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Memory and the self
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Martin A. Conway
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The Leeds Memory Group, Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
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Received 19 July 2005; revision received 29 August 2005
7 Abstract
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The Self-Memory System (SMS) is a conceptual framework that emphasizes the interconnectedness of self and memory. Within this framework memory is viewed as the data base of the self. The self is conceived as a complex set of active
goals and associated self-images, collectively referred to as the working self. The relationship between the working self
and long-term memory is a reciprocal one in which autobiographical knowledge constrains what the self is, has been,
and can be, whereas the working self-modulates access to long-term knowledge. Specific proposals concerning the role
of episodic memories and autobiographical knowledge in the SMS, their function in defining the self, the neuroanatomical basis of the system, its development, relation to consciousness, and possible evolutionary history are considered with
reference to current and new findings as well as to findings from the study of impaired autobiographical remembering.
! 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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17 Keywords: Autobiographical memory; Episodic memory; Goals; Recollective experience; Déjà vu; Amnesia; Neuroanatomy of me18
mory; EEG; fMRI; Evolution of memory
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A key feature of the approach taken to memory here,
is that cognition is driven by goals: memory is motivated. This approach is embodied in a conceptual framework termed the Self-Memory System, (SMS, Conway
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini,
2004) and the principal aim is to elaborate the nature
of and rationale for the SMS. Findings from various domains are used to illustrate aspects of the SMS but a systematic review of the full range of findings is not
undertaken (several very detailed reviews are currently
available; see, for example, Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004; McAdams, 2001,
and edited volumes by Bluck, 2003; Holmes and Hack-
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The author was supported by the award of a Professorial
Fellowship from the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC), RES-051-27-0127 of the United Kingdom and he
thanks the ESRC for this support.
E-mail address: [email protected]
man, 2004; Lampien et al., 2004; Skowronski, 2004).
The SMS consists of two main components, the working
self and the autobiographical memory knowledge base.
When these components interlock in acts of remembering, specific autobiographical memories can be formed.
Each, however, can operate independently and possibly
enter into processing sequences other than those mediating memory. Both components and their interaction in
remembering are considered in detail in this article. In
the opening section, two general distinctions underlying
the SMS framework are outlined. These are, first, a distinction between the self-coherence of autobiographical
knowledge and how it does or does not correspond to
experience and, second, a distinction between very recent memories and long-term retention. Subsequent sections consider in turn, the working self, the
autobiographical knowledge base, the construction of
autobiographical memories, and the neuroanatomical
basis of the system. The discussion closes with new pro-
0749-596X/$ - see front matter ! 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005
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In this section, general issues relating to accuracy of
memory, the self, and goals are outlined that conceptually frame empirical findings from the study of both normal and abnormal remembering. One starting point for
current thinking about the nature of autobiographical
remembering derives from the distinction made by Russell (2001, Chapters 12 & 13 in The Problems of Philosophy) between philosophical theories of truth that
depend on coherence (of propositions) versus those that
depend on correspondence with a fact.1 A version of this
distinction applied to human memory is useful in conceptualizing various aspects of autobiographical
remembering.
70 Coherence and correspondence
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Human memory, as William James (1890/1950) observed, is a major component of the self. Indeed, it has
often been observed and long been known that memories may be altered, distorted, even fabricated, to support current aspects of the self, e.g., Bartlett (1932),
Freud (1899, 1915), Greenwald (1980), Loftus (1993),
Loftus and Ketcham (1994), Rapaport (1952/1961),
Ross (1989). This is referred to here as coherence or
self-coherence (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004).
Coherence is a strong force in human memory that acts
at encoding, post-encoding remembering, and re-encoding, to shape both the accessibility of memories and the
accessibility of their content. This is done in such a way
as to make memory consistent with an individual!s current goals, self-images, and self-beliefs (as Greenwald,
1980, originally noted). Thus, memory and central aspects of the self form a coherent system in which, in
the healthy individual, beliefs about, and knowledge
of, the self are confirmed and supported by memories
of specific experiences. By way of illustration consider
for example a perhaps not uncommon occurrence: supporters of a football team recalled events from an important match that confirmed their belief in the
sportsmanship and high skill level of the players, despite
the fact that their team had clearly played a very physical and unsportman-like match (Hastorf & Cantril,
1952). Such biases in memory in favor of core aspects
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56 Constraints and types of memories
of the self are pervasive signs of coherence. Indeed
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Rapaport (1952/1961), in a classic review of the relation
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of emotion to memory, commented that memory should
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be conceived of ‘‘not as an ability to revive accurately
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impressions once obtained, but as the integration of
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impressions into the whole personality and their revival
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according to the the needs of the whole personality (p.
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112–113).’’ The converse, however, extreme violations
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of coherence when memories undermine or contradict
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important parts of the self, are only usually present in
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psychological illnesses or following brain damage.
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Baddeley, Thornton, Chua, and McKenna (1996)
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reported a series of cases illustrating these types of strik110
ing violations of coherence in hospitalized schizophren111
ics. For instance, a young man who believed himself to
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be a famous rock guitarist also knew that he could not
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play the guitar, another patient believed himself to be
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a Russian chess grand master even though he had never
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been to Russia, could not speak Russian, and was regu116
larly beaten at chess by fellow patients, and so on. Dow117
nes and Mayes (1994) report an interesting case of a
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neuropsychological patient with a vivid and intrusive
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memory of having a bitter argument with his father
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the previous evening even though, at the same time, he
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could recall attending his father!s funeral some years
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earlier. When the self and autobiographical memory be123
come disconnected in this way, so that memories no
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longer "ground! core beliefs of the self, then delusions
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and confabulations emerge. Disorders of coherence will
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be considered further in the later section.
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These are extreme violations of coherence and per- 128
haps only arise, frequently and prominently, in psycho129
logical and neurological illnesses. They nonetheless quite
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powerfully suggest the importance of coherence to a sta131
ble self, one which can operate effectively on the world.
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Indeed, it seems that in the healthy individual a variety
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of processes may act to self-regulate and ameliorate
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the effects of self-dissonant memories. Beike and Landoll
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(2000) found that dissonant memories were responded
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to with a variety of strategies including outweighing, jus137
tification, and closure. Thus, an individual who recalls a
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memory of a happy experience from a period of their life
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they evaluate as unhappy, might categorize the disso140
nant happy memory as being an exception in a period
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of otherwise unhappy experiences (outweighing), or they
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might consider the remembered event to be a justifiably
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happy one in an otherwise unhappy period, or they may
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have some closure on the dissonant memory, accept that
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it was unusual for the period, but not require any further
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processing. These are all cognitive reactions to dissonant
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memories. Another reaction, however, is that of rumina148
tion and preoccupation with memories of difficult and
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discordant experiences. In the well individual this may
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be manifest as "worry! whereas in psychological illness
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it may take a more intrusive, repetitive, and malignant
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form. It seems then that autobiographical memory is
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posals concerning the types of memory system that
might mediate autobiographical remembering and the
development of these systems ontogenetically and
phylogenetically.
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1
I am particularly indebted to the philosopher Dr. Christoph
Hoerl, from the University of Warwick, for directing me to
Russell!s discussion of this distinction.
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is a product of the tradeoff between the separate but
competing demands of coherence and correspondence.
Recent memory and long-term memory
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A fundamental problem confronting any goal-based 213
system is how to keep track of progress in goal process214
ing. If you cannot remember whether or not you locked
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the door of your house this morning the only way to
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evaluate this goal is to conduct some sort of physical
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check. But the cost in activity and time of such checking
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are prohibitive and can be maladaptive. Consider the ex219
treme case of the densely amnesic patient Clive Wearing
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(Wilson, Baddeley, & Kapur, 1995) who initially kept
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several diaries in which, every few minutes, he would
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write that he had just awoken from being dead, appar223
ently unaware that he had written the same statement
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a few minutes earlier. Although this patient is unusual
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it is the case that many patients with anterograde amne226
sia repeat actions, statements, and behaviors that they
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fail to remember having recently executed. Set against
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this is a storage-cost problem. An efficient memory sys229
tem could not retain the many thousands of memories of
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door locking, car parking, and all the myriad!s of rou231
tine every day activities. Despite this, memories of such
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events must initially be formed otherwise progress in
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goal processing could not be accurately tracked. Per234
haps, these recent memories are, within a short period
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of time, actively inhibited (Bjork, 1989) and because of
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this they are not rehearsed and so rapidly become diffi237
cult to access. Such memories might still, perhaps, play
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some nonconscious role and for at least some time con239
tinue to influence cognition implicitly.2 The suggestion
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that episodic memories arising from everyday experience
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may have enduring nonconscious effects is particularly
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interesting and points to a new and potentially impor243
tant direction for future autobiographical memory
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research.
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The SMS framework proposes that all recent memo- 246
ries are ultimately on a forgetting trajectory and will in
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fact be forgotten unless they become integrated with
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other long-term memory representations. From an
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adaptive point of view this is desirable because a record
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of events that featured recent goal processing is retained
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but for only a brief period and, therefore, does not im252
pose an unacceptable demand on storage. Long-term
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memory does not retain extensive numbers of recent
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memories. Instead, it is proposed that, retention of re255
cent memories only occurs for those recent episodic
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memories associated in some way with long-term goals.
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In summary, recent memory consists of a set of recently
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formed episodic memories that represent events featur259
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dominated by the "force! or "demand! of coherence. A
stable, integrated, self with a confirmatory past that
yields a consistent and rich life story (Bluck & Habermas, 2001) constitutes a self that is able to operate effectively, achieve goals, and relate to others in productive
ways (Bluck, 2003). A coherent self will have high selfesteem and a strong positive sense of well being (see
Csikszentmihalkyi & Beattie, 1979 & Conway, Singer
et al., 2004, for a review), both powerful predictors of
physical health. Thus, the benefits of coherence may
then be considerable.
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Set against the force of coherence is the demand of
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correspondence. Conway, Meares et al. (2004) argued
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that from an evolutionary perspective a memory system
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that did not maintain an accurate record of goal process169
ing and the effects of goal processing would be unlikely
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to survive. Memory then should correspond to experi171
ence. On the other hand, a system that maintained literal
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or even highly detailed records of moment-by-moment
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experience would be faced with insurmountable prob174
lems of storage and retrieval. The memory system is,
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therefore, faced with several mutually contradictory de176
mands. One is to represent reality as this is experienced,
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but in cognitively efficient ways, and another is to retain
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knowledge in such way as to support a coherent and
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effective self. Conway, Meares et al. (2004) propose that
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this is achieved by what they term adaptive coherence.
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That is to say that there is some optimum level of reten182
tion for any given experience that maximizes fitness and
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survival. For instance, for many experiences simply
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recalling the meaning or the "gist! may be sufficient, as
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Bartlett (1932) so strongly argued, (see Brainerd & Rey186
na, 2001, 2004; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000, for
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recent treatments of this and see too Neisser!s, 1981 clas188
sic study of John Dean!s memory). In autobiographical
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remembering there is a great deal that people can accu190
rately remember, i.e., that certain events occurred, with191
out recalling many or, in some instances, any further
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details. Note that, this is not to do with inferring what
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must have taken place or what might have been the case.
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But rather it is to do with representing experience con195
ceptually. In unpublished work from our laboratory
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we have found that people can remember experiences
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as varied as period of work, a holiday, period of illness,
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house they once lived in, people that they have briefly
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met, etc., without being able to recall any, or more than
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a few, specific memories. Retention of conceptual auto201
biographical knowledge that corresponds to experiences
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that actually occurred without access to associated epi203
sodic memories may be one way the SMS reduces the
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potential information overload of retaining very detailed
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and extensive records of experience. Conceptual auto206
biographical knowledge and retaining the meanings of
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experiences are ways in which memory can accurately
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correspond to experience in efficient ways. Overall, a
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central principle of the SMS framework is that memory
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I am grateful to Professor Larry Jacoby, of Washington
University, for drawing this possibility to my attention.
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In the SMS framework recent episodic memory and
long-term autobiographical knowledge solve the problems of keeping track of short- and long-term goal processing respectively. Another set of problems, however,
relate to goal management, i.e., coordinating goal processing, maintaining goal compatibility, goal prioritization, etc. This is achieved by the working self, the
main function of which is to maintain coherence (between goals) and it does so, in part, by modulating the
construction of specific memories, determining their
accessibility and inaccessibility, and in the encoding
and consolidation of memories.
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283 Goals and self-knowledge
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The term working self as used by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) refers to the currently active goal hierarchy which they viewed as part of the working memory
system (Baddeley, 1986, 2000). The central idea is that
there is a highly complex goal-sub-goal hierarchy of interlocked negative and positive feedback loops in which
goals are represented at different levels of specificity
(Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998). The purpose of the goal
hierarchy is to reduce discrepancies between desired goal
states and the current state and in so doing, regulate
behavior. It is through the goal hierarchy that new knowledge enters long-term memory and it is also through the
working self that preexisting knowledge is accessed and
memories are constructed. It is proposed that the goal
structure is in a permanent state of activation but at any
given time some subset of the structure is at a yet higher
level of activation and is operative in guiding and regulating current cognition, affect, and behavior (see Carver &
Scheier, 1998). In these respects, the goal hierarchy of
the working self-operates as a set of control processes that
determine encoding, accessibility of knowledge in longterm memory, and the construction of memories (see Burgess & Shallice, 1996; for a more processing-oriented account of the working self, Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; for
a more social-cognitive oriented account, and the closing
section of this paper for data on the neurological representation of this system).
