17
CHAPTER2
Vietnam: Rellections and Lessons
ThomasSchelling
Distinguished
Professor
of Economics
andPublicAffarrs
University
of Maryland
My assignedropic is the disastrous
war in
Vieham whaLlessons.it any. cameour of thdl
war andhavewe in fact leamedthoselessons?
The overall frameworkfor this sessionis
th€ Cold War in Asia, and it is fitring that my
topiccomesunderthdt headrngrhe mosrsalienl
charactenstic
of rhelmS.engagernenr
In Vietnam
ras that two U.S. administations.lhe Lyndon
Johnsonandrhe Richard\rxon adnunisration",
5aw the initial Viet Cong insurgencyand the
later full scale milirary engagemenrwirh Nonh
Vietoameseforcesas an integral pan of rhe Cold
War. A seniormemberof Lyndon Johnsons
3taff explainedto me lhat the lTth parallel was
an extensionof ihe Polsdamagreement.We
w e r ec o m m i t t e d
t o h o l d r n gl h e l i n e a t t h a l
paralleljust as we were committedto hold the
li.e at the Elbe or ar lhe border berweencreece
atrdBulgaria.
SEangely.
Lhrsconceplion
appeared
toenla.
the vie$ nol only rhalrhe$aJ sar an Integral
parrof lhe Cold war. but rhalNonb vieham
was an integral pan of a monolithic and almosr
seanes( Communistblock. And this qar eveu
afler lhe splrrbet$eenChrnaand rhe So!rel
Uoionhadbecomevisibleto theoursideworlda!
bothbiiter andprobablyirreversible.
I doubt whetherthe North Vietnarmsewere
muchconcemed$irh $helherrheyuere pan o,
lhe ColdWar or not. Howeverwilling andeager
th€y were to reaeivematerial assistancefiom the
SovrerUnion.rhe) wereunlrlel) ro lhink or
themselves
as any kind of sitellire,or evenas
anotherCuba. Their own relationswith China
wereclearl) incompar'ble
wilh any fioueht ot a
Moscow-Beijing-Hanoi
axis. Any intereslsthey
h.d in Cambodraand olher nerghbonng
narion\
weresurel)intere\r(
oI tberrowD.not inreresls
subordinateto the interestsof Moscow. And
they could only have shakentbeir headsin
pu/,,lemenlif told rharrhe lTth parallelcreaEd
in rhe lo50s as a narionalboundarywas in anJ
way a cpintualdeicendatrt
ot rhe conrerence
al
That the North Vietnameseconsrruedrhc
stake.dd rheisruesalrogerhi'ditierenrlyfiom
the way lhe U.S. govemmentconstruedthern
especiallyin ;dentirying the strugglein Vietnam
$rlh lhe Cold \lar, doesnol sell Invdiidalearl
Americaninrerpreraron.rrhe time thal whar
was al stale at the lTih parallel wasexacdywhar
$as ar srakear rhe l8rh parallelrwenr)yearr
ea-rlier.Bur ir doesrarserhe quesrion$hether
the United Stateswas obliged ro see rhar
conne.tionand to.espondaccordingly.And it
promplr$e quesrionwherier.tf tndeedthe lTth
parallelacquiedde symbohc.Laru,ol rhe JSlh
parallel. it had alreadyacquiredthat slalus at the
rimelndochindudr drudedIn rhe Io50sor jt
hadacquiredthars6rusas a consequence
ol lhe
I ' S i n ! o l v e m e n t - + ! le na r e s u lol t l h et . S
govemments choiceto construethe strugglein
Vietnamaspartof theColdWar.
