje.
Mr. Kim Mehmeti, Executive Director, Center for Multicultural
Understanding and Cooperation (CMUC), Skopje.
Mr. Shpend Imeri, Director, Association for Democratic Initiatives
(ADI), Gostivar.
Mr. Albert Musliu, Senior Programme Officer, Association for
Democratic Initiatives (ADI), Gostivar.
Ms. Diturije Mustafi, Senior Programme Officer, Association for
Democratic Initiatives (ADI), Gostivar.
Mr. Paul Miller, Amnesty International Office, Skopje
Ms. Elena Georgieva, Director, Embassy for Peace
Judge Evelyn Lance, ABA-CEELI, Skopje
Ms. Tanja Lubbers, Human Rights Project Director for Macedonia, Pax
Christi, the Netherlands
Ms. Farimah Daftary, Program Officer, European Commission on Minority
Issues, Germany
Ms. Victoria Ayer, Program Officer, National Democratic Institute
(U.S.A.), Skopje