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270 The working self
A recent theoretical development of the working self- 311
construct (Conway, Meares et al., 2004), one that aimed
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to integrate the SMS model more fully with social-cog313
nitive theorizing about the self, e.g., Cantor and Kihl314
strom (1985, 1987, 1989), Klein and Loftus (1993),
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Neisser, 1988, recognizes that in addition to the working
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self-goal structure there is also a set of working self-con317
ceptual knowledge. This consists of non-temporally
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specified conceptual self-structures, such as personal
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scripts (Demorest, 1995; Singer & Salovey, 1993;
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Thorne, 1995; Tomkins, 1979), possible selves (Markus
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& Nurius, 1986), self-with-other units (Ogilvie & Rose,
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1995), conceptual aspects of internal working models
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(Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980), relational schema
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(Baldwin, 1992), self-guides (Strauman, 1990; Strauman
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& Higgins, 1987), attitudes, values and beliefs. All of
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these are abstracted knowledge structures that exist
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independently of specific temporally defined incidents
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(episodic memories and autobiographical knowledge),
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but are connected to autobiographical knowledge and
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the episodic memory system to activate specific instances
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that exemplify, contextualize, and ground their underly332
ing themes or concepts. Conway, Meares et al. (2004)
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term this the conceptual self. The representations of
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the conceptual self are socially constructed schema and
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categories that define the self, other people, and typical
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interactions with others and the surrounding world.
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These schema and categories are drawn largely from
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the influences of familial and peer socialization, school339
ing, and religion, as well as the stories, fairy-tales,
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myths, and media influences that are constitutive of an
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individual!s particular culture (Bruner, 1990; Pasupathi,
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2001; Shweder and Bourne, 1984). Thus, both goals and
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conceptual self-knowledge act as control processes or as
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the source for such processes in the everyday regulation
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of memory.
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ing short-term goal-processing, e.g., getting to work.
Long-term memory contains knowledge and episodic
memories related to long-term goal processing, e.g.,
completing a work project. In terms of correspondence
and coherence, recent memory is biased towards correspondence at the expense of coherence whereas the reverse is the case for long-term memory which is biased
towards issues of coherence over correspondence. In
the sections that follow a wide range of findings that
bear upon these distinctions are described.
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Maintaining coherence
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Recently, Conway, Meares et al. (2004, 2005) have 348
suggested that at the heart of the working self-goal
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structure is a principle of conservatism, the purpose of
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which is to resist goal change (in this respect the working
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self corresponds to what Greenwald, 1980; called the "to352
talitarian ego!). Goal change is costly in cognitive-affec353
tive terms because any change, even the successful
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achievement of a goal, has consequences for many other
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goals. Moreover, during a period of goal-change the self
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may be more vulnerable to destabilizing influences and
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less capable of operating effectively upon the world.
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Thus, the working self may act to lower the accessibility
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of memories of events which challenged the goal struc360
ture. It may even distort memories of such events in or361
der to maintain coherence and to delay or avoid
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altogether goal-change, cf. Wilson and Ross (2003).
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Conway, Meares et al. (2004) provide several clinical
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(i) Memory for a road traffic accident (RTA). A man
who drove cars for a living was involved in a road
traffic accident. He was a back seat passenger in a
car when it was in a high speed collision with
another vehicle; activation of the air bags in the
front of the car produced a cloud of powder,
which he thought at the time was smoke. At the
time he could smell petrol and thought the car
might ignite and he remembered thinking "I will
be burned alive.! His wife was unconscious after
the impact and he thought that she had died. He
remembered thinking to himself "What am I going
to do now?! as he thought about his future alone
without his wife. Subsequently he experienced
severe guilt about this thought, which suggested
to him that he was a selfish person. It became
one of his intrusive flashbacks and always induced
an overwhelming guilt. In addition, he was a highly professional driver and he had anticipated the
crash, but did not cry out. He felt that he could
have averted the crash if he had done so. He experienced intrusive thoughts, such as "I should have
shouted! (to warn the driver) and he relived the
feeling of guilt he felt when he thought his wife
had died, which he believed to be his fault because
he did not shout a warning.
(ii) A 9/11 eyewitness. A middle-aged woman
observed the planes going into the World Trade
Center from a street close by. Two months later
she was referred to a cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT) clinic (in England) and appeared to be very
distressed, anxious, and with marked avoidance.
She had a powerful distorted visual image flashback in which she saw herself high above the
ground observing the collision of the plane with
the building. The scene is very peaceful and there
is no noise. Whenever the image intruded into
consciousness, which it frequently did, she felt
intense, destabilizing, guilt.
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false and she was able to recognize it as false, even
though she nonetheless experienced it as a "real! memory.
A later section considers how it is possible to have memories that are false or not even memories but nonetheless
experience these mental states as memories. Note too,
the strong parallel with findings from the laboratory
using the DRM procedure which induces recollective
experience for items falsely recognized (Roediger &
McDermott, 1995). Both patients underwent cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT) in which "reliving! was a
prominent part of the treatment. For the RTA patient
this entailed a visit to the crash site, detailed examination of police records, as well repeated recall of all that
could be remembered of the experience. For the 9/11 patient the treatment focussed on imagery and in trying to
reinstate something close to the perspective she would
have had at the time (rather than the "observer! perspective of her flashback, see Nigro & Neisser, 1983). A
breakthrough in the treatment of the RTA patient occurred when he realized, based on police records and
his own memory, that there had in fact been no possibility of him shouting a warning. In his memory the moment of impact was time dilated so it appeared to him
that he had the opportunity to shout a warning, but
for some inexplicable and "guilty! reason had not. In
CBT the time dilation gradually diminished so that his
memory came to represent more accurately the speed
with which the collision had occurred. As this change
in his memory came about so his intrusions diminished
and the guilt and anxiety associated with them considerably weakened. The 9/11 patient quite quickly regained
a field perspective in her memory and could then recall
the cries of the crowd around her as she looked up to
see the plane strike the building. At this point she was
able to experience the powerful feelings of foreboding,
fear, and anger which she had experience at the time,
but which up to this point she had not been able to
either experience or acknowledge. Once the observer
perspective was reinstated her PTSD symptoms lessened, eventually being lost altogether (Conway, Meares,
et al., 2005, for a full account of these and several similar
cases).
According to the present view of autobiographical
memory the SMS operates to protect itself from change
(to maintain coherence). In the case of the RTA patient,
although he eventually resumed a normal life he did not
return to his career of professional driving. Indeed, he
required further therapy to enable him to even sit in a
car. For this patient the accident clearly demonstrated
to him that he was not always in total control when driving a vehicle, that events could occur no matter how professional a driver he was. This notion was destabilizing
for the patient to such an extent that it was preferable
to have a distorted intrusive memory than to acknowledge it and its implications. During his CBT issues of
control emerged as a preoccupation in several areas of
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examples of patients with posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) who presented with intrusive vivid memories
that contained errors or which were false. These PTSD
memories appeared to serve a defensive function which
was to protect the self from major change. One of the
most common comments from trauma survivors is that
post trauma they are a ‘‘different person,’’ which at least
suggests that changes to the self following the experience
of trauma can be far reaching (see Conway, Meares
et al., 2004, 2005 & Conway, Singer et al., 2004, for a
more detailed treatment of this point). By way of illustration consider the following two cases:
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These examples are interesting for several reasons.
418 But note that for the 9/11 witness her memory is clearly
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implausible events, denial of physical incapacities, and
lack of insight into their brain damage (anosognosia).
In contrast, other types of frontal damage (often mainly
to the right hemisphere) can give rise to false memories
that support an aggressive and paranoid view of the
world (Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004). Fotopoulou,
Conway, and Tyrer (2005) report the case of patient
AO who suffered extensive right hemisphere lesions
and subsequently developed many paranoid false memories and beliefs, i.e., that she was moved from room
to room at night, that she had rows with carers, etc.
These were persistent and often consistent. Fotopoulou
et al. (2005) argue that these false memories were generated by the SMS to justify her feelings of paranoia and
anger. Patient AO was anosognosic for her physical and
mental incapacities. For example, she not only claimed
she could walk but confabulated memories of recent
trips in which she walked long distances (around her
childhood village in Scotland for example which was
over 250 miles away and impossible for her to visit).
She blamed the doctors for doing something, nonspecific, to her head. Occasionally, AO did have insight into
her condition and could acknowledge her injuries. But
these insights were rare episodes and quickly supplanted
by the return of her paranoid confabulations, the ultimate function of which was to deny her changed state
of well-being and the major changes to her goal-system
that this required.
According to the SMS framework control process of
the working self may act to edit memory content or generate false memories to resist change and, ultimately, to
maintain goal coherence. This is seen strikingly in some
patients with psychological illnesses and in other patients with brain damage. It may, however, be a general
feature of all autobiographical remembering and, perhaps, one of the reasons that memory has been found
to be so open to manipulations that create false memories or which distort features of existing memories (see
Conway, 1997a, 1997b; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Schacter, 1997). An interesting corollary is that it should
be difficult if not impossible to induce false memories
and memory distortions which disrupt coherence. It is
notable that the types of memories that have been induced using experimental procedures are of fairly anodyne and plausible childhood events such as being lost
in a shopping mall (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994) or spilling
a soup turin at a wedding reception (Hyman, 1998).
These are memories that hardly conflict with goals and
beliefs about the self. The SMS view predicts that experimentally inducing false memories that undermine currently active goals is most probably not possible (in
healthy individuals).
Finally, in this section it might be noted that it is not
suggested that maintaining coherence is the only way in
which memory distortions and errors can arise. Arguably, one of the major generators of these sorts of mem-
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his life and his choice of career, driving, was an important realization of one of his central motivations: to have
control. The only way he could accept the clear meaning
of the RTA, that he did not always have control, was to
instigate major changes to his goal system. It is not suggested that any of this occurred consciously but rather
that working self-control processes distorted the memory to maintain the belief of control, i.e., that he could
have shouted a warning when in fact there was no time
to do so. The distortion maintained the illusion of control but only at the cost of psychological illness. The
observer perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983) in the false
memory of the 9/11 witness was clearly an attempt to
avoid recalling a very difficult memory, an attempt to
avoid acknowledging the human aspect of the attack
and her own intensely negative emotions. Cognitive
behavioral therapy for her focussed strongly on this
avoidance (of her emotions). In her case it was preferable for the SMS to have a distorted and false memory
than to remember her emotional reactions to the attack.
She eventually recovered and returned to New York to
meet relatives of some of the victims. Interestingly, as
she recovered she too changed her career, and in this respect became a "new! self.
Conway, Meares et al. (2004, 2005) describe a range
of other cases in which memory distortions in PTSD appeared to serve a protective function (against goalchange). There is, however, no suggestion that this always occurs in PTSD or even that it is very frequent.
From the current perspective it is mainly of interest because it demonstrates that distortions of memory in the
SMS can and do occur, and when they do they are often
attempts to avoid change to the self, and ultimately to
goals. In other words, they are attempts to maintain
coherence during traumatic experiences that overwhelm
the self, when an individual might experience "mental defeat! (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) or the complete failure of
the goal-system to operate effectively during the trauma.
What is also of interest is that the patients in all the cases
described by Conway, Meares, et al. (2005), were able to
regain access to more accurate memories of their trauma
experience. This is by no means always the case (see, for
example, the cases reported in Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004) and in other memory disorders in which
confabulation features, false memories may be persistent
and pervasive.
Conway and Tacchi (1996), reported a detailed case
study of an RTA victim (patient OP) who sustained
frontal lobe damage and subsequently developed a range
of false autobiographical memories that portrayed her
current situation as far more supportive than it in fact
was. Pleasant wishful false memories that can arise following frontal injuries often seem to serve the function
of maintaining a positive view of current circumstances,
cf. Fotopoulou, Solms, and Turnbull (2004). These frequently are unrealistically positive and may feature
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629 Memory accessibility
The working self moderates between the demands of
coherence and correspondence in the formation of memories and in their construction. According to the SMS
view, however, issues relating to coherence predominate
in long-term memory and in order to maintain coherence between memories, conceptual knowledge, goals
and the conceptual self, control processes of the working
self-modulate the accessibility of autobiographical
knowledge and episodic memories. It does so to ground
the self in memories of goal-relevant self-defining experiences (Pillemer, 1998; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Singer,
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1995) that provide constraints on what the self has been,
can currently be, and what it might become in the future.
(See Tulving, 2002, for a related and particularly interesting account of the subjective sense of time or as he
terms it, chronesthesia.) Singer and Salovey (1993)
found that memories associated with feelings of happiness and pride were strongly linked with goal attainment
and the smooth running of personal plans (see too Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). In contrast, memories associated
with feelings of sadness and anger were linked to the
progressive failure to achieve goals. Singer and Salovey
(1993) proposed that each individual has a set of "self-defining! memories which contain critical knowledge of
progress on the attainment of long-term goals, e.g.,
attaining independence, intimacy, mastery, and so on.