Ihe i('ue hele is oneol expectatrons
and
interpretations:wheiher th€ United Stateshad to
d e t e n dr t , h o n " r . l l . r e p u l a l r o na. n d j t .
commitmenro
s a l l r e rx r o u n dr h e \ o r l d h )
defendingSouth Vietnarnat whatevercost is
largely a maiter of whetherCermansand Gre€ks
and SoulhKorean.and Ru.sians
and ahines(
per,ei!erhe'rruggleIn rharfashron.{rd il the}
did, rhat must be becausethe United States
18
governmentmanifestedand articularedihar
rymboUsm
jur| a5 Ho Ctu
andrharinlerpretatron
Minh aniculatedthe struggleas a tesr wherhera
DoorAsiansocialistcountrycouldoudasra rich
Amencancapilalisrin a resrof nuhtarysramina
U.S. leaderscalledattentiotrto themselvesat
respondinglo a Cold War challengero a
seamlessboundarysurroundingthe Sovierbloc.
I belaborthe rs.uebecauieir rs a key lo rh(
quenionwhetherthe UniledSlarescullrLared
an
u n n e c e s s asr e
y n \ eo f c o m m i t m e nwt h e nr r
elecredto consrruethe arremptcto .ublen and
invadeSourhVrelDam
aspan of lhe Moscos
'nspjredandMoscow led Cold War. What
"escalated"in Vietnam
was no1 only the
c o m m i L m e nolf r e s o u r c ear n d t h e l e ! e l o l
v'oleoceand rhe areaol involvement;$hal
es€alatedalsowere the stakesin the contest,
It is imponant to understandhow the shkes
can cometo be raisedso high. I prceive ai least
t q o m e c h a n r s m sm, e c h a n ' s mtsh a t w o r k
'justification'
together. Oneis
, the otheris
Thein\ohemenl
is lus0fi€d
on grounds
lhar
ihe conflict is not local but worldwide, lhat the
U.S. must meetib commitnents hereor bave itj
€ommitmeotsdoubtedin otherplaces,thar as
lsder of the liee $orld the | .S. ha: no chorce.
lhat lhis strugglehas ramificationsfor the enlire
region througha domino process,and has
ramifications
as fdj awa) as Berhn.Greece.dnd
Cuba. The deterrencedimensionh $e hope of
makingrr clearro rheorhers,delharrhe U S.
commitmentis so immenseaDdso obligatory
and so unavoidablethat the United Stateshasno
choicebur lo slicl, to Ihe end at whaFvercosr.
the hope being that the other side will recognize
lhe ftuirle\.nesr
o[ rr]ingIo ourla.llh( I ni(ed
States.
The Cold War is over, and maybewe
needn't wony about repeatingmistakesthat our
ColdWar thinkingled us into. But I am nol sure
that our Cold war thinkingwas peculiarto rhe
Cold War. It will almosl always be the case
when the United States,or an allianceled by tbe
Uniled Slatescontemplateg.
or engagesin,
mililar)acrionrharrheicri.n conremplared
or
engagedin has to be iustified; and the
justification will almost certainly adduce
Yreham;Fell€ctdr3ra
principlesrhir rrrnscendlhe concretelocal
kluer Eralung rhosepnncrplesanddedicariog
r h e n a t i o nr o l h o s ep r i n c i p l e "q r l l a l m o s l
certaiolyenlarSelhe stakesIn the game. And
usuallydl(o. to p€rsuade
rhe opponenrlhar lhe
UoitedSraresmusl acr unlessdemandsare mel
or must stay in the contestuntil somekind of
victory is achieved,$e United Stareswill have
to display and .dvertise that if it do€snot rise to
the occasionhere,other aggressors
will be
emboldened
in olhertimesandplaces.rbrealened
nations will submit rather than count on
Amencanhelp.andan) Lnd of newwodd order
will loseits inliashrcture.
This is a genuinedilemrna. The needto
6nd jusrincarronin broadpnncrplesmtherrhan
local inrereslsis genuineand legirinate.andrh€
importance of providing grounds for the belief
rhalrheUnrledSlalesdndrrsalles cannorafford
ro backdosn shouldnor be mioimized.But
thesetwo ne€dsare met only al gr€at.isk. I can
o n l , L a l la t e n l l o nr o r h ed i l e m m aI. c a n n o r
resol\eir until I kno$ $heLherlhe mxt occasro'l
is goine to be Panmunjom.the lTih parallel
Berlin, Cubaor the PersianGulf.