The pattern of highly accessible memories provides the
major active content of the self and it is from this knowledge that "self-images! emerge. Self-images are mental
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) of the self in relation to
past, current, and future goals and form part of the conceptual self as discussed earlier. For example, one of the
existential problems that faces the adolescent is how to
integrate an emerging self with larger social groups, culture, and society generally (Erikson, 1950/1997); also
known as the problem of the formation of a generation
identity, (Conway, 1997a, 1997b, see too the brilliant original essay on this concept by Mannheim, 1952).
Holmes and Conway (1999) and Conway and Holmes
(2004) found that autobiographical memories from this
period, as recalled by middle-aged and older adults, often featured either learning about events of major public
importance or attending and taking part in cultural
events. Recall of autobiographical memories of public
and cultural events from other periods of life was less
common. Thus, there may be a set of self-images relating
to the late period of adolescence that provide access to
memories of public and cultural events and in this way
integrate the self with generation-defining events.
This type of raised accessibility of memories of events
once high in self-relevance, because of their self-defining
properties, can in fact be seen across the lifespan. Conway
and Holmes (2004) had older adults (70+ years) free recall memories from each decade of their life. The memories were then content analyzed on the basis of Erikson!s
(1950/1997) characterization of each of the psychosocial
stages proposed to occur across the lifespan. Of especial
interest here was the distribution of memories, by age at
encoding, across the lifespan. Fig. 1 shows the distribution by age at encoding of memories classified as being
dominated by content related to the psychosocial stages
of childhood psychosocial themes, identity/identity confusion (adolescence), intimacy/isolation (young adulthood, early 20s), and generativity/stagnation (middle
age). It can be seen from Fig. 1 that those memories classified as being strongly related to a particular psychosocial stage tend to predominate at the point in the
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ory failures (or failures of correspondence) are errors in
source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993; Johnson, Hayes, D!Esposito, & Raye, 2000). Correctly establishing the nature of an activated mental representation by identifying its source may be one of the
control processes that enable the working self to appropriately coordinate processing sequences. In the case of
confabulating frontal patients it is clear that source
monitoring errors are an important factor underlying
their false memories. Take the case of AO above, one
of whose sets of confabulated memories was that nurses
("evil! nurses according to AO) often woke her during the
night and made her move from her room. (An experience which could occur several times a night.) Indeed,
this was one of the confabulations that she often presented with at the beginning of a testing session. However, it is well known that frontal patients have disrupted
sleep cycles and AO would certainly have spontaneously
awoken most nights, usually several times. It is also
probable that she suffered from some paramnesia and
may well have believed herself to have awoken in another room than the one she went to sleep in. If this were
the case then the source monitoring error would be to
confuse her thoughts with actual experience. Fotopoulou and Conway (2005) found that AO often had recollective experience (see the section on episodic memory
ahead) for her confabulations which she experienced as
memories. Thus, source monitoring errors almost certainly would have played a role in AO!s confabulations.
It is possible that mistaking thoughts and fantasies for
memories, even experiencing them as memories, may
be quite common in patients with disrupted control processes. The point is that such source monitoring errors
can be used by the working self to protect against the
need for goal change and to maintain coherence. For
both OP and AO confabulated memories, of quite different types, served the very useful purpose of avoiding
consciously recognizing an unpleasant reality and the
need to change to deal with exigencies of that reality.
Experiencing one!s fantasies as memories is clearly maladaptive but it may nonetheless constitute an effective
working self-strategy for maintaining coherence.
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Fig. 1. Distributions of memories across the lifespan by psychosocial theme.
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societal level or in individual personal relationships.
Such memories clearly relate to the pursuance of important goals that mark the emergence of an independent
self-system in late adolescence. Assuming that the goals
which preoccupy the individual at his point do not
change in kind, then the memories that ground them
in remembered reality should remain highly accessible
across the lifespan.
These periods of development of the self are reflected
in the life span retrieval curve which is observed when
older adults (about 35 years and older) recall autobiographical memories in free recall or in a variety of cued
recall conditions (Franklin & Holding, 1977; Fitzgerald
& Lawrence, 1984; Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998).
Memories are plotted in terms of age at encoding of
the remembered experiences and the resulting life span
retrieval curve typically takes a form similar to that
shown in Fig. 2 (this is an idealized representation derived from many studies and not based on specific data).
As Fig. 2 shows the life span retrieval curve consists of
three components: the period of childhood amnesia,
(from birth to approximately five years of age), the period
of the reminiscence bump (from 10 to 30 years), and the
period of recency (from the present declining back to the
period of the reminiscence bump). The pattern of the lifespan retrieval curved is extremely robust and has been observed in many studies, to such an extent it led Rubin to
conclude that it was one of the most reliable phenomena
of contemporary memory research (Conway & Rubin,
1993). This reliability is remarkably striking and in a recent study we (Wang et al., 2005) sampled groups from
five different countries: the US, UK, Bangladesh, Japan,
and China. Fig. 3 shows the lifespan curves for each of
these countries. Note, that participants although asked
to free recall 20 memories from their life were additionally
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lifespan when the stage would have been dominant. This
is not an all-or-none effect but rather one of degree as at
any given psychosocial stage memories relating to a variety of psychosocial themes are present. This, and other
findings from Conway and Holmes (2004), suggest that
memories of events that were once of high relevance to
the self remain in a state of high accessibility and are
amongst the first memories to come to mind when a period in the past is freely sampled. It seems that memories of
experiences that have been of strong life-goal significance
remain strongly associated with the self and its history.
This is the case even after the period in which the specific
goals featured has passed, and been replaced by sets of
goals active in the current psychosocial period.
Although generation identity may be an important
aspect of the development of the self in late adolescence,
other themes and goals are also significant. The development of close and intimate relationships in late adolescence and early adulthood is one. Investigating this
Thorne (1995) found that the content of memories freely
recalled across the lifespan by 20-year-olds conformed to
what she termed "developmental truths.! Memories from
childhood very frequently referred to situations in which
the child wanted help, approval and love, usually from
parents, whereas memories from late adolescence and
early adulthood referred to events in which the rememberer wanted reciprocal love, was assertive, or helped
another. More recently, McLean and Thorne (2003) focused on the content of 19-year olds! self-defining memories of relationship experiences. They found that
memories of parents tended to emphasize issues relating
to separation whereas self-defining memories of peers
emphasized closeness and romantic relationships. Thus,
memories of adolescence are often of events in which
identity formation is preeminent, either at the group or
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Fig. 2. Idealized representation of the lifespan retrieval curve.
instructed not to recall events from the previous year (to
eliminate the recency portion of the curve).
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that there were striking periods of childhood amnesia and the reminiscence bump
across countries and these were statistically reliable.
Moreover, there were no reliable differences between
countries other than the US cohort who had earlier earliest memories than all other countries. This further attests
to the robustness of the lifespan retrieval curve, indeed
even perhaps to its universality. It was nonetheless an
unexpected finding and is returned to below.
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Fig. 3. Lifespan retrieval curves for six countries.
778 Childhood amnesia
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There are many theoretical explanations of the peri780 od of childhood amnesia (see Pillemer & White, 1989
& Wang, 2003 for reviews) but most flounder on the fact
that children below the age of 5 years have a wide range
of specific and detailed autobiographical memories
(Bauer, 1997; Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996). Explanations that postulate childhood amnesia to be related to
general developmental changes in intellect, language,
emotion, etc., fail simply because apparently normal
autobiographical memories were in fact accessible when
the individual was in the period of childhood amnesia. It
seems unlikely that an increase in general functioning
would make unavailable already accessible memories.
From the SMS perspective this period is seen as reflecting changes in the working self-goal hierarchy. The goals
of the infant and young child, through which experience
is encoded into memory, are so different, so disjunct,
from those of the adult that the adult working self is un-
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may still be the case that these influences act upon an
emerging SMS in which sensory-perceptual episodic
memories already exist. These are difficult issues to
investigate, particularly in the laboratory, and recently
we (Morrison & Conway, 2005) have been attempting
to explore the question of the relationship of language
to early memories by having adult participants recall
their very earliest memory to individual words in a set
of cue words. A novel feature of this procedure is that
mean age-of-acquisition (AoA) of the cue words is
known and, therefore, the age-of-encoding (AoE) of
the earliest memory retrievable to a word can be compared to AoA. If there is some systematic relationship
between language and emergence of autobiographical
memory then that may be evident in the relation of
AoA and AoE. In two studies using a large group of
cue words that varied in AoA we found positive correlations of r = 0.85 and r = 0.8, respectively, and for both
p < .001, demonstrating a very strong relation between
AoA of cue words and AoE of earliest memories. Interestingly however, AoA differed from AoE by being, on
average, 10 months earlier. Moreover, these earliest
memories date to when the participants were aged between 5 and 7 years and, therefore, to a period which
is considerably later than that of the very earliest memories, which typically date to about 3–4 years of age (see
Fig. 2). These data suggest that children have to learn to
apply words to experiences they are in process of encoding or have already encoded prior to acquiring particular words. The data indicate that this occurs about 10
months after acquiring a word and in a period when it
is known that children already have many memories.
Thus, memories predate acquisition of words with which
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able to access those memories (see too Howe & Courage,
1997, for a particularly interesting account of childhood
amnesia in terms of development of the self). Other accounts emphasize mother/child interactions, the role of
language development, and emergence of narrative abilities (Fivush and Nelson, 2004).
Socialization and culture must play some role in the
development of memory, although it seems that the infant/child capacity to actually have episodic memories
may predate these developments (Rovee-Collier, 1997).
If this is the case then presumably the effects of socialization, culture, and language are largely on the organization of memory and perhaps on memory content
too, rather than on the processes that mediate the actual
formation of episodic memories. For instance, the finding mentioned earlier of Conway, Wang, Hanyu, and
Haque (2005) in which US participants were found to
have earlier "earliest! memories than all other groups
might relate to the observation that US mothers undertake more "memory! talk with their children than mothers from other countries. Moreover, Wang and her
colleagues (2001) have found powerful cross-cultural
differences in the focus and content of memories. Childhood memories from people in cultures with interdependent self-focus (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), China, for
example, tend to be less oriented to the individual, less
emotional, and more socially oriented than the childhood memories of people from cultures with independent self-focus, Northern Europe, North America, for
example. Fig. 4 shows data from Wang (2001) on this.
Thus, socialization experiences and the self-focus that
predominates in a culture may influence the accessibility
of earliest memories and their content. Despite this it
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Fig. 4. Differences between Asian and North American autobiographical memories.
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The second component of the lifespan retrieval curve
is the period when rememberers were aged 10–30 years
and this is known as the reminiscence bump (Rubin
et al., 1998). The reminiscence bump is distinguished
by an increase in recall of memories relative to the periods that precede it and follow it. The reminiscence bump
is present not just in the recall of specific autobiographical memories but also emerges in a range of different
types of autobiographical knowledge. For example, the
reminiscence bump has been observed in the recall of
films (Sehulster, 1996), music (cf. Rubin et al., 1998),
books (Larsen, 1998), and public events (Holmes &
Conway, 1999; Schuman, Belli, & Bischoping, 1997).
Memories recalled from the period of the reminiscence
bump are more accurate (Rubin et al., 1998), they are
judged more important than memories from other time
periods, and are rated as highly likely to be included
in one!s autobiography (Fitzgerald, 1988, 1996; Fromholt & Larsen, 1991, 1992; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997).
The reminiscence bump is only observed in people over
the age of about 35 years and some recent findings suggest that it might only be present, or is much more
prominent, in memories of positive experiences (Rubin
& Berntsen, 2003).
Many of the more obvious explanations of the reminiscence bump have been rejected, i.e., that the memories are of first time experiences and that is why they
are memorable, but in fact it has been found that less
than 20% are typically of first time experiences (Fitzgerald, 1988). Rubin et al. (1998) reviewed a series of potential explanations and argued in favor of an explanation
in terms of novelty. According to this view the period
when people are aged 10–30 years, and especially 15–
25 years, is distinguished by novel experiences, occurring
during a period of rapid change that gives way to a period of stability. It is assumed that memories from the
period of rapid change are more distinct than those from
the period of stability and this is why they are comparatively more frequently accessed. By this account a period of rapid change taking place at some other point in
the life cycle should also lead to raised accessibility of
memories from that period relative to more stable peri-
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874 The reminiscence bump
ods and there is some evidence that this is the case (Conway & Haque, 1999). However, periods of (goal) change
and experiences of novelty always involve the self and a
related but alternative explanation is that the high accessibility of memories from this period (and other periods
too) may be related to their enduring relation to the self
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Possibly, many memories from the period of the reminiscence bump are
memories of ‘‘self-defining’’ experiences (Fitzgerald,
1988; Singer & Salovey, 1993) and have a powerful effect
in cohering the working to self into a particular form.
The novelty of reminiscence bump experiences lies in
their newness and uniqueness for the self and they may
play a crucial role in the final formation of a stable
self-system and identity formation during late adolescence and early adulthood. The raised accessibility of
these memories might then serve processes relating to
coherence and the duration of a coherent self through
time.
One final explanation, considered but rejected by Rubin et al. (1998), argues that there may be something
special about memory during the period of the reminiscence bump. The suggestion is that encoding is, somehow, more efficient during this period and it is this
that gives memories formed during this period an advantage in accessibility: they stand out in memory by virtue
of some differential from of encoding. Note that, this is a
type of correspondence theory related in kind to Brown
and Kulik!s (1977) encoding account of the formation of
flashbulb memories (see Conway, 1995, for a review). A
correspondence theory like this might, perhaps, posit
that hippocampal networks function more effectively
during this period or maybe fronto-hippocampal interactions are more efficient so that information is encoded
is some unusually highly accessible form. Given that
there are no reasons other than the phenomenon of
the reminiscence bump itself to support an encoding or
special processing account it seems implausible as an
explanation of the reminiscence bump, as, indeed, Rubin
et al. (1998) concluded. However, the findings of Conway et al. (see Fig. 3 above) suggest that this rejection
may be premature. The cross-cultural finding of a highly
similar reminiscence bump in all six countries sampled
was unexpected. The original hypothesis had been that
cultures with interdependent self-focus (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991), China for example, would have a reminiscence bump dating to a later period (20–40 years of
age rather than 10–30 years of age). This is because in
these cultures coming of age occurs later than in the
individual-focussed cultures of Europe and North
America. In China, a young man becomes an adult when
he has developed a certain group of colleagues and
friends and a young woman an adult woman when she
has her first child. Typically, people are aged about 30
years when this occurs compared to a coming of age in
the late adolescence in cultures with an independent
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they might be associated but once words have been acquired and associated with memories a consistent and
systematic relation is present. Another important determinant of the accessibility of earliest memories may then
be the age at which a memory or feature of a memory
can be described with language and associated with specific words. A clear implication of this is that the relatively slow development of associations between words
and memories might be an additional factor contributing to the inaccessibility of childhood memories in
adulthood.
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In the SMS framework then, one of the important
functions of the working self is to raise the accessibility
of memories of experiences in which important goal
related processing occurred. These memories are often
of self-defining experiences from critical periods of the
formation of the self and other highly self-relevant memories of experiences which featured the processing of
dominant goals. The working self, however, also acts
to lower the accessibility of memories of experiences that
threaten and undermine the coherence of the self-system
or which require major change if they are to be accommodated by the SMS. This is especially so for those
memories that contradict the goals of the working self
and important conceptual aspects of the self, e.g., selfimages. One way in which this might be accomplished
is by inhibitory control of autobiographical remembering and several recent projects have attempted to examine this using standard laboratory procedures (for
reviews of these procedures see, Anderson, 2003; Bjork,
1989 Bjork, Bjork, & Anderson, 1998). In a series of
directed forgetting experiments we examined the sensitivity of recently recalled autobiographical memories
to an explicit instruction to forget (Barnier, Conway,
Mayoh, Speyer, & Avizmil, 2005; Conway & Barnier,
2003). In these experiments, participants were presented
with cue words and to each word they recalled a specific
autobiographical memory (Conway & Bekerian, 1987a;
Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; Robinson, 1976). They were
instructed to try to keep both cue words and the memories they recalled in mind for a later memory test. At the
the midpoint of the list half the participants (the Fgroup) were informed that they had just completed a
practice list. This list (List 1) was to familiarize them
with the procedure and the types of cues to be used
and they should now forget the practice list and the
memories recalled up to this point and concentrate instead on the upcoming experimental list (List 2) for
which they would be required to recall cues and associated memories. Other participants (the R-group) were
informed that they had now studied the first part of
the list, and they should try to retain both the cues
and associated memories, while they recalled further
memories to the second part of the list, for which their
memory would also be tested. Each list consisted of 12
words in three groups of four positive words, e.g., happy, summer, etc., four neutral words, e.g., chair, kitchen,
etc., and four negative words, e.g., accident, illness, etc.
Order of presentation of words was random. Over five
experiments there were two persistent findings: a powerful and statistically reliable overall directed forgetting effect but one that was only consistently reliable for
positive and neutral cue words. The means in Table 1
show this over the full five experiments. Thus, negative
memories appeared more resistant to directed forgetting
than other types of memories.
Inhibitory control of recently recalled autobiographical memories is then possible using a simple single-episode intentional laboratory procedure. In everyday
cognition using a similar procedure perhaps hundreds
or even thousands of times, even to the extent that it becomes automated for the to-be-forgotten memories,
might be a powerful way to control memory accessibility: indeed it may even extend to memories of negative
experiences. Another way in which inhibitory control
might be achieved is by selective rehearsal of memories
or parts of memories. Barnier, Hung, and Conway
(2002) investigated this using a modification of the
retrieval practice procedure (cf. Anderson & Spellman,
1995). In this procedure participants recall memories
to cue words from happy, sad, angry, and friendly categories. For each memory they provide a short title. They
then practice recalling the memory they recalled earlier
to cues taken from any two of the categories (this is
cycled over participants so that all categories are equally
sampled). After a 10-min delay they receive a category
cued recall test in which they recall the memories they recalled earlier to each of the cue words. This procedure
yields three types of memory items: items which have
been practiced, rp+, items from practiced categories
which were not themselves practiced, rp! items, and
items which were neither practiced nor originate from
practiced categories, nrp items. The typical finding is
that rp+ items are recalled to a high level, nrp items
to an intermediate level and rp! items to level reliably
lower than that of nrp items, showing inhibition of these
items. Barnier et al. (2002) found exactly this pattern for
recently recalled autobiographical memories and Table 2
shows mean recall. Note that, unlike directed forgetting
the inhibitory pattern is present for all types of emotional memories including memories of negative experiences
demonstrating that memories of these experiences can be
impaired too, and by a relatively simple laboratory task.
Note that both sets of findings are laboratory demonstrations of inhibition of recently recalled items. Our
view is that in everyday cognition procedures like directed forgetting and retrieval practice may be spontaneously and repeatedly used to avoid conscious awareness of
certain memories and thoughts. The fact that this can
be induced in the laboratory at all is some indication
that this at least could occur in other settings.
It is worth noting that there are several differences between directed forgetting and retrieval practice. Obviously in the former the forgetting is intentional
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self-focus. The reminiscence bump was, however, quite
independent of these potential effects of culture and that
at least suggests that a pan-cultural explanation may be
required. Such an explanation might well be based on
the suggestion of development of neural processes in late
adolescence.
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List 1
Positive
Neutral
List 2
List 1
List 2
List 1
List 2
Experiment 1
Forget
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Remember
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Experiment 2
Forget
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a
List 1 recall in the Forget group that is significantly lower
than List 1 recall in the Remember group, whereas List 2 recall
in the Forget group is significantly higher than List 2 recall in
the Remember group. Showing a strong directed forgetting
effect.
Table 2
Inhibition of recently recalled autobiographical memories in the
retrieval practice procedure
Cue valence
Positive
Neutral
0.85
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0.79
0.84
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0.66
0.97
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Rp+
Rp!
Nrp
Negative
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Recall levels that are significantly lower than Nrp recall.
Rp+ = practiced items, Rp! = items from practiced categories
which were not themselves practiced, Nrp = items from
unpractised categories.
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whereas in the later it is not. But perhaps more important is that in retrieval practice, practice is repeated
(three times per rp+ item in Barnier et al., 2002) thereby
providing several opportunities to trigger inhibition of
associated (rp!) items. Possibly, it is this repeated inhibition that leads to successful inhibition of all types of
recently recalled memories including negative autobiographical memories. Set against this, however, we have
found that repeatedly practicing not thinking about
recently recalled autobiographical memories (positive,
negative, and neutral) does not impair their recall (Barnier et al., in preparation). Instead the pattern of findings in the directed forgetting and retrieval induced
forgetting for recently recalled autobiographical memories suggests that competition between memories, for later recall, might be an important factor in triggering
inhibition. Indeed, Barnier et al. (2005) found that memories from the same time period, e.g., a holiday, showed
strong effects of directed forgetting whereas memories
from a less distinct more disparate period did not. As
the next section shows autobiographical memory is
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Cue valence
Negative
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highly organized into relatively discrete sets of knowledge, potentially making it particularly sensitive to inhibition triggered by competition. This suggests the
following explanation of the two sets of findings: the
directed forgetting experiments induced only weak competition and this was not sufficient to cause the inhibition of negative memories. Perhaps, the negative affect
associated with such memories requires more extensive
inhibition that the mild affect induced by positive and
neutral experiences. The retrieval practice experiments
were more effective in inducing inhibition and this may
be because the retrieval practice procedure causes stronger and more direct competition between to-be-recalled
items.
The present studies show that representations of
recently recalled memories can be inhibited. But they
do not necessarily demonstrate the inhibition of the representations of those memories in long-term memory,
i.e., representations from which the memories were constructed in the study phase. Racsmany and Conway
(2005) argue these effects on recent memories are a product of what they term episodic inhibition. The central notion here is that the locus of the effects of directed
forgetting and retrieval induced forgetting is in an episodic memory of the study phase. In the case of the present experiments, episodic memories arising from the
study phases in each of the experiments would contain
records of cue words and associated memories. Racsmany and Conway (2005) argue that subsequent processing
of these study episode memories configures a pattern of
activation/inhibition over their contents and when accessed in the later cued recall test it is this pattern of activation/inhibition that determines accessibility to
knowledge contained in the memory. By this view, in
the Barnier et al. (2002) retrieval induced forgetting
experiments the effect of practicing recall of memories
is to cause inhibition of representations of associated
word-memory pairs held in a recent episodic memory
of the study phase. It does not, or need not, cause inhibition of representations of the word cues or memories
that preexisted in long-term memory (see Racsmany &
Conway, 2005, for a series of experiments supporting
the idea of episodic inhibition).
This notion that inhibitory processes triggered by the
working self-act on episodic memories of recently recalled memories leads to some interesting clinical connections. For instance, in the study of recovered
memories identified several patients who showed what
was termed the ‘‘knew-it-all-along’’ effect (Joslyn &
Schooler, 2004; Schooler, Bendiksen, & Ambadar,
1997). These are patients who recover, often suddenly
and always unexpectedly, detailed and vivid memories
of childhood abuse, usually sexual abuse. Although the
patients were apparently wholly unaware of these aspects of their past it turns out that on previous occasions
they had described the abuse, or some part of it, to
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Table 1
Directed forgetting of recently recalled autobiographical
memories
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A RTA patient remembered every single thing except
what she said to her new husband (of 3 weeks) when
she phoned him to say she had been in an accident. After
some weeks of CBT, during which amnesia for the telephone call persisted, prompted by her therapist she
asked him. He described how she had said ‘‘I have had
an accident but I am OK. Meet me at the hospital’’
He then asked ‘‘Why the hospital if you are OK?’’.
Her husband recalled that she replied, ‘‘I have hurt my
legs, but its not too bad.’’ For a while this became part
of the focus of the therapy and she eventually recalled
how terrified she had been that her legs were so badly
hurt that she might have to have them amputated. This
idea was linked to a vivid memory she had at the time, of
once having to tell a female friend that the friend!s father
had been involved in an RTA, hurt his leg and it would
have to be amputated. The patient said that she could
not bring herself to tell her husband any of these
thoughts, and so minimized it, because ‘‘That was not
what he had signed up for,’’ i.e., a disabled wife. In fact,
she had broken one leg, and torn ligaments in the other.
She made a full recovery from these injuries and her
PTSD began to resolve once she recalled the telephone
conversation with her husband and, importantly, the
memory that had come to mind at the time of that con-
From the present perspective this is a striking example of episodic inhibition. Clearly the patient!s memory
of the telephone call was inhibited but more importantly so was the troubling memory she recalled and
implications of this for her self. What is inhibited here
are mental representations, memories and thoughts,
that foreshadow the emergence of an especially negative self-image of an amputated and disabled self.
The working self can then impair access to memories
and other knowledge in order to maintain goal coherence. This might occur as part of everyday memory
"housekeeping! routines in which recently acquired
information of low-goal relevance has attenuated
accessibility (or is inhibited) and so is unlikely to be rehearsed and, as a consequence, more likely to be forgotten. Presumably if this type of memory were
accessed then its accessibility would increase. But if it
is not accessed then it enters a state of more permanent inaccessibility, (cf. Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966,
for further discussion of accessibility versus availability). Patterns of activation/inhibition in memories can
be established by subsequent selective access of memory details. In more extreme circumstances such as those
involving the experience of trauma, inhibitory processes may be more powerfully present.
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versation. She expressed considerable amazement that
she had "forgotten! these details of her experience.
(Hackman, 2005, personal communication).3
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another person but do not remember doing this. From
the present perspective the ‘‘knew-it-all-along’’ effect is
exactly what episodic inhibition predicts, namely that
memories of recalling the abuse can themselves be inhibited so that the rememberer is unaware that they have recalled these memories at points in the past. In these
clinical cases however, added to the episodic inhibition
there is also inhibition of the abuse memories themselves. According to episodic inhibition this would not
be the case in laboratory experiments in which the tobe-forgotten memories would remain (highly) accessible
in long-term memory and their representations only
inhibited in the episodic memory of the study phase.
Thus, when participants were reminded of the memories
they had failed to recall by prompting with a cue from
the memory rather than by trying to recall the study
phase, the inhibition was abolished and the memories recalled (Barnier et al., 2005). It is not predicted that this
would occur for patients! memories of abuse. These
types of episodic inhibitory phenomena are not confined
to patients with sexual abuse histories and PTSD. Patients suffering from a range of traumas often show similar types of forgetting. Consider, for example, the
following case from our ongoing research:
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3
I am especially grateful to Professor Ann Hackmann,
Consultant Clinical Psychologist at the University Department
of Psychiatry, Warneford Hospital, Oxford, for drawing this
case to my attention and generously allowing me to report it
here.