A srunningleatureol rhe war In Vretnam
sa( Ihe e\rraordinarystabilit) of U.S.-Chinese
andU.S.-Sovier
relauonsduringtharenurewar.
I rpeorthe spflogof I06J In London.reading
editorials in The London Times and The
FinancialTimesand talking with pedplein
govemment. The most wid€spreadobjection to
the bombing of North Vietnam was that the
bombingso greatlyraisedthe probabilitythat
CommunistChinawould intervene:specilically
ir qas almosluni!ersall'arguedrhatif Arnencan
aircraftever went nonh of Hanoi the Chinese
$ould bc impell€dto rnrerlene.But tbe t orted
St:l'e' 'eSularl)hadnxhla4 arrcraftwrthrn5 or
l0 secondsflying time of the Chineseborder
andI believetherewere al leasta hundredborder
(roryngs recordedIn the newqpapers.
dndnever
a sign that the Chinesewould let themselves
be provoked into an jmprudent military
It was during thai war that U.S. relations
$irh Chrndrmpro\eddrdmatrcaily.And the facr
thalwe werein a bitterandexpensive
wa{with a
SoYierally thal 6.
6upporling seemcd
Sovier-ArEricaD .cL
by trying ro Fescrr I
Arn€ricao aircrrfl d
3idcs were ablc ro !
Soviet personoctr
.rraft sit€s.
In the aft.rDd.
lbc eIa of Sovica-Ar
crrsrs n,a! simplt I
Gcchoslovatir it| 19
SALT Egoria.io6. h
aor tccp thcD i
of tl
iEturbability
(n)o drinS di.
!d
ldd-nin!ftG
Similrrly siti
-t Edry soadaE?as did Dd pttrt Korcln Wrr lb I
biDdcetov,hodrocdil
&.8 . Nobody La
bao
oot to !- I
fc bd coc r lol
h.idcr.
Eir*
G.'htbr
uill codb..
r
LLblc
ffi r- - a
'gch rr+c
lfl,
r
b h.ving bcc@ cu
!y coobal rLaEiclly milir.rt I
't
purposcs,I r
be os€djoi a
r anythlngdr.'
Tco t€3rs lara, i
h6oo
said. "M& |
lhinS a! a cooE
d
rineteen
pc.il-iI
;o.
bo-d dr aton rgi- i political deci3io
cotrfess I do dot b
Fjte how€r rE lly rE
by the l960s almod I
rlapom lo be Fti|Fl
*!y b€yondVicr!.n
Vbtnam;
Retleclions
andLe$ons
I9
Sovietally thal lhe Sovietswere materialty
s u p p o r l i nsge e m e d
r o h a \ e n o i n f l u e n coen
Soviel-American
relarion\The Soviet(obtrped
by lryjng lo pre.enrno embanassing
larger,ro
Americanarrcrafror naval\essel(,and borll
sideswere able to prerendrhat there was no
S o \ , e tp e r s o n n ealr N o r r h\ r e r n a m e (aen t r .
It is indeed a tribute to how far nuclear
e x p e c t d r i o n ,h a d r ' a v e l e d i n r h d t d e c a d er h d l
ha(lly anybody remarked. during Vietnam, on
t h e a b s e n c eo f d e b a t e a b o u t p o s s i b l e u s e o f
nuclea.weapons. Of course,there may not have
beeniargels thai demandednuclearaitacks. Bur
ifnuclear weaponswere, in Eisenhower'swo.ds,
''as
atdildble for u.e us nlher mun,Ilon., uc
In $e ajrermath
ol rheCuban(nyr ol 1962 s h o u l d h a v e h e a r d a r g u m e n t s o r . e p o r t s o f
l h e e r ao f S o \ i e r - A m e r j coarnS o r i e lN A I U
a r g u m e n t sa b o u t t a r g e r s jm e a n s o f d e l i v e r y .
c r i l i l w a s r i m p l ) o \ e r T h e r n v a . i o no l
)ield, andbu,.l ele!atlons \o. they$ere
Czechoslova*ia
In I9o8 remporarilypoJrponed simply noi available.