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Summary: The working self and the effort after coherence 1237
In the SMS model it is hypothesized that goal coherence and self-images (derived from goals) are supported
by patterns of accessibility and inaccessibility (to memories and other long-term knowledge) that have been generated by working self-control processes. These act to
make highly accessible sets of memories and autobiographical knowledge that confirm and support important goals and self-images. Highly accessible memories
and knowledge across the lifespan form a more or less
coherent story of the individual and their achievements.
Some knowledge about goals that were abandoned or
which the individual failed to achieve may also have
high accessibility, perhaps because these are highly
instructive or directive (Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1998) or
because they provide a confirmatory context for the
achievement of other goals, e.g., "I wasn!t a success at
college and left to earn money! (see Cztsyhanlyi & Beattie, 1978). Memories and knowledge of experiences that
contradict or undermine central components of the
working self may, however, be assigned low levels of
accessibility and in some cases may be actively inhibited.
The working self!s main function is to keep the goal system connected to reality by being based in comparatively accurate memories of episodes of goal processing
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1266 The autobiographical memory knowledge base
According to the SMS model the autobiographical
memory knowledge base in long-term memory contains
two distinct types of representation: autobiographical
knowledge and episodic memories. Autobiographical
knowledge is organized in partonomic hierarchical
knowledge structures (Barsalou, 1988; Burt et al.,
2003; Conway, 1993, 1996; Conway and Bekerian,
1987a; Lancaster and Barsalou, 1997) which range from
highly abstract and conceptual knowledge to conceptual
knowledge that is event specific and experience-near.
Autobiographical memory knowledge structures terminate in episodic memories. It is these representations
and their various forms of organization that are considered in this section.
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1281 Autobiographical knowledge
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Fig. 5 shows one type of knowledge structure and
some broad distinctions between different types of conceptual autobiographical knowledge. At the most abstract level is a structure termed the "life story! (Bluck,
2003; Bluck & Habermas, 2001; Pillemer, 1998). In
Fig. 5 this is conceived of as being part of the conceptual
self (Conway, Singer et al., 2004). The life story contains
general factual and evaluative knowledge about the individual. It may also contain self-images that divide and
separate the self into several different selves. These divisions may be supported by the way in which different
self-images contain cues that differentially access other
knowledge in the autobiographical knowledge base.
For example, a self that accesses a particular lifetime
period (see Fig. 5) will have cues that are channeled by
knowledge represented as part of the lifetime period
which in turn can be used to access particular sets of
general events which contain cues to specific episodic
memories.
To illustrate this, consider an individual whose profession is that of an academic. In Fig. 5, this knowledge
would be part of the life story and would access schema
and lifetime periods that represent personal conceptual
knowledge about work. Perhaps an autobiographical
fact that might be highly accessible would be where this
person took their undergraduate degree, at University
X. This is depicted in Fig. 5 as a lifetime period representation that contains knowledge about goals, others,
locations, activities, evaluations, that were common to
that period. It is this lifetime period knowledge that
can be used to access more specific autobiographical
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knowledge at the level of "general events! which include
repeated or categoric events (Barsalou, 1988; Williams,
1996), extended events (Burt et al., 2003; Conway,
1996; Haque & Conway, 2001), and mini-histories, such
as learning to drive a car (Robinson, 1992). General
events as conceptual (gist) representations of events are
closer in the hierarchy to representation of experience
than are lifetime periods but like lifetime periods they
contain knowledge about goals, others, locations, activities, evaluations, etc., but of a more event-specific nature. Thus, the lifetime period ‘‘At University X’’ might
access the general event ‘‘Taking first year laboratory
classes.’’ This general event will contain knowledge that
can access episodic memories of, for example ‘‘taking
part in some card sorting experiments,’’ ‘‘handling a
Hooded Lister rat,’’ all of which bring to mind images
(sensory-perceptual episodic memories—see ahead)
relating to those specific experiences. In the SMS model
the conjunction of autobiographical knowledge with episodic memories constitute what is meant by the term
‘‘specific autobiographical memory.’’
Relatively recent experiences, particularly those
occurring during the current lifetime period, that give
rise to sets of multiply related general events and associated episodic memories must be represented in terms of
the currently active goals of the working self that dominate at the time. Burt et al. (2003) investigated this for
several extended events, e.g., Christmas shopping. In
these studies events were sorted into groups created by
participants and from these groupings currently active
themes were identified. Fig. 6 shows the organization
of a series of episodic memories associated with the general event of buying a house. Note that, Fig. 6 is constructed from the data reported in Burt et al. (2003).4
The themes shown in Fig. 6 are all associated with other
memories too and with lifetime periods in which the
themes were present. The findings of Burt et al. (2003)
demonstrate that general events typically access groups
of episodic memories that connect the general event to
unique and specific moments in time. One important
property of this organization is that when goals change
and new themes and lifetime periods become central to
the working self, a record of the past concerns of an older version of the working self-exists in the form of general events and the colonies of episodic memories they
access. Even if no goal-information is explicitly encoded
it can, to at least some extent, be inferred from the
groupings of general events and the associated episodic
memories.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) review the extensive experimental evidence supporting this account of
the organization of autobiographical knowledge and in
a later section I consider some recent neuroimaging find-
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(correspondence) while simultaneously making available
memories and knowledge that support the continued
pursuance of current goals and evidence of at least some
positive progress (coherence).
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4
I thank Professor Chris Burt for making this data available.
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Fig. 5. Knowledge structures in autobiographical memory.
ings that also lend another line of converging support.
Here it might be briefly noted that in retrograde amnesia
following brain injury the autobiographical memory
knowledge base often fractionates in terms of knowledge
types (this literature is reviewed in Conway & Fthenaki,
2000). For example, most retrograde amnesics retain
some conceptual knowledge of their lives and often this
can be quite extensive. Even the most extreme patients,
with no episodic memories, such as K.C. (Tulving, Sch-
acter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988) and Clive
Wearing (Wilson et al., 1995) retained some general
autobiographical factual information. Other patients,
such as SS (Cermak & O!Connor, 1983), although
apparently having no episodic memories at all nevertheless had good knowledge of his past and a set of "stories!
about various events which he retained in detail. Yet,
other retrograde amnesic patients have temporally graded amnesia which often extends back to roughly the
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period of the reminiscence bump (when the patients were
young adults, see Fig. 2) and may appear relatively normal for memories in this and earlier periods. (But note
that temporal gradients do not take this form in all cases
and temporally graded amnesics are highly variable,
Conway & Fthenaki, 2000.) Indeed, one notable patient
whose retrograde amnesia extended back to when he
had been 19-year-old, subsequently believed himself to
be a 19-year-old naval rating on shore leave during
World War II (Hodges & McCarthy, 1993). In the absence of all other autobiographical knowledge in what
other way can the self-define itself except in terms of
knowledge currently available? Finally, it might be noted that in psychological illnesses too, access to the most
specific types of knowledge, especially episodic memories, is attenuated. This is especially marked in clinical
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Fig. 6. Episodic memories and a general event.
depression (Williams, 1996) but occurs in other illnesses
too, e.g., schizophrenia, obsessional-compulsive disorder, etc. (see Williams et al., 2005, for a review).
Evidence from the laboratory and the study of memory disorders converges then on the view of the organization of autobiographical knowledge depicted in Fig. 5.
One aspect of this organization which has been emphasized in the foregoing discussion is that subsets of
knowledge and memories can be used to support and
psychologically define particular self-images. Recently,
we have been studying current self-images and how these
are related to selective sets of memories (Moulin, Rathbone, & Conway, 2005). In these experiments participants (n = 40, all middle-aged) complete a short
questionnaire in which they list six "I ams. . .! (Kuhn &
McPartland, 1954). They are instructed that an "I
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Episodic memory
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In the SMS approach to understanding autobiographical memory the view of the nature of "episodic! memory is
an evolving one. In earlier versions of the SMS the term
"episodic memory! was not used and instead specific aspects of memory were referred to in a theoretically neutral
way as "event specific knowledge,! ESK (Conway, 1993,
1996; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). However, it became apparent that ESK was simply the content of episodic memories and the conception of this very specific
experience-near knowledge was very similar in many respects to Tulving!s original conception of episodic memory (1972 and 1983) and also to the revision of the concept
in Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving (1997). Conway (2001) in
reviewing the evidence arrived at the view that episodic
memories are summary records of sensory-perceptual–
conceptual-affective processing derived from working
memory (see Baddeley, 2000) and that they form a separate memory system from the conceptual autobiographical knowledge base. It is for this reason that episodic
memories can be lost, sometimes completely, in organic
amnesia and psychological illness while some, or extensive, access to conceptual autobiographical memory is retained. Note too that the converse can also occur, that is
preserved episodic memory with degraded, or loss of, conceptual knowledge (see Hodges & Graham, 2001, for a review). The separation of conceptual autobiographical
knowledge from episodic memory also explains why when
accessing autobiographical memory under normal circumstances specific autobiographical memories are not
always formed. Conway (1996) proposed that the level
of general events is the preferred level of access to autobiographical memory, it is in Rosch!s (1978) terms a basic level in this class of knowledge. That is to say that the level
of general events is the level at which knowledge is optimized in terms of its informativeness and ease of access.
In the current version of the SMS the episodic memory
system is conceived of as a separate system in which representations have the characteristics listed in Table 3,
(note, this is not an exhaustive list and it is anticipated that
new characteristics will be added). Much of the evidence
in support of the characteristics listed in Table 3 is reviewed in several recent papers, e.g., Wheeler et al.
(1997); Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), Conway
(2001), Conway, Singer et al. (2004)—see also Tulving!s
(1983) important extended account—and it is not intended to repeat those reviews here. Instead the focus is on the
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phrenia is the consolidation of personal identity in late
adolescence/early adulthood. Possibly, one of the features of the abnormal SMS associated with this is a
failure or weakening of the grounding of conceptual
autobiographical knowledge in episodic memories of
formative experiences, further demonstrating the
importance of coherence to an integrated self.
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am. . .! can be anything and that they should respond
with the first six "I ams. . .! to come to mind and try
not to edit or select. They then provide various sorts
of information about their "I ams! including the approximate age they were when each "I am! first emerged. In a
second phase participants recall three specific autobiographical memories to each of their previously listed "I
ams. . .! They recall specific memories of experiences that
lasted for periods of minutes, hours, and no longer than
one day and are, again, instructed to respond with the
first memories to come to mind and not select or edit.
For each memory they provide a short title, rate various
qualities of the memories, and the date when the remembered experience occurred. Fig. 7 shows the distribution
of age at encoding of the memories relative to age of
emergence of the "I ams. . .! Fig. 7 strikingly shows that
age at encoding clusters around the date of emergence
of the "I ams. . .! Strongly suggesting that "I ams. . .! are
grounded in sets of memories of formative experiences.
The "I ams. . .! collected in this study were, as might
be expected, highly variable but nevertheless could to
be categorized into two broad classes: roles and traits.
All participants used both these categories and a typical set of "I ams. . .! was: I am a father, I am a "occupation,! I am a gardener, I am honest, I am happy, I am a
hard worker (the actual mix of roles and traits in any
set of "I ams. . .! was variable). Fig. 7 is replotted for
roles and traits separately and Fig. 8 shows the two
distributions for the two sets of "I ams. . .! It can be
seen from Fig. 8 that the distributions are highly similar and they did not differ statistically. Both role and
trait "I ams. . .! seem then to be marked in memory by
highly accessible specific memories that come first to
mind when the "I am. . .! is processed. In our view this
reflects the grounding of aspects of the conceptual self
(self-images) in subsets of memories and knowledge
that define and provided the content, for the individual, of that part of the self. This differentiation of the
self, supported by the organization of autobiographical
memory, might be particularly important in the development of the self. For example, the period of the reminiscence bump may be a period in which a sole "I
am. . .,! or single self-image, develops into multiple "I
ams. . .,! e.g., I am a son, I am a student, etc. Also at
this point multiple "I will become. . .! may be formed,
supported by the differentiation of "I ams. . .! and the final the emergence of a complete working self-goal hierarchy
and
conceptual
self-grounded
in
autobiographical knowledge and memories (the SMS).
Finally it might be noted that older patients with
schizophrenia have been found to show an early and
disorganized reminiscence bump, with an impairment
of conscious recollection associated with memories
highly relevant to personal identity (Cuevo-Lombard,
Jovenin, Hedelin, Rizzo-Peter, & Danion, 2005). This
suggests that a developmental failure present in schizo-
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Fig. 7. Distribution of memories recalled to "I ams. . .!
Fig. 8. Distribution of memories recalled role and trait "I ams. . .!
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1526 content and form of individual episodic memories and the
1527 nature of recollective experience.
1528 The content of episodic memories
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In Table 3, following Tulving (1983), episodic memories are viewed as containing summary records of sensory-perceptual–conceptual-affective
processing
that
characterized or predominated in a particular experience.
Some of this knowledge will be copies of specific patterns
of activation/inhibition that existed over networks in
affective and motor systems during the experience. For instance, the fear and anxiety associated with looking at
oncoming car headlights prior to a major RTA may be literally represented in an episodic memory of the experience (see Ehlers et al., 2004, for a series of related PTSD
cases). More prosaically the pattern of activation/inhibition of a fragment of a semantic category might be contained in an episodic memory of learning a study list
(Racsmany & Conway, 2005). There may even be very
specific representations of motor movements. For example, a PTSD patient who was involved in an RTA had
the experience of intense anxiety every time he leaned
his upper torso forward while sitting down. During reliving in CBT he recalled that as his vehicle was struck at
speed from behind he was thrown forward and as this
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Table 3
Ten characteristics of episodic memory
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a mix of processing relating to both the external and inter- 1591
nal milieu. Which dominates, external versus internal, is 1592
determined by issues relating to coherence.
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The period represented by episodic memories
1594
One important question is: what is the length of an
episodic memory? What period of time does it cover?
If a person studies a word list do they have a single
episodic memory? Several? Is there a memory for each
word? The SMS answer to the question of what period
an episodic memory represents is based on a consideration of goals. Episodic memories are records of shortterm goal processing and so should be formed at junctures in goal processing (Table 3, VIII). But goal junctures can occur at many different levels, from making a
cup of tea, answering a telephone call, to writing a paper, etc. The SMS framework proposes that episodic
memories are formed at goal junctions of action
sequences when there is major change in the predominating goal. For example, in typing the fine grained
goals of striking the keys, are not points at which episodic memories are formed. Ceasing to type and moving to some other activity, making a cup of tea,
daydreaming, etc. should, according to the SMS, be
points at which episodic memories are formed. In
any given day then many memories will be formed
but relatively few will remain accessible for enduring
periods of time (Table 3, VII). Thus, a person can
remember in great detail their trip to work this morning and other features of the day!s activities. Within a
short retention interval, perhaps as little as 24 h, most
of these recent episodic memories are no longer accessible. Only those with an enduring association with
current goals are retained and even then must become
integrated with knowledge structures in the autobiographical knowledge base if they are to be retained
in the long-term. In current studies in our laboratory,
we have been attempting to examine some these aspects of episodic memory using a simple procedure
(Conway, Williams, & Baddeley, 2005). Participants
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happen he had a sudden memory of someone he had
known who had broken his neck and simultaneously realized that this was about to happened to him. Episodic
memory for specific motor movements although not
uncommon in PTSD clearly needs to be studied under
more controlled conditions. At the moment the clinical
evidence strongly indicates that this does occur, but as
yet there are no formal studies. In addition to all this highly experience-specific content, there may be some more
conceptual knowledge about the experience, rather than
deriving directly from it, such as evaluative knowledge,
e.g., it was a good, bad, or dull experience, one achieved
or did not achieve certain goals, and so forth.
Characteristics I and II in Table 3 are about episodic
memory content. Characteristic III is also but in a slightly
different way as it mainly concerns the way in which episodic memories come to mind. Brewer (1986) originally
pointed out that many specific memories come to mind
in the form of imagery and especially visual imagery. In
subsequent research he established that memories containing visual images constitute more than 80% in a set
of randomly sampled memories (Brewer, 1988). Others
have reported similar findings, e.g., Whitten and Leonard,
1981, Williams and Hollan (1981), and it has been known
for some time in the neuropsychological literature, see for
example, Conway (1996), Conway and Fthenaki (2000)
for reviews, and Rubin and Greenberg (1998) for a recent
treatment. Visual imagery predominates in episodic memory and the loss of the ability to generate visual images
may give rise, as a secondary consequence, to retrograde
amnesia, see Ogden (1993) for an especially interesting
case. Note too, that when amnesia occurs as a secondary
consequence of the loss of the ability to form visual images, conceptual autobiographical knowledge appears to remain intact. This view of the content of episodic memories
might appear at first to constitute a fairly extreme correspondence theory. Yet this is not the case. Episodic memories are records of experience and correspond to reality
only to the extent that the extended pattern of internal
processing during an experience accurately represents
reality. By the SMS view most episodic memories will be
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PR
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
Retain summary records of sensory-perceptual–conceptual-affective processing derived from working memory.
Retain patterns of activation/inhibition over long periods.
They are predominately represented in the form of (visual) images.
Represent short time slices, determined by changes in goal-processing.
Represented roughly in their order of occurrence.
They are only retained in a durable form if they become linked to conceptual autobiographical knowledge.
Otherwise they are rapidly forgotten.
Their main function is to provide a short-term record of progress in current goal processing.
They are recollectively experienced when accessed.
When included as part of an autobiographical memory construction they provide specificity.
Neuroanatomically they may be represented in brain regions separate from other (conceptual) autobiographical
knowledge networks.
D
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
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that changes in activities mark event boundaries
(Newtson, 1976; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001) and
in our terms these reflect changes in goal processing.
It seems from our preliminary data that recent episodic
memories start with actions that indicate goal change,
i.e., meeting people on the way into University, conversations, catching buses, walking particular routes,
and so forth. In contrast to start details, end details
are more varied and do not predominantly take the
form of actions. If, as the SMS framework proposes,
goal-processing mediates the formation of episodic
memories it seems from the present findings that commencing new actions may trigger encoding processes.
Possibly, encoding processes are terminated not by
the end details collected here but rather by the implementation of new actions, marking the start of a new
episodic memory. Finally, when retested one week later
very little was recalled and no temporal order was
present. Interestingly what little was recalled was mainly what had been written by the participants a week
earlier and they were able to distinguished between
actually remembering an event from their trip to work
the week previously and their memory for writing
about it.
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upon arrival at the University of Leeds come to our
laboratory and in a surprise free recall test, recall all
they can about what happened, including thoughts
and feelings, between leaving their home and arriving
at the laboratory. They list this information in the order in which it comes to mind. Next they go back
through their written account and divide it into discrete memories. They are given no detailed instructions
for this but are simply asked to mark it as they see it
(see Newtson, 1976, for a similar procedure used in
determining "event! boundaries). It is explained that
there are no correct or incorrect answers and we are
interested in how different people divide up this type
of information into memories. Having marked their
memories participants then indicate in what order the
remembered experiences occurred from first to last.
Two judges independently read the memory descriptions and developed a coding scheme used to classify
each of the statements in a memory description. The
coding scheme contained the following categories: action, thought, feeling, location, and fact.
A number of findings emerged from these data.
Relating to characteristic V in Table 3 comparatively
few participants listed their memories out of temporal
order. All started with their departure from home,
some then had one or two memories subsequently listed as occurring, one memory back. This is at least
some preliminary evidence that recent episodic memories are not yet order by themes, self-images, and the
knowledge structures of autobiographical memory
(see Figs. 5 and 6). Instead temporal information appears to play a prominent role, at least in the output
of these memories. Another finding relates to the
beginnings and endings of the episodes. Table 4 shows
the distribution of first (start) and last (end) memory
details in percentages judged to be in the content categories. It is clear from Table 4 that the start of memories is predominantly marked by actions whereas the
last details in these recent episodic memories take a
wide variety of forms. Other research has also found
Table 4
Classification of first and last details in episodic memories for
very recent events
Type of detaila
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Action
Fact
Thought
Feeling
Visual perception
Auditory perception
Evaluation
Position of detail
First
Last
67.00
21.58
3.46
1.29
4.78
1.52
0.38
16.28
40.07
9.02
2.97
4.21
0.30
7.90
a
Note that 24 memories had only one detail and these were
not classified.
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Memory awareness and episodic memory
1694
The experience of remembering or autonoetic consciousness has become an important area of research
arising from Tulving!s (1985) classic paper, (see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999, for review). In autobiographical remembering autonoetic consciousness occurs
when episodic memories enter consciousness (see Table
3). Within the SMS framework autonoetic consciousness
is considered to be a defining feature of the experience of
remembering (Wheeler et al., 1997). In Tulving!s (1985,
2002) memorable phrase recollective experience is a type
of "mental time travel! in which the past is experienced.
Note that, this does not necessarily entail re-experience
(cf. Roediger & McDermott, 1995), and instead what
is important is the feeling of remembering. Possibly
one of the functions of recollective experience, is to signal to the rememberer that they are in fact remembering
(Conway, 2001). That is to say that the feeling signals
the state in a experiential way. Recollective experience,
the sense of the self in the past and the episodic imagery
that accompanies that sense, indicate to the rememberer
that they are in fact remembering and not daydreaming,
fantasying, or in some other non-memory state.
Related to this possible signaling function of recollective experience we have recently had the opportunity to
study some neuropsychological patients who suffer from
a striking malfunction of autonoetic consciousness
(Moulin et al., 2005). All these patients suffer from
chronic and intense experiences of déjà vecu: the feeling
of having lived the present moment before. This can be
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False positives
Ra
F
G
R
F
G
0.75
0.88
0.15
0.09
0.10
0.03
0.57
0.17
0.21
0.50
0.21
0.33
a
R, recollective experience; F, a feeling of familiarity, and G,
a guess.
Table 6
Justifications for memory awareness responses in a recognition
memory study
Stimuli
Status
R/F
AKP
Science
Bargain
FP
FP
F
F
Plaza
FP
R
FP
R
FP
R
Edict
Modernist
Hit
Hit
F
F
Handkerchief
Hit
R
Gondola
Hit
R
Polka
Hit
R
Control
Preference
Employment
Arrival
FP
Hit
Hit
F
F
F
Fissure
Handkerchief
Hit
Hit
R
R
Gondola
Hit
R
Polka
Hit
R
Enigma
D
PR
Abode
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distinguished from the experience of déjà vu which is the
feeling of having seen something before, which we believe is more properly associated with the feeling of
familiarity or noetic consciousness (Moulin et al.,
2005). In formal testing these patients overextend recollective experience to the large number of false positive
errors that they make in standard recognition memory
tests. Table 5 shows data from one of these patients (patient AKP) and it can be seen that compared to controls
AKP has a vastly increased false positive rate and that
most of these are judged by AKP to be items for which
he has the experience of remembering.
AKP and other patients we are currently studying are
asked to justify their recognition memory responses and
describe what in their memory experience has led them
to a particular response. Table 6 lists a representative set
of the protocols from patient AKP. It can be seen from
these that AKP makes an entirely appropriate use of the
response categories (remember, familiar, and guess) and
one which is indistinguishable from that of age matched
healthy controls. It seems from this that AKP actually
experiences false positives as old items. For AKP, and
the other patients we have studied, this powerful and pervasive experience of recollection gives rise in their everyday lives to what we have termed recollective
confabulation (Moulin et al., 2005). AKP constantly confabulates "explanations,! based on his déjà vecu, of how it
is that he remembers something he cannot possibly
remember. For instance, he rejected reading the newspaper because he had read it before, claiming that he had
done so while out for an early morning walk (which was
untrue). He no longer watched television because it was
all repeats, no longer read his journals (he was a former
engineer), books or letters, because he had read them before. While walking with his wife who found a coin on the
path, he remarked that he was pleased that she had found
the coin he had put there for her to find. These and many
other examples, from the other patients too, were frequent
and highly disruptive.
AKP!s most revealing recollective confabulation occurred while he was being interviewed during a radio program. The interviewer challenged AKP to justify his claim
that he had been to the studio before and undertaken
exactly the same interview with the same interviewer. To
Justification
Just rings a bell, familiar word
I just feel I saw it, what else
can one say?
Polish is the same, it means
!beach!
Enigma Variations, it sticks
in the mind
It just seems like I remember
it. I can!t explain, except the
symmetry at presentation
Just a feeling
Its vague, I think I saw it
before
Because I haven!t got one,
I always forget it
I remember seeing this at the
beginning
Polka is Polish for female
OO
F
Hits
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Table 5
Over-extended recollective experience in patient AKP!s recognition memory performance
AKP
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I think I saw it, not remember
I think I heard it
I!m not sure, it just seem
(to be old) to me
I saw rocks opening
I thought the word is so out
of the group, the others are
posh
Almost certainly, it is a
romantic thing.
I made an association with
a polka dot. It!s a Polish word,
it means woman
FP, false positive; F, a feeling of familiarity; R, recollective
experience.
the interviewer!s incomprehension AKP then proceeded
to describe the studio, the clothes worn by the interviewer,
and the questions asked, as though they were in the past.
AKP experienced the present as the past. This over-extension of autonoetic consciousness was most evident when
he was in novel situations but also was present to some degree virtually all the time. In the recognition memory tests
it became apparent that what triggered recollective confabulations was not the presentation of the (new) word
but instead the association that AKP made to that word.
For example, in Table 6 it can be seen that in response to
the word "handkerchief! AKP claimed that when he saw
this word during the study phase he thought "I usually forget mine! and that he now recollectively experienced this
thought. But he was incorrect in that he must have made
this association at test (the word had not previously been
presented) and only at that point did he recollectively
experience it and on that basis incorrectly infer that "hand-
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support, in the healthy brain, a link to a detailed past that 1842
can be experienced as past.
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When a cue activates part of the autobiographical
knowledge base then knowledge becomes available to
evaluative control processes. These processes can either
terminate the search or initiate a new search cycle with
a cue elaborated on the basis of the preceding search.