SALI negotiarions.
burrhewri in vrernamdid
trot keep lhem lrom resumrng. The
imperlurbabiliry
ol borhChinaandrhe So\ier
Unrondunng tbir periodr\ one ol the periods
mosl stuoningfaatures.
Similarly striking and signincanl,thorgh
ml nearlyso astoni.hroS.
rs rh€role rharnuclear
eeapons did not play. Rememberthat early in
tbe Koreanwar rhe PrimeMrni\rerof Grear
Britainflew lo \lashingronto beseech
Pre<idenl
Trumannot to considerusingnuclearweapons
in
Korea. Nobody had to imporruneLyndon
Johnson
not ro u(e such$eapon\in Vrelnam.
W€ had comea long way since1953.when
PresidentEisenhowerapproved a policy
"ln lhe evenrof hosrilrries,
datemenr.
fte I nheo
Stateswill considernuclearweaponsto be as
availablefor use as othermunitions." And in
1954,"suchweaponsmustnow be treatedas in
facthavingbecomeconventional.'Andin 1955,
'ln any combatwherethese
thingscan be used
on strictly military targetsand for srriclly
military purposes.
I seeno reasonwhy rhe,
shouldnt be usediustexactlyasyou wouldusea
bulletor anythingelse."
Ten yearslat€r, in Seplember1964,Lyndon
.aid, 'Make no misrale The.ei. nu
Johnson
suchrhinga. a conrentronal
nuclear$eapon
For nineteenperil filled years no nation has
loosedthe atom againstanother. To do so now
is a political decisionof the highestorder.' I
c o n f e c rI d o n o t b e l i e \ e t h a t P r e r r d e n l
E'"enhowerreall] meanrwharhe sard.bursurelr
by the 1960salmostnobodyexpectednuclear
weaponslo be peninenrunlesslhe warescalared
waybeyondVietnam.
Vietnamremindsus of how exceptionally
difficult it can be to get out of a war thal one
$ould prefernol lo conrroue theremaybe \ery
lew points,if any, at which a govemmentcan
turn aroundand get oui, declaringvictory (or
defeat) but getring out. Is tbere any way to
identify one of lhoserare moments?The late
.pnng of l068 may havebeenone. Rrehrafte'
rheTeroffensr\e.
washrngron
wastull ofpeople
$ho had appeared
enlhu.ra.tsof rhe war lor
severalyea$ who werediscoveringthat ihey had
reallyheenagain.trr sinceevenbeforerheTel
offensive This was a wholly demoralizing
' e t b a c \ .p a r t i c u l a r lr!o t h e a ( p i r a r i o na<n d
pretensions
of military intelligence.It was an
e.asytim€ to come oul and say, "I told you so '
Maybeil was unfortunatethat it turnedout to
havebeenenoughof a setbackfor the other side.
roo.,o thdt n,'hod) couldrakead\antageol he
occasjonto developa consensus
and go to the
President
andsayit wastimeto getout.
Pre\rdenr
JohnsonIndeedpavePresidenl
\i(on an opponunir).
andNi\onrcled*ronglr.
not necessarily
unwisely,but wronglyin the
event.I think he recognized
theopponunilyibut
he $anredlo do rhe rightlhing.andrhe riShl
thjng meant nothing precipitous.norhing
disprl"eful.
onl) gelonpout wrrhhonor. Thal
approach
may be just as muchof a quagmneas
gettingin in the lirst place. lf you are flying in
thecloud' dnd'unnrngourof tuelanddon t dare
ro de.cendfor tearlhe cloud. reachhe ground.
rf youeverse€an op€ning,divel Probablywhen
fiere is an opponunityto ger out of a war one
ha5Io be grarprt prompd).as PresidenlNi\on
did nol.
2Q
The lessonthat may ne€db be leamedover
andover,a lessonthatpossiblyno one canever
apply.is the extraordinary
difficulty of pulling
in
which
one hasinvested
out of a situation
reasons
why the United
heavily. Whateverthe
got
Slares into Vietnam,the ultimatereasonsthal
we weretherefrom late 1965until the time we
finally evacuaredwas that nobody could
persuasively
inventa gmcefulway of gettingout.