This iterative model of memory construction, search–
evaluate–elaborate, was originally proposed by Norman
and Bobrow (1979). Subsequently it was developed further by Williams and Santos-Williams (1980), adopted
for the SMS model (Conway, 1990, 1992, 1996; Conway
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and recently extensively
expanded by Burgess and Shallice (1996). We refer to
this process as generative retrieval and contrast it with
direct retrieval (see Moscovitch, 1995, for a similar distinction). The two types of retrieval are, however, closely
related and all generative retrieval cycles end in direct
retrieval, i.e., when the cue accesses the sought-forknowledge. The only major difference between the two
is that direct retrieval does not entail iterative searches
of knowledge base as depicted in Fig. 9. In this section,
both types of retrieval are briefly considered as well as
the evaluation process or use of retrieval models.
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Generative retrieval
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Table 7 shows two protocols collected from participants reporting the contents of consciousness while
recalling specific autobiographical memories to the
cue words shown at the top of Table 7. These data
are taken from several unpublished protocol studies
and are organized in terms of pauses in the protocols
in which, typically, some information is initially reported, followed by a pause, followed by new information,
and so on until a specific memory is formed. They provide a good example of what is meant by the term
"generative retrieval! and that is why they are included
here. They also draw attention to several interesting
points. We have found in these studies of generative
retrieval that participants frequently (over 60% of trials) commenced retrieval by elaborating the cue so that
it corresponded to some aspect of their current life. In
the case of cues that name objects this often takes the
form of recalling the named object from their home or
office. It is as though the current physical environment
maps onto autobiographical knowledge in a particularly direct way. The objects in our current physical environments may have highly specific associations to
particular current goals and so to the working self.
Alternatively, it was found that the initial processing
of a cue in a cycle of generative retrieval might com-
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Constructing autobiographical memories
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kerchief! must have been a studied word (a striking instance of recollective confabulation). We believe that this
process of recollectively experiencing one!s current
thoughts and perceptions was what underlay AKP!s frequent experience of déjà vecu and pervasive recollective
confabulations, (see Moulin et al., 2005, for a review of
related patient work and Brown, 2003, for a general review of déjà vu states).
The patients reported in Moulin, Conway, Thompson,
James, and Jones (2004) had marked atrophy in the temporal lobes. However, another patient with overextended
autonoetic consciousness on formal memory tests was
known to have frontal rather than temporal lobe lesions
(Schacter, Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996).
On the basis of this and other findings Moulin et al.
(2005) suggested that circuits in the medial temporal lobes
might generate recollective experience but that conscious
experience of recollection could only enter awareness
through a route modulated by frontal (working self) control processes. In our déjà vecu patients, we argued that
the connection between control processes and a hypothesized medial temporal lobe recollective experience circuit
had become attenuated or disrupted altogether. According to the SMS account cues constantly activate autobiographical knowledge and episodic memories but the
effects of these activations are prevented from entering
consciousness by the working self as this usually would
disrupt processing and the effective pursuit of current
goals. For AKP this system of interlocked distributed networks was attenuated such that activated episodic memories were still prevented from entering conscious
awareness but their effect in triggering the recollective
experience circuit occurred unchecked and hence the pervasive state of autonoetic consciousness and persistent
experience of déjà vecu. More generally this account of
a malfunction of autonoetic consciousness is consistent
with current thinking about one possible the function of
consciousness, namely Baars!s (2002) conscious access
hypothesis. The suggestion is that consciousness serves
an integrative function and acts to temporally bind
together networks that operate nonconsciously, separately, and independently. This fits well with the idea that
when a stable pattern of activation in long-term memory
becomes linked to the working self then consciousness
of what has become available can, potentially, occur.
When the pattern of activation encompasses episodic
memories then autonoetic conscious may result with all
that entails i.e., the turning inwards of attention, the emergence of imagery, feelings, and the coming to mind of
associated knowledge and memories. Autonoetic consciousness in the SMS may then reflect the integration
of parts of the knowledge base and the working self in a
dynamic act of remembering as well as signaling to the
individual what state they are in, i.e., remembering and
not some other state. The role of episodic memories in
autobiographical remembering is key and these memories
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Fig. 9. Direct and generative retrieval.
Table 7
Schematized memory protocols
Bicycle
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Cue word
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Seaside
When did I last go to the seaside?
I just had an image of a beach in Cornwall
I!m trying to remember going there on a holiday just after I left school, before college
I remember we bought some nets, just like kids
And now I remember a rock pool and we had out nets in the water, and our trousers rolled up, and we had a bucket
too, I don!t know where that came from—(followed highly specific mainly visual descriptions of trying to catch
small fish with her friends)
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Cue Word
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I can see my own bicycle at home in the garage
I rode it a lot when I was home last year in the summer but not at Christmas because of the weather
There is a pub on the canal near us and "X! and I cycled there and it was completely packed out with people
sitting outside on the walls, everywhere—(followed by series of detailed descriptions of buying drinks, seating
arrangements, etc.)
mence with an elaboration of the cue in terms of the
organization of autobiographical knowledge, e.g.,
selection of a lifetime period or general event to
search. Table 7 shows protocols for both these types
of elaboration. Note that, on some trials there was
no generative retrieval and a memory came rapidly
and directly to mind. When generative retrieval was
present the initial elaboration of the cue was followed
by further elaborations and in most cases retrieval was
terminated when a set of vivid images (episodic memories) enter awareness. The number of elaborations in
iterative searches that were undertaken was highly variable but over 80% terminated within five elaborations
(or at least as we measured these). There are some
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Direct retrieval
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and search. One connection that can be made here is to the
clouded or categorical autobiographical memories seen in
frontal (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986) and depressed Williams (1996) patients, respectively. In these patients it
seems likely that there has been some impairment or attenuation of generative retrieval such that the whole process
terminates too early in the generative cycle. This might be
due to a failure to elaborate a cue appropriately or to some
failure of the evaluation processes. From the examples in
the literature it seems that in these disorders the former
may be more frequent then the latter (see Williams
et al., 2005, for review).
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Undoubtedly the most well-known account of an
experience of direct retrieval comes from Proust (but
see Salaman, 1970, for many other examples from literature and Berntsen, 1996, for some recent survey evidence). In Remembrance of Times Past, Proust (1925/
1981) recounts how the tastes of a madeline cake dipped
in warm tea suddenly brought to mind a whole section
of his life he had previously thought lost to recollective
experience (see Chu & Downes, 2002, for experimental
evidence). Assuming this to be true it is unusual because
the experience (or at least the way in which Proust describes it) was an opening up of a known period of his
life in a way that allowed it to change from a noetic to
an autonoetic experience of remembering. The power
of a cue to bring about this type of change from an experience of knowing to one of recollection has also been
observed in two cases of organic amnesia (Lucchelli,
Muggia, & Spinnler, 1995). In one of these, the act of
having a pacemaker fitted suddenly lead to the recovery
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searches that persist for the full 30s of the maximum
trial length never accessing specific memories and some
others that terminate in conceptual knowledge rather
than episodic memories. Finally, there were a few trials
which showed signs of "blocking.! That is some, often
conceptual, knowledge would come to mind and remain in mind with the participant claiming to be unable to progress further.
To investigate the process of generative retrieval further Haque and Conway (2001) conducted a series of
probed retrieval experiments. In this procedure participants recall specific autobiographical memories to cue
words but are presented with a probe signal at 2s, 5s, or
are allowed as long as they need to recall a memory
(30s). In response to the probe, or if they recall a memory,
whichever occurs first, they report the contents of consciousness. Haque and Conway (2001) developed a coding
scheme to classify the content of the resulting protocols.
The classes were: specific memory, autobiographical
knowledge (general events and lifetime periods), or nothing in mind (NiM), see Conway and Haque (1999), for a
full account of this classificatory scheme. Fig. 10 shows
the number of responses classified at each probe deadline,
2s, 5s, and 30s. For specific memories over 44% were
found to occur at the 2s deadline. For responses featuring
autobiographical knowledge, but not specific memories,
approximately 38% were present at the 2s deadline. At
the 5s probe specific memories increased and autobiographical knowledge decreased until at the 30s probe
deadline virtually all responses were specific memories
or retrieval failures (of which there were very few). Thus,
instances of direct retrieval are present very rapidly and
these are trials which either did not feature generative
retrieval at all or which had very few cycles of elaboration
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Fig. 10. Distributions of memory types present at different probe delays.
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Retrieval models
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In the SMS view of memory construction accessed
knowledge is evaluated by a retrieval model (a concept
similar to Norman & Bobrow!s, 1979, notion of a "memory description!). A retrieval model is a control process
of the working self and, it is hypothesized, one that
develops during infancy and childhood under the influence of socialization and cultural factors as discussed
earlier (see Wang & Conway, 2004 & Nelson & Fivush,
2004a, 2004b, for related theory). A possibility here in
terms of development is that the episodic system is functional early in development, possibly even from birth but
that the organizing conceptual knowledge and retrieval
models that modulate the whole system only develop later. The evidence indicates that infants appear to have
memories that are episodic-like (Table 3) and highly
responsive to episode-specific cues (Rovee-Collier,
1997). Neurological evidence on the slow development
of neural networks in the frontal lobes, especially over
the first 5 years of life, also suggests that processes that
might control and coordinate memory are slow to
emerge (Kolb & Wishaw, 1995). This slow emergence
perhaps allows socialization processes to shape the formation of organizing conceptual autobiographical
knowledge (cf. Nelson, 1974) and the formation of
retrieval models.
We believe that the main function of a retrieval model is to separate mental representations that are memories from those that are not. The model, thus, specifies
what classes of knowledge have to be combined for a
mental representation to be a memory. This requires at
a minimum: recollective experience, the turning of attention inwards, and emergence of certain types of knowledge into consciousness. These are the "constraints! of
the retrieval model that have to be satisfied if a mental
representation is to be experienced as a memory and
not as some other type of mental phenomenon, e.g., fantasy, day dream, imagery, thought, etc. There will, however, be other constraints that also have to be satisfied,
i.e., tasks demands for specific types of memories. These
will be particular to specific episodes of memory construction and will act to make each retrieval model unique. Thus, recalling with a friend a recent shared
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occurring in the recent past (perhaps 24 h or less) are
closely associated with current highly active and accessible goals. As these working self-goals continue to be
processed then it would seem inevitable that, by encoding specificity alone, knowledge would be processed that
formed an effective cue to recent episodic memories and
direct retrieval would then occur. Little is known about
how the current environment, internal and external,
drives direct retrieval in daily life. This is an area that
awaits investigation (but see Schank, 1982, for some
interesting examples).
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of many memories from an almost total retrograde
amnesia with the memories returning to mind in groupings, e.g., all medical memories, school memories, etc.,
over a period of days following the initial access to a
memory of having a pacemaker fitted previously. In
the second, a young man following an RTA presented
with an extremely dense retrograde amnesia, he could
not for example recognize his girlfriend, modern telephones, or any family members. Some months later
when playing tennis—he was a highly skilled amateur—he made an error with a particular stroke and
immediately recalled making the same error in a match
months previously. At that point his "tennis! memories
began to return followed by other groups of memories.
Impressive though these cases are the main two areas
in which direct retrieval is most evident are in PTSD and
for very recent experiences. Memory in PTSD has already been touched upon and it might simply be noted
here that intrusive highly detailed episodic memories often triggered by very specific cues are a major symptom
of the disorder. Ehlers et al. (2003) provide a wide range
of case studies many featuring vivid flashback recall
occurring rapidly in response to highly specific cues.
For instance, in one case a woman in a restaurant started to feel intensely anxious and have flashbacks to a
traumatic episode in which she had been assaulted. After
some time she suddenly became aware that a man on an
adjacent table had a beard that was highly similar to the
beard of her assailant. In another case a cyclist who had
been run over by a truck from behind had no memory
for his RTA. Subsequently, he was referred for treatment for dangerous (car) driving, of which he had no
prior history. He described how when driving if he
looked in his rear view mirror and saw headlights, particularly those on buses or trucks, he became anxious
and felt strongly compelled to drive as quickly as he
could until the headlights were no longer visible. The patient did not connect this compulsion with his accident.
Nevertheless, when it was pointed out to him he began
to feel that he understood his compulsive driving behavior and he began to control it: yet he never recovered his
memory of the RTA. Such nonconscious effects of direct
retrieval parallel nonconscious memory effects originally
studied in the laboratory by Jacoby and colleagues (see
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989, for review).
These sorts of cases illustrate a principle of memory
first formulated by Tulving and Thomson (1973), namely the encoding specificity principle, i.e., the idea that at
some point during retrieval some item of knowledge in
the search set must correspond to an item of knowledge
in the sought-for-knowledge in long term memory. The
term "direct retrieval! is simply a convenient synonym
for encoding specificity (see Moscovitch, 1992, for alternative terminology). By the SMS approach instances of
direct retrieval should be most frequent in recent memory because the objects, actions, feelings, and thoughts
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2129 Neuroanatomical bases of the autobiographical
2130 remembering: Two memory systems?