LyndonJohnsoncameas closeas one might to
demonstating a principle rhat I have quoted
from Ernesl May on a numberof occasions.
That is that "gov€mments" never surrenderthe
wars lhey fight. New govemmentshaveto come
in to do the su.rendering. Lyndon Johnsonlet a
new governmentin, and il failed to take
advantage.
I do not think ihe U.S. Govemmenteve'
seriouslystudiedthe oplion of getting out of
Vietnam. The reasonI do not think so is not that
I have not heardabout plans but that I think
p l a n n r n gI o r l h d r k r n d o f c o n t l n g e n c i] s
something that governmentsare almosl
constitutionallyincapableof, probablyall
govemmentsand not just govemmentslike ours
in the United States. To officially and seriously
askp€opleduriog Vieoum to makeplans to pull
the rug out from under those who were over
there fighting would be terribly risky-not only
with respectto what leaksto the enemy,but what
leaksto ones own people,andto one'spolilical
opponeots.To acknowledgewithdrawalas a
responsibleoption to study plays inio the hands
of thosewho alreadywant to get out and who
w a n ra Da d m i s s t o inn p t i n c i p l et h a t r l r s a
legitimate option, thereby giving them
bargainingpower.
For thal reason.to talk aboutthe ne€dio set
up a procedurein which you will always
e'{amine$ar opfionrs to asklhe impossrbleA
leadercannotpermir that. Any hint that suchan
optionis beingtakenseriouslycould seriorsly
demoralizethe military officers responsiblefor
Ihe wdr. Perhap((uchsludiescan
conducring
only be done unofficially. Somebodyhas to
volunreerro go off and studythe problems
saying."l know that my Presidentcould never
acquresce
rn my d.rng $is at hi' reque$.I won t
, e c a u siel
e v e na s kh i m r l h e s a n l r i l d o n e b
would be lnfair to require the Presidentto give
an answer,and his answerwould have to be
negalve.'
It occursto me as I write this that I may
by evenhintinglhat
incur disfavorsomewhere
rhe ljnrredSrateswill eler againneedto lum
around
andgerout. 8ut thediffcult)ol luming
aroundand gettingout should go into that
calculaiion of risks that I m€ntionedearlier, the
whelherlo raiserhe stakeslo iusdry
calcularion
tbe action and to create that credible
Khrushchevin 1960saidthat demo€racies
$ e r e r o o s o l r r o 6 g h l i n w a r so f n a l i o n a
bul I
liberaflon. Sofi r5loo srmplea diagnosis.
thrnl a do?enyearslaterwe knewwhalhe meant
dd grudFnglyconcededhe hada pornl Whal
we didn t know and what he didn't know was
and
rharlhe SovierUnions krnd.t sociahsm
despotrsm
couldpro!e jusl as soll. He died
couldshowup his misplac€d
beloreArghanrstatr
?
Itr rhc l95(b bityA||ier.
r conaurat att
!I
QE-.of oF(db!
-LDP torn ia lll
f6trr|-aa
aa
lcaia
aclicrcl
L-,
|lat arat
craa ff
.-
rb.L
tu,
b-ti{
ry
F.f
ircrEidt
ta.Ead ca
Dr! altrl]l
Tho.'l
irdE
And the SovietUniondidn't evenhavelhe
Cold War to cement their commitmentin
Afghanislanor to justify it. Vietnam and its
invilereexamjna[on
man)posimonemanalyses
6asco
in AfghanisBn.
hShr
ot
the
Sovrel
rn rhe
but I am not ihe onelo provide it.
clrir'tF
rcvard JE-
rtuttd
Stkto
iir
arE
oilir-y d
oortL, ccom-
. Bu pdiJ
chrrEiztir
r
+orrd:tbtHi
Bat*aao tta- r
Fods caoc, of cq
Pr6idcot Richrrd t