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Time course of activations during autobiographical
remembering
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In a series of EEG studies we have examined the time
course of activations present during retrieving (constructing) a memory and then holding that memory in
mind for a set period of time (Conway, Pleydell-Pearce,
& Whitecross, 2001; Conway et al., 2003). EEG is especially suited to tracking the evolution of activations over
what is a lengthy and variable period of retrieval for
each individual memory. The cost of this fine temporal
resolution is relatively weak topographical localization,
nevertheless as one of our main interests has been in
how the pattern of activation unfolds over time we have
focussed on EEG. In these EEG experiments participants recall memories to cue words. Changes in slow
cortical potentials (SCPs) are monitored during the
pre-retrieval period, retrieval, and while a memory is
held in mind, usually for a period of 5 s. Fig. 10 shows
averaged head plots for three epochs from each of these
three periods (areas colored red depict highly active regions and areas colored blue indicated regions that are
dysfacilitated).
The top line of Fig. 11 shows changes in SCPs during
the epochs 3, 2, and 1 s (from left to right in the Fig. 11)
prior to cue word on screen, (these head plots were modeled using several different baselines, see Conway et al.,
2001, for full details). In the pre-retrieval period activation builds in the left anterior temporal lobe, in the region of the temporal pole. The initially diffuse
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1991, for review) image generation times for common
items are on average around one second, even access to
autobiographical factual knowledge typically averages
around 1200 ms (Conway, 1987). In contrast, autobiographical memory retrieval times are highly variable and
means in the range 5–7 s are not uncommon (see Conway,
1990). Even when the cues are highly specific being taken
from the participants! own autobiographical knowledge,
mean retrieval times are in the range 2–3 s (Conway &
Bekerian, 1987a). The evidence from experiments, neuropsychology, and psychological illnesses, all point to a
lengthy construction process, involving search, evaluation and the formation of a stable pattern of activation
over autobiographical memory knowledge structures that
includes imagery. If this view is correct then we should observe the dynamic emergence over time of widely distributed patterns of brain activation during the retrieval and
formation of autobiographical memories. This is exactly
the finding of a series of neuroimaging studies of autobiographical remembering. Here I will briefly summarize
these findings and then consider a hypothesis they suggest
about the evolution of autobiographical memory. It
might be noted that very detailed reviews are also available in Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, and Sharpe
(2002), Markowitsch (1998), and Maguire (2001).
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vacation will feature a retrieval model that specifies
some constraints that are quite different from those present when the same memories are recalled in an autobiographical memory cue word experiment. Nevertheless,
on both the occasions of recall constraints common to
all retrieval models will be present, e.g., the requirement
for recollective experience, etc. Retrieval models are then
derived from a general control process and embody the
constraints specified in that process while additionally
containing constraints specific to each individual act of
memory construction.
In the formation of a specific autobiographical memory one of the major general constraints is that episodic
memories and autobiographical knowledge be brought
together. We have suggested this occurs by a cue establishing an appropriate pattern of activation in long-term
memory. A process that can occur directly with little input from the working self or which occurs generatively
and features iterative cue elaboration. In either case
the eventual mental representation must minimally satisfy the common or general constraints of the retrieval
model. Clearly, if the control process that specifies general constraints or standards for all memories were to
malfunction then other types of mental representations
could be experienced, reported, and acted upon as memories. As discussed earlier something like this appears to
occur in plausible confabulations that can emerge following brain injury to regions of the frontal lobes. One
suggestion, based on the SMS account of memory, is
that the general retrieval model control processes malfunction so that, intermittently (frontal confabulators
often have correct memories too, Baddeley & Wilson,
1986; Conway & Tacchi, 1996), parts of the conceptual
self, i.e., self-images, are experienced as memories. The
frontal lobe patients described earlier who suffered from
motivated confabulation provide some evidence of this
intrusion of pleasant or paranoid goals in the form of
self-images into retrieval models where they are experienced as memories. In summary, comparatively little is
known about the construction of memories. What evidence there is largely comes from protocol studies and
neuropsychological case studies. The investigation of
memory construction processes remains a challenge.
As we shall see in the next and final section there is
now compelling neuroimaging evidence demonstrating
that construction must indeed take place.
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One striking feature of autobiographical remembering
is that memories take a considerable amount of time to
form, relative that is to other types of knowledge access.
Access to word meaning has been found to occur in periods a few hundred milliseconds in duration (see Neely,
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activation in the frontal lobes settles into intense foci of
activation mainly in the left frontal lobe (see too Conway et al., 1999, for a similar finding using PET). In
the period 1 s prior to cue word on-screen left anterior
temporal and frontal networks are highly activated or
primed for retrieval. Note too, that at this point posterior networks are not activated but rather are dysfacilitated or, perhaps, inhibited. According to the SMS view
these patterns reflect the priming of working self-memory construction processes in the frontal networks. The
left anterior temporal activation might possibly reflect
the priming of conceptual autobiographical knowledge
that could be used in the elaboration of cues.
The cue word appears on screen (the phasic components associated with the semantic processing of the
cue word are not shown in Fig. 11) and retrieval then
commences. The middle row of Fig. 11 shows head
plots depicting changes in SCPs at a point 1 s into
retrieval (left plot), at the midpoint of retrieval which,
of course, varies with retrieval time (middle plot), and
the right side plot shows the epoch 1 s prior to a response indicating that a memory had been formed. Initially the pattern of activation contracts to foci
primarily in the left medial prefrontal cortex. However,
by the midpoint of retrieval activation has spread to
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Fig. 11. Head plots showing patterns of neurophysiological activation present at different points during the retrieval of
autobiographical memories (note that, areas colored red depict activated regions and area color blue indicate deactivated regions).
(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
posterior networks in the posterior temporal lobes
and most markedly in the occipital lobes, bilateral in
both cases but stronger in right than left occipital regions. Note this pattern was present for both slow
and fast retrieval times (see Conway et al., 2001). By
our account this reflects working self-control processes
accessing and activating episodic memories stored in
posterior networks. In the last second of retrieval,
(right plot of the middle row of Fig. 11), activation
again contracts to frontal and motor regions. This reflects a switch in activity from forming a memory to
making a manual response to indicate that a memory
is now in mind.
The bottom row in Fig. 11 shows (working from left
to right) the epoch 1 s post-retrieval (while a memory is
held in mind—the hold period), a 1 s epoch from the
midpoint of the hold period and an epoch 1 s before
the end of the hold period (4 s into holding a memory
in mind). Not shown here, but especially interesting, is
a powerful negative-going wave from frontal to posterior regions which occurred shortly after the manual response. Conway et al. (2001) termed this a Memory
Engagement Potential and proposed that it acted to reset the recently activated networks that formed the
memory which, temporarily, were set in a state of grad-
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2265 Neuroanatomy
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EGG provides good temporal resolution but relative
to fMRI and PET comparatively poor spatial resolution. Our detailed knowledge of the critical neuroanatomical
sites
that
mediate
autobiographical
remembering derives mainly from fMRI studies. However, as Conway et al. (2002) point out in an extended
evaluative review many of these studies have methodological flaws that greatly reduce the generality of their
conclusions. For instance, Conway et al. (1999) in an
early PET study of autobiographical remembering allowed only 5 s for memory retrieval. This was to ensure
retrieval of sufficient memories in the 90 s window of
scanning time. In retrospect we discovered that this simply had not been long enough and many participants
failed to form specific memories on many of the trials.
In one sense this proved to be of interest as all participants had at least attempted to form memories to each
cue word and we had, therefore, a good study of the
retrieval phase of autobiographical remembering. The
main finding of this study was very extensive left prefrontal activation which is highly consistent with the left
prefrontal activation shown in Fig. 11.
Despite methodological problems with many neuroimaging studies that aimed to investigate the neurological basis of autobiographical remembering, and the
almost complete absence of replications, there are
now numerous studies and some consensus amongst
the findings. Addis (2005) provides the most compre-
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Two memory systems? An evolutionary hypothesis
2324
Findings from neuroimaging have enriched the study
of autobiographical memory and both confirmed and
helped to develop thinking about this complicated form
of higher order cognition. Overall these findings as well
as the other findings covered in earlier sections suggest a
hypothesis concerning the evolution of memory. The
hypothesis is this: there are two memory systems one
phylogenetically older than the other. The older memory
system is episodic memory. This an image based correspondence system that has little in the way of conceptual
organization and which is mainly specialized for recent
memories. It is a system that evolved to support adaptive short-term goal processing and is cue driven. In
neuroanatomical terms it is a posterior temporo-occipital system. It is a system that would allow most species
to operate effectively in their environment day-by-day.
The more recent system is knowledge based and conceptually organized. It provides an organizing context for
episodic memory. In a sense it "sits! on top of episodic
memory and provides an access route that locates memories and set of memories in meaningful ways for the
self. It is a system in which coherence is the dominant
force and it is specialized to support long-term goals. I
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F
hensive review to date. Key regions identified in this
review are the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior thalamus, temporal pole, medial temporal lobes (MTL), retrosplenial/posterior cingulate regions, precuneus,
temporoparietal junction and cuneus. It is these areas
which in most studies have been found to be highly active during the construction of specific autobiographical memories. Exactly the type of distributed network
that could give rise to the pattern of activation we
detected in our EEG study and which is shown in
Fig. 11. Importantly, however, is what appears to be
the increasingly central role of the MTL and in particular the hippocampal formation (for recent studies, see
for example, Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Gilboa, Wincour, Grady, Hevenor, &
Moscovitch, 2004 Graham, Lee, Brett, & Patterson,
2003). One possibility here is that during retrieval hippocampal networks may act to mediate the connection
between anterior systems and posterior networks. In
the SMS model this would be a connection between
autobiographical knowledge and episodic memories.
Conway (2001) argued that fronto-temporal networks
mediate the connection of working self-processes to
the autobiographical knowledge base which itself is
distributed in temporal lobe networks, especially the
MTL. Neuroanatomically then generative retrieval
might be mediated by interlocking networks which extend from frontal, through temporal, and via MTL
and hippocampal networks, to occipital and other posterior sites, i.e., retrosplenial networks.
D
ual dysfacilitation by the switch to processing mediating
the execution of the manual response. This is perhaps
reflected in the first plot (left side) of the lowest row in
Fig. 11 which shows activation contracted to frontal
and motor regions. The middle plot in this row and final
plot both show the reestablishment of the pattern of
activation present at the midpoint of retrieval. This is
a pattern in which foci of activation are distributed
through networks in left prefrontal cortex and posterior
occipital networks. Activation was found to be strongest
in right occipital networks. Note also, that activation in
right posterior temporal regions was stronger than activation in the corresponding left posterior temporal regions. This pattern is the neurophysiological signature
of forming and holding a specific autobiographical
memory in mind. It shows the gradual interlocking of
control processes with the autobiographical memory
knowledge base and especially sensory-perceptual episodic memories which appear to be located in occipital
areas. This interlocking task took place over a period
of several seconds during which generative retrieval
operated. It is the dynamic and extended pattern of activation predicted by the SMS framework and fully reflects the neurological complexity of autobiographical
remembering.
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and the emergence of a conceptual self, both which are, 2403
arguably, uniquely human characteristics.
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Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994), Collins and Loftus (1975), Grey, Holmes, and Brewin (2001), Holmes
et al. (2004), Loewald (1980), Racsmany (2003), Robins,
Nrem, and Cheek (1999), Schuman and Rodgers (2004),
Simons and Spiers (2003), Tipper, Grison, and Kessler
(2003).
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TE
suggest that the knowledge-based system is, neuroanatomically, a prefrontal anterior-temporal system (in
which temporal pole networks are critical). In this
scheme the hippocampus might function as a major
bridge between the fronto-temporal and temporo-occipital memory systems.
This two systems memory view has some interesting
predictions. A major one is that organisms who do not
have the more recent system, or who have only an attenuated version of it, will not be able to engage in long-term
planning. Thus, many animals that appear to have something like episodic memory such as birds, dogs, and other
animals who can for example horde food and return considerable periods of time later to find that food (see Clayton, Griffiths, Emery, & Dickenson, 2001), nonetheless
cannot engage in the long term pursuit of goals. And this
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some amnesic patients often retain extensive amounts of
conceptual autobiographical knowledge while having little in the way of episodic memory (Conway & Fthenaki,
2000). Conversely in semantic dementia episodic memories exist for items of knowledge of which the patient no
longer has any conceptual knowledge (Hodges & Graham, 2001, review the growing body neuropsychological
evidence in this area).
Episodic memories that exist without conceptual
knowledge and can, perhaps, still be of value in that they
can provide information about recent goal processing. A
speculative suggestion from the SMS perspective is that
episodic memories are formed from the very earliest
points in life and act as the building blocks of conceptual
knowledge (this theory was originally proposed by Nelson, 1974). Within the SMS framework episodic memories are viewed as phylogenetically and ontogenetically
earlier than conceptual autobiographical knowledge. This
is a conjecture that runs counter to Tulving!s thinking
about the development of episodic memory (see Tulving,
2005). Tulving argues for the late phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of episodic memory and for the case
that episodic memory is a uniquely human mental ability.
The goal-driven, motivated cognition, view of human
memory expressed in the SMS framework leads to a different conclusion. Episodic memories with the characteristics listed in Table 3 represent information about
progress in short-term goal processing and this is a species-general adaptation that allows organisms to operate
in an adaptive way in their environments. Conceptual
knowledge about an individual!s life is the later evolutionary development and it allows long-term goal processing